4.19.19-stable review
Subsystems (5)
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainercover 4.19.19-stable review
This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 4.19.19 release. There are 103 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please let me know.
Responses should be made by Thu Jan 31 11:31:30 UTC 2019. Anything received after that time might be too late.
The whole patch series can be found in one patch at:
https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v4.x/stable-review/patch-4.19.19-rc1.gz
or in the git tree and branch at:
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.git linux-4.19.y
and the diffstat can be found below.
thanks,
greg k-h
-------------
Pseudo-Shortlog of commits:
Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
Linux 4.19.19-rc1
Christoph Hellwig <[email protected]>
ide: fix a typo in the settings proc file name
Jack Pham <[email protected]>
usb: dwc3: gadget: Clear req->needs_extra_trb flag on cleanup
Michal Hocko <[email protected]>
Revert "mm, memory_hotplug: initialize struct pages for the full memory section"
Raju Rangoju <[email protected]>
nvmet-rdma: fix null dereference under heavy load
Israel Rukshin <[email protected]>
nvmet-rdma: Add unlikely for response allocated check
David Hildenbrand <[email protected]>
s390/smp: Fix calling smp_call_ipl_cpu() from ipl CPU
Daniel Borkmann <[email protected]>
bpf: fix inner map masking to prevent oob under speculation
Daniel Borkmann <[email protected]>
bpf: fix sanitation of alu op with pointer / scalar type from different paths
Daniel Borkmann <[email protected]>
bpf: prevent out of bounds speculation on pointer arithmetic
Daniel Borkmann <[email protected]>
bpf: fix check_map_access smin_value test when pointer contains offset
Daniel Borkmann <[email protected]>
bpf: restrict unknown scalars of mixed signed bounds for unprivileged
Daniel Borkmann <[email protected]>
bpf: restrict stack pointer arithmetic for unprivileged
Daniel Borkmann <[email protected]>
bpf: restrict map value pointer arithmetic for unprivileged
Daniel Borkmann <[email protected]>
bpf: enable access to ax register also from verifier rewrite
Daniel Borkmann <[email protected]>
bpf: move tmp variable into ax register in interpreter
Daniel Borkmann <[email protected]>
bpf: move {prev_,}insn_idx into verifier env
Alexei Starovoitov <[email protected]>
bpf: add per-insn complexity limit
Alexei Starovoitov <[email protected]>
bpf: improve verifier branch analysis
Neil Armstrong <[email protected]>
drm/meson: Fix atomic mode switching regression
Nicolas Pitre <[email protected]>
vt: invoke notifier on screen size change
Nicolas Pitre <[email protected]>
vt: always call notifier with the console lock held
Nicolas Pitre <[email protected]>
vt: make vt_console_print() compatible with the unicode screen buffer
Uwe Kleine-König <[email protected]>
can: flexcan: fix NULL pointer exception during bringup
Oliver Hartkopp <[email protected]>
can: bcm: check timer values before ktime conversion
Manfred Schlaegl <[email protected]>
can: dev: __can_get_echo_skb(): fix bogous check for non-existing skb by removing it
Marc Zyngier <[email protected]>
irqchip/gic-v3-its: Align PCI Multi-MSI allocation on their size
Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
net: sun: cassini: Cleanup license conflict
Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
posix-cpu-timers: Unbreak timer rearming
Jan Beulich <[email protected]>
x86/entry/64/compat: Fix stack switching for XEN PV
Daniel Drake <[email protected]>
x86/kaslr: Fix incorrect i8254 outb() parameters
Dave Hansen <[email protected]>
x86/selftests/pkeys: Fork() to check for state being preserved
Dave Hansen <[email protected]>
x86/pkeys: Properly copy pkey state at fork()
KarimAllah Ahmed <[email protected]>
KVM/nVMX: Do not validate that posted_intr_desc_addr is page aligned
Tom Roeder <[email protected]>
kvm: x86/vmx: Use kzalloc for cached_vmcs12
Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>
KVM: x86: WARN_ONCE if sending a PV IPI returns a fatal error
Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>
KVM: x86: Fix PV IPIs for 32-bit KVM host
Alexander Popov <[email protected]>
KVM: x86: Fix single-step debugging
Alex Deucher <[email protected]>
drm/amdgpu: Add APTX quirk for Lenovo laptop
Milan Broz <[email protected]>
dm crypt: fix parsing of extended IV arguments
Joe Thornber <[email protected]>
dm thin: fix passdown_double_checking_shared_status()
Marc Gonzalez <[email protected]>
scsi: ufs: Use explicit access size in ufshcd_dump_regs
Dan Williams <[email protected]>
acpi/nfit: Fix command-supported detection
Dan Williams <[email protected]>
acpi/nfit: Block function zero DSMs
Dmitry Torokhov <[email protected]>
Input: uinput - fix undefined behavior in uinput_validate_absinfo()
Deepa Dinamani <[email protected]>
Input: input_event - provide override for sparc64
Tom Panfil <[email protected]>
Input: xpad - add support for SteelSeries Stratus Duo
Ronnie Sahlberg <[email protected]>
smb3: add credits we receive from oplock/break PDUs
Pavel Shilovsky <[email protected]>
CIFS: Do not reconnect TCP session in add_credits()
Pavel Shilovsky <[email protected]>
CIFS: Fix credit calculation for encrypted reads with errors
Pavel Shilovsky <[email protected]>
CIFS: Fix credits calculations for reads with errors
Pavel Shilovsky <[email protected]>
CIFS: Fix possible hang during async MTU reads and writes
Nicolas Pitre <[email protected]>
vgacon: unconfuse vc_origin when using soft scrollback
Dexuan Cui <[email protected]>
Drivers: hv: vmbus: Check for ring when getting debug info
Vitaly Kuznetsov <[email protected]>
hv_balloon: avoid touching uninitialized struct page during tail onlining
Paul Fulghum <[email protected]>
tty/n_hdlc: fix __might_sleep warning
Samir Virmani <[email protected]>
uart: Fix crash in uart_write and uart_put_char
Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
tty: Handle problem if line discipline does not have receive_buf
Michael Straube <[email protected]>
staging: rtl8188eu: Add device code for D-Link DWA-121 rev B1
Remi Pommarel <[email protected]>
mmc: meson-gx: Free irq in release() callback
Liming Sun <[email protected]>
mmc: dw_mmc-bluefield: : Fix the license information
Gustavo A. R. Silva <[email protected]>
char/mwave: fix potential Spectre v1 vulnerability
Gustavo A. R. Silva <[email protected]>
misc: ibmvsm: Fix potential NULL pointer dereference
Gerald Schaefer <[email protected]>
s390/smp: fix CPU hotplug deadlock with CPU rescan
Christian Borntraeger <[email protected]>
s390/early: improve machine detection
Martin Schwidefsky <[email protected]>
s390/mm: always force a load of the primary ASCE on context switch
Eugeniy Paltsev <[email protected]>
ARC: perf: map generic branches to correct hardware condition
Eugeniy Paltsev <[email protected]>
ARC: adjust memblock_reserve of kernel memory
Eugeniy Paltsev <[email protected]>
ARCv2: lib: memeset: fix doing prefetchw outside of buffer
Anthony Wong <[email protected]>
ALSA: hda - Add mute LED support for HP ProBook 470 G5
Kailang Yang <[email protected]>
ALSA: hda/realtek - Fix typo for ALC225 model
Tetsuo Handa <[email protected]>
inotify: Fix fd refcount leak in inotify_add_watch().
Dinh Nguyen <[email protected]>
clk: socfpga: stratix10: fix naming convention for the fixed-clocks
Dinh Nguyen <[email protected]>
clk: socfpga: stratix10: fix rate calculation for pll clocks
b-ak <[email protected]>
ASoC: tlv320aic32x4: Kernel OOPS while entering DAPM standby mode
Gustavo A. R. Silva <[email protected]>
ASoC: rt5514-spi: Fix potential NULL pointer dereference
Kangjie Lu <[email protected]>
ASoC: atom: fix a missing check of snd_pcm_lib_malloc_pages
Yan, Zheng <[email protected]>
ceph: clear inode pointer when snap realm gets dropped by its inode
Charles Yeh <[email protected]>
USB: serial: pl2303: add new PID to support PL2303TB
Max Schulze <[email protected]>
USB: serial: simple: add Motorola Tetra TPG2200 device id
Christian Lamparter <[email protected]>
USB: leds: fix regression in usbport led trigger
Tomas Winkler <[email protected]>
mei: me: add denverton innovation engine device IDs
Alexander Usyskin <[email protected]>
mei: me: mark LBG devices as having dma support
Willem de Bruijn <[email protected]>
tcp: allow MSG_ZEROCOPY transmission also in CLOSE_WAIT state
Hangbin Liu <[email protected]>
ip6_gre: update version related info when changing link
Andrew Lunn <[email protected]>
net: phy: marvell: Fix deadlock from wrong locking
Xin Long <[email protected]>
erspan: build the header with the right proto according to erspan_ver
Olivier Matz <[email protected]>
ip6_gre: fix tunnel list corruption for x-netns
Willem de Bruijn <[email protected]>
udp: with udp_segment release on error path
Ivan Vecera <[email protected]>
net/sched: cls_flower: allocate mask dynamically in fl_change()
Ido Schimmel <[email protected]>
mlxsw: pci: Ring CQ's doorbell before RDQ's
Nir Dotan <[email protected]>
mlxsw: spectrum_fid: Update dummy FID index
Ido Schimmel <[email protected]>
net: ipv4: Fix memory leak in network namespace dismantle
Nir Dotan <[email protected]>
mlxsw: pci: Increase PCI SW reset timeout
Jason Wang <[email protected]>
vhost: log dirty page correctly
Ross Lagerwall <[email protected]>
openvswitch: Avoid OOB read when parsing flow nlattrs
Cong Wang <[email protected]>
net_sched: refetch skb protocol for each filter
Davide Caratti <[email protected]>
net/sched: act_tunnel_key: fix memory leak in case of action replace
Camelia Groza <[email protected]>
net: phy: phy driver features are mandatory
Thomas Petazzoni <[email protected]>
net: phy: mdio_bus: add missing device_del() in mdiobus_register() error handling
Andrew Lunn <[email protected]>
net: phy: marvell: Errata for mv88e6390 internal PHYs
Ross Lagerwall <[email protected]>
net: Fix usage of pskb_trim_rcsum
Yunjian Wang <[email protected]>
net: bridge: Fix ethernet header pointer before check skb forwardable
Lendacky, Thomas <[email protected]>
amd-xgbe: Fix mdio access for non-zero ports and clause 45 PHYs
-------------
Diffstat:
Makefile | 4 +- arch/arc/include/asm/perf_event.h | 3 +- arch/arc/lib/memset-archs.S | 40 +- arch/arc/mm/init.c | 3 +- arch/s390/include/asm/mmu_context.h | 5 +- arch/s390/kernel/early.c | 4 +- arch/s390/kernel/setup.c | 2 + arch/s390/kernel/smp.c | 12 +- arch/x86/entry/entry_64_compat.S | 6 +- arch/x86/include/asm/mmu_context.h | 18 + arch/x86/kernel/kvm.c | 7 +- arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c | 14 +- arch/x86/kvm/x86.c | 5 +- arch/x86/lib/kaslr.c | 4 +- drivers/acpi/nfit/core.c | 61 ++- drivers/char/mwave/mwavedd.c | 7 + drivers/clk/socfpga/clk-pll-s10.c | 2 +- drivers/clk/socfpga/clk-s10.c | 20 +- drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/amdgpu_atpx_handler.c | 1 + drivers/gpu/drm/meson/meson_crtc.c | 23 +- drivers/gpu/drm/meson/meson_drv.c | 5 + drivers/hv/hv_balloon.c | 10 +- drivers/hv/ring_buffer.c | 31 +- drivers/hv/vmbus_drv.c | 91 ++-- drivers/ide/ide-proc.c | 2 +- drivers/input/joystick/xpad.c | 3 + drivers/input/misc/uinput.c | 5 +- drivers/irqchip/irq-gic-v3-its.c | 25 +- drivers/md/dm-crypt.c | 25 +- drivers/md/dm-thin-metadata.c | 4 +- drivers/md/dm-thin-metadata.h | 2 +- drivers/md/dm-thin.c | 10 +- drivers/misc/ibmvmc.c | 7 +- drivers/misc/mei/hw-me-regs.h | 2 + drivers/misc/mei/pci-me.c | 4 +- drivers/mmc/host/dw_mmc-bluefield.c | 5 - drivers/mmc/host/meson-gx-mmc.c | 18 +- drivers/net/can/dev.c | 27 +- drivers/net/can/flexcan.c | 2 +- drivers/net/ethernet/amd/xgbe/xgbe-common.h | 2 - drivers/net/ethernet/amd/xgbe/xgbe-dev.c | 22 +- drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlxsw/pci.c | 12 +- drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlxsw/pci_hw.h | 3 +- drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlxsw/spectrum_fid.c | 4 +- drivers/net/ethernet/sun/cassini.c | 15 +- drivers/net/ethernet/sun/cassini.h | 15 +- drivers/net/phy/marvell.c | 37 +- drivers/net/phy/mdio_bus.c | 1 + drivers/net/phy/phy_device.c | 5 + drivers/net/ppp/pppoe.c | 1 + drivers/nvme/target/rdma.c | 17 +- drivers/s390/char/sclp_config.c | 2 + drivers/scsi/ufs/ufshcd.c | 10 +- drivers/staging/rtl8188eu/os_dep/usb_intf.c | 1 + drivers/tty/n_hdlc.c | 1 + drivers/tty/serial/serial_core.c | 12 +- drivers/tty/tty_io.c | 3 +- drivers/tty/vt/vt.c | 50 +-- drivers/usb/core/ledtrig-usbport.c | 17 +- drivers/usb/dwc3/gadget.c | 2 + drivers/usb/serial/pl2303.c | 1 + drivers/usb/serial/pl2303.h | 2 + drivers/usb/serial/usb-serial-simple.c | 3 +- drivers/vhost/net.c | 3 +- drivers/vhost/vhost.c | 97 ++++- drivers/vhost/vhost.h | 3 +- drivers/video/console/vgacon.c | 7 +- fs/ceph/caps.c | 2 + fs/cifs/cifssmb.c | 35 +- fs/cifs/connect.c | 21 + fs/cifs/smb2misc.c | 7 + fs/cifs/smb2ops.c | 62 ++- fs/notify/inotify/inotify_user.c | 6 +- include/linux/bpf_verifier.h | 13 + include/linux/filter.h | 10 +- include/linux/hyperv.h | 5 +- include/linux/phy.h | 4 +- include/linux/skbuff.h | 1 + include/net/ip_fib.h | 2 +- include/uapi/linux/input.h | 6 +- kernel/bpf/core.c | 54 ++- kernel/bpf/map_in_map.c | 17 +- kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 470 +++++++++++++++++---- kernel/time/posix-cpu-timers.c | 1 + mm/page_alloc.c | 12 - net/bridge/br_forward.c | 9 +- net/bridge/br_netfilter_ipv6.c | 1 + net/bridge/netfilter/nft_reject_bridge.c | 1 + net/can/bcm.c | 27 ++ net/ipv4/fib_frontend.c | 4 +- net/ipv4/fib_trie.c | 15 +- net/ipv4/ip_gre.c | 23 +- net/ipv4/ip_input.c | 1 + net/ipv4/tcp.c | 2 +- net/ipv4/udp.c | 16 +- net/ipv6/ip6_gre.c | 14 +- net/ipv6/udp.c | 16 +- net/openvswitch/flow_netlink.c | 2 +- net/sched/act_tunnel_key.c | 19 +- net/sched/cls_api.c | 3 +- net/sched/cls_flower.c | 19 +- sound/pci/hda/patch_conexant.c | 1 + sound/pci/hda/patch_realtek.c | 2 +- sound/soc/codecs/rt5514-spi.c | 2 + sound/soc/codecs/tlv320aic32x4.c | 4 + sound/soc/intel/atom/sst-mfld-platform-pcm.c | 8 +- tools/testing/selftests/x86/protection_keys.c | 41 +- 107 files changed, 1307 insertions(+), 518 deletions(-)
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 1/103 amd-xgbe: Fix mdio access for non-zero ports and clause 45 PHYs
4.19-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: "Lendacky, Thomas" <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 5ab3121beeb76aa6090195b67d237115860dd9ec ]
The XGBE hardware has support for performing MDIO operations using an MDIO command request. The driver mistakenly uses the mdio port address as the MDIO command request device address instead of the MDIO command request port address. Additionally, the driver does not properly check for and create a clause 45 MDIO command.
Check the supplied MDIO register to determine if the request is a clause 45 operation (MII_ADDR_C45). For a clause 45 operation, extract the device address and register number from the supplied MDIO register and use them to set the MDIO command request device address and register number fields. For a clause 22 operation, the MDIO request device address is set to zero and the MDIO command request register number is set to the supplied MDIO register. In either case, the supplied MDIO port address is used as the MDIO command request port address.
--- drivers/net/ethernet/amd/xgbe/xgbe-common.h | 2 -- drivers/net/ethernet/amd/xgbe/xgbe-dev.c | 22 ++++++++++++++++------ 2 files changed, 16 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
drivers/net/ethernet/amd/xgbe/xgbe-common.h +0 -2
@@ -431,8 +431,6 @@#define MAC_MDIOSCAR_PA_WIDTH 5#define MAC_MDIOSCAR_RA_INDEX 0#define MAC_MDIOSCAR_RA_WIDTH 16 -#define MAC_MDIOSCAR_REG_INDEX 0 -#define MAC_MDIOSCAR_REG_WIDTH 21#define MAC_MDIOSCCDR_BUSY_INDEX 22#define MAC_MDIOSCCDR_BUSY_WIDTH 1#define MAC_MDIOSCCDR_CMD_INDEX 16
drivers/net/ethernet/amd/xgbe/xgbe-dev.c +16 -6
@@ -1284,6 +1284,20 @@ static void xgbe_write_mmd_regs(struct x } } +static unsigned int xgbe_create_mdio_sca (int port,int reg) +{ +unsigned int mdio_sca, da; + + da = (reg &MII_ADDR_C45 ) ? reg >>16 :0 ; + + mdio_sca =0 ; +XGMAC_SET_BITS (mdio_sca,MAC_MDIOSCAR ,RA , reg); +XGMAC_SET_BITS (mdio_sca,MAC_MDIOSCAR ,PA , port); +XGMAC_SET_BITS (mdio_sca,MAC_MDIOSCAR ,DA , da); + +return mdio_sca; +} +static int xgbe_write_ext_mii_regs (struct xgbe_prv_data *pdata,int addr,int reg,u16 val) {
@@ -1291,9 +1305,7 @@ static int xgbe_write_ext_mii_regs(strucreinit_completion (&pdata->mdio_complete); - mdio_sca =0 ; -XGMAC_SET_BITS (mdio_sca,MAC_MDIOSCAR ,REG , reg); -XGMAC_SET_BITS (mdio_sca,MAC_MDIOSCAR ,DA , addr); + mdio_sca =xgbe_create_mdio_sca (addr, reg);XGMAC_IOWRITE (pdata,MAC_MDIOSCAR , mdio_sca); mdio_sccd =0 ;
@@ -1317,9 +1329,7 @@ static int xgbe_read_ext_mii_regs(structreinit_completion (&pdata->mdio_complete); - mdio_sca =0 ; -XGMAC_SET_BITS (mdio_sca,MAC_MDIOSCAR ,REG , reg); -XGMAC_SET_BITS (mdio_sca,MAC_MDIOSCAR ,DA , addr); + mdio_sca =xgbe_create_mdio_sca (addr, reg);XGMAC_IOWRITE (pdata,MAC_MDIOSCAR , mdio_sca); mdio_sccd =0 ;
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 2/103 net: bridge: Fix ethernet header pointer before check skb forwardable
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman4.19-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Yunjian Wang <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 28c1382fa28f2e2d9d0d6f25ae879b5af2ecbd03 ]
The skb header should be set to ethernet header before using is_skb_forwardable. Because the ethernet header length has been considered in is_skb_forwardable(including dev->hard_header_len length).
To reproduce the issue:
1, add 2 ports on linux bridge br using following commands:
$ brctl addbr br $ brctl addif br eth0 $ brctl addif br eth1 2, the MTU of eth0 and eth1 is 1500 3, send a packet(Data 1480, UDP 8, IP 20, Ethernet 14, VLAN 4) from eth0 to eth1
So the expect result is packet larger than 1500 cannot pass through eth0 and eth1. But currently, the packet passes through success, it means eth1's MTU limit doesn't take effect.
--- net/bridge/br_forward.c | 9 ++++----- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
net/bridge/br_forward.c +4 -5
@@ -36,10 +36,10 @@ static inline int should_deliver(const sint br_dev_queue_push_xmit (struct net *net,struct sock *sk,struct sk_buff *skb) { +skb_push (skb,ETH_HLEN );if (!is_skb_forwardable (skb->dev, skb)) goto drop; -skb_push (skb,ETH_HLEN );br_drop_fake_rtable (skb); if (skb->ip_summed == CHECKSUM_PARTIAL &&
@@ -98,12 +98,11 @@ static void __br_forward(const struct ne net =dev_net (indev); }else {if (unlikely (netpoll_tx_running (to->br->dev))) { -if (!is_skb_forwardable (skb->dev, skb)) { +skb_push (skb,ETH_HLEN ); +if (!is_skb_forwardable (skb->dev, skb))kfree_skb (skb); - }else { -skb_push (skb,ETH_HLEN ); +else br_netpoll_send_skb (to, skb); - }return ; } br_hook =NF_BR_LOCAL_OUT ;
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 3/103 net: Fix usage of pskb_trim_rcsum
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman4.19-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Ross Lagerwall <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 6c57f0458022298e4da1729c67bd33ce41c14e7a ]
In certain cases, pskb_trim_rcsum() may change skb pointers. Reinitialize header pointers afterwards to avoid potential use-after-frees. Add a note in the documentation of pskb_trim_rcsum(). Found by KASAN.
--- drivers/net/ppp/pppoe.c | 1 + include/linux/skbuff.h | 1 + net/bridge/br_netfilter_ipv6.c | 1 + net/bridge/netfilter/nft_reject_bridge.c | 1 + net/ipv4/ip_input.c | 1 + 5 files changed, 5 insertions(+)
drivers/net/ppp/pppoe.c +1 -0
@@ -445,6 +445,7 @@ static int pppoe_rcv(struct sk_buff *skbif (pskb_trim_rcsum (skb, len)) goto drop; + ph =pppoe_hdr (skb); pn =pppoe_pernet (dev_net (dev));/* Note that get_item does a sock_hold(), so sk_pppox(po)
include/linux/skbuff.h +1 -0
@@ -3178,6 +3178,7 @@ int pskb_trim_rcsum_slow(struct sk_buff* * This is exactly the same as pskb_trim except that it ensures the * checksum of received packets are still valid after the operation. +* It can change skb pointers. */ static inline int pskb_trim_rcsum (struct sk_buff *skb,unsigned int len)
net/bridge/br_netfilter_ipv6.c +1 -0
@@ -131,6 +131,7 @@ int br_validate_ipv6(struct net *net, st IPSTATS_MIB_INDISCARDS); goto drop; } + hdr =ipv6_hdr (skb); }if (hdr->nexthdr ==NEXTHDR_HOP &&br_nf_check_hbh_len (skb)) goto drop;
net/bridge/netfilter/nft_reject_bridge.c +1 -0
@@ -229,6 +229,7 @@ static bool reject6_br_csum_ok(struct sk pskb_trim_rcsum(skb, ntohs(ip6h->payload_len) + sizeof(*ip6h)))return false; + ip6h =ipv6_hdr (skb); thoff =ipv6_skip_exthdr (skb, ((u8 *)(ip6h+1 ) - skb->data), &proto, &fo);if (thoff <0 || thoff >= skb->len || (fo &htons (~0x7 )) !=0 )return false;
net/ipv4/ip_input.c +1 -0
@@ -489,6 +489,7 @@ static struct sk_buff *ip_rcv_core(struc goto drop; } + iph =ip_hdr (skb); skb->transport_header = skb->network_header + iph->ihl*4 ;/* Remove any debris in the socket control block */
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 4/103 net: phy: marvell: Errata for mv88e6390 internal PHYs
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman4.19-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Andrew Lunn <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 8cbcdc1a51999ca81db2956608b917aacd28d837 ]
The VOD can be out of spec, unless some magic value is poked into an undocumented register in an undocumented page.
--- drivers/net/phy/marvell.c | 35 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++- 1 file changed, 34 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/net/phy/marvell.c +34 -1
@@ -1063,6 +1063,39 @@ static int m88e1145_config_init(struct preturn 0 ; } +/* The VOD can be out of specification on link up. Poke an +* undocumented register, in an undocumented page, with a magic value +* to fix this. +*/ +static int m88e6390_errata (struct phy_device *phydev) +{ +int err; + + err =phy_write (phydev,MII_BMCR , +BMCR_ANENABLE |BMCR_SPEED1000 |BMCR_FULLDPLX ); +if (err) +return err; + +usleep_range (300 ,400 ); + + err =phy_write_paged (phydev,0xf8 ,0x08 ,0x36 ); +if (err) +return err; + +return genphy_soft_reset (phydev); +} + +static int m88e6390_config_aneg (struct phy_device *phydev) +{ +int err; + + err =m88e6390_errata (phydev); +if (err) +return err; + +return m88e1510_config_aneg (phydev); +} +/** * fiber_lpa_to_ethtool_lpa_t * @lpa: value of the MII_LPA register for fiber link
@@ -2313,7 +2346,7 @@ static struct phy_driver marvell_drivers .flags = PHY_HAS_INTERRUPT, .probe = m88e6390_probe, .config_init = &marvell_config_init, - .config_aneg = &m88e1510_config_aneg, + .config_aneg = &m88e6390_config_aneg, .read_status = &marvell_read_status, .ack_interrupt = &marvell_ack_interrupt, .config_intr = &marvell_config_intr,
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 5/103 net: phy: mdio_bus: add missing device_del() in mdiobus_register() error handling
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman4.19-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Thomas Petazzoni <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit e40e2a2e78664fa90ea4b9bdf4a84efce2fea9d9 ]
The current code in __mdiobus_register() doesn't properly handle failures returned by the devm_gpiod_get_optional() call: it returns immediately, without unregistering the device that was added by the call to device_register() earlier in the function.
This leaves a stale device, which then causes a NULL pointer dereference in the code that handles deferred probing:
[ 1.489982] Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 00000074 [ 1.498110] pgd = (ptrval) [ 1.500838] [00000074] *pgd=00000000 [ 1.504432] Internal error: Oops: 17 [#1] SMP ARM [ 1.509133] Modules linked in: [ 1.512192] CPU: 1 PID: 51 Comm: kworker/1:3 Not tainted 4.20.0-00039-g3b73a4cc8b3e-dirty #99 [ 1.520708] Hardware name: Xilinx Zynq Platform [ 1.525261] Workqueue: events deferred_probe_work_func [ 1.530403] PC is at klist_next+0x10/0xfc [ 1.534403] LR is at device_for_each_child+0x40/0x94 [ 1.539361] pc : [<c0683fbc>] lr : [<c0455d90>] psr: 200e0013 [ 1.545628] sp : ceeefe68 ip : 00000001 fp : ffffe000 [ 1.550863] r10: 00000000 r9 : c0c66790 r8 : 00000000 [ 1.556079] r7 : c0457d44 r6 : 00000000 r5 : ceeefe8c r4 : cfa2ec78 [ 1.562604] r3 : 00000064 r2 : c0457d44 r1 : ceeefe8c r0 : 00000064 [ 1.569129] Flags: nzCv IRQs on FIQs on Mode SVC_32 ISA ARM Segment none [ 1.576263] Control: 18c5387d Table: 0ed7804a DAC: 00000051 [ 1.582013] Process kworker/1:3 (pid: 51, stack limit = 0x(ptrval)) [ 1.588280] Stack: (0xceeefe68 to 0xceef0000) [ 1.592630] fe60: cfa2ec78 c0c03c08 00000000 c0457d44 00000000 c0c66790 [ 1.600814] fe80: 00000000 c0455d90 ceeefeac 00000064 00000000 0d7a542e cee9d494 cfa2ec78 [ 1.608998] fea0: cfa2ec78 00000000 c0457d44 c0457d7c cee9d494 c0c03c08 00000000 c0455dac [ 1.617182] fec0: cf98ba44 cf926a00 cee9d494 0d7a542e 00000000 cf935a10 cf935a10 cf935a10 [ 1.625366] fee0: c0c4e9b8 c0457d7c c0c4e80c 00000001 cf935a10 c0457df4 cf935a10 c0c4e99c [ 1.633550] ff00: c0c4e99c c045a27c c0c4e9c4 ced63f80 cfde8a80 cfdebc00 00000000 c013893c [ 1.641734] ff20: cfde8a80 cfde8a80 c07bd354 ced63f80 ced63f94 cfde8a80 00000008 c0c02d00 [ 1.649936] ff40: cfde8a98 cfde8a80 ffffe000 c0139a30 ffffe000 c0c6624a c07bd354 00000000 [ 1.658120] ff60: ffffe000 cee9e780 ceebfe00 00000000 ceeee000 ced63f80 c0139788 cf8cdea4 [ 1.666304] ff80: cee9e79c c013e598 00000001 ceebfe00 c013e44c 00000000 00000000 00000000 [ 1.674488] ffa0: 00000000 00000000 00000000 c01010e8 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 [ 1.682671] ffc0: 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 [ 1.690855] ffe0: 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000013 00000000 00000000 00000000 [ 1.699058] [<c0683fbc>] (klist_next) from [<c0455d90>] (device_for_each_child+0x40/0x94) [ 1.707241] [<c0455d90>] (device_for_each_child) from [<c0457d7c>] (device_reorder_to_tail+0x38/0x88) [ 1.716476] [<c0457d7c>] (device_reorder_to_tail) from [<c0455dac>] (device_for_each_child+0x5c/0x94) [ 1.725692] [<c0455dac>] (device_for_each_child) from [<c0457d7c>] (device_reorder_to_tail+0x38/0x88) [ 1.734927] [<c0457d7c>] (device_reorder_to_tail) from [<c0457df4>] (device_pm_move_to_tail+0x28/0x40) [ 1.744235] [<c0457df4>] (device_pm_move_to_tail) from [<c045a27c>] (deferred_probe_work_func+0x58/0x8c) [ 1.753746] [<c045a27c>] (deferred_probe_work_func) from [<c013893c>] (process_one_work+0x210/0x4fc) [ 1.762888] [<c013893c>] (process_one_work) from [<c0139a30>] (worker_thread+0x2a8/0x5c0) [ 1.771072] [<c0139a30>] (worker_thread) from [<c013e598>] (kthread+0x14c/0x154) [ 1.778482] [<c013e598>] (kthread) from [<c01010e8>] (ret_from_fork+0x14/0x2c) [ 1.785689] Exception stack(0xceeeffb0 to 0xceeefff8) [ 1.790739] ffa0: 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 [ 1.798923] ffc0: 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 [ 1.807107] ffe0: 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000013 00000000 [ 1.813724] Code: e92d47f0 e1a05000 e8900048 e1a00003 (e5937010) [ 1.819844] ---[ end trace 3c2c0c8b65399ec9 ]---
The actual error that we had from devm_gpiod_get_optional() was -EPROBE_DEFER, due to the GPIO being provided by a driver that is probed later than the Ethernet controller driver.
To fix this, we simply add the missing device_del() invocation in the error path.
--- drivers/net/phy/mdio_bus.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
drivers/net/phy/mdio_bus.c +1 -0
@@ -391,6 +391,7 @@ int __mdiobus_register(struct mii_bus *bif (IS_ERR (gpiod)) {dev_err (&bus->dev,"mii_bus %s couldn't get reset GPIO\n" , bus->id); +device_del (&bus->dev);return PTR_ERR (gpiod); }else if (gpiod) { bus->reset_gpiod = gpiod;
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 6/103 net: phy: phy driver features are mandatory
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman4.19-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Camelia Groza <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 3e64cf7a435ed0500e3adaa8aada2272d3ae8abc ]
Since phy driver features became a link_mode bitmap, phy drivers that don't have a list of features configured will cause the kernel to crash when probed.
Prevent the phy driver from registering if the features field is missing.
--- drivers/net/phy/phy_device.c | 5 +++++ include/linux/phy.h | 4 ++-- 2 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/net/phy/phy_device.c +5 -0
@@ -1917,6 +1917,11 @@ int phy_driver_register(struct phy_drive {int retval; +if (WARN_ON (!new_driver->features)) { +pr_err ("%s: Driver features are missing\n" , new_driver->name); +return -EINVAL ; + } + new_driver->mdiodrv.flags |=MDIO_DEVICE_IS_PHY ; new_driver->mdiodrv.driver.name = new_driver->name; new_driver->mdiodrv.driver.bus = &mdio_bus_type;
include/linux/phy.h +2 -2
@@ -491,8 +491,8 @@ struct phy_device {* only works for PHYs with IDs which match this field * name: The friendly name of this PHY type * phy_id_mask: Defines the important bits of the phy_id -* features: A list of features (speed, duplex, etc) supported -* by this PHY +* features: A mandatory list of features (speed, duplex, etc) +* supported by this PHY * flags: A bitfield defining certain other features this PHY * supports (like interrupts) *
Re: [PATCH 4.19 006/103] net: phy: phy driver features are mandatory
Quoted 42 lines · Greg Kroah-Hartman
4.19-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Camelia Groza <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit
3e64cf7a435ed0500e3adaa8aada2272d3ae8abc]Since phy driver features became a
link_modebitmap, phy drivers that don't have a list of features configured will cause the kernel to crash when probed.Prevent the phy driver from registering if the features field is missing.
Fixes 719655a14971 ("net: phy: Replace phy driver features u32 with link_mode bitmap")Reported-by Scott Wood <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Camelia Groza <[email protected]>Signed-off-by David S. Miller <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>--- drivers/net/phy/phy_device.c | 5 +++++ include/linux/phy.h | 4 ++-- 2 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)drivers/net/phy/phy_device.c +5
-0@@ -1917,6 +1917,11 @@ int phy_driver_register(struct phy_drive {int retval; +if (WARN_ON (!new_driver->features)) { +pr_err ("%s: Driver features are missing\n" , new_driver->name); +return -EINVAL ; + } + new_driver->mdiodrv.flags |=MDIO_DEVICE_IS_PHY ; new_driver->mdiodrv.driver.name = new_driver->name; new_driver->mdiodrv.driver.bus = &mdio_bus_type;
include/linux/phy.h struct phy_device { · line 498
Quoted 10 lines
include/linux/phy.h +2
-2@@ -491,8 +491,8 @@ struct phy_device {* only works for PHYs with IDs which match this field * name: The friendly name of this PHY type * phy_id_mask: Defines the important bits of the phy_id -* features: A list of features (speed, duplex, etc) supported -* by this PHY +* features: A mandatory list of features (speed, duplex, etc) +* supported by this PHY * flags: A bitfield defining certain other features this PHY * supports (like interrupts) *
This patch leads to the following dump during boot and no working network:
Jan 29 13:11:50 ragnarok kernel: RIP: 0010:phy_driver_register+0x5f/0x80 [libphy] Jan 29 13:11:50 ragnarok kernel: Code: dd 06 a0 48 c7 47 40 30 e4 06 a0 48 89 77 10 c7 47 24 02 00 00 00 e8 10 5c 44 e1 89 c5 85 c0 0f 85 aa 1d 00 00 89 e8 5b 5d c3 <0f> 0b 48 c7 c7 f0 20 07 a0 48 89 c6 bd ea ff ff ff e8 c9 4c 02 e1 Jan 29 13:11:50 ragnarok kernel: RSP: 0018:ffffc90000df3c78 EFLAGS: 00010246 Jan 29 13:11:50 ragnarok kernel: RAX: ffffffffa0071c8d RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000000 Jan 29 13:11:50 ragnarok kernel: RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffffffffa0076900 RDI: ffffffffa0076040 Jan 29 13:11:50 ragnarok kernel: RBP: ffffffffa007a000 R08: 0000000000000044 R09: 0000000000000228 Jan 29 13:11:50 ragnarok kernel: R10: ffff888603a0d6f8 R11: 000000000000003c R12: ffff888601252d00 Jan 29 13:11:50 ragnarok kernel: R13: 0000000000000002 R14: ffffc90000df3e98 R15: ffffffffa0076900 Jan 29 13:11:50 ragnarok kernel: FS: 00007feea9ced800(0000) GS:ffff888607240000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 Jan 29 13:11:50 ragnarok kernel: CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 Jan 29 13:11:50 ragnarok kernel: CR2: 00007feea9cdfc42 CR3: 00000005fec64001 CR4: 00000000000606e0 Jan 29 13:11:50 ragnarok kernel: Call Trace: Jan 29 13:11:50 ragnarok kernel: ? 0xffffffffa007a000 Jan 29 13:11:50 ragnarok kernel: phy_init+0x24/0x58 [libphy] Jan 29 13:11:50 ragnarok kernel: do_one_initcall+0x43/0x1af Jan 29 13:11:50 ragnarok kernel: ? _cond_resched+0x15/0x30 Jan 29 13:11:50 ragnarok kernel: ? kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0x154/0x1b0 Jan 29 13:11:50 ragnarok kernel: do_init_module+0x5a/0x210 Jan 29 13:11:50 ragnarok kernel: load_module+0x203a/0x2500 Jan 29 13:11:50 ragnarok kernel: ? vfs_read+0x10d/0x130 Jan 29 13:11:50 ragnarok kernel: ? __se_sys_finit_module+0xb1/0xd0 Jan 29 13:11:50 ragnarok kernel: __se_sys_finit_module+0xb1/0xd0 Jan 29 13:11:50 ragnarok kernel: do_syscall_64+0x3e/0xe0 Jan 29 13:11:50 ragnarok kernel: entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 Jan 29 13:11:50 ragnarok kernel: RIP: 0033:0x7feeaa2417c9 Jan 29 13:11:50 ragnarok kernel: Code: 00 00 00 75 05 48 83 c4 18 c3 e8 82 9c 01 00 66 90 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d 87 c6 0c 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48 Jan 29 13:11:50 ragnarok kernel: RSP: 002b:00007fff6fa6ea08 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000139 Jan 29 13:11:50 ragnarok kernel: RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 000055c6eac06db0 RCX: 00007feeaa2417c9 Jan 29 13:11:50 ragnarok kernel: RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 00007feeaa4198fd RDI: 0000000000000006 Jan 29 13:11:50 ragnarok kernel: RBP: 00007feeaa4198fd R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 000055c6eac03000 Jan 29 13:11:50 ragnarok kernel: R10: 0000000000000006 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000 Jan 29 13:11:50 ragnarok kernel: R13: 000055c6eabfc1d0 R14: 0000000000020000 R15: 000055c6eac06db0 Jan 29 13:11:50 ragnarok kernel: ---[ end trace 18e05a0afeb140b2 ]--- Jan 29 13:11:50 ragnarok kernel: libphy: Generic 10G PHY: Driver features are missing
Apparently the r8169 driver for my NIC does something wrong wrt. this fix and the original commit (719655a14971), but regardless - reverting this patch leads to a booting & working 4.19.19:
Jan 29 13:29:16 ragnarok kernel: libphy: r8169: probed Jan 29 13:29:19 ragnarok kernel: RTL8211E Gigabit Ethernet r8169-400:00: attached PHY driver [RTL8211E Gigabit Ethernet] (mii_bus:phy_addr=r8169-400:00, irq=IGNORE)
I've cc'ed Heiner Kallweit who might know why phylib with this fix and r8169 don't like each other.
cheers,
Holger
RE: [PATCH 4.19 006/103] net: phy: phy driver features are mandatory
Quoted 134 lines
-----Original Message-----
From: Holger Hoffstätte <[email protected]>
Sent: Tuesday, January 29, 2019 17:50
To: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>; linux- [email protected]
Cc: [email protected]; Scott Wood <[email protected]>; Camelia Alexandra Groza <[email protected]>; David S. Miller <[email protected]>; Heiner Kallweit <[email protected]>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 4.19 006/103] net: phy: phy driver features are mandatoryQuoted 1 line · Greg Kroah-Hartman
4.19-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me
know.
