x86/enter: Use IBRS on syscall and interrupts
Quoted 12 lines
Quoted 11 lines · Dave Hansen
Quoted 1 line · Andy Lutomirski
Do we need an
arch_prctl()to enable IBRS for user mode?Eventually, once the dust settles. I think there's a spectrum of paranoia here, that is roughly (with increasing paranoia):
1. do nothing
2. do retpoline
3. do IBRS in kernel
4. do IBRS always
Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 6 lines
I think you're asking for ~3.5.
Patches for 1-3 are out there and 4 is pretty straightforward. Doing a
arch_prctl()is still straightforward, but will be a much more niche thing than any of the other choices. Plus, with a user interface, we have to argue over the ABI for at least a month or two. ;)
I was chatting to Andrea about this, and we came to the conclusion one use might be for qemu; I was worried about (theoretically) whether userspace in a guest could read privileged data from the guest kernel by attacking the qemu process rather than by attacking the kernels.
Dave
--
Dr. David Alan Gilbert / [email protected] / Manchester, UK
Quoted 8 lines · Dr. David Alan Gilbert
Quoted 4 lines
Quoted 4 lines
Patches for 1-3 are out there and 4 is pretty straightforward. Doing a
arch_prctl()is still straightforward, but will be a much more niche thing than any of the other choices. Plus, with a user interface, we have to argue over the ABI for at least a month or two. ;)I was chatting to Andrea about this, and we came to the conclusion one use might be for qemu; I was worried about (theoretically) whether userspace in a guest could read privileged data from the guest kernel by attacking the qemu process rather than by attacking the kernels.
Theoretically, I believe it's possible. The SMEP-based mitigations are effective when crossing rings, but do not help with guest-ring0->host-ring0 or presumably guest-ring3->host-ring3.
For the same-ring things, we have the indirect branch predictor flush operation MSR (IBPB). Expect those to be posted once we have the IBRS and retpoline approaches settled.