Skip to contentSkip to conversation

Linear Address Masking enabling

PATCH Superseded Kirill A. Shutemov 5 participants 27 messages Oct 18, 2022 – Oct 19, 2022

Subsystems (29)

v10 of 16 Superseded Latest is v16 →

lore
Share & tools
lore
#0 lore raw

v10 cover Linear Address Masking enabling

Linear Address Masking[1] (LAM) modifies the checking that is applied to 64-bit linear addresses, allowing software to use of the untranslated address bits for metadata.

The capability can be used for efficient address sanitizers (ASAN) implementation and for optimizations in virtual machines.

The patchset brings support for LAM for userspace addresses. Only LAM_U57 at this time.

Please review and consider applying.

Results for the self-tests:

ok 1 MALLOC: LAM_U57. Dereferencing pointer with metadata
# Get segmentation fault(11).ok 2 MALLOC:[Negative] Disable LAM. Dereferencing pointer with metadata. ok 3 BITS: Check default tag bits
ok 4 # SKIP MMAP: First mmap high address, then set LAM_U57.
ok 5 # SKIP MMAP: First LAM_U57, then High address.
ok 6 MMAP: First LAM_U57, then Low address.
ok 7 SYSCALL: LAM_U57. syscall with metadata
ok 8 SYSCALL:[Negative] Disable LAM. Dereferencing pointer with metadata.
ok 9 URING: LAM_U57. Dereferencing pointer with metadata
ok 10 URING:[Negative] Disable LAM. Dereferencing pointer with metadata.
ok 11 FORK: LAM_U57, child process should get LAM mode same as parent
ok 12 EXECVE: LAM_U57, child process should get disabled LAM mode
open: Device or resource busy
ok 13 PASID: [Negative] Execute LAM, PASID, SVM in sequence
ok 14 PASID: Execute LAM, SVM, PASID in sequence
ok 15 PASID: [Negative] Execute PASID, LAM, SVM in sequence
ok 16 PASID: Execute PASID, SVM, LAM in sequence
ok 17 PASID: Execute SVM, LAM, PASID in sequence
ok 18 PASID: Execute SVM, PASID, LAM in sequence
1..18

git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kas/linux.git lam

v10:
- Rebased to v6.1-rc1;
- Add selftest for SVM vs LAM;
v9:
- Fix race between LAM enabling and check that KVM memslot address doesn't

    have any tags;

- Reduce untagged_addr() overhead until the first LAM user;
- Clarify SVM vs. LAM semantics;
- Use mmap_lock to serialize LAM enabling;
v8:
- Drop redundant smb_mb() in prctl_enable_tagged_addr();
- Cleanup code around build_cr3();
- Fix commit messages;
- Selftests updates;
- Acked/Reviewed/Tested-bys from Alexander and Peter;
v7:
- Drop redundant smb_mb() in prctl_enable_tagged_addr();
- Cleanup code around build_cr3();
- Fix commit message;
- Fix indentation;
v6:
- Rebased onto v6.0-rc1
- LAM_U48 excluded from the patchet. Still available in the git tree;
- add ARCH_GET_MAX_TAG_BITS;
- Fix build without CONFIG_DEBUG_VM;
- Update comments;
- Reviewed/Tested-by from Alexander;
v5:
- Do not use switch_mm() in enable_lam_func()
- Use mb()/READ_ONCE() pair on LAM enabling;
- Add self-test by Weihong Zhang;
- Add comments;
v4:
- Fix untagged_addr() for LAM_U48;
- Remove no-threads restriction on LAM enabling;
- Fix mm_struct access from /proc/$PID/arch_status
- Fix LAM handling in initialize_tlbstate_and_flush()
- Pack tlb_state better;
- Comments and commit messages;
v3:
- Rebased onto v5.19-rc1
- Per-process enabling;
- API overhaul (again);
- Avoid branches and costly computations in the fast path;
- LAM_U48 is in optional patch.
v2:
- Rebased onto v5.18-rc1
- New arch_prctl(2)-based API
- Expose status of LAM (or other thread features) in /proc/$PID/arch_status

[1] ISE, Chapter 10. https://cdrdv2.intel.com/v1/dl/getContent/671368

Kirill A. Shutemov (10):
x86/mm: Fix CR3_ADDR_MASK
x86: CPUID and CR3/CR4 flags for Linear Address Masking
mm: Pass down mm_struct to untagged_addr()
x86/mm: Handle LAM on context switch
x86/uaccess: Provide untagged_addr() and remove tags before address
check
KVM: Serialize tagged address check against tagging enabling x86/mm: Provide arch_prctl() interface for LAM
x86/mm: Reduce untagged_addr() overhead until the first LAM user
x86: Expose untagging mask in /proc/$PID/arch_status x86/mm, iommu/sva: Make LAM and SVM mutually exclusive