Quoted 7 lines
------------------
From: Camelia Groza <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit
3e64cf7a435ed0500e3adaa8aada2272d3ae8abc]Quoted 7 lines
Since phy driver features became a
link_modebitmap, phy drivers that don't have a list of features configured will cause the kernel to crash when probed.Prevent the phy driver from registering if the features field is missing.
Fixes 719655a14971 ("net: phy: Replace phy driver features u32 with
link_modebitmap")Quoted 28 lines
Reported-by Scott Wood <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Camelia Groza <[email protected]>Signed-off-by David S. Miller <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>--- drivers/net/phy/phy_device.c | 5 +++++ include/linux/phy.h | 4 ++-- 2 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)drivers/net/phy/phy_device.c +5
-0@@ -1917,6 +1917,11 @@ int phy_driver_register(struct phy_drive {int retval; +if (WARN_ON (!new_driver->features)) { +pr_err ("%s: Driver features are missing\n" , new_driver- name); +return -EINVAL ; + } + new_driver->mdiodrv.flags |=MDIO_DEVICE_IS_PHY ; new_driver->mdiodrv.driver.name = new_driver->name;new_driver->mdiodrv.driver.bus = &mdio_bus_type;include/linux/phy.h struct phy_device { · line 498
Quoted 10 lines
include/linux/phy.h +2
-2@@ -491,8 +491,8 @@ struct phy_device {* only works for PHYs with IDs which match this field * name: The friendly name of this PHY type * phy_id_mask: Defines the important bits of the phy_id -* features: A list of features (speed, duplex, etc) supported -* by this PHY +* features: A mandatory list of features (speed, duplex, etc) +* supported by this PHY * flags: A bitfield defining certain other features this PHY * supports (like interrupts) * This patch leads to the following dump during boot and no working network:
Jan 29 13:11:50 ragnarok kernel: RIP: 0010:phy_driver_register+0x5f/0x80 [libphy] Jan 29 13:11:50 ragnarok kernel: Code: dd 06 a0 48 c7 47 40 30 e4 06 a0 48 89 77 10 c7 47 24 02 00 00 00 e8 10 5c 44 e1 89 c5 85 c0 0f 85 aa 1d 00 00 89 e8 5b 5d c3 <0f> 0b 48 c7 c7 f0 20 07 a0 48 89 c6 bd ea ff ff ff e8 c9 4c 02 e1 Jan 29 13:11:50 ragnarok kernel: RSP: 0018:ffffc90000df3c78 EFLAGS: 00010246 Jan 29 13:11:50 ragnarok kernel: RAX: ffffffffa0071c8d RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000000 Jan 29 13:11:50 ragnarok kernel: RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffffffffa0076900 RDI: ffffffffa0076040 Jan 29 13:11:50 ragnarok kernel: RBP: ffffffffa007a000 R08: 0000000000000044 R09: 0000000000000228 Jan 29 13:11:50 ragnarok kernel: R10: ffff888603a0d6f8 R11: 000000000000003c R12: ffff888601252d00 Jan 29 13:11:50 ragnarok kernel: R13: 0000000000000002 R14: ffffc90000df3e98 R15: ffffffffa0076900 Jan 29 13:11:50 ragnarok kernel: FS: 00007feea9ced800(0000) GS:ffff888607240000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 Jan 29 13:11:50 ragnarok kernel: CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 Jan 29 13:11:50 ragnarok kernel: CR2: 00007feea9cdfc42 CR3: 00000005fec64001 CR4: 00000000000606e0 Jan 29 13:11:50 ragnarok kernel: Call Trace: Jan 29 13:11:50 ragnarok kernel: ? 0xffffffffa007a000 Jan 29 13:11:50 ragnarok kernel: phy_init+0x24/0x58 [libphy] Jan 29 13:11:50 ragnarok kernel: do_one_initcall+0x43/0x1af Jan 29 13:11:50 ragnarok kernel: ? _cond_resched+0x15/0x30 Jan 29 13:11:50 ragnarok kernel: ? kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0x154/0x1b0 Jan 29 13:11:50 ragnarok kernel: do_init_module+0x5a/0x210 Jan 29 13:11:50 ragnarok kernel: load_module+0x203a/0x2500 Jan 29 13:11:50 ragnarok kernel: ? vfs_read+0x10d/0x130 Jan 29 13:11:50 ragnarok kernel: ? __se_sys_finit_module+0xb1/0xd0 Jan 29 13:11:50 ragnarok kernel: __se_sys_finit_module+0xb1/0xd0 Jan 29 13:11:50 ragnarok kernel: do_syscall_64+0x3e/0xe0 Jan 29 13:11:50 ragnarok kernel: entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 Jan 29 13:11:50 ragnarok kernel: RIP: 0033:0x7feeaa2417c9 Jan 29 13:11:50 ragnarok kernel: Code: 00 00 00 75 05 48 83 c4 18 c3 e8 82 9c 01 00 66 90 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d 87 c6 0c 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48 Jan 29 13:11:50 ragnarok kernel: RSP: 002b:00007fff6fa6ea08 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000139 Jan 29 13:11:50 ragnarok kernel: RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 000055c6eac06db0 RCX: 00007feeaa2417c9 Jan 29 13:11:50 ragnarok kernel: RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 00007feeaa4198fd RDI: 0000000000000006 Jan 29 13:11:50 ragnarok kernel: RBP: 00007feeaa4198fd R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 000055c6eac03000 Jan 29 13:11:50 ragnarok kernel: R10: 0000000000000006 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000 Jan 29 13:11:50 ragnarok kernel: R13: 000055c6eabfc1d0 R14: 0000000000020000 R15: 000055c6eac06db0 Jan 29 13:11:50 ragnarok kernel: ---[ end trace 18e05a0afeb140b2 ]--- Jan 29 13:11:50 ragnarok kernel: libphy: Generic 10G PHY: Driver features aremissing
Apparently the r8169 driver for my NIC does something wrong wrt. this fix and the original commit (
719655a14971), but regardless - reverting this patch leads to a booting & working 4.19.19:Jan 29 13:29:16 ragnarok kernel: libphy: r8169: probed Jan 29 13:29:19 ragnarok kernel: RTL8211E Gigabit Ethernet r8169-400:00:
Quoted 8 lines
attached PHY driver [RTL8211E Gigabit Ethernet] (mii_bus:phy_addr=r8169- 400:00, irq=IGNORE)
I've cc'ed Heiner Kallweit who might know why phylib with this fix and r8169 don't like each other.
cheers,
Holger
Hi
This points to an issue with the Generic 10G PHY driver. The following patch seems to be missing from the 4.19 stable tree and should be merged:
f802912 net: phy: genphy_10g_driver: Avoid NULL pointer dereference
Thanks for pointing this out.
Regards,
Camelia
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerRe: [PATCH 4.19 006/103] net: phy: phy driver features are mandatory
Quoted 140 lines · Camelia Alexandra Groza
Quoted 140 lines
-----Original Message-----
From: Holger Hoffstätte <[email protected]>
Sent: Tuesday, January 29, 2019 17:50
To: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>; linux- [email protected]
Cc: [email protected]; Scott Wood <[email protected]>; Camelia Alexandra Groza <[email protected]>; David S. Miller <[email protected]>; Heiner Kallweit <[email protected]>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 4.19 006/103] net: phy: phy driver features are mandatoryQuoted 1 line · Greg Kroah-Hartman
4.19-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me
know.
Quoted 7 lines
------------------
From: Camelia Groza <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit
3e64cf7a435ed0500e3adaa8aada2272d3ae8abc]Quoted 7 lines
Since phy driver features became a
link_modebitmap, phy drivers that don't have a list of features configured will cause the kernel to crash when probed.Prevent the phy driver from registering if the features field is missing.
Fixes 719655a14971 ("net: phy: Replace phy driver features u32 with
link_modebitmap")Quoted 28 lines
Reported-by Scott Wood <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Camelia Groza <[email protected]>Signed-off-by David S. Miller <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>--- drivers/net/phy/phy_device.c | 5 +++++ include/linux/phy.h | 4 ++-- 2 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)drivers/net/phy/phy_device.c +5
-0@@ -1917,6 +1917,11 @@ int phy_driver_register(struct phy_drive {int retval; +if (WARN_ON (!new_driver->features)) { +pr_err ("%s: Driver features are missing\n" , new_driver- name); +return -EINVAL ; + } + new_driver->mdiodrv.flags |=MDIO_DEVICE_IS_PHY ; new_driver->mdiodrv.driver.name = new_driver->name;new_driver->mdiodrv.driver.bus = &mdio_bus_type;include/linux/phy.h struct phy_device { · line 498
Quoted 10 lines
include/linux/phy.h +2
-2@@ -491,8 +491,8 @@ struct phy_device {* only works for PHYs with IDs which match this field * name: The friendly name of this PHY type * phy_id_mask: Defines the important bits of the phy_id -* features: A list of features (speed, duplex, etc) supported -* by this PHY +* features: A mandatory list of features (speed, duplex, etc) +* supported by this PHY * flags: A bitfield defining certain other features this PHY * supports (like interrupts) * This patch leads to the following dump during boot and no working network:
Jan 29 13:11:50 ragnarok kernel: RIP: 0010:phy_driver_register+0x5f/0x80 [libphy] Jan 29 13:11:50 ragnarok kernel: Code: dd 06 a0 48 c7 47 40 30 e4 06 a0 48 89 77 10 c7 47 24 02 00 00 00 e8 10 5c 44 e1 89 c5 85 c0 0f 85 aa 1d 00 00 89 e8 5b 5d c3 <0f> 0b 48 c7 c7 f0 20 07 a0 48 89 c6 bd ea ff ff ff e8 c9 4c 02 e1 Jan 29 13:11:50 ragnarok kernel: RSP: 0018:ffffc90000df3c78 EFLAGS: 00010246 Jan 29 13:11:50 ragnarok kernel: RAX: ffffffffa0071c8d RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000000 Jan 29 13:11:50 ragnarok kernel: RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffffffffa0076900 RDI: ffffffffa0076040 Jan 29 13:11:50 ragnarok kernel: RBP: ffffffffa007a000 R08: 0000000000000044 R09: 0000000000000228 Jan 29 13:11:50 ragnarok kernel: R10: ffff888603a0d6f8 R11: 000000000000003c R12: ffff888601252d00 Jan 29 13:11:50 ragnarok kernel: R13: 0000000000000002 R14: ffffc90000df3e98 R15: ffffffffa0076900 Jan 29 13:11:50 ragnarok kernel: FS: 00007feea9ced800(0000) GS:ffff888607240000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 Jan 29 13:11:50 ragnarok kernel: CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 Jan 29 13:11:50 ragnarok kernel: CR2: 00007feea9cdfc42 CR3: 00000005fec64001 CR4: 00000000000606e0 Jan 29 13:11:50 ragnarok kernel: Call Trace: Jan 29 13:11:50 ragnarok kernel: ? 0xffffffffa007a000 Jan 29 13:11:50 ragnarok kernel: phy_init+0x24/0x58 [libphy] Jan 29 13:11:50 ragnarok kernel: do_one_initcall+0x43/0x1af Jan 29 13:11:50 ragnarok kernel: ? _cond_resched+0x15/0x30 Jan 29 13:11:50 ragnarok kernel: ? kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0x154/0x1b0 Jan 29 13:11:50 ragnarok kernel: do_init_module+0x5a/0x210 Jan 29 13:11:50 ragnarok kernel: load_module+0x203a/0x2500 Jan 29 13:11:50 ragnarok kernel: ? vfs_read+0x10d/0x130 Jan 29 13:11:50 ragnarok kernel: ? __se_sys_finit_module+0xb1/0xd0 Jan 29 13:11:50 ragnarok kernel: __se_sys_finit_module+0xb1/0xd0 Jan 29 13:11:50 ragnarok kernel: do_syscall_64+0x3e/0xe0 Jan 29 13:11:50 ragnarok kernel: entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 Jan 29 13:11:50 ragnarok kernel: RIP: 0033:0x7feeaa2417c9 Jan 29 13:11:50 ragnarok kernel: Code: 00 00 00 75 05 48 83 c4 18 c3 e8 82 9c 01 00 66 90 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d 87 c6 0c 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48 Jan 29 13:11:50 ragnarok kernel: RSP: 002b:00007fff6fa6ea08 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000139 Jan 29 13:11:50 ragnarok kernel: RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 000055c6eac06db0 RCX: 00007feeaa2417c9 Jan 29 13:11:50 ragnarok kernel: RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 00007feeaa4198fd RDI: 0000000000000006 Jan 29 13:11:50 ragnarok kernel: RBP: 00007feeaa4198fd R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 000055c6eac03000 Jan 29 13:11:50 ragnarok kernel: R10: 0000000000000006 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000 Jan 29 13:11:50 ragnarok kernel: R13: 000055c6eabfc1d0 R14: 0000000000020000 R15: 000055c6eac06db0 Jan 29 13:11:50 ragnarok kernel: ---[ end trace 18e05a0afeb140b2 ]--- Jan 29 13:11:50 ragnarok kernel: libphy: Generic 10G PHY: Driver features aremissing
Apparently the r8169 driver for my NIC does something wrong wrt. this fix and the original commit (
719655a14971), but regardless - reverting this patch leads to a booting & working 4.19.19:Jan 29 13:29:16 ragnarok kernel: libphy: r8169: probed Jan 29 13:29:19 ragnarok kernel: RTL8211E Gigabit Ethernet r8169-400:00:attached PHY driver [RTL8211E Gigabit Ethernet] (mii_bus:phy_addr=r8169- 400:00, irq=IGNORE)
I've cc'ed Heiner Kallweit who might know why phylib with this fix and r8169 don't like each other.
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 2 lines
cheers,
HolgerHi
This points to an issue with the Generic 10G PHY driver. The following patch seems to be missing from the 4.19 stable tree and should be merged:
f802912 net: phy:genphy_10g_driver: Avoid NULL pointer dereference
But that patch says it:
Which is not in 4.19.y, it showed up in 4.20.
Ah, wait, I think that there was a patch backported to the 4.19.y queue that should not have, specifically:
3e64cf7a435e ("net: phy: phy driver features are mandatory")
which said it too fixes:
719655a14971 ("net: phy: Replace phy driver features u32 with link_mode bitmap")
Holger, if you revert 3e64cf7a435e, does that solve the problem for you here?
thanks,
greg k-h
Re: [PATCH 4.19 006/103] net: phy: phy driver features are mandatory
Quoted 146 lines · Greg Kroah-Hartman
Quoted 145 lines · Camelia Alexandra Groza
Quoted 134 lines
-----Original Message-----
From: Holger Hoffstätte <[email protected]>
Sent: Tuesday, January 29, 2019 17:50
To: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>; linux- [email protected]
Cc: [email protected]; Scott Wood <[email protected]>; Camelia Alexandra Groza <[email protected]>; David S. Miller <[email protected]>; Heiner Kallweit <[email protected]>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 4.19 006/103] net: phy: phy driver features are mandatoryQuoted 1 line · Greg Kroah-Hartman
4.19-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me
know.
Quoted 7 lines
------------------
From: Camelia Groza <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit
3e64cf7a435ed0500e3adaa8aada2272d3ae8abc]Quoted 7 lines
Since phy driver features became a
link_modebitmap, phy drivers that don't have a list of features configured will cause the kernel to crash when probed.Prevent the phy driver from registering if the features field is missing.
Fixes 719655a14971 ("net: phy: Replace phy driver features u32 with
link_modebitmap")Quoted 28 lines
Reported-by Scott Wood <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Camelia Groza <[email protected]>Signed-off-by David S. Miller <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>--- drivers/net/phy/phy_device.c | 5 +++++ include/linux/phy.h | 4 ++-- 2 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)drivers/net/phy/phy_device.c +5
-0@@ -1917,6 +1917,11 @@ int phy_driver_register(struct phy_drive {int retval; +if (WARN_ON (!new_driver->features)) { +pr_err ("%s: Driver features are missing\n" , new_driver- name); +return -EINVAL ; + } + new_driver->mdiodrv.flags |=MDIO_DEVICE_IS_PHY ; new_driver->mdiodrv.driver.name = new_driver->name;new_driver->mdiodrv.driver.bus = &mdio_bus_type;include/linux/phy.h struct phy_device { · line 498
Quoted 10 lines
include/linux/phy.h +2
-2@@ -491,8 +491,8 @@ struct phy_device {* only works for PHYs with IDs which match this field * name: The friendly name of this PHY type * phy_id_mask: Defines the important bits of the phy_id -* features: A list of features (speed, duplex, etc) supported -* by this PHY +* features: A mandatory list of features (speed, duplex, etc) +* supported by this PHY * flags: A bitfield defining certain other features this PHY * supports (like interrupts) * This patch leads to the following dump during boot and no working network:
Jan 29 13:11:50 ragnarok kernel: RIP: 0010:phy_driver_register+0x5f/0x80 [libphy] Jan 29 13:11:50 ragnarok kernel: Code: dd 06 a0 48 c7 47 40 30 e4 06 a0 48 89 77 10 c7 47 24 02 00 00 00 e8 10 5c 44 e1 89 c5 85 c0 0f 85 aa 1d 00 00 89 e8 5b 5d c3 <0f> 0b 48 c7 c7 f0 20 07 a0 48 89 c6 bd ea ff ff ff e8 c9 4c 02 e1 Jan 29 13:11:50 ragnarok kernel: RSP: 0018:ffffc90000df3c78 EFLAGS: 00010246 Jan 29 13:11:50 ragnarok kernel: RAX: ffffffffa0071c8d RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000000 Jan 29 13:11:50 ragnarok kernel: RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffffffffa0076900 RDI: ffffffffa0076040 Jan 29 13:11:50 ragnarok kernel: RBP: ffffffffa007a000 R08: 0000000000000044 R09: 0000000000000228 Jan 29 13:11:50 ragnarok kernel: R10: ffff888603a0d6f8 R11: 000000000000003c R12: ffff888601252d00 Jan 29 13:11:50 ragnarok kernel: R13: 0000000000000002 R14: ffffc90000df3e98 R15: ffffffffa0076900 Jan 29 13:11:50 ragnarok kernel: FS: 00007feea9ced800(0000) GS:ffff888607240000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 Jan 29 13:11:50 ragnarok kernel: CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 Jan 29 13:11:50 ragnarok kernel: CR2: 00007feea9cdfc42 CR3: 00000005fec64001 CR4: 00000000000606e0 Jan 29 13:11:50 ragnarok kernel: Call Trace: Jan 29 13:11:50 ragnarok kernel: ? 0xffffffffa007a000 Jan 29 13:11:50 ragnarok kernel: phy_init+0x24/0x58 [libphy] Jan 29 13:11:50 ragnarok kernel: do_one_initcall+0x43/0x1af Jan 29 13:11:50 ragnarok kernel: ? _cond_resched+0x15/0x30 Jan 29 13:11:50 ragnarok kernel: ? kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0x154/0x1b0 Jan 29 13:11:50 ragnarok kernel: do_init_module+0x5a/0x210 Jan 29 13:11:50 ragnarok kernel: load_module+0x203a/0x2500 Jan 29 13:11:50 ragnarok kernel: ? vfs_read+0x10d/0x130 Jan 29 13:11:50 ragnarok kernel: ? __se_sys_finit_module+0xb1/0xd0 Jan 29 13:11:50 ragnarok kernel: __se_sys_finit_module+0xb1/0xd0 Jan 29 13:11:50 ragnarok kernel: do_syscall_64+0x3e/0xe0 Jan 29 13:11:50 ragnarok kernel: entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 Jan 29 13:11:50 ragnarok kernel: RIP: 0033:0x7feeaa2417c9 Jan 29 13:11:50 ragnarok kernel: Code: 00 00 00 75 05 48 83 c4 18 c3 e8 82 9c 01 00 66 90 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d 87 c6 0c 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48 Jan 29 13:11:50 ragnarok kernel: RSP: 002b:00007fff6fa6ea08 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000139 Jan 29 13:11:50 ragnarok kernel: RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 000055c6eac06db0 RCX: 00007feeaa2417c9 Jan 29 13:11:50 ragnarok kernel: RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 00007feeaa4198fd RDI: 0000000000000006 Jan 29 13:11:50 ragnarok kernel: RBP: 00007feeaa4198fd R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 000055c6eac03000 Jan 29 13:11:50 ragnarok kernel: R10: 0000000000000006 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000 Jan 29 13:11:50 ragnarok kernel: R13: 000055c6eabfc1d0 R14: 0000000000020000 R15: 000055c6eac06db0 Jan 29 13:11:50 ragnarok kernel: ---[ end trace 18e05a0afeb140b2 ]--- Jan 29 13:11:50 ragnarok kernel: libphy: Generic 10G PHY: Driver features aremissing
Apparently the r8169 driver for my NIC does something wrong wrt. this fix and the original commit (
719655a14971), but regardless - reverting this patch leads to a booting & working 4.19.19:Jan 29 13:29:16 ragnarok kernel: libphy: r8169: probed Jan 29 13:29:19 ragnarok kernel: RTL8211E Gigabit Ethernet r8169-400:00:Quoted 8 lines
attached PHY driver [RTL8211E Gigabit Ethernet] (mii_bus:phy_addr=r8169- 400:00, irq=IGNORE)
I've cc'ed Heiner Kallweit who might know why phylib with this fix and r8169 don't like each other.
cheers,
HolgerHi
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 2 lines
This points to an issue with the Generic 10G PHY driver. The following patch seems to be missing from the 4.19 stable tree and should be merged:
f802912 net: phy:genphy_10g_driver: Avoid NULL pointer dereferenceBut that patch says it:
Fixes 719655a14971 ("net: phy: Replace phy driver features u32 with link_mode bitmap")Which is not in 4.19.y, it showed up in 4.20.
Nope, as you found 719655a14971 was backported:
https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?h=linux-4.19.y&id=719655a149715f26fc4de904fe0aa83068bd5b9e
Quoted 9 lines
Ah, wait, I think that there was a patch backported to the 4.19.y queue that should not have, specifically:
3e64cf7a435e("net: phy: phy driver features are mandatory")
which said it too fixes:
719655a14971("net: phy: Replace phy driver features u32 withlink_modebitmap")Holger, if you revert
3e64cf7a435e, does that solve the problem for you here?
Yes, as per $SUBJECT if I patch --reverse 3e64cf7a435e it works again, seem my original log above.
Fwiw just test-booted 5.0-rc4 and it works too.
cheers,
Holger
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerRe: [PATCH 4.19 006/103] net: phy: phy driver features are mandatory
Quoted 150 lines · Holger Hoffstätte
Quoted 149 lines · Greg Kroah-Hartman
Quoted 147 lines · Camelia Alexandra Groza
Quoted 134 lines
-----Original Message-----
From: Holger Hoffstätte <[email protected]>
Sent: Tuesday, January 29, 2019 17:50
To: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>; linux- [email protected]
Cc: [email protected]; Scott Wood <[email protected]>; Camelia Alexandra Groza <[email protected]>; David S. Miller <[email protected]>; Heiner Kallweit <[email protected]>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 4.19 006/103] net: phy: phy driver features are mandatoryQuoted 1 line · Greg Kroah-Hartman
4.19-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me
know.
Quoted 7 lines
------------------
From: Camelia Groza <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit
3e64cf7a435ed0500e3adaa8aada2272d3ae8abc]Quoted 7 lines
Since phy driver features became a
link_modebitmap, phy drivers that don't have a list of features configured will cause the kernel to crash when probed.Prevent the phy driver from registering if the features field is missing.
Fixes 719655a14971 ("net: phy: Replace phy driver features u32 with
link_modebitmap")Quoted 28 lines
Reported-by Scott Wood <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Camelia Groza <[email protected]>Signed-off-by David S. Miller <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>--- drivers/net/phy/phy_device.c | 5 +++++ include/linux/phy.h | 4 ++-- 2 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)drivers/net/phy/phy_device.c +5
-0@@ -1917,6 +1917,11 @@ int phy_driver_register(struct phy_drive {int retval; +if (WARN_ON (!new_driver->features)) { +pr_err ("%s: Driver features are missing\n" , new_driver- name); +return -EINVAL ; + } + new_driver->mdiodrv.flags |=MDIO_DEVICE_IS_PHY ; new_driver->mdiodrv.driver.name = new_driver->name;new_driver->mdiodrv.driver.bus = &mdio_bus_type;include/linux/phy.h struct phy_device { · line 498
Quoted 10 lines
include/linux/phy.h +2
-2@@ -491,8 +491,8 @@ struct phy_device {* only works for PHYs with IDs which match this field * name: The friendly name of this PHY type * phy_id_mask: Defines the important bits of the phy_id -* features: A list of features (speed, duplex, etc) supported -* by this PHY +* features: A mandatory list of features (speed, duplex, etc) +* supported by this PHY * flags: A bitfield defining certain other features this PHY * supports (like interrupts) * This patch leads to the following dump during boot and no working network:
Jan 29 13:11:50 ragnarok kernel: RIP: 0010:phy_driver_register+0x5f/0x80 [libphy] Jan 29 13:11:50 ragnarok kernel: Code: dd 06 a0 48 c7 47 40 30 e4 06 a0 48 89 77 10 c7 47 24 02 00 00 00 e8 10 5c 44 e1 89 c5 85 c0 0f 85 aa 1d 00 00 89 e8 5b 5d c3 <0f> 0b 48 c7 c7 f0 20 07 a0 48 89 c6 bd ea ff ff ff e8 c9 4c 02 e1 Jan 29 13:11:50 ragnarok kernel: RSP: 0018:ffffc90000df3c78 EFLAGS: 00010246 Jan 29 13:11:50 ragnarok kernel: RAX: ffffffffa0071c8d RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000000 Jan 29 13:11:50 ragnarok kernel: RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffffffffa0076900 RDI: ffffffffa0076040 Jan 29 13:11:50 ragnarok kernel: RBP: ffffffffa007a000 R08: 0000000000000044 R09: 0000000000000228 Jan 29 13:11:50 ragnarok kernel: R10: ffff888603a0d6f8 R11: 000000000000003c R12: ffff888601252d00 Jan 29 13:11:50 ragnarok kernel: R13: 0000000000000002 R14: ffffc90000df3e98 R15: ffffffffa0076900 Jan 29 13:11:50 ragnarok kernel: FS: 00007feea9ced800(0000) GS:ffff888607240000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 Jan 29 13:11:50 ragnarok kernel: CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 Jan 29 13:11:50 ragnarok kernel: CR2: 00007feea9cdfc42 CR3: 00000005fec64001 CR4: 00000000000606e0 Jan 29 13:11:50 ragnarok kernel: Call Trace: Jan 29 13:11:50 ragnarok kernel: ? 0xffffffffa007a000 Jan 29 13:11:50 ragnarok kernel: phy_init+0x24/0x58 [libphy] Jan 29 13:11:50 ragnarok kernel: do_one_initcall+0x43/0x1af Jan 29 13:11:50 ragnarok kernel: ? _cond_resched+0x15/0x30 Jan 29 13:11:50 ragnarok kernel: ? kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0x154/0x1b0 Jan 29 13:11:50 ragnarok kernel: do_init_module+0x5a/0x210 Jan 29 13:11:50 ragnarok kernel: load_module+0x203a/0x2500 Jan 29 13:11:50 ragnarok kernel: ? vfs_read+0x10d/0x130 Jan 29 13:11:50 ragnarok kernel: ? __se_sys_finit_module+0xb1/0xd0 Jan 29 13:11:50 ragnarok kernel: __se_sys_finit_module+0xb1/0xd0 Jan 29 13:11:50 ragnarok kernel: do_syscall_64+0x3e/0xe0 Jan 29 13:11:50 ragnarok kernel: entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 Jan 29 13:11:50 ragnarok kernel: RIP: 0033:0x7feeaa2417c9 Jan 29 13:11:50 ragnarok kernel: Code: 00 00 00 75 05 48 83 c4 18 c3 e8 82 9c 01 00 66 90 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d 87 c6 0c 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48 Jan 29 13:11:50 ragnarok kernel: RSP: 002b:00007fff6fa6ea08 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000139 Jan 29 13:11:50 ragnarok kernel: RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 000055c6eac06db0 RCX: 00007feeaa2417c9 Jan 29 13:11:50 ragnarok kernel: RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 00007feeaa4198fd RDI: 0000000000000006 Jan 29 13:11:50 ragnarok kernel: RBP: 00007feeaa4198fd R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 000055c6eac03000 Jan 29 13:11:50 ragnarok kernel: R10: 0000000000000006 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000 Jan 29 13:11:50 ragnarok kernel: R13: 000055c6eabfc1d0 R14: 0000000000020000 R15: 000055c6eac06db0 Jan 29 13:11:50 ragnarok kernel: ---[ end trace 18e05a0afeb140b2 ]--- Jan 29 13:11:50 ragnarok kernel: libphy: Generic 10G PHY: Driver features aremissing
Apparently the r8169 driver for my NIC does something wrong wrt. this fix and the original commit (
719655a14971), but regardless - reverting this patch leads to a booting & working 4.19.19:Jan 29 13:29:16 ragnarok kernel: libphy: r8169: probed Jan 29 13:29:19 ragnarok kernel: RTL8211E Gigabit Ethernet r8169-400:00:Quoted 8 lines
attached PHY driver [RTL8211E Gigabit Ethernet] (mii_bus:phy_addr=r8169- 400:00, irq=IGNORE)
I've cc'ed Heiner Kallweit who might know why phylib with this fix and r8169 don't like each other.
cheers,
HolgerHi
This points to an issue with the Generic 10G PHY driver. The following patch seems to be missing from the 4.19 stable tree and should be merged:
f802912 net: phy:genphy_10g_driver: Avoid NULL pointer dereference
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 4 lines
But that patch says it:
Fixes 719655a14971 ("net: phy: Replace phy driver features u32 with link_mode bitmap")Which is not in 4.19.y, it showed up in 4.20.
Nope, as you found
719655a14971was backported:
https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?h=linux-4.19.y&id=719655a149715f26fc4de904fe0aa83068bd5b9e
That doesn't show that happening, sorry, it's on a different branch.
It really did not get applied to the 4.19.y branch, you can see that if you search manually with a local copy.
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 7 lines
Ah, wait, I think that there was a patch backported to the 4.19.y queue that should not have, specifically:
3e64cf7a435e("net: phy: phy driver features are mandatory")
which said it too fixes:
719655a14971("net: phy: Replace phy driver features u32 withlink_modebitmap")
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 2 lines
Holger, if you revert
3e64cf7a435e, does that solve the problem for you here?Yes, as per $SUBJECT if I patch --reverse
3e64cf7a435eit works again, seem my original log above.Fwiw just test-booted 5.0-rc4 and it works too.
Wonderful, I'll go drop 3e64cf7a435e and push out a new -rc release.
Thanks so much for the quick testing and debugging.
greg k-h
Re: [PATCH 4.19 006/103] net: phy: phy driver features are mandatory
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanQuoted 8 lines
Quoted 4 lines
Hi
This points to an issue with the Generic 10G PHY driver. The following patch seems to be missing from the 4.19 stable tree and should be merged:
f802912 net: phy:genphy_10g_driver: Avoid NULL pointer dereferenceBut that patch says it:
Fixes 719655a14971 ("net: phy: Replace phy driver features u32 with link_mode bitmap")
Quoted 7 lines
Which is not in 4.19.y, it showed up in 4.20.
Ah, wait, I think that there was a patch backported to the 4.19.y queue that should not have, specifically:
3e64cf7a435e("net: phy: phy driver features are mandatory")
which said it too fixes:
719655a14971("net: phy: Replace phy driver features u32 withlink_modebitmap")
Hi Greg
None of these patches should be backported to v4.19. All the link mode and features stuff is v4.20 and later.
Thanks
Andrew
Re: [PATCH 4.19 006/103] net: phy: phy driver features are mandatory
In reply to Camelia Alexandra GrozaQuoted 143 lines · Camelia Alexandra Groza
Quoted 134 lines
-----Original Message-----
From: Holger Hoffstätte <[email protected]>
Sent: Tuesday, January 29, 2019 17:50
To: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>; linux- [email protected]
Cc: [email protected]; Scott Wood <[email protected]>; Camelia Alexandra Groza <[email protected]>; David S. Miller <[email protected]>; Heiner Kallweit <[email protected]>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 4.19 006/103] net: phy: phy driver features are mandatoryQuoted 1 line · Greg Kroah-Hartman
4.19-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me
know.
Quoted 7 lines
------------------
From: Camelia Groza <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit
3e64cf7a435ed0500e3adaa8aada2272d3ae8abc]Quoted 7 lines
Since phy driver features became a
link_modebitmap, phy drivers that don't have a list of features configured will cause the kernel to crash when probed.Prevent the phy driver from registering if the features field is missing.
Fixes 719655a14971 ("net: phy: Replace phy driver features u32 with
link_modebitmap")Quoted 28 lines
Reported-by Scott Wood <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Camelia Groza <[email protected]>Signed-off-by David S. Miller <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>--- drivers/net/phy/phy_device.c | 5 +++++ include/linux/phy.h | 4 ++-- 2 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)drivers/net/phy/phy_device.c +5
-0@@ -1917,6 +1917,11 @@ int phy_driver_register(struct phy_drive {int retval; +if (WARN_ON (!new_driver->features)) { +pr_err ("%s: Driver features are missing\n" , new_driver- name); +return -EINVAL ; + } + new_driver->mdiodrv.flags |=MDIO_DEVICE_IS_PHY ; new_driver->mdiodrv.driver.name = new_driver->name;new_driver->mdiodrv.driver.bus = &mdio_bus_type;include/linux/phy.h struct phy_device { · line 498
Quoted 10 lines
include/linux/phy.h +2
-2@@ -491,8 +491,8 @@ struct phy_device {* only works for PHYs with IDs which match this field * name: The friendly name of this PHY type * phy_id_mask: Defines the important bits of the phy_id -* features: A list of features (speed, duplex, etc) supported -* by this PHY +* features: A mandatory list of features (speed, duplex, etc) +* supported by this PHY * flags: A bitfield defining certain other features this PHY * supports (like interrupts) * This patch leads to the following dump during boot and no working network:
Jan 29 13:11:50 ragnarok kernel: RIP: 0010:phy_driver_register+0x5f/0x80 [libphy] Jan 29 13:11:50 ragnarok kernel: Code: dd 06 a0 48 c7 47 40 30 e4 06 a0 48 89 77 10 c7 47 24 02 00 00 00 e8 10 5c 44 e1 89 c5 85 c0 0f 85 aa 1d 00 00 89 e8 5b 5d c3 <0f> 0b 48 c7 c7 f0 20 07 a0 48 89 c6 bd ea ff ff ff e8 c9 4c 02 e1 Jan 29 13:11:50 ragnarok kernel: RSP: 0018:ffffc90000df3c78 EFLAGS: 00010246 Jan 29 13:11:50 ragnarok kernel: RAX: ffffffffa0071c8d RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000000 Jan 29 13:11:50 ragnarok kernel: RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffffffffa0076900 RDI: ffffffffa0076040 Jan 29 13:11:50 ragnarok kernel: RBP: ffffffffa007a000 R08: 0000000000000044 R09: 0000000000000228 Jan 29 13:11:50 ragnarok kernel: R10: ffff888603a0d6f8 R11: 000000000000003c R12: ffff888601252d00 Jan 29 13:11:50 ragnarok kernel: R13: 0000000000000002 R14: ffffc90000df3e98 R15: ffffffffa0076900 Jan 29 13:11:50 ragnarok kernel: FS: 00007feea9ced800(0000) GS:ffff888607240000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 Jan 29 13:11:50 ragnarok kernel: CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 Jan 29 13:11:50 ragnarok kernel: CR2: 00007feea9cdfc42 CR3: 00000005fec64001 CR4: 00000000000606e0 Jan 29 13:11:50 ragnarok kernel: Call Trace: Jan 29 13:11:50 ragnarok kernel: ? 0xffffffffa007a000 Jan 29 13:11:50 ragnarok kernel: phy_init+0x24/0x58 [libphy] Jan 29 13:11:50 ragnarok kernel: do_one_initcall+0x43/0x1af Jan 29 13:11:50 ragnarok kernel: ? _cond_resched+0x15/0x30 Jan 29 13:11:50 ragnarok kernel: ? kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0x154/0x1b0 Jan 29 13:11:50 ragnarok kernel: do_init_module+0x5a/0x210 Jan 29 13:11:50 ragnarok kernel: load_module+0x203a/0x2500 Jan 29 13:11:50 ragnarok kernel: ? vfs_read+0x10d/0x130 Jan 29 13:11:50 ragnarok kernel: ? __se_sys_finit_module+0xb1/0xd0 Jan 29 13:11:50 ragnarok kernel: __se_sys_finit_module+0xb1/0xd0 Jan 29 13:11:50 ragnarok kernel: do_syscall_64+0x3e/0xe0 Jan 29 13:11:50 ragnarok kernel: entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 Jan 29 13:11:50 ragnarok kernel: RIP: 0033:0x7feeaa2417c9 Jan 29 13:11:50 ragnarok kernel: Code: 00 00 00 75 05 48 83 c4 18 c3 e8 82 9c 01 00 66 90 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d 87 c6 0c 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48 Jan 29 13:11:50 ragnarok kernel: RSP: 002b:00007fff6fa6ea08 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000139 Jan 29 13:11:50 ragnarok kernel: RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 000055c6eac06db0 RCX: 00007feeaa2417c9 Jan 29 13:11:50 ragnarok kernel: RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 00007feeaa4198fd RDI: 0000000000000006 Jan 29 13:11:50 ragnarok kernel: RBP: 00007feeaa4198fd R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 000055c6eac03000 Jan 29 13:11:50 ragnarok kernel: R10: 0000000000000006 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000 Jan 29 13:11:50 ragnarok kernel: R13: 000055c6eabfc1d0 R14: 0000000000020000 R15: 000055c6eac06db0 Jan 29 13:11:50 ragnarok kernel: ---[ end trace 18e05a0afeb140b2 ]--- Jan 29 13:11:50 ragnarok kernel: libphy: Generic 10G PHY: Driver features aremissing
Apparently the r8169 driver for my NIC does something wrong wrt. this fix and the original commit (
719655a14971), but regardless - reverting this patch leads to a booting & working 4.19.19:Jan 29 13:29:16 ragnarok kernel: libphy: r8169: probed Jan 29 13:29:19 ragnarok kernel: RTL8211E Gigabit Ethernet r8169-400:00:Quoted 8 lines
attached PHY driver [RTL8211E Gigabit Ethernet] (mii_bus:phy_addr=r8169- 400:00, irq=IGNORE)
I've cc'ed Heiner Kallweit who might know why phylib with this fix and r8169 don't like each other.
cheers,
Holger
Quoted 8 lines
Hi
This points to an issue with the Generic 10G PHY driver. The following patch seems to be missing from the 4.19 stable tree and should be merged:
f802912 net: phy:genphy_10g_driver: Avoid NULL pointer dereferenceThanks for pointing this out.
