efi_loader: add secure boot support
v2 cover efi_loader: add secure boot support
One of major missing features in current UEFI implementation is "secure boot." The ultimate goal of my attempt is to implement image authentication based on signature and provide UEFI secure boot support which would be fully compliant with UEFI specification, section 32[1].
(The code was originally developed by Patrick Wildt.)
While this patch/RFC is still rough-edged, the aim here is to get early feedbacks from the community as the patch is quite huge (in total) and also as it's a security enhancement.
Please note, however, this patch doesn't work on its own; there are a couple of functional dependencies[2] and [3], that I have submitted before. For complete workable patch set, see my repository[4], which also contains exeperimental timestamp-based revocation suuport.
My "non-volatile" support[5], which is under discussion, is not mandatory and so not included here, but this inevitably implies that, for example, signature database variables, like db and dbx, won't be persistent unless you explicitly run "env save" command and that UEFI variables are not separated from U-Boot environment. Anyhow, Linaro is also working on implementing real "secure storage" solution based on TF-A and OP-TEE.
Supported features:
* image authentication based on db and dbx
* supported signature types are EFI_CERT_SHA256_GUID (SHA256 digest for unsigned images) EFI_CERT_X509_GUID (x509 certificate for signed images)
* SecureBoot/SignatureSupport variables
* SetupMode and user mode
* variable authentication based on PK and KEK EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS
* basic pytest test cases
Unsupported features: (marked as TODO in most cases in the source code,
and won't be included in this series)
* hash algorithms other than SHA256
* dbt: timestamp(RFC6131)-based certificate revocation
* dbr: OS recovery
* xxxDefault: default values for signature stores
* transition to AuditMode and DeployedMode
* recording rejected images in EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_INFO_TABLE
* verification "policy", in particular, check against signature's owner
* private authenticated variables
* variable authentication with EFI_VARIABLE_ENHANCED_AUTHENTICATED_ACCESS
* real secure storage support, including hardware-specific PK (Platform Key) installation
TODO's other than "Unsupported features": (won't be included in this series)
* struct efi_image_regions cannot have arbitrary number of regions
* fail recovery, in particular, in modifying authenticated variables
* support read-only attributes of well-defined global variables in particular, "SignatureSupport"
* Extensive test suite (or more test cases) to confirm compatibility with EDK2
=> I requested EDK SCT community to add tests[6].
Test:
* my pytest, included in this patch set, passed.
* efi_selftest passed. (At least no reguression.)
* Travis CI tests, except the following two, have passed:
- test/py sandbox
test/py/tests/test_fs/test_unlink.py test_unlink2
- test/py sandbox with clang
cmd/efidebug.c:703:15: error: result of comparison of constant 9223372036854775822 with expression of type 'int' is always false [-Werror,-Wtautological-constant-out-of-range-compare]
But as you can see, those have nothing to do with my UEFI secure boot patch and are existing bugs.
Known issues:
* efitools is used in pytest, and its version must be v1.5.2 or later. (Solution: You can define EFITOOLS_PATH in defs.py for your own efitools.)
* Pytest depends on standalone "helloworld" app for sandbox (Solution: You can define HELLO_PATH in defs.py or Heinrich's [7].)
* Travis CI errors mentioned above
=> I will send *separate* bug-fix patches once fixed.
Hints about how to use:
(Please see other documents, or my pytest scripts, for details.)
* You can create your own certificates with openssl.
* You can sign your application with sbsign (on Ubuntu).
* You can create raw data for signature database with efitools, and install/manage authenticated variables with "env -set -e" command or efitools' "UpdateVars.efi" application.
[1] https://uefi.org/sites/default/files/resources/UEFI_Spec_2_8_final.pdf
[2] https://lists.denx.de/pipermail/u-boot/2019-November/390127.html
(import x509/pkcs7 parsers from linux)
[3] https://lists.denx.de/pipermail/u-boot/2019-November/390150.html
(extend rsa_verify() for UEFI secure boot)
[4] http://git.linaro.org/people/takahiro.akashi/u-boot.git/ efi/secboot
[5] https://lists.denx.de/pipermail/u-boot/2019-September/382835.html
(non-volatile variables support)
[6] https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2230
[7] https://lists.denx.de/pipermail/u-boot/2019-November/389593.html
Changes in v2 (Nov 26, 2019)
* rebased to v2020.01-rc3
* rename IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_CERTTABLE to IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY (patch#1,#9)
* add comments (patch#1)
* drop v1's patch#2 as it is no longer necessary
* drop v1's patch#3 as other "SECURE_BOOT" architectures have renamed this option and no longer use it
* add structure descriptions (patch#3)
* rework hash calculation code in efi_signature_verify() and remove an odd constant, WinIndrectSha256 (patch#3)
* move travis.yml changes to a seprate patch (patch#12, #16)
* yield_fixture() -> fixture() (patch#12)
* call console.restart_uboot() at every test case (13,#14)
* add patch#15; enable UEFI-related configurations by default on sandbox
* add patch#16; modify Travis CI environment to run UEFI secure boot test
Changes in v1 (Nov 13, 2019)
* rebased to v2020.01-rc
* remove already-merged patches
* re-work the patch set for easier reviews, including
- move a config definition patch forward (patch#4)
- refactor/rename verification functions (patch#5/#10)
- split signature database parser as a separate patch (patch#6)
- split secure state transition code as a separate patch (patch#8)
- move most part of init_secure_boot() into init_variables() (patch#8)
- split test environment setup from test patches (patch#14)
* add function descriptions (patch#5-#11)
* make sure the section list is sorted in ascending order in hash calculation of PE image (patch#10)
* add a new "-at" (authenticated access) option to "env -e" (patch#13)
* list required host packages, in particular udisks2, in pytest (patch#14)
* modify conftest.py to run under python3 (patch#14)
* use a partition on a disk instead of a whole disk without partition table (patch#14)
* reduce depencendy on efitools, yet relying on its host tools (patch#14)
* modify pytests to catch up wth latest changes of "env -e" syntax (patch#15,#16)
RFC (Sept 18, 2019)
AKASHI Takahiro (16):
include: pe.h: add signature-related definitions
efi_loader: add CONFIG_EFI_SECURE_BOOT config option
efi_loader: add signature verification functions
efi_loader: add signature database parser
efi_loader: variable: support variable authentication
efi_loader: variable: add secure boot state transition
efi_loader: variable: add VendorKeys variable
efi_loader: image_loader: support image authentication
efi_loader: set up secure boot
cmd: env: use appropriate guid for authenticated UEFI variable
cmd: env: add "-at" option to "env set -e" command efi_loader, pytest: set up secure boot environment efi_loader, pytest: add UEFI secure boot tests (authenticated
variables)
efi_loader, pytest: add UEFI secure boot tests (image)
sandbox: add extra configurations for UEFI and related tests
travis: add packages for UEFI secure boot test
.travis.yml | 11 +- cmd/nvedit.c | 5 +- cmd/nvedit_efi.c | 23 +- configs/sandbox64_defconfig | 3 + configs/sandbox_defconfig | 3 + include/efi_api.h | 87 ++ include/efi_loader.h | 85 +- include/pe.h | 18 + lib/efi_loader/Kconfig | 16 + lib/efi_loader/Makefile | 1 + lib/efi_loader/efi_boottime.c | 2 +- lib/efi_loader/efi_image_loader.c | 443 +++++++- lib/efi_loader/efi_setup.c | 38 + lib/efi_loader/efi_signature.c | 811 +++++++++++++++ lib/efi_loader/efi_variable.c | 950 ++++++++++++++++-- test/py/README.md | 8 + test/py/tests/test_efi_secboot/conftest.py | 151 +++ test/py/tests/test_efi_secboot/defs.py | 21 + .../py/tests/test_efi_secboot/test_authvar.py | 282 ++++++ test/py/tests/test_efi_secboot/test_signed.py | 99 ++ .../tests/test_efi_secboot/test_unsigned.py | 103 ++ 21 files changed, 3032 insertions(+), 128 deletions(-) create mode 100644 lib/efi_loader/efi_signature.c create mode 100644 test/py/tests/test_efi_secboot/conftest.py create mode 100644 test/py/tests/test_efi_secboot/defs.py create mode 100644 test/py/tests/test_efi_secboot/test_authvar.py create mode 100644 test/py/tests/test_efi_secboot/test_signed.py create mode 100644 test/py/tests/test_efi_secboot/test_unsigned.py
Signature · 1 line
2.24.0
PATCH v2 1/16 include: pe.h: add signature-related definitions
The index (IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY) in a table points to a region containing authentication information (image's signature) in PE format.
WIN_CERTIFICATE structure defines an embedded signature format.
Those definitions will be used in my UEFI secure boot patch.
--- include/pe.h | 18 ++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 18 insertions(+)
include/pe.h +18 -0
@@ -155,6 +155,8 @@ typedef struct _IMAGE_SECTION_HEADER {uint32_t Characteristics; }IMAGE_SECTION_HEADER , *PIMAGE_SECTION_HEADER ; +/* Indices for Optional Header Data Directories */ +#define IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY 4#define IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_BASERELOC 5 typedef struct _IMAGE_BASE_RELOCATION
@@ -252,4 +254,20 @@ typedef struct _IMAGE_RELOCATION#define IMAGE_REL_AMD64_PAIR 0x000F#define IMAGE_REL_AMD64_SSPAN32 0x0010 +/* certificate appended to PE image */ +typedef struct _WIN_CERTIFICATE { +uint32_t dwLength; +uint16_t wRevision; +uint16_t wCertificateType; +uint8_t bCertificate[]; +}WIN_CERTIFICATE , *LPWIN_CERTIFICATE ; + +/* Definitions for the contents of the certs data block */ +#define WIN_CERT_TYPE_PKCS_SIGNED_DATA 0x0002 +#define WIN_CERT_TYPE_EFI_OKCS115 0x0EF0 +#define WIN_CERT_TYPE_EFI_GUID 0x0EF1 + +#define WIN_CERT_REVISION_1_0 0x0100 +#define WIN_CERT_REVISION_2_0 0x0200 +#endif /* _PE_H */
Signature · 1 line
2.24.0
PATCH v2 1/16 include: pe.h: add signature-related definitions
Quoted 9 lines · AKASHI Takahiro
The index (
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY) in a table points to a region containing authentication information (image's signature) in PE format.
WIN_CERTIFICATEstructure defines an embedded signature format.Those definitions will be used in my UEFI secure boot patch.
Signed-off-by AKASHI Takahiro<[email protected]>
Quoted 3 lines
--- include/pe.h | 18 ++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 18 insertions(+)
PATCH v2 2/16 efi_loader: add CONFIG_EFI_SECURE_BOOT config option
In reply to AKASHI TakahiroUnder this configuration, UEFI secure boot support will be added in later patches.
--- lib/efi_loader/Kconfig | 16 ++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 16 insertions(+)
lib/efi_loader/Kconfig +16 -0
@@ -115,4 +115,20 @@ config EFI_GRUB_ARM32_WORKAROUND GRUB prior to version 2.04 requires U-Boot to disable caches. This workaround currently is also needed on systems with caches that cannot be managed via CP15. + +config EFI_SECURE_BOOT + bool "Enable EFI secure boot support" + depends on EFI_LOADER + imply SHA256 + depends on ASYMMETRIC_PUBLIC_KEY_SUBTYPE + imply RSA_VERIFY_WITH_PKEY + imply X509_CERTIFICATE_PARSER + imply PCKS7_MESSAGE_PARSER + default n + help + Select this option to enable EFI secure boot support. + Once SecureBoot mode is enforced, any EFI binary can run only if + it is signed with a trusted key. To do that, you need to install, + at least, PK, KEK and db. + endif
Signature · 1 line
2.24.0
PATCH v2 3/16 efi_loader: add signature verification functions
In reply to AKASHI TakahiroIn this commit, implemented are a couple of helper functions which will be used to materialize variable authentication as well as image authentication in later patches.