Weihong Zhang (5):
selftests/x86/lam: Add malloc and tag-bits test cases for
linear-address masking
selftests/x86/lam: Add mmap and SYSCALL test cases for linear-address
masking
selftests/x86/lam: Add io_uring test cases for linear-address masking selftests/x86/lam: Add inherit test cases for linear-address masking selftests/x86/lam: Add ARCH_FORCE_TAGGED_SVM test cases for
linear-address masking

 arch/arm64/include/asm/memory.h               |    4 +-
 arch/arm64/include/asm/signal.h               |    2 +-
 arch/arm64/include/asm/uaccess.h              |    2 +-
 arch/arm64/kernel/hw_breakpoint.c             |    2 +-
 arch/arm64/kernel/traps.c                     |    4 +-
 arch/arm64/mm/fault.c                         |   10 +-
 arch/sparc/include/asm/pgtable_64.h           |    2 +-
 arch/sparc/include/asm/uaccess_64.h           |    2 +
 arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h            |    1 +
 arch/x86/include/asm/mmu.h                    |   12 +-
 arch/x86/include/asm/mmu_context.h            |   47 +
 arch/x86/include/asm/processor-flags.h        |    4 +-
 arch/x86/include/asm/tlbflush.h               |   35 +
 arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h                |   46 +-
 arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/prctl.h             |    5 +
 arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/processor-flags.h   |    6 +
 arch/x86/kernel/Makefile                      |    2 +
 arch/x86/kernel/fpu/xstate.c                  |   47 -
 arch/x86/kernel/proc.c                        |   60 +
 arch/x86/kernel/process.c                     |    3 +
 arch/x86/kernel/process_64.c                  |   82 +-
 arch/x86/mm/tlb.c                             |   48 +-
 .../gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/amdgpu_amdkfd_gpuvm.c  |    2 +-
 drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/amdgpu_gem.c       |    2 +-
 drivers/gpu/drm/radeon/radeon_gem.c           |    2 +-
 drivers/infiniband/hw/mlx4/mr.c               |    2 +-
 drivers/iommu/iommu-sva-lib.c                 |   12 +
 drivers/media/common/videobuf2/frame_vector.c |    2 +-
 drivers/media/v4l2-core/videobuf-dma-contig.c |    2 +-
 .../staging/media/atomisp/pci/hmm/hmm_bo.c    |    2 +-
 drivers/tee/tee_shm.c                         |    2 +-
 drivers/vfio/vfio_iommu_type1.c               |    2 +-
 fs/proc/task_mmu.c                            |    2 +-
 include/linux/mm.h                            |   11 -
 include/linux/mmu_context.h                   |    4 +
 include/linux/uaccess.h                       |   15 +
 lib/strncpy_from_user.c                       |    2 +-
 lib/strnlen_user.c                            |    2 +-
 mm/gup.c                                      |    6 +-
 mm/madvise.c                                  |    2 +-
 mm/mempolicy.c                                |    6 +-
 mm/migrate.c                                  |    2 +-
 mm/mincore.c                                  |    2 +-
 mm/mlock.c                                    |    4 +-
 mm/mmap.c                                     |    2 +-
 mm/mprotect.c                                 |    2 +-
 mm/mremap.c                                   |    2 +-
 mm/msync.c                                    |    2 +-
 tools/testing/selftests/x86/Makefile          |    2 +-
 tools/testing/selftests/x86/lam.c             | 1149 +++++++++++++++++
 virt/kvm/kvm_main.c                           |   14 +-
 51 files changed, 1563 insertions(+), 124 deletions(-)
 create mode 100644 arch/x86/kernel/proc.c
 create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/x86/lam.c
Signature · 1 line
2.38.0
#1 lore raw

PATCH v10 1/15 x86/mm: Fix CR3_ADDR_MASK

The mask must not include bits above physical address mask. These bits are reserved and can be used for other things. Bits 61 and 62 are used for Linear Address Masking.