Applied, unfortunately it doesn't compile since PHY_10GBIT_FEATURES is nowhere to be found. Took a quick look around and didn't really find any commit(s) that would apply as well.
Further suggestions welcome. :)
Holger
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerRe: [PATCH 4.19 006/103] net: phy: phy driver features are mandatory
In reply to Holger HoffstätteQuoted 95 lines · Holger Hoffstätte
Quoted 41 lines · Greg Kroah-Hartman
4.19-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Camelia Groza <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit
3e64cf7a435ed0500e3adaa8aada2272d3ae8abc]Since phy driver features became a
link_modebitmap, phy drivers that don't have a list of features configured will cause the kernel to crash when probed.Prevent the phy driver from registering if the features field is missing.
Fixes 719655a14971 ("net: phy: Replace phy driver features u32 with link_mode bitmap")Reported-by Scott Wood <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Camelia Groza <[email protected]>Signed-off-by David S. Miller <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>--- drivers/net/phy/phy_device.c | 5 +++++ include/linux/phy.h | 4 ++-- 2 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)drivers/net/phy/phy_device.c +5
-0@@ -1917,6 +1917,11 @@ int phy_driver_register(struct phy_drive {int retval; +if (WARN_ON (!new_driver->features)) { +pr_err ("%s: Driver features are missing\n" , new_driver->name); +return -EINVAL ; + } + new_driver->mdiodrv.flags |=MDIO_DEVICE_IS_PHY ; new_driver->mdiodrv.driver.name = new_driver->name; new_driver->mdiodrv.driver.bus = &mdio_bus_type;include/linux/phy.h struct phy_device { · line 498
Quoted 10 lines
include/linux/phy.h +2
-2@@ -491,8 +491,8 @@ struct phy_device {* only works for PHYs with IDs which match this field * name: The friendly name of this PHY type * phy_id_mask: Defines the important bits of the phy_id -* features: A list of features (speed, duplex, etc) supported -* by this PHY +* features: A mandatory list of features (speed, duplex, etc) +* supported by this PHY * flags: A bitfield defining certain other features this PHY * supports (like interrupts) * This patch leads to the following dump during boot and no working network:
Jan 29 13:11:50 ragnarok kernel: RIP: 0010:phy_driver_register+0x5f/0x80 [libphy] Jan 29 13:11:50 ragnarok kernel: Code: dd 06 a0 48 c7 47 40 30 e4 06 a0 48 89 77 10 c7 47 24 02 00 00 00 e8 10 5c 44 e1 89 c5 85 c0 0f 85 aa 1d 00 00 89 e8 5b 5d c3 <0f> 0b 48 c7 c7 f0 20 07 a0 48 89 c6 bd ea ff ff ff e8 c9 4c 02 e1 Jan 29 13:11:50 ragnarok kernel: RSP: 0018:ffffc90000df3c78 EFLAGS: 00010246 Jan 29 13:11:50 ragnarok kernel: RAX: ffffffffa0071c8d RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000000 Jan 29 13:11:50 ragnarok kernel: RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffffffffa0076900 RDI: ffffffffa0076040 Jan 29 13:11:50 ragnarok kernel: RBP: ffffffffa007a000 R08: 0000000000000044 R09: 0000000000000228 Jan 29 13:11:50 ragnarok kernel: R10: ffff888603a0d6f8 R11: 000000000000003c R12: ffff888601252d00 Jan 29 13:11:50 ragnarok kernel: R13: 0000000000000002 R14: ffffc90000df3e98 R15: ffffffffa0076900 Jan 29 13:11:50 ragnarok kernel: FS: 00007feea9ced800(0000) GS:ffff888607240000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 Jan 29 13:11:50 ragnarok kernel: CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 Jan 29 13:11:50 ragnarok kernel: CR2: 00007feea9cdfc42 CR3: 00000005fec64001 CR4: 00000000000606e0 Jan 29 13:11:50 ragnarok kernel: Call Trace: Jan 29 13:11:50 ragnarok kernel: ? 0xffffffffa007a000 Jan 29 13:11:50 ragnarok kernel: phy_init+0x24/0x58 [libphy] Jan 29 13:11:50 ragnarok kernel: do_one_initcall+0x43/0x1af Jan 29 13:11:50 ragnarok kernel: ? _cond_resched+0x15/0x30 Jan 29 13:11:50 ragnarok kernel: ? kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0x154/0x1b0 Jan 29 13:11:50 ragnarok kernel: do_init_module+0x5a/0x210 Jan 29 13:11:50 ragnarok kernel: load_module+0x203a/0x2500 Jan 29 13:11:50 ragnarok kernel: ? vfs_read+0x10d/0x130 Jan 29 13:11:50 ragnarok kernel: ? __se_sys_finit_module+0xb1/0xd0 Jan 29 13:11:50 ragnarok kernel: __se_sys_finit_module+0xb1/0xd0 Jan 29 13:11:50 ragnarok kernel: do_syscall_64+0x3e/0xe0 Jan 29 13:11:50 ragnarok kernel: entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 Jan 29 13:11:50 ragnarok kernel: RIP: 0033:0x7feeaa2417c9 Jan 29 13:11:50 ragnarok kernel: Code: 00 00 00 75 05 48 83 c4 18 c3 e8 82 9c 01 00 66 90 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d 87 c6 0c 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48 Jan 29 13:11:50 ragnarok kernel: RSP: 002b:00007fff6fa6ea08 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000139 Jan 29 13:11:50 ragnarok kernel: RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 000055c6eac06db0 RCX: 00007feeaa2417c9 Jan 29 13:11:50 ragnarok kernel: RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 00007feeaa4198fd RDI: 0000000000000006 Jan 29 13:11:50 ragnarok kernel: RBP: 00007feeaa4198fd R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 000055c6eac03000 Jan 29 13:11:50 ragnarok kernel: R10: 0000000000000006 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000 Jan 29 13:11:50 ragnarok kernel: R13: 000055c6eabfc1d0 R14: 0000000000020000 R15: 000055c6eac06db0 Jan 29 13:11:50 ragnarok kernel: ---[ end trace 18e05a0afeb140b2 ]--- Jan 29 13:11:50 ragnarok kernel: libphy: Generic 10G PHY: Driver features are missingApparently the r8169 driver for my NIC does something wrong wrt. this fix and the original commit (
719655a14971), but regardless - reverting this patch leads to a booting & working 4.19.19:
Quoted 5 lines
Jan 29 13:29:16 ragnarok kernel: libphy: r8169: probed Jan 29 13:29:19 ragnarok kernel: RTL8211E Gigabit Ethernet r8169-400:00: attached PHY driver [RTL8211E Gigabit Ethernet] (mii_bus:phy_addr=r8169-400:00, irq=IGNORE)I've cc'ed Heiner Kallweit who might know why phylib with this fix and r8169 don't like each other.
Does 5.0-rc3 also fail for you?
thanks,
greg k-h
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 7/103 net/sched: act_tunnel_key: fix memory leak in case of action replace
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman4.19-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Davide Caratti <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 9174c3df1cd181c14913138d50ccbe539bb08335 ]
running the following TDC test cases:
7afc - Replace tunnel_key set action with all parameters 364d - Replace tunnel_key set action with all parameters and cookie
it's possible to trigger kmemleak warnings like:
unreferenced object 0xffff94797127ab40 (size 192):
comm "tc", pid 3248, jiffies 4300565293 (age 1006.862s) hex dump (first 32 bytes):
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 c0 93 f9 8a ff ff ff ff ................
41 84 ee 89 ff ff ff ff 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 A...............
backtrace:
[<000000001e85b61c>] tunnel_key_init+0x31d/0x820 [act_tunnel_key]
[<000000007f3f6ee7>] tcf_action_init_1+0x384/0x4c0
[<00000000e89e3ded>] tcf_action_init+0x12b/0x1a0
[<00000000c1c8c0f8>] tcf_action_add+0x73/0x170
[<0000000095a9fc28>] tc_ctl_action+0x122/0x160
[<000000004bebeac5>] rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x263/0x2d0
[<000000009fd862dd>] netlink_rcv_skb+0x4a/0x110
[<00000000b55199e7>] netlink_unicast+0x1a0/0x250
[<000000004996cd21>] netlink_sendmsg+0x2c1/0x3c0
[<000000004d6a94b4>] sock_sendmsg+0x36/0x40
[<000000005d9f0208>] ___sys_sendmsg+0x280/0x2f0
[<00000000dec19023>] __sys_sendmsg+0x5e/0xa0
[<000000004b82ac81>] do_syscall_64+0x5b/0x180
[<00000000a0f1209a>] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
[<000000002926b2ab>] 0xffffffffffffffffwhen the tunnel_key action is replaced, the kernel forgets to release the dst metadata: ensure they are released by tunnel_key_init(), the same way it's done in tunnel_key_release().
--- net/sched/act_tunnel_key.c | 19 +++++++++++-------- 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
net/sched/act_tunnel_key.c +11 -8
@@ -197,6 +197,15 @@ static const struct nla_policy tunnel_ke [TCA_TUNNEL_KEY_ENC_TTL] = { .type = NLA_U8 }, }; +static void tunnel_key_release_params (struct tcf_tunnel_key_params *p) +{ +if (!p) +return ; +if (p->tcft_action ==TCA_TUNNEL_KEY_ACT_SET ) +dst_release (&p->tcft_enc_metadata->dst); +kfree_rcu (p, rcu); +} + static int tunnel_key_init(struct net *net, struct nlattr *nla, struct nlattr *est, struct tc_action **a, int ovr, int bind, bool rtnl_held,
@@ -360,8 +369,7 @@ static int tunnel_key_init(struct net *nrcu_swap_protected (t->params, params_new,lockdep_is_held (&t->tcf_lock));spin_unlock_bh (&t->tcf_lock); -if (params_new) -kfree_rcu (params_new, rcu); +tunnel_key_release_params (params_new);if (ret ==ACT_P_CREATED )tcf_idr_insert (tn, *a);
@@ -385,12 +393,7 @@ static void tunnel_key_release(struct tcstruct tcf_tunnel_key_params *params; params =rcu_dereference_protected (t->params,1 ); -if (params) { -if (params->tcft_action ==TCA_TUNNEL_KEY_ACT_SET ) -dst_release (¶ms->tcft_enc_metadata->dst); - -kfree_rcu (params, rcu); - } +tunnel_key_release_params (params); } static int tunnel_key_geneve_opts_dump(struct sk_buff *skb,
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 8/103 net_sched: refetch skb protocol for each filter
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman4.19-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Cong Wang <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit cd0c4e70fc0ccfa705cdf55efb27519ce9337a26 ]
Martin reported a set of filters don't work after changing from reclassify to continue. Looking into the code, it looks like skb protocol is not always fetched for each iteration of the filters. But, as demonstrated by Martin, TC actions could modify skb->protocol, for example act_vlan, this means we have to refetch skb protocol in each iteration, rather than using the one we fetch in the beginning of the loop.
This bug is _not_ introduced by commit 3b3ae880266d ("net: sched: consolidate tc_classify{,_compat}"), technically, if act_vlan is the only action that modifies skb protocol, then it is commit c7e2b9689ef8 ("sched: introduce vlan action") which introduced this bug.
--- net/sched/cls_api.c | 3 +-- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 2 deletions(-)
net/sched/cls_api.c +1 -2
@@ -960,7 +960,6 @@ static int tcf_block_cb_call(struct tcf_int tcf_classify (struct sk_buff *skb,const struct tcf_proto *tp,struct tcf_result *res,bool compat_mode) { -__be16 protocol =tc_skb_protocol (skb);#ifdef CONFIG_NET_CLS_ACT const int max_reclassify_loop =4 ;const struct tcf_proto *orig_tp = tp;
@@ -970,6 +969,7 @@ int tcf_classify(struct sk_buff *skb, co reclassify: #endiffor (; tp; tp =rcu_dereference_bh (tp->next)) { +__be16 protocol =tc_skb_protocol (skb);int err; if (tp->protocol != protocol &&
@@ -1002,7 +1002,6 @@ reset: } tp = first_tp; - protocol =tc_skb_protocol (skb); goto reclassify;#endif }
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 9/103 openvswitch: Avoid OOB read when parsing flow nlattrs
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman4.19-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Ross Lagerwall <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 04a4af334b971814eedf4e4a413343ad3287d9a9 ]
For nested and variable attributes, the expected length of an attribute is not known and marked by a negative number. This results in an OOB read when the expected length is later used to check if the attribute is all zeros. Fix this by using the actual length of the attribute rather than the expected length.
--- net/openvswitch/flow_netlink.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
net/openvswitch/flow_netlink.c +1 -1
@@ -500,7 +500,7 @@ static int __parse_flow_nlattrs(const streturn -EINVAL ; } -if (!nz || !is_all_zero (nla_data (nla), expected_len)) { +if (!nz || !is_all_zero (nla_data (nla),nla_len (nla))) { attrs |=1 << type; a[type] = nla; }
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 10/103 vhost: log dirty page correctly
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman4.19-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Jason Wang <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit cc5e710759470bc7f3c61d11fd54586f15fdbdf4 ]
Vhost dirty page logging API is designed to sync through GPA. But we try to log GIOVA when device IOTLB is enabled. This is wrong and may lead to missing data after migration.
To solve this issue, when logging with device IOTLB enabled, we will:
1) reuse the device IOTLB translation result of GIOVA->HVA mapping to get HVA, for writable descriptor, get HVA through iovec. For used ring update, translate its GIOVA to HVA
2) traverse the GPA->HVA mapping to get the possible GPA and log through GPA. Pay attention this reverse mapping is not guaranteed to be unique, so we should log each possible GPA in this case.
This fix the failure of scp to guest during migration. In -next, we will probably support passing GIOVA->GPA instead of GIOVA->HVA.
--- drivers/vhost/net.c | 3 + drivers/vhost/vhost.c | 97 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------- drivers/vhost/vhost.h | 3 + 3 files changed, 87 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-)
drivers/vhost/net.c +2 -1
@@ -1024,7 +1024,8 @@ static void handle_rx(struct vhost_net *if (nvq->done_idx >VHOST_NET_BATCH )vhost_net_signal_used (nvq);if (unlikely (vq_log)) -vhost_log_write (vq, vq_log, log, vhost_len); +vhost_log_write (vq, vq_log, log, vhost_len, + vq->iov, in); total_len += vhost_len;if (unlikely (vhost_exceeds_weight (++recv_pkts, total_len))) {vhost_poll_queue (&vq->poll);
drivers/vhost/vhost.c +83 -14
133 lines not on this page · raw message
drivers/vhost/vhost.h +2 -1
@@ -205,7 +205,8 @@ bool vhost_vq_avail_empty(struct vhost_dbool vhost_enable_notify (struct vhost_dev *,struct vhost_virtqueue *);int vhost_log_write (struct vhost_virtqueue *vq,struct vhost_log *log, -unsigned int log_num,u64 len); +unsigned int log_num,u64 len, +struct iovec *iov,int count);int vq_iotlb_prefetch (struct vhost_virtqueue *vq);struct vhost_msg_node *vhost_new_msg (struct vhost_virtqueue *vq,int type);
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 11/103 mlxsw: pci: Increase PCI SW reset timeout
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman4.19-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Nir Dotan <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit d2f372ba0914e5722ac28e15f2ed2db61bcf0e44 ]
Spectrum-2 PHY layer introduces a calibration period which is a part of the Spectrum-2 firmware boot process. Hence increase the SW timeout waiting for the firmware to come out of boot. This does not increase system boot time in cases where the firmware PHY calibration process is done quickly.
--- drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlxsw/pci_hw.h | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlxsw/pci_hw.h +1 -1
@@ -27,7 +27,7 @@#define MLXSW_PCI_SW_RESET 0xF0010#define MLXSW_PCI_SW_RESET_RST_BIT BIT(0) -#define MLXSW_PCI_SW_RESET_TIMEOUT_MSECS 5000 +#define MLXSW_PCI_SW_RESET_TIMEOUT_MSECS 13000#define MLXSW_PCI_SW_RESET_WAIT_MSECS 100#define MLXSW_PCI_FW_READY 0xA1844#define MLXSW_PCI_FW_READY_MASK 0xFFFF
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 12/103 net: ipv4: Fix memory leak in network namespace dismantle
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman4.19-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Ido Schimmel <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit f97f4dd8b3bb9d0993d2491e0f22024c68109184 ]
IPv4 routing tables are flushed in two cases:
1. In response to events in the netdev and inetaddr notification chains
2. When a network namespace is being dismantled
In both cases only routes associated with a dead nexthop group are flushed. However, a nexthop group will only be marked as dead in case it is populated with actual nexthops using a nexthop device. This is not the case when the route in question is an error route (e.g., 'blackhole', 'unreachable').
Therefore, when a network namespace is being dismantled such routes are not flushed and leaked [1].
To reproduce:
# ip netns add blue # ip -n blue route add unreachable 192.0.2.0/24 # ip netns del blue
Fix this by not skipping error routes that are not marked with RTNH_F_DEAD when flushing the routing tables.
To prevent the flushing of such routes in case #1, add a parameter to fib_table_flush() that indicates if the table is flushed as part of namespace dismantle or not.
Note that this problem does not exist in IPv6 since error routes are associated with the loopback device.
[1]
unreferenced object 0xffff888066650338 (size 56):
comm "ip", pid 1206, jiffies 4294786063 (age 26.235s) hex dump (first 32 bytes):
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 b0 1c 62 61 80 88 ff ff ..........ba....
e8 8b a1 64 80 88 ff ff 00 07 00 08 fe 00 00 00 ...d............
backtrace:
[<00000000856ed27d>] inet_rtm_newroute+0x129/0x220
[<00000000fcdfc00a>] rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x397/0xa20
[<00000000cb85801a>] netlink_rcv_skb+0x132/0x380
[<00000000ebc991d2>] netlink_unicast+0x4c0/0x690
[<0000000014f62875>] netlink_sendmsg+0x929/0xe10
[<00000000bac9d967>] sock_sendmsg+0xc8/0x110
[<00000000223e6485>] ___sys_sendmsg+0x77a/0x8f0
[<000000002e94f880>] __sys_sendmsg+0xf7/0x250
[<00000000ccb1fa72>] do_syscall_64+0x14d/0x610
[<00000000ffbe3dae>] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
[<000000003a8b605b>] 0xffffffffffffffffunreferenced object 0xffff888061621c88 (size 48):
comm "ip", pid 1206, jiffies 4294786063 (age 26.235s) hex dump (first 32 bytes):
6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b kkkkkkkkkkkkkkkk 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b d8 8e 26 5f 80 88 ff ff kkkkkkkk..&_....
backtrace:
[<00000000733609e3>] fib_table_insert+0x978/0x1500
[<00000000856ed27d>] inet_rtm_newroute+0x129/0x220
[<00000000fcdfc00a>] rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x397/0xa20
[<00000000cb85801a>] netlink_rcv_skb+0x132/0x380
[<00000000ebc991d2>] netlink_unicast+0x4c0/0x690
[<0000000014f62875>] netlink_sendmsg+0x929/0xe10
[<00000000bac9d967>] sock_sendmsg+0xc8/0x110
[<00000000223e6485>] ___sys_sendmsg+0x77a/0x8f0
[<000000002e94f880>] __sys_sendmsg+0xf7/0x250
[<00000000ccb1fa72>] do_syscall_64+0x14d/0x610
[<00000000ffbe3dae>] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
[<000000003a8b605b>] 0xffffffffffffffff--- include/net/ip_fib.h | 2 +- net/ipv4/fib_frontend.c | 4 ++-- net/ipv4/fib_trie.c | 15 ++++++++++++--- 3 files changed, 15 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
include/net/ip_fib.h +1 -1
@@ -230,7 +230,7 @@ int fib_table_delete(struct net *, struc struct netlink_ext_ack *extack);int fib_table_dump (struct fib_table *table,struct sk_buff *skb,struct netlink_callback *cb); -int fib_table_flush (struct net *net,struct fib_table *table); +int fib_table_flush (struct net *net,struct fib_table *table,bool flush_all);struct fib_table *fib_trie_unmerge (struct fib_table *main_tb);void fib_table_flush_external (struct fib_table *table);void fib_free_table (struct fib_table *tb);
net/ipv4/fib_frontend.c +2 -2
@@ -203,7 +203,7 @@ static void fib_flush(struct net *net)struct fib_table *tb;hlist_for_each_entry_safe (tb, tmp, head, tb_hlist) - flushed +=fib_table_flush (net, tb); + flushed +=fib_table_flush (net, tb, false); }if (flushed)
@@ -1357,7 +1357,7 @@ static void ip_fib_net_exit(struct net *hlist_for_each_entry_safe (tb, tmp, head, tb_hlist) {hlist_del (&tb->tb_hlist); -fib_table_flush (net, tb); +fib_table_flush (net, tb, true);fib_free_table (tb); } }
net/ipv4/fib_trie.c +12 -3
@@ -1856,7 +1856,7 @@ void fib_table_flush_external(struct fib }/* Caller must hold RTNL. */ -int fib_table_flush (struct net *net,struct fib_table *tb) +int fib_table_flush (struct net *net,struct fib_table *tb,bool flush_all) {struct trie *t = (struct trie *)tb->tb_data;struct key_vector *pn = t->kv;
@@ -1904,8 +1904,17 @@ int fib_table_flush(struct net *net, strhlist_for_each_entry_safe (fa, tmp, &n->leaf, fa_list) {struct fib_info *fi = fa->fa_info; -if (!fi || !(fi->fib_flags &RTNH_F_DEAD ) || - tb->tb_id != fa->tb_id) { +if (!fi || tb->tb_id != fa->tb_id || + (!(fi->fib_flags &RTNH_F_DEAD ) && + !fib_props[fa->fa_type].error)) { + slen = fa->fa_slen; +continue ; + } + +/* Do not flush error routes if network namespace is +* not being dismantled +*/ +if (!flush_all && fib_props[fa->fa_type].error) { slen = fa->fa_slen;continue ; }
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 13/103 mlxsw: spectrum_fid: Update dummy FID index
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman4.19-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Nir Dotan <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit a11dcd6497915ba79d95ef4fe2541aaac27f6201 ]
When using a tc flower action of egress mirred redirect, the driver adds an implicit FID setting action. This implicit action sets a dummy FID to the packet and is used as part of a design for trapping unmatched flows in OVS. While this implicit FID setting action is supposed to be a NOP when a redirect action is added, in Spectrum-2 the FID record is consulted as the dummy FID index is an 802.1D FID index and the packet is dropped instead of being redirected.
Set the dummy FID index value to be within 802.1Q range. This satisfies both Spectrum-1 which ignores the FID and Spectrum-2 which identifies it as an 802.1Q FID and will then follow the redirect action.
--- drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlxsw/spectrum_fid.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlxsw/spectrum_fid.c +2 -2
@@ -696,8 +696,8 @@ static const struct mlxsw_sp_fid_ops mlxstatic const struct mlxsw_sp_fid_family mlxsw_sp_fid_dummy_family = { .type =MLXSW_SP_FID_TYPE_DUMMY , .fid_size =sizeof (struct mlxsw_sp_fid ), - .start_index =MLXSW_SP_RFID_BASE -1 , - .end_index =MLXSW_SP_RFID_BASE -1 , + .start_index =VLAN_N_VID -1 , + .end_index =VLAN_N_VID -1 , .ops = &mlxsw_sp_fid_dummy_ops, };
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 14/103 mlxsw: pci: Ring CQs doorbell before RDQs
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman4.19-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Ido Schimmel <[email protected]>
When a packet should be trapped to the CPU the device consumes a WQE (work queue element) from an RDQ (receive descriptor queue) and copies the packet to the address specified in the WQE. The device then tries to post a CQE (completion queue element) that contains various metadata (e.g., ingress port) about the packet to a CQ (completion queue).
In case the device managed to consume a WQE, but did not manage to post the corresponding CQE, it will get stuck. This unlikely situation can be triggered due to the scheme the driver is currently using to process CQEs.
The driver will consume up to 512 CQEs at a time and after processing each corresponding WQE it will ring the RDQ's doorbell, letting the device know that a new WQE was posted for it to consume. Only after processing all the CQEs (up to 512), the driver will ring the CQ's doorbell, letting the device know that new ones can be posted.
Fix this by having the driver ring the CQ's doorbell for every processed CQE, but before ringing the RDQ's doorbell. This guarantees that whenever we post a new WQE, there is a corresponding CQE available. Copy the currently processed CQE to prevent the device from overwriting it with a new CQE after ringing the doorbell.
Note that the driver still arms the CQ only after processing all the pending CQEs, so that interrupts for this CQ will only be delivered after the driver finished its processing.
Before commit 8404f6f2e8ed ("mlxsw: pci: Allow to use CQEs of version 1 and version 2") the issue was virtually impossible to trigger since the number of CQEs was twice the number of WQEs and the number of CQEs processed at a time was equal to the number of available WQEs.
--- drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlxsw/pci.c | 12 +++++++----- drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlxsw/pci_hw.h | 1 + 2 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlxsw/pci.c +7 -5
@@ -604,29 +604,31 @@ static void mlxsw_pci_cq_tasklet(unsigneu16 wqe_counter =mlxsw_pci_cqe_wqe_counter_get (cqe);u8 sendq =mlxsw_pci_cqe_sr_get (q->u.cq.v, cqe);u8 dqn =mlxsw_pci_cqe_dqn_get (q->u.cq.v, cqe); +char ncqe[MLXSW_PCI_CQE_SIZE_MAX ]; + +memcpy (ncqe, cqe, q->elem_size); +mlxsw_pci_queue_doorbell_consumer_ring (mlxsw_pci, q);if (sendq) {struct mlxsw_pci_queue *sdq; sdq =mlxsw_pci_sdq_get (mlxsw_pci, dqn);mlxsw_pci_cqe_sdq_handle (mlxsw_pci, sdq, - wqe_counter, cqe); + wqe_counter, ncqe); q->u.cq.comp_sdq_count++; }else {struct mlxsw_pci_queue *rdq; rdq =mlxsw_pci_rdq_get (mlxsw_pci, dqn);mlxsw_pci_cqe_rdq_handle (mlxsw_pci, rdq, - wqe_counter, q->u.cq.v, cqe); + wqe_counter, q->u.cq.v, ncqe); q->u.cq.comp_rdq_count++; }if (++items == credits)break ; } -if (items) { -mlxsw_pci_queue_doorbell_consumer_ring (mlxsw_pci, q); +if (items)mlxsw_pci_queue_doorbell_arm_consumer_ring (mlxsw_pci, q); - } }static u16 mlxsw_pci_cq_elem_count (const struct mlxsw_pci_queue *q)
drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlxsw/pci_hw.h +1 -0
@@ -53,6 +53,7 @@#define MLXSW_PCI_WQE_SIZE 32/* 32 bytes per element */ #define MLXSW_PCI_CQE01_SIZE 16/* 16 bytes per element */ #define MLXSW_PCI_CQE2_SIZE 32/* 32 bytes per element */ +#define MLXSW_PCI_CQE_SIZE_MAX MLXSW_PCI_CQE2_SIZE#define MLXSW_PCI_EQE_SIZE 16/* 16 bytes per element */ #define MLXSW_PCI_WQE_COUNT (MLXSW_PCI_AQ_SIZE / MLXSW_PCI_WQE_SIZE)#define MLXSW_PCI_CQE01_COUNT (MLXSW_PCI_AQ_SIZE / MLXSW_PCI_CQE01_SIZE)
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 15/103 net/sched: cls_flower: allocate mask dynamically in fl_change()
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman4.19-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Ivan Vecera <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 2cddd20147826aef283115abb00012d4dafe3cdb ]
Recent changes (especially 05cd271fd61a ("cls_flower: Support multiple masks per priority")) in the fl_flow_mask structure grow it and its current size e.g. on x86_64 with defconfig is 760 bytes and more than 1024 bytes with some debug options enabled. Prior the mentioned commit its size was 176 bytes (using defconfig on x86_64).
With regard to this fact it's reasonable to allocate this structure dynamically in fl_change() to reduce its stack size.
v2:
- use kzalloc() instead of kcalloc()
--- net/sched/cls_flower.c | 19 ++++++++++++++----- 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
net/sched/cls_flower.c +14 -5
@@ -1176,17 +1176,23 @@ static int fl_change(struct net *net, ststruct cls_fl_head *head =rtnl_dereference (tp->root);struct cls_fl_filter *fold = *arg;struct cls_fl_filter *fnew; +struct fl_flow_mask *mask;struct nlattr **tb; -struct fl_flow_mask mask = {};int err;if (!tca[TCA_OPTIONS ])return -EINVAL ; - tb =kcalloc (TCA_FLOWER_MAX +1 ,sizeof (struct nlattr *),GFP_KERNEL ); -if (!tb) + mask =kzalloc (sizeof (struct fl_flow_mask ),GFP_KERNEL ); +if (!mask)return -ENOBUFS ; + tb =kcalloc (TCA_FLOWER_MAX +1 ,sizeof (struct nlattr *),GFP_KERNEL ); +if (!tb) { + err = -ENOBUFS ; + goto errout_mask_alloc; + } + err =nla_parse_nested (tb,TCA_FLOWER_MAX , tca[TCA_OPTIONS ], fl_policy,NULL );if (err <0 )
@@ -1229,12 +1235,12 @@ static int fl_change(struct net *net, st } } - err =fl_set_parms (net, tp, fnew, &mask, base, tb, tca[TCA_RATE ], ovr, + err =fl_set_parms (net, tp, fnew, mask, base, tb, tca[TCA_RATE ], ovr, tp->chain->tmplt_priv, extack);if (err) goto errout_idr; - err =fl_check_assign_mask (head, fnew, fold, &mask); + err =fl_check_assign_mask (head, fnew, fold, mask);if (err) goto errout_idr;
@@ -1281,6 +1287,7 @@ static int fl_change(struct net *net, st }kfree (tb); +kfree (mask);return 0 ; errout_mask:
@@ -1294,6 +1301,8 @@ errout:kfree (fnew); errout_tb:kfree (tb); +errout_mask_alloc: +kfree (mask);return err; }
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 16/103 udp: with udp_segment release on error path
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman4.19-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Willem de Bruijn <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 0f149c9fec3cd720628ecde83bfc6f64c1e7dcb6 ]
Failure __ip_append_data triggers udp_flush_pending_frames, but these tests happen later. The skb must be freed directly.
--- net/ipv4/udp.c | 16 ++++++++++++---- net/ipv6/udp.c | 16 ++++++++++++---- 2 files changed, 24 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
net/ipv4/udp.c +12 -4
@@ -785,15 +785,23 @@ static int udp_send_skb(struct sk_buff *const int hlen =skb_network_header_len (skb) +sizeof (struct udphdr ); -if (hlen + cork->gso_size > cork->fragsize) +if (hlen + cork->gso_size > cork->fragsize) { +kfree_skb (skb);return -EINVAL ; -if (skb->len > cork->gso_size *UDP_MAX_SEGMENTS ) + } +if (skb->len > cork->gso_size *UDP_MAX_SEGMENTS ) { +kfree_skb (skb);return -EINVAL ; -if (sk->sk_no_check_tx) + } +if (sk->sk_no_check_tx) { +kfree_skb (skb);return -EINVAL ; + }if (skb->ip_summed !=CHECKSUM_PARTIAL || is_udplite || -dst_xfrm (skb_dst (skb))) +dst_xfrm (skb_dst (skb))) { +kfree_skb (skb);return -EIO ; + }skb_shinfo (skb)->gso_size = cork->gso_size;skb_shinfo (skb)->gso_type =SKB_GSO_UDP_L4 ;
net/ipv6/udp.c +12 -4
@@ -1056,15 +1056,23 @@ static int udp_v6_send_skb(struct sk_bufconst int hlen =skb_network_header_len (skb) +sizeof (struct udphdr ); -if (hlen + cork->gso_size > cork->fragsize) +if (hlen + cork->gso_size > cork->fragsize) { +kfree_skb (skb);return -EINVAL ; -if (skb->len > cork->gso_size *UDP_MAX_SEGMENTS ) + } +if (skb->len > cork->gso_size *UDP_MAX_SEGMENTS ) { +kfree_skb (skb);return -EINVAL ; -if (udp_sk (sk)->no_check6_tx) + } +if (udp_sk (sk)->no_check6_tx) { +kfree_skb (skb);return -EINVAL ; + }if (skb->ip_summed !=CHECKSUM_PARTIAL || is_udplite || -dst_xfrm (skb_dst (skb))) +dst_xfrm (skb_dst (skb))) { +kfree_skb (skb);return -EIO ; + }skb_shinfo (skb)->gso_size = cork->gso_size;skb_shinfo (skb)->gso_type =SKB_GSO_UDP_L4 ;
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 17/103 ip6_gre: fix tunnel list corruption for x-netns
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman4.19-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Olivier Matz <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit ab5098fa25b91cb6fe0a0676f17abb64f2bbf024 ]
In changelink ops, the ip6gre_net pointer is retrieved from dev_net(dev), which is wrong in case of x-netns. Thus, the tunnel is not unlinked from its current list and is relinked into another net namespace. This corrupts the tunnel lists and can later trigger a kernel oops.
Fix this by retrieving the netns from device private area.
--- net/ipv6/ip6_gre.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
net/ipv6/ip6_gre.c +2 -2
@@ -2047,9 +2047,9 @@ static int ip6gre_changelink(struct net_struct nlattr *data[], struct netlink_ext_ack *extack) { - struct ip6gre_net *ign = net_generic(dev_net(dev), ip6gre_net_id); + struct ip6_tnl *t = netdev_priv(dev); +struct ip6gre_net *ign =net_generic (t->net, ip6gre_net_id);struct __ip6_tnl_parm p; -struct ip6_tnl *t; t =ip6gre_changelink_common (dev, tb, data, &p, extack);if (IS_ERR (t))
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 18/103 erspan: build the header with the right proto according to erspan_ver
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman4.19-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Xin Long <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 20704bd1633dd5afb29a321d3a615c9c8e9c9d05 ]
As said in draft-foschiano-erspan-03#section4:
Different frame variants known as "ERSPAN Types" can be distinguished based on the GRE "Protocol Type" field value: Type I and II's value is 0x88BE while Type III's is 0x22EB [ETYPES].
So set it properly in erspan_xmit() according to erspan_ver. While at it, also remove the unused parameter 'proto' in erspan_fb_xmit().
--- net/ipv4/ip_gre.c | 23 ++++++++++++++--------- net/ipv6/ip6_gre.c | 6 ++++-- 2 files changed, 18 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
net/ipv4/ip_gre.c +14 -9
@@ -570,8 +570,7 @@ err_free_skb: dev->stats.tx_dropped++; } -static void erspan_fb_xmit (struct sk_buff *skb,struct net_device *dev, -__be16 proto) +static void erspan_fb_xmit (struct sk_buff *skb,struct net_device *dev) {struct ip_tunnel *tunnel =netdev_priv (dev);struct ip_tunnel_info *tun_info;
@@ -579,10 +578,10 @@ static void erspan_fb_xmit(struct sk_bufstruct erspan_metadata *md;struct rtable *rt =NULL ;bool truncate = false; +__be16 df, proto;struct flowi4 fl;int tunnel_hlen;int version; -__be16 df;int nhoff;int thoff;
@@ -627,18 +626,20 @@ static void erspan_fb_xmit(struct sk_bufif (version ==1 ) {erspan_build_header (skb,ntohl (tunnel_id_to_key32 (key->tun_id)),ntohl (md->u.index), truncate, true); + proto =htons (ETH_P_ERSPAN ); }else if (version ==2 ) {erspan_build_header_v2 (skb,ntohl (tunnel_id_to_key32 (key->tun_id)), md->u.md2.dir,get_hwid (&md->u.md2), truncate, true); + proto =htons (ETH_P_ERSPAN2 ); }else { goto err_free_rt; }gre_build_header (skb,8 ,TUNNEL_SEQ , -htons (ETH_P_ERSPAN ),0 ,htonl (tunnel->o_seqno++)); + proto,0 ,htonl (tunnel->o_seqno++)); df = key->tun_flags &TUNNEL_DONT_FRAGMENT ?htons (IP_DF ) :0 ;
@@ -722,12 +723,13 @@ static netdev_tx_t erspan_xmit(struct sk {struct ip_tunnel *tunnel =netdev_priv (dev);bool truncate = false; +__be16 proto;if (!pskb_inet_may_pull (skb)) goto free_skb;if (tunnel->collect_md) { -erspan_fb_xmit (skb, dev, skb->protocol); +erspan_fb_xmit (skb, dev);return NETDEV_TX_OK ; }
@@ -743,19 +745,22 @@ static netdev_tx_t erspan_xmit(struct sk }/* Push ERSPAN header */ -if (tunnel->erspan_ver ==1 ) +if (tunnel->erspan_ver ==1 ) {erspan_build_header (skb,ntohl (tunnel->parms.o_key), tunnel->index, truncate, true); -else if (tunnel->erspan_ver ==2 ) + proto =htons (ETH_P_ERSPAN ); + }else if (tunnel->erspan_ver ==2 ) {erspan_build_header_v2 (skb,ntohl (tunnel->parms.o_key), tunnel->dir, tunnel->hwid, truncate, true); -else + proto =htons (ETH_P_ERSPAN2 ); + }else { goto free_skb; + } tunnel->parms.o_flags &= ~TUNNEL_KEY ; -__gre_xmit (skb, dev, &tunnel->parms.iph,htons (ETH_P_ERSPAN )); +__gre_xmit (skb, dev, &tunnel->parms.iph, proto);return NETDEV_TX_OK ; free_skb:
net/ipv6/ip6_gre.c +4 -2
@@ -938,6 +938,7 @@ static netdev_tx_t ip6erspan_tunnel_xmit__u8 dsfield = false;struct flowi6 fl6;int err = -EINVAL ; +__be16 proto;__u32 mtu;int nhoff;int thoff;
@@ -1051,8 +1052,9 @@ static netdev_tx_t ip6erspan_tunnel_xmit }/* Push GRE header. */ -gre_build_header (skb,8 ,TUNNEL_SEQ , -htons (ETH_P_ERSPAN ),0 ,htonl (t->o_seqno++)); + proto = (t->parms.erspan_ver ==1 ) ?htons (ETH_P_ERSPAN ) + :htons (ETH_P_ERSPAN2 ); +gre_build_header (skb,8 ,TUNNEL_SEQ , proto,0 ,htonl (t->o_seqno++));/* TooBig packet may have updated dst->dev's mtu */ if (!t->parms.collect_md && dst &&dst_mtu (dst) > dst->dev->mtu)
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 19/103 net: phy: marvell: Fix deadlock from wrong locking
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman4.19-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Andrew Lunn <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit e0a7328fad9979104f73e19bedca821ef3262ae1 ]
m88e1318_set_wol() takes the lock as part of phy_select_page(). Don't take the lock again with phy_read(), use the unlocked __phy_read().