--- include/efi_api.h | 87 +++++ include/efi_loader.h | 72 ++++ lib/efi_loader/Makefile | 1 + lib/efi_loader/efi_signature.c | 584 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 4 files changed, 744 insertions(+) create mode 100644 lib/efi_loader/efi_signature.c
include/efi_api.h +87 -0
@@ -18,6 +18,7 @@#include <efi.h> #include <charset.h> +#include <pe.h> #ifdef CONFIG_EFI_LOADER #include <asm/setjmp.h>
@@ -307,6 +308,10 @@ struct efi_runtime_services {EFI_GUID (0x8be4df61 ,0x93ca ,0x11d2 ,0xaa ,0x0d , \ 0x00, 0xe0, 0x98, 0x03, 0x2b, 0x8c) +#define EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE_GUID \ + EFI_GUID(0xd719b2cb, 0x3d3a, 0x4596, 0xa3, 0xbc, \ + 0xda, 0xd0, 0x0e, 0x67, 0x65, 0x6f) +#define EFI_FDT_GUID \ EFI_GUID(0xb1b621d5, 0xf19c, 0x41a5, \ 0x83, 0x0b, 0xd9, 0x15, 0x2c, 0x69, 0xaa, 0xe0)
@@ -1616,4 +1621,86 @@ struct efi_unicode_collation_protocol {#define LOAD_OPTION_CATEGORY_BOOT 0x00000000#define LOAD_OPTION_CATEGORY_APP 0x00000100 +/* Certificate types in signature database */ +#define EFI_CERT_SHA256_GUID \ + EFI_GUID(0xc1c41626, 0x504c, 0x4092, 0xac, 0xa9, \ + 0x41, 0xf9, 0x36, 0x93, 0x43, 0x28) +#define EFI_CERT_RSA2048_GUID \ + EFI_GUID(0x3c5766e8, 0x269c, 0x4e34, 0xaa, 0x14, \ + 0xed, 0x77, 0x6e, 0x85, 0xb3, 0xb6) +#define EFI_CERT_X509_GUID \ + EFI_GUID(0xa5c059a1, 0x94e4, 0x4aa7, 0x87, 0xb5, \ + 0xab, 0x15, 0x5c, 0x2b, 0xf0, 0x72) +#define EFI_CERT_X509_SHA256_GUID \ + EFI_GUID(0x3bd2a492, 0x96c0, 0x4079, 0xb4, 0x20, \ + 0xfc, 0xf9, 0x8e, 0xf1, 0x03, 0xed) +#define EFI_CERT_TYPE_PKCS7_GUID \ + EFI_GUID(0x4aafd29d, 0x68df, 0x49ee, 0x8a, 0xa9, \ + 0x34, 0x7d, 0x37, 0x56, 0x65, 0xa7) + +/** +* win_certificate_uefi_guid - A certificate that encapsulates +* a GUID-specific signature +* +* @hdr: Windows certificate header +* @cert_type: Certificate type +* @cert_data: Certificate data +*/ +struct win_certificate_uefi_guid { +WIN_CERTIFICATE hdr; +efi_guid_t cert_type; +u8 cert_data[]; +} __attribute__((__packed__ )); + +/** +* efi_variable_authentication_2 - A time-based authentication method +* descriptor +* +* This structure describes an authentication information for +* a variable with EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS +* and should be included as part of a variable's value. +* Only EFI_CERT_TYPE_PKCS7_GUID is accepted. +* +* @time_stamp: Descriptor's time stamp +* @auth_info: Authentication info +*/ +struct efi_variable_authentication_2 { +struct efi_time time_stamp; +struct win_certificate_uefi_guid auth_info; +} __attribute__((__packed__ )); + +/** +* efi_signature_data - A format of signature +* +* This structure describes a single signature in signature database. +* +* @signature_owner: Signature owner +* @signature_data: Signature data +*/ +struct efi_signature_data { +efi_guid_t signature_owner; +u8 signature_data[]; +} __attribute__((__packed__ )); + +/** +* efi_signature_list - A format of signature database +* +* This structure describes a list of signatures with the same type. +* An authenticated variable's value is a concatenation of one or more +* efi_signature_list's. +* +* @signature_type: Signature type +* @signature_list_size: Size of signature list +* @signature_header_size: Size of signature header +* @signature_size: Size of signature +*/ +struct efi_signature_list { +efi_guid_t signature_type; +u32 signature_list_size; +u32 signature_header_size; +u32 signature_size; +/* u8 signature_header[signature_header_size]; */ +/* struct efi_signature_data signatures[...][signature_size]; */ +} __attribute__((__packed__ )); +#endif
include/efi_loader.h +72 -0
90 lines not on this page · raw message
lib/efi_loader/Makefile +1 -0
@@ -42,3 +42,4 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_PARTITIONS) += efi_disk.o obj-$(CONFIG_NET) += efi_net.o obj-$(CONFIG_GENERATE_ACPI_TABLE) += efi_acpi.o obj-$(CONFIG_GENERATE_SMBIOS_TABLE) += efi_smbios.o +obj-y += efi_signature.o
lib/efi_loader/efi_signature.c new file +584 -0
584 lines not on this page · raw message
Signature · 1 line
2.24.0
PATCH v2 3/16 efi_loader: add signature verification functions
[...]
lib/efi_loader/efi_signature.c line 194
Quoted 5 lines
lib/efi_loader/efi_signature.c new file +5
-0+/* verify signature */ +/* against digest */ + c =0x31 ; + regtmp[0 ].data = &c; + regtmp[0 ].size =1 ;
Is there a reason for '1' instea of sizeof(c)?
lib/efi_loader/efi_signature.c line 209
Quoted 5 lines
lib/efi_loader/efi_signature.c new file +5
-0+ regtmp[1 ].data = ps_info->authattrs; + regtmp[1 ].size = ps_info->authattrs_len; + + +out:
Thanks
/Ilias
PATCH v2 3/16 efi_loader: add signature verification functions
Quoted 8 lines · Ilias Apalodimas
[...]
lib/efi_loader/efi_signature.c line 194
Quoted 5 lines
lib/efi_loader/efi_signature.c new file +5
-0+/* verify signature */ +/* against digest */ + c =0x31 ; + regtmp[0 ].data = &c; + regtmp[0 ].size =1 ;Is there a reason for '1' instea of sizeof(c)?
Yes, it explicitly says that we want to add *exact one byte* for hash calculation here.
Thanks,
-Takahiro Akashi
Quoted 8 lines
lib/efi_loader/efi_signature.c line 209
Quoted 5 lines
lib/efi_loader/efi_signature.c new file +5
-0+ regtmp[1 ].data = ps_info->authattrs; + regtmp[1 ].size = ps_info->authattrs_len; + + +out:Thanks
/Ilias
PATCH v2 4/16 efi_loader: add signature database parser
In reply to AKASHI Takahiroefi_signature_parse_sigdb() is a helper function will be used to parse signature database variable and instantiate a signature store structure in later patches.
--- include/efi_loader.h | 3 + lib/efi_loader/efi_signature.c | 227 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 230 insertions(+)
include/efi_loader.h +3 -0
@@ -720,6 +720,9 @@ bool efi_signature_verify_with_sigdb(struct efi_image_regions *regs,efi_status_t efi_image_region_add (struct efi_image_regions *regs,const void *start,const void *end,int nocheck); + +void efi_sigstore_free (struct efi_signature_store *sigstore); +struct efi_signature_store *efi_sigstore_parse_sigdb (u16 *name);#endif /* CONFIG_EFI_SECURE_BOOT */ #else /* CONFIG_IS_ENABLED(EFI_LOADER) */
lib/efi_loader/efi_signature.c +227 -0
231 lines not on this page · raw message
Signature · 1 line
2.24.0
PATCH v2 4/16 efi_loader: add signature database parser
Akashi-san,
Quoted 42 lines · AKASHI Takahiro
efi_signature_parse_sigdb()is a helper function will be used to parse signature database variable and instantiate a signature store structure in later patches.Signed-off-by AKASHI Takahiro <[email protected]>--- include/efi_loader.h | 3 + lib/efi_loader/efi_signature.c | 227 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 230 insertions(+)include/efi_loader.h +3
-0@@ -720,6 +720,9 @@ bool efi_signature_verify_with_sigdb(struct efi_image_regions *regs,efi_status_t efi_image_region_add (struct efi_image_regions *regs,const void *start,const void *end,int nocheck); + +void efi_sigstore_free (struct efi_signature_store *sigstore); +struct efi_signature_store *efi_sigstore_parse_sigdb (u16 *name);#endif /* CONFIG_EFI_SECURE_BOOT */ #else /* CONFIG_IS_ENABLED(EFI_LOADER) */ lib/efi_loader/efi_signature.c +10
-0@@ -581,4 +581,231 @@ efi_status_t efi_image_region_add(struct efi_image_regions *regs,return EFI_SUCCESS ; } + +/** +* efi_sigstore_free - free signature store +* @sigstore: Pointer to signature store structure +* +* Feee all the memories held in signature store and itself, +* which were allocated by efi_sigstore_parse_sigdb(). +*/ +void efi_sigstore_free (struct efi_signature_store *sigstore) +{
lib/efi_loader/efi_signature.c efi_status_t efi_image_region_add(struct efi_image_regions *regs, · line 603
Quoted 10 lines
lib/efi_loader/efi_signature.c +10
-0+struct efi_signature_store *sigstore_next; +struct efi_sig_data *sig_data, *sig_data_next; + +while (sigstore) { + sigstore_next = sigstore->next; + + sig_data = sigstore->sig_data_list; +while (sig_data) { +if (sig_data) + sig_data_next = sig_data->next;
Why the extra if check?
lib/efi_loader/efi_signature.c efi_status_t efi_image_region_add(struct efi_image_regions *regs, · line 613
Quoted 10 lines
lib/efi_loader/efi_signature.c +10
-0+free (sig_data->data); +free (sig_data); + sig_data = sig_data_next; + } + +free (sigstore); + sigstore = sigstore_next; + } +} +
Thnaks
/Ilias
PATCH v2 4/16 efi_loader: add signature database parser
Quoted 49 lines · Ilias Apalodimas
Akashi-san,
Quoted 46 lines · AKASHI Takahiro
efi_signature_parse_sigdb()is a helper function will be used to parse signature database variable and instantiate a signature store structure in later patches.Signed-off-by AKASHI Takahiro <[email protected]>--- include/efi_loader.h | 3 + lib/efi_loader/efi_signature.c | 227 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 230 insertions(+)include/efi_loader.h +3
-0@@ -720,6 +720,9 @@ bool efi_signature_verify_with_sigdb(struct efi_image_regions *regs,efi_status_t efi_image_region_add (struct efi_image_regions *regs,const void *start,const void *end,int nocheck); + +void efi_sigstore_free (struct efi_signature_store *sigstore); +struct efi_signature_store *efi_sigstore_parse_sigdb (u16 *name);#endif /* CONFIG_EFI_SECURE_BOOT */ #else /* CONFIG_IS_ENABLED(EFI_LOADER) */ lib/efi_loader/efi_signature.c +14
-0@@ -581,4 +581,231 @@ efi_status_t efi_image_region_add(struct efi_image_regions *regs,return EFI_SUCCESS ; } + +/** +* efi_sigstore_free - free signature store +* @sigstore: Pointer to signature store structure +* +* Feee all the memories held in signature store and itself, +* which were allocated by efi_sigstore_parse_sigdb(). +*/ +void efi_sigstore_free (struct efi_signature_store *sigstore) +{ +struct efi_signature_store *sigstore_next; +struct efi_sig_data *sig_data, *sig_data_next; + +while (sigstore) {
Quoted 8 lines
lib/efi_loader/efi_signature.c efi_status_t efi_image_region_add(struct efi_image_regions *regs, · line 603
Quoted 6 lines
lib/efi_loader/efi_signature.c +6
-0+ sigstore_next = sigstore->next; + + sig_data = sigstore->sig_data_list; +while (sig_data) { +if (sig_data) + sig_data_next = sig_data->next;Why the extra if check?
Looking at it again, maybe this is a typo and you wanted to check sig_data->next?
Quoted 14 lines
lib/efi_loader/efi_signature.c efi_status_t efi_image_region_add(struct efi_image_regions *regs, · line 613
Quoted 11 lines
lib/efi_loader/efi_signature.c +10
-0+free (sig_data->data); +free (sig_data); + sig_data = sig_data_next; + } + +free (sigstore); + sigstore = sigstore_next; + } +} +Thnaks
/Ilias
PATCH v2 4/16 efi_loader: add signature database parser
Quoted 59 lines · Ilias Apalodimas
Quoted 49 lines · Ilias Apalodimas
Akashi-san,
Quoted 46 lines · AKASHI Takahiro
efi_signature_parse_sigdb()is a helper function will be used to parse signature database variable and instantiate a signature store structure in later patches.Signed-off-by AKASHI Takahiro <[email protected]>--- include/efi_loader.h | 3 + lib/efi_loader/efi_signature.c | 227 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 230 insertions(+)include/efi_loader.h +3
-0@@ -720,6 +720,9 @@ bool efi_signature_verify_with_sigdb(struct efi_image_regions *regs,efi_status_t efi_image_region_add (struct efi_image_regions *regs,const void *start,const void *end,int nocheck); + +void efi_sigstore_free (struct efi_signature_store *sigstore); +struct efi_signature_store *efi_sigstore_parse_sigdb (u16 *name);#endif /* CONFIG_EFI_SECURE_BOOT */ #else /* CONFIG_IS_ENABLED(EFI_LOADER) */ lib/efi_loader/efi_signature.c +14
-0@@ -581,4 +581,231 @@ efi_status_t efi_image_region_add(struct efi_image_regions *regs,return EFI_SUCCESS ; } + +/** +* efi_sigstore_free - free signature store +* @sigstore: Pointer to signature store structure +* +* Feee all the memories held in signature store and itself, +* which were allocated by efi_sigstore_parse_sigdb(). +*/ +void efi_sigstore_free (struct efi_signature_store *sigstore) +{ +struct efi_signature_store *sigstore_next; +struct efi_sig_data *sig_data, *sig_data_next; + +while (sigstore) {Quoted 8 lines
lib/efi_loader/efi_signature.c efi_status_t efi_image_region_add(struct efi_image_regions *regs, · line 603
Quoted 6 lines
lib/efi_loader/efi_signature.c +6
-0+ sigstore_next = sigstore->next; + + sig_data = sigstore->sig_data_list; +while (sig_data) { +if (sig_data) + sig_data_next = sig_data->next;Why the extra if check?
Quoted 2 lines
Looking at it again, maybe this is a typo and you wanted to check
sig_data->next?
The check is just redundant. Will remove it.
Thanks,
-Takahiro Akashi
Quoted 14 lines
Quoted 14 lines
lib/efi_loader/efi_signature.c efi_status_t efi_image_region_add(struct efi_image_regions *regs, · line 613
Quoted 11 lines
lib/efi_loader/efi_signature.c +10
-0+free (sig_data->data); +free (sig_data); + sig_data = sig_data_next; + } + +free (sigstore); + sigstore = sigstore_next; + } +} +Thnaks
/Ilias
PATCH v2 5/16 efi_loader: variable: support variable authentication
In reply to AKASHI TakahiroWith this commit, EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS is supported for authenticated variables and the system secure state will transfer between setup mode and user mode as UEFI specification section 32.3 describes.
Internally, authentication data is stored as part of authenticated variable's value. It is nothing but a pkcs7 message (but we need some wrapper, see efi_variable_parse_signature()) and will be validated by efi_variable_authenticate(), hence efi_signature_verify_with_db().
Associated time value will be encoded in "{...,time=...}" along with other UEFI variable's attributes.
