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x86/altp2m: Add hypercall to set a range of sve bits

PATCH In review Alexandru Stefan ISAILA 3 participants 14 messages Nov 21, 2019 – Dec 13, 2019

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#0 lore raw

PATCH v3 1/2 x86/altp2m: Add hypercall to set a range of sve bits

By default the sve bits are not set.
This patch adds a new hypercall, xc_altp2m_set_supress_ve_multi(), to set a range of sve bits.
The core function, p2m_set_suppress_ve_multi(), does not brake in case of a error and it is doing a best effort for setting the bits in the given range. A check for continuation is made in order to have preemption on big ranges.

---
CC: Ian Jackson <[email protected]>
CC: Wei Liu <[email protected]>
CC: Andrew Cooper <[email protected]>
CC: George Dunlap <[email protected]>
CC: Jan Beulich <[email protected]>
CC: Julien Grall <[email protected]>
CC: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <[email protected]>
CC: Stefano Stabellini <[email protected]>
CC: "Roger Pau Monné" <[email protected]>
CC: George Dunlap <[email protected]>
CC: Razvan Cojocaru <[email protected]>
CC: Tamas K Lengyel <[email protected]>
CC: Petre Pircalabu <[email protected]>
---
Changes since V2:
- Add a new structure "xen_hvm_altp2m_suppress_ve_multi"
- Copy the gfn of the first error to the caller
- Revert xen_hvm_altp2m_suppress_ve
- Add a mechanism to save the first error.

---
 tools/libxc/include/xenctrl.h   |  4 +++
 tools/libxc/xc_altp2m.c         | 30 +++++++++++++++++
 xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c          | 13 +++++++
 xen/arch/x86/mm/p2m.c           | 60 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 xen/include/public/hvm/hvm_op.h | 14 ++++++++
 xen/include/xen/mem_access.h    |  3 ++
 6 files changed, 124 insertions(+)
tools/libxc/include/xenctrl.h +4 -0
index f4431687b3..356533e391 100644
@@ -1923,6 +1923,10 @@ int xc_altp2m_switch_to_view(xc_interface *handle, uint32_t domid,
                              uint16_t view_id);
 int xc_altp2m_set_suppress_ve(xc_interface *handle, uint32_t domid,
                               uint16_t view_id, xen_pfn_t gfn, bool sve);
+int xc_altp2m_set_supress_ve_multi(xc_interface *handle, uint32_t domid,
+                                   uint16_t view_id, xen_pfn_t first_gfn,
+                                   xen_pfn_t last_gfn, bool sve,
+                                   xen_pfn_t *error);
 int xc_altp2m_get_suppress_ve(xc_interface *handle, uint32_t domid,
                               uint16_t view_id, xen_pfn_t gfn, bool *sve);
 int xc_altp2m_set_mem_access(xc_interface *handle, uint32_t domid,
tools/libxc/xc_altp2m.c +30 -0
index 09dad0355e..03bd651a61 100644
@@ -234,6 +234,36 @@ int xc_altp2m_set_suppress_ve(xc_interface *handle, uint32_t domid,
     return rc;
 }
 
+int xc_altp2m_set_supress_ve_multi(xc_interface *handle, uint32_t domid,
+                                   uint16_t view_id, xen_pfn_t first_gfn,
+                                   xen_pfn_t last_gfn, bool sve,
+                                   xen_pfn_t *error)
+{
+    int rc;
+    DECLARE_HYPERCALL_BUFFER(xen_hvm_altp2m_op_t, arg);
+
+    arg = xc_hypercall_buffer_alloc(handle, arg, sizeof(*arg));
+    if ( arg == NULL )
+        return -1;
+
+    arg->version = HVMOP_ALTP2M_INTERFACE_VERSION;
+    arg->cmd = HVMOP_altp2m_set_suppress_ve_multi;
+    arg->domain = domid;
+    arg->u.suppress_ve_multi.view = view_id;
+    arg->u.suppress_ve_multi.first_gfn = first_gfn;
+    arg->u.suppress_ve_multi.last_gfn = last_gfn;
+    arg->u.suppress_ve_multi.suppress_ve = sve;
+
+    rc = xencall2(handle->xcall, __HYPERVISOR_hvm_op, HVMOP_altp2m,
+                  HYPERCALL_BUFFER_AS_ARG(arg));
+
+    if ( arg->u.suppress_ve_multi.first_error )
+        *error = arg->u.suppress_ve_multi.first_error;
+
+    xc_hypercall_buffer_free(handle, arg);
+    return rc;
+}
+
 int xc_altp2m_set_mem_access(xc_interface *handle, uint32_t domid,
                              uint16_t view_id, xen_pfn_t gfn,
                              xenmem_access_t access)
xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c +13 -0
index 818e705fd1..8a2d4325f9 100644
@@ -4553,6 +4553,7 @@ static int do_altp2m_op(
     case HVMOP_altp2m_destroy_p2m:
     case HVMOP_altp2m_switch_p2m:
     case HVMOP_altp2m_set_suppress_ve:
+    case HVMOP_altp2m_set_suppress_ve_multi:
     case HVMOP_altp2m_get_suppress_ve:
     case HVMOP_altp2m_set_mem_access:
     case HVMOP_altp2m_set_mem_access_multi:
@@ -4711,6 +4712,18 @@ static int do_altp2m_op(
         }
         break;
 
+    case HVMOP_altp2m_set_suppress_ve_multi:
+        if ( a.u.suppress_ve_multi.pad1 || !a.u.suppress_ve_multi.pad2 )
+            rc = -EINVAL;
+        else
+        {
+            rc = p2m_set_suppress_ve_multi(d, &a.u.suppress_ve_multi);
+
+            if ( __copy_to_guest(arg, &a, 1) )
+                rc = -EFAULT;
+        }
+        break;
+
     case HVMOP_altp2m_get_suppress_ve:
         if ( a.u.suppress_ve.pad1 || a.u.suppress_ve.pad2 )
             rc = -EINVAL;
xen/arch/x86/mm/p2m.c +60 -0

66 lines not on this page · raw message

xen/include/public/hvm/hvm_op.h +14 -0
index 353f8034d9..10ba0149f1 100644
@@ -46,6 +46,17 @@ struct xen_hvm_altp2m_suppress_ve {
     uint64_t gfn;
 };
 
+struct xen_hvm_altp2m_suppress_ve_multi {
+    uint16_t view;
+    uint8_t suppress_ve; /* Boolean type. */
+    uint8_t pad1;
+    uint32_t pad2;
+    uint64_t first_gfn;
+    uint64_t last_gfn;
+    uint64_t opaque;
+    uint64_t first_error; /* Gfn of the first error. */
+};
+
 #if __XEN_INTERFACE_VERSION__ < 0x00040900
 