--- drivers/net/phy/marvell.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/net/phy/marvell.c +1 -1
@@ -1451,7 +1451,7 @@ static int m88e1318_set_wol(struct phy_d* before enabling it if !phy_interrupt_is_valid() */ if (!phy_interrupt_is_valid (phydev)) -phy_read (phydev,MII_M1011_IEVENT ); +__phy_read (phydev,MII_M1011_IEVENT );/* Enable the WOL interrupt */ err = __phy_modify(phydev, MII_88E1318S_PHY_CSIER, 0,
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 20/103 ip6_gre: update version related info when changing link
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman4.19-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Hangbin Liu <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 80b3671e9377916bf2b02e56113fa7377ce5705a ]
We forgot to update ip6erspan version related info when changing link, which will cause setting new hwid failed.
--- net/ipv6/ip6_gre.c | 4 ++++ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)
net/ipv6/ip6_gre.c +4 -0
@@ -1187,6 +1187,10 @@ static void ip6gre_tnl_copy_tnl_parm(str t->parms.i_flags = p->i_flags; t->parms.o_flags = p->o_flags; t->parms.fwmark = p->fwmark; + t->parms.erspan_ver = p->erspan_ver; + t->parms.index = p->index; + t->parms.dir = p->dir; + t->parms.hwid = p->hwid;dst_cache_reset (&t->dst_cache); }
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 21/103 tcp: allow MSG_ZEROCOPY transmission also in CLOSE_WAIT state
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman4.19-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Willem de Bruijn <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 13d7f46386e060df31b727c9975e38306fa51e7a ]
TCP transmission with MSG_ZEROCOPY fails if the peer closes its end of the connection and so transitions this socket to CLOSE_WAIT state.
Transmission in close wait state is acceptable. Other similar tests in the stack (e.g., in FastOpen) accept both states. Relax this test, too.
--- net/ipv4/tcp.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
net/ipv4/tcp.c +1 -1
@@ -1186,7 +1186,7 @@ int tcp_sendmsg_locked(struct sock *sk, flags = msg->msg_flags;if (flags &MSG_ZEROCOPY && size &&sock_flag (sk,SOCK_ZEROCOPY )) { -if (sk->sk_state !=TCP_ESTABLISHED ) { +if ((1 << sk->sk_state) & ~(TCPF_ESTABLISHED |TCPF_CLOSE_WAIT )) { err = -EINVAL ; goto out_err; }
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 22/103 mei: me: mark LBG devices as having dma support
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman4.19-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Alexander Usyskin <[email protected]>
commit 173436ba800d01178a8b19e5de4a8cb02c0db760 upstream.
The LBG server platform sports DMA support.
--- drivers/misc/mei/pci-me.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/misc/mei/pci-me.c +1 -1
@@ -88,7 +88,7 @@ static const struct pci_device_id mei_me {MEI_PCI_DEVICE(MEI_DEV_ID_SPT_2, MEI_ME_PCH8_CFG)}, {MEI_PCI_DEVICE(MEI_DEV_ID_SPT_H, MEI_ME_PCH8_SPS_CFG)}, {MEI_PCI_DEVICE(MEI_DEV_ID_SPT_H_2, MEI_ME_PCH8_SPS_CFG)}, - {MEI_PCI_DEVICE(MEI_DEV_ID_LBG, MEI_ME_PCH8_CFG)}, + {MEI_PCI_DEVICE(MEI_DEV_ID_LBG, MEI_ME_PCH12_CFG)}, {MEI_PCI_DEVICE(MEI_DEV_ID_BXT_M, MEI_ME_PCH8_CFG)}, {MEI_PCI_DEVICE(MEI_DEV_ID_APL_I, MEI_ME_PCH8_CFG)},
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 23/103 mei: me: add denverton innovation engine device IDs
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman4.19-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Tomas Winkler <[email protected]>
commit f7ee8ead151f9d0b8dac6ab6c3ff49bbe809c564 upstream.
Add the Denverton innovation engine (IE) device ids. The IE is an ME-like device which provides HW security offloading.
--- drivers/misc/mei/hw-me-regs.h | 2 ++ drivers/misc/mei/pci-me.c | 2 ++ 2 files changed, 4 insertions(+)
drivers/misc/mei/hw-me-regs.h +2 -0
@@ -127,6 +127,8 @@#define MEI_DEV_ID_BXT_M 0x1A9A/* Broxton M */ #define MEI_DEV_ID_APL_I 0x5A9A/* Apollo Lake I */ +#define MEI_DEV_ID_DNV_IE 0x19E5/* Denverton IE */ +#define MEI_DEV_ID_GLK 0x319A/* Gemini Lake */ #define MEI_DEV_ID_KBP 0xA2BA/* Kaby Point */
drivers/misc/mei/pci-me.c +2 -0
@@ -93,6 +93,8 @@ static const struct pci_device_id mei_me {MEI_PCI_DEVICE(MEI_DEV_ID_BXT_M, MEI_ME_PCH8_CFG)}, {MEI_PCI_DEVICE(MEI_DEV_ID_APL_I, MEI_ME_PCH8_CFG)}, + {MEI_PCI_DEVICE(MEI_DEV_ID_DNV_IE, MEI_ME_PCH8_CFG)}, + {MEI_PCI_DEVICE(MEI_DEV_ID_GLK, MEI_ME_PCH8_CFG)}, {MEI_PCI_DEVICE(MEI_DEV_ID_KBP, MEI_ME_PCH8_CFG)},
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 24/103 USB: leds: fix regression in usbport led trigger
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman4.19-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Christian Lamparter <[email protected]>
commit 91f7d2e89868fcac0e750a28230fdb1ad4512137 upstream.
The patch "usb: simplify usbport trigger" together with "leds: triggers:
add device attribute support" caused an regression for the usbport trigger. it will no longer enumerate any active usb hub ports under the "ports" directory in the sysfs class directory, if the usb host drivers are fully initialized before the usbport trigger was loaded.
The reason is that the usbport driver tries to register the sysfs entries during the activate() callback. And this will fail with -2 / ENOENT because the patch "leds: triggers: add device attribute support" made it so that the sysfs "ports" group was only being added after the activate() callback succeeded.
This version of the patch reverts parts of the "usb: simplify usbport trigger" patch and restores usbport trigger's functionality.
--- drivers/usb/core/ledtrig-usbport.c | 17 ++++++++++------- 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
drivers/usb/core/ledtrig-usbport.c +10 -7
@@ -119,11 +119,6 @@ static const struct attribute_group port .attrs = ports_attrs, }; -static const struct attribute_group *ports_groups[] = { - &ports_group, -NULL -}; -/*************************************** * Adding & removing ports ***************************************/
@@ -307,6 +302,7 @@ static int usbport_trig_notify(struct nostatic int usbport_trig_activate (struct led_classdev *led_cdev) {struct usbport_trig_data *usbport_data; +int err; usbport_data =kzalloc (sizeof (*usbport_data),GFP_KERNEL );if (!usbport_data)
@@ -315,6 +311,9 @@ static int usbport_trig_activate(struct/* List of ports */ INIT_LIST_HEAD (&usbport_data->ports); + err =sysfs_create_group (&led_cdev->dev->kobj, &ports_group); +if (err) + goto err_free;usb_for_each_dev (usbport_data, usbport_trig_add_usb_dev_ports);usbport_trig_update_count (usbport_data);
@@ -322,8 +321,11 @@ static int usbport_trig_activate(struct usbport_data->nb.notifier_call = usbport_trig_notify;led_set_trigger_data (led_cdev, usbport_data);usb_register_notify (&usbport_data->nb); -return 0 ; + +err_free: +kfree (usbport_data); +return err; }static void usbport_trig_deactivate (struct led_classdev *led_cdev)
@@ -335,6 +337,8 @@ static void usbport_trig_deactivate(struusbport_trig_remove_port (usbport_data, port); } +sysfs_remove_group (&led_cdev->dev->kobj, &ports_group); +usb_unregister_notify (&usbport_data->nb);kfree (usbport_data);
@@ -344,7 +348,6 @@ static struct led_trigger usbport_led_tr .name = "usbport", .activate = usbport_trig_activate, .deactivate = usbport_trig_deactivate, - .groups = ports_groups, };static int __init usbport_trig_init (void )
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 25/103 USB: serial: simple: add Motorola Tetra TPG2200 device id
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman4.19-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Max Schulze <[email protected]>
commit b81c2c33eab79dfd3650293b2227ee5c6036585c upstream.
Add new Motorola Tetra device id for Motorola Solutions TETRA PEI device
T: Bus=02 Lev=01 Prnt=01 Port=01 Cnt=01 Dev#= 4 Spd=480 MxCh= 0 D: Ver= 2.00 Cls=00(>ifc ) Sub=00 Prot=00 MxPS=64 #Cfgs= 1 P: Vendor=0cad ProdID=9016 Rev=24.16 S: Manufacturer=Motorola Solutions, Inc. S: Product=TETRA PEI interface C: #Ifs= 2 Cfg#= 1 Atr=80 MxPwr=500mA I: If#= 0 Alt= 0 #EPs= 2 Cls=ff(vend.) Sub=00 Prot=00 Driver=usb_serial_simple I: If#= 1 Alt= 0 #EPs= 2 Cls=ff(vend.) Sub=00 Prot=00 Driver=usb_serial_simple
--- drivers/usb/serial/usb-serial-simple.c | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/usb/serial/usb-serial-simple.c +2 -1
@@ -85,7 +85,8 @@ DEVICE(moto_modem, MOTO_IDS);/* Motorola Tetra driver */ #define MOTOROLA_TETRA_IDS () \ { USB_DEVICE(0x0cad, 0x9011) },/* Motorola Solutions TETRA PEI */ \ - { USB_DEVICE(0x0cad, 0x9012) } /* MTP6550 */ + { USB_DEVICE(0x0cad, 0x9012) }, /* MTP6550 */ \ + { USB_DEVICE(0x0cad, 0x9016) } /* TPG2200 */DEVICE (motorola_tetra,MOTOROLA_TETRA_IDS );/* Novatel Wireless GPS driver */
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 26/103 USB: serial: pl2303: add new PID to support PL2303TB
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman4.19-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Charles Yeh <[email protected]>
commit 4dcf9ddc9ad5ab649abafa98c5a4d54b1a33dabb upstream.
Add new PID to support PL2303TB (TYPE_HX)
--- drivers/usb/serial/pl2303.c | 1 + drivers/usb/serial/pl2303.h | 2 ++ 2 files changed, 3 insertions(+)
drivers/usb/serial/pl2303.c +1 -0
@@ -46,6 +46,7 @@ static const struct usb_device_id id_tab { USB_DEVICE(PL2303_VENDOR_ID, PL2303_PRODUCT_ID_HCR331) }, { USB_DEVICE(PL2303_VENDOR_ID, PL2303_PRODUCT_ID_MOTOROLA) }, { USB_DEVICE(PL2303_VENDOR_ID, PL2303_PRODUCT_ID_ZTEK) }, + { USB_DEVICE(PL2303_VENDOR_ID, PL2303_PRODUCT_ID_TB) }, { USB_DEVICE(IODATA_VENDOR_ID, IODATA_PRODUCT_ID) }, { USB_DEVICE(IODATA_VENDOR_ID, IODATA_PRODUCT_ID_RSAQ5) }, { USB_DEVICE(ATEN_VENDOR_ID, ATEN_PRODUCT_ID),
drivers/usb/serial/pl2303.h +2 -0
@@ -8,6 +8,7 @@#define PL2303_VENDOR_ID 0x067b#define PL2303_PRODUCT_ID 0x2303 +#define PL2303_PRODUCT_ID_TB 0x2304#define PL2303_PRODUCT_ID_RSAQ2 0x04bb#define PL2303_PRODUCT_ID_DCU11 0x1234#define PL2303_PRODUCT_ID_PHAROS 0xaaa0
@@ -20,6 +21,7 @@#define PL2303_PRODUCT_ID_MOTOROLA 0x0307#define PL2303_PRODUCT_ID_ZTEK 0xe1f1 +#define ATEN_VENDOR_ID 0x0557#define ATEN_VENDOR_ID2 0x0547#define ATEN_PRODUCT_ID 0x2008
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 27/103 ceph: clear inode pointer when snap realm gets dropped by its inode
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman4.19-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Yan, Zheng <[email protected]>
commit d95e674c01cfb5461e8b9fdeebf6d878c9b80b2f upstream.
snap realm and corresponding inode have pointers to each other. The two pointer should get clear at the same time. Otherwise, snap realm's pointer may reference freed inode.
--- fs/ceph/caps.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
fs/ceph/caps.c +2 -0
@@ -1030,6 +1030,8 @@ static void drop_inode_snap_realm(structlist_del_init (&ci->i_snap_realm_item); ci->i_snap_realm_counter++; ci->i_snap_realm =NULL ; +if (realm->ino == ci->i_vino.ino) + realm->inode =NULL ;spin_unlock (&realm->inodes_with_caps_lock);ceph_put_snap_realm (ceph_sb_to_client (ci->vfs_inode.i_sb)->mdsc, realm);
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 28/103 ASoC: atom: fix a missing check of snd_pcm_lib_malloc_pages
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman4.19-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Kangjie Lu <[email protected]>
commit 44fabd8cdaaa3acb80ad2bb3b5c61ae2136af661 upstream.
snd_pcm_lib_malloc_pages() may fail, so let's check its status and return its error code upstream.
--- sound/soc/intel/atom/sst-mfld-platform-pcm.c | 8 +++++++- 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
sound/soc/intel/atom/sst-mfld-platform-pcm.c +7 -1
@@ -399,7 +399,13 @@ static int sst_media_hw_params(struct snstruct snd_pcm_hw_params *params, struct snd_soc_dai *dai) { -snd_pcm_lib_malloc_pages (substream ,params_buffer_bytes (params )); + int ret; + + ret = +snd_pcm_lib_malloc_pages (substream, +params_buffer_bytes (params)); +if (ret) +return ret;memset (substream->runtime->dma_area,0 ,params_buffer_bytes (params));return 0 ; }
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 29/103 ASoC: rt5514-spi: Fix potential NULL pointer dereference
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman4.19-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Gustavo A. R. Silva <[email protected]>
commit 060d0bf491874daece47053c4e1fb0489eb867d2 upstream.
There is a potential NULL pointer dereference in case devm_kzalloc() fails and returns NULL.
Fix this by adding a NULL check on rt5514_dsp.
This issue was detected with the help of Coccinelle.
--- sound/soc/codecs/rt5514-spi.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
sound/soc/codecs/rt5514-spi.c +2 -0
@@ -278,6 +278,8 @@ static int rt5514_spi_pcm_probe(struct s rt5514_dsp =devm_kzalloc (component->dev,sizeof (*rt5514_dsp),GFP_KERNEL ); +if (!rt5514_dsp) +return -ENOMEM ; rt5514_dsp->dev = &rt5514_spi->dev;mutex_init (&rt5514_dsp->dma_lock);
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 30/103 ASoC: tlv320aic32x4: Kernel OOPS while entering DAPM standby mode
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman4.19-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: b-ak <[email protected]>
commit 667e9334fa64da2273e36ce131b05ac9e47c5769 upstream.
During the bootup of the kernel, the DAPM bias level is in the OFF state. As soon as the DAPM framework kicks in it pushes the codec into STANDBY state.
The probe function doesn't prepare the clock, and STANDBY state does a clk_disable_unprepare() without checking the previous state. This leads to an OOPS.
Not transitioning from an OFF state to the STANDBY state fixes the problem.
--- sound/soc/codecs/tlv320aic32x4.c | 4 ++++ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)
sound/soc/codecs/tlv320aic32x4.c +4 -0
@@ -822,6 +822,10 @@ static int aic32x4_set_bias_level(structcase SND_SOC_BIAS_PREPARE :break ;case SND_SOC_BIAS_STANDBY : +/* Initial cold start */ +if (snd_soc_component_get_bias_level (component) ==SND_SOC_BIAS_OFF ) +break ; +/* Switch off BCLK_N Divider */ snd_soc_component_update_bits (component,AIC32X4_BCLKN ,AIC32X4_BCLKEN ,0 );
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 31/103 clk: socfpga: stratix10: fix rate calculation for pll clocks
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman4.19-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Dinh Nguyen <[email protected]>
commit c0a636e4cc2eb39244d23c0417c117be4c96a7fe upstream.
The main PLL calculation has a mistake. We should be using the multiplying the VCO frequency, not the parent clock frequency.
Stratix10 platform")
--- drivers/clk/socfpga/clk-pll-s10.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/clk/socfpga/clk-pll-s10.c +1 -1
@@ -43,7 +43,7 @@ static unsigned long clk_pll_recalc_rate/* Read mdiv and fdiv from the fdbck register */ reg =readl (socfpgaclk->hw.reg +0x4 ); mdiv = (reg &SOCFPGA_PLL_MDIV_MASK ) >>SOCFPGA_PLL_MDIV_SHIFT ; - vco_freq = (unsigned long long )parent_rate * (mdiv +6 ); + vco_freq = (unsigned long long )vco_freq * (mdiv +6 );return (unsigned long )vco_freq; }
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 32/103 clk: socfpga: stratix10: fix naming convention for the fixed-clocks
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman4.19-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Dinh Nguyen <[email protected]>
commit b488517b28a47d16b228ce8dcf07f5cb8e5b3dc5 upstream.
The fixed clocks in the DTS file have a hyphen, but the clock driver has the fixed clocks using underbar. Thus the clock driver cannot detect the other fixed clocks correctly. Change the fixed clock names to a hyphen.
Stratix10 platform")
--- drivers/clk/socfpga/clk-s10.c | 20 ++++++++++---------- 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
drivers/clk/socfpga/clk-s10.c +10 -10
@@ -12,17 +12,17 @@#include "stratix10-clk.h" -static const char *const pll_mux[] = {"osc1" ,"cb_intosc_hs_div2_clk" , -"f2s_free_clk" ,}; +static const char *const pll_mux[] = {"osc1" ,"cb-intosc-hs-div2-clk" , +"f2s-free-clk" ,};static const char *const cntr_mux[] = {"main_pll" ,"periph_pll" , -"osc1" ,"cb_intosc_hs_div2_clk" , -"f2s_free_clk" }; -static const char *const boot_mux[] = {"osc1" ,"cb_intosc_hs_div2_clk" ,}; +"osc1" ,"cb-intosc-hs-div2-clk" , +"f2s-free-clk" }; +static const char *const boot_mux[] = {"osc1" ,"cb-intosc-hs-div2-clk" ,};static const char *const noc_free_mux[] = {"main_noc_base_clk" ,"peri_noc_base_clk" , -"osc1" ,"cb_intosc_hs_div2_clk" , -"f2s_free_clk" }; +"osc1" ,"cb-intosc-hs-div2-clk" , +"f2s-free-clk" };static const char *const emaca_free_mux[] = {"peri_emaca_clk" ,"boot_clk" };static const char *const emacb_free_mux[] = {"peri_emacb_clk" ,"boot_clk" };
@@ -33,14 +33,14 @@ static const char * const s2f_usr1_free_static const char *const psi_ref_free_mux[] = {"peri_psi_ref_clk" ,"boot_clk" };static const char *const mpu_mux[] = {"mpu_free_clk" ,"boot_clk" ,}; -static const char *const s2f_usr0_mux[] = {"f2s_free_clk" ,"boot_clk" }; +static const char *const s2f_usr0_mux[] = {"f2s-free-clk" ,"boot_clk" };static const char *const emac_mux[] = {"emaca_free_clk" ,"emacb_free_clk" };static const char *const noc_mux[] = {"noc_free_clk" ,"boot_clk" };static const char *const mpu_free_mux[] = {"main_mpu_base_clk" ,"peri_mpu_base_clk" , -"osc1" ,"cb_intosc_hs_div2_clk" , -"f2s_free_clk" }; +"osc1" ,"cb-intosc-hs-div2-clk" , +"f2s-free-clk" };/* clocks in AO (always on) controller */ static const struct stratix10_pll_clock s10_pll_clks[] = {
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 33/103 inotify: Fix fd refcount leak in inotify_add_watch().
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman4.19-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Tetsuo Handa <[email protected]>
commit 125892edfe69915a227d8d125ff0e1cd713178f4 upstream.
Commit 4d97f7d53da7dc83 ("inotify: Add flag IN_MASK_CREATE for inotify_add_watch()") forgot to call fdput() before bailing out.
--- fs/notify/inotify/inotify_user.c | 6 ++++-- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
fs/notify/inotify/inotify_user.c +4 -2
@@ -724,8 +724,10 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE3(inotify_add_watch, int,return -EBADF ;/* IN_MASK_ADD and IN_MASK_CREATE don't make sense together */ -if (unlikely ((mask &IN_MASK_ADD ) && (mask &IN_MASK_CREATE ))) -return -EINVAL ; +if (unlikely ((mask &IN_MASK_ADD ) && (mask &IN_MASK_CREATE ))) { + ret = -EINVAL ; + goto fput_and_out; + }/* verify that this is indeed an inotify instance */ if (unlikely (f.file->f_op != &inotify_fops)) {
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 34/103 ALSA: hda/realtek - Fix typo for ALC225 model
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman4.19-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Kailang Yang <[email protected]>
commit 82aa0d7e09840704d9a37434fef1770179d663fb upstream.
Fix typo for model alc255-dell1 to alc225-dell1.
Enable headset mode support for new WYSE NB platform.
--- sound/pci/hda/patch_realtek.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
sound/pci/hda/patch_realtek.c +1 -1
@@ -6842,7 +6842,7 @@ static const struct hda_model_fixup alc2 {.id = ALC293_FIXUP_LENOVO_SPK_NOISE, .name = "lenovo-spk-noise"}, {.id = ALC233_FIXUP_LENOVO_LINE2_MIC_HOTKEY, .name = "lenovo-hotkey"}, {.id = ALC255_FIXUP_DELL_SPK_NOISE, .name = "dell-spk-noise"}, - {.id = ALC225_FIXUP_DELL1_MIC_NO_PRESENCE, .name = "alc255-dell1"}, + {.id = ALC225_FIXUP_DELL1_MIC_NO_PRESENCE, .name = "alc225-dell1"}, {.id = ALC295_FIXUP_DISABLE_DAC3, .name = "alc295-disable-dac3"}, {.id = ALC280_FIXUP_HP_HEADSET_MIC, .name = "alc280-hp-headset"}, {.id = ALC221_FIXUP_HP_FRONT_MIC, .name = "alc221-hp-mic"},
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 35/103 ALSA: hda - Add mute LED support for HP ProBook 470 G5
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman4.19-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Anthony Wong <[email protected]>
commit 699390381a7bae2fab01a22f742a17235c44ed8a upstream.
Support speaker and mic mute LEDs on HP ProBook 470 G5.
--- sound/pci/hda/patch_conexant.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
sound/pci/hda/patch_conexant.c +1 -0
@@ -931,6 +931,7 @@ static const struct snd_pci_quirk cxt506SND_PCI_QUIRK (0x103c ,0x814f ,"HP ZBook 15u G3" ,CXT_FIXUP_MUTE_LED_GPIO ),SND_PCI_QUIRK (0x103c ,0x822e ,"HP ProBook 440 G4" ,CXT_FIXUP_MUTE_LED_GPIO ),SND_PCI_QUIRK (0x103c ,0x836e ,"HP ProBook 455 G5" ,CXT_FIXUP_MUTE_LED_GPIO ), +SND_PCI_QUIRK (0x103c ,0x837f ,"HP ProBook 470 G5" ,CXT_FIXUP_MUTE_LED_GPIO ),SND_PCI_QUIRK (0x103c ,0x8299 ,"HP 800 G3 SFF" ,CXT_FIXUP_HP_MIC_NO_PRESENCE ),SND_PCI_QUIRK (0x103c ,0x829a ,"HP 800 G3 DM" ,CXT_FIXUP_HP_MIC_NO_PRESENCE ), SND_PCI_QUIRK(0x103c, 0x8455, "HP Z2 G4", CXT_FIXUP_HP_MIC_NO_PRESENCE),
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 36/103 ARCv2: lib: memeset: fix doing prefetchw outside of buffer
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman4.19-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Eugeniy Paltsev <[email protected]>
commit e6a72b7daeeb521753803550f0ed711152bb2555 upstream.
ARCv2 optimized memset uses PREFETCHW instruction for prefetching the next cache line but doesn't ensure that the line is not past the end of the buffer. PRETECHW changes the line ownership and marks it dirty, which can cause issues in SMP config when next line was already owned by other core. Fix the issue by avoiding the PREFETCHW
Some more details:
The current code has 3 logical loops (ignroing the unaligned part)
(a) Big loop for doing aligned 64 bytes per iteration with PREALLOC
(b) Loop for 32 x 2 bytes with PREFETCHW
(c) any left over bytes
loop (a) was already eliding the last 64 bytes, so PREALLOC was safe. The fix was removing PREFETCW from (b).
Another potential issue (applicable to configs with 32 or 128 byte L1 cache line) is that PREALLOC assumes 64 byte cache line and may not do the right thing specially for 32b. While it would be easy to adapt, there are no known configs with those lie sizes, so for now, just compile out PREALLOC in such cases.
--- arch/arc/lib/memset-archs.S | 40 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------- 1 file changed, 32 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
arch/arc/lib/memset-archs.S +32 -8
@@ -7,11 +7,39 @@ */ #include <linux/linkage.h> +#include <asm/cache.h> -#undef PREALLOC_NOT_AVAIL +/* + * The memset implementation below is optimized to use prefetchw and prealloc + * instruction in case of CPU with 64B L1 data cache line (L1_CACHE_SHIFT == 6) + * If you want to implement optimized memset for other possible L1 data cache + * line lengths (32B and 128B) you should rewrite code carefully checking + * we don't call any prefetchw/prealloc instruction for L1 cache lines which + * don't belongs to memset area. + */ + +#if L1_CACHE_SHIFT == 6 + +.macro PREALLOC_INSTR reg, off + prealloc [\reg, \off] +.endm + +.macro PREFETCHW_INSTR reg, off + prefetchw [\reg, \off] +.endm + +#else + +.macro PREALLOC_INSTR +.endm + +.macro PREFETCHW_INSTR +.endm + +#endif ENTRY_CFI(memset) - prefetchw [r0] ; Prefetch the write location + PREFETCHW_INSTR r0, 0 ; Prefetch the first write location mov.f 0, r2 ;;; if size is zero jz.d [blink]
@@ -48,11 +76,8 @@ ENTRY_CFI(memset) lpnz @.Lset64bytes ;; LOOP START -#ifdef PREALLOC_NOT_AVAIL - prefetchw [r3, 64] ;Prefetch the next write location -#else - prealloc [r3, 64] -#endif + PREALLOC_INSTR r3, 64 ; alloc next line w/o fetching + #ifdef CONFIG_ARC_HAS_LL64 std.ab r4, [r3, 8] std.ab r4, [r3, 8]
@@ -85,7 +110,6 @@ ENTRY_CFI(memset) lsr.f lp_count, r2, 5 ;Last remaining max 124 bytes lpnz .Lset32bytes ;; LOOP START - prefetchw [r3, 32] ;Prefetch the next write location #ifdef CONFIG_ARC_HAS_LL64 std.ab r4, [r3, 8] std.ab r4, [r3, 8]
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 37/103 ARC: adjust memblock_reserve of kernel memory
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman4.19-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Eugeniy Paltsev <[email protected]>
commit a3010a0465383300f909f62b8a83f83ffa7b2517 upstream.
In setup_arch_memory we reserve the memory area wherein the kernel is located. Current implementation may reserve more memory than it actually required in case of CONFIG_LINUX_LINK_BASE is not equal to CONFIG_LINUX_RAM_BASE. This happens because we calculate start of the reserved region relatively to the CONFIG_LINUX_RAM_BASE and end of the region relatively to the CONFIG_LINUX_RAM_BASE.
For example in case of HSDK board we wasted 256MiB of physical memory:
------------------->8------------------------------
Memory: 770416K/1048576K available (5496K kernel code,
240K rwdata, 1064K rodata, 2200K init, 275K bss,
278160K reserved, 0K cma-reserved)------------------->8------------------------------
Fix that.
--- arch/arc/mm/init.c | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
arch/arc/mm/init.c +2 -1
@@ -138,7 +138,8 @@ void __init setup_arch_memory(void)*/ memblock_add_node (low_mem_start, low_mem_sz,0 ); -memblock_reserve (low_mem_start,__pa (_end) - low_mem_start); +memblock_reserve (CONFIG_LINUX_LINK_BASE , +__pa (_end) -CONFIG_LINUX_LINK_BASE );#ifdef CONFIG_BLK_DEV_INITRD if (initrd_start)
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 38/103 ARC: perf: map generic branches to correct hardware condition
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman4.19-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Eugeniy Paltsev <[email protected]>
commit 3affbf0e154ee351add6fcc254c59c3f3947fa8f upstream.
So far we've mapped branches to "ijmp" which also counts conditional branches NOT taken. This makes us different from other architectures such as ARM which seem to be counting only taken branches.
So use "ijmptak" hardware condition which only counts (all jump instructions that are taken)
'ijmptak' event is available on both ARCompact and ARCv2 ISA based cores.
--- arch/arc/include/asm/perf_event.h | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
arch/arc/include/asm/perf_event.h +2 -1
@@ -103,7 +103,8 @@ static const char * const arc_pmu_ev_hw_/* counts condition */ [PERF_COUNT_HW_INSTRUCTIONS ] ="iall" , - [PERF_COUNT_HW_BRANCH_INSTRUCTIONS] = "ijmp", /* Excludes ZOL jumps */ + /* All jump instructions that are taken */ + [PERF_COUNT_HW_BRANCH_INSTRUCTIONS] = "ijmptak", [PERF_COUNT_ARC_BPOK ] ="bpok" ,/* NP-NT, PT-T, PNT-NT */ #ifdef CONFIG_ISA_ARCV2 [PERF_COUNT_HW_BRANCH_MISSES] = "bpmp",
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 39/103 s390/mm: always force a load of the primary ASCE on context switch
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman4.19-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Martin Schwidefsky <[email protected]>
commit a38662084c8bdb829ff486468c7ea801c13fcc34 upstream.
The ASCE of an mm_struct can be modified after a task has been created, e.g. via crst_table_downgrade for a compat process. The active_mm logic to avoid the switch_mm call if the next task is a kernel thread can lead to a situation where switch_mm is called where 'prev == next' is true but 'prev->context.asce == next->context.asce' is not.
This can lead to a situation where a CPU uses the outdated ASCE to run a task. The result can be a crash, endless loops and really subtle problem due to TLBs being created with an invalid ASCE.
--- arch/s390/include/asm/mmu_context.h | 5 ++--- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
arch/s390/include/asm/mmu_context.h +2 -3
@@ -89,8 +89,6 @@ static inline void switch_mm(struct mm_s {int cpu =smp_processor_id (); -if (prev == next) -return ; S390_lowcore.user_asce = next->context.asce;cpumask_set_cpu (cpu, &next->context.cpu_attach_mask);/* Clear previous user-ASCE from CR1 and CR7 */
@@ -102,7 +100,8 @@ static inline void switch_mm(struct mm_s__ctl_load (S390_lowcore.vdso_asce,7 ,7 );clear_cpu_flag (CIF_ASCE_SECONDARY ); } -cpumask_clear_cpu (cpu, &prev->context.cpu_attach_mask); +if (prev != next) +cpumask_clear_cpu (cpu, &prev->context.cpu_attach_mask); }#define finish_arch_post_lock_switch finish_arch_post_lock_switch
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 40/103 s390/early: improve machine detection
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman4.19-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Christian Borntraeger <[email protected]>
commit 03aa047ef2db4985e444af6ee1c1dd084ad9fb4c upstream.
Right now the early machine detection code check stsi 3.2.2 for "KVM" and set MACHINE_IS_VM if this is different. As the console detection uses diagnose 8 if MACHINE_IS_VM returns true this will crash Linux early for any non z/VM system that sets a different value than KVM. So instead of assuming z/VM, do not set any of MACHINE_IS_LPAR, MACHINE_IS_VM, or MACHINE_IS_KVM.
--- arch/s390/kernel/early.c | 4 ++-- arch/s390/kernel/setup.c | 2 ++ 2 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
arch/s390/kernel/early.c +2 -2
@@ -64,10 +64,10 @@ static noinline __init void detect_machiif (stsi (vmms,3 ,2 ,2 ) || !vmms->count)return ; -/* Running under KVM? If not we assume z/VM */ +/* Detect known hypervisors */ if (!memcmp (vmms->vm[0 ].cpi,"\xd2\xe5\xd4" ,3 )) S390_lowcore.machine_flags |=MACHINE_FLAG_KVM ; -else +else if (!memcmp (vmms->vm[0 ].cpi,"\xa9\x61\xe5\xd4" ,4 )) S390_lowcore.machine_flags |=MACHINE_FLAG_VM ; }
arch/s390/kernel/setup.c +2 -0
@@ -882,6 +882,8 @@ void __init setup_arch(char **cmdline_p)pr_info ("Linux is running under KVM in 64-bit mode\n" ); else if (MACHINE_IS_LPAR) pr_info("Linux is running natively in 64-bit mode\n"); + else + pr_info("Linux is running as a guest in 64-bit mode\n");/* Have one command line that is parsed and saved in /proc/cmdline */ /* boot_command_line has been already set up in early.c */
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 41/103 s390/smp: fix CPU hotplug deadlock with CPU rescan
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman4.19-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Gerald Schaefer <[email protected]>
commit b7cb707c373094ce4008d4a6ac9b6b366ec52da5 upstream.
smp_rescan_cpus() is called without the device_hotplug_lock, which can lead to a dedlock when a new CPU is found and immediately set online by a udev rule.
This was observed on an older kernel version, where the cpu_hotplug_begin() loop was still present, and it resulted in hanging chcpu and systemd-udev processes. This specific deadlock will not show on current kernels. However, there may be other possible deadlocks, and since smp_rescan_cpus() can still trigger a CPU hotplug operation, the device_hotplug_lock should be held.
For reference, this was the deadlock with the old cpu_hotplug_begin() loop:
chcpu (rescan) systemd-udevd
echo 1 > /sys/../rescan
-> smp_rescan_cpus()
-> (*) get_online_cpus()
(increases refcount)
-> smp_add_present_cpu()
(new CPU found)
-> register_cpu()
-> device_add()
-> udev "add" event triggered -----------> udev rule sets CPU online
-> echo 1 > /sys/.../online
-> lock_device_hotplug_sysfs()
(this is missing in rescan path)
-> device_online()
-> (**) device_lock(new CPU dev)
-> cpu_up()
-> cpu_hotplug_begin()
(loops until refcount == 0)
-> deadlock with (*)
-> bus_probe_device()
-> device_attach()
-> device_lock(new CPU dev)
-> deadlock with (**)Fix this by taking the device_hotplug_lock in the CPU rescan path.
--- arch/s390/kernel/smp.c | 4 ++++ drivers/s390/char/sclp_config.c | 2 ++ 2 files changed, 6 insertions(+)
arch/s390/kernel/smp.c +4 -0
@@ -1152,7 +1152,11 @@ static ssize_t __ref rescan_store(struct {int rc; + rc =lock_device_hotplug_sysfs (); +if (rc) +return rc; rc =smp_rescan_cpus (); +unlock_device_hotplug ();return rc ? rc : count; }static DEVICE_ATTR_WO (rescan);
drivers/s390/char/sclp_config.c +2 -0
@@ -60,7 +60,9 @@ static void sclp_cpu_capability_notify(sstatic void __ref sclp_cpu_change_notify (struct work_struct *work) { +lock_device_hotplug ();smp_rescan_cpus (); +unlock_device_hotplug (); }static void sclp_conf_receiver_fn (struct evbuf_header *evbuf)
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 42/103 misc: ibmvsm: Fix potential NULL pointer dereference
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman4.19-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Gustavo A. R. Silva <[email protected]>
commit e25df7812c91f62581301f9a7ac102acf92e4937 upstream.
There is a potential NULL pointer dereference in case kzalloc() fails and returns NULL.
Fix this by adding a NULL check on *session*
Also, update the function header with information about the expected return on failure and remove unnecessary variable rc.
This issue was detected with the help of Coccinelle.
--- drivers/misc/ibmvmc.c | 7 +++++-- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/misc/ibmvmc.c +5 -2
@@ -820,21 +820,24 @@ static int ibmvmc_send_msg(struct crq_se* * Return: * 0 - Success +* Non-zero - Failure */ static int ibmvmc_open (struct inode *inode,struct file *file) {struct ibmvmc_file_session *session; -int rc =0 ;pr_debug ("%s: inode = 0x%lx, file = 0x%lx, state = 0x%x\n" , __func__, (unsigned long )inode, (unsigned long )file, ibmvmc.state); session =kzalloc (sizeof (*session),GFP_KERNEL ); +if (!session) +return -ENOMEM ; + session->file = file; file->private_data = session; -return rc; +return 0 ; }/**
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 43/103 char/mwave: fix potential Spectre v1 vulnerability
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman4.19-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Gustavo A. R. Silva <[email protected]>
commit 701956d4018e5d5438570e39e8bda47edd32c489 upstream.
ipcnum is indirectly controlled by user-space, hence leading to a potential exploitation of the Spectre variant 1 vulnerability.
This issue was detected with the help of Smatch:
drivers/char/mwave/mwavedd.c:299 mwave_ioctl() warn: potential spectre issue 'pDrvData->IPCs' [w] (local cap)
Fix this by sanitizing ipcnum before using it to index pDrvData->IPCs.
Notice that given that speculation windows are large, the policy is to kill the speculation on the first load and not worry if it can be completed with a dependent load/store [1].
[1] https://marc.info/?l=linux-kernel&m=152449131114778&w=2
--- drivers/char/mwave/mwavedd.c | 7 +++++++ 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+)
drivers/char/mwave/mwavedd.c +7 -0
@@ -59,6 +59,7 @@#include <linux/mutex.h> #include <linux/delay.h> #include <linux/serial_8250.h> +#include <linux/nospec.h> #include "smapi.h" #include "mwavedd.h" #include "3780i.h"
@@ -289,6 +290,8 @@ static long mwave_ioctl(struct file *fil ipcnum);return -EINVAL ; } + ipcnum =array_index_nospec (ipcnum, +ARRAY_SIZE (pDrvData->IPCs)); PRINTK_3(TRACE_MWAVE, "mwavedd::mwave_ioctl IOCTL_MW_REGISTER_IPC" " ipcnum %x entry usIntCount %x\n",
@@ -317,6 +320,8 @@ static long mwave_ioctl(struct file *fil " Invalid ipcnum %x\n", ipcnum);return -EINVAL ; } + ipcnum =array_index_nospec (ipcnum, +ARRAY_SIZE (pDrvData->IPCs)); PRINTK_3(TRACE_MWAVE, "mwavedd::mwave_ioctl IOCTL_MW_GET_IPC" " ipcnum %x, usIntCount %x\n",
@@ -383,6 +388,8 @@ static long mwave_ioctl(struct file *fil ipcnum);return -EINVAL ; } + ipcnum =array_index_nospec (ipcnum, +ARRAY_SIZE (pDrvData->IPCs));mutex_lock (&mwave_mutex);if (pDrvData->IPCs[ipcnum].bIsEnabled == true) { pDrvData->IPCs[ipcnum].bIsEnabled = false;
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 44/103 mmc: dw_mmc-bluefield: : Fix the license information
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman4.19-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Liming Sun <[email protected]>
commit f3716b8ae9347797b73896725f192c3a7b0069b5 upstream.