--- include/efi_loader.h | 3 + lib/efi_loader/efi_variable.c | 664 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------ 2 files changed, 563 insertions(+), 104 deletions(-)
include/efi_loader.h +3 -0
@@ -175,6 +175,7 @@ extern const efi_guid_t efi_guid_image_security_database;extern const efi_guid_t efi_guid_sha256;extern const efi_guid_t efi_guid_cert_x509;extern const efi_guid_t efi_guid_cert_x509_sha256; +extern const efi_guid_t efi_guid_cert_type_pkcs7;extern unsigned int __efi_runtime_start, __efi_runtime_stop;extern unsigned int __efi_runtime_rel_start, __efi_runtime_rel_stop;
@@ -723,6 +724,8 @@ efi_status_t efi_image_region_add(struct efi_image_regions *regs,void efi_sigstore_free (struct efi_signature_store *sigstore);struct efi_signature_store *efi_sigstore_parse_sigdb (u16 *name); + +bool efi_secure_boot_enabled (void );#endif /* CONFIG_EFI_SECURE_BOOT */ #else /* CONFIG_IS_ENABLED(EFI_LOADER) */
lib/efi_loader/efi_variable.c +560 -104
830 lines not on this page · raw message
Signature · 1 line
2.24.0
PATCH v2 6/16 efi_loader: variable: add secure boot state transition
In reply to AKASHI TakahiroUEFI specification defines several global variables which are related to the current secure boot state. In this commit, those values will be maintained according to operations. Currently, AuditMode and DeployedMode are defined but not implemented.
--- lib/efi_loader/efi_variable.c | 231 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++- 1 file changed, 228 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
lib/efi_loader/efi_variable.c +228 -3
@@ -15,8 +15,16 @@#include <linux/compat.h> #include "../lib/crypto/pkcs7_parser.h" +enum efi_secure_mode { +EFI_MODE_SETUP , +EFI_MODE_USER , +EFI_MODE_AUDIT , +EFI_MODE_DEPLOYED , +}; +const efi_guid_t efi_guid_cert_type_pkcs7 =EFI_CERT_TYPE_PKCS7_GUID ;static bool efi_secure_boot; +static int efi_secure_mode;#define READ_ONLY BIT(31)
@@ -158,6 +166,210 @@ static const char *parse_attr(const char *str, u32 *attrp, u64 *timep)return str; } +static efi_status_t efi_set_variable_internal (u16 *variable_name, +const efi_guid_t *vendor, +u32 attributes, +efi_uintn_t data_size, +const void *data, +bool ro_check); + +/** +* efi_transfer_secure_state - handle a secure boot state transition +* @mode: new state +* +* Depending on @mode, secure boot related variables are updated. +* Those variables are *read-only* for users, efi_set_variable_internal() +* is called here. +* +* Return: EFI_SUCCESS on success, status code (negative) on error +*/ +static efi_status_t efi_transfer_secure_state (enum efi_secure_mode mode) +{ +u32 attributes; +u8 val; +efi_status_t ret; + +debug ("Secure state from %d to %d\n" , efi_secure_mode, mode); + + attributes =EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS | +EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS ; +if (mode ==EFI_MODE_DEPLOYED ) { + val =1 ; + ret =efi_set_variable_internal (L"SecureBoot" , + &efi_global_variable_guid, + attributes |READ_ONLY , +sizeof (val), &val, + false); +if (ret !=EFI_SUCCESS ) + goto err; + val =0 ; + ret =efi_set_variable_internal (L"SetupMode" , + &efi_global_variable_guid, + attributes |READ_ONLY , +sizeof (val), &val, + false); +if (ret !=EFI_SUCCESS ) + goto err; + val =0 ; + ret =efi_set_variable_internal (L"AuditMode" , + &efi_global_variable_guid, + attributes |READ_ONLY , +sizeof (val), &val, + false); +if (ret !=EFI_SUCCESS ) + goto err; + val =1 ; + ret =efi_set_variable_internal (L"DeployedMode" , + &efi_global_variable_guid, + attributes |READ_ONLY , +sizeof (val), &val, + false); +if (ret !=EFI_SUCCESS ) + goto err; + + efi_secure_boot = true; + }else if (mode ==EFI_MODE_AUDIT ) { + ret =efi_set_variable_internal (L"PK" , + &efi_global_variable_guid, + attributes, +0 ,NULL , + false); +if (ret !=EFI_SUCCESS ) + goto err; + val =0 ; + ret =efi_set_variable_internal (L"SecureBoot" , + &efi_global_variable_guid, + attributes |READ_ONLY , +sizeof (val), &val, + false); +if (ret !=EFI_SUCCESS ) + goto err; + val =1 ; + ret =efi_set_variable_internal (L"SetupMode" , + &efi_global_variable_guid, + attributes |READ_ONLY , +sizeof (val), &val, + false); +if (ret !=EFI_SUCCESS ) + goto err; + val =1 ; + ret =efi_set_variable_internal (L"AuditMode" , + &efi_global_variable_guid, + attributes |READ_ONLY , +sizeof (val), &val, + false); +if (ret !=EFI_SUCCESS ) + goto err; + val =0 ; + ret =efi_set_variable_internal (L"DeployedMode" , + &efi_global_variable_guid, + attributes |READ_ONLY , +sizeof (val), &val, + false); +if (ret !=EFI_SUCCESS ) + goto err; + + efi_secure_boot = true; + }else if (mode ==EFI_MODE_USER ) { + val =1 ; + ret =efi_set_variable_internal (L"SecureBoot" , + &efi_global_variable_guid, + attributes |READ_ONLY , +sizeof (val), &val, + false); +if (ret !=EFI_SUCCESS ) + goto err; + val =0 ; + ret =efi_set_variable_internal (L"SetupMode" , + &efi_global_variable_guid, + attributes |READ_ONLY , +sizeof (val), &val, + false); +if (ret !=EFI_SUCCESS ) + goto err; + val =0 ; + ret =efi_set_variable_internal (L"AuditMode" , + &efi_global_variable_guid, + attributes, +sizeof (val), &val, + false); +if (ret !=EFI_SUCCESS ) + goto err; + val =0 ; + ret =efi_set_variable_internal (L"DeployedMode" , + &efi_global_variable_guid, + attributes, +sizeof (val), &val, + false); +if (ret !=EFI_SUCCESS ) + goto err; + + efi_secure_boot = true; + }else if (mode ==EFI_MODE_SETUP ) { + val =0 ; + ret =efi_set_variable_internal (L"SecureBoot" , + &efi_global_variable_guid, + attributes |READ_ONLY , +sizeof (val), &val, + false); +if (ret !=EFI_SUCCESS ) + goto err; + val =1 ; + ret =efi_set_variable_internal (L"SetupMode" , + &efi_global_variable_guid, + attributes |READ_ONLY , +sizeof (val), &val, + false); +if (ret !=EFI_SUCCESS ) + goto err; + val =0 ; + ret =efi_set_variable_internal (L"AuditMode" , + &efi_global_variable_guid, + attributes, +sizeof (val), &val, + false); +if (ret !=EFI_SUCCESS ) + goto err; + val =0 ; + ret =efi_set_variable_internal (L"DeployedMode" , + &efi_global_variable_guid, + attributes |READ_ONLY , +sizeof (val), &val, + false); +if (ret !=EFI_SUCCESS ) + goto err; + }else { +return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER ; + } + +return EFI_SUCCESS ; + +err: +/* TODO: What action should be taken here? */ +printf ("ERROR: Secure state transition failed\n" ); +return ret; +} + +/** +* efi_init_secure_state - initialize secure boot state +* +* Return: EFI_SUCCESS on success, status code (negative) on error +*/ +static efi_status_t efi_init_secure_state (void ) +{ +efi_uintn_t size =0 ; +efi_status_t ret; + + ret =EFI_CALL (efi_get_variable (L"PK" , &efi_global_variable_guid, +NULL , &size,NULL )); +if (ret ==EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL &&IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_EFI_SECURE_BOOT )) + ret =efi_transfer_secure_state (EFI_MODE_USER ); +else + ret =efi_transfer_secure_state (EFI_MODE_SETUP ); + +return ret; +} +/** * efi_secure_boot_enabled - return if secure boot is enabled or not *
@@ -906,10 +1118,19 @@ efi_status_t EFIAPI efi_set_variable_common(u16 *variable_name,EFI_PRINT ("setting: %s=%s\n" , native_name, val); out: -if (env_set (native_name, val)) +if (env_set (native_name, val)) { ret =EFI_DEVICE_ERROR ; -else + }else { +if ((u16_strcmp (variable_name,L"PK" ) ==0 && +guidcmp (vendor, &efi_global_variable_guid) ==0 )) { + ret =efi_transfer_secure_state ( + (delete ?EFI_MODE_SETUP : +EFI_MODE_USER )); +if (ret !=EFI_SUCCESS ) + goto err; + } ret =EFI_SUCCESS ; + } err:free (native_name);
@@ -1094,5 +1315,9 @@ void efi_variables_boot_exit_notify(void)*/ efi_status_t efi_init_variables (void ) { -return EFI_SUCCESS ; +efi_status_t ret; + + ret =efi_init_secure_state (); + +return ret; }
Signature · 1 line
2.24.0
PATCH v2 7/16 efi_loader: variable: add VendorKeys variable
In reply to AKASHI TakahiroThe following variable is exported as UEFI specification defines:
VendorKeys: whether the system is configured to use only vendor-provided
keys or not
The value will have to be modified if a platform has its own way of initializing signature database, in particular, PK.
--- lib/efi_loader/efi_variable.c | 69 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--- 1 file changed, 63 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
lib/efi_loader/efi_variable.c +63 -6
@@ -25,6 +25,7 @@ enum efi_secure_mode {const efi_guid_t efi_guid_cert_type_pkcs7 =EFI_CERT_TYPE_PKCS7_GUID ;static bool efi_secure_boot;static int efi_secure_mode; +static u8 efi_vendor_keys;#define READ_ONLY BIT(31)
@@ -342,6 +343,8 @@ static efi_status_t efi_transfer_secure_state(enum efi_secure_mode mode)return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER ; } + efi_secure_mode = mode; +return EFI_SUCCESS ; err:
@@ -357,16 +360,46 @@ err:*/ static efi_status_t efi_init_secure_state (void ) { -efi_uintn_t size =0 ; +enum efi_secure_mode mode; +efi_uintn_t size;efi_status_t ret; +/* +* TODO: +* Since there is currently no "platform-specific" installation +* method of Platform Key, we can't say if VendorKeys is 0 or 1 +* precisely. +*/ + + size =0 ; ret =EFI_CALL (efi_get_variable (L"PK" , &efi_global_variable_guid,NULL , &size,NULL )); -if (ret ==EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL &&IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_EFI_SECURE_BOOT )) - ret =efi_transfer_secure_state (EFI_MODE_USER ); -else - ret =efi_transfer_secure_state (EFI_MODE_SETUP ); +if (ret ==EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL ) { +if (IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_EFI_SECURE_BOOT )) + mode =EFI_MODE_USER ; +else + mode =EFI_MODE_SETUP ; + + efi_vendor_keys =0 ; + }else if (ret ==EFI_NOT_FOUND ) { + mode =EFI_MODE_SETUP ; + efi_vendor_keys =1 ; + }else { + goto err; + } + ret =efi_transfer_secure_state (mode); +if (ret ==EFI_SUCCESS ) + ret =efi_set_variable_internal (L"VendorKeys" , + &efi_global_variable_guid, +EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS + |EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS + |READ_ONLY , +sizeof (efi_vendor_keys), + &efi_vendor_keys, + false); + +err:return ret; }
@@ -1121,6 +1154,8 @@ out:if (env_set (native_name, val)) { ret =EFI_DEVICE_ERROR ; }else { +bool vendor_keys_modified = false; +if ((u16_strcmp (variable_name,L"PK" ) ==0 &&guidcmp (vendor, &efi_global_variable_guid) ==0 )) { ret = efi_transfer_secure_state(
@@ -1128,8 +1163,30 @@ out: EFI_MODE_USER));if (ret !=EFI_SUCCESS ) goto err; + +if (efi_secure_mode !=EFI_MODE_SETUP ) + vendor_keys_modified = true; + }else if ((u16_strcmp (variable_name,L"KEK" ) ==0 && +guidcmp (vendor, &efi_global_variable_guid) ==0 )) { +if (efi_secure_mode !=EFI_MODE_SETUP ) + vendor_keys_modified = true; + } + +/* update VendorKeys */ +if (vendor_keys_modified & efi_vendor_keys) { + efi_vendor_keys =0 ; + ret =efi_set_variable_internal ( +L"VendorKeys" , + &efi_global_variable_guid, +EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS + |EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS + |READ_ONLY , +sizeof (efi_vendor_keys), + &efi_vendor_keys, + false); + }else { + ret =EFI_SUCCESS ; } - ret =EFI_SUCCESS ; } err:
Signature · 1 line
2.24.0
PATCH v2 8/16 efi_loader: image_loader: support image authentication
In reply to AKASHI TakahiroWith this commit, image validation can be enforced, as UEFI specification section 32.5 describes, if CONFIG_EFI_SECURE_BOOT is enabled.
Currently we support
* authentication based on db and dbx,
so dbx-validated image will always be rejected.
* following signature types:
EFI_CERT_SHA256_GUID (SHA256 digest for unsigned images) EFI_CERT_X509_GUID (x509 certificate for signed images)
Timestamp-based certificate revocation is not supported here.
Internally, authentication data is stored in one of certificates tables of PE image (See efi_image_parse()) and will be verified by efi_image_authenticate() before loading a given image.
It seems that UEFI specification defines the verification process in a bit ambiguous way. I tried to implement it as closely to as EDK2 does.