---
 arch/x86/include/asm/processor-flags.h | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
arch/x86/include/asm/processor-flags.h +1 -1
index 02c2cbda4a74..a7f3d9100adb 100644
@@ -35,7 +35,7 @@
  */
 #ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
 /* Mask off the address space ID and SME encryption bits. */
-#define CR3_ADDR_MASK	__sme_clr(0x7FFFFFFFFFFFF000ull)
+#define CR3_ADDR_MASK	__sme_clr(PHYSICAL_PAGE_MASK)
 #define CR3_PCID_MASK	0xFFFull
 #define CR3_NOFLUSH	BIT_ULL(63)
 
Signature · 1 line
2.38.0
#2 lore raw

PATCH v10 2/15 x86: CPUID and CR3/CR4 flags for Linear Address Masking

In reply to Kirill A. Shutemov

Enumerate Linear Address Masking and provide defines for CR3 and CR4 flags.

---
 arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h          | 1 +
 arch/x86/include/asm/processor-flags.h      | 2 ++
 arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/processor-flags.h | 6 ++++++
 3 files changed, 9 insertions(+)
arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h +1 -0
index b71f4f2ecdd5..265805e71806 100644
@@ -308,6 +308,7 @@
 /* Intel-defined CPU features, CPUID level 0x00000007:1 (EAX), word 12 */
 #define X86_FEATURE_AVX_VNNI		(12*32+ 4) /* AVX VNNI instructions */
 #define X86_FEATURE_AVX512_BF16		(12*32+ 5) /* AVX512 BFLOAT16 instructions */
+#define X86_FEATURE_LAM			(12*32+26) /* Linear Address Masking */
 
 /* AMD-defined CPU features, CPUID level 0x80000008 (EBX), word 13 */
 #define X86_FEATURE_CLZERO		(13*32+ 0) /* CLZERO instruction */
arch/x86/include/asm/processor-flags.h +2 -0
index a7f3d9100adb..d8cccadc83a6 100644
@@ -28,6 +28,8 @@
  * On systems with SME, one bit (in a variable position!) is stolen to indicate
  * that the top-level paging structure is encrypted.
  *
+ * On systemms with LAM, bits 61 and 62 are used to indicate LAM mode.
+ *
  * All of the remaining bits indicate the physical address of the top-level
  * paging structure.
  *
arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/processor-flags.h +6 -0
index c47cc7f2feeb..d898432947ff 100644
@@ -82,6 +82,10 @@
 #define X86_CR3_PCID_BITS	12
 #define X86_CR3_PCID_MASK	(_AC((1UL << X86_CR3_PCID_BITS) - 1, UL))
 
+#define X86_CR3_LAM_U57_BIT	61 /* Activate LAM for userspace, 62:57 bits masked */
+#define X86_CR3_LAM_U57		_BITULL(X86_CR3_LAM_U57_BIT)
+#define X86_CR3_LAM_U48_BIT	62 /* Activate LAM for userspace, 62:48 bits masked */
+#define X86_CR3_LAM_U48		_BITULL(X86_CR3_LAM_U48_BIT)
 #define X86_CR3_PCID_NOFLUSH_BIT 63 /* Preserve old PCID */
 #define X86_CR3_PCID_NOFLUSH    _BITULL(X86_CR3_PCID_NOFLUSH_BIT)
 
@@ -132,6 +136,8 @@
 #define X86_CR4_PKE		_BITUL(X86_CR4_PKE_BIT)
 #define X86_CR4_CET_BIT		23 /* enable Control-flow Enforcement Technology */
 #define X86_CR4_CET		_BITUL(X86_CR4_CET_BIT)
+#define X86_CR4_LAM_SUP_BIT	28 /* LAM for supervisor pointers */
+#define X86_CR4_LAM_SUP		_BITUL(X86_CR4_LAM_SUP_BIT)
 
 /*
  * x86-64 Task Priority Register, CR8
Signature · 1 line
2.38.0
#3 lore raw

PATCH v10 3/15 mm: Pass down mm_struct to untagged_addr()

In reply to Kirill A. Shutemov

Intel Linear Address Masking (LAM) brings per-mm untagging rules. Pass down mm_struct to the untagging helper. It will help to apply untagging policy correctly.

In most cases, current->mm is the one to use, but there are some exceptions, such as get_user_page_remote().

Move dummy implementation of untagged_addr() from <linux/mm.h> to <linux/uaccess.h>. <asm/uaccess.h> can override the implementation. Moving the dummy header outside <linux/mm.h> helps to avoid header hell if you need to defer mm_struct within the helper.