 /* Set the logical level of one of a domain's PCI INTx wires. */
@@ -339,6 +350,8 @@ struct xen_hvm_altp2m_op {
 #define HVMOP_altp2m_vcpu_disable_notify  13
 /* Get the active vcpu p2m index */
 #define HVMOP_altp2m_get_p2m_idx          14
+/* Set the "Supress #VE" bit for a range of pages */
+#define HVMOP_altp2m_set_suppress_ve_multi 15
     domid_t domain;
     uint16_t pad1;
     uint32_t pad2;
@@ -353,6 +366,7 @@ struct xen_hvm_altp2m_op {
         struct xen_hvm_altp2m_change_gfn           change_gfn;
         struct xen_hvm_altp2m_set_mem_access_multi set_mem_access_multi;
         struct xen_hvm_altp2m_suppress_ve          suppress_ve;
+        struct xen_hvm_altp2m_suppress_ve_multi    suppress_ve_multi;
         struct xen_hvm_altp2m_vcpu_disable_notify  disable_notify;
         struct xen_hvm_altp2m_get_vcpu_p2m_idx     get_vcpu_p2m_idx;
         uint8_t pad[64];
xen/include/xen/mem_access.h +3 -0
index e4d24502e0..00e594a0ad 100644
@@ -75,6 +75,9 @@ long p2m_set_mem_access_multi(struct domain *d,
 int p2m_set_suppress_ve(struct domain *d, gfn_t gfn, bool suppress_ve,
                         unsigned int altp2m_idx);
 
+int p2m_set_suppress_ve_multi(struct domain *d,
+                              struct xen_hvm_altp2m_suppress_ve_multi *suppress_ve);
+
 int p2m_get_suppress_ve(struct domain *d, gfn_t gfn, bool *suppress_ve,
                         unsigned int altp2m_idx);
 
Signature · 6 lines
2.17.1

_______________________________________________
Xen-devel mailing list
[email protected]
https://lists.xenproject.org/mailman/listinfo/xen-devel
#1 lore raw

PATCH v3 2/2 x86/mm: Make use of the default access param from xc_altp2m_create_view

At this moment the default_access param from xc_altp2m_create_view is not used.

This patch assigns default_access to p2m->default_access at the time of initializing a new altp2m view.

---
CC: Jan Beulich <[email protected]>
CC: Andrew Cooper <[email protected]>
CC: Wei Liu <[email protected]>
CC: "Roger Pau Monné" <[email protected]>
CC: George Dunlap <[email protected]>
CC: Ian Jackson <[email protected]>
CC: Julien Grall <[email protected]>
CC: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <[email protected]>
CC: Stefano Stabellini <[email protected]>
CC: Razvan Cojocaru <[email protected]>
CC: Tamas K Lengyel <[email protected]>
CC: Petre Pircalabu <[email protected]>
CC: George Dunlap <[email protected]>
CC: Jun Nakajima <[email protected]>
CC: Kevin Tian <[email protected]>
---
Changes since V2:
- Drop static from xenmem_access_to_p2m_access() and declare it
in mem_access.h
- Use xenmem_access_to_p2m_access() in p2m_init_next_altp2m()
- Pull out the p2m specifics from p2m_init_altp2m_ept().

---
 xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c          |  3 ++-
 xen/arch/x86/mm/mem_access.c    |  6 +++---
 xen/arch/x86/mm/p2m-ept.c       |  6 ------
 xen/arch/x86/mm/p2m.c           | 29 +++++++++++++++++++++++++----
 xen/include/asm-x86/p2m.h       |  3 ++-
 xen/include/public/hvm/hvm_op.h |  2 --
 xen/include/xen/mem_access.h    |  4 ++++
 7 files changed, 36 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-)
xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c +2 -1
index 8a2d4325f9..82ead91cad 100644
@@ -4687,7 +4687,8 @@ static int do_altp2m_op(
     }
 
     case HVMOP_altp2m_create_p2m:
-        if ( !(rc = p2m_init_next_altp2m(d, &a.u.view.view)) )
+        if ( !(rc = p2m_init_next_altp2m(d, &a.u.view.view,
+                                         a.u.view.hvmmem_default_access)) )
             rc = __copy_to_guest(arg, &a, 1) ? -EFAULT : 0;
         break;
 
xen/arch/x86/mm/mem_access.c +3 -3
index 320b9fe621..0639056748 100644
@@ -314,9 +314,9 @@ static int set_mem_access(struct domain *d, struct p2m_domain *p2m,
     return rc;
 }
 
-static bool xenmem_access_to_p2m_access(struct p2m_domain *p2m,
-                                        xenmem_access_t xaccess,
-                                        p2m_access_t *paccess)
+bool xenmem_access_to_p2m_access(struct p2m_domain *p2m,
+                                 xenmem_access_t xaccess,
+                                 p2m_access_t *paccess)
 {
     static const p2m_access_t memaccess[] = {
 #define ACCESS(ac) [XENMEM_access_##ac] = p2m_access_##ac
xen/arch/x86/mm/p2m-ept.c +0 -6
index f06e51904a..2bdc93b689 100644
@@ -1357,13 +1357,7 @@ void p2m_init_altp2m_ept(struct domain *d, unsigned int i)
     struct p2m_domain *hostp2m = p2m_get_hostp2m(d);
     struct ept_data *ept;
 
-    p2m->default_access = hostp2m->default_access;
-    p2m->domain = hostp2m->domain;
-
-    p2m->global_logdirty = hostp2m->global_logdirty;
     p2m->ept.ad = hostp2m->ept.ad;
-    p2m->min_remapped_gfn = gfn_x(INVALID_GFN);
-    p2m->max_mapped_pfn = p2m->max_remapped_gfn = 0;
     ept = &p2m->ept;
     ept->mfn = pagetable_get_pfn(p2m_get_pagetable(p2m));
     d->arch.altp2m_eptp[i] = ept->eptp;
xen/arch/x86/mm/p2m.c +25 -4
index 2b51a7f50f..18f5b2ef29 100644
@@ -25,6 +25,7 @@
 
 #include <xen/guest_access.h> /* copy_from_guest() */
 #include <xen/iommu.h>
+#include <xen/mem_access.h>
 #include <xen/vm_event.h>
 #include <xen/event.h>
 #include <public/vm_event.h>
@@ -2533,7 +2534,8 @@ void p2m_flush_altp2m(struct domain *d)
     altp2m_list_unlock(d);
 }
 
-static int p2m_activate_altp2m(struct domain *d, unsigned int idx)
+static int p2m_activate_altp2m(struct domain *d, unsigned int idx,
+                               p2m_access_t hvmmem_default_access)
 {
     struct p2m_domain *hostp2m, *p2m;
     int rc;
@@ -2559,6 +2561,12 @@ static int p2m_activate_altp2m(struct domain *d, unsigned int idx)
         goto out;
     }
 