The SPDX license identifier and the boiler plate text are contradicting. Only the SPDX license identifier is needed. The other one is removed.
--- drivers/mmc/host/dw_mmc-bluefield.c | 5 ----- 1 file changed, 5 deletions(-)
drivers/mmc/host/dw_mmc-bluefield.c +0 -5
@@ -1,11 +1,6 @@// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 /* * Copyright (C) 2018 Mellanox Technologies. -* -* This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify -* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by -* the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or -* (at your option) any later version. */ #include <linux/bitfield.h>
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 45/103 mmc: meson-gx: Free irq in release() callback
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman4.19-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Remi Pommarel <[email protected]>
commit bb364890323cca6e43f13e86d190ebf34a7d8cea upstream.
Because the irq was requested through device managed resources API (devm_request_threaded_irq()) it was freed after meson_mmc_remove() completion, thus after mmc_free_host() has reclaimed meson_host memory. As this irq is IRQF_SHARED, while using CONFIG_DEBUG_SHIRQ, its handler get called by free_irq(). So meson_mmc_irq() was called after the meson_host memory reclamation and was using invalid memory.
We ended up with the following scenario:device_release_driver()
meson_mmc_remove() mmc_free_host() /* Freeing host memory */ ... devres_release_all() devm_irq_release() __free_irq() meson_mmc_irq() /* Uses freed memory */
To avoid this, the irq is released in meson_mmc_remove() and in mseon_mmc_probe() error path before mmc_free_host() gets called.
--- drivers/mmc/host/meson-gx-mmc.c | 18 +++++++++++------- 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
drivers/mmc/host/meson-gx-mmc.c +11 -7
@@ -174,6 +174,8 @@ struct meson_host {struct sd_emmc_desc *descs;dma_addr_t descs_dma_addr; +int irq; +bool vqmmc_enabled; };
@@ -1181,7 +1183,7 @@ static int meson_mmc_probe(struct platfostruct resource *res;struct meson_host *host;struct mmc_host *mmc; -int ret, irq; +int ret; mmc =mmc_alloc_host (sizeof (struct meson_host ), &pdev->dev);if (!mmc)
@@ -1228,8 +1230,8 @@ static int meson_mmc_probe(struct platfo goto free_host; } - irq =platform_get_irq (pdev,0 ); -if (irq <=0 ) { + host->irq =platform_get_irq (pdev,0 ); +if (host->irq <=0 ) {dev_err (&pdev->dev,"failed to get interrupt resource.\n" ); ret = -EINVAL ; goto free_host;
@@ -1283,9 +1285,8 @@ static int meson_mmc_probe(struct platfowritel (IRQ_CRC_ERR |IRQ_TIMEOUTS |IRQ_END_OF_CHAIN , host->regs +SD_EMMC_IRQ_EN ); - ret =devm_request_threaded_irq (&pdev->dev, irq, meson_mmc_irq, - meson_mmc_irq_thread,IRQF_SHARED , -NULL , host); + ret =request_threaded_irq (host->irq, meson_mmc_irq, + meson_mmc_irq_thread,IRQF_SHARED ,NULL , host);if (ret) goto err_init_clk;
@@ -1303,7 +1304,7 @@ static int meson_mmc_probe(struct platfoif (host->bounce_buf ==NULL ) {dev_err (host->dev,"Unable to map allocate DMA bounce buffer.\n" ); ret = -ENOMEM ; - goto err_init_clk; + goto err_free_irq; } host->descs = dma_alloc_coherent(host->dev, SD_EMMC_DESC_BUF_LEN,
@@ -1322,6 +1323,8 @@ static int meson_mmc_probe(struct platfo err_bounce_buf:dma_free_coherent (host->dev, host->bounce_buf_size, host->bounce_buf, host->bounce_dma_addr); +err_free_irq: +free_irq (host->irq, host); err_init_clk:clk_disable_unprepare (host->mmc_clk); err_core_clk:
@@ -1339,6 +1342,7 @@ static int meson_mmc_remove(struct platf/* disable interrupts */ writel (0 , host->regs +SD_EMMC_IRQ_EN ); +free_irq (host->irq, host);dma_free_coherent (host->dev,SD_EMMC_DESC_BUF_LEN , host->descs, host->descs_dma_addr);
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 46/103 staging: rtl8188eu: Add device code for D-Link DWA-121 rev B1
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman4.19-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Michael Straube <[email protected]>
commit 5f74a8cbb38d10615ed46bc3e37d9a4c9af8045a upstream.
This device was added to the stand-alone driver on github. Add it to the staging driver as well.
--- drivers/staging/rtl8188eu/os_dep/usb_intf.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
drivers/staging/rtl8188eu/os_dep/usb_intf.c +1 -0
@@ -35,6 +35,7 @@ static const struct usb_device_id rtw_us {USB_DEVICE(0x2001, 0x330F)}, /* DLink DWA-125 REV D1 */ {USB_DEVICE(0x2001, 0x3310)}, /* Dlink DWA-123 REV D1 */ {USB_DEVICE(0x2001, 0x3311)}, /* DLink GO-USB-N150 REV B1 */ + {USB_DEVICE(0x2001, 0x331B)}, /* D-Link DWA-121 rev B1 */ {USB_DEVICE(0x2357, 0x010c)}, /* TP-Link TL-WN722N v2 */ {USB_DEVICE(0x0df6, 0x0076)}, /* Sitecom N150 v2 */ {USB_DEVICE(USB_VENDER_ID_REALTEK, 0xffef)}, /* Rosewill RNX-N150NUB */
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 47/103 tty: Handle problem if line discipline does not have receive_buf
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman4.19-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
commit 27cfb3a53be46a54ec5e0bd04e51995b74c90343 upstream.
Some tty line disciplines do not have a receive buf callback, so properly check for that before calling it. If they do not have this callback, just eat the character quietly, as we can't fail this call.
--- drivers/tty/tty_io.c | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/tty/tty_io.c +2 -1
@@ -2188,7 +2188,8 @@ static int tiocsti(struct tty_struct *tt ld =tty_ldisc_ref_wait (tty);if (!ld)return -EIO ; - ld->ops->receive_buf (tty, &ch, &mbz,1 ); +if (ld->ops->receive_buf) + ld->ops->receive_buf (tty, &ch, &mbz,1 );tty_ldisc_deref (ld);return 0 ; }
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 48/103 uart: Fix crash in uart_write and uart_put_char
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman4.19-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Samir Virmani <[email protected]>
commit aff9cf5955185d1f183227e46c5f8673fa483813 upstream.
We were experiencing a crash similar to the one reported as part of commit:a5ba1d95e46e ("uart: fix race between uart_put_char() and uart_shutdown()") in our testbed as well. We continue to observe the same crash after integrating the commit a5ba1d95e46e ("uart: fix race between uart_put_char() and uart_shutdown()")
On reviewing the change, the port lock should be taken prior to checking for if (!circ->buf) in fn. __uart_put_char and other fns. that update the buffer uart_state->xmit.
Traceback:
[11/27/2018 06:24:32.4870] Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference
at virtual address 0000003b
[11/27/2018 06:24:32.4950] PC is at memcpy+0x48/0x180 [11/27/2018 06:24:32.4950] LR is at uart_write+0x74/0x120 [11/27/2018 06:24:32.4950] pc : [<ffffffc0002e6808>]
lr : [<ffffffc0003747cc>] pstate: 000001c5
[11/27/2018 06:24:32.4950] sp : ffffffc076433d30 [11/27/2018 06:24:32.4950] x29: ffffffc076433d30 x28: 0000000000000140 [11/27/2018 06:24:32.4950] x27: ffffffc0009b9d5e x26: ffffffc07ce36580 [11/27/2018 06:24:32.4950] x25: 0000000000000000 x24: 0000000000000140 [11/27/2018 06:24:32.4950] x23: ffffffc000891200 x22: ffffffc01fc34000 [11/27/2018 06:24:32.4950] x21: 0000000000000fff x20: 0000000000000076 [11/27/2018 06:24:32.4950] x19: 0000000000000076 x18: 0000000000000000 [11/27/2018 06:24:32.4950] x17: 000000000047cf08 x16: ffffffc000099e68 [11/27/2018 06:24:32.4950] x15: 0000000000000018 x14: 776d726966205948 [11/27/2018 06:24:32.4950] x13: 50203a6c6974755f x12: 74647075205d3333 [11/27/2018 06:24:32.4950] x11: 3a35323a36203831 x10: 30322f37322f3131 [11/27/2018 06:24:32.4950] x9 : 5b205d303638342e x8 : 746164206f742070 [11/27/2018 06:24:32.4950] x7 : 7520736920657261 x6 : 000000000000003b [11/27/2018 06:24:32.4950] x5 : 000000000000817a x4 : 0000000000000008 [11/27/2018 06:24:32.4950] x3 : 2f37322f31312a5b x2 : 000000000000006e [11/27/2018 06:24:32.4950] x1 : ffffffc0009b9cf0 x0 : 000000000000003b
[11/27/2018 06:24:32.4950] CPU2: stopping
[11/27/2018 06:24:32.4950] CPU: 2 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/2 Tainted: P D O 4.1.51 #3
[11/27/2018 06:24:32.4950] Hardware name: Broadcom-v8A (DT) [11/27/2018 06:24:32.4950] Call trace:
[11/27/2018 06:24:32.4950] [<ffffffc0000883b8>] dump_backtrace+0x0/0x150 [11/27/2018 06:24:32.4950] [<ffffffc00008851c>] show_stack+0x14/0x20 [11/27/2018 06:24:32.4950] [<ffffffc0005ee810>] dump_stack+0x90/0xb0 [11/27/2018 06:24:32.4950] [<ffffffc00008e844>] handle_IPI+0x18c/0x1a0 [11/27/2018 06:24:32.4950] [<ffffffc000080c68>] gic_handle_irq+0x88/0x90
--- drivers/tty/serial/serial_core.c | 12 ++++++++---- 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
drivers/tty/serial/serial_core.c +8 -4
@@ -550,10 +550,12 @@ static int uart_put_char(struct tty_struint ret =0 ; circ = &state->xmit; -if (!circ->buf) + port =uart_port_lock (state, flags); +if (!circ->buf) { +uart_port_unlock (port, flags);return 0 ; + } - port =uart_port_lock (state, flags);if (port &&uart_circ_chars_free (circ) !=0 ) { circ->buf[circ->head] = c; circ->head = (circ->head +1 ) & (UART_XMIT_SIZE -1 );
@@ -586,11 +588,13 @@ static int uart_write(struct tty_structreturn -EL3HLT ; } + port =uart_port_lock (state, flags); circ = &state->xmit; -if (!circ->buf) +if (!circ->buf) { +uart_port_unlock (port, flags);return 0 ; + } - port =uart_port_lock (state, flags);while (port) { c =CIRC_SPACE_TO_END (circ->head, circ->tail,UART_XMIT_SIZE );if (count < c)
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 49/103 tty/n_hdlc: fix __might_sleep warning
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman4.19-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Paul Fulghum <[email protected]>
commit fc01d8c61ce02c034e67378cd3e645734bc18c8c upstream.
Fix __might_sleep warning[1] in tty/n_hdlc.c read due to copy_to_user call while current is TASK_INTERRUPTIBLE. This is a false positive since the code path does not depend on current state remaining TASK_INTERRUPTIBLE. The loop breaks out and sets TASK_RUNNING after calling copy_to_user.
This patch supresses the warning by setting TASK_RUNNING before calling copy_to_user.
[1] https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?id=17d5de7f1fcab794cb8c40032f893f52de899324
--- drivers/tty/n_hdlc.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
drivers/tty/n_hdlc.c +1 -0
@@ -597,6 +597,7 @@ static ssize_t n_hdlc_tty_read(struct tt/* too large for caller's buffer */ ret = -EOVERFLOW ; }else { +__set_current_state (TASK_RUNNING );if (copy_to_user (buf, rbuf->buf, rbuf->count)) ret = -EFAULT ;else
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 50/103 hv_balloon: avoid touching uninitialized struct page during tail onlining
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman4.19-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Vitaly Kuznetsov <[email protected]>
commit da8ced360ca8ad72d8f41f5c8fcd5b0e63e1555f upstream.
Hyper-V memory hotplug protocol has 2M granularity and in Linux x86 we use 128M. To deal with it we implement partial section onlining by registering custom page onlining callback (hv_online_page()). Later, when more memory arrives we try to online the 'tail' (see hv_bring_pgs_online()).
It was found that in some cases this 'tail' onlining causes issues:
BUG: Bad page state in process kworker/0:2 pfn:109e3a page:ffffe08344278e80 count:0 mapcount:1 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 flags: 0xfffff80000000() raw: 000fffff80000000 dead000000000100 dead000000000200 0000000000000000 raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 page dumped because: nonzero mapcount ... Workqueue: events hot_add_req [hv_balloon] Call Trace: dump_stack+0x5c/0x80 bad_page.cold.112+0x7f/0xb2 free_pcppages_bulk+0x4b8/0x690 free_unref_page+0x54/0x70 hv_page_online_one+0x5c/0x80 [hv_balloon] hot_add_req.cold.24+0x182/0x835 [hv_balloon] ...
Turns out that we now have deferred struct page initialization for memory hotplug so e.g. memory_block_action() in drivers/base/memory.c does pages_correctly_probed() check and in that check it avoids inspecting struct pages and checks sections instead. But in Hyper-V balloon driver we do PageReserved(pfn_to_page()) check and this is now wrong.
Switch to checking online_section_nr() instead.
--- drivers/hv/hv_balloon.c | 10 ++++++---- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
drivers/hv/hv_balloon.c +6 -4
@@ -888,12 +888,14 @@ static unsigned long handle_pg_range(uns pfn_cnt -= pgs_ol;/* * Check if the corresponding memory block is already -* online by checking its last previously backed page. -* In case it is we need to bring rest (which was not -* backed previously) online too. +* online. It is possible to observe struct pages still +* being uninitialized here so check section instead. +* In case the section is online we need to bring the +* rest of pfns (which were not backed previously) +* online too. */ if (start_pfn > has->start_pfn && - !PageReserved (pfn_to_page (start_pfn -1 ))) +online_section_nr (pfn_to_section_nr (start_pfn)))hv_bring_pgs_online (has, start_pfn, pgs_ol); }
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 51/103 Drivers: hv: vmbus: Check for ring when getting debug info
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman4.19-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Dexuan Cui <[email protected]>
commit ba50bf1ce9a51fc97db58b96d01306aa70bc3979 upstream.
fc96df16a1ce is good and can already fix the "return stack garbage" issue, but let's also improve hv_ringbuffer_get_debuginfo(), which would silently return stack garbage, if people forget to check channel->state or ring_info->ring_buffer, when using the function in the future.
Having an error check in the function would eliminate the potential risk.
Add a Fixes tag to indicate the patch depdendency.
--- drivers/hv/ring_buffer.c | 29 +++++++------- drivers/hv/vmbus_drv.c | 91 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------------- include/linux/hyperv.h | 5 +- 3 files changed, 78 insertions(+), 47 deletions(-)
drivers/hv/ring_buffer.c +14 -15
@@ -164,26 +164,25 @@ hv_get_ringbuffer_availbytes(const struc }/* Get various debug metrics for the specified ring buffer. */ -void hv_ringbuffer_get_debuginfo (const struct hv_ring_buffer_info *ring_info, -struct hv_ring_buffer_debug_info *debug_info) +int hv_ringbuffer_get_debuginfo (const struct hv_ring_buffer_info *ring_info, +struct hv_ring_buffer_debug_info *debug_info) {u32 bytes_avail_towrite;u32 bytes_avail_toread; -if (ring_info->ring_buffer) { -hv_get_ringbuffer_availbytes (ring_info, - &bytes_avail_toread, - &bytes_avail_towrite); +if (!ring_info->ring_buffer) +return -EINVAL ; - debug_info->bytes_avail_toread = bytes_avail_toread; - debug_info->bytes_avail_towrite = bytes_avail_towrite; - debug_info->current_read_index = - ring_info->ring_buffer->read_index; - debug_info->current_write_index = - ring_info->ring_buffer->write_index; - debug_info->current_interrupt_mask = - ring_info->ring_buffer->interrupt_mask; - } +hv_get_ringbuffer_availbytes (ring_info, + &bytes_avail_toread, + &bytes_avail_towrite); + debug_info->bytes_avail_toread = bytes_avail_toread; + debug_info->bytes_avail_towrite = bytes_avail_towrite; + debug_info->current_read_index = ring_info->ring_buffer->read_index; + debug_info->current_write_index = ring_info->ring_buffer->write_index; + debug_info->current_interrupt_mask + = ring_info->ring_buffer->interrupt_mask; +return 0 ; }EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL (hv_ringbuffer_get_debuginfo);
drivers/hv/vmbus_drv.c +61 -30
181 lines not on this page · raw message
include/linux/hyperv.h +3 -2
@@ -1166,8 +1166,9 @@ struct hv_ring_buffer_debug_info {u32 bytes_avail_towrite; }; -void hv_ringbuffer_get_debuginfo (const struct hv_ring_buffer_info *ring_info, -struct hv_ring_buffer_debug_info *debug_info); + +int hv_ringbuffer_get_debuginfo (const struct hv_ring_buffer_info *ring_info, +struct hv_ring_buffer_debug_info *debug_info);/* Vmbus interface */ #define vmbus_driver_register (driver) \
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 52/103 vgacon: unconfuse vc_origin when using soft scrollback
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman4.19-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Nicolas Pitre <[email protected]>
commit bfd8d8fe98b8792f362cd210a7873969f8d2fc04 upstream.
When CONFIG_VGACON_SOFT_SCROLLBACK is selected, the VGA display memory index and vc_visible_origin don't change when scrollback is activated. The actual screen content is saved away and the scrollbackdata is copied over it. However the vt code, and /dev/vcs devices in particular, still expect vc_origin to always point at the actual screen content not the displayed scrollback content.
So adjust vc_origin to point at the saved screen content when scrollback is active and set it back to vc_visible_origin when restoring the screen.
This fixes /dev/vcsa<n> that return scrollback content when they shouldn't (onli /dev/vcsa without a number should), and also fixes /dev/vcsu that should return scrollback content when scrollback is active but currently doesn't.
An unnecessary call to vga_set_mem_top() is also removed.
--- drivers/video/console/vgacon.c | 7 ++++--- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
drivers/video/console/vgacon.c +4 -3
@@ -271,6 +271,7 @@ static void vgacon_scrollback_update(strstatic void vgacon_restore_screen (struct vc_data *c) { + c->vc_origin = c->vc_visible_origin; vgacon_scrollback_cur->save =0 ;if (!vga_is_gfx && !vgacon_scrollback_cur->restore) {
@@ -287,8 +288,7 @@ static void vgacon_scrolldelta(struct vcint start, end, count, soff;if (!lines) { - c->vc_visible_origin = c->vc_origin; -vga_set_mem_top (c); +vgacon_restore_screen (c);return ; }
@@ -298,6 +298,7 @@ static void vgacon_scrolldelta(struct vcif (!vgacon_scrollback_cur->save) {vgacon_cursor (c,CM_ERASE );vgacon_save_screen (c); + c->vc_origin = (unsigned long )c->vc_screenbuf; vgacon_scrollback_cur->save =1 ; }
@@ -335,7 +336,7 @@ static void vgacon_scrolldelta(struct vcint copysize;int diff = c->vc_rows - count; -void *d = (void *) c->vc_origin; +void *d = (void *) c->vc_visible_origin;void *s = (void *) c->vc_screenbuf; count *= c->vc_size_row;
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 53/103 CIFS: Fix possible hang during async MTU reads and writes
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman4.19-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Pavel Shilovsky <[email protected]>
commit acc58d0bab55a50e02c25f00bd6a210ee121595f upstream.
When doing MTU i/o we need to leave some credits for possible reopen requests and other operations happening in parallel. Currently we leave 1 credit which is not enough even for reopen only: we need at least 2 credits if durable handle reconnect fails. Also there may be other operations at the same time including compounding ones which require 3 credits at a time each. Fix this by leaving 8 credits which is big enough to cover most scenarios.
Was able to reproduce this when server was configured to give out fewer credits than usual.
The proper fix would be to reconnect a file handle first and then obtain credits for an MTU request but this leads to bigger code changes and should happen in other patches.
--- fs/cifs/smb2ops.c | 6 +++--- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
fs/cifs/smb2ops.c +3 -3
@@ -154,14 +154,14 @@ smb2_wait_mtu_credits(struct TCP_Server_ scredits = server->credits;/* can deadlock with reopen */ -if (scredits ==1 ) { +if (scredits <=8 ) { *num =SMB2_MAX_BUFFER_SIZE ; *credits =0 ;break ; } -/* leave one credit for a possible reopen */ - scredits--; +/* leave some credits for reopen and other ops */ + scredits -=8 ; *num = min_t(unsigned int, size, scredits *SMB2_MAX_BUFFER_SIZE );
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 54/103 CIFS: Fix credits calculations for reads with errors
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman4.19-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Pavel Shilovsky <[email protected]>
commit 8004c78c68e894e4fd5ac3c22cc22eb7dc24cabc upstream.
Currently we mark MID as malformed if we get an error from server in a read response. This leads to not properly processing credits in the readv callback. Fix this by marking such a response as normal received response and process it appropriately.
--- fs/cifs/cifssmb.c | 35 +++++++++++++++++++++++------------ 1 file changed, 23 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
fs/cifs/cifssmb.c +23 -12
@@ -1458,18 +1458,26 @@ cifs_discard_remaining_data(struct TCP_S }static int -cifs_readv_discard (struct TCP_Server_Info *server,struct mid_q_entry *mid) +__cifs_readv_discard (struct TCP_Server_Info *server,struct mid_q_entry *mid, +bool malformed) {int length; -struct cifs_readdata *rdata = mid->callback_data; length =cifs_discard_remaining_data (server); -dequeue_mid (mid, rdata->result); +dequeue_mid (mid, malformed); mid->resp_buf = server->smallbuf; server->smallbuf =NULL ;return length; } +static int +cifs_readv_discard (struct TCP_Server_Info *server,struct mid_q_entry *mid) +{ +struct cifs_readdata *rdata = mid->callback_data; + +return __cifs_readv_discard (server, mid, rdata->result); +} +int cifs_readv_receive (struct TCP_Server_Info *server,struct mid_q_entry *mid) {
@@ -1511,12 +1519,23 @@ cifs_readv_receive(struct TCP_Server_Infreturn -1 ; } +/* set up first two iov for signature check and to get credits */ + rdata->iov[0 ].iov_base = buf; + rdata->iov[0 ].iov_len =4 ; + rdata->iov[1 ].iov_base = buf +4 ; + rdata->iov[1 ].iov_len = server->total_read -4 ; +cifs_dbg (FYI ,"0: iov_base=%p iov_len=%zu\n" , + rdata->iov[0 ].iov_base, rdata->iov[0 ].iov_len); +cifs_dbg (FYI ,"1: iov_base=%p iov_len=%zu\n" , + rdata->iov[1 ].iov_base, rdata->iov[1 ].iov_len); +/* Was the SMB read successful? */ rdata->result = server->ops->map_error (buf, false);if (rdata->result !=0 ) {cifs_dbg (FYI ,"%s: server returned error %d\n" , __func__, rdata->result); -return cifs_readv_discard (server, mid); +/* normal error on read response */ +return __cifs_readv_discard (server, mid, false); }/* Is there enough to get to the rest of the READ_RSP header? */
@@ -1560,14 +1579,6 @@ cifs_readv_receive(struct TCP_Server_Inf server->total_read += length; } -/* set up first iov for signature check */ - rdata->iov[0 ].iov_base = buf; - rdata->iov[0 ].iov_len =4 ; - rdata->iov[1 ].iov_base = buf +4 ; - rdata->iov[1 ].iov_len = server->total_read -4 ; -cifs_dbg (FYI ,"0: iov_base=%p iov_len=%u\n" , - rdata->iov[0 ].iov_base, server->total_read); -/* how much data is in the response? */ #ifdef CONFIG_CIFS_SMB_DIRECT use_rdma_mr = rdata->mr;
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 55/103 CIFS: Fix credit calculation for encrypted reads with errors
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman4.19-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Pavel Shilovsky <[email protected]>
commit ec678eae746dd25766a61c4095e2b649d3b20b09 upstream.
We do need to account for credits received in error responses to read requests on encrypted sessions.
--- fs/cifs/smb2ops.c | 24 ++++++++++++++---------- 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
fs/cifs/smb2ops.c +14 -10
@@ -2901,11 +2901,23 @@ handle_read_data(struct TCP_Server_Info server->ops->is_status_pending(buf, server, 0))return -1 ; - rdata->result = server->ops->map_error (buf, false); +/* set up first two iov to get credits */ + rdata->iov[0 ].iov_base = buf; + rdata->iov[0 ].iov_len =4 ; + rdata->iov[1 ].iov_base = buf +4 ; + rdata->iov[1 ].iov_len = + min_t(unsigned int, buf_len, server->vals->read_rsp_size) - 4; +cifs_dbg (FYI ,"0: iov_base=%p iov_len=%zu\n" , + rdata->iov[0 ].iov_base, rdata->iov[0 ].iov_len); +cifs_dbg (FYI ,"1: iov_base=%p iov_len=%zu\n" , + rdata->iov[1 ].iov_base, rdata->iov[1 ].iov_len); + + rdata->result = server->ops->map_error (buf, true);if (rdata->result !=0 ) {cifs_dbg (FYI ,"%s: server returned error %d\n" , __func__, rdata->result); -dequeue_mid (mid, rdata->result); +/* normal error on read response */ +dequeue_mid (mid, false);return 0 ; }
@@ -2978,14 +2990,6 @@ handle_read_data(struct TCP_Server_Inforeturn 0 ; } -/* set up first iov for signature check */ - rdata->iov[0 ].iov_base = buf; - rdata->iov[0 ].iov_len =4 ; - rdata->iov[1 ].iov_base = buf +4 ; - rdata->iov[1 ].iov_len = server->vals->read_rsp_size -4 ; -cifs_dbg (FYI ,"0: iov_base=%p iov_len=%zu\n" , - rdata->iov[0 ].iov_base, server->vals->read_rsp_size); - length = rdata->copy_into_pages (server, rdata, &iter);kfree (bvec);
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 56/103 CIFS: Do not reconnect TCP session in add_credits()
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman4.19-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Pavel Shilovsky <[email protected]>
commit ef68e831840c40c7d01b328b3c0f5d8c4796c232 upstream.
When executing add_credits() we currently call cifs_reconnect() if the number of credits is zero and there are no requests in flight. In this case we may call cifs_reconnect() recursively twice and cause memory corruption given the following sequence of functions:
mid1.callback() -> add_credits() -> cifs_reconnect() -> -> mid2.callback() -> add_credits() -> cifs_reconnect().
Fix this by avoiding to call cifs_reconnect() in add_credits() and checking for zero credits in the demultiplex thread.
--- fs/cifs/connect.c | 21 +++++++++++++++++++++ fs/cifs/smb2ops.c | 32 +++++++++++++++++++++++++------- 2 files changed, 46 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
fs/cifs/connect.c +21 -0
@@ -533,6 +533,21 @@ server_unresponsive(struct TCP_Server_Inreturn false; } +static inline bool +zero_credits (struct TCP_Server_Info *server) +{ +int val; + +spin_lock (&server->req_lock); + val = server->credits + server->echo_credits + server->oplock_credits; +if (server->in_flight ==0 && val ==0 ) { +spin_unlock (&server->req_lock); +return true; + } +spin_unlock (&server->req_lock); +return false; +} +static int cifs_readv_from_socket (struct TCP_Server_Info *server,struct msghdr *smb_msg) {
@@ -545,6 +560,12 @@ cifs_readv_from_socket(struct TCP_Serverfor (total_read =0 ;msg_data_left (smb_msg); total_read += length) {try_to_freeze (); +/* reconnect if no credits and no requests in flight */ +if (zero_credits (server)) { +cifs_reconnect (server); +return -ECONNABORTED ; + } +if (server_unresponsive (server))return -ECONNABORTED ;if (cifs_rdma_enabled (server) && server->smbd_conn)
fs/cifs/smb2ops.c +25 -7
@@ -34,6 +34,7 @@#include "cifs_ioctl.h" #include "smbdirect.h" +/* Change credits for different ops and return the total number of credits */ static int change_conf (struct TCP_Server_Info *server) {
@@ -41,17 +42,15 @@ change_conf(struct TCP_Server_Info *serv server->oplock_credits = server->echo_credits =0 ;switch (server->credits) {case 0 : -return -1 ; +return 0 ;case 1 : server->echoes = false; server->oplocks = false; -cifs_dbg (VFS ,"disabling echoes and oplocks\n" );break ;case 2 : server->echoes = true; server->oplocks = false; server->echo_credits =1 ; -cifs_dbg (FYI ,"disabling oplocks\n" );break ;default : server->echoes = true;
@@ -64,14 +63,15 @@ change_conf(struct TCP_Server_Info *serv server->echo_credits =1 ; } server->credits -= server->echo_credits + server->oplock_credits; -return 0 ; +return server->credits + server->echo_credits + server->oplock_credits; }static void smb2_add_credits (struct TCP_Server_Info *server,const unsigned int add,const int optype) { -int *val, rc =0 ; +int *val, rc =-1 ; +spin_lock (&server->req_lock); val = server->ops->get_credits_field (server, optype); *val += add;
@@ -95,8 +95,26 @@ smb2_add_credits(struct TCP_Server_Info }spin_unlock (&server->req_lock);wake_up (&server->request_q); -if (rc) -cifs_reconnect (server); + +if (server->tcpStatus == CifsNeedReconnect) +return ; + +switch (rc) { +case -1 : +/* change_conf hasn't been executed */ +break ; +case 0 : +cifs_dbg (VFS ,"Possible client or server bug - zero credits\n" ); +break ; +case 1 : +cifs_dbg (VFS ,"disabling echoes and oplocks\n" ); +break ; +case 2 : +cifs_dbg (FYI ,"disabling oplocks\n" ); +break ; +default : +cifs_dbg (FYI ,"add %u credits total=%d\n" , add, rc); + } } static void
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 57/103 smb3: add credits we receive from oplock/break PDUs
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman4.19-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Ronnie Sahlberg <[email protected]>
commit 2e5700bdde438ed708b36d8acd0398dc73cbf759 upstream.
Otherwise we gradually leak credits leading to potential hung session.
--- fs/cifs/smb2misc.c | 7 +++++++ 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+)
fs/cifs/smb2misc.c +7 -0
@@ -648,6 +648,13 @@ smb2_is_valid_oplock_break(char *buffer,if (rsp->sync_hdr.Command !=SMB2_OPLOCK_BREAK )return false; +if (rsp->sync_hdr.CreditRequest) { +spin_lock (&server->req_lock); + server->credits +=le16_to_cpu (rsp->sync_hdr.CreditRequest); +spin_unlock (&server->req_lock); +wake_up (&server->request_q); + } +if (rsp->StructureSize != smb2_rsp_struct_sizes[SMB2_OPLOCK_BREAK_HE ]) {if (le16_to_cpu (rsp->StructureSize) ==44 )
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 58/103 Input: xpad - add support for SteelSeries Stratus Duo
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman4.19-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Tom Panfil <[email protected]>
commit fe2bfd0d40c935763812973ce15f5764f1c12833 upstream.
Add support for the SteelSeries Stratus Duo, a wireless Xbox 360 controller. The Stratus Duo ships with a USB dongle to enable wireless connectivity, but it can also function as a wired controller by connecting it directly to a PC via USB, hence the need for two USD PIDs. 0x1430 is the dongle, and 0x1431 is the controller.
--- drivers/input/joystick/xpad.c | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
drivers/input/joystick/xpad.c +3 -0
@@ -252,6 +252,8 @@ static const struct xpad_device { { 0x0f30, 0x0202, "Joytech Advanced Controller", 0, XTYPE_XBOX }, { 0x0f30, 0x8888, "BigBen XBMiniPad Controller", 0, XTYPE_XBOX }, { 0x102c, 0xff0c, "Joytech Wireless Advanced Controller", 0, XTYPE_XBOX }, + { 0x1038, 0x1430, "SteelSeries Stratus Duo", 0, XTYPE_XBOX360 }, + { 0x1038, 0x1431, "SteelSeries Stratus Duo", 0, XTYPE_XBOX360 }, { 0x11c9, 0x55f0, "Nacon GC-100XF", 0, XTYPE_XBOX360 }, { 0x12ab, 0x0004, "Honey Bee Xbox360 dancepad", MAP_DPAD_TO_BUTTONS, XTYPE_XBOX360 }, { 0x12ab, 0x0301, "PDP AFTERGLOW AX.1", 0, XTYPE_XBOX360 },
@@ -428,6 +430,7 @@ static const struct usb_device_id xpad_tXPAD_XBOXONE_VENDOR (0x0e6f ),/* 0x0e6f X-Box One controllers */ XPAD_XBOX360_VENDOR (0x0f0d ),/* Hori Controllers */ XPAD_XBOXONE_VENDOR (0x0f0d ),/* Hori Controllers */ +XPAD_XBOX360_VENDOR (0x1038 ),/* SteelSeries Controllers */ XPAD_XBOX360_VENDOR (0x11c9 ),/* Nacon GC100XF */ XPAD_XBOX360_VENDOR (0x12ab ),/* X-Box 360 dance pads */ XPAD_XBOX360_VENDOR(0x1430), /* RedOctane X-Box 360 controllers */
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 59/103 Input: input_event - provide override for sparc64
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman4.19-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Deepa Dinamani <[email protected]>
commit 2e746942ebacf1565caa72cf980745e5ce297c48 upstream.
The usec part of the timeval is defined as__kernel_suseconds_t tv_usec; /* microseconds */
Arnd noticed that sparc64 is the only architecture that defines __kernel_suseconds_t as int rather than long.
This breaks the current y2038 fix for kernel as we only access and define the timeval struct for non-kernel use cases. But, this was hidden by an another typo in the use of __KERNEL__ qualifier.
Fix the typo, and provide an override for sparc64.
--- include/uapi/linux/input.h | 6 +++++- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
include/uapi/linux/input.h +5 -1
@@ -26,13 +26,17 @@*/ struct input_event { -#if (__BITS_PER_LONG !=32 || !defined(__USE_TIME_BITS64)) && !defined(__KERNEL) +#if (__BITS_PER_LONG !=32 || !defined(__USE_TIME_BITS64)) && !defined(__KERNEL__)struct timeval time;#define input_event_sec time.tv_sec#define input_event_usec time.tv_usec#else __kernel_ulong_t __sec; +#ifdef CONFIG_SPARC64 +unsigned int __usec; +#else __kernel_ulong_t __usec; +#endif #define input_event_sec __sec#define input_event_usec __usec#endif
A message that is not in the archive (sent off-list or not yet received): [email protected]
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerRe: [PATCH 4.19 059/103] Input: input_event - provide override for sparc64
Quoted 4 lines · Deepa Dinamani
There was another bug here that Arnd pointed out. It is fixed by
https://www.mail-archive.com/[email protected]/msg1904961.htmlYou need this patch also.
Thanks, now queued up for 4.19.y and 4.20.y.
greg k-h
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 60/103 Input: uinput - fix undefined behavior in uinput_validate_absinfo()
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman4.19-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Dmitry Torokhov <[email protected]>
commit d77651a227f8920dd7ec179b84e400cce844eeb3 upstream.
An integer overflow may arise in uinput_validate_absinfo() if "max - min" can't be represented by an "int". We should check for overflow before trying to use the result.
--- drivers/input/misc/uinput.c | 5 +++-- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/input/misc/uinput.c +3 -2
@@ -39,6 +39,7 @@#include <linux/init.h> #include <linux/fs.h> #include <linux/miscdevice.h> +#include <linux/overflow.h> #include <linux/input/mt.h> #include "../input-compat.h"
@@ -405,7 +406,7 @@ static int uinput_open(struct inode *inostatic int uinput_validate_absinfo (struct input_dev *dev,unsigned int code,const struct input_absinfo *abs) { -int min, max; +int min, max, range; min = abs->minimum; max = abs->maximum;
@@ -417,7 +418,7 @@ static int uinput_validate_absinfo(strucreturn -EINVAL ; } -if (abs->flat > max - min) { +if (!check_sub_overflow (max, min, &range) && abs->flat > range) {printk (KERN_DEBUG "%s: abs_flat #%02x out of range: %d (min:%d/max:%d)\n" ,UINPUT_NAME , code, abs->flat, min, max);
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 61/103 acpi/nfit: Block function zero DSMs
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman4.19-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Dan Williams <[email protected]>
commit 5e9e38d0db1d29efed1dd4cf9a70115d33521be7 upstream.
In preparation for using function number 0 as an error value, prevent it from being considered a valid function value by acpi_nfit_ctl().
--- drivers/acpi/nfit/core.c | 7 +++++++ 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+)
drivers/acpi/nfit/core.c +7 -0
@@ -1764,6 +1764,13 @@ static int acpi_nfit_add_dimm(struct acpreturn 0 ; } +/* +* Function 0 is the command interrogation function, don't +* export it to potential userspace use, and enable it to be +* used as an error value in acpi_nfit_ctl(). +*/ + dsm_mask &= ~1UL ; + guid =to_nfit_uuid (nfit_mem->family);for_each_set_bit (i, &dsm_mask,BITS_PER_LONG ) if (acpi_check_dsm(adev_dimm->handle, guid,
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 62/103 acpi/nfit: Fix command-supported detection
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman4.19-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Dan Williams <[email protected]>
commit 11189c1089da413aa4b5fd6be4c4d47c78968819 upstream.
The _DSM function number validation only happens to succeed when the generic Linux command number translation corresponds with a DSM-family-specific function number. This breaks NVDIMM-N implementations that correctly implement _LSR, _LSW, and _LSI, but do not happen to publish support for DSM function numbers 4, 5, and 6.
Recall that the support for _LS{I,R,W} family of methods results in the DIMM being marked as supporting those command numbers at acpi_nfit_register_dimms() time. The DSM function mask is only used for ND_CMD_CALL support of non-NVDIMM_FAMILY_INTEL devices.