--- include/efi_loader.h | 7 +- lib/efi_loader/efi_boottime.c | 2 +- lib/efi_loader/efi_image_loader.c | 443 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++- 3 files changed, 438 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)
include/efi_loader.h +6 -1
@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@#include <common.h> #include <part_efi.h> #include <efi_api.h> +#include <pe.h> static inline int guidcmp (const void *g1,const void *g2) {
@@ -398,7 +399,8 @@ efi_status_t efi_set_watchdog(unsigned long timeout);/* Called from places to check whether a timer expired */ void efi_timer_check (void );/* PE loader implementation */ -efi_status_t efi_load_pe (struct efi_loaded_image_obj *handle,void *efi, +efi_status_t efi_load_pe (struct efi_loaded_image_obj *handle, +void *efi,size_t efi_size,struct efi_loaded_image *loaded_image_info);/* Called once to store the pristine gd pointer */ void efi_save_gd (void );
@@ -726,6 +728,9 @@ void efi_sigstore_free(struct efi_signature_store *sigstore);struct efi_signature_store *efi_sigstore_parse_sigdb (u16 *name);bool efi_secure_boot_enabled (void ); + +bool efi_image_parse (void *efi,size_t len,struct efi_image_regions **regp, +WIN_CERTIFICATE **auth,size_t *auth_len);#endif /* CONFIG_EFI_SECURE_BOOT */ #else /* CONFIG_IS_ENABLED(EFI_LOADER) */
lib/efi_loader/efi_boottime.c +1 -1
@@ -1879,7 +1879,7 @@ efi_status_t EFIAPI efi_load_image(bool boot_policy,efi_dp_split_file_path (file_path, &dp, &fp); ret =efi_setup_loaded_image (dp, fp, image_obj, &info);if (ret ==EFI_SUCCESS ) - ret =efi_load_pe (*image_obj, dest_buffer, info); + ret =efi_load_pe (*image_obj, dest_buffer, source_size, info);if (!source_buffer)/* Release buffer to which file was loaded */ efi_free_pages((uintptr_t)dest_buffer,
lib/efi_loader/efi_image_loader.c +431 -12
520 lines not on this page · raw message
Signature · 1 line
2.24.0
PATCH v2 9/16 efi_loader: set up secure boot
In reply to AKASHI TakahiroThe following variable is exported as UEFI specification defines:
SignatureSupport: array of GUIDs representing the type of signatures
supported by the platform firmware
--- lib/efi_loader/efi_setup.c | 38 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 38 insertions(+)
lib/efi_loader/efi_setup.c +38 -0
@@ -82,6 +82,39 @@ out:return ret; } +#ifdef CONFIG_EFI_SECURE_BOOT +/** +* efi_init_secure_boot - initialize secure boot state +* +* Return: EFI_SUCCESS on success, status code (negative) on error +*/ +static efi_status_t efi_init_secure_boot (void ) +{ +efi_guid_t signature_types[] = { +EFI_CERT_SHA256_GUID , +EFI_CERT_X509_GUID , + }; +efi_status_t ret; + +/* TODO: read-only */ + ret =EFI_CALL (efi_set_variable (L"SignatureSupport" , + &efi_global_variable_guid, +EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS + |EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS , +sizeof (signature_types), + &signature_types)); +if (ret !=EFI_SUCCESS ) +printf ("EFI: cannot initialize SignatureSupport variable\n" ); + +return ret; +} +#else +static efi_status_t efi_init_secure_boot (void ) +{ +return EFI_SUCCESS ; +} +#endif /* CONFIG_EFI_SECURE_BOOT */ +/** * efi_init_obj_list() - Initialize and populate EFI object list *
@@ -122,6 +155,11 @@ efi_status_t efi_init_obj_list(void)if (ret !=EFI_SUCCESS ) goto out; +/* Secure boot */ + ret =efi_init_secure_boot (); +if (ret !=EFI_SUCCESS ) + goto out; +/* Indicate supported runtime services */ ret =efi_init_runtime_supported ();if (ret !=EFI_SUCCESS )
Signature · 1 line
2.24.0
PATCH v2 10/16 cmd: env: use appropriate guid for authenticated UEFI variable
In reply to AKASHI TakahiroA signature database variable is associated with a specific guid. For convenience, if user doesn't supply any guid info, "env set|print -e" should complement it.
--- cmd/nvedit_efi.c | 18 ++++++++++++++---- 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
cmd/nvedit_efi.c +14 -4
@@ -41,6 +41,11 @@ static const struct { } efi_guid_text[] = { /* signature database */ {EFI_GLOBAL_VARIABLE_GUID, "EFI_GLOBAL_VARIABLE_GUID"}, + {EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE_GUID, "EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE_GUID"}, + /* certificate type */ + {EFI_CERT_SHA256_GUID, "EFI_CERT_SHA256_GUID"}, + {EFI_CERT_X509_GUID, "EFI_CERT_X509_GUID"}, + {EFI_CERT_TYPE_PKCS7_GUID, "EFI_CERT_TYPE_PKCS7_GUID"}, }; /* "xxxxxxxx-xxxx-xxxx-xxxx-xxxxxxxxxxxx" */
@@ -525,9 +530,9 @@ int do_env_set_efi(cmd_tbl_t *cmdtp, int flag, int argc, char * const argv[])if (*ep !=',' )return CMD_RET_USAGE ; +/* 0 should be allowed for delete */ size =simple_strtoul (++ep,NULL ,16 ); -if (!size) -return CMD_RET_FAILURE ; + value_on_memory = true; }else if (!strcmp (argv[0 ],"-v" )) { verbose = true;
@@ -539,8 +544,13 @@ int do_env_set_efi(cmd_tbl_t *cmdtp, int flag, int argc, char * const argv[])return CMD_RET_USAGE ; var_name = argv[0 ]; -if (default_guid) - guid = efi_global_variable_guid; +if (default_guid) { +if (!strcmp (var_name,"db" ) || !strcmp (var_name,"dbx" ) || + !strcmp (var_name,"dbt" )) + guid = efi_guid_image_security_database; +else + guid = efi_global_variable_guid; + }if (verbose) { printf("GUID: %s\n", efi_guid_to_str((const efi_guid_t *)
Signature · 1 line
2.24.0
PATCH v2 11/16 cmd: env: add "-at" option to "env set -e" command
In reply to AKASHI TakahiroWith "-at" option, EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS will be passed to SetVariable() to authenticate the variable.
--- cmd/nvedit.c | 5 +++-- cmd/nvedit_efi.c | 5 ++++- 2 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
cmd/nvedit.c +3 -2
@@ -1399,7 +1399,7 @@ static char env_help_text[] =#endif #endif #if defined(CONFIG_CMD_NVEDIT_EFI ) -"env set -e [-nv][-bs][-rt][-a][-i addr,size][-v] name [arg ...]\n" +"env set -e [-nv][-bs][-rt][-at][-a][-i addr,size][-v] name [arg ...]\n" " - set UEFI variable; unset if '-i' or 'arg' not specified\n"#endif "env set [-f] name [arg ...]\n" ;
@@ -1461,13 +1461,14 @@ U_BOOT_CMD_COMPLETE( setenv, CONFIG_SYS_MAXARGS, 0, do_env_set, "set environment variables", #if defined(CONFIG_CMD_NVEDIT_EFI) -"-e [-guid guid][-nv][-bs][-rt][-a][-v]\n" +"-e [-guid guid][-nv][-bs][-rt][-at][-a][-v]\n" " [-i addr,size name], or [name [value ...]]\n" " - set UEFI variable 'name' to 'value' ...'\n" " \"-guid\": set vendor guid\n" " \"-nv\": set non-volatile attribute\n" " \"-bs\": set boot-service attribute\n" " \"-rt\": set runtime attribute\n" +" \"-at\": set time-based authentication attribute\n" " \"-a\": append-write\n" " \"-i addr,size\": use <addr,size> as variable's value\n" " \"-v\": verbose message\n"
cmd/nvedit_efi.c +4 -1
@@ -458,7 +458,7 @@ out:* Return: CMD_RET_SUCCESS on success, or CMD_RET_RET_FAILURE * * This function is for "env set -e" or "setenv -e" command: -* => env set -e [-guid guid][-nv][-bs][-rt][-a][-v] +* => env set -e [-guid guid][-nv][-bs][-rt][-at][-a][-v] * [-i address,size] var, or * var [value ...] * Encode values specified and set given UEFI variable.
@@ -517,6 +517,9 @@ int do_env_set_efi(cmd_tbl_t *cmdtp, int flag, int argc, char * const argv[]) attributes |=EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS ; }else if (!strcmp (argv[0 ],"-nv" )) { attributes |=EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE ; + }else if (!strcmp (argv[0 ],"-at" )) { + attributes |= +EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS ; }else if (!strcmp (argv[0 ],"-a" )) { attributes |=EFI_VARIABLE_APPEND_WRITE ; }else if (!strcmp (argv[0 ],"-i" )) {
Signature · 1 line
2.24.0
PATCH v2 12/16 efi_loader, pytest: set up secure boot environment
In reply to AKASHI TakahiroA fixture for UEFI secure boot tests (image authentication and variable authentication) is defined. A small file system with test data in a single partition formatted in fat is created.
This test requires efitools v1.5.2 or later. If the system's efitools is older, you have to build it on your own and define EFITOOLS_PATH.
--- test/py/README.md | 8 ++ test/py/tests/test_efi_secboot/conftest.py | 151 +++++++++++++++++++++ test/py/tests/test_efi_secboot/defs.py | 21 +++ 3 files changed, 180 insertions(+) create mode 100644 test/py/tests/test_efi_secboot/conftest.py create mode 100644 test/py/tests/test_efi_secboot/defs.py
test/py/README.md +8 -0
@@ -37,7 +37,15 @@ will be required. The following is an incomplete list: | openssl | | sudo OR guestmount | | e2fsprogs | +| util-linux | +| coreutils | | dosfstools | +| efitools | +| mount | +| mtools | +| sbsigntool | +| udisks2 | + Please use the apporirate commands for your distribution to match these tools up with the package that provides them.
test/py/tests/test_efi_secboot/conftest.py new file +151 -0
151 lines not on this page · raw message
test/py/tests/test_efi_secboot/defs.py new file +21 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,21 @@ +# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0+ + +# Disk image name +EFI_SECBOOT_IMAGE_NAME='test_efi_secboot.img' + +# Size in MiB +EFI_SECBOOT_IMAGE_SIZE=16 +EFI_SECBOOT_PART_SIZE=8 + +# Partition file system type +EFI_SECBOOT_FS_TYPE='vfat' + +# Owner guid +GUID='11111111-2222-3333-4444-123456789abc' + +# v1.5.1 or earlier of efitools has a bug in sha256 calculation, and +# you need build a newer version on your own. +EFITOOLS_PATH='' + +# Hello World application for sandbox +HELLO_PATH=''
Signature · 1 line
2.24.0
PATCH v2 13/16 efi_loader, pytest: add UEFI secure boot tests (authenticated variables)
In reply to AKASHI TakahiroProvide a couple of test cases for variable authentication.
--- .../py/tests/test_efi_secboot/test_authvar.py | 282 ++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 282 insertions(+) create mode 100644 test/py/tests/test_efi_secboot/test_authvar.py
test/py/tests/test_efi_secboot/test_authvar.py new file +282 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,282 @@ +# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0+ +# Copyright (c) 2019, Linaro Limited +# Author: AKASHI Takahiro <[email protected]> +# +# U-Boot UEFI: Variable Authentication Test + +""" +This test verifies variable authentication +""" + +import pytest +import re +from defs import * + + at pytest.mark.boardspec('sandbox') + at pytest.mark.buildconfigspec('efi_secure_boot') + at pytest.mark.buildconfigspec('cmd_fat') + at pytest.mark.buildconfigspec('cmd_nvedit_efi') + at pytest.mark.slow +class TestEfiAuthVar(object): + def test_efi_var_auth1(self, u_boot_console, efi_boot_env): + """ + Test Case 1 - Install signature database + """ + u_boot_console.restart_uboot() + disk_img = efi_boot_env + with u_boot_console.log.section('Test Case 1a'): + # Test Case 1a, Initial secure state + output = u_boot_console.run_command_list([ + 'host bind 0 %s' % disk_img, + 'printenv -e SecureBoot']) + assert('00000000: 00' in ''.join(output)) + + output = u_boot_console.run_command( + 'printenv -e SetupMode') + assert('00000000: 01' in output) + + with u_boot_console.log.section('Test Case 1b'): + # Test Case 1b, PK without AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS + output = u_boot_console.run_command_list([ + 'fatload host 0:1 4000000 PK.auth', + 'setenv -e -nv -bs -rt -i 4000000,$filesize PK']) + assert(re.search('Failed to set EFI variable', ''.join(output))) + + with u_boot_console.log.section('Test Case 1c'): + # Test Case 1c, install PK + output = u_boot_console.run_command_list([ + 'fatload host 0:1 4000000 PK.auth', + 'setenv -e -nv -bs -rt -at -i 4000000,$filesize PK', + 'printenv -e -n PK']) + assert(re.search('PK:', ''.join(output))) + + output = u_boot_console.run_command( + 'printenv -e SecureBoot') + assert('00000000: 01' in output) + output = u_boot_console.run_command( + 'printenv -e SetupMode') + assert('00000000: 00' in output) + + with u_boot_console.log.section('Test Case 1d'): + # Test Case 1d, db/dbx without KEK + output = u_boot_console.run_command_list([ + 'fatload host 0:1 4000000 db.auth', + 'setenv -e -nv -bs -rt -at -i 4000000,$filesize db']) + assert(re.search('Failed to set EFI variable', ''.join(output))) + + output = u_boot_console.run_command_list([ + 'fatload host 0:1 4000000 db.auth', + 'setenv -e -nv -bs -rt -at -i 4000000,$filesize dbx']) + assert(re.search('Failed to set EFI variable', ''.join(output))) + + with u_boot_console.log.section('Test Case 1e'): + # Test Case 1e, install KEK + output = u_boot_console.run_command_list([ + 'fatload host 0:1 4000000 KEK.auth', + 'setenv -e -nv -bs -rt -i 4000000,$filesize KEK']) + assert(re.search('Failed to set EFI variable', ''.join(output))) + + output = u_boot_console.run_command_list([ + 'fatload host 0:1 4000000 KEK.auth', + 'setenv -e -nv -bs -rt -at -i 4000000,$filesize KEK', + 'printenv -e -n KEK']) + assert(re.search('KEK:', ''.join(output))) + + output = u_boot_console.run_command( + 'printenv -e SecureBoot') + assert('00000000: 01' in output) + + with u_boot_console.log.section('Test