---
 arch/arm64/include/asm/memory.h                  |  4 ++--
 arch/arm64/include/asm/signal.h                  |  2 +-
 arch/arm64/include/asm/uaccess.h                 |  2 +-
 arch/arm64/kernel/hw_breakpoint.c                |  2 +-
 arch/arm64/kernel/traps.c                        |  4 ++--
 arch/arm64/mm/fault.c                            | 10 +++++-----
 arch/sparc/include/asm/pgtable_64.h              |  2 +-
 arch/sparc/include/asm/uaccess_64.h              |  2 ++
 drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/amdgpu_amdkfd_gpuvm.c |  2 +-
 drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/amdgpu_gem.c          |  2 +-
 drivers/gpu/drm/radeon/radeon_gem.c              |  2 +-
 drivers/infiniband/hw/mlx4/mr.c                  |  2 +-
 drivers/media/common/videobuf2/frame_vector.c    |  2 +-
 drivers/media/v4l2-core/videobuf-dma-contig.c    |  2 +-
 drivers/staging/media/atomisp/pci/hmm/hmm_bo.c   |  2 +-
 drivers/tee/tee_shm.c                            |  2 +-
 drivers/vfio/vfio_iommu_type1.c                  |  2 +-
 fs/proc/task_mmu.c                               |  2 +-
 include/linux/mm.h                               | 11 -----------
 include/linux/uaccess.h                          | 15 +++++++++++++++
 lib/strncpy_from_user.c                          |  2 +-
 lib/strnlen_user.c                               |  2 +-
 mm/gup.c                                         |  6 +++---
 mm/madvise.c                                     |  2 +-
 mm/mempolicy.c                                   |  6 +++---
 mm/migrate.c                                     |  2 +-
 mm/mincore.c                                     |  2 +-
 mm/mlock.c                                       |  4 ++--
 mm/mmap.c                                        |  2 +-
 mm/mprotect.c                                    |  2 +-
 mm/mremap.c                                      |  2 +-
 mm/msync.c                                       |  2 +-
 virt/kvm/kvm_main.c                              |  2 +-
 33 files changed, 58 insertions(+), 52 deletions(-)
arch/arm64/include/asm/memory.h +2 -2
index 9dd08cd339c3..5b24ef93c6b9 100644
@@ -227,8 +227,8 @@ static inline unsigned long kaslr_offset(void)
 #define __untagged_addr(addr)	\
 	((__force __typeof__(addr))sign_extend64((__force u64)(addr), 55))
 
-#define untagged_addr(addr)	({					\
-	u64 __addr = (__force u64)(addr);					\
+#define untagged_addr(mm, addr)	({					\
+	u64 __addr = (__force u64)(addr);				\
 	__addr &= __untagged_addr(__addr);				\
 	(__force __typeof__(addr))__addr;				\
 })
arch/arm64/include/asm/signal.h +1 -1
index ef449f5f4ba8..0899c355c398 100644
@@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ static inline void __user *arch_untagged_si_addr(void __user *addr,
 	if (sig == SIGTRAP && si_code == TRAP_BRKPT)
 		return addr;
 
-	return untagged_addr(addr);
+	return untagged_addr(current->mm, addr);
 }
 #define arch_untagged_si_addr arch_untagged_si_addr
 
arch/arm64/include/asm/uaccess.h +1 -1
index 5c7b2f9d5913..122d894a4136 100644
@@ -44,7 +44,7 @@ static inline int access_ok(const void __user *addr, unsigned long size)
 	 */
 	if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_ARM64_TAGGED_ADDR_ABI) &&
 	    (current->flags & PF_KTHREAD || test_thread_flag(TIF_TAGGED_ADDR)))
-		addr = untagged_addr(addr);
+		addr = untagged_addr(current->mm, addr);
 
 	return likely(__access_ok(addr, size));
 }
arch/arm64/kernel/hw_breakpoint.c +1 -1
index b29a311bb055..d637cee7b771 100644
@@ -715,7 +715,7 @@ static u64 get_distance_from_watchpoint(unsigned long addr, u64 val,
 	u64 wp_low, wp_high;
 	u32 lens, lene;
 
-	addr = untagged_addr(addr);
+	addr = untagged_addr(current->mm, addr);
 
 	lens = __ffs(ctrl->len);
 	lene = __fls(ctrl->len);
arch/arm64/kernel/traps.c +2 -2
index 23d281ed7621..f40f3885b674 100644
@@ -477,7 +477,7 @@ void arm64_notify_segfault(unsigned long addr)
 	int code;
 
 	mmap_read_lock(current->mm);
-	if (find_vma(current->mm, untagged_addr(addr)) == NULL)
+	if (find_vma(current->mm, untagged_addr(current->mm, addr)) == NULL)
 		code = SEGV_MAPERR;
 	else
 		code = SEGV_ACCERR;
@@ -551,7 +551,7 @@ static void user_cache_maint_handler(unsigned long esr, struct pt_regs *regs)
 	int ret = 0;
 
 	tagged_address = pt_regs_read_reg(regs, rt);
-	address = untagged_addr(tagged_address);
+	address = untagged_addr(current->mm, tagged_address);
 
 	switch (crm) {
 	case ESR_ELx_SYS64_ISS_CRM_DC_CVAU:	/* DC CVAU, gets promoted */
arch/arm64/mm/fault.c +5 -5
index 5b391490e045..b8799e9c7e1b 100644
@@ -454,7 +454,7 @@ static void set_thread_esr(unsigned long address, unsigned long esr)
 static void do_bad_area(unsigned long far, unsigned long esr,
 			struct pt_regs *regs)
 {
-	unsigned long addr = untagged_addr(far);
+	unsigned long addr = untagged_addr(current->mm, far);
 