+    p2m->default_access = hvmmem_default_access;
+    p2m->domain = hostp2m->domain;
+    p2m->global_logdirty = hostp2m->global_logdirty;
+    p2m->min_remapped_gfn = gfn_x(INVALID_GFN);
+    p2m->max_mapped_pfn = p2m->max_remapped_gfn = 0;
+
     p2m_init_altp2m_ept(d, idx);
 
  out:
@@ -2570,6 +2578,7 @@ static int p2m_activate_altp2m(struct domain *d, unsigned int idx)
 int p2m_init_altp2m_by_id(struct domain *d, unsigned int idx)
 {
     int rc = -EINVAL;
+    struct p2m_domain *hostp2m = p2m_get_hostp2m(d);
 
     if ( idx >= MAX_ALTP2M )
         return rc;
@@ -2577,16 +2586,23 @@ int p2m_init_altp2m_by_id(struct domain *d, unsigned int idx)
     altp2m_list_lock(d);
 
     if ( d->arch.altp2m_eptp[idx] == mfn_x(INVALID_MFN) )
-        rc = p2m_activate_altp2m(d, idx);
+        rc = p2m_activate_altp2m(d, idx, hostp2m->default_access);
 
     altp2m_list_unlock(d);
     return rc;
 }
 
-int p2m_init_next_altp2m(struct domain *d, uint16_t *idx)
+int p2m_init_next_altp2m(struct domain *d, uint16_t *idx,
+                         uint16_t hvmmem_default_access)
 {
     int rc = -EINVAL;
     unsigned int i;
+    p2m_access_t a;
+    struct p2m_domain *p2m;
+
+
+    if ( hvmmem_default_access > XENMEM_access_default )
+        return rc;
 
     altp2m_list_lock(d);
 
@@ -2595,7 +2611,12 @@ int p2m_init_next_altp2m(struct domain *d, uint16_t *idx)
         if ( d->arch.altp2m_eptp[i] != mfn_x(INVALID_MFN) )
             continue;
 
-        rc = p2m_activate_altp2m(d, i);
+        p2m = d->arch.altp2m_p2m[i];
+
+        if ( !xenmem_access_to_p2m_access(p2m, hvmmem_default_access, &a) )
+            return -EINVAL;
+
+        rc = p2m_activate_altp2m(d, i, a);
 
         if ( !rc )
             *idx = i;
xen/include/asm-x86/p2m.h +2 -1
index 94285db1b4..321d5e70a8 100644
@@ -884,7 +884,8 @@ bool p2m_altp2m_get_or_propagate(struct p2m_domain *ap2m, unsigned long gfn_l,
 int p2m_init_altp2m_by_id(struct domain *d, unsigned int idx);
 
 /* Find an available alternate p2m and make it valid */
-int p2m_init_next_altp2m(struct domain *d, uint16_t *idx);
+int p2m_init_next_altp2m(struct domain *d, uint16_t *idx,
+                         uint16_t hvmmem_default_access);
 
 /* Make a specific alternate p2m invalid */
 int p2m_destroy_altp2m_by_id(struct domain *d, unsigned int idx);
xen/include/public/hvm/hvm_op.h +0 -2
index 10ba0149f1..bd44cd0f58 100644
@@ -252,8 +252,6 @@ DEFINE_XEN_GUEST_HANDLE(xen_hvm_altp2m_vcpu_disable_notify_t);
 struct xen_hvm_altp2m_view {
     /* IN/OUT variable */
     uint16_t view;
-    /* Create view only: default access type
-     * NOTE: currently ignored */
     uint16_t hvmmem_default_access; /* xenmem_access_t */
 };
 typedef struct xen_hvm_altp2m_view xen_hvm_altp2m_view_t;
xen/include/xen/mem_access.h +4 -0
index 00e594a0ad..e0ab5b2775 100644
@@ -58,6 +58,10 @@ typedef enum {
     /* NOTE: Assumed to be only 4 bits right now on x86. */
 } p2m_access_t;
 
+bool xenmem_access_to_p2m_access(struct p2m_domain *p2m,
+                                        xenmem_access_t xaccess,
+                                        p2m_access_t *paccess);
+
 /*
  * Set access type for a region of gfns.
  * If gfn == INVALID_GFN, sets the default access type.
Signature · 6 lines
2.17.1

_______________________________________________
Xen-devel mailing list
[email protected]
https://lists.xenproject.org/mailman/listinfo/xen-devel
#2 lore raw

Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH V3 2/2] x86/mm: Make use of the default access param from xc_altp2m_create_view

Quoted 5 lines · Alexandru Stefan ISAILA

Changes since V2:
- Drop static from xenmem_access_to_p2m_access() and declare it
in mem_access.h
- Use xenmem_access_to_p2m_access() in p2m_init_next_altp2m()
- Pull out the p2m specifics from p2m_init_altp2m_ept().

I guess this last point would better have been a prereq patch, but anyway.

Quoted 4 lines
xen/arch/x86/mm/p2m.c +0 -0
@@ -2577,16 +2586,23 @@ int p2m_init_altp2m_by_id(struct domain *d, unsigned int idx)
     altp2m_list_lock(d);
 
     if ( d->arch.altp2m_eptp[idx] == mfn_x(INVALID_MFN) )

xen/arch/x86/mm/p2m.c int p2m_init_altp2m_by_id(struct domain *d, unsigned int idx) · line 2596

Quoted 10 lines
xen/arch/x86/mm/p2m.c +3 -2
-        rc = p2m_activate_altp2m(d, idx);
+        rc = p2m_activate_altp2m(d, idx, hostp2m->default_access);
 
     altp2m_list_unlock(d);
     return rc;
 }
 
-int p2m_init_next_altp2m(struct domain *d, uint16_t *idx)
+int p2m_init_next_altp2m(struct domain *d, uint16_t *idx,
+                         uint16_t hvmmem_default_access)

Does this new parameter really need to be a fixed width type, rather than simply unsigned int (or even a suitable enum type if there [hopefully] is one)?

xen/arch/x86/mm/p2m.c int p2m_init_altp2m_by_id(struct domain *d, unsigned int idx) · line 2603

Quoted 7 lines
xen/arch/x86/mm/p2m.c +4 -0
 {
     int rc = -EINVAL;
     unsigned int i;
+    p2m_access_t a;
+    struct p2m_domain *p2m;
+
+

Two successive blank lines again.

xen/arch/x86/mm/p2m.c int p2m_init_next_altp2m(struct domain *d, uint16_t *idx) · line 2617

Quoted 9 lines
xen/arch/x86/mm/p2m.c +4 -1
@@ -2595,7 +2611,12 @@ int p2m_init_next_altp2m(struct domain *d, uint16_t *idx)
         if ( d->arch.altp2m_eptp[i] != mfn_x(INVALID_MFN) )
             continue;
 
-        rc = p2m_activate_altp2m(d, i);
+        p2m = d->arch.altp2m_p2m[i];
+
+        if ( !xenmem_access_to_p2m_access(p2m, hvmmem_default_access, &a) )
+            return -EINVAL;

Returning with a lock still held?

xen/include/xen/mem_access.h typedef enum { · line 63

Quoted 9 lines
xen/include/xen/mem_access.h +3 -0
@@ -58,6 +58,10 @@ typedef enum {
     /* NOTE: Assumed to be only 4 bits right now on x86. */
 } p2m_access_t;
 
+bool xenmem_access_to_p2m_access(struct p2m_domain *p2m,
+                                        xenmem_access_t xaccess,
+                                        p2m_access_t *paccess);

Indentation.