Case 1f'): + # Test Case 1f, install db + output = u_boot_console.run_command_list([ + 'fatload host 0:1 4000000 db.auth', + 'setenv -e -nv -bs -rt -i 4000000,$filesize db']) + assert(re.search('Failed to set EFI variable', ''.join(output))) + + output = u_boot_console.run_command_list([ + 'fatload host 0:1 4000000 db.auth', + 'setenv -e -nv -bs -rt -at -i 4000000,$filesize db', + 'printenv -e -n -guid d719b2cb-3d3a-4596-a3bc-dad00e67656f db']) + assert(not re.search('Failed to set EFI variable', ''.join(output))) + assert(re.search('db:', ''.join(output))) + + output = u_boot_console.run_command( + 'printenv -e SecureBoot') + assert('00000000: 01' in output) + + with u_boot_console.log.section('Test Case 1g'): + # Test Case 1g, install dbx + output = u_boot_console.run_command_list([ + 'fatload host 0:1 4000000 db.auth', + 'setenv -e -nv -bs -rt -i 4000000,$filesize db']) + assert(re.search('Failed to set EFI variable', ''.join(output))) + + output = u_boot_console.run_command_list([ + 'fatload host 0:1 4000000 db.auth', + 'setenv -e -nv -bs -rt -at -i 4000000,$filesize db', + 'printenv -e -n -guid d719b2cb-3d3a-4596-a3bc-dad00e67656f db']) + assert(not re.search('Failed to set EFI variable', ''.join(output))) + assert(re.search('db:', ''.join(output))) + + output = u_boot_console.run_command( + 'printenv -e SecureBoot') + assert('00000000: 01' in output) + + def test_efi_var_auth2(self, u_boot_console, efi_boot_env): + """ + Test Case 2 - Update database by overwriting + """ + u_boot_console.restart_uboot() + disk_img = efi_boot_env + with u_boot_console.log.section('Test Case 2a'): + # Test Case 2a, update without AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS + output = u_boot_console.run_command_list([ + 'host bind 0 %s' % disk_img, + 'fatload host 0:1 4000000 PK.auth', + 'setenv -e -nv -bs -rt -at -i 4000000,$filesize PK', + 'fatload host 0:1 4000000 KEK.auth', + 'setenv -e -nv -bs -rt -at -i 4000000,$filesize KEK', + 'fatload host 0:1 4000000 db.auth', + 'setenv -e -nv -bs -rt -at -i 4000000,$filesize db', + 'printenv -e -n -guid d719b2cb-3d3a-4596-a3bc-dad00e67656f db']) + assert(not re.search('Failed to set EFI variable', ''.join(output))) + assert(re.search('db:', ''.join(output))) + + output = u_boot_console.run_command_list([ + 'fatload host 0:1 4000000 db1.auth', + 'setenv -e -nv -bs -rt -i 4000000,$filesize db']) + assert(re.search('Failed to set EFI variable', ''.join(output))) + + with u_boot_console.log.section('Test Case 2b'): + # Test Case 2b, update without correct signature + output = u_boot_console.run_command_list([ + 'fatload host 0:1 4000000 db.esl', + 'setenv -e -nv -bs -rt -at -i 4000000,$filesize db']) + assert(re.search('Failed to set EFI variable', ''.join(output))) + + with u_boot_console.log.section('Test Case 2c'): + # Test Case 2c, update with correct signature + output = u_boot_console.run_command_list([ + 'fatload host 0:1 4000000 db1.auth', + 'setenv -e -nv -bs -rt -at -i 4000000,$filesize db', + 'printenv -e -n -guid d719b2cb-3d3a-4596-a3bc-dad00e67656f db']) + assert(not re.search('Failed to set EFI variable', ''.join(output))) + assert(re.search('db:', ''.join(output))) + + def test_efi_var_auth3(self, u_boot_console, efi_boot_env): + """ + Test Case 3 - Append database + """ + u_boot_console.restart_uboot() + disk_img = efi_boot_env + with u_boot_console.log.section('Test Case 3a'): + # Test Case 3a, update without AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS + output = u_boot_console.run_command_list([ + 'host bind 0 %s' % disk_img, + 'fatload host 0:1 4000000 PK.auth', + 'setenv -e -nv -bs -rt -at -i 4000000,$filesize PK', + 'fatload host 0:1 4000000 KEK.auth', + 'setenv -e -nv -bs -rt -at -i 4000000,$filesize KEK', + 'fatload host 0:1 4000000 db.auth', + 'setenv -e -nv -bs -rt -at -i 4000000,$filesize db', + 'printenv -e -n -guid d719b2cb-3d3a-4596-a3bc-dad00e67656f db']) + assert(not re.search('Failed to set EFI variable', ''.join(output))) + assert(re.search('db:', ''.join(output))) + + output = u_boot_console.run_command_list([ + 'fatload host 0:1 4000000 db1.auth', + 'setenv -e -nv -bs -rt -a -i 4000000,$filesize db']) + assert(re.search('Failed to set EFI variable', ''.join(output))) + + with u_boot_console.log.section('Test Case 3b'): + # Test Case 3b, update without correct signature + output = u_boot_console.run_command_list([ + 'fatload host 0:1 4000000 db.esl', + 'setenv -e -nv -bs -rt -at -a -i 4000000,$filesize db']) + assert(re.search('Failed to set EFI variable', ''.join(output))) + + with u_boot_console.log.section('Test Case 3c'): + # Test Case 3c, update with correct signature + output = u_boot_console.run_command_list([ + 'fatload host 0:1 4000000 db1.auth', + 'setenv -e -nv -bs -rt -at -a -i 4000000,$filesize db', + 'printenv -e -n -guid d719b2cb-3d3a-4596-a3bc-dad00e67656f db']) + assert(not re.search('Failed to set EFI variable', ''.join(output))) + assert(re.search('db:', ''.join(output))) + + def test_efi_var_auth4(self, u_boot_console, efi_boot_env): + """ + Test Case 4 - Delete database without authentication + """ + u_boot_console.restart_uboot() + disk_img = efi_boot_env + with u_boot_console.log.section('Test Case 4a'): + # Test Case 4a, update without AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS + output = u_boot_console.run_command_list([ + 'host bind 0 %s' % disk_img, + 'fatload host 0:1 4000000 PK.auth', + 'setenv -e -nv -bs -rt -at -i 4000000,$filesize PK', + 'fatload host 0:1 4000000 KEK.auth', + 'setenv -e -nv -bs -rt -at -i 4000000,$filesize KEK', + 'fatload host 0:1 4000000 db.auth', + 'setenv -e -nv -bs -rt -at -i 4000000,$filesize db', + 'printenv -e -n -guid d719b2cb-3d3a-4596-a3bc-dad00e67656f db']) + assert(not re.search('Failed to set EFI variable', ''.join(output))) + assert(re.search('db:', ''.join(output))) + + output = u_boot_console.run_command_list([ + 'setenv -e -nv -bs -rt db', + 'printenv -e -n -guid d719b2cb-3d3a-4596-a3bc-dad00e67656f db']) + assert(re.search('Failed to set EFI variable', ''.join(output))) + assert(re.search('db:', ''.join(output))) + + with u_boot_console.log.section('Test Case 4b'): + # Test Case 4b, update without correct signature/data + output = u_boot_console.run_command_list([ + 'setenv -e -nv -bs -rt -at db', + 'printenv -e -n -guid d719b2cb-3d3a-4596-a3bc-dad00e67656f db']) + assert(re.search('Failed to set EFI variable', ''.join(output))) + assert(re.search('db:', ''.join(output))) + + def test_efi_var_auth5(self, u_boot_console, efi_boot_env): + """ + Test Case 5 - Uninstall(delete) PK + """ + u_boot_console.restart_uboot() + disk_img = efi_boot_env + with u_boot_console.log.section('Test Case 5a'): + # Test Case 5a, Uninstall PK without correct signature + output = u_boot_console.run_command_list([ + 'host bind 0 %s' % disk_img, + 'fatload host 0:1 4000000 PK.auth', + 'setenv -e -nv -bs -rt -at -i 4000000,$filesize PK', + 'fatload host 0:1 4000000 KEK.auth', + 'setenv -e -nv -bs -rt -at -i 4000000,$filesize KEK', + 'fatload host 0:1 4000000 db.auth', + 'setenv -e -nv -bs -rt -at -i 4000000,$filesize db', + 'printenv -e -n PK']) + assert(not re.search('Failed to set EFI variable', ''.join(output))) + assert(re.search('PK:', ''.join(output))) + + output = u_boot_console.run_command_list([ + 'fatload host 0:1 4000000 PK_null.esl', + 'setenv -e -nv -bs -rt -at -i 4000000,$filesize PK', + 'printenv -e -n PK']) + assert(re.search('Failed to set EFI variable', ''.join(output))) + assert(re.search('PK:', ''.join(output))) + + with u_boot_console.log.section('Test Case 5b'): + # Test Case 5b, Uninstall PK with correct signature + output = u_boot_console.run_command_list([ + 'fatload host 0:1 4000000 PK_null.auth', + 'setenv -e -nv -bs -rt -at -i 4000000,$filesize PK', + 'printenv -e -n PK']) + assert(not re.search('Failed to set EFI variable', ''.join(output))) + assert(re.search('\"PK\" not defined', ''.join(output))) + + output = u_boot_console.run_command( + 'printenv -e SecureBoot') + assert('00000000: 00' in output) + output = u_boot_console.run_command( + 'printenv -e SetupMode') + assert('00000000: 01' in output)
Signature · 1 line
2.24.0
PATCH v2 14/16 efi_loader, pytest: add UEFI secure boot tests (image)
In reply to AKASHI TakahiroProvide test cases for
* image authentication for signed images
(test_efi_secboot/test_signed.py)
* image authentication for unsigned images
(test_efi_secboot/test_unsigned.py)
--- test/py/tests/test_efi_secboot/test_signed.py | 99 +++++++++++++++++ .../tests/test_efi_secboot/test_unsigned.py | 103 ++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 202 insertions(+) create mode 100644 test/py/tests/test_efi_secboot/test_signed.py create mode 100644 test/py/tests/test_efi_secboot/test_unsigned.py
test/py/tests/test_efi_secboot/test_signed.py new file +99 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,99 @@ +# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0+ +# Copyright (c) 2019, Linaro Limited +# Author: AKASHI Takahiro <[email protected]> +# +# U-Boot UEFI: Signed Image Authentication Test + +""" +This test verifies image authentication for signed images. +""" + +import pytest +import re +from defs import * + + at pytest.mark.boardspec('sandbox') + at pytest.mark.buildconfigspec('efi_secure_boot') + at pytest.mark.buildconfigspec('cmd_efidebug') + at pytest.mark.buildconfigspec('cmd_fat') + at pytest.mark.buildconfigspec('cmd_nvedit_efi') + at pytest.mark.slow +class TestEfiSignedImage(object): + def test_efi_signed_image_auth1(self, u_boot_console, efi_boot_env): + """ + Test Case 1 - authenticated by db + """ + u_boot_console.restart_uboot() + disk_img = efi_boot_env + with u_boot_console.log.section('Test Case 1a'): + # Test Case 1a, run signed image if no db/dbx + output = u_boot_console.run_command_list([ + 'host bind 0 %s' % disk_img, + 'efidebug boot add 1 HELLO1 host 0:1 /helloworld.efi.signed ""', + 'efidebug boot next 1', + 'bootefi bootmgr']) + assert(re.search('Hello, world!', ''.join(output))) + + with u_boot_console.log.section('Test Case 1b'): + # Test Case 1b, run unsigned image if no db/dbx + output = u_boot_console.run_command_list([ + 'efidebug boot add 2 HELLO2 host 0:1 /helloworld.efi ""', + 'efidebug boot next 2', + 'bootefi bootmgr']) + assert(re.search('Hello, world!', ''.join(output))) + + with u_boot_console.log.section('Test Case 1c'): + # Test Case 1c, not authenticated by db + output = u_boot_console.run_command_list([ + 'fatload host 0:1 4000000 db.auth', + 'setenv -e -nv -bs -rt -at -i 4000000,$filesize db', + 'fatload host 0:1 4000000 KEK.auth', + 'setenv -e -nv -bs -rt -at -i 4000000,$filesize KEK', + 'fatload host 0:1 4000000 PK.auth', + 'setenv -e -nv -bs -rt -at -i 4000000,$filesize PK']) + assert(not re.search('Failed to set EFI variable', ''.join(output))) + output = u_boot_console.run_command_list([ + 'efidebug boot next 2', + 'bootefi bootmgr']) + assert(re.search('\'HELLO2\' failed', ''.join(output))) + + with u_boot_console.log.section('Test Case 1d'): + # Test Case 1d, authenticated by db + output = u_boot_console.run_command_list([ + 'efidebug boot next 1', + 'bootefi bootmgr']) + assert(re.search('Hello, world!', ''.join(output))) + + def test_efi_signed_image_auth2(self, u_boot_console, efi_boot_env): + """ + Test Case 2 - rejected by dbx + """ + u_boot_console.restart_uboot() + disk_img = efi_boot_env + with u_boot_console.log.section('Test Case 2a'): + # Test Case 2a, rejected by dbx + output = u_boot_console.run_command_list([ + 'host bind 0 %s' % disk_img, + 'fatload host 0:1 4000000 db.auth', + 'setenv -e -nv -bs -rt -at -i 4000000,$filesize dbx', + 'fatload host 0:1 4000000 KEK.auth', + 'setenv -e -nv -bs -rt -at -i 4000000,$filesize KEK', + 'fatload host 0:1 4000000 PK.auth', + 'setenv -e -nv -bs -rt -at -i 4000000,$filesize PK']) + assert(not re.search('Failed to set EFI variable', ''.join(output))) + output = u_boot_console.run_command_list([ + 'efidebug boot add 1 HELLO host 0:1 /helloworld.efi.signed ""', + 'efidebug boot next 1', + 'bootefi bootmgr']) + assert(re.search('\'HELLO\' failed', ''.join(output))) + + with u_boot_console.log.section('Test Case 2b'): + # Test Case 2b, rejected by dbx even if db allows + output = u_boot_console.run_command_list([ + 'fatload host 0:1 4000000 db.auth', + 'setenv -e -nv -bs -rt -at -i 4000000,$filesize db']) + assert(not re.search('Failed to set EFI variable', ''.join(output))) + output = u_boot_console.run_command_list([ + 'efidebug boot next 1', + 'bootefi bootmgr']) + assert(re.search('\'HELLO\' failed', ''.join(output)))
test/py/tests/test_efi_secboot/test_unsigned.py new file +103 -0
103 lines not on this page · raw message
Signature · 1 line
2.24.0
PATCH v2 15/16 sandbox: add extra configurations for UEFI and related tests
In reply to AKASHI TakahiroAdding those extra configurations allows us to successfully run UEFI secure boot pytest on Travis CI.