--- drivers/acpi/nfit/core.c | 54 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------------- 1 file changed, 40 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)
drivers/acpi/nfit/core.c +40 -14
@@ -391,6 +391,32 @@ static u8 nfit_dsm_revid(unsigned familyreturn id; } +static int cmd_to_func (struct nfit_mem *nfit_mem,unsigned int cmd, +struct nd_cmd_pkg *call_pkg) +{ +if (call_pkg) { +int i; + +if (nfit_mem->family != call_pkg->nd_family) +return -ENOTTY ; + +for (i =0 ; i <ARRAY_SIZE (call_pkg->nd_reserved2); i++) +if (call_pkg->nd_reserved2[i]) +return -EINVAL ; +return call_pkg->nd_command; + } + +/* Linux ND commands == NVDIMM_FAMILY_INTEL function numbers */ +if (nfit_mem->family ==NVDIMM_FAMILY_INTEL ) +return cmd; + +/* +* Force function number validation to fail since 0 is never +* published as a valid function in dsm_mask. +*/ +return 0 ; +} +int acpi_nfit_ctl (struct nvdimm_bus_descriptor *nd_desc,struct nvdimm *nvdimm,unsigned int cmd,void *buf,unsigned int buf_len,int *cmd_rc) {
@@ -404,30 +430,23 @@ int acpi_nfit_ctl(struct nvdimm_bus_descunsigned long cmd_mask, dsm_mask;u32 offset, fw_status =0 ;acpi_handle handle; -unsigned int func;const guid_t *guid; -int rc, i; +int func, rc, i;if (cmd_rc) *cmd_rc = -EINVAL ; - func = cmd; -if (cmd ==ND_CMD_CALL ) { - call_pkg = buf; - func = call_pkg->nd_command; - -for (i =0 ; i <ARRAY_SIZE (call_pkg->nd_reserved2); i++) -if (call_pkg->nd_reserved2[i]) -return -EINVAL ; - }if (nvdimm) {struct acpi_device *adev = nfit_mem->adev;if (!adev)return -ENOTTY ; -if (call_pkg && nfit_mem->family != call_pkg->nd_family) -return -ENOTTY ; +if (cmd ==ND_CMD_CALL ) + call_pkg = buf; + func =cmd_to_func (nfit_mem, cmd, call_pkg); +if (func <0 ) +return func; dimm_name =nvdimm_name (nvdimm); cmd_name =nvdimm_cmd_name (cmd); cmd_mask =nvdimm_cmd_mask (nvdimm);
@@ -438,6 +457,7 @@ int acpi_nfit_ctl(struct nvdimm_bus_desc }else {struct acpi_device *adev =to_acpi_dev (acpi_desc); + func = cmd; cmd_name =nvdimm_bus_cmd_name (cmd); cmd_mask = nd_desc->cmd_mask; dsm_mask = cmd_mask;
@@ -452,7 +472,13 @@ int acpi_nfit_ctl(struct nvdimm_bus_descif (!desc || (cmd && (desc->out_num + desc->in_num ==0 )))return -ENOTTY ; -if (!test_bit (cmd, &cmd_mask) || !test_bit (func, &dsm_mask)) +/* +* Check for a valid command. For ND_CMD_CALL, we also have to +* make sure that the DSM function is supported. +*/ +if (cmd ==ND_CMD_CALL && !test_bit (func, &dsm_mask)) +return -ENOTTY ; +else if (!test_bit (cmd, &cmd_mask))return -ENOTTY ; in_obj.type =ACPI_TYPE_PACKAGE ;
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 63/103 scsi: ufs: Use explicit access size in ufshcd_dump_regs
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman4.19-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Marc Gonzalez <[email protected]>
commit d67247566450cf89a693307c9bc9f05a32d96cea upstream.
memcpy_fromio() doesn't provide any control over access size. For example, on arm64, it is implemented using readb and readq. This may trigger a synchronous external abort:
[ 3.729943] Internal error: synchronous external abort: 96000210 [#1] PREEMPT SMP [ 3.737000] Modules linked in: [ 3.744371] CPU: 2 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Tainted: G S 4.20.0-rc4 #16 [ 3.747413] Hardware name: Qualcomm Technologies, Inc. MSM8998 v1 MTP (DT) [ 3.755295] pstate: 00000005 (nzcv daif -PAN -UAO) [ 3.761978] pc : __memcpy_fromio+0x68/0x80 [ 3.766718] lr : ufshcd_dump_regs+0x50/0xb0 [ 3.770767] sp : ffff00000807ba00 [ 3.774830] x29: ffff00000807ba00 x28: 00000000fffffffb [ 3.778344] x27: ffff0000089db068 x26: ffff8000f6e58000 [ 3.783728] x25: 000000000000000e x24: 0000000000000800 [ 3.789023] x23: ffff8000f6e587c8 x22: 0000000000000800 [ 3.794319] x21: ffff000008908368 x20: ffff8000f6e1ab80 [ 3.799615] x19: 000000000000006c x18: ffffffffffffffff [ 3.804910] x17: 0000000000000000 x16: 0000000000000000 [ 3.810206] x15: ffff000009199648 x14: ffff000089244187 [ 3.815502] x13: ffff000009244195 x12: ffff0000091ab000 [ 3.820797] x11: 0000000005f5e0ff x10: ffff0000091998a0 [ 3.826093] x9 : 0000000000000000 x8 : ffff8000f6e1ac00 [ 3.831389] x7 : 0000000000000000 x6 : 0000000000000068 [ 3.836676] x5 : ffff8000f6e1abe8 x4 : 0000000000000000 [ 3.841971] x3 : ffff00000928c868 x2 : ffff8000f6e1abec [ 3.847267] x1 : ffff00000928c868 x0 : ffff8000f6e1abe8 [ 3.852567] Process swapper/0 (pid: 1, stack limit = 0x(____ptrval____)) [ 3.857900] Call trace: [ 3.864473] __memcpy_fromio+0x68/0x80 [ 3.866683] ufs_qcom_dump_dbg_regs+0x1c0/0x370 [ 3.870522] ufshcd_print_host_regs+0x168/0x190 [ 3.874946] ufshcd_init+0xd4c/0xde0 [ 3.879459] ufshcd_pltfrm_init+0x3c8/0x550 [ 3.883264] ufs_qcom_probe+0x24/0x60 [ 3.887188] platform_drv_probe+0x50/0xa0
Assuming aligned 32-bit registers, let's use readl, after making sure that 'offset' and 'len' are indeed multiples of 4.
--- drivers/scsi/ufs/ufshcd.c | 10 ++++++++-- 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/scsi/ufs/ufshcd.c +8 -2
@@ -109,13 +109,19 @@int ufshcd_dump_regs (struct ufs_hba *hba,size_t offset,size_t len,const char *prefix) { -u8 *regs; +u32 *regs; +size_t pos; + +if (offset %4 !=0 || len %4 !=0 )/* keep readl happy */ +return -EINVAL ; regs =kzalloc (len,GFP_KERNEL );if (!regs)return -ENOMEM ; -memcpy_fromio (regs, hba->mmio_base + offset, len); +for (pos =0 ; pos < len; pos +=4 ) + regs[pos /4 ] =ufshcd_readl (hba, offset + pos); +ufshcd_hex_dump (prefix, regs, len);kfree (regs);
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 64/103 dm thin: fix passdown_double_checking_shared_status()
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman4.19-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Joe Thornber <[email protected]>
commit d445bd9cec1a850c2100fcf53684c13b3fd934f2 upstream.
Commit 00a0ea33b495 ("dm thin: do not queue freed thin mapping for next stage processing") changed process_prepared_discard_passdown_pt1() to increment all the blocks being discarded until after the passdown had completed to avoid them being prematurely reused.
IO issued to a thin device that breaks sharing with a snapshot, followed by a discard issued to snapshot(s) that previously shared the block(s), results in passdown_double_checking_shared_status() being called to iterate through the blocks double checking their reference count is zero and issuing the passdown if so. So a side effect of commit 00a0ea33b495 is passdown_double_checking_shared_status() was broken.
Fix this by checking if the block reference count is greater than 1. Also, rename dm_pool_block_is_used() to dm_pool_block_is_shared().
--- drivers/md/dm-thin-metadata.c | 4 ++-- drivers/md/dm-thin-metadata.h | 2 +- drivers/md/dm-thin.c | 10 +++++----- 3 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
drivers/md/dm-thin-metadata.c +2 -2
@@ -1678,7 +1678,7 @@ int dm_thin_remove_range(struct dm_thin_return r; } -int dm_pool_block_is_used (struct dm_pool_metadata *pmd,dm_block_t b,bool *result) +int dm_pool_block_is_shared (struct dm_pool_metadata *pmd,dm_block_t b,bool *result) {int r;uint32_t ref_count;
@@ -1686,7 +1686,7 @@ int dm_pool_block_is_used(struct dm_pooldown_read (&pmd->root_lock); r =dm_sm_get_count (pmd->data_sm, b, &ref_count);if (!r) - *result = (ref_count !=0 ); + *result = (ref_count >1 );up_read (&pmd->root_lock);return r;
drivers/md/dm-thin-metadata.h +1 -1
@@ -195,7 +195,7 @@ int dm_pool_get_metadata_dev_size(structint dm_pool_get_data_dev_size (struct dm_pool_metadata *pmd,dm_block_t *result); -int dm_pool_block_is_used (struct dm_pool_metadata *pmd,dm_block_t b,bool *result); +int dm_pool_block_is_shared (struct dm_pool_metadata *pmd,dm_block_t b,bool *result);int dm_pool_inc_data_range (struct dm_pool_metadata *pmd,dm_block_t b,dm_block_t e);int dm_pool_dec_data_range (struct dm_pool_metadata *pmd,dm_block_t b,dm_block_t e);
drivers/md/dm-thin.c +5 -5
@@ -1048,7 +1048,7 @@ static void passdown_double_checking_sha* passdown we have to check that these blocks are now unused. */ int r =0 ; -bool used = true; +bool shared = true;struct thin_c *tc = m->tc;struct pool *pool = tc->pool;dm_block_t b = m->data_block, e, end = m->data_block + m->virt_end - m->virt_begin;
@@ -1058,11 +1058,11 @@ static void passdown_double_checking_shawhile (b != end) {/* find start of unmapped run */ for (; b < end; b++) { - r =dm_pool_block_is_used (pool->pmd, b, &used); + r =dm_pool_block_is_shared (pool->pmd, b, &shared);if (r) goto out; -if (!used) +if (!shared)break ; }
@@ -1071,11 +1071,11 @@ static void passdown_double_checking_sha/* find end of run */ for (e = b +1 ; e != end; e++) { - r =dm_pool_block_is_used (pool->pmd, e, &used); + r =dm_pool_block_is_shared (pool->pmd, e, &shared);if (r) goto out; -if (used) +if (shared)break ; }
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 65/103 dm crypt: fix parsing of extended IV arguments
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman4.19-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Milan Broz <[email protected]>
commit 1856b9f7bcc8e9bdcccc360aabb56fbd4dd6c565 upstream.
The dm-crypt cipher specification in a mapping table is defined as:
cipher[:keycount]-chainmode-ivmode[:ivopts]
or (new crypt API format):
capi:cipher_api_spec-ivmode[:ivopts]
For ESSIV, the parameter includes hash specification, for example:
aes-cbc-essiv:sha256
The implementation expected that additional IV option to never include another dash '-' character.
But, with SHA3, there are names like sha3-256; so the mapping table parser fails:
dmsetup create test --table "0 8 crypt aes-cbc-essiv:sha3-256 9c1185a5c5e9fc54612808977ee8f5b9e 0 /dev/sdb 0"
or (new crypt API format)
dmsetup create test --table "0 8 crypt capi:cbc(aes)-essiv:sha3-256 9c1185a5c5e9fc54612808977ee8f5b9e 0 /dev/sdb 0"
device-mapper: crypt: Ignoring unexpected additional cipher options
device-mapper: table: 253:0: crypt: Error creating IV
device-mapper: ioctl: error adding target to table
Fix the dm-crypt constructor to ignore additional dash in IV options and also remove a bogus warning (that is ignored anyway).
--- drivers/md/dm-crypt.c | 25 +++++++++++++++++-------- 1 file changed, 17 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
drivers/md/dm-crypt.c +17 -8
@@ -2405,9 +2405,21 @@ static int crypt_ctr_cipher_new(struct d* capi:cipher_api_spec-iv:ivopts */ tmp = &cipher_in[strlen ("capi:" )]; - cipher_api =strsep (&tmp,"-" ); - *ivmode =strsep (&tmp,":" ); - *ivopts = tmp; + +/* Separate IV options if present, it can contain another '-' in hash name */ + *ivopts =strrchr (tmp,':' ); +if (*ivopts) { + **ivopts ='\0' ; + (*ivopts)++; + } +/* Parse IV mode */ + *ivmode =strrchr (tmp,'-' ); +if (*ivmode) { + **ivmode ='\0' ; + (*ivmode)++; + } +/* The rest is crypto API spec */ + cipher_api = tmp;if (*ivmode && !strcmp (*ivmode,"lmk" )) cc->tfms_count =64 ;
@@ -2477,11 +2489,8 @@ static int crypt_ctr_cipher_old(struct d goto bad_mem; chainmode =strsep (&tmp,"-" ); - *ivopts =strsep (&tmp,"-" ); - *ivmode =strsep (&*ivopts,":" ); - -if (tmp) -DMWARN ("Ignoring unexpected additional cipher options" ); + *ivmode =strsep (&tmp,":" ); + *ivopts = tmp;/* * For compatibility with the original dm-crypt mapping format, if
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 66/103 drm/amdgpu: Add APTX quirk for Lenovo laptop
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman4.19-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Alex Deucher <[email protected]>
commit f15f3eb26e8d9d25ea2330ed1273473df2f039df upstream.
Needs ATPX rather than _PR3 for dGPU power control.
--- drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/amdgpu_atpx_handler.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/amdgpu_atpx_handler.c +1 -0
@@ -576,6 +576,7 @@ static const struct amdgpu_px_quirk amdg { 0x1002, 0x6900, 0x1028, 0x0812, AMDGPU_PX_QUIRK_FORCE_ATPX }, { 0x1002, 0x6900, 0x1028, 0x0813, AMDGPU_PX_QUIRK_FORCE_ATPX }, { 0x1002, 0x6900, 0x1025, 0x125A, AMDGPU_PX_QUIRK_FORCE_ATPX }, + { 0x1002, 0x6900, 0x17AA, 0x3806, AMDGPU_PX_QUIRK_FORCE_ATPX }, { 0, 0, 0, 0, 0 }, };
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 67/103 KVM: x86: Fix single-step debugging
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman4.19-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Alexander Popov <[email protected]>
commit 5cc244a20b86090c087073c124284381cdf47234 upstream.
The single-step debugging of KVM guests on x86 is broken: if we run gdb 'stepi' command at the breakpoint when the guest interrupts are enabled, RIP always jumps to native_apic_mem_write(). Then other nasty effects follow.
Long investigation showed that on Jun 7, 2017 the
commit c8401dda2f0a00cd25c0 ("KVM: x86: fix singlestepping over syscall") introduced the kvm_run.debug corruption: kvm_vcpu_do_singlestep() can be called without X86_EFLAGS_TF set.
Let's fix it. Please consider that for -stable.
--- arch/x86/kvm/x86.c | 3 +-- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 2 deletions(-)
arch/x86/kvm/x86.c +1 -2
@@ -6277,8 +6277,7 @@ restart:toggle_interruptibility (vcpu, ctxt->interruptibility); vcpu->arch.emulate_regs_need_sync_to_vcpu = false;kvm_rip_write (vcpu, ctxt->eip); -if (r ==EMULATE_DONE && - (ctxt->tf || (vcpu->guest_debug &KVM_GUESTDBG_SINGLESTEP ))) +if (r ==EMULATE_DONE && ctxt->tf)kvm_vcpu_do_singlestep (vcpu, &r);if (!ctxt->have_exception ||exception_type (ctxt->exception.vector) ==EXCPT_TRAP )
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 68/103 KVM: x86: Fix PV IPIs for 32-bit KVM host
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman4.19-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>
commit 1ed199a41c70ad7bfaee8b14f78e791fcf43b278 upstream.
The recognition of the KVM_HC_SEND_IPI hypercall was unintentionally wrapped in "#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64", causing 32-bit KVM hosts to reject any and all PV IPI requests despite advertising the feature. This results in all KVM paravirtualized guests hanging during SMP boot due to IPIs never being delivered.
--- arch/x86/kvm/x86.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
arch/x86/kvm/x86.c +1 -1
@@ -6867,10 +6867,10 @@ int kvm_emulate_hypercall(struct kvm_vcpcase KVM_HC_CLOCK_PAIRING : ret =kvm_pv_clock_pairing (vcpu, a0, a1);break ; +#endif case KVM_HC_SEND_IPI : ret =kvm_pv_send_ipi (vcpu->kvm, a0, a1, a2, a3, op_64_bit);break ; -#endif default : ret = -KVM_ENOSYS ;break ;
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 69/103 KVM: x86: WARN_ONCE if sending a PV IPI returns a fatal error
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman4.19-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>
commit de81c2f912ef57917bdc6d63b410c534c3e07982 upstream.
KVM hypercalls return a negative value error code in case of a fatal error, e.g. when the hypercall isn't supported or was made with invalid parameters. WARN_ONCE on fatal errors when sending PV IPIs as any such error all but guarantees an SMP system will hang due to a missing IPI.
--- arch/x86/kernel/kvm.c | 7 +++++-- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
arch/x86/kernel/kvm.c +5 -2
@@ -457,6 +457,7 @@ static void __send_ipi_mask(const struct#else u64 ipi_bitmap =0 ;#endif +long ret;if (cpumask_empty (mask))return ;
@@ -482,8 +483,9 @@ static void __send_ipi_mask(const struct }else if (apic_id < min +KVM_IPI_CLUSTER_SIZE ) { max = apic_id < max ? max : apic_id; }else { -kvm_hypercall4 (KVM_HC_SEND_IPI , (unsigned long )ipi_bitmap, + ret =kvm_hypercall4 (KVM_HC_SEND_IPI , (unsigned long )ipi_bitmap, (unsigned long )(ipi_bitmap >>BITS_PER_LONG ), min, icr); +WARN_ONCE (ret <0 ,"KVM: failed to send PV IPI: %ld" , ret); min = max = apic_id; ipi_bitmap =0 ; }
@@ -491,8 +493,9 @@ static void __send_ipi_mask(const struct }if (ipi_bitmap) { -kvm_hypercall4 (KVM_HC_SEND_IPI , (unsigned long )ipi_bitmap, + ret =kvm_hypercall4 (KVM_HC_SEND_IPI , (unsigned long )ipi_bitmap, (unsigned long )(ipi_bitmap >>BITS_PER_LONG ), min, icr); +WARN_ONCE (ret <0 ,"KVM: failed to send PV IPI: %ld" , ret); }local_irq_restore (flags);
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 70/103 kvm: x86/vmx: Use kzalloc for cached_vmcs12
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman4.19-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Tom Roeder <[email protected]>
commit 3a33d030daaa7c507e1c12d5adcf828248429593 upstream.
This changes the allocation of cached_vmcs12 to use kzalloc instead of kmalloc. This removes the information leak found by Syzkaller (see Reported-by) in this case and prevents similar leaks from happening based on cached_vmcs12.
It also changes vmx_get_nested_state to copy out the full 4k VMCS12_SIZE in copy_to_user rather than only the size of the struct.
Tested: rebuilt against head, booted, and ran the syszkaller repro
https://syzkaller.appspot.com/text?tag=ReproC&x=174efca3400000 without observing any problems.
--- arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c | 12 ++++++++---- 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c +8 -4
@@ -8290,11 +8290,11 @@ static int enter_vmx_operation(struct kvif (r <0 ) goto out_vmcs02; - vmx->nested.cached_vmcs12 =kmalloc (VMCS12_SIZE ,GFP_KERNEL ); + vmx->nested.cached_vmcs12 =kzalloc (VMCS12_SIZE ,GFP_KERNEL );if (!vmx->nested.cached_vmcs12) goto out_cached_vmcs12; - vmx->nested.cached_shadow_vmcs12 =kmalloc (VMCS12_SIZE ,GFP_KERNEL ); + vmx->nested.cached_shadow_vmcs12 =kzalloc (VMCS12_SIZE ,GFP_KERNEL );if (!vmx->nested.cached_shadow_vmcs12) goto out_cached_shadow_vmcs12;
@@ -13984,13 +13984,17 @@ static int vmx_get_nested_state(struct kelse if (enable_shadow_vmcs && !vmx->nested.sync_shadow_vmcs)copy_shadow_to_vmcs12 (vmx); -if (copy_to_user (user_kvm_nested_state->data, vmcs12,sizeof (*vmcs12))) +/* +* Copy over the full allocated size of vmcs12 rather than just the size +* of the struct. +*/ +if (copy_to_user (user_kvm_nested_state->data, vmcs12,VMCS12_SIZE ))return -EFAULT ;if (nested_cpu_has_shadow_vmcs (vmcs12) && vmcs12->vmcs_link_pointer !=-1ull ) {if (copy_to_user (user_kvm_nested_state->data +VMCS12_SIZE , -get_shadow_vmcs12 (vcpu),sizeof (*vmcs12))) +get_shadow_vmcs12 (vcpu),VMCS12_SIZE ))return -EFAULT ; }
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 71/103 KVM/nVMX: Do not validate that posted_intr_desc_addr is page aligned
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman4.19-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: KarimAllah Ahmed <[email protected]>
commit 22a7cdcae6a4a3c8974899e62851d270956f58ce upstream.
The spec only requires the posted interrupt descriptor address to be 64-bytes aligned (i.e. bits[0:5] == 0). Using page_address_valid also forces the address to be page aligned.
Only validate that the address does not cross the maximum physical address without enforcing a page alignment.
From: Mark Mielke <[email protected]>
--- arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c +1 -1
@@ -11733,7 +11733,7 @@ static int nested_vmx_check_apicv_contro !nested_exit_intr_ack_set (vcpu) || (vmcs12->posted_intr_nv &0xff00 ) || (vmcs12->posted_intr_desc_addr &0x3f ) || - (!page_address_valid(vcpu, vmcs12->posted_intr_desc_addr)))) + (vmcs12->posted_intr_desc_addr >> cpuid_maxphyaddr(vcpu)))) return -EINVAL;/* tpr shadow is needed by all apicv features. */
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 72/103 x86/pkeys: Properly copy pkey state at fork()
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman4.19-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Dave Hansen <[email protected]>
commit a31e184e4f69965c99c04cc5eb8a4920e0c63737 upstream.
Memory protection key behavior should be the same in a child as it was in the parent before a fork. But, there is a bug that resets the state in the child at fork instead of preserving it.
The creation of new mm's is a bit convoluted. At fork(), the code does:
1. memcpy() the parent mm to initialize child
2. mm_init() to initalize some select stuff stuff
3. dup_mmap() to create true copies that memcpy() did not do right
For pkeys two bits of state need to be preserved across a fork:
'execute_only_pkey' and 'pkey_allocation_map'.
Those are preserved by the memcpy(), but mm_init() invokes init_new_context() which overwrites 'execute_only_pkey' and 'pkey_allocation_map' with "new" values.
The author of the code erroneously believed that init_new_context is *only* called at execve()-time. But, alas, init_new_context() is used at execve() and fork().
The result is that, after a fork(), the child's pkey state ends up looking like it does after an execve(), which is totally wrong. pkeys that are already allocated can be allocated again, for instance.
To fix this, add code called by dup_mmap() to copy the pkey state from parent to child explicitly. Also add a comment above init_new_context() to make it more clear to the next poor sod what this code is used for.
--- arch/x86/include/asm/mmu_context.h | 18 ++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 18 insertions(+)
arch/x86/include/asm/mmu_context.h +18 -0
@@ -178,6 +178,10 @@ static inline void switch_ldt(struct mm_void enter_lazy_tlb (struct mm_struct *mm,struct task_struct *tsk); +/* +* Init a new mm. Used on mm copies, like at fork() +* and on mm's that are brand-new, like at execve(). +*/ static inline int init_new_context (struct task_struct *tsk,struct mm_struct *mm) {
@@ -228,8 +232,22 @@ do { \ } while (0)#endif +static inline void arch_dup_pkeys (struct mm_struct *oldmm, +struct mm_struct *mm) +{ +#ifdef CONFIG_X86_INTEL_MEMORY_PROTECTION_KEYS +if (!cpu_feature_enabled (X86_FEATURE_OSPKE )) +return ; + +/* Duplicate the oldmm pkey state in mm: */ + mm->context.pkey_allocation_map = oldmm->context.pkey_allocation_map; + mm->context.execute_only_pkey = oldmm->context.execute_only_pkey; +#endif +} +static inline int arch_dup_mmap (struct mm_struct *oldmm,struct mm_struct *mm) { +arch_dup_pkeys (oldmm, mm);paravirt_arch_dup_mmap (oldmm, mm);return ldt_dup_context (oldmm, mm); }
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 73/103 x86/selftests/pkeys: Fork() to check for state being preserved
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman4.19-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Dave Hansen <[email protected]>
commit e1812933b17be7814f51b6c310c5d1ced7a9a5f5 upstream.
There was a bug where the per-mm pkey state was not being preserved across fork() in the child. fork() is performed in the pkey selftests, but all of the pkey activity is performed in the parent. The child does not perform any actions sensitive to pkey state.
To make the test more sensitive to these kinds of bugs, add a fork() where the parent exits, and execution continues in the child.
To achieve this let the key exhaustion test not terminate at the first allocation failure and fork after 2*NR_PKEYS loops and continue in the child.
--- tools/testing/selftests/x86/protection_keys.c | 41 +++++++++++++++++++------- 1 file changed, 31 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
tools/testing/selftests/x86/protection_keys.c +31 -10
@@ -1133,6 +1133,21 @@ void test_pkey_syscalls_bad_args(int *ptpkey_assert (err); } +void become_child (void ) +{ +pid_t forkret; + + forkret =fork (); +pkey_assert (forkret >=0 ); +dprintf3 ("[%d] fork() ret: %d\n" ,getpid (), forkret); + +if (!forkret) { +/* in the child */ +return ; + } +exit (0 ); +} +/* Assumes that all pkeys other than 'pkey' are unallocated */ void test_pkey_alloc_exhaust (int *ptr,u16 pkey) {
@@ -1141,7 +1156,7 @@ void test_pkey_alloc_exhaust(int *ptr, uint nr_allocated_pkeys =0 ;int i; -for (i =0 ; i <NR_PKEYS *2 ; i++) { +for (i =0 ; i <NR_PKEYS *3 ; i++) {int new_pkey;dprintf1 ("%s() alloc loop: %d\n" , __func__, i); new_pkey =alloc_pkey ();
@@ -1152,21 +1167,27 @@ void test_pkey_alloc_exhaust(int *ptr, uif ((new_pkey ==-1 ) && (errno ==ENOSPC )) {dprintf2 ("%s() failed to allocate pkey after %d tries\n" , __func__, nr_allocated_pkeys); -break ; + }else { +/* +* Ensure the number of successes never +* exceeds the number of keys supported +* in the hardware. +*/ +pkey_assert (nr_allocated_pkeys <NR_PKEYS ); + allocated_pkeys[nr_allocated_pkeys++] = new_pkey; } -pkey_assert (nr_allocated_pkeys <NR_PKEYS ); - allocated_pkeys[nr_allocated_pkeys++] = new_pkey; + +/* +* Make sure that allocation state is properly +* preserved across fork(). +*/ +if (i ==NR_PKEYS *2 ) +become_child (); }dprintf3 ("%s()::%d\n" , __func__, __LINE__);/* -* ensure it did not reach the end of the loop without -* failure: -*/ -pkey_assert (i <NR_PKEYS *2 ); - -/* * There are 16 pkeys supported in hardware. Three are * allocated by the time we get here: * 1. The default key (0)
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 74/103 x86/kaslr: Fix incorrect i8254 outb() parameters
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman4.19-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Daniel Drake <[email protected]>
commit 7e6fc2f50a3197d0e82d1c0e86282976c9e6c8a4 upstream.
The outb() function takes parameters value and port, in that order. Fix the parameters used in the kalsr i8254 fallback code.
--- arch/x86/lib/kaslr.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
arch/x86/lib/kaslr.c +2 -2
@@ -36,8 +36,8 @@ static inline u16 i8254(void)u16 status, timer; do { - outb(I8254_PORT_CONTROL, - I8254_CMD_READBACK | I8254_SELECT_COUNTER0); + outb(I8254_CMD_READBACK | I8254_SELECT_COUNTER0, + I8254_PORT_CONTROL); status = inb(I8254_PORT_COUNTER0); timer = inb(I8254_PORT_COUNTER0); timer |= inb(I8254_PORT_COUNTER0) << 8;
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 75/103 x86/entry/64/compat: Fix stack switching for XEN PV
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman4.19-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Jan Beulich <[email protected]>
commit fc24d75a7f91837d7918e40719575951820b2b8f upstream.
While in the native case entry into the kernel happens on the trampoline stack, PV Xen kernels get entered with the current thread stack right away. Hence source and destination stacks are identical in that case, and special care is needed.
Other than in sync_regs() the copying done on the INT80 path isn't NMI / #MC safe, as either of these events occurring in the middle of the stack copying would clobber data on the (source) stack.
There is similar code in interrupt_entry() and nmi(), but there is no fixup required because those code paths are unreachable in XEN PV guests.
[ tglx: Sanitized subject, changelog, Fixes tag and stable mail address. Sigh ]
--- arch/x86/entry/entry_64_compat.S | 6 ++++-- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
arch/x86/entry/entry_64_compat.S +4 -2
@@ -356,7 +356,8 @@ ENTRY(entry_INT80_compat) /* Need to switch before accessing the thread stack. */ SWITCH_TO_KERNEL_CR3 scratch_reg=%rdi - movq %rsp, %rdi + /* In the Xen PV case we already run on the thread stack. */ + ALTERNATIVE "movq %rsp, %rdi", "jmp .Lint80_keep_stack", X86_FEATURE_XENPV movq PER_CPU_VAR(cpu_current_top_of_stack), %rsp pushq 6*8(%rdi) /* regs->ss */
@@ -365,8 +366,9 @@ ENTRY(entry_INT80_compat) pushq 3*8(%rdi) /* regs->cs */ pushq 2*8(%rdi) /* regs->ip */ pushq 1*8(%rdi) /* regs->orig_ax */ - pushq (%rdi) /* pt_regs->di */ +.Lint80_keep_stack: + pushq %rsi /* pt_regs->si */ xorl %esi, %esi /* nospec si */ pushq %rdx /* pt_regs->dx */
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Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 75/103 x86/entry/64/compat: Fix stack switching for XEN PV
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman4.19-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Jan Beulich <[email protected]>
commit fc24d75a7f91837d7918e40719575951820b2b8f upstream.
While in the native case entry into the kernel happens on the trampoline stack, PV Xen kernels get entered with the current thread stack right away. Hence source and destination stacks are identical in that case, and special care is needed.
Other than in sync_regs() the copying done on the INT80 path isn't NMI / #MC safe, as either of these events occurring in the middle of the stack copying would clobber data on the (source) stack.
There is similar code in interrupt_entry() and nmi(), but there is no fixup required because those code paths are unreachable in XEN PV guests.
[ tglx: Sanitized subject, changelog, Fixes tag and stable mail address. Sigh ]
--- arch/x86/entry/entry_64_compat.S | 6 ++++-- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
arch/x86/entry/entry_64_compat.S +4 -2
@@ -356,7 +356,8 @@ ENTRY(entry_INT80_compat) /* Need to switch before accessing the thread stack. */ SWITCH_TO_KERNEL_CR3 scratch_reg=%rdi - movq %rsp, %rdi + /* In the Xen PV case we already run on the thread stack. */ + ALTERNATIVE "movq %rsp, %rdi", "jmp .Lint80_keep_stack", X86_FEATURE_XENPV movq PER_CPU_VAR(cpu_current_top_of_stack), %rsp pushq 6*8(%rdi) /* regs->ss */
@@ -365,8 +366,9 @@ ENTRY(entry_INT80_compat) pushq 3*8(%rdi) /* regs->cs */ pushq 2*8(%rdi) /* regs->ip */ pushq 1*8(%rdi) /* regs->orig_ax */ - pushq (%rdi) /* pt_regs->di */ +.Lint80_keep_stack: + pushq %rsi /* pt_regs->si */ xorl %esi, %esi /* nospec si */ pushq %rdx /* pt_regs->dx */
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 76/103 posix-cpu-timers: Unbreak timer rearming
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman4.19-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
commit 93ad0fc088c5b4631f796c995bdd27a082ef33a6 upstream.
The recent commit which prevented a division by 0 issue in the alarm timer code broke posix CPU timers as an unwanted side effect.
The reason is that the common rearm code checks for timer->it_interval being 0 now. What went unnoticed is that the posix cpu timer setup does not initialize timer->it_interval as it stores the interval in CPU timer specific storage. The reason for the separate storage is historical as the posix CPU timers always had a 64bit nanoseconds representation internally while timer->it_interval is type ktime_t which used to be a modified timespec representation on 32bit machines.
Instead of reverting the offending commit and fixing the alarmtimer issue in the alarmtimer code, store the interval in timer->it_interval at CPU timer setup time so the common code check works. This also repairs the existing inconistency of the posix CPU timer code which kept a single shot timer armed despite of the interval being 0.
The separate storage can be removed in mainline, but that needs to be a separate commit as the current one has to be backported to stable kernels.
--- kernel/time/posix-cpu-timers.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
kernel/time/posix-cpu-timers.c +1 -0
@@ -685,6 +685,7 @@ static int posix_cpu_timer_set(struct k_* set up the signal and overrun bookkeeping. */ timer->it.cpu.incr =timespec64_to_ns (&new->it_interval); + timer->it_interval =ns_to_ktime (timer->it.cpu.incr);/* * This acts as a modification timestamp for the timer,
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 77/103 net: sun: cassini: Cleanup license conflict
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman4.19-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
commit 56cb4e5034998b5522a657957321ca64ca2ea0a0 upstream.
The recent addition of SPDX license identifiers to the files in drivers/net/ethernet/sun created a licensing conflict.
The cassini driver files contain a proper license notice:
* This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
* modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as
* published by the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the
* License, or (at your option) any later version.
but the SPDX change added:
SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
So the file got tagged GPL v2 only while in fact it is licensed under GPL v2 or later.
It's nice that people care about the SPDX tags, but they need to be more careful about it. Not everything under (the) sun belongs to ...
Fix up the SPDX identifier and remove the boiler plate text as it is redundant.
--- drivers/net/ethernet/sun/cassini.c | 15 +-------------- drivers/net/ethernet/sun/cassini.h | 15 +-------------- 2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 28 deletions(-)
drivers/net/ethernet/sun/cassini.c +1 -14
@@ -1,22 +1,9 @@ -// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0+ /* cassini.c: Sun Microsystems Cassini(+) ethernet driver. * * Copyright (C) 2004 Sun Microsystems Inc. * Copyright (C) 2003 Adrian Sun ([email protected]) * -* This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or -* modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as -* published by the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the -* License, or (at your option) any later version. -* -* This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, -* but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of -* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the -* GNU General Public License for more details. -* -* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License -* along with this program; if not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>. -* * This driver uses the sungem driver (c) David Miller * ([email protected]) as its basis. *
drivers/net/ethernet/sun/cassini.h +1 -14
@@ -1,23 +1,10 @@ -/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0+ */ /* $Id: cassini.h,v 1.16 2004/08/17 21:15:16 zaumen Exp $ * cassini.h: Definitions for Sun Microsystems Cassini(+) ethernet driver. * * Copyright (C) 2004 Sun Microsystems Inc. * Copyright (c) 2003 Adrian Sun ([email protected]) * -* This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or -* modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as -* published by the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the -* License, or (at your option) any later version. -* -* This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, -* but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of -* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the -* GNU General Public License for more details. -* -* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License -* along with this program; if not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>. -* * vendor id: 0x108E (Sun Microsystems, Inc.) * device id: 0xabba (Cassini) * revision ids: 0x01 = Cassini
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 78/103 irqchip/gic-v3-its: Align PCI Multi-MSI allocation on their size
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman4.19-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Marc Zyngier <[email protected]>
commit 8208d1708b88b412ca97f50a6d951242c88cbbac upstream.
The way we allocate events works fine in most cases, except when multiple PCI devices share an ITS-visible DevID, and that one of them is trying to use MultiMSI allocation.
In that case, our allocation is not guaranteed to be zero-based anymore, and we have to make sure we allocate it on a boundary that is compatible with the PCI Multi-MSI constraints.
Fix this by allocating the full region upfront instead of iterating over the number of MSIs. MSI-X are always allocated one by one, so this shouldn't change anything on that front.
--- drivers/irqchip/irq-gic-v3-its.c | 25 +++++++++++++------------ 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
drivers/irqchip/irq-gic-v3-its.c +13 -12
@@ -2267,13 +2267,14 @@ static void its_free_device(struct its_dkfree (its_dev); } -static int its_alloc_device_irq (struct its_device *dev,irq_hw_number_t *hwirq) +static int its_alloc_device_irq (struct its_device *dev,int nvecs,irq_hw_number_t *hwirq) {int idx; - idx =find_first_zero_bit (dev->event_map.lpi_map, - dev->event_map.nr_lpis); -if (idx == dev->event_map.nr_lpis) + idx =bitmap_find_free_region (dev->event_map.lpi_map, + dev->event_map.nr_lpis, +get_count_order (nvecs)); +if (idx <0 )return -ENOSPC ; *hwirq = dev->event_map.lpi_base + idx;
@@ -2369,21 +2370,21 @@ static int its_irq_domain_alloc(struct iint err;int i; -for (i =0 ; i < nr_irqs; i++) { - err =its_alloc_device_irq (its_dev, &hwirq); -if (err) -return err; + err =its_alloc_device_irq (its_dev, nr_irqs, &hwirq); +if (err) +return err; - err =its_irq_gic_domain_alloc (domain, virq + i, hwirq); +for (i =0 ; i < nr_irqs; i++) { + err =its_irq_gic_domain_alloc (domain, virq + i, hwirq + i);if (err)return err;irq_domain_set_hwirq_and_chip (domain, virq + i, - hwirq, &its_irq_chip, its_dev); + hwirq + i, &its_irq_chip, its_dev);irqd_set_single_target (irq_desc_get_irq_data (irq_to_desc (virq + i)));pr_debug ("ID:%d pID:%d vID:%d\n" , - (int )(hwirq - its_dev->event_map.lpi_base), - (int ) hwirq, virq + i); + (int )(hwirq + i - its_dev->event_map.lpi_base), + (int )(hwirq + i), virq + i); }return 0 ;
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 79/103 can: dev: __can_get_echo_skb(): fix bogous check for non-existing skb by removing it
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman4.19-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Manfred Schlaegl <[email protected]>
commit 7b12c8189a3dc50638e7d53714c88007268d47ef upstream.
This patch revert commit 7da11ba5c506
("can: dev: __can_get_echo_skb(): print error message, if trying to echo non existing skb")
After introduction of this change we encountered following new error message on various i.MX plattforms (flexcan):
| flexcan 53fc8000.can can0: __can_get_echo_skb: BUG! Trying to echo non | existing skb: can_priv::echo_skb[0]
The introduction of the message was a mistake because priv->echo_skb[idx] = NULL is a perfectly valid in following case: If CAN_RAW_LOOPBACK is disabled (setsockopt) in applications, the pkt_type of the tx skb's given to can_put_echo_skb is set to PACKET_LOOPBACK. In this case can_put_echo_skb will not set priv->echo_skb[idx]. It is therefore kept NULL.
As additional argument for revert: The order of check and usage of idx was changed. idx is used to access an array element before checking it's boundaries.
