net: nfs: fix buffer overflow in nfs_readlink_reply()
Subsystems (2)
PATCH 1/1 net: nfs: fix buffer overflow in nfs_readlink_reply()
From: Sebastian Josue Alba Vives <[email protected]>
nfs_readlink_reply() validates rlen only against the incoming packet length (inherited from CVE-2019-14195), but not against the destination buffer nfs_path_buff[2048]. A malicious NFS server can send a valid READLINK reply where pathlen + rlen exceeds sizeof(nfs_path_buff), overflowing the BSS buffer into adjacent memory.
The recent fix in fd6e3d34097f addressed the same overflow class in net/lwip/nfs.c but left the legacy path in net/nfs-common.c unpatched.
Add bounds checks before both memcpy calls in nfs_readlink_reply():
- relative path branch: reject if pathlen + rlen >= sizeof(nfs_path_buff)
- absolute path branch: reject if rlen >= sizeof(nfs_path_buff)
--- net/nfs-common.c | 4 ++++ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)
net/nfs-common.c +4 -0
@@ -674,11 +674,15 @@ static int nfs_readlink_reply(uchar *pkt, unsigned int len)strcat (nfs_path,"/" ); pathlen =strlen (nfs_path); +if (pathlen + rlen >=sizeof (nfs_path_buff)) +return -NFS_RPC_DROP ;memcpy (nfs_path + pathlen, (uchar *)&rpc_pkt.u.reply.data[2 + nfsv3_data_offset], rlen); nfs_path[pathlen + rlen] =0 ; }else { +if (rlen >=sizeof (nfs_path_buff)) +return -NFS_RPC_DROP ;memcpy (nfs_path, (uchar *)&rpc_pkt.u.reply.data[2 + nfsv3_data_offset], rlen);
Signature · 1 line
2.43.0
Quoted 32 lines · Sebastian Alba Vives
From: Sebastian Josue Alba Vives <[email protected]>
nfs_readlink_reply()validates rlen only against the incoming packet length (inherited from CVE-2019-14195), but not against the destination buffer nfs_path_buff[2048]. A malicious NFS server can send a valid READLINK reply where pathlen + rlen exceedssizeof(nfs_path_buff), overflowing the BSS buffer into adjacent memory.The recent fix in
fd6e3d34097faddressed the same overflow class innet/lwip/nfs.cbut left the legacy path innet/nfs-common.cunpatched.Add bounds checks before both memcpy calls in
nfs_readlink_reply():
- relative path branch: reject if pathlen + rlen >=sizeof(nfs_path_buff)
- absolute path branch: reject if rlen >=sizeof(nfs_path_buff)Fixes cf3a4f1e86 ("net: nfs: Fix CVE-2019-14195")Signed-off-by Sebastian Alba Vives <[email protected]>--- net/nfs-common.c | 4 ++++ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)net/nfs-common.c +2
-0@@ -674,11 +674,15 @@ static int nfs_readlink_reply(uchar *pkt, unsigned int len)strcat (nfs_path,"/" ); pathlen =strlen (nfs_path); +if (pathlen + rlen >=sizeof (nfs_path_buff)) +return -NFS_RPC_DROP ;
net/nfs-common.c static int nfs_readlink_reply(uchar *pkt, unsigned int len) · line 688
Quoted 10 lines
net/nfs-common.c +2
-0memcpy (nfs_path + pathlen, (uchar *)&rpc_pkt.u.reply.data[2 + nfsv3_data_offset], rlen); nfs_path[pathlen + rlen] =0 ; }else { +if (rlen >=sizeof (nfs_path_buff)) +return -NFS_RPC_DROP ;memcpy (nfs_path, (uchar *)&rpc_pkt.u.reply.data[2 + nfsv3_data_offset], rlen);
Added to my net queue, thanks!
Signature · 1 line
Jerome
Hi Jerome,
Thank you for the review and for adding the patch to your net queue!
Regarding CVE assignment: the GitHub mirror does not have Security Advisories enabled, and Tom indicated the submitter should request one. Would it be possible for you or the U-Boot project to request a CVE through your CNA channel (ARM/Linaro or otherwise)?
Thanks again.
Best regards,
Sebastián Alba Vives
Quoted 54 lines · Jerome Forissier
net/nfs-common.c static int nfs_readlink_reply(uchar *pkt, unsigned
Quoted 27 lines · Sebastian Alba Vives
From: Sebastian Josue Alba Vives <[email protected]>
nfs_readlink_reply()validates rlen only against the incoming packet length (inherited from CVE-2019-14195), but not against the destination buffer nfs_path_buff[2048]. A malicious NFS server can send a valid READLINK reply where pathlen + rlen exceedssizeof(nfs_path_buff), overflowing the BSS buffer into adjacent memory.The recent fix in
fd6e3d34097faddressed the same overflow class innet/lwip/nfs.cbut left the legacy path innet/nfs-common.cunpatched.Add bounds checks before both memcpy calls in
nfs_readlink_reply():
- relative path branch: reject if pathlen + rlen >=sizeof(nfs_path_buff)
- absolute path branch: reject if rlen >=sizeof(nfs_path_buff)Fixes cf3a4f1e86 ("net: nfs: Fix CVE-2019-14195")Signed-off-by Sebastian Alba Vives <[email protected]>--- net/nfs-common.c | 4 ++++ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)net/nfs-common.c +0
-0@@ -674,11 +674,15 @@ static int nfs_readlink_reply(uchar *pkt, unsignedint len)
net/nfs-common.c static int nfs_readlink_reply(uchar *pkt, unsigned int len)
Quoted 7 lines
net/nfs-common.c +2
-0strcat (nfs_path,"/" ); pathlen =strlen (nfs_path); +if (pathlen + rlen >=sizeof (nfs_path_buff)) +return -NFS_RPC_DROP ;memcpy (nfs_path + pathlen, (uchar *)&rpc_pkt.u.reply.data[2 +
nfsv3_data_offset],net/nfs-common.c static int nfs_readlink_reply(uchar *pkt, unsigned int len)
Quoted 7 lines
net/nfs-common.c +2
-0rlen); nfs_path[pathlen + rlen] =0 ; } else { + if (rlen >= sizeof(nfs_path_buff)) + return -NFS_RPC_DROP; memcpy(nfs_path, (uchar *)&rpc_pkt.u.reply.data[2 +
nfsv3_data_offset],net/nfs-common.c static int nfs_readlink_reply(uchar *pkt, unsigned · line 687
Quoted 1 line
net/nfs-common.c +0
-0rlen);Reviewed-by Jerome Forissier <[email protected]>Added to my net queue, thanks!
--
Jerome
Signature · 1 line
Sebastián Alba