Jan

_______________________________________________
Xen-devel mailing list
[email protected]
https://lists.xenproject.org/mailman/listinfo/xen-devel

#3 lore raw

Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH V3 2/2] x86/mm: Make use of the default access param from xc_altp2m_create_view

Quoted 9 lines · Jan Beulich
Quoted 5 lines · Alexandru Stefan ISAILA

Changes since V2:
- Drop static from xenmem_access_to_p2m_access() and declare it
in mem_access.h
- Use xenmem_access_to_p2m_access() in p2m_init_next_altp2m()
- Pull out the p2m specifics from p2m_init_altp2m_ept().

I guess this last point would better have been a prereq patch, but anyway.

Should I have a prereq patch for this in the next version?

Quoted 12 lines
Quoted 12 lines
xen/arch/x86/mm/p2m.c +1 -1
@@ -2577,16 +2586,23 @@ int p2m_init_altp2m_by_id(struct domain *d, unsigned int idx)
      altp2m_list_lock(d);
 
      if ( d->arch.altp2m_eptp[idx] == mfn_x(INVALID_MFN) )
-        rc = p2m_activate_altp2m(d, idx);
+        rc = p2m_activate_altp2m(d, idx, hostp2m->default_access);
 
      altp2m_list_unlock(d);
      return rc;
  }
 
Quoted 7 lines

xen/arch/x86/mm/p2m.c int p2m_init_altp2m_by_id(struct domain *d, unsigned int idx) · line 2596

Quoted 3 lines
xen/arch/x86/mm/p2m.c +2 -1
-int p2m_init_next_altp2m(struct domain *d, uint16_t *idx)
+int p2m_init_next_altp2m(struct domain *d, uint16_t *idx,
+                         uint16_t hvmmem_default_access)

Does this new parameter really need to be a fixed width type, rather than simply unsigned int (or even a suitable enum type if there [hopefully] is one)?

I think xenmem_access_t would be a good fit here.

Quoted 10 lines

xen/arch/x86/mm/p2m.c int p2m_init_altp2m_by_id(struct domain *d, unsigned int idx) · line 2603

Quoted 8 lines
xen/arch/x86/mm/p2m.c +4 -0
  {
      int rc = -EINVAL;
      unsigned int i;
+    p2m_access_t a;
+    struct p2m_domain *p2m;
+
+

Two successive blank lines again.

I will fix that.

Quoted 5 lines
Quoted 5 lines
xen/arch/x86/mm/p2m.c +0 -0
@@ -2595,7 +2611,12 @@ int p2m_init_next_altp2m(struct domain *d, uint16_t *idx)
          if ( d->arch.altp2m_eptp[i] != mfn_x(INVALID_MFN) )
              continue;
 
Quoted 7 lines

xen/arch/x86/mm/p2m.c int p2m_init_next_altp2m(struct domain *d, uint16_t *idx) · line 2617

Quoted 5 lines
xen/arch/x86/mm/p2m.c +4 -1
-        rc = p2m_activate_altp2m(d, i);
+        p2m = d->arch.altp2m_p2m[i];
+
+        if ( !xenmem_access_to_p2m_access(p2m, hvmmem_default_access, &a) )
+            return -EINVAL;

Returning with a lock still held?

Thanks for spotting this, it definitely needs a free.

Alex
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#4 lore raw

Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH V3 2/2] x86/mm: Make use of the default access param from xc_altp2m_create_view

Quoted 8 lines · Alexandru Stefan ISAILA
Quoted 7 lines · Jan Beulich
Quoted 5 lines · Alexandru Stefan ISAILA

Changes since V2:
- Drop static from xenmem_access_to_p2m_access() and declare it
in mem_access.h
- Use xenmem_access_to_p2m_access() in p2m_init_next_altp2m()
- Pull out the p2m specifics from p2m_init_altp2m_ept().

Quoted 4 lines
Quoted 2 lines

I guess this last point would better have been a prereq patch, but anyway.

Should I have a prereq patch for this in the next version?

Well, I'm not the maintainer of this code, but if I was, I would much prefer you doing so.

Jan

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#5 lore raw
In reply to Alexandru Stefan ISAILA
Quoted 5 lines · Alexandru Stefan ISAILA

Changes since V2:
- Add a new structure "xen_hvm_altp2m_suppress_ve_multi"
- Copy the gfn of the first error to the caller
- Revert xen_hvm_altp2m_suppress_ve
- Add a mechanism to save the first error.

And I guess you want to adjust the commit message to cover this fact.

xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c static int do_altp2m_op( · line 4723

Quoted 13 lines
xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c +9 -0
@@ -4711,6 +4712,18 @@ static int do_altp2m_op(
         }
         break;
 
+    case HVMOP_altp2m_set_suppress_ve_multi:
+        if ( a.u.suppress_ve_multi.pad1 || !a.u.suppress_ve_multi.pad2 )
+            rc = -EINVAL;
+        else
+        {
+            rc = p2m_set_suppress_ve_multi(d, &a.u.suppress_ve_multi);
+
+            if ( __copy_to_guest(arg, &a, 1) )
+                rc = -EFAULT;

Do you really want to replace a possible prior error here?

Quoted 15 lines
xen/arch/x86/mm/p2m.c +9 -0
@@ -3059,6 +3059,66 @@ out:
     return rc;
 }
 
+/*
+ * Set/clear the #VE suppress bit for multiple pages.  Only available on VMX.
+ */
+int p2m_set_suppress_ve_multi(struct domain *d,
+                              struct xen_hvm_altp2m_suppress_ve_multi *sve)
+{
+    struct p2m_domain *host_p2m = p2m_get_hostp2m(d);
+    struct p2m_domain *ap2m = NULL;
+    struct p2m_domain *p2m;

xen/arch/x86/mm/p2m.c out: · line 3080

Quoted 10 lines
xen/arch/x86/mm/p2m.c +10 -0
+    uint64_t start = sve->opaque ?: sve->first_gfn;
+    int rc = 0;
+
+    if ( sve->view > 0 )
+    {
+        if ( sve->view >= MAX_ALTP2M ||
+             d->arch.altp2m_eptp[sve->view] == mfn_x(INVALID_MFN) )
+            return -EINVAL;
+
+        p2m = ap2m = d->arch.altp2m_p2m[sve->view];