--- drivers/net/can/dev.c | 27 +++++++++++++-------------- 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)
drivers/net/can/dev.c +13 -14
@@ -480,8 +480,6 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(can_put_echo_skb);struct sk_buff *__can_get_echo_skb (struct net_device *dev,unsigned int idx,u8 *len_ptr) {struct can_priv *priv =netdev_priv (dev); -struct sk_buff *skb = priv->echo_skb[idx]; -struct canfd_frame *cf;if (idx >= priv->echo_skb_max) { netdev_err(dev, "%s: BUG! Trying to access can_priv::echo_skb out of bounds (%u/max %u)\n",
@@ -489,20 +487,21 @@ struct sk_buff *__can_get_echo_skb(strucreturn NULL ; } -if (!skb) { -netdev_err (dev,"%s: BUG! Trying to echo non existing skb: can_priv::echo_skb[%u]\n" , - __func__, idx); -return NULL ; - } +if (priv->echo_skb[idx]) { +/* Using "struct canfd_frame::len" for the frame +* length is supported on both CAN and CANFD frames. +*/ +struct sk_buff *skb = priv->echo_skb[idx]; +struct canfd_frame *cf = (struct canfd_frame *)skb->data; +u8 len = cf->len; -/* Using "struct canfd_frame::len" for the frame -* length is supported on both CAN and CANFD frames. -*/ - cf = (struct canfd_frame *)skb->data; - *len_ptr = cf->len; - priv->echo_skb[idx] =NULL ; + *len_ptr = len; + priv->echo_skb[idx] =NULL ; + +return skb; + } -return skb; +return NULL ; }/*
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 80/103 can: bcm: check timer values before ktime conversion
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman4.19-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Oliver Hartkopp <[email protected]>
commit 93171ba6f1deffd82f381d36cb13177872d023f6 upstream.
Kyungtae Kim detected a potential integer overflow in bcm_[rx|tx]_setup() when the conversion into ktime multiplies the given value with NSEC_PER_USEC (1000).
Reference: https://marc.info/?l=linux-can&m=154732118819828&w=2
Add a check for the given tv_usec, so that the value stays below one second. Additionally limit the tv_sec value to a reasonable value for CAN related use-cases of 400 days and ensure all values to be positive.
--- net/can/bcm.c | 27 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 27 insertions(+)
net/can/bcm.c +27 -0
@@ -67,6 +67,9 @@*/ #define MAX_NFRAMES 256 +/* limit timers to 400 days for sending/timeouts */ +#define BCM_TIMER_SEC_MAX (400 * 24 * 60 * 60) +/* use of last_frames[index].flags */ #define RX_RECV 0x40/* received data for this element */ #define RX_THR 0x80/* element not been sent due to throttle feature */
@@ -140,6 +143,22 @@ static inline ktime_t bcm_timeval_to_ktireturn ktime_set (tv.tv_sec, tv.tv_usec *NSEC_PER_USEC ); } +/* check limitations for timeval provided by user */ +static bool bcm_is_invalid_tv (struct bcm_msg_head *msg_head) +{ +if ((msg_head->ival1.tv_sec <0 ) || + (msg_head->ival1.tv_sec >BCM_TIMER_SEC_MAX ) || + (msg_head->ival1.tv_usec <0 ) || + (msg_head->ival1.tv_usec >=USEC_PER_SEC ) || + (msg_head->ival2.tv_sec <0 ) || + (msg_head->ival2.tv_sec >BCM_TIMER_SEC_MAX ) || + (msg_head->ival2.tv_usec <0 ) || + (msg_head->ival2.tv_usec >=USEC_PER_SEC )) +return true; + +return false; +} +#define CFSIZ (flags) ((flags & CAN_FD_FRAME) ? CANFD_MTU : CAN_MTU)#define OPSIZ sizeof(struct bcm_op)#define MHSIZ sizeof(struct bcm_msg_head)
@@ -873,6 +892,10 @@ static int bcm_tx_setup(struct bcm_msg_hif (msg_head->nframes <1 || msg_head->nframes >MAX_NFRAMES )return -EINVAL ; +/* check timeval limitations */ +if ((msg_head->flags &SETTIMER ) &&bcm_is_invalid_tv (msg_head)) +return -EINVAL ; +/* check the given can_id */ op =bcm_find_op (&bo->tx_ops, msg_head, ifindex);if (op) {
@@ -1053,6 +1076,10 @@ static int bcm_rx_setup(struct bcm_msg_h (!(msg_head->can_id & CAN_RTR_FLAG))))return -EINVAL ; +/* check timeval limitations */ +if ((msg_head->flags &SETTIMER ) &&bcm_is_invalid_tv (msg_head)) +return -EINVAL ; +/* check the given can_id */ op =bcm_find_op (&bo->rx_ops, msg_head, ifindex);if (op) {
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 81/103 can: flexcan: fix NULL pointer exception during bringup
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman4.19-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Uwe Kleine-König <[email protected]>
commit a55234dabe1f72cf22f9197980751d37e38ba020 upstream.
Commit cbffaf7aa09e ("can: flexcan: Always use last mailbox for TX") introduced a loop letting i run up to (including) ARRAY_SIZE(regs->mb) and in the body accessed regs->mb[i] which is an out-of-bounds array access that then resulted in an access to an reserved register area.
Later this was changed by commit 0517961ccdf1 ("can: flexcan: Add provision for variable payload size") to iterate a bit differently but still runs one iteration too much resulting to call
flexcan_get_mb(priv, priv->mb_count)
which results in a WARN_ON and then a NULL pointer exception. This only affects devices compatible with "fsl,p1010-flexcan", "fsl,imx53-flexcan", "fsl,imx35-flexcan", "fsl,imx25-flexcan", "fsl,imx28-flexcan", so newer i.MX SoCs are not affected.
--- drivers/net/can/flexcan.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/net/can/flexcan.c +1 -1
@@ -1004,7 +1004,7 @@ static int flexcan_chip_start(struct net } }else {/* clear and invalidate unused mailboxes first */ -for (i =FLEXCAN_TX_MB_RESERVED_OFF_FIFO ; i <=ARRAY_SIZE (regs->mb); i++) { +for (i =FLEXCAN_TX_MB_RESERVED_OFF_FIFO ; i <ARRAY_SIZE (regs->mb); i++) { priv->write (FLEXCAN_MB_CODE_RX_INACTIVE , ®s->mb[i].can_ctrl); }
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 82/103 vt: make vt_console_print() compatible with the unicode screen buffer
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman4.19-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Nicolas Pitre <[email protected]>
commit 6609cff65c5b184ab889880ef5d41189611ea05f upstream.
When kernel messages are printed to the console, they appear blank on the unicode screen. This is because vt_console_print() is lacking a call to vc_uniscr_putc(). However the later function assumes vc->vc_x is always up to date when called, which is not the case here as vt_console_print() uses it to mark the beginning of the display update.
This patch reworks (and simplifies) vt_console_print() so that vc->vc_x is always valid and keeps the start of display update in a local variable instead, which finally allows for adding the missing vc_uniscr_putc() call.
--- drivers/tty/vt/vt.c | 47 +++++++++++++++-------------------------------- 1 file changed, 15 insertions(+), 32 deletions(-)
drivers/tty/vt/vt.c +15 -32
@@ -2887,8 +2887,7 @@ static void vt_console_print(struct consunsigned char c;static DEFINE_SPINLOCK (printing_lock);const ushort *start; -ushort cnt =0 ; -ushort myx; +ushort start_x, cnt;int kmsg_console;/* console busy or not yet initialized */
@@ -2901,10 +2900,6 @@ static void vt_console_print(struct consif (kmsg_console &&vc_cons_allocated (kmsg_console -1 )) vc = vc_cons[kmsg_console -1 ].d; -/* read `x' only after setting currcons properly (otherwise -the `x' macro will read the x of the foreground console). */ - myx = vc->vc_x; -if (!vc_cons_allocated (fg_console)) {/* impossible */ /* printk("vt_console_print: tty %d not allocated ??\n", currcons+1); */
@@ -2919,53 +2914,41 @@ static void vt_console_print(struct conshide_cursor (vc); start = (ushort *)vc->vc_pos; - -/* Contrived structure to try to emulate original need_wrap behaviour -* Problems caused when we have need_wrap set on '\n' character */ + start_x = vc->vc_x; + cnt =0 ;while (count--) { c = *b++;if (c ==10 || c ==13 || c ==8 || vc->vc_need_wrap) { -if (cnt >0 ) { -if (con_is_visible (vc)) - vc->vc_sw->con_putcs (vc, start, cnt, vc->vc_y, vc->vc_x); - vc->vc_x += cnt; -if (vc->vc_need_wrap) - vc->vc_x--; - cnt =0 ; - } +if (cnt &&con_is_visible (vc)) + vc->vc_sw->con_putcs (vc, start, cnt, vc->vc_y, start_x); + cnt =0 ;if (c ==8 ) {/* backspace */ bs (vc); start = (ushort *)vc->vc_pos; - myx = vc->vc_x; + start_x = vc->vc_x;continue ; }if (c !=13 )lf (vc);cr (vc); start = (ushort *)vc->vc_pos; - myx = vc->vc_x; + start_x = vc->vc_x;if (c ==10 || c ==13 )continue ; } +vc_uniscr_putc (vc, c);scr_writew ((vc->vc_attr <<8 ) + c, (unsigned short *)vc->vc_pos);notify_write (vc, c); cnt++; -if (myx == vc->vc_cols -1 ) { - vc->vc_need_wrap =1 ; -continue ; - } - vc->vc_pos +=2 ; - myx++; - } -if (cnt >0 ) { -if (con_is_visible (vc)) - vc->vc_sw->con_putcs (vc, start, cnt, vc->vc_y, vc->vc_x); - vc->vc_x += cnt; -if (vc->vc_x == vc->vc_cols) { - vc->vc_x--; +if (vc->vc_x == vc->vc_cols -1 ) { vc->vc_need_wrap =1 ; + }else { + vc->vc_pos +=2 ; + vc->vc_x++; } } +if (cnt &&con_is_visible (vc)) + vc->vc_sw->con_putcs (vc, start, cnt, vc->vc_y, start_x);set_cursor (vc);notify_update (vc);
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 83/103 vt: always call notifier with the console lock held
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman4.19-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Nicolas Pitre <[email protected]>
commit 7e1d226345f89ad5d0216a9092c81386c89b4983 upstream.
Every invocation of notify_write() and notify_update() is performed under the console lock, except for one case. Let's fix that.
--- drivers/tty/vt/vt.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/tty/vt/vt.c +1 -1
@@ -2767,8 +2767,8 @@ rescan_last_byte:con_flush (vc, draw_from, draw_to, &draw_x);vc_uniscr_debug_check (vc);console_conditional_schedule (); -console_unlock ();notify_update (vc); +console_unlock ();return n; }
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 84/103 vt: invoke notifier on screen size change
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman4.19-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Nicolas Pitre <[email protected]>
commit 0c9b1965faddad7534b6974b5b36c4ad37998f8e upstream.
User space using poll() on /dev/vcs devices are not awaken when a screen size change occurs. Let's fix that.
--- drivers/tty/vt/vt.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
drivers/tty/vt/vt.c +1 -0
@@ -1275,6 +1275,7 @@ static int vc_do_resize(struct tty_strucif (con_is_visible (vc))update_screen (vc);vt_event_post (VT_EVENT_RESIZE , vc->vc_num, vc->vc_num); +notify_update (vc);return err; }
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 85/103 drm/meson: Fix atomic mode switching regression
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman4.19-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Neil Armstrong <[email protected]>
commit ce0210c12433031aba3bbacd75f4c02ab77f2004 upstream.
Since commit 2bcd3ecab773 when switching mode from X11 (ubuntu mate for example) the display gets blurry, looking like an invalid framebuffer width.
This commit fixed atomic crtc modesetting in a totally wrong way and introduced a local unnecessary ->enabled crtc state.
This commit reverts the crctc _begin() and _enable() changes and simply adds drm_atomic_helper_commit_tail_rpm as helper.
--- drivers/gpu/drm/meson/meson_crtc.c | 23 ++--------------------- drivers/gpu/drm/meson/meson_drv.c | 5 +++++ 2 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 21 deletions(-)
drivers/gpu/drm/meson/meson_crtc.c +2 -21
@@ -45,7 +45,6 @@ struct meson_crtc {struct drm_crtc base;struct drm_pending_vblank_event *event;struct meson_drm *priv; -bool enabled; };#define to_meson_crtc (x) container_of(x, struct meson_crtc, base)
@@ -81,7 +80,8 @@ static const struct drm_crtc_funcs meson }; -static void meson_crtc_enable (struct drm_crtc *crtc) +static void meson_crtc_atomic_enable (struct drm_crtc *crtc, +struct drm_crtc_state *old_state) {struct meson_crtc *meson_crtc =to_meson_crtc (crtc);struct drm_crtc_state *crtc_state = crtc->state;
@@ -103,20 +103,6 @@ static void meson_crtc_enable(struct drmdrm_crtc_vblank_on (crtc); - meson_crtc->enabled = true; -} - -static void meson_crtc_atomic_enable (struct drm_crtc *crtc, -struct drm_crtc_state *old_state) -{ -struct meson_crtc *meson_crtc =to_meson_crtc (crtc); -struct meson_drm *priv = meson_crtc->priv; - -DRM_DEBUG_DRIVER ("\n" ); - -if (!meson_crtc->enabled) -meson_crtc_enable (crtc); - priv->viu.osd1_enabled = true; }
@@ -142,8 +128,6 @@ static void meson_crtc_atomic_disable(st crtc->state->event =NULL ; } - - meson_crtc->enabled = false; } static void meson_crtc_atomic_begin(struct drm_crtc *crtc,
@@ -152,9 +136,6 @@ static void meson_crtc_atomic_begin(strustruct meson_crtc *meson_crtc =to_meson_crtc (crtc);unsigned long flags; -if (crtc->state->enable && !meson_crtc->enabled) -meson_crtc_enable (crtc); -if (crtc->state->event) {WARN_ON (drm_crtc_vblank_get (crtc) !=0 );
drivers/gpu/drm/meson/meson_drv.c +5 -0
@@ -82,6 +82,10 @@ static const struct drm_mode_config_func .fb_create = drm_gem_fb_create, }; +static const struct drm_mode_config_helper_funcs meson_mode_config_helpers = { + .atomic_commit_tail = drm_atomic_helper_commit_tail_rpm, +}; +static irqreturn_t meson_irq (int irq,void *arg) {struct drm_device *dev = arg;
@@ -246,6 +250,7 @@ static int meson_drv_bind_master(struct drm->mode_config.max_width =3840 ; drm->mode_config.max_height =2160 ; drm->mode_config.funcs = &meson_mode_config_funcs; + drm->mode_config.helper_private = &meson_mode_config_helpers;/* Hardware Initialization */
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 86/103 bpf: improve verifier branch analysis
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman4.19-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
[ commit 4f7b3e82589e0de723780198ec7983e427144c0a upstream ]
pathological bpf programs may try to force verifier to explode in the number of branch states:
20: (d5) if r1 s<= 0x24000028 goto pc+0
21: (b5) if r0 <= 0xe1fa20 goto pc+2
22: (d5) if r1 s<= 0x7e goto pc+0
23: (b5) if r0 <= 0xe880e000 goto pc+0
24: (c5) if r0 s< 0x2100ecf4 goto pc+0
25: (d5) if r1 s<= 0xe880e000 goto pc+1
26: (c5) if r0 s< 0xf4041810 goto pc+0
27: (d5) if r1 s<= 0x1e007e goto pc+0
28: (b5) if r0 <= 0xe86be000 goto pc+0
29: (07) r0 += 16614
30: (c5) if r0 s< 0x6d0020da goto pc+0
31: (35) if r0 >= 0x2100ecf4 goto pc+0
Teach verifier to recognize always taken and always not taken branches. This analysis is already done for == and != comparison. Expand it to all other branches.
It also helps real bpf programs to be verified faster:
before after
bpf_lb-DLB_L3.o 2003 1940 bpf_lb-DLB_L4.o 3173 3089 bpf_lb-DUNKNOWN.o 1080 1065 bpf_lxc-DDROP_ALL.o 29584 28052 bpf_lxc-DUNKNOWN.o 36916 35487 bpf_netdev.o 11188 10864 bpf_overlay.o 6679 6643 bpf_lcx_jit.o 39555 38437
--- kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 93 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------ 1 file changed, 80 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)
kernel/bpf/verifier.c +80 -13
@@ -3475,6 +3475,79 @@ static void find_good_pkt_pointers(struct bpf_verifier_state *vstate, } } +/* compute branch direction of the expression "if (reg opcode val) goto target;" +* and return: +* 1 - branch will be taken and "goto target" will be executed +* 0 - branch will not be taken and fall-through to next insn +* -1 - unknown. Example: "if (reg < 5)" is unknown when register value range [0,10] +*/ +static int is_branch_taken (struct bpf_reg_state *reg,u64 val,u8 opcode) +{ +if (__is_pointer_value (false, reg)) +return -1 ; + +switch (opcode) { +case BPF_JEQ : +if (tnum_is_const (reg->var_off)) +return !!tnum_equals_const (reg->var_off, val); +break ; +case BPF_JNE : +if (tnum_is_const (reg->var_off)) +return !tnum_equals_const (reg->var_off, val); +break ; +case BPF_JGT : +if (reg->umin_value > val) +return 1 ; +else if (reg->umax_value <= val) +return 0 ; +break ; +case BPF_JSGT : +if (reg->smin_value > (s64 )val) +return 1 ; +else if (reg->smax_value < (s64 )val) +return 0 ; +break ; +case BPF_JLT : +if (reg->umax_value < val) +return 1 ; +else if (reg->umin_value >= val) +return 0 ; +break ; +case BPF_JSLT : +if (reg->smax_value < (s64 )val) +return 1 ; +else if (reg->smin_value >= (s64 )val) +return 0 ; +break ; +case BPF_JGE : +if (reg->umin_value >= val) +return 1 ; +else if (reg->umax_value < val) +return 0 ; +break ; +case BPF_JSGE : +if (reg->smin_value >= (s64 )val) +return 1 ; +else if (reg->smax_value < (s64 )val) +return 0 ; +break ; +case BPF_JLE : +if (reg->umax_value <= val) +return 1 ; +else if (reg->umin_value > val) +return 0 ; +break ; +case BPF_JSLE : +if (reg->smax_value <= (s64 )val) +return 1 ; +else if (reg->smin_value > (s64 )val) +return 0 ; +break ; + } + +return -1 ; +} +/* Adjusts the register min/max values in the case that the dst_reg is the * variable register that we are working on, and src_reg is a constant or we're * simply doing a BPF_K check.
@@ -3868,21 +3941,15 @@ static int check_cond_jmp_op(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, dst_reg = ®s[insn->dst_reg]; -/* detect if R == 0 where R was initialized to zero earlier */ -if (BPF_SRC (insn->code) ==BPF_K && - (opcode ==BPF_JEQ || opcode ==BPF_JNE ) && - dst_reg->type ==SCALAR_VALUE && -tnum_is_const (dst_reg->var_off)) { -if ((opcode ==BPF_JEQ && dst_reg->var_off.value == insn->imm) || - (opcode ==BPF_JNE && dst_reg->var_off.value != insn->imm)) { -/* if (imm == imm) goto pc+off; -* only follow the goto, ignore fall-through -*/ +if (BPF_SRC (insn->code) ==BPF_K ) { +int pred =is_branch_taken (dst_reg, insn->imm, opcode); + +if (pred ==1 ) { +/* only follow the goto, ignore fall-through */ *insn_idx += insn->off;return 0 ; - }else { -/* if (imm != imm) goto pc+off; -* only follow fall-through branch, since + }else if (pred ==0 ) { +/* only follow fall-through branch, since * that's where the program will go */ return 0 ;
Signature · 1 line
2.19.1
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 87/103 bpf: add per-insn complexity limit
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman4.19-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
[ commit ceefbc96fa5c5b975d87bf8e89ba8416f6b764d9 upstream ]
malicious bpf program may try to force the verifier to remember a lot of distinct verifier states.
Put a limit to number of per-insn 'struct bpf_verifier_state'. Note that hitting the limit doesn't reject the program.
It potentially makes the verifier do more steps to analyze the program. It means that malicious programs will hit BPF_COMPLEXITY_LIMIT_INSNS sooner instead of spending cpu time walking long link list.
The limit of BPF_COMPLEXITY_LIMIT_STATES==64 affects cilium progs with slight increase in number of "steps" it takes to successfully verify the programs:
before after
bpf_lb-DLB_L3.o 1940 1940 bpf_lb-DLB_L4.o 3089 3089 bpf_lb-DUNKNOWN.o 1065 1065 bpf_lxc-DDROP_ALL.o 28052 | 28162 bpf_lxc-DUNKNOWN.o 35487 | 35541 bpf_netdev.o 10864 10864 bpf_overlay.o 6643 6643 bpf_lcx_jit.o 38437 38437
But it also makes malicious program to be rejected in 0.4 seconds vs 6.5 Hence apply this limit to unprivileged programs only.
--- kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 7 ++++++- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
kernel/bpf/verifier.c +6 -1
@@ -156,6 +156,7 @@ struct bpf_verifier_stack_elem {#define BPF_COMPLEXITY_LIMIT_INSNS 131072#define BPF_COMPLEXITY_LIMIT_STACK 1024 +#define BPF_COMPLEXITY_LIMIT_STATES 64#define BPF_MAP_PTR_UNPRIV 1UL#define BPF_MAP_PTR_POISON ((void *)((0xeB9FUL << 1) + \
@@ -4735,7 +4736,7 @@ static int is_state_visited(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int insn_idx)struct bpf_verifier_state_list *new_sl;struct bpf_verifier_state_list *sl;struct bpf_verifier_state *cur = env->cur_state; -int i, j, err; +int i, j, err, states_cnt =0 ; sl = env->explored_states[insn_idx];if (!sl)
@@ -4762,8 +4763,12 @@ static int is_state_visited(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int insn_idx)return 1 ; } sl = sl->next; + states_cnt++; } +if (!env->allow_ptr_leaks && states_cnt >BPF_COMPLEXITY_LIMIT_STATES ) +return 0 ; +/* there were no equivalent states, remember current one. * technically the current state is not proven to be safe yet, * but it will either reach outer most bpf_exit (which means it's safe)
Signature · 1 line
2.19.1
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 88/103 bpf: move {prev_,}insn_idx into verifier env
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman4.19-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
[ commit c08435ec7f2bc8f4109401f696fd55159b4b40cb upstream ]
Move prev_insn_idx and insn_idx from the do_check() function into the verifier environment, so they can be read inside the various helper functions for handling the instructions. It's easier to put this into the environment rather than changing all call-sites only to pass it along. insn_idx is useful in particular since this later on allows to hold state in env->insn_aux_data[env->insn_idx].
--- include/linux/bpf_verifier.h | 2 + kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 75 ++++++++++++++++++------------------ 2 files changed, 40 insertions(+), 37 deletions(-)
include/linux/bpf_verifier.h +2 -0
@@ -186,6 +186,8 @@ struct bpf_subprog_info {* one verifier_env per bpf_check() call */ struct bpf_verifier_env { +u32 insn_idx; +u32 prev_insn_idx;struct bpf_prog *prog;/* eBPF program being verified */ const struct bpf_verifier_ops *ops;struct bpf_verifier_stack_elem *head;/* stack of verifier states to be processed */
kernel/bpf/verifier.c +38 -37
207 lines not on this page · raw message
Signature · 1 line
2.19.1
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 89/103 bpf: move tmp variable into ax register in interpreter
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman4.19-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
[ commit 144cd91c4c2bced6eb8a7e25e590f6618a11e854 upstream ]
This change moves the on-stack 64 bit tmp variable in ___bpf_prog_run() into the hidden ax register. The latter is currently only used in JITs for constant blinding as a temporary scratch register, meaning the BPF interpreter will never see the use of ax. Therefore it is safe to use it for the cases where tmp has been used earlier. This is needed to later on allow restricted hidden use of ax in both interpreter and JITs.
--- include/linux/filter.h | 3 ++- kernel/bpf/core.c | 34 +++++++++++++++++----------------- 2 files changed, 19 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-)
include/linux/filter.h +2 -1
@@ -60,7 +60,8 @@ struct sock_reuseport;* constants. See JIT pre-step in bpf_jit_blind_constants(). */ #define BPF_REG_AX MAX_BPF_REG -#define MAX_BPF_JIT_REG (MAX_BPF_REG + 1) +#define MAX_BPF_EXT_REG (MAX_BPF_REG + 1) +#define MAX_BPF_JIT_REG MAX_BPF_EXT_REG/* unused opcode to mark special call to bpf_tail_call() helper */ #define BPF_TAIL_CALL 0xf0
kernel/bpf/core.c +17 -17
@@ -52,6 +52,7 @@#define DST regs[insn->dst_reg]#define SRC regs[insn->src_reg]#define FP regs[BPF_REG_FP] +#define AX regs[BPF_REG_AX]#define ARG1 regs[BPF_REG_ARG1]#define CTX regs[BPF_REG_CTX]#define IMM insn->imm
@@ -971,7 +972,6 @@ bool bpf_opcode_in_insntable(u8 code)*/ static u64 ___bpf_prog_run (u64 *regs,const struct bpf_insn *insn,u64 *stack) { -u64 tmp;#define BPF_INSN_2_LBL (x, y) [BPF_##x | BPF_##y] = &&x##_##y#define BPF_INSN_3_LBL (x, y, z) [BPF_##x | BPF_##y | BPF_##z] = &&x##_##y##_##zstatic const void *jumptable[256 ] = {
@@ -1045,36 +1045,36 @@ static u64 ___bpf_prog_run(u64 *regs, const struct bpf_insn *insn, u64 *stack) (*(s64 *) &DST ) >>=IMM ;CONT ; ALU64_MOD_X: -div64_u64_rem (DST ,SRC , &tmp); -DST = tmp; +div64_u64_rem (DST ,SRC , &AX ); +DST =AX ;CONT ; ALU_MOD_X: - tmp = (u32 )DST ; -DST =do_div (tmp, (u32 )SRC ); +AX = (u32 )DST ; +DST =do_div (AX , (u32 )SRC );CONT ; ALU64_MOD_K: -div64_u64_rem (DST ,IMM , &tmp); -DST = tmp; +div64_u64_rem (DST ,IMM , &AX ); +DST =AX ;CONT ; ALU_MOD_K: - tmp = (u32 )DST ; -DST =do_div (tmp, (u32 )IMM ); +AX = (u32 )DST ; +DST =do_div (AX , (u32 )IMM );CONT ; ALU64_DIV_X:DST =div64_u64 (DST ,SRC );CONT ; ALU_DIV_X: - tmp = (u32 )DST ; -do_div (tmp, (u32 )SRC ); -DST = (u32 ) tmp; +AX = (u32 )DST ; +do_div (AX , (u32 )SRC ); +DST = (u32 )AX ;CONT ; ALU64_DIV_K:DST =div64_u64 (DST ,IMM );CONT ; ALU_DIV_K: - tmp = (u32 )DST ; -do_div (tmp, (u32 )IMM ); -DST = (u32 ) tmp; +AX = (u32 )DST ; +do_div (AX , (u32 )IMM ); +DST = (u32 )AX ;CONT ; ALU_END_TO_BE:switch (IMM ) {
@@ -1330,7 +1330,7 @@ STACK_FRAME_NON_STANDARD(___bpf_prog_run); /* jump table */static unsigned int PROG_NAME (stack_size )(const void *ctx,const struct bpf_insn *insn) \ { \u64 stack[stack_size /sizeof (u64)]; \ -u64 regs[MAX_BPF_REG ]; \ +u64 regs[MAX_BPF_EXT_REG ]; \ \FP = (u64 ) (unsigned long ) &stack[ARRAY_SIZE (stack)]; \ARG1 = (u64 ) (unsigned long ) ctx; \
@@ -1343,7 +1343,7 @@ static u64 PROG_NAME_ARGS(stack_size)(u64 r1, u64 r2, u64 r3, u64 r4, u64 r5, \ const struct bpf_insn *insn) \ { \u64 stack[stack_size /sizeof (u64)]; \ -u64 regs[MAX_BPF_REG ]; \ +u64 regs[MAX_BPF_EXT_REG ]; \ \FP = (u64 ) (unsigned long ) &stack[ARRAY_SIZE (stack)]; \BPF_R1 = r1; \
Signature · 1 line
2.19.1
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 90/103 bpf: enable access to ax register also from verifier rewrite
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman4.19-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
[ commit 9b73bfdd08e73231d6a90ae6db4b46b3fbf56c30 upstream ]
Right now we are using BPF ax register in JIT for constant blinding as well as in interpreter as temporary variable. Verifier will not be able to use it simply because its use will get overridden from the former in bpf_jit_blind_insn(). However, it can be made to work in that blinding will be skipped if there is prior use in either source or destination register on the instruction. Taking constraints of ax into account, the verifier is then open to use it in rewrites under some constraints. Note, ax register already has mappings in every eBPF JIT.
--- include/linux/filter.h | 7 +------ kernel/bpf/core.c | 20 ++++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 21 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
include/linux/filter.h +1 -6
@@ -53,12 +53,7 @@ struct sock_reuseport;#define BPF_REG_D BPF_REG_8/* data, callee-saved */ #define BPF_REG_H BPF_REG_9/* hlen, callee-saved */ -/* Kernel hidden auxiliary/helper register for hardening step. -* Only used by eBPF JITs. It's nothing more than a temporary -* register that JITs use internally, only that here it's part -* of eBPF instructions that have been rewritten for blinding -* constants. See JIT pre-step in bpf_jit_blind_constants(). -*/ +/* Kernel hidden auxiliary/helper register. */ #define BPF_REG_AX MAX_BPF_REG#define MAX_BPF_EXT_REG (MAX_BPF_REG + 1)#define MAX_BPF_JIT_REG MAX_BPF_EXT_REG
kernel/bpf/core.c +20 -0
@@ -643,6 +643,26 @@ static int bpf_jit_blind_insn(const struct bpf_insn *from,BUILD_BUG_ON (BPF_REG_AX +1 !=MAX_BPF_JIT_REG );BUILD_BUG_ON (MAX_BPF_REG +1 !=MAX_BPF_JIT_REG ); +/* Constraints on AX register: +* +* AX register is inaccessible from user space. It is mapped in +* all JITs, and used here for constant blinding rewrites. It is +* typically "stateless" meaning its contents are only valid within +* the executed instruction, but not across several instructions. +* There are a few exceptions however which are further detailed +* below. +* +* Constant blinding is only used by JITs, not in the interpreter. +* The interpreter uses AX in some occasions as a local temporary +* register e.g. in DIV or MOD instructions. +* +* In restricted circumstances, the verifier can also use the AX +* register for rewrites as long as they do not interfere with +* the above cases! +*/ +if (from->dst_reg ==BPF_REG_AX || from->src_reg ==BPF_REG_AX ) + goto out; +if (from->imm ==0 && (from->code == (BPF_ALU |BPF_MOV |BPF_K ) || from->code == (BPF_ALU64 |BPF_MOV |BPF_K ))) {
Signature · 1 line
2.19.1
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 91/103 bpf: restrict map value pointer arithmetic for unprivileged
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman4.19-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
[ commit 0d6303db7970e6f56ae700fa07e11eb510cda125 upstream ]
Restrict map value pointer arithmetic for unprivileged users in that arithmetic itself must not go out of bounds as opposed to the actual access later on. Therefore after each adjust_ptr_min_max_vals() with a map value pointer as a destination it will simulate a check_map_access() of 1 byte on the destination and once that fails the program is rejected for unprivileged program loads. We use this later on for masking any pointer arithmetic with the remainder of the map value space. The likelihood of breaking any existing real-world unprivileged eBPF program is very small for this corner case.
--- kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 11 +++++++++++ 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+)
kernel/bpf/verifier.c +11 -0
@@ -2880,6 +2880,17 @@ static int adjust_ptr_min_max_vals(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,__update_reg_bounds (dst_reg);__reg_deduce_bounds (dst_reg);__reg_bound_offset (dst_reg); + +/* For unprivileged we require that resulting offset must be in bounds +* in order to be able to sanitize access later on. +*/ +if (!env->allow_ptr_leaks && dst_reg->type ==PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE && +check_map_access (env, dst, dst_reg->off,1 , false)) { +verbose (env,"R%d pointer arithmetic of map value goes out of range, prohibited for !root\n" , + dst); +return -EACCES ; + } +return 0 ; }
Signature · 1 line
2.19.1
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 92/103 bpf: restrict stack pointer arithmetic for unprivileged
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman4.19-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
[ commit e4298d25830a866cc0f427d4bccb858e76715859 upstream ]
Restrict stack pointer arithmetic for unprivileged users in that arithmetic itself must not go out of bounds as opposed to the actual access later on. Therefore after each adjust_ptr_min_max_vals() with a stack pointer as a destination we simulate a check_stack_access() of 1 byte on the destination and once that fails the program is rejected for unprivileged program loads. This is analog to map value pointer arithmetic and needed for masking later on.
--- kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 63 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------------- 1 file changed, 41 insertions(+), 22 deletions(-)
kernel/bpf/verifier.c +41 -22
@@ -1238,6 +1238,31 @@ static int check_stack_read(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, } } +static int check_stack_access (struct bpf_verifier_env *env, +const struct bpf_reg_state *reg, +int off,int size) +{ +/* Stack accesses must be at a fixed offset, so that we +* can determine what type of data were returned. See +* check_stack_read(). +*/ +if (!tnum_is_const (reg->var_off)) { +char tn_buf[48 ]; + +tnum_strn (tn_buf,sizeof (tn_buf), reg->var_off); +verbose (env,"variable stack access var_off=%s off=%d size=%d" , + tn_buf, off, size); +return -EACCES ; + } + +if (off >=0 || off < -MAX_BPF_STACK ) { +verbose (env,"invalid stack off=%d size=%d\n" , off, size); +return -EACCES ; + } + +return 0 ; +} +/* check read/write into map element returned by bpf_map_lookup_elem() */ static int __check_map_access (struct bpf_verifier_env *env,u32 regno,int off,int size,bool zero_size_allowed)
@@ -1736,24 +1761,10 @@ static int check_mem_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int insn_idx, u32 regn } }else if (reg->type ==PTR_TO_STACK ) { -/* stack accesses must be at a fixed offset, so that we can -* determine what type of data were returned. -* See check_stack_read(). -*/ -if (!tnum_is_const (reg->var_off)) { -char tn_buf[48 ]; - -tnum_strn (tn_buf,sizeof (tn_buf), reg->var_off); -verbose (env,"variable stack access var_off=%s off=%d size=%d" , - tn_buf, off, size); -return -EACCES ; - } off += reg->var_off.value; -if (off >=0 || off < -MAX_BPF_STACK ) { -verbose (env,"invalid stack off=%d size=%d\n" , off, - size); -return -EACCES ; - } + err =check_stack_access (env, reg, off, size); +if (err) +return err; state =func (env, reg); err =update_stack_depth (env, state, off);
@@ -2884,11 +2895,19 @@ static int adjust_ptr_min_max_vals(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,/* For unprivileged we require that resulting offset must be in bounds * in order to be able to sanitize access later on. */ -if (!env->allow_ptr_leaks && dst_reg->type ==PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE && -check_map_access (env, dst, dst_reg->off,1 , false)) { -verbose (env,"R%d pointer arithmetic of map value goes out of range, prohibited for !root\n" , - dst); -return -EACCES ; +if (!env->allow_ptr_leaks) { +if (dst_reg->type ==PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE && +check_map_access (env, dst, dst_reg->off,1 , false)) { +verbose (env,"R%d pointer arithmetic of map value goes out of range, " +"prohibited for !root\n" , dst); +return -EACCES ; + }else if (dst_reg->type ==PTR_TO_STACK && +check_stack_access (env, dst_reg, dst_reg->off + + dst_reg->var_off.value,1 )) { +verbose (env,"R%d stack pointer arithmetic goes out of range, " +"prohibited for !root\n" , dst); +return -EACCES ; + } }return 0 ;
Signature · 1 line
2.19.1
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 93/103 bpf: restrict unknown scalars of mixed signed bounds for unprivileged
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman4.19-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
[ commit 9d7eceede769f90b66cfa06ad5b357140d5141ed upstream ]
For unknown scalars of mixed signed bounds, meaning their smin_value is negative and their smax_value is positive, we need to reject arithmetic with pointer to map value. For unprivileged the goal is to mask every map pointer arithmetic and this cannot reliably be done when it is unknown at verification time whether the scalar value is negative or positive. Given this is a corner case, the likelihood of breaking should be very small.
--- kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 8 +++++++- 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
kernel/bpf/verifier.c +7 -1
@@ -2712,8 +2712,8 @@ static int adjust_ptr_min_max_vals(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, smin_ptr = ptr_reg->smin_value, smax_ptr = ptr_reg->smax_value;u64 umin_val = off_reg->umin_value, umax_val = off_reg->umax_value, umin_ptr = ptr_reg->umin_value, umax_ptr = ptr_reg->umax_value; +u32 dst = insn->dst_reg, src = insn->src_reg;u8 opcode =BPF_OP (insn->code); -u32 dst = insn->dst_reg; dst_reg = ®s[dst];
@@ -2749,6 +2749,12 @@ static int adjust_ptr_min_max_vals(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, dst);return -EACCES ; } +if (ptr_reg->type ==PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE && + !env->allow_ptr_leaks && !known && (smin_val <0 ) != (smax_val <0 )) { +verbose (env,"R%d has unknown scalar with mixed signed bounds, pointer arithmetic with it prohibited for !root\n" , + off_reg == dst_reg ? dst : src); +return -EACCES ; + }/* In case of 'scalar += pointer', dst_reg inherits pointer type and id. * The id may be overwritten later if we create a new variable offset.
Signature · 1 line
2.19.1
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 94/103 bpf: fix check_map_access smin_value test when pointer contains offset
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman4.19-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
[ commit b7137c4eab85c1cf3d46acdde90ce1163b28c873 upstream ]
In check_map_access() we probe actual bounds through __check_map_access() with offset of reg->smin_value + off for lower bound and offset of reg->umax_value + off for the upper bound. However, even though the reg->smin_value could have a negative value, the final result of the sum with off could be positive when pointer arithmetic with known and unknown scalars is combined. In this case we reject the program with an error such as "R<x> min value is negative, either use unsigned index or do a if (index >=0) check." even though the access itself would be fine. Therefore extend the check to probe whether the actual resulting reg->smin_value + off is less than zero.
--- kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 6 +++++- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
kernel/bpf/verifier.c +5 -1
@@ -1294,13 +1294,17 @@ static int check_map_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 regno,*/ if (env->log.level)print_verifier_state (env, state); +/* The minimum value is only important with signed * comparisons where we can't assume the floor of a * value is 0. If we are using signed variables for our * index'es we need to make sure that whatever we use * will have a set floor within our range. */ -if (reg->smin_value <0 ) { +if (reg->smin_value <0 && + (reg->smin_value ==S64_MIN || + (off + reg->smin_value != (s64)(s32)(off + reg->smin_value)) || + reg->smin_value + off <0 )) {verbose (env,"R%d min value is negative, either use unsigned index or do a if (index >=0) check.\n" , regno);return -EACCES ;
Signature · 1 line
2.19.1
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 95/103 bpf: prevent out of bounds speculation on pointer arithmetic
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman4.19-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
[ commit 979d63d50c0c0f7bc537bf821e056cc9fe5abd38 upstream ]
Jann reported that the original commit back in b2157399cc98 ("bpf: prevent out-of-bounds speculation") was not sufficient to stop CPU from speculating out of bounds memory access:
While b2157399cc98 only focussed on masking array map access for unprivileged users for tail calls and data access such that the user provided index gets sanitized from BPF program and syscall side, there is still a more generic form affected from BPF programs that applies to most maps that hold user data in relation to dynamic map access when dealing with unknown scalars or "slow" known scalars as access offset, for example:
- Load a map value pointer into R6
- Load an index into R7
- Do a slow computation (e.g. with a memory dependency) that loads a limit into R8 (e.g. load the limit from a map for high latency, then mask it to make the verifier happy)
- Exit if R7 >= R8 (mispredicted branch)
- Load R0 = R6[R7]
- Load R0 = R6[R0]
For unknown scalars there are two options in the BPF verifier where we could derive knowledge from in order to guarantee safe access to the memory: i) While </>/<=/>= variants won't allow to derive any lower or upper bounds from the unknown scalar where it would be safe to add it to the map value pointer, it is possible through ==/!= test however. ii) another option is to transform the unknown scalar into a known scalar, for example, through ALU ops combination such as R &= <imm> followed by R |= <imm> or any similar combination where the original information from the unknown scalar would be destroyed entirely leaving R with a constant. The initial slow load still precedes the latter ALU ops on that register, so the CPU executes speculatively from that point. Once we have the known scalar, any compare operation would work then. A third option only involving registers with known scalars could be crafted as described in [0] where a CPU port (e.g. Slow Int unit) would be filled with many dependent computations such that the subsequent condition depending on its outcome has to wait for evaluation on its execution port and thereby executing speculatively if the speculated code can be scheduled on a different execution port, or any other form of mistraining as described in [1], for example. Given this is not limited to only unknown scalars, not only map but also stack access is affected since both is accessible for unprivileged users and could potentially be used for out of bounds access under speculation.