--- configs/sandbox64_defconfig | 3 +++ configs/sandbox_defconfig | 3 +++ 2 files changed, 6 insertions(+)
configs/sandbox64_defconfig +3 -0
@@ -26,6 +26,7 @@ CONFIG_CMD_ASKENV=y CONFIG_CMD_GREPENV=y CONFIG_CMD_ENV_CALLBACK=y CONFIG_CMD_ENV_FLAGS=y +CONFIG_CMD_NVEDIT_EFI=y CONFIG_LOOPW=y CONFIG_CMD_MD5SUM=y CONFIG_CMD_MEMINFO=y
@@ -52,6 +53,7 @@ CONFIG_CMD_DNS=y CONFIG_CMD_LINK_LOCAL=y CONFIG_CMD_ETHSW=y CONFIG_CMD_BMP=y +CONFIG_CMD_EFIDEBUG=y CONFIG_CMD_TIME=y CONFIG_CMD_TIMER=y CONFIG_CMD_SOUND=y
@@ -194,6 +196,7 @@ CONFIG_CMD_DHRYSTONE=y CONFIG_TPM=y CONFIG_LZ4=y CONFIG_ERRNO_STR=y +CONFIG_EFI_SECURE_BOOT=y CONFIG_TEST_FDTDEC=y CONFIG_UNIT_TEST=y CONFIG_UT_TIME=y
configs/sandbox_defconfig +3 -0
@@ -29,6 +29,7 @@ CONFIG_CMD_ASKENV=y CONFIG_CMD_GREPENV=y CONFIG_CMD_ENV_CALLBACK=y CONFIG_CMD_ENV_FLAGS=y +CONFIG_CMD_NVEDIT_EFI=y CONFIG_LOOPW=y CONFIG_CMD_MD5SUM=y CONFIG_CMD_MEMINFO=y
@@ -60,6 +61,7 @@ CONFIG_CMD_LINK_LOCAL=y CONFIG_CMD_ETHSW=y CONFIG_CMD_BMP=y CONFIG_CMD_BOOTCOUNT=y +CONFIG_CMD_EFIDEBUG=y CONFIG_CMD_TIME=y CONFIG_CMD_TIMER=y CONFIG_CMD_SOUND=y
@@ -221,6 +223,7 @@ CONFIG_CMD_DHRYSTONE=y CONFIG_TPM=y CONFIG_LZ4=y CONFIG_ERRNO_STR=y +CONFIG_EFI_SECURE_BOOT=y CONFIG_TEST_FDTDEC=y CONFIG_UNIT_TEST=y CONFIG_UT_TIME=y
Signature · 1 line
2.24.0
PATCH v2 16/16 travis: add packages for UEFI secure boot test
In reply to AKASHI TakahiroPytest for UEFI secure boot will use several host commands. In paricular, Test setup relies on efitools, whose version must be v1.5.2 or later. So fetch a new version of deb package directly. Please note it has a dependency on mtools, which must also be installed along wih efitools.
In addition, the path, '/sbin', is added to PATH for use of sgdisk and mkfs.
--- .travis.yml | 11 ++++++++++- 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
.travis.yml +10 -1
@@ -38,6 +38,14 @@ addons: - libisl15 - clang-7 - srecord + - coreutils + - util-linux + - dosfstools + - gdisk + - mount + - mtools + - openssl + - sbsigntool install: # Clone uboot-test-hooks
@@ -58,10 +66,11 @@ install: - mkdir ~/grub2-arm64 - ( cd ~/grub2-arm64; wget -O - http://download.opensuse.org/ports/aarch64/distribution/leap/42.2/repo/oss/suse/aarch64/grub2-arm64-efi-2.02~beta2-87.1.aarch64.rpm | rpm2cpio | cpio -di ) - wget http://mirrors.kernel.org/ubuntu/pool/main/m/mpfr4/libmpfr4_3.1.4-1_amd64.deb && sudo dpkg -i libmpfr4_3.1.4-1_amd64.deb && rm libmpfr4_3.1.4-1_amd64.deb + - wget http://mirrors.kernel.org/ubuntu/pool/universe/e/efitools/efitools_1.8.1-0ubuntu2_amd64.deb && sudo dpkg -i efitools_1.8.1-0ubuntu2_amd64.deb && rm efitools_1.8.1-0ubuntu2_amd64.deb env: global: - - PATH=/tmp/qemu-install/bin:/tmp/uboot-test-hooks/bin:/usr/bin:/bin:/usr/local/bin + - PATH=/tmp/qemu-install/bin:/tmp/uboot-test-hooks/bin:/sbin:/usr/bin:/bin:/usr/local/bin - PYTHONPATH=/tmp/uboot-test-hooks/py/travis-ci - BUILD_DIR=build - HOSTCC="cc"
Signature · 1 line
2.24.0
PATCH v2 16/16 travis: add packages for UEFI secure boot test
Quoted 10 lines · AKASHI Takahiro
Pytest for UEFI secure boot will use several host commands. In paricular, Test setup relies on efitools, whose version must be v1.5.2 or later. So fetch a new version of deb package directly. Please note it has a dependency on mtools, which must also be installed along wih efitools.
In addition, the path, '/sbin', is added to PATH for use of sgdisk and mkfs.
Signed-off-by AKASHI Takahiro <[email protected]>
Ah, so that's on the list of stuff that's not installed and why we don't run these tests in Travis today but only GitLab/Azure. Thanks for fixing that. The rest looks good and I'll post something to update the Docker container GitLab/Azure use.
Signature · 8 lines
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v2 cover efi_loader: add secure boot support
In reply to AKASHI TakahiroSome updates,
Quoted 9 lines · AKASHI Takahiro
One of major missing features in current UEFI implementation is "secure boot." The ultimate goal of my attempt is to implement image authentication based on signature and provide UEFI secure boot support which would be fully compliant with UEFI specification, section 32[1].
(The code was originally developed by Patrick Wildt.)While this patch/RFC is still rough-edged, the aim here is to get early feedbacks from the community as the patch is quite huge (in total) and also as it's a security enhancement.
Oops, this sentence should have been deleted.
[...]
Quoted 6 lines
Test:
* my pytest, included in this patch set, passed.
*efi_selftestpassed. (At least no reguression.)
* Travis CI tests, except the following two, have passed:
- test/py sandboxtest/py/tests/test_fs/test_unlink.pytest_unlink2
I cannot reproduce this issue even if I re-submit a specific job. It may be a transient error as Heinrich has reported on fat write before?
Quoted 4 lines
- test/py sandbox with clang
cmd/efidebug.c:703:15: error: result of comparison of constant 9223372036854775822 with expression of type 'int' is always false [-Werror,-Wtautological-constant-out-of-range-compare]
Sent out a patch.
Thanks,
-Takahiro Akashi
Quoted 126 lines
But as you can see, those have nothing to do with my UEFI secure boot patch and are existing bugs.
Known issues:
* efitools is used in pytest, and its version must be v1.5.2 or later. (Solution: You can defineEFITOOLS_PATHindefs.pyfor your own efitools.)
* Pytest depends on standalone "helloworld" app for sandbox (Solution: You can defineHELLO_PATHindefs.pyor Heinrich's [7].)
* Travis CI errors mentioned above
=> I will send *separate* bug-fix patches once fixed.Hints about how to use:
(Please see other documents, or my pytest scripts, for details.)
* You can create your own certificates with openssl.
* You can sign your application with sbsign (on Ubuntu).
* You can create raw data for signature database with efitools, and install/manage authenticated variables with "env -set -e" command or efitools' "UpdateVars.efi" application.[1] https://uefi.org/sites/default/files/resources/UEFI_Spec_2_8_final.pdf
[2] https://lists.denx.de/pipermail/u-boot/2019-November/390127.html
(import x509/pkcs7 parsers from linux)
[3] https://lists.denx.de/pipermail/u-boot/2019-November/390150.html
(extendrsa_verify()for UEFI secure boot)
[4] http://git.linaro.org/people/takahiro.akashi/u-boot.git/ efi/secboot
[5] https://lists.denx.de/pipermail/u-boot/2019-September/382835.html
(non-volatile variables support)
[6] https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2230
[7] https://lists.denx.de/pipermail/u-boot/2019-November/389593.htmlChanges in v2 (Nov 26, 2019)
* rebased to v2020.01-rc3
* renameIMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_CERTTABLEtoIMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY(patch#1,#9)
* add comments (patch#1)
* drop v1's patch#2 as it is no longer necessary
* drop v1's patch#3 as other "SECURE_BOOT" architectures have renamed this option and no longer use it
* add structure descriptions (patch#3)
* rework hash calculation code inefi_signature_verify()and remove an odd constant, WinIndrectSha256 (patch#3)
* move travis.yml changes to a seprate patch (patch#12, #16)
*yield_fixture()->fixture()(patch#12)
* callconsole.restart_uboot()at every test case (13,#14)
* add patch#15; enable UEFI-related configurations by default on sandbox
* add patch#16; modify Travis CI environment to run UEFI secure boot testChanges in v1 (Nov 13, 2019)
* rebased to v2020.01-rc
* remove already-merged patches
* re-work the patch set for easier reviews, including
- move a config definition patch forward (patch#4)
- refactor/rename verification functions (patch#5/#10)
- split signature database parser as a separate patch (patch#6)
- split secure state transition code as a separate patch (patch#8)
- move most part ofinit_secure_boot()intoinit_variables()(patch#8)
- split test environment setup from test patches (patch#14)
* add function descriptions (patch#5-#11)
* make sure the section list is sorted in ascending order in hash calculation of PE image (patch#10)
* add a new "-at" (authenticated access) option to "env -e" (patch#13)
* list required host packages, in particular udisks2, in pytest (patch#14)
* modifyconftest.pyto run under python3 (patch#14)
* use a partition on a disk instead of a whole disk without partition table (patch#14)
* reduce depencendy on efitools, yet relying on its host tools (patch#14)
* modify pytests to catch up wth latest changes of "env -e" syntax (patch#15,#16)RFC (Sept 18, 2019)
AKASHI Takahiro (16):
include:pe.h: add signature-related definitions
efi_loader: addCONFIG_EFI_SECURE_BOOTconfig option
efi_loader: add signature verification functions
efi_loader: add signature database parser
efi_loader: variable: support variable authentication
efi_loader: variable: add secure boot state transition
efi_loader: variable: add VendorKeys variable
efi_loader:image_loader: support image authentication
efi_loader: set up secure boot
cmd: env: use appropriate guid for authenticated UEFI variable
cmd: env: add "-at" option to "env set -e" commandefi_loader, pytest: set up secure boot environmentefi_loader, pytest: add UEFI secure boot tests (authenticated
variables)
efi_loader, pytest: add UEFI secure boot tests (image)
sandbox: add extra configurations for UEFI and related tests
travis: add packages for UEFI secure boot test.travis.yml | 11 +- cmd/nvedit.c | 5 +- cmd/nvedit_efi.c | 23 +- configs/sandbox64_defconfig | 3 + configs/sandbox_defconfig | 3 + include/efi_api.h | 87 ++ include/efi_loader.h | 85 +- include/pe.h | 18 + lib/efi_loader/Kconfig | 16 + lib/efi_loader/Makefile | 1 + lib/efi_loader/efi_boottime.c | 2 +- lib/efi_loader/efi_image_loader.c | 443 +++++++- lib/efi_loader/efi_setup.c | 38 + lib/efi_loader/efi_signature.c | 811 +++++++++++++++ lib/efi_loader/efi_variable.c | 950 ++++++++++++++++-- test/py/README.md | 8 + test/py/tests/test_efi_secboot/conftest.py | 151 +++ test/py/tests/test_efi_secboot/defs.py | 21 + .../py/tests/test_efi_secboot/test_authvar.py | 282 ++++++ test/py/tests/test_efi_secboot/test_signed.py | 99 ++ .../tests/test_efi_secboot/test_unsigned.py | 103 ++ 21 files changed, 3032 insertions(+), 128 deletions(-) create mode 100644 lib/efi_loader/efi_signature.c create mode 100644 test/py/tests/test_efi_secboot/conftest.py create mode 100644 test/py/tests/test_efi_secboot/defs.py create mode 100644 test/py/tests/test_efi_secboot/test_authvar.py create mode 100644 test/py/tests/test_efi_secboot/test_signed.py create mode 100644 test/py/tests/test_efi_secboot/test_unsigned.pySignature · 1 line
2.24.0
v2 cover efi_loader: add secure boot support
In reply to AKASHI TakahiroQuoted 181 lines · AKASHI Takahiro
One of major missing features in current UEFI implementation is "secure boot." The ultimate goal of my attempt is to implement image authentication based on signature and provide UEFI secure boot support which would be fully compliant with UEFI specification, section 32[1].
(The code was originally developed by Patrick Wildt.)While this patch/RFC is still rough-edged, the aim here is to get early feedbacks from the community as the patch is quite huge (in total) and also as it's a security enhancement.
Please note, however, this patch doesn't work on its own; there are a couple of functional dependencies[2] and [3], that I have submitted before. For complete workable patch set, see my repository[4], which also contains exeperimental timestamp-based revocation suuport.
My "non-volatile" support[5], which is under discussion, is not mandatory and so not included here, but this inevitably implies that, for example, signature database variables, like db and dbx, won't be persistent unless you explicitly run "env save" command and that UEFI variables are not separated from U-Boot environment. Anyhow, Linaro is also working on implementing real "secure storage" solution based on TF-A and OP-TEE.