 	/*
 	 * If we are in kernel mode at this point, we have no context to
@@ -524,7 +524,7 @@ static int __kprobes do_page_fault(unsigned long far, unsigned long esr,
 	vm_fault_t fault;
 	unsigned long vm_flags;
 	unsigned int mm_flags = FAULT_FLAG_DEFAULT;
-	unsigned long addr = untagged_addr(far);
+	unsigned long addr = untagged_addr(mm, far);
 
 	if (kprobe_page_fault(regs, esr))
 		return 0;
@@ -679,7 +679,7 @@ static int __kprobes do_translation_fault(unsigned long far,
 					  unsigned long esr,
 					  struct pt_regs *regs)
 {
-	unsigned long addr = untagged_addr(far);
+	unsigned long addr = untagged_addr(current->mm, far);
 
 	if (is_ttbr0_addr(addr))
 		return do_page_fault(far, esr, regs);
@@ -726,7 +726,7 @@ static int do_sea(unsigned long far, unsigned long esr, struct pt_regs *regs)
 		 * UNKNOWN for synchronous external aborts. Mask them out now
 		 * so that userspace doesn't see them.
 		 */
-		siaddr  = untagged_addr(far);
+		siaddr  = untagged_addr(current->mm, far);
 	}
 	arm64_notify_die(inf->name, regs, inf->sig, inf->code, siaddr, esr);
 
@@ -816,7 +816,7 @@ static const struct fault_info fault_info[] = {
 void do_mem_abort(unsigned long far, unsigned long esr, struct pt_regs *regs)
 {
 	const struct fault_info *inf = esr_to_fault_info(esr);
-	unsigned long addr = untagged_addr(far);
+	unsigned long addr = untagged_addr(current->mm, far);
 
 	if (!inf->fn(far, esr, regs))
 		return;
arch/sparc/include/asm/pgtable_64.h +1 -1
index a779418ceba9..aa996ffe5c8c 100644
@@ -1052,7 +1052,7 @@ static inline unsigned long __untagged_addr(unsigned long start)
 
 	return start;
 }
-#define untagged_addr(addr) \
+#define untagged_addr(mm, addr) \
 	((__typeof__(addr))(__untagged_addr((unsigned long)(addr))))
 
 static inline bool pte_access_permitted(pte_t pte, bool write)
arch/sparc/include/asm/uaccess_64.h +2 -0
index 94266a5c5b04..b825a5dd0210 100644
@@ -8,8 +8,10 @@
 
 #include <linux/compiler.h>
 #include <linux/string.h>
+#include <linux/mm_types.h>
 #include <asm/asi.h>
 #include <asm/spitfire.h>
+#include <asm/pgtable.h>
 
 #include <asm/processor.h>
 #include <asm-generic/access_ok.h>
drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/amdgpu_amdkfd_gpuvm.c +1 -1
index 978d3970b5cc..173f0b5ccba1 100644
@@ -1659,7 +1659,7 @@ int amdgpu_amdkfd_gpuvm_alloc_memory_of_gpu(
 		if (flags & KFD_IOC_ALLOC_MEM_FLAGS_USERPTR) {
 			if (!offset || !*offset)
 				return -EINVAL;
-			user_addr = untagged_addr(*offset);
+			user_addr = untagged_addr(current->mm, *offset);
 		} else if (flags & (KFD_IOC_ALLOC_MEM_FLAGS_DOORBELL |
 				    KFD_IOC_ALLOC_MEM_FLAGS_MMIO_REMAP)) {
 			bo_type = ttm_bo_type_sg;
drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/amdgpu_gem.c +1 -1
index 8ef31d687ef3..691dfb3f2c0e 100644
@@ -382,7 +382,7 @@ int amdgpu_gem_userptr_ioctl(struct drm_device *dev, void *data,
 	uint32_t handle;
 	int r;
 
-	args->addr = untagged_addr(args->addr);
+	args->addr = untagged_addr(