These want array_index_nospec() or alike used (and the pre-existing similar uses taken care of in a separate patch).

xen/arch/x86/mm/p2m.c out: · line 3083

Quoted 3 lines
xen/arch/x86/mm/p2m.c +3 -0
+    }
+    else
+        p2m = host_p2m;

Each time I see yet another instance of this pattern appear, I wonder why this is. Use (or not) of initializers should be consistent at least within individual functions. I.e. either you initialize both ap2m and p2m in their declaration, or you do so for neither of them.

xen/arch/x86/mm/p2m.c out: · line 3090

Quoted 6 lines
xen/arch/x86/mm/p2m.c +6 -0
+    p2m_lock(host_p2m);
+
+    if ( ap2m )
+        p2m_lock(ap2m);
+
+

Please no two blank lines next to one another.

xen/arch/x86/mm/p2m.c out: · line 3091

Quoted 1 line
xen/arch/x86/mm/p2m.c +1 -0
+    while ( sve->last_gfn >= start )

There are no checks on ->last_gfn, ->first_gfn, or ->opaque. At the very least a bogus ->opaque should result in an error. I wonder though why you don't simply update ->first_gfn, omitting the need for ->opaque. All this would need is a comment in the public header clarifying that callers should expect the values to change.

Furthermore I think it would be helpful to bail on entirely out of range ->first_gfn. This being a 64-bit field, only 40 of the bits are actually usable from an architecture pov (in reality it may be even less). Otherwise you potentially invoke p2m_ept_set_entry() perhaps trillions of times just for it to return -EINVAL from its first if().

xen/arch/x86/mm/p2m.c out: · line 3102

Quoted 11 lines
xen/arch/x86/mm/p2m.c +11 -0
+    {
+        p2m_access_t a;
+        p2m_type_t t;
+        mfn_t mfn;
+
+        if ( altp2m_get_effective_entry(p2m, _gfn(start), &mfn, &t, &a, AP2MGET_query) )
+            a = p2m->default_access;
+
+        if ( p2m->set_entry(p2m, _gfn(start), mfn, PAGE_ORDER_4K, t, a,
+                            sve->suppress_ve) && !sve->first_error )
+            sve->first_error = start; /* Save the gfn from of the first error */

Drop either "from" or "of"?

xen/include/public/hvm/hvm_op.h struct xen_hvm_altp2m_suppress_ve { · line 53

Quoted 11 lines
xen/include/public/hvm/hvm_op.h +5 -0
@@ -46,6 +46,17 @@ struct xen_hvm_altp2m_suppress_ve {
     uint64_t gfn;
 };
 
+struct xen_hvm_altp2m_suppress_ve_multi {
+    uint16_t view;
+    uint8_t suppress_ve; /* Boolean type. */
+    uint8_t pad1;
+    uint32_t pad2;

Perhaps use this field to report the error code of the first error encountered?

xen/include/public/hvm/hvm_op.h struct xen_hvm_altp2m_suppress_ve { · line 56

Quoted 3 lines
xen/include/public/hvm/hvm_op.h +3 -0
+    uint64_t first_gfn;
+    uint64_t last_gfn;
+    uint64_t opaque;

Afaics there's a requirement that the caller put zero in here for the initial invocation. This should be noted in a comment.

xen/include/public/hvm/hvm_op.h struct xen_hvm_altp2m_suppress_ve { · line 57

Quoted 1 line
xen/include/public/hvm/hvm_op.h +1 -0
+    uint64_t first_error; /* Gfn of the first error. */

Actually the same appears to apply to this one.

Jan

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#6 lore raw
Quoted 9 lines · Jan Beulich
Quoted 5 lines · Alexandru Stefan ISAILA

Changes since V2:
- Add a new structure "xen_hvm_altp2m_suppress_ve_multi"
- Copy the gfn of the first error to the caller
- Revert xen_hvm_altp2m_suppress_ve
- Add a mechanism to save the first error.

And I guess you want to adjust the commit message to cover this fact.

I will update the commit message.

Quoted 5 lines
Quoted 5 lines
(quoted diff) +0 -0
@@ -4711,6 +4712,18 @@ static int do_altp2m_op(
          }
          break;
 
Quoted 11 lines

xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c static int do_altp2m_op( · line 4723

Quoted 9 lines
xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c +9 -0
+    case HVMOP_altp2m_set_suppress_ve_multi:
+        if ( a.u.suppress_ve_multi.pad1 || !a.u.suppress_ve_multi.pad2 )
+            rc = -EINVAL;
+        else
+        {
+            rc = p2m_set_suppress_ve_multi(d, &a.u.suppress_ve_multi);
+
+            if ( __copy_to_guest(arg, &a, 1) )
+                rc = -EFAULT;

Do you really want to replace a possible prior error here?

I thought about this and the only error that can be replaced here is EINVAL. A error on __copy_to_guest has a grater importance if this fails.

Quoted 21 lines
Quoted 21 lines
xen/arch/x86/mm/p2m.c +14 -0
@@ -3059,6 +3059,66 @@ out:
      return rc;
  }
 
+/*
+ * Set/clear the #VE suppress bit for multiple pages.  Only available on VMX.
+ */
+int p2m_set_suppress_ve_multi(struct domain *d,
+                              struct xen_hvm_altp2m_suppress_ve_multi *sve)
+{
+    struct p2m_domain *host_p2m = p2m_get_hostp2m(d);
+    struct p2m_domain *ap2m = NULL;
+    struct p2m_domain *p2m;
+    uint64_t start = sve->opaque ?: sve->first_gfn;
+    int rc = 0;
+
+    if ( sve->view > 0 )
+    {
Quoted 8 lines

xen/arch/x86/mm/p2m.c out: · line 3080

Quoted 5 lines
xen/arch/x86/mm/p2m.c +5 -0
+        if ( sve->view >= MAX_ALTP2M ||
+             d->arch.altp2m_eptp[sve->view] == mfn_x(INVALID_MFN) )
+            return -EINVAL;
+
+        p2m = ap2m = d->arch.altp2m_p2m[sve->view];

These want array_index_nospec() or alike used (and the pre-existing similar uses taken care of in a separate patch).

Sure, this can change to p2m = ap2m = d->arch.altp2m_p2m[array_index_nospec(sve->view, MAX_ALTP2M).

But what preexisting uses are you talking about? All the places where d->arch.altp2m_p2m[idx] is used? If so, there will be a handful of changes in that new patch.

Quoted 10 lines

xen/arch/x86/mm/p2m.c out: · line 3083

Quoted 4 lines
xen/arch/x86/mm/p2m.c +3 -0
+    }
+    else
+        p2m = host_p2m;

Each time I see yet another instance of this pattern appear, I wonder why this is. Use (or not) of initializers should be consistent at least within individual functions. I.e. either you initialize both ap2m and p2m in their declaration, or you do so for neither of them.