Supported features:
* image authentication based on db and dbx
* supported signature types areEFI_CERT_SHA256_GUID(SHA256 digest for unsigned images)EFI_CERT_X509_GUID(x509 certificate for signed images)
* SecureBoot/SignatureSupport variables
* SetupMode and user mode
* variable authentication based on PK and KEKEFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS
* basic pytest test casesUnsupported features: (marked as TODO in most cases in the source code,
and won't be included in this series)
* hash algorithms other than SHA256
* dbt: timestamp(RFC6131)-based certificate revocation
* dbr: OS recovery
* xxxDefault: default values for signature stores
* transition to AuditMode and DeployedMode
* recording rejected images inEFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_INFO_TABLE
* verification "policy", in particular, check against signature's owner
* private authenticated variables
* variable authentication withEFI_VARIABLE_ENHANCED_AUTHENTICATED_ACCESS
* real secure storage support, including hardware-specific PK (Platform Key) installationTODO's other than "Unsupported features": (won't be included in this series)
* structefi_image_regionscannot have arbitrary number of regions
* fail recovery, in particular, in modifying authenticated variables
* support read-only attributes of well-defined global variables in particular, "SignatureSupport"
* Extensive test suite (or more test cases) to confirm compatibility with EDK2
=> I requested EDK SCT community to add tests[6].Test:
* my pytest, included in this patch set, passed.
*efi_selftestpassed. (At least no reguression.)
* Travis CI tests, except the following two, have passed:
- test/py sandbox
test/py/tests/test_fs/test_unlink.pytest_unlink2
- test/py sandbox with clang
cmd/efidebug.c:703:15: error: result of comparison of constant 9223372036854775822 with expression of type 'int' is always false [-Werror,-Wtautological-constant-out-of-range-compare]
But as you can see, those have nothing to do with my UEFI secure boot patch and are existing bugs.Known issues:
* efitools is used in pytest, and its version must be v1.5.2 or later. (Solution: You can defineEFITOOLS_PATHindefs.pyfor your own efitools.)
* Pytest depends on standalone "helloworld" app for sandbox (Solution: You can defineHELLO_PATHindefs.pyor Heinrich's [7].)
* Travis CI errors mentioned above
=> I will send *separate* bug-fix patches once fixed.Hints about how to use:
(Please see other documents, or my pytest scripts, for details.)
* You can create your own certificates with openssl.
* You can sign your application with sbsign (on Ubuntu).
* You can create raw data for signature database with efitools, and install/manage authenticated variables with "env -set -e" command or efitools' "UpdateVars.efi" application.[1] https://uefi.org/sites/default/files/resources/UEFI_Spec_2_8_final.pdf
[2] https://lists.denx.de/pipermail/u-boot/2019-November/390127.html
(import x509/pkcs7 parsers from linux)
[3] https://lists.denx.de/pipermail/u-boot/2019-November/390150.html
(extendrsa_verify()for UEFI secure boot)
[4] http://git.linaro.org/people/takahiro.akashi/u-boot.git/ efi/secboot
[5] https://lists.denx.de/pipermail/u-boot/2019-September/382835.html
(non-volatile variables support)
[6] https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2230
[7] https://lists.denx.de/pipermail/u-boot/2019-November/389593.htmlChanges in v2 (Nov 26, 2019)
* rebased to v2020.01-rc3
* renameIMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_CERTTABLEtoIMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY(patch#1,#9)
* add comments (patch#1)
* drop v1's patch#2 as it is no longer necessary
* drop v1's patch#3 as other "SECURE_BOOT" architectures have renamed this option and no longer use it
* add structure descriptions (patch#3)
* rework hash calculation code inefi_signature_verify()and remove an odd constant, WinIndrectSha256 (patch#3)
* move travis.yml changes to a seprate patch (patch#12, #16)
*yield_fixture()->fixture()(patch#12)
* callconsole.restart_uboot()at every test case (13,#14)
* add patch#15; enable UEFI-related configurations by default on sandbox
* add patch#16; modify Travis CI environment to run UEFI secure boot testChanges in v1 (Nov 13, 2019)
* rebased to v2020.01-rc
* remove already-merged patches
* re-work the patch set for easier reviews, including
- move a config definition patch forward (patch#4)
- refactor/rename verification functions (patch#5/#10)
- split signature database parser as a separate patch (patch#6)
- split secure state transition code as a separate patch (patch#8)
- move most part ofinit_secure_boot()intoinit_variables()(patch#8)
- split test environment setup from test patches (patch#14)
* add function descriptions (patch#5-#11)
* make sure the section list is sorted in ascending order in hash calculation of PE image (patch#10)
* add a new "-at" (authenticated access) option to "env -e" (patch#13)
* list required host packages, in particular udisks2, in pytest (patch#14)
* modifyconftest.pyto run under python3 (patch#14)
* use a partition on a disk instead of a whole disk without partition table (patch#14)
* reduce depencendy on efitools, yet relying on its host tools (patch#14)
* modify pytests to catch up wth latest changes of "env -e" syntax (patch#15,#16)RFC (Sept 18, 2019)
AKASHI Takahiro (16):
include:pe.h: add signature-related definitions
efi_loader: addCONFIG_EFI_SECURE_BOOTconfig option
efi_loader: add signature verification functions
efi_loader: add signature database parser
efi_loader: variable: support variable authentication
efi_loader: variable: add secure boot state transition
efi_loader: variable: add VendorKeys variable
efi_loader:image_loader: support image authentication
efi_loader: set up secure boot
cmd: env: use appropriate guid for authenticated UEFI variable
cmd: env: add "-at" option to "env set -e" commandefi_loader, pytest: set up secure boot environmentefi_loader, pytest: add UEFI secure boot tests (authenticated
variables)
efi_loader, pytest: add UEFI secure boot tests (image)
sandbox: add extra configurations for UEFI and related tests
travis: add packages for UEFI secure boot test.travis.yml | 11 +- cmd/nvedit.c | 5 +- cmd/nvedit_efi.c | 23 +- configs/sandbox64_defconfig | 3 + configs/sandbox_defconfig | 3 + include/efi_api.h | 87 ++ include/efi_loader.h | 85 +- include/pe.h | 18 + lib/efi_loader/Kconfig | 16 + lib/efi_loader/Makefile | 1 + lib/efi_loader/efi_boottime.c | 2 +- lib/efi_loader/efi_image_loader.c | 443 +++++++- lib/efi_loader/efi_setup.c | 38 + lib/efi_loader/efi_signature.c | 811 +++++++++++++++ lib/efi_loader/efi_variable.c | 950 ++++++++++++++++-- test/py/README.md | 8 + test/py/tests/test_efi_secboot/conftest.py | 151 +++ test/py/tests/test_efi_secboot/defs.py | 21 + .../py/tests/test_efi_secboot/test_authvar.py | 282 ++++++ test/py/tests/test_efi_secboot/test_signed.py | 99 ++
Quoted 12 lines
.../tests/test_efi_secboot/test_unsigned.py | 103 ++ 21 files changed, 3032 insertions(+), 128 deletions(-) create mode 100644 lib/efi_loader/efi_signature.c create mode 100644 test/py/tests/test_efi_secboot/conftest.py create mode 100644 test/py/tests/test_efi_secboot/defs.py create mode 100644 test/py/tests/test_efi_secboot/test_authvar.py create mode 100644 test/py/tests/test_efi_secboot/test_signed.py create mode 100644 test/py/tests/test_efi_secboot/test_unsigned.pySignature · 1 line
2.24.0
I managed to test the functionality using SHA256 in 'db'. For that part
v2 cover efi_loader: add secure boot support
In reply to AKASHI TakahiroTom, Simon, Heinrich,
I have submitted three major patch sets for UEFI secure boot:
* x509/pkcs7 parser
* RSA library extension
* UEFI secure boot
I have no technical issues to fix now and have seen only a few minor comments on them (if I confirm that you have no more comments, I can submit new version almost immediately).
Considering those, can I expect that those patches be merged in v2020.01?
If not, do you need to have more time for your reviewing? What else do you expect from my side to accelerate the upstream?
Please let me know your review status and your expectation. (I'm not pushing you, but just asking.)
Thanks,
-Takahiro Akashi
Quoted 193 lines · AKASHI Takahiro
One of major missing features in current UEFI implementation is "secure boot." The ultimate goal of my attempt is to implement image authentication based on signature and provide UEFI secure boot support which would be fully compliant with UEFI specification, section 32[1].
(The code was originally developed by Patrick Wildt.)While this patch/RFC is still rough-edged, the aim here is to get early feedbacks from the community as the patch is quite huge (in total) and also as it's a security enhancement.
Please note, however, this patch doesn't work on its own; there are a couple of functional dependencies[2] and [3], that I have submitted before. For complete workable patch set, see my repository[4], which also contains exeperimental timestamp-based revocation suuport.
My "non-volatile" support[5], which is under discussion, is not mandatory and so not included here, but this inevitably implies that, for example, signature database variables, like db and dbx, won't be persistent unless you explicitly run "env save" command and that UEFI variables are not separated from U-Boot environment. Anyhow, Linaro is also working on implementing real "secure storage" solution based on TF-A and OP-TEE.
Supported features:
* image authentication based on db and dbx
* supported signature types areEFI_CERT_SHA256_GUID(SHA256 digest for unsigned images)EFI_CERT_X509_GUID(x509 certificate for signed images)
* SecureBoot/SignatureSupport variables
* SetupMode and user mode
* variable authentication based on PK and KEKEFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS
* basic pytest test casesUnsupported features: (marked as TODO in most cases in the source code,
and won't be included in this series)
* hash algorithms other than SHA256
* dbt: timestamp(RFC6131)-based certificate revocation
* dbr: OS recovery
* xxxDefault: default values for signature stores
* transition to AuditMode and DeployedMode
* recording rejected images inEFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_INFO_TABLE
* verification "policy", in particular, check against signature's owner
* private authenticated variables
* variable authentication withEFI_VARIABLE_ENHANCED_AUTHENTICATED_ACCESS
* real secure storage support, including hardware-specific PK (Platform Key) installationTODO's other than "Unsupported features": (won't be included in this series)
* structefi_image_regionscannot have arbitrary number of regions
* fail recovery, in particular, in modifying authenticated variables
* support read-only attributes of well-defined global variables in particular, "SignatureSupport"
* Extensive test suite (or more test cases) to confirm compatibility with EDK2
=> I requested EDK SCT community to add tests[6].Test:
* my pytest, included in this patch set, passed.
*efi_selftestpassed. (At least no reguression.)
* Travis CI tests, except the following two, have passed:
- test/py sandbox
test/py/tests/test_fs/test_unlink.pytest_unlink2
- test/py sandbox with clang
cmd/efidebug.c:703:15: error: result of comparison of constant 9223372036854775822 with expression of type 'int' is always false [-Werror,-Wtautological-constant-out-of-range-compare]
But as you can see, those have nothing to do with my UEFI secure boot patch and are existing bugs.Known issues:
* efitools is used in pytest, and its version must be v1.5.2 or later. (Solution: You can defineEFITOOLS_PATHindefs.pyfor your own efitools.)
* Pytest depends on standalone "helloworld" app for sandbox (Solution: You can defineHELLO_PATHindefs.pyor Heinrich's [7].)
* Travis CI errors mentioned above
=> I will send *separate* bug-fix patches once fixed.Hints about how to use:
(Please see other documents, or my pytest scripts, for details.)
* You can create your own certificates with openssl.
* You can sign your application with sbsign (on Ubuntu).
* You can create raw data for signature database with efitools, and install/manage authenticated variables with "env -set -e" command or efitools' "UpdateVars.efi" application.[1] https://uefi.org/sites/default/files/resources/UEFI_Spec_2_8_final.pdf
[2] https://lists.denx.de/pipermail/u-boot/2019-November/390127.html
(import x509/pkcs7 parsers from linux)
[3] https://lists.denx.de/pipermail/u-boot/2019-November/390150.html
(extendrsa_verify()for UEFI secure boot)
[4] http://git.linaro.org/people/takahiro.akashi/u-boot.git/ efi/secboot
[5] https://lists.denx.de/pipermail/u-boot/2019-September/382835.html
(non-volatile variables support)
[6] https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2230
[7] https://lists.denx.de/pipermail/u-boot/2019-November/389593.htmlChanges in v2 (Nov 26, 2019)
* rebased to v2020.01-rc3
* renameIMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_CERTTABLEtoIMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY(patch#1,#9)
* add comments (patch#1)
* drop v1's patch#2 as it is no longer necessary
* drop v1's patch#3 as other "SECURE_BOOT" architectures have renamed this option and no longer use it
* add structure descriptions (patch#3)
* rework hash calculation code inefi_signature_verify()and remove an odd constant, WinIndrectSha256 (patch#3)
* move travis.yml changes to a seprate patch (patch#12, #16)
*yield_fixture()->fixture()(patch#12)
* callconsole.restart_uboot()at every test case (13,#14)
* add patch#15; enable UEFI-related configurations by default on sandbox
* add patch#16; modify Travis CI environment to run UEFI secure boot testChanges in v1 (Nov 13, 2019)
* rebased to v2020.01-rc
* remove already-merged patches
* re-work the patch set for easier reviews, including
- move a config definition patch forward (patch#4)
- refactor/rename verification functions (patch#5/#10)
- split signature database parser as a separate patch (patch#6)
- split secure state transition code as a separate patch (patch#8)
- move most part ofinit_secure_boot()intoinit_variables()(patch#8)
- split test environment setup from test patches (patch#14)
* add function descriptions (patch#5-#11)
* make sure the section list is sorted in ascending order in hash calculation of PE image (patch#10)
* add a new "-at" (authenticated access) option to "env -e" (patch#13)
* list required host packages, in particular udisks2, in pytest (patch#14)
* modifyconftest.pyto run under python3 (patch#14)
* use a partition on a disk instead of a whole disk without partition table (patch#14)
* reduce depencendy on efitools, yet relying on its host tools (patch#14)
* modify pytests to catch up wth latest changes of "env -e" syntax (patch#15,#16)RFC (Sept 18, 2019)
AKASHI Takahiro (16):
include:pe.h: add signature-related definitions
efi_loader: addCONFIG_EFI_SECURE_BOOTconfig option
efi_loader: add signature verification functions
efi_loader: add signature database parser
efi_loader: variable: support variable authentication
efi_loader: variable: add secure boot state transition
efi_loader: variable: add VendorKeys variable
efi_loader:image_loader: support image authentication
efi_loader: set up secure boot
cmd: env: use appropriate guid for authenticated UEFI variable
cmd: env: add "-at" option to "env set -e" commandefi_loader, pytest: set up secure boot environmentefi_loader, pytest: add UEFI secure boot tests (authenticated
variables)
efi_loader, pytest: add UEFI secure boot tests (image)
sandbox: add extra configurations for UEFI and related tests
travis: add packages for UEFI secure boot test.travis.yml | 11 +- cmd/nvedit.c | 5 +- cmd/nvedit_efi.c | 23 +- configs/sandbox64_defconfig | 3 + configs/sandbox_defconfig | 3 + include/efi_api.h | 87 ++ include/efi_loader.h | 85 +- include/pe.h | 18 + lib/efi_loader/Kconfig | 16 + lib/efi_loader/Makefile | 1 + lib/efi_loader/efi_boottime.c | 2 +- lib/efi_loader/efi_image_loader.c | 443 +++++++- lib/efi_loader/efi_setup.c | 38 + lib/efi_loader/efi_signature.c | 811 +++++++++++++++ lib/efi_loader/efi_variable.c | 950 ++++++++++++++++-- test/py/README.md | 8 + test/py/tests/test_efi_secboot/conftest.py | 151 +++ test/py/tests/test_efi_secboot/defs.py | 21 + .../py/tests/test_efi_secboot/test_authvar.py | 282 ++++++ test/py/tests/test_efi_secboot/test_signed.py | 99 ++ .../tests/test_efi_secboot/test_unsigned.py | 103 ++ 21 files changed, 3032 insertions(+), 128 deletions(-) create mode 100644 lib/efi_loader/efi_signature.c create mode 100644 test/py/tests/test_efi_secboot/conftest.py create mode 100644 test/py/tests/test_efi_secboot/defs.py create mode 100644 test/py/tests/test_efi_secboot/test_authvar.py create mode 100644 test/py/tests/test_efi_secboot/test_signed.py create mode 100644 test/py/tests/test_efi_secboot/test_unsigned.pySignature · 1 line
2.24.0
v2 cover efi_loader: add secure boot support
Quoted 7 lines · AKASHI Takahiro
Tom, Simon, Heinrich,
I have submitted three major patch sets for UEFI secure boot:
* x509/pkcs7 parser
* RSA library extension
* UEFI secure boot
Quoted 8 lines
I have no technical issues to fix now and have seen only a few minor comments on them (if I confirm that you have no more comments, I can submit new version almost immediately).