In order to prevent any of these cases, the verifier is now sanitizing pointer arithmetic on the offset such that any out of bounds speculation would be masked in a way where the pointer arithmetic result in the destination register will stay unchanged, meaning offset masked into zero similar as in array_index_nospec() case. With regards to implementation, there are three options that were considered: i) new insn for sanitation, ii) push/pop insn and sanitation as inlined BPF, iii) reuse of ax register and sanitation as inlined BPF.
Option i) has the downside that we end up using from reserved bits in the opcode space, but also that we would require each JIT to emit masking as native arch opcodes meaning mitigation would have slow adoption till everyone implements it eventually which is counter-productive. Option ii) and iii) have both in common that a temporary register is needed in order to implement the sanitation as inlined BPF since we are not allowed to modify the source register. While a push / pop insn in ii) would be useful to have in any case, it requires once again that every JIT needs to implement it first. While possible, amount of changes needed would also be unsuitable for a -stable patch. Therefore, the path which has fewer changes, less BPF instructions for the mitigation and does not require anything to be changed in the JITs is option iii) which this work is pursuing. The ax register is already mapped to a register in all JITs (modulo arm32 where it's mapped to stack as various other BPF registers there) and used in constant blinding for JITs-only so far. It can be reused for verifier rewrites under certain constraints. The interpreter's tmp "register" has therefore been remapped into extending the register set with hidden ax register and reusing that for a number of instructions that needed the prior temporary variable internally (e.g. div, mod). This allows for zero increase in stack space usage in the interpreter, and enables (restricted) generic use in rewrites otherwise as long as such a patchlet does not make use of these instructions. The sanitation mask is dynamic and relative to the offset the map value or stack pointer currently holds.
There are various cases that need to be taken under consideration for the masking, e.g. such operation could look as follows:
ptr += val or val += ptr or ptr -= val. Thus, the value to be sanitized could reside either in source or in destination register, and the limit is different depending on whether the ALU op is addition or subtraction and depending on the current known and bounded offset. The limit is derived as
follows: limit := max_value_size - (smin_value + off). For
subtraction: limit := umax_value + off. This holds because we do not allow any pointer arithmetic that would temporarily go out of bounds or would have an unknown value with mixed signed bounds where it is unclear at verification time whether the actual runtime value would be either negative or positive. For example, we have a derived map pointer value with constant offset and bounded one, so limit based on smin_value works because the verifier requires that statically analyzed arithmetic on the pointer must be in bounds, and thus it checks if resulting smin_value + off and umax_value + off is still within map value bounds at time of arithmetic in addition to time of access. Similarly, for the case of stack access we derive the limit as follows: MAX_BPF_STACK + off for subtraction and -off for the case of addition where off := ptr_reg->off + ptr_reg->var_off.value. Subtraction is a special case for the masking which can be in form of ptr += -val, ptr -= -val, or ptr -= val. In the first two cases where we know that the value is negative, we need to temporarily negate the value in order to do the sanitation on a positive value where we later swap the ALU op, and restore original source register if the value was in source.
The sanitation of pointer arithmetic alone is still not fully sufficient as is, since a scenario like the following could happen ...
PTR += 0x1000 (e.g. K-based imm)
PTR -= BIG_NUMBER_WITH_SLOW_COMPARISON
PTR += 0x1000
PTR -= BIG_NUMBER_WITH_SLOW_COMPARISON
[...]
... which under speculation could end up as ...
PTR += 0x1000
PTR -= 0 [ truncated by mitigation ]
PTR += 0x1000
PTR -= 0 [ truncated by mitigation ]
[...]
... and therefore still access out of bounds. To prevent such case, the verifier is also analyzing safety for potential out of bounds access under speculative execution. Meaning, it is also simulating pointer access under truncation. We therefore "branch off" and push the current verification state after the ALU operation with known 0 to the verification stack for later analysis. Given the current path analysis succeeded it is likely that the one under speculation can be pruned. In any case, it is also subject to existing complexity limits and therefore anything beyond this point will be rejected. In terms of pruning, it needs to be ensured that the verification state from speculative execution simulation must never prune a non-speculative execution path, therefore, we mark verifier state accordingly at the time of push_stack(). If verifier detects out of bounds access under speculative execution from one of the possible paths that includes a truncation, it will reject such program.
Given we mask every reg-based pointer arithmetic for unprivileged programs, we've been looking into how it could affect real-world programs in terms of size increase. As the majority of programs are targeted for privileged-only use case, we've unconditionally enabled masking (with its alu restrictions on top of it) for privileged programs for the sake of testing in order to check i) whether they get rejected in its current form, and ii) by how much the number of instructions and size will increase. We've tested this by using Katran, Cilium and test_l4lb from the kernel selftests. For Katran we've evaluated balancer_kern.o, Cilium bpf_lxc.o and an older test object bpf_lxc_opt_-DUNKNOWN.o and l4lb we've used test_l4lb.o as well as test_l4lb_noinline.o. We found that none of the programs got rejected by the verifier with this change, and that impact is rather minimal to none. balancer_kern.o had 13,904 bytes (1,738 insns) xlated and 7,797 bytes JITed before and after the change. Most complex program in bpf_lxc.o had 30,544 bytes (3,817 insns) xlated and 18,538 bytes JITed before and after and none of the other tail call programs in bpf_lxc.o had any changes either. For the older bpf_lxc_opt_-DUNKNOWN.o object we found a small increase from 20,616 bytes (2,576 insns) and 12,536 bytes JITed before to 20,664 bytes (2,582 insns) and 12,558 bytes JITed after the change. Other programs from that object file had similar small increase. Both test_l4lb.o had no change and remained at 6,544 bytes (817 insns) xlated and 3,401 bytes JITed and for test_l4lb_noinline.o constant at 5,080 bytes (634 insns) xlated and 3,313 bytes JITed. This can be explained in that LLVM typically optimizes stack based pointer arithmetic by using K-based operations and that use of dynamic map access is not overly frequent. However, in future we may decide to optimize the algorithm further under known guarantees from branch and value speculation. Latter seems also unclear in terms of prediction heuristics that today's CPUs apply as well as whether there could be collisions in e.g. the predictor's Value History/Pattern Table for triggering out of bounds access, thus masking is performed unconditionally at this point but could be subject to relaxation later on. We were generally also brainstorming various other approaches for mitigation, but the blocker was always lack of available registers at runtime and/or overhead for runtime tracking of limits belonging to a specific pointer. Thus, we found this to be minimally intrusive under given constraints.
With that in place, a simple example with sanitized access on unprivileged load at post-verification time looks as follows:
# bpftool prog dump xlated id 282 [...] 28: (79) r1 = *(u64 *)(r7 +0) 29: (79) r2 = *(u64 *)(r7 +8) 30: (57) r1 &= 15 31: (79) r3 = *(u64 *)(r0 +4608) 32: (57) r3 &= 1 33: (47) r3 |= 1 34: (2d) if r2 > r3 goto pc+19 35: (b4) (u32) r11 = (u32) 20479 | 36: (1f) r11 -= r2 | Dynamic sanitation for pointer 37: (4f) r11 |= r2 | arithmetic with registers 38: (87) r11 = -r11 | containing bounded or known 39: (c7) r11 s>>= 63 | scalars in order to prevent 40: (5f) r11 &= r2 | out of bounds speculation. 41: (0f) r4 += r11 | 42: (71) r4 = *(u8 *)(r4 +0) 43: (6f) r4 <<= r1 [...]
For the case where the scalar sits in the destination register as opposed to the source register, the following code is emitted for the above example:
[...]
16: (b4) (u32) r11 = (u32) 20479
17: (1f) r11 -= r2
18: (4f) r11 |= r2
19: (87) r11 = -r11
20: (c7) r11 s>>= 63
21: (5f) r2 &= r11
22: (0f) r2 += r0
23: (61) r0 = *(u32 *)(r2 +0)
[...]
JIT blinding example with non-conflicting use of r10:
[...]
d5: je 0x0000000000000106 _ d7: mov 0x0(%rax),%edi | da: mov $0xf153246,%r10d | Index load from map value and e0: xor $0xf153259,%r10 | (const blinded) mask with 0x1f. e7: and %r10,%rdi |_ ea: mov $0x2f,%r10d | f0: sub %rdi,%r10 | Sanitized addition. Both use r10 f3: or %rdi,%r10 | but do not interfere with each f6: neg %r10 | other. (Neither do these instructions f9: sar $0x3f,%r10 | interfere with the use of ax as temp fd: and %r10,%rdi | in interpreter.) 100: add %rax,%rdi |_ 103: mov 0x0(%rdi),%eax
[...]
Tested that it fixes Jann's reproducer, and also checked that test_verifier and test_progs suite with interpreter, JIT and JIT with hardening enabled on x86-64 and arm64 runs successfully.
[0] Speculose: Analyzing the Security Implications of Speculative Execution in CPUs, Giorgi Maisuradze and Christian Rossow,
https://arxiv.org/pdf/1801.04084.pdf
[1] A Systematic Evaluation of Transient Execution Attacks and Defenses, Claudio Canella, Jo Van Bulck, Michael Schwarz, Moritz Lipp, Benjamin von Berg, Philipp Ortner, Frank Piessens, Dmitry Evtyushkin, Daniel Gruss,
https://arxiv.org/pdf/1811.05441.pdf
--- include/linux/bpf_verifier.h | 10 ++ kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 186 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-- 2 files changed, 189 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
include/linux/bpf_verifier.h +10 -0
@@ -134,6 +134,7 @@ struct bpf_verifier_state {struct bpf_func_state *frame[MAX_CALL_FRAMES ];struct bpf_verifier_state *parent;u32 curframe; +bool speculative; };/* linked list of verifier states used to prune search */
@@ -142,15 +143,24 @@ struct bpf_verifier_state_list {struct bpf_verifier_state_list *next; }; +/* Possible states for alu_state member. */ +#define BPF_ALU_SANITIZE_SRC 1U +#define BPF_ALU_SANITIZE_DST 2U +#define BPF_ALU_NEG_VALUE (1U << 2) +#define BPF_ALU_SANITIZE (BPF_ALU_SANITIZE_SRC | \ + BPF_ALU_SANITIZE_DST) +struct bpf_insn_aux_data {union {enum bpf_reg_type ptr_type;/* pointer type for load/store insns */ unsigned long map_state;/* pointer/poison value for maps */ s32 call_imm;/* saved imm field of call insn */ +u32 alu_limit;/* limit for add/sub register with pointer */ };int ctx_field_size;/* the ctx field size for load insn, maybe 0 */ int sanitize_stack_off;/* stack slot to be cleared */ bool seen;/* this insn was processed by the verifier */ +u8 alu_state;/* used in combination with alu_limit */ };#define MAX_USED_MAPS 64/* max number of maps accessed by one eBPF program */
kernel/bpf/verifier.c +179 -7
264 lines not on this page · raw message
Signature · 1 line
2.19.1
Re: [PATCH 4.19 095/103] bpf: prevent out of bounds speculation on pointer arithmetic
Quoted 6 lines · Greg Kroah-Hartman
4.19-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
[ commit
979d63d50c0c0f7bc537bf821e056cc9fe5abd38upstream ]
Quoted 11 lines
Jann reported that the original commit back in
b2157399cc98("bpf: prevent out-of-bounds speculation") was not sufficient to stop CPU from speculating out of bounds memory access:
Whileb2157399cc98only focussed on masking array map access for unprivileged users for tail calls and data access such that the user provided index gets sanitized from BPF program and syscall side, there is still a more generic form affected from BPF programs that applies to most maps that hold user data in relation to dynamic map access when dealing with unknown scalars or "slow" known scalars as access offset, for example:
Is this also going into 4.14 and 4.9? I don't see anything related in the stable queue or in stable-rc.
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerRe: [PATCH 4.19 095/103] bpf: prevent out of bounds speculation on pointer arithmetic
Quoted 20 lines · Jann Horn
Quoted 6 lines · Greg Kroah-Hartman
4.19-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
[ commit
979d63d50c0c0f7bc537bf821e056cc9fe5abd38upstream ]Quoted 11 lines
Jann reported that the original commit back in
b2157399cc98("bpf: prevent out-of-bounds speculation") was not sufficient to stop CPU from speculating out of bounds memory access:
Whileb2157399cc98only focussed on masking array map access for unprivileged users for tail calls and data access such that the user provided index gets sanitized from BPF program and syscall side, there is still a more generic form affected from BPF programs that applies to most maps that hold user data in relation to dynamic map access when dealing with unknown scalars or "slow" known scalars as access offset, for example:
Quoted 2 lines
Is this also going into 4.14 and 4.9? I don't see anything related in the stable queue or in stable-rc.
Ah, the original submitter did not send backported patches, but you are right, it should go further back. I'll see how hard it would be to do the backport, thanks for letting me know.
greg k-h
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerRe: [PATCH 4.19 095/103] bpf: prevent out of bounds speculation on pointer arithmetic
Quoted 21 lines · Greg Kroah-Hartman
Quoted 20 lines · Jann Horn
Quoted 17 lines · Greg Kroah-Hartman
4.19-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
[ commit
979d63d50c0c0f7bc537bf821e056cc9fe5abd38upstream ]Jann reported that the original commit back in
b2157399cc98("bpf: prevent out-of-bounds speculation") was not sufficient to stop CPU from speculating out of bounds memory access:
Whileb2157399cc98only focussed on masking array map access for unprivileged users for tail calls and data access such that the user provided index gets sanitized from BPF program and syscall side, there is still a more generic form affected from BPF programs that applies to most maps that hold user data in relation to dynamic map access when dealing with unknown scalars or "slow" known scalars as access offset, for example:
Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 2 lines
Is this also going into 4.14 and 4.9? I don't see anything related in the stable queue or in stable-rc.
Ah, the original submitter did not send backported patches, but you are right, it should go further back. I'll see how hard it would be to do the backport, thanks for letting me know.
Ok, no, there's no way I can do this backport. It didn't apply cleanly, and trying to take the patches prior to this resulted in a huge mess.
So, it would be wonderful if someone who knows the bpf code stack could do this and send it in.
thanks,
greg k-h
Re: [PATCH 4.19 095/103] bpf: prevent out of bounds speculation on pointer arithmetic
Quoted 29 lines · Greg Kroah-Hartman
Quoted 21 lines · Greg Kroah-Hartman
Quoted 20 lines · Jann Horn
Quoted 17 lines · Greg Kroah-Hartman
4.19-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
[ commit
979d63d50c0c0f7bc537bf821e056cc9fe5abd38upstream ]Jann reported that the original commit back in
b2157399cc98("bpf: prevent out-of-bounds speculation") was not sufficient to stop CPU from speculating out of bounds memory access:
Whileb2157399cc98only focussed on masking array map access for unprivileged users for tail calls and data access such that the user provided index gets sanitized from BPF program and syscall side, there is still a more generic form affected from BPF programs that applies to most maps that hold user data in relation to dynamic map access when dealing with unknown scalars or "slow" known scalars as access offset, for example:Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 2 lines
Is this also going into 4.14 and 4.9? I don't see anything related in the stable queue or in stable-rc.
Ah, the original submitter did not send backported patches, but you are right, it should go further back. I'll see how hard it would be to do the backport, thanks for letting me know.
Quoted 5 lines
Ok, no, there's no way I can do this backport. It didn't apply cleanly, and trying to take the patches prior to this resulted in a huge mess.
So, it would be wonderful if someone who knows the bpf code stack could do this and send it in.
Daniel, Alexei: Can one of you do the backports to older stable kernels?
Given that the 4.19 and 4.20 stable kernels are out, I'm going to derestrict the entry in our bugtracker now.
Re: [PATCH 4.19 095/103] bpf: prevent out of bounds speculation on pointer arithmetic
Quoted 31 lines · Jann Horn
Quoted 29 lines · Greg Kroah-Hartman
Quoted 27 lines · Greg Kroah-Hartman
Quoted 20 lines · Jann Horn
Quoted 6 lines · Greg Kroah-Hartman
4.19-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
[ commit
979d63d50c0c0f7bc537bf821e056cc9fe5abd38upstream ]Quoted 11 lines
Jann reported that the original commit back in
b2157399cc98("bpf: prevent out-of-bounds speculation") was not sufficient to stop CPU from speculating out of bounds memory access:
Whileb2157399cc98only focussed on masking array map access for unprivileged users for tail calls and data access such that the user provided index gets sanitized from BPF program and syscall side, there is still a more generic form affected from BPF programs that applies to most maps that hold user data in relation to dynamic map access when dealing with unknown scalars or "slow" known scalars as access offset, for example:Quoted 2 lines
Is this also going into 4.14 and 4.9? I don't see anything related in the stable queue or in stable-rc.
Ah, the original submitter did not send backported patches, but you are right, it should go further back. I'll see how hard it would be to do the backport, thanks for letting me know.
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 5 lines
Ok, no, there's no way I can do this backport. It didn't apply cleanly, and trying to take the patches prior to this resulted in a huge mess.
So, it would be wonderful if someone who knows the bpf code stack could do this and send it in.
Daniel, Alexei: Can one of you do the backports to older stable kernels?
Ok, I'll try to find some cycles for 4.9 / 4.14 backports and see how complex it gets, might be around next week though.
Thanks,
Daniel
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 96/103 bpf: fix sanitation of alu op with pointer / scalar type from different paths
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman4.19-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
[ commit d3bd7413e0ca40b60cf60d4003246d067cafdeda upstream ]
While 979d63d50c0c ("bpf: prevent out of bounds speculation on pointer arithmetic") took care of rejecting alu op on pointer when e.g. pointer came from two different map values with different map properties such as value size, Jann reported that a case was not covered yet when a given alu op is used in both "ptr_reg += reg" and "numeric_reg += reg" from different branches where we would incorrectly try to sanitize based on the pointer's limit. Catch this corner case and reject the program instead.
--- include/linux/bpf_verifier.h | 1 + kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 61 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------- 2 files changed, 49 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)
include/linux/bpf_verifier.h +1 -0
@@ -147,6 +147,7 @@ struct bpf_verifier_state_list {#define BPF_ALU_SANITIZE_SRC 1U#define BPF_ALU_SANITIZE_DST 2U#define BPF_ALU_NEG_VALUE (1U << 2) +#define BPF_ALU_NON_POINTER (1U << 3)#define BPF_ALU_SANITIZE (BPF_ALU_SANITIZE_SRC | \ BPF_ALU_SANITIZE_DST)
kernel/bpf/verifier.c +48 -13
98 lines not on this page · raw message
Signature · 1 line
2.19.1
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 97/103 bpf: fix inner map masking to prevent oob under speculation
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman4.19-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
[ commit 9d5564ddcf2a0f5ba3fa1c3a1f8a1b59ad309553 upstream ]
During review I noticed that inner meta map setup for map in map is buggy in that it does not propagate all needed data from the reference map which the verifier is later accessing.
In particular one such case is index masking to prevent out of bounds access under speculative execution due to missing the map's unpriv_array/index_mask field propagation. Fix this such that the verifier is generating the correct code for inlined lookups in case of unpriviledged use.
Before patch (test_verifier's 'map in map access' dump):
# bpftool prog dump xla id 3
0: (62) *(u32 *)(r10 -4) = 0
1: (bf) r2 = r10
2: (07) r2 += -4
3: (18) r1 = map[id:4]
5: (07) r1 += 272 |
6: (61) r0 = *(u32 *)(r2 +0) |
7: (35) if r0 >= 0x1 goto pc+6 | Inlined map in map lookup
8: (54) (u32) r0 &= (u32) 0 | with index masking for
9: (67) r0 <<= 3 | map->unpriv_array.
10: (0f) r0 += r1 |
11: (79) r0 = *(u64 *)(r0 +0) |
12: (15) if r0 == 0x0 goto pc+1 |
13: (05) goto pc+1 |
14: (b7) r0 = 0 |
15: (15) if r0 == 0x0 goto pc+11
16: (62) *(u32 *)(r10 -4) = 0
17: (bf) r2 = r10
18: (07) r2 += -4
19: (bf) r1 = r0
20: (07) r1 += 272 |
21: (61) r0 = *(u32 *)(r2 +0) | Index masking missing (!)
22: (35) if r0 >= 0x1 goto pc+3 | for inner map despite
23: (67) r0 <<= 3 | map->unpriv_array set.
24: (0f) r0 += r1 |
25: (05) goto pc+1 |
26: (b7) r0 = 0 |
27: (b7) r0 = 0
28: (95) exitAfter patch:
# bpftool prog dump xla id 1
0: (62) *(u32 *)(r10 -4) = 0
1: (bf) r2 = r10
2: (07) r2 += -4
3: (18) r1 = map[id:2]
5: (07) r1 += 272 |
6: (61) r0 = *(u32 *)(r2 +0) |
7: (35) if r0 >= 0x1 goto pc+6 | Same inlined map in map lookup
8: (54) (u32) r0 &= (u32) 0 | with index masking due to
9: (67) r0 <<= 3 | map->unpriv_array.
10: (0f) r0 += r1 |
11: (79) r0 = *(u64 *)(r0 +0) |
12: (15) if r0 == 0x0 goto pc+1 |
13: (05) goto pc+1 |
14: (b7) r0 = 0 |
15: (15) if r0 == 0x0 goto pc+12
16: (62) *(u32 *)(r10 -4) = 0
17: (bf) r2 = r10
18: (07) r2 += -4
19: (bf) r1 = r0
20: (07) r1 += 272 |
21: (61) r0 = *(u32 *)(r2 +0) |
22: (35) if r0 >= 0x1 goto pc+4 | Now fixed inlined inner map
23: (54) (u32) r0 &= (u32) 0 | lookup with proper index masking
24: (67) r0 <<= 3 | for map->unpriv_array.
25: (0f) r0 += r1 |
26: (05) goto pc+1 |
27: (b7) r0 = 0 |
28: (b7) r0 = 0
29: (95) exit--- kernel/bpf/map_in_map.c | 17 +++++++++++++++-- 1 file changed, 15 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
kernel/bpf/map_in_map.c +15 -2
@@ -12,6 +12,7 @@struct bpf_map *bpf_map_meta_alloc (int inner_map_ufd) {struct bpf_map *inner_map, *inner_map_meta; +u32 inner_map_meta_size;struct fd f; f =fdget (inner_map_ufd);
@@ -35,7 +36,12 @@ struct bpf_map *bpf_map_meta_alloc(int ireturn ERR_PTR (-EINVAL ); } - inner_map_meta =kzalloc (sizeof (*inner_map_meta),GFP_USER ); + inner_map_meta_size =sizeof (*inner_map_meta); +/* In some cases verifier needs to access beyond just base map. */ +if (inner_map->ops == &array_map_ops) + inner_map_meta_size =sizeof (struct bpf_array ); + + inner_map_meta =kzalloc (inner_map_meta_size,GFP_USER );if (!inner_map_meta) {fdput (f);return ERR_PTR (-ENOMEM );
@@ -45,9 +51,16 @@ struct bpf_map *bpf_map_meta_alloc(int i inner_map_meta->key_size = inner_map->key_size; inner_map_meta->value_size = inner_map->value_size; inner_map_meta->map_flags = inner_map->map_flags; - inner_map_meta->ops = inner_map->ops; inner_map_meta->max_entries = inner_map->max_entries; +/* Misc members not needed in bpf_map_meta_equal() check. */ + inner_map_meta->ops = inner_map->ops; +if (inner_map->ops == &array_map_ops) { + inner_map_meta->unpriv_array = inner_map->unpriv_array; + container_of(inner_map_meta, struct bpf_array, map)->index_mask = + container_of(inner_map, struct bpf_array, map)->index_mask; + } +fdput (f);return inner_map_meta; }
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 98/103 s390/smp: Fix calling smp_call_ipl_cpu() from ipl CPU
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman4.19-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: David Hildenbrand <[email protected]>
commit 60f1bf29c0b2519989927cae640cd1f50f59dc7f upstream.
When calling smp_call_ipl_cpu() from the IPL CPU, we will try to read from pcpu_devices->lowcore. However, due to prefixing, that will result in reading from absolute address 0 on that CPU. We have to go via the actual lowcore instead.
This means that right now, we will read lc->nodat_stack == 0 and therfore work on a very wrong stack.
This BUG essentially broke rebooting under QEMU TCG (which will report a low address protection exception). And checking under KVM, it is also broken under KVM. With 1 VCPU it can be easily triggered.
:/# echo 1 > /proc/sys/kernel/sysrq :/# echo b > /proc/sysrq-trigger [ 28.476745] sysrq: SysRq : Resetting [ 28.476793] Kernel stack overflow. [ 28.476817] CPU: 0 PID: 424 Comm: sh Not tainted 5.0.0-rc1+ #13 [ 28.476820] Hardware name: IBM 2964 NE1 716 (KVM/Linux) [ 28.476826] Krnl PSW : 0400c00180000000 0000000000115c0c (pcpu_delegate+0x12c/0x140) [ 28.476861] R:0 T:1 IO:0 EX:0 Key:0 M:0 W:0 P:0 AS:3 CC:0 PM:0 RI:0 EA:3 [ 28.476863] Krnl GPRS: ffffffffffffffff 0000000000000000 000000000010dff8 0000000000000000 [ 28.476864] 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000ab7090 000003e0006efbf0 [ 28.476864] 000000000010dff8 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 [ 28.476865] 000000007fffc000 0000000000730408 000003e0006efc58 0000000000000000 [ 28.476887] Krnl Code: 0000000000115bfe: 4170f000 la %r7,0(%r15) [ 28.476887] 0000000000115c02: 41f0a000 la %r15,0(%r10) [ 28.476887] #0000000000115c06: e370f0980024 stg %r7,152(%r15) [ 28.476887] >0000000000115c0c: c0e5fffff86e brasl %r14,114ce8 [ 28.476887] 0000000000115c12: 41f07000 la %r15,0(%r7) [ 28.476887] 0000000000115c16: a7f4ffa8 brc 15,115b66 [ 28.476887] 0000000000115c1a: 0707 bcr 0,%r7 [ 28.476887] 0000000000115c1c: 0707 bcr 0,%r7 [ 28.476901] Call Trace: [ 28.476902] Last Breaking-Event-Address: [ 28.476920] [<0000000000a01c4a>] arch_call_rest_init+0x22/0x80 [ 28.476927] Kernel panic - not syncing: Corrupt kernel stack, can't continue. [ 28.476930] CPU: 0 PID: 424 Comm: sh Not tainted 5.0.0-rc1+ #13 [ 28.476932] Hardware name: IBM 2964 NE1 716 (KVM/Linux) [ 28.476932] Call Trace:
--- arch/s390/kernel/smp.c | 8 ++++++-- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
arch/s390/kernel/smp.c +6 -2
@@ -371,9 +371,13 @@ void smp_call_online_cpu(void (*func)(vo*/ void smp_call_ipl_cpu (void (*func)(void *),void *data) { +struct lowcore *lc = pcpu_devices->lowcore; + +if (pcpu_devices[0 ].address ==stap ()) + lc = &S390_lowcore; +pcpu_delegate (&pcpu_devices[0 ], func, data, - pcpu_devices->lowcore->panic_stack - -PANIC_FRAME_OFFSET +PAGE_SIZE ); + lc->panic_stack -PANIC_FRAME_OFFSET +PAGE_SIZE ); }int smp_find_processor_id (u16 address)
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 99/103 nvmet-rdma: Add unlikely for response allocated check
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman4.19-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Israel Rukshin <[email protected]>
commit ad1f824948e4ed886529219cf7cd717d078c630d upstream.
--- drivers/nvme/target/rdma.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/nvme/target/rdma.c +1 -1
@@ -196,7 +196,7 @@ nvmet_rdma_put_rsp(struct nvmet_rdma_rsp {unsigned long flags; -if (rsp->allocated) { +if (unlikely (rsp->allocated)) {kfree (rsp);return ; }
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 100/103 nvmet-rdma: fix null dereference under heavy load
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman4.19-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Raju Rangoju <[email protected]>
commit 5cbab6303b4791a3e6713dfe2c5fda6a867f9adc upstream.
Under heavy load if we don't have any pre-allocated rsps left, we dynamically allocate a rsp, but we are not actually allocating memory for nvme_completion (rsp->req.rsp). In such a case, accessing pointer fields (req->rsp->status) in nvmet_req_init() will result in crash.
To fix this, allocate the memory for nvme_completion by calling nvmet_rdma_alloc_rsp()
--- drivers/nvme/target/rdma.c | 15 ++++++++++++++- 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/nvme/target/rdma.c +14 -1
@@ -139,6 +139,10 @@ static void nvmet_rdma_recv_done(structstatic void nvmet_rdma_read_data_done (struct ib_cq *cq,struct ib_wc *wc);static void nvmet_rdma_qp_event (struct ib_event *event,void *priv);static void nvmet_rdma_queue_disconnect (struct nvmet_rdma_queue *queue); +static void nvmet_rdma_free_rsp (struct nvmet_rdma_device *ndev, +struct nvmet_rdma_rsp *r); +static int nvmet_rdma_alloc_rsp (struct nvmet_rdma_device *ndev, +struct nvmet_rdma_rsp *r);static const struct nvmet_fabrics_ops nvmet_rdma_ops;
@@ -182,9 +186,17 @@ nvmet_rdma_get_rsp(struct nvmet_rdma_quespin_unlock_irqrestore (&queue->rsps_lock, flags);if (unlikely (!rsp)) { - rsp =kmalloc (sizeof (*rsp),GFP_KERNEL ); +int ret; + + rsp =kzalloc (sizeof (*rsp),GFP_KERNEL );if (unlikely (!rsp))return NULL ; + ret =nvmet_rdma_alloc_rsp (queue->dev, rsp); +if (unlikely (ret)) { +kfree (rsp); +return NULL ; + } + rsp->allocated = true; }
@@ -197,6 +209,7 @@ nvmet_rdma_put_rsp(struct nvmet_rdma_rspunsigned long flags;if (unlikely (rsp->allocated)) { +nvmet_rdma_free_rsp (rsp->queue->dev, rsp);kfree (rsp);return ; }
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 101/103 Revert "mm, memory_hotplug: initialize struct pages for the full memory section"
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman4.19-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Michal Hocko <[email protected]>
commit 4aa9fc2a435abe95a1e8d7f8c7b3d6356514b37a upstream.
This reverts commit 2830bf6f05fb3e05bc4743274b806c821807a684.
The underlying assumption that one sparse section belongs into a single numa node doesn't hold really. Robert Shteynfeld has reported a boot failure. The boot log was not captured but his memory layout is as follows:
Early memory node ranges
node 1: [mem 0x0000000000001000-0x0000000000090fff]
node 1: [mem 0x0000000000100000-0x00000000dbdf8fff]
node 1: [mem 0x0000000100000000-0x0000001423ffffff]
node 0: [mem 0x0000001424000000-0x0000002023ffffff]This means that node0 starts in the middle of a memory section which is also in node1. memmap_init_zone tries to initialize padding of a section even when it is outside of the given pfn range because there are code paths (e.g. memory hotplug) which assume that the full worth of memory section is always initialized.
In this particular case, though, such a range is already intialized and most likely already managed by the page allocator. Scribbling over those pages corrupts the internal state and likely blows up when any of those pages gets used.
--- mm/page_alloc.c | 12 ------------ 1 file changed, 12 deletions(-)
mm/page_alloc.c +0 -12
@@ -5538,18 +5538,6 @@ not_early:cond_resched (); } } -#ifdef CONFIG_SPARSEMEM -/* -* If the zone does not span the rest of the section then -* we should at least initialize those pages. Otherwise we -* could blow up on a poisoned page in some paths which depend -* on full sections being initialized (e.g. memory hotplug). -*/ -while (end_pfn %PAGES_PER_SECTION ) { -__init_single_page (pfn_to_page (end_pfn), end_pfn, zone, nid); - end_pfn++; - } -#endif }static void __meminit zone_init_free_lists (struct zone *zone)
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 102/103 usb: dwc3: gadget: Clear req->needs_extra_trb flag on cleanup
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman4.19-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Jack Pham <[email protected]>
commit bd6742249b9ca918565e4e3abaa06665e587f4b5 upstream.
OUT endpoint requests may somtimes have this flag set when preparing to be submitted to HW indicating that there is an additional TRB chained to the request for alignment purposes. If that request is removed before the controller can execute the transfer (e.g. ep_dequeue/ep_disable), the request will not go through the dwc3_gadget_ep_cleanup_completed_request() handler and will not have its needs_extra_trb flag cleared when dwc3_gadget_giveback() is called. This same request could be later requeued for a new transfer that does not require an extra TRB and if it is successfully completed, the cleanup and TRB reclamation will incorrectly process the additional TRB which belongs to the next request, and incorrectly advances the TRB dequeue pointer, thereby messing up calculation of the next requeust's actual/remaining count when it completes.
The right thing to do here is to ensure that the flag is cleared before it is given back to the function driver. A good place to do that is in dwc3_gadget_del_and_unmap_request().
[jackp: backport to <= 4.20: replaced 'needs_extra_trb' with 'unaligned'
and 'zero' members in patch and reworded commit text]
--- drivers/usb/dwc3/gadget.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
drivers/usb/dwc3/gadget.c +2 -0
@@ -177,6 +177,8 @@ static void dwc3_gadget_del_and_unmap_re req->started = false;list_del (&req->list); req->remaining =0 ; + req->unaligned = false; + req->zero = false;if (req->request.status == -EINPROGRESS ) req->request.status = status;
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 103/103 ide: fix a typo in the settings proc file name
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman4.19-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Christoph Hellwig <[email protected]>
commit f8ff6c732d35904d773043f979b844ef330c701b upstream.
--- drivers/ide/ide-proc.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/ide/ide-proc.c +1 -1
@@ -544,7 +544,7 @@ void ide_proc_port_register_devices(ide_ drive->proc =proc_mkdir (drive->name, parent);if (drive->proc) {ide_add_proc_entries (drive->proc, generic_drive_entries, drive); -proc_create_data ("setting" ,S_IFREG |S_IRUSR |S_IWUSR , +proc_create_data ("settings" ,S_IFREG |S_IRUSR |S_IWUSR , drive->proc, &ide_settings_proc_fops, drive); }
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerQuoted 5 lines · Greg Kroah-Hartman
This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 4.19.19 release. There are 103 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please let me know.
Quoted 8 lines
Responses should be made by Thu Jan 31 11:31:30 UTC 2019. Anything received after that time might be too late.
The whole patch series can be found in one patch at:
https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v4.x/stable-review/patch-4.19.19-rc1.gzor in the git tree and branch at:
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.gitlinux-4.19.y
and the diffstat can be found below.
-rc2 is out to fix a reported networking issue:
https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v4.x/stable-review/patch-4.19.19-rc2.gz
Quoted 15 lines · Greg Kroah-Hartman
Quoted 5 lines · Greg Kroah-Hartman
This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 4.19.19 release. There are 103 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please let me know.
Quoted 8 lines
Responses should be made by Thu Jan 31 11:31:30 UTC 2019. Anything received after that time might be too late.
The whole patch series can be found in one patch at:
https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v4.x/stable-review/patch-4.19.19-rc1.gzor in the git tree and branch at:
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.gitlinux-4.19.y
and the diffstat can be found below.
Quoted 5 lines
-rc2 is out to fix a reported networking issue:
https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v4.x/stable-review/patch-4.19.19-rc2.gz
Compiled and booted on my test system. No dmesg regressions.
thanks,
-- Shuah
Quoted 10 lines · Greg Kroah-Hartman
This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 4.19.19 release. There are 103 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please let me know.
Responses should be made by Thu Jan 31 11:31:30 UTC 2019. Anything received after that time might be too late.
The whole patch series can be found in one patch at:
Quoted 9 lines
https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v4.x/stable-review/patch-4.19.19-rc1.gzor in the git tree and branch at:
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.gitlinux-4.19.y
and the diffstat can be found below.thanks,
greg k-h
RC2 report.
Results from Linaro’s test farm.
No regressions on arm64, arm, x86_64, and i386.
Summary
------------------------------------------------------------------------
kernel: 4.19.19-rc2
git repo: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.git
git branch: linux-4.19.y
git commit: d0a51a4dd99af17e1f6a0d3758b9c2a7a6c0014a
git describe: v4.19.18-104-gd0a51a4dd99a
Test details: https://qa-reports.linaro.org/lkft/linux-stable-rc-4.19-oe/build/v4.19.18-104-gd0a51a4dd99a
No Regressions (compared to build v4.19.18)
No fixes (compared to build v4.19.18)
Ran 19574 total tests in the following environments and test suites.
Environments
--------------
- dragonboard-410c - arm64
- hi6220-hikey - arm64
- i386
- juno-r2 - arm64
- qemu_arm
- qemu_arm64
- qemu_i386
- qemu_x86_64
- x15 - arm
- x86_64
Test Suites
-----------
* boot
* install-android-platform-tools-r2600
* kselftest
* libhugetlbfs
* ltp-cap_bounds-tests
* ltp-containers-tests
* ltp-cpuhotplug-tests
* ltp-cve-tests
* ltp-fcntl-locktests-tests
* ltp-filecaps-tests
* ltp-fs-tests
* ltp-fs_bind-tests
* ltp-fs_perms_simple-tests
* ltp-fsx-tests
* ltp-hugetlb-tests
* ltp-io-tests
* ltp-ipc-tests
* ltp-math-tests
* ltp-mm-tests
* ltp-nptl-tests
* ltp-pty-tests
* ltp-sched-tests
* ltp-securebits-tests
* ltp-syscalls-tests
* ltp-timers-tests
* spectre-meltdown-checker-test
* ltp-open-posix-tests
* kselftest-vsyscall-mode-native
* kselftest-vsyscall-mode-none
Signature · 2 lines
Linaro LKFT https://lkft.linaro.org
Quoted 8 lines · Greg Kroah-Hartman
This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 4.19.19 release. There are 103 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please let me know.
Responses should be made by Thu Jan 31 11:31:30 UTC 2019. Anything received after that time might be too late.
For v4.19.18-104-gd0a51a4dd99a:
Build results:
total: 156 pass: 156 fail: 0 Qemu test results: total: 343 pass: 343 fail: 0
Guenter