The only reason I can see for this pattern is that p2m will be assigned a value but ap2m can never get a value. But I agree with you and I will have them both initialized with NULL.

Quoted 10 lines

xen/arch/x86/mm/p2m.c out: · line 3090

Quoted 7 lines
xen/arch/x86/mm/p2m.c +6 -0
+    p2m_lock(host_p2m);
+
+    if ( ap2m )
+        p2m_lock(ap2m);
+
+

Please no two blank lines next to one another.

Quoted 8 lines

xen/arch/x86/mm/p2m.c out: · line 3091

Quoted 1 line
xen/arch/x86/mm/p2m.c +1 -0
+    while ( sve->last_gfn >= start )

There are no checks on ->last_gfn, ->first_gfn, or ->opaque. At the very least a bogus ->opaque should result in an error. I wonder though why you don't simply update ->first_gfn, omitting the need for ->opaque. All this would need is a comment in the public header clarifying that callers should expect the values to change.

I was following the pattern from range_share() after Tamas requested the opaque field. I agree that it would be simpler to have ->first_gfn update and I can change to that in the next version.

Quoted 7 lines

Furthermore I think it would be helpful to bail on entirely out of range ->first_gfn. This being a 64-bit field, only 40 of the bits are actually usable from an architecture pov (in reality it may be even less). Otherwise you potentially invoke p2m_ept_set_entry() perhaps trillions of times just for it to return -EINVAL from its first if().

Do you mean to check ->first_gfn(that will be updated in the next version) against domain_get_maximum_gpfn() and bail after that range?

Quoted 21 lines

xen/arch/x86/mm/p2m.c out: · line 3102

Quoted 12 lines
xen/arch/x86/mm/p2m.c +11 -0
+    {
+        p2m_access_t a;
+        p2m_type_t t;
+        mfn_t mfn;
+
+        if ( altp2m_get_effective_entry(p2m, _gfn(start), &mfn, &t, &a, AP2MGET_query) )
+            a = p2m->default_access;
+
+        if ( p2m->set_entry(p2m, _gfn(start), mfn, PAGE_ORDER_4K, t, a,
+                            sve->suppress_ve) && !sve->first_error )
+            sve->first_error = start; /* Save the gfn from of the first error */

Drop either "from" or "of"?

Quoted 6 lines
xen/include/public/hvm/hvm_op.h +0 -0
@@ -46,6 +46,17 @@ struct xen_hvm_altp2m_suppress_ve {
      uint64_t gfn;
  };
 
Quoted 8 lines

xen/include/public/hvm/hvm_op.h struct xen_hvm_altp2m_suppress_ve { · line 53

Quoted 5 lines
xen/include/public/hvm/hvm_op.h +5 -0
+struct xen_hvm_altp2m_suppress_ve_multi {
+    uint16_t view;
+    uint8_t suppress_ve; /* Boolean type. */
+    uint8_t pad1;
+    uint32_t pad2;

Perhaps use this field to report the error code of the first error encountered?

That sound good.

Quoted 11 lines

xen/include/public/hvm/hvm_op.h struct xen_hvm_altp2m_suppress_ve { · line 56

Quoted 4 lines
xen/include/public/hvm/hvm_op.h +3 -0
+    uint64_t first_gfn;
+    uint64_t last_gfn;
+    uint64_t opaque;

Afaics there's a requirement that the caller put zero in here for the initial invocation. This should be noted in a comment.

xen/include/public/hvm/hvm_op.h struct xen_hvm_altp2m_suppress_ve { · line 57

Quoted 1 line
xen/include/public/hvm/hvm_op.h +1 -0
+    uint64_t first_error; /* Gfn of the first error. */

Actually the same appears to apply to this one.

I will update the comments.

Thanks,
Alex
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#7 lore raw
Quoted 18 lines · Alexandru Stefan ISAILA
Quoted 5 lines · Jan Beulich
Quoted 4 lines · Alexandru Stefan ISAILA
(quoted diff) +0 -0
@@ -4711,6 +4712,18 @@ static int do_altp2m_op(
          }
          break;
 
Quoted 11 lines

xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c static int do_altp2m_op( · line 4723

Quoted 9 lines
xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c +9 -0
+    case HVMOP_altp2m_set_suppress_ve_multi:
+        if ( a.u.suppress_ve_multi.pad1 || !a.u.suppress_ve_multi.pad2 )
+            rc = -EINVAL;
+        else
+        {
+            rc = p2m_set_suppress_ve_multi(d, &a.u.suppress_ve_multi);
+
+            if ( __copy_to_guest(arg, &a, 1) )
+                rc = -EFAULT;

Do you really want to replace a possible prior error here?

Quoted 2 lines

I thought about this and the only error that can be replaced here is EINVAL. A error on __copy_to_guest has a grater importance if this fails.

I'm afraid I don't understand the reference to EINVAL.

As to "greater importance" - I'm not sure I follow. Please take a look at e.g. do_event_channel_op(), but there are numerous other examples throughout the tree. The pattern there is a common on, and what you do here doesn't match that.

Quoted 29 lines
Quoted 20 lines
Quoted 20 lines
xen/arch/x86/mm/p2m.c +14 -0
@@ -3059,6 +3059,66 @@ out:
      return rc;
  }
 
+/*
+ * Set/clear the #VE suppress bit for multiple pages.  Only available on VMX.
+ */
+int p2m_set_suppress_ve_multi(struct domain *d,
+                              struct xen_hvm_altp2m_suppress_ve_multi *sve)
+{
+    struct p2m_domain *host_p2m = p2m_get_hostp2m(d);
+    struct p2m_domain *ap2m = NULL;
+    struct p2m_domain *p2m;
+    uint64_t start = sve->opaque ?: sve->first_gfn;
+    int rc = 0;
+
+    if ( sve->view > 0 )
+    {
Quoted 8 lines

xen/arch/x86/mm/p2m.c out: · line 3080

Quoted 5 lines
xen/arch/x86/mm/p2m.c +5 -0
+        if ( sve->view >= MAX_ALTP2M ||
+             d->arch.altp2m_eptp[sve->view] == mfn_x(INVALID_MFN) )
+            return -EINVAL;
+
+        p2m = ap2m = d->arch.altp2m_p2m[sve->view];

These want array_index_nospec() or alike used (and the pre-existing similar uses taken care of in a separate patch).

Quoted 6 lines

Sure, this can change to p2m = ap2m = d->arch.altp2m_p2m[array_index_nospec(sve->view, MAX_ALTP2M).

But what preexisting uses are you talking about? All the places where d->arch.altp2m_p2m[idx] is used? If so, there will be a handful of changes in that new patch.

Indeed, all the places where a caller (i.e. potentially guest) provided value gets used as array index.