Considering those, can I expect that those patches be merged in v2020.01?If not, do you need to have more time for your reviewing? What else do you expect from my side to accelerate the upstream?
We are reaching the end of the release cycle. So do not expect any of these patch series to be merged in v2020.01.
cf. https://www.denx.de/wiki/U-Boot/ReleaseCycle
To my understanding the UEFI secure boot series depends on the other two so it must be merged last.
Best regards
Heinrich
v2 cover efi_loader: add secure boot support
Quoted 14 lines · Heinrich Schuchardt
Quoted 13 lines · AKASHI Takahiro
Tom, Simon, Heinrich,
I have submitted three major patch sets for UEFI secure boot:
* x509/pkcs7 parser
* RSA library extension
* UEFI secure bootI have no technical issues to fix now and have seen only a few minor comments on them (if I confirm that you have no more comments, I can submit new version almost immediately).
Considering those, can I expect that those patches be merged in v2020.01?
Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 2 lines
If not, do you need to have more time for your reviewing? What else do you expect from my side to accelerate the upstream?
We are reaching the end of the release cycle. So do not expect any of these patch series to be merged in v2020.01.
cf. https://www.denx.de/wiki/U-Boot/ReleaseCycle
I have often seen several patches (not bug fix) merged even after "merge window".
Anyway,
Quoted 2 lines
To my understanding the UEFI secure boot series depends on the other two so it must be merged last.
So once the first two patch set are accepted by the maintainers, do you agree to merging the third one (i.e. secure boot patch itself) promptly?
-> Heinrich
As I said, I have had no technical issues on the first two patches and haven't heard any comments/objections from the maintainers so far. Are you willing to accept them for the next release?
-> Tom, Simon
Thanks,
-Takahiro Akashi
Quoted 2 lines
Heinrich
v2 cover efi_loader: add secure boot support
Quoted 18 lines · AKASHI Takahiro
Quoted 17 lines · Heinrich Schuchardt
Quoted 15 lines · AKASHI Takahiro
Tom, Simon, Heinrich,
I have submitted three major patch sets for UEFI secure boot:
* x509/pkcs7 parser
* RSA library extension
* UEFI secure bootI have no technical issues to fix now and have seen only a few minor comments on them (if I confirm that you have no more comments, I can submit new version almost immediately).
Considering those, can I expect that those patches be merged in v2020.01?If not, do you need to have more time for your reviewing? What else do you expect from my side to accelerate the upstream?
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 3 lines
We are reaching the end of the release cycle. So do not expect any of these patch series to be merged in v2020.01.
cf. https://www.denx.de/wiki/U-Boot/ReleaseCycleI have often seen several patches (not bug fix) merged even after "merge window".
Anyway,
Please keep pushing back on me when you see "large" changes go in later than probably should. I try and hold to what I say, but I don't always make it.
Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 2 lines
To my understanding the UEFI secure boot series depends on the other two so it must be merged last.
So once the first two patch set are accepted by the maintainers, do you agree to merging the third one (i.e. secure boot patch itself) promptly?
Quoted 6 lines
-> HeinrichAs I said, I have had no technical issues on the first two patches and haven't heard any comments/objections from the maintainers so far. Are you willing to accept them for the next release?
-> Tom, Simon
My hope is to put some of this in to -next and see what comes out. As I send this I'm doing what I hope will be a last test of the MTD clean up series, which has been what's eating all of my "try something" cycles since the end of Oct.
Signature · 8 lines
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v2 cover efi_loader: add secure boot support
In reply to AKASHI TakahiroSimon,
Quoted 32 lines · AKASHI Takahiro
Quoted 14 lines · Heinrich Schuchardt
Quoted 13 lines · AKASHI Takahiro
Tom, Simon, Heinrich,
I have submitted three major patch sets for UEFI secure boot:
* x509/pkcs7 parser
* RSA library extension
* UEFI secure bootI have no technical issues to fix now and have seen only a few minor comments on them (if I confirm that you have no more comments, I can submit new version almost immediately).
Considering those, can I expect that those patches be merged in v2020.01?Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 2 lines
If not, do you need to have more time for your reviewing? What else do you expect from my side to accelerate the upstream?
We are reaching the end of the release cycle. So do not expect any of these patch series to be merged in v2020.01.
cf. https://www.denx.de/wiki/U-Boot/ReleaseCycleI have often seen several patches (not bug fix) merged even after "merge window".
Anyway,Quoted 2 lines
To my understanding the UEFI secure boot series depends on the other two so it must be merged last.
So once the first two patch set are accepted by the maintainers, do you agree to merging the third one (i.e. secure boot patch itself) promptly?
Quoted 6 lines
-> HeinrichAs I said, I have had no technical issues on the first two patches and haven't heard any comments/objections from the maintainers so far. Are you willing to accept them for the next release?
-> Tom, Simon
Can you confirm that you have queued my "RSA library extension" patch in your -next(?) branch, please?
-Takahiro Akashi
Quoted 5 lines
Thanks,
-Takahiro AkashiQuoted 2 lines
Heinrich
v2 cover efi_loader: add secure boot support
Quoted 37 lines · AKASHI Takahiro
Simon,
Quoted 34 lines · AKASHI Takahiro
Quoted 14 lines · Heinrich Schuchardt
Quoted 13 lines · AKASHI Takahiro
Tom, Simon, Heinrich,
I have submitted three major patch sets for UEFI secure boot:
* x509/pkcs7 parser
* RSA library extension
* UEFI secure bootI have no technical issues to fix now and have seen only a few minor comments on them (if I confirm that you have no more comments, I can submit new version almost immediately).
Considering those, can I expect that those patches be merged in v2020.01?Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 2 lines
If not, do you need to have more time for your reviewing? What else do you expect from my side to accelerate the upstream?
We are reaching the end of the release cycle. So do not expect any of these patch series to be merged in v2020.01.
cf. https://www.denx.de/wiki/U-Boot/ReleaseCycleI have often seen several patches (not bug fix) merged even after "merge window".
Anyway,Quoted 2 lines
To my understanding the UEFI secure boot series depends on the other two so it must be merged last.
So once the first two patch set are accepted by the maintainers, do you agree to merging the third one (i.e. secure boot patch itself) promptly?
-> Heinrich
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 4 lines
As I said, I have had no technical issues on the first two patches and haven't heard any comments/objections from the maintainers so far. Are you willing to accept them for the next release?
-> Tom, SimonCan you confirm that you have queued my "RSA library extension" patch in your -next(?) branch, please?
Please note that I raised a concern with the RSA patch series that needs to be addressed. There's unexplained / unexpected size growth on platforms that aren't otherwise enabling new features. Thanks!
Signature · 8 lines
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v2 cover efi_loader: add secure boot support
Quoted 43 lines · Tom Rini
Quoted 42 lines · AKASHI Takahiro
Simon,
Quoted 38 lines · AKASHI Takahiro
Quoted 14 lines · Heinrich Schuchardt
Quoted 13 lines · AKASHI Takahiro
Tom, Simon, Heinrich,
I have submitted three major patch sets for UEFI secure boot:
* x509/pkcs7 parser
* RSA library extension
* UEFI secure bootI have no technical issues to fix now and have seen only a few minor comments on them (if I confirm that you have no more comments, I can submit new version almost immediately).
Considering those, can I expect that those patches be merged in v2020.01?Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 2 lines
If not, do you need to have more time for your reviewing? What else do you expect from my side to accelerate the upstream?
We are reaching the end of the release cycle. So do not expect any of these patch series to be merged in v2020.01.
cf. https://www.denx.de/wiki/U-Boot/ReleaseCycleI have often seen several patches (not bug fix) merged even after "merge window".
Anyway,Quoted 2 lines
To my understanding the UEFI secure boot series depends on the other two so it must be merged last.
So once the first two patch set are accepted by the maintainers, do you agree to merging the third one (i.e. secure boot patch itself) promptly?
-> HeinrichAs I said, I have had no technical issues on the first two patches and haven't heard any comments/objections from the maintainers so far. Are you willing to accept them for the next release?
-> Tom, Simon
Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 2 lines
Can you confirm that you have queued my "RSA library extension" patch in your -next(?) branch, please?
Please note that I raised a concern with the RSA patch series that needs to be addressed. There's unexplained / unexpected size growth on platforms that aren't otherwise enabling new features. Thanks!
I misunderstood your statement there.
Questions:
1) How did you measure the size growth?
Please specify the exact command(s).
2) Did you use T1042RDB_PI_NAND_SECURE_BOOT_defconfig without any change?
I want to reproduce your result on my side.
Thanks,
-Takahiro Akashi
Quoted 2 lines
Signature · 1 line
Tom
v2 cover efi_loader: add secure boot support
Quoted 51 lines · AKASHI Takahiro
Quoted 43 lines · Tom Rini
Quoted 42 lines · AKASHI Takahiro
Simon,
Quoted 38 lines · AKASHI Takahiro
Quoted 14 lines · Heinrich Schuchardt
Quoted 13 lines · AKASHI Takahiro
Tom, Simon, Heinrich,
I have submitted three major patch sets for UEFI secure boot:
* x509/pkcs7 parser
* RSA library extension
* UEFI secure bootI have no technical issues to fix now and have seen only a few minor comments on them (if I confirm that you have no more comments, I can submit new version almost immediately).
Considering those, can I expect that those patches be merged in v2020.01?Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 2 lines
If not, do you need to have more time for your reviewing? What else do you expect from my side to accelerate the upstream?
We are reaching the end of the release cycle. So do not expect any of these patch series to be merged in v2020.01.
cf. https://www.denx.de/wiki/U-Boot/ReleaseCycleI have often seen several patches (not bug fix) merged even after "merge window".
Anyway,Quoted 2 lines
To my understanding the UEFI secure boot series depends on the other two so it must be merged last.
So once the first two patch set are accepted by the maintainers, do you agree to merging the third one (i.e. secure boot patch itself) promptly?
-> HeinrichAs I said, I have had no technical issues on the first two patches and haven't heard any comments/objections from the maintainers so far. Are you willing to accept them for the next release?
-> Tom, SimonQuoted 6 lines
Quoted 2 lines
Can you confirm that you have queued my "RSA library extension" patch in your -next(?) branch, please?
Please note that I raised a concern with the RSA patch series that needs to be addressed. There's unexplained / unexpected size growth on platforms that aren't otherwise enabling new features. Thanks!
Quoted 5 lines
I misunderstood your statement there.
Questions:
1) How did you measure the size growth?
Please specify the exact command(s).
2) Did you useT1042RDB_PI_NAND_SECURE_BOOT_defconfigwithout any change?
So, I have the following script for doing size tests:
#!/bin/bash
# Initial and constant buildman args
ARGS="-devl"
ALL=0
KEEP=0
# Find our arguments
while test $# -ne 0; do
if [ "$1" == "--all" ]; then ALL=1 shift 1 elif [ "$1" == "--branch" ]; then BRANCH=$2 shift 2 elif [ "$1" == "--keep" ]; then KEEP=1 ARGS="$ARGS -k" shift 1 else MACHINE=$1 shift fi
done
if [ -z $MACHINE ]; then
echo Usage: $0 MACHINE [--all] [--keep] [--branch BRANCH] exit 1
fi
# If not all, then only first/last
if [ $ALL -ne 1 ]; then
ARGS="$ARGS --step 0"
fi
if [ ! -z $BRANCH ]; then
ARGS="$ARGS -b $BRANCH" else ARGS="$ARGS -b `git rev-parse --abbrev-ref HEAD`"
fi
mkdir -p /tmp/$MACHINE
export SOURCE_DATE_EPOCH=date +%s ./tools/buildman/buildman -o /tmp/$MACHINE $ARGS -SBC $MACHINE ./tools/buildman/buildman -o /tmp/$MACHINE $ARGS -SsB $MACHINE
[ $KEEP -eq 0 ] && rm -rf /tmp/$MACHINE
And yes, I applied just the series and built the world. The T1042RDB_PI_NAND_SECURE_BOOT_defconfig config along with a handful of other PowerPC platforms (also of the _SECURE_BOOT variety) had the same size growth. I didn't bisect down to the specific commit in question at the time.
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