Quoted 11 lines
Quoted 10 lines

xen/arch/x86/mm/p2m.c out: · line 3083

Quoted 4 lines
xen/arch/x86/mm/p2m.c +3 -0
+    }
+    else
+        p2m = host_p2m;

Each time I see yet another instance of this pattern appear, I wonder why this is. Use (or not) of initializers should be consistent at least within individual functions. I.e. either you initialize both ap2m and p2m in their declaration, or you do so for neither of them.

Quoted 3 lines

The only reason I can see for this pattern is that p2m will be assigned a value but ap2m can never get a value. But I agree with you and I will have them both initialized with NULL.

Why NULL? This isn't what I had in mind. Quite clearly you would initialize p2m from host_p2m, eliminating the need for the "else" altogether.

Quoted 20 lines
Quoted 8 lines

xen/arch/x86/mm/p2m.c out: · line 3091

Quoted 1 line
xen/arch/x86/mm/p2m.c +1 -0
+    while ( sve->last_gfn >= start )

There are no checks on ->last_gfn, ->first_gfn, or ->opaque. At the very least a bogus ->opaque should result in an error. I wonder though why you don't simply update ->first_gfn, omitting the need for ->opaque. All this would need is a comment in the public header clarifying that callers should expect the values to change.

I was following the pattern from range_share() after Tamas requested the opaque field. I agree that it would be simpler to have ->first_gfn update and I can change to that in the next version.

Quoted 6 lines

Furthermore I think it would be helpful to bail on entirely out of range ->first_gfn. This being a 64-bit field, only 40 of the bits are actually usable from an architecture pov (in reality it may be even less). Otherwise you potentially invoke p2m_ept_set_entry() perhaps trillions of times just for it to return -EINVAL from its first if().

Quoted 2 lines

Do you mean to check ->first_gfn(that will be updated in the next version) against domain_get_maximum_gpfn() and bail after that range?

This may be one possibility (depending on what the inteneded behavior for GFNs above this value is). Another would be to simply judge from the guest's CPUID setting for the number of physical address bits.

Jan

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#8 lore raw
Quoted 22 lines · Jan Beulich
Quoted 18 lines · Alexandru Stefan ISAILA
Quoted 5 lines · Jan Beulich
Quoted 4 lines · Alexandru Stefan ISAILA
(quoted diff) +0 -0
@@ -4711,6 +4712,18 @@ static int do_altp2m_op(
           }
           break;
 
Quoted 11 lines

xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c static int do_altp2m_op( · line 4723

Quoted 9 lines
xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c +9 -0
+    case HVMOP_altp2m_set_suppress_ve_multi:
+        if ( a.u.suppress_ve_multi.pad1 || !a.u.suppress_ve_multi.pad2 )
+            rc = -EINVAL;
+        else
+        {
+            rc = p2m_set_suppress_ve_multi(d, &a.u.suppress_ve_multi);
+
+            if ( __copy_to_guest(arg, &a, 1) )
+                rc = -EFAULT;

Do you really want to replace a possible prior error here?

Quoted 2 lines

I thought about this and the only error that can be replaced here is EINVAL. A error on __copy_to_guest has a grater importance if this fails.

Quoted 6 lines

I'm afraid I don't understand the reference to EINVAL.

As to "greater importance" - I'm not sure I follow. Please take a look at e.g. do_event_channel_op(), but there are numerous other examples throughout the tree. The pattern there is a common on, and what you do here doesn't match that.

I will follow that pattern.

Quoted 21 lines
Quoted 21 lines
Quoted 9 lines

xen/arch/x86/mm/p2m.c out: · line 3091

Quoted 2 lines
xen/arch/x86/mm/p2m.c +1 -0
+    while ( sve->last_gfn >= start )

There are no checks on ->last_gfn, ->first_gfn, or ->opaque. At the very least a bogus ->opaque should result in an error. I wonder though why you don't simply update ->first_gfn, omitting the need for ->opaque. All this would need is a comment in the public header clarifying that callers should expect the values to change.

I was following the pattern from range_share() after Tamas requested the opaque field. I agree that it would be simpler to have ->first_gfn update and I can change to that in the next version.

Quoted 6 lines

Furthermore I think it would be helpful to bail on entirely out of range ->first_gfn. This being a 64-bit field, only 40 of the bits are actually usable from an architecture pov (in reality it may be even less). Otherwise you potentially invoke p2m_ept_set_entry() perhaps trillions of times just for it to return -EINVAL from its first if().

Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 2 lines

Do you mean to check ->first_gfn(that will be updated in the next version) against domain_get_maximum_gpfn() and bail after that range?

This may be one possibility (depending on what the inteneded behavior for GFNs above this value is). Another would be to simply judge from the guest's CPUID setting for the number of physical address bits.

I will check ->first_gfn against d->arch.cpuid->extd.maxphysaddr and bail out on out of range.

Thanks,
Alex
_______________________________________________
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#9 lore raw
In reply to Jan Beulich
Quoted 22 lines · Jan Beulich
Quoted 18 lines · Alexandru Stefan ISAILA
Quoted 5 lines · Jan Beulich
Quoted 4 lines · Alexandru Stefan ISAILA
(quoted diff) +0 -0
@@ -4711,6 +4712,18 @@ static int do_altp2m_op(
           }
           break;
 
Quoted 11 lines

xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c static int do_altp2m_op( · line 4723

Quoted 9 lines
xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c +9 -0
+    case HVMOP_altp2m_set_suppress_ve_multi:
+        if ( a.u.suppress_ve_multi.pad1 || !a.u.suppress_ve_multi.pad2 )
+            rc = -EINVAL;
+        else
+        {
+            rc = p2m_set_suppress_ve_multi(d, &a.u.suppress_ve_multi);
+
+            if ( __copy_to_guest(arg, &a, 1) )
+                rc = -EFAULT;

Do you really want to replace a possible prior error here?

Quoted 2 lines

I thought about this and the only error that can be replaced here is EINVAL. A error on __copy_to_guest has a grater importance if this fails.

Quoted 6 lines

I'm afraid I don't understand the reference to EINVAL.

As to "greater importance" - I'm not sure I follow. Please take a look at e.g. do_event_channel_op(), but there are numerous other examples throughout the tree. The pattern there is a common on, and what you do here doesn't match that.

I will follow that pattern.

Quoted 21 lines
Quoted 21 lines
Quoted 9 lines

xen/arch/x86/mm/p2m.c out: · line 3091

Quoted 2 lines
xen/arch/x86/mm/p2m.c +1 -0
+    while ( sve->last_gfn >= start )

There are no checks on ->last_gfn, ->first_gfn, or ->opaque. At the very least a bogus ->opaque should result in an error. I wonder though why you don't simply update ->first_gfn, omitting the need for ->opaque. All this would need is a comment in the public header clarifying that callers should expect the values to change.

I was following the pattern from range_share() after Tamas requested the opaque field. I agree that it would be simpler to have ->first_gfn update and I can change to that in the next version.

Quoted 6 lines

Furthermore I think it would be helpful to bail on entirely out of range ->first_gfn. This being a 64-bit field, only 40 of the bits are actually usable from an architecture pov (in reality it may be even less). Otherwise you potentially invoke p2m_ept_set_entry() perhaps trillions of times just for it to return -EINVAL from its first if().

Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 2 lines

Do you mean to check ->first_gfn(that will be updated in the next version) against domain_get_maximum_gpfn() and bail after that range?

This may be one possibility (depending on what the inteneded behavior for GFNs above this value is). Another would be to simply judge from the guest's CPUID setting for the number of physical address bits.

I will check ->first_gfn against d->arch.cpuid->extd.maxphysaddr and bail out on out of range.

Thanks,
Alex
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#10 lore raw
In reply to Alexandru Stefan ISAILA
Quoted 9 lines · Alexandru Stefan ISAILA

By default the sve bits are not set.
This patch adds a new hypercall, xc_altp2m_set_supress_ve_multi(), to set a range of sve bits.
The core function, p2m_set_suppress_ve_multi(), does not brake in case of a error and it is doing a best effort for setting the bits in the given range. A check for continuation is made in order to have preemption on big ranges.

There's something strangely deformed in your mail that makes it hard for me to apply the patches to my tree, and I'm not sure why.

It seems the core mail is base64-encrypted; and that *inside* that base64 encryption is a bunch of Windows-style linefeeds. The result is that when I try to download your series and apply it with git-am, I get loads of rejected hunks with "^M" at the end of them.

Sometimes I've been able to work around this by going on patchew.org/Xen and getting an mbox from there; but it doesn't seem to have your series (perhaps because it doesn't have a cover letter).

Looking at the headers, it seems this is coming from git itself. Do you perhaps have "transferEncoding" set to "base64"? If so, chance you could try setting it to 'auto', and setting 'assume8bitEncoding = true"?

Not sure why this is such a pain; it seems like this should have been sorted out somehow by now.

-George

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#11 lore raw
Quoted 19 lines · George Dunlap
Quoted 9 lines · Alexandru Stefan ISAILA

By default the sve bits are not set.
This patch adds a new hypercall, xc_altp2m_set_supress_ve_multi(), to set a range of sve bits.
The core function, p2m_set_suppress_ve_multi(), does not brake in case of a error and it is doing a best effort for setting the bits in the given range. A check for continuation is made in order to have preemption on big ranges.

There's something strangely deformed in your mail that makes it hard for me to apply the patches to my tree, and I'm not sure why.

It seems the core mail is base64-encrypted; and that *inside* that base64 encryption is a bunch of Windows-style linefeeds. The result is that when I try to download your series and apply it with git-am, I get loads of rejected hunks with "^M" at the end of them.

Quoted 7 lines

Sometimes I've been able to work around this by going on patchew.org/Xen and getting an mbox from there; but it doesn't seem to have your series (perhaps because it doesn't have a cover letter).

Looking at the headers, it seems this is coming from git itself. Do you perhaps have "transferEncoding" set to "base64"? If so, chance you could try setting it to 'auto', and setting 'assume8bitEncoding = true"?

I didn't have anything set for transferEncoding in .gitconfig but I can set
assume8bitEncoding = yes
transferEncoding = 8bit

for the future.

Sorry for the inconvenience.

Alex
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#12 lore raw
Quoted 30 lines · Alexandru Stefan ISAILA
Quoted 19 lines · George Dunlap
Quoted 9 lines · Alexandru Stefan ISAILA

By default the sve bits are not set.
This patch adds a new hypercall, xc_altp2m_set_supress_ve_multi(), to set a range of sve bits.
The core function, p2m_set_suppress_ve_multi(), does not brake in case of a error and it is doing a best effort for setting the bits in the given range. A check for continuation is made in order to have preemption on big ranges.

There's something strangely deformed in your mail that makes it hard for me to apply the patches to my tree, and I'm not sure why.

It seems the core mail is base64-encrypted; and that *inside* that base64 encryption is a bunch of Windows-style linefeeds. The result is that when I try to download your series and apply it with git-am, I get loads of rejected hunks with "^M" at the end of them.

Quoted 7 lines

Sometimes I've been able to work around this by going on patchew.org/Xen and getting an mbox from there; but it doesn't seem to have your series (perhaps because it doesn't have a cover letter).

Looking at the headers, it seems this is coming from git itself. Do you perhaps have "transferEncoding" set to "base64"? If so, chance you could try setting it to 'auto', and setting 'assume8bitEncoding = true"?

Quoted 7 lines

I didn't have anything set for transferEncoding in .gitconfig but I can set
assume8bitEncoding = yes
transferEncoding = 8bit

for the future.

Sorry for the inconvenience.

Well, I'm also sorry that I'm having trouble on my end. :-) You'd think that you doing "git send-email" and me doing "git am" would Just Work(tm), and it's frustrating that it doesn't. *Hopefully* those changes will make it work; otherwise we'll have to figure out something else.

-George

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#13 lore raw
Quoted 37 lines · George Dunlap
Quoted 36 lines · Alexandru Stefan ISAILA
Quoted 19 lines · George Dunlap
Quoted 9 lines · Alexandru Stefan ISAILA

By default the sve bits are not set.
This patch adds a new hypercall, xc_altp2m_set_supress_ve_multi(), to set a range of sve bits.
The core function, p2m_set_suppress_ve_multi(), does not brake in case of a error and it is doing a best effort for setting the bits in the given range. A check for continuation is made in order to have preemption on big ranges.

There's something strangely deformed in your mail that makes it hard for me to apply the patches to my tree, and I'm not sure why.

It seems the core mail is base64-encrypted; and that *inside* that base64 encryption is a bunch of Windows-style linefeeds. The result is that when I try to download your series and apply it with git-am, I get loads of rejected hunks with "^M" at the end of them.

Quoted 7 lines

Sometimes I've been able to work around this by going on patchew.org/Xen and getting an mbox from there; but it doesn't seem to have your series (perhaps because it doesn't have a cover letter).

Looking at the headers, it seems this is coming from git itself. Do you perhaps have "transferEncoding" set to "base64"? If so, chance you could try setting it to 'auto', and setting 'assume8bitEncoding = true"?

I didn't have anything set for transferEncoding in .gitconfig but I can set
assume8bitEncoding = yes
transferEncoding = 8bit

for the future.

Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 1 line

Sorry for the inconvenience.

Well, I'm also sorry that I'm having trouble on my end. :-) You'd think that you doing "git send-email" and me doing "git am" would Just Work(tm), and it's frustrating that it doesn't. *Hopefully* those changes will make it work; otherwise we'll have to figure out something else.

We have to solve this somehow so on the next ver. please let me know if everything is ok.

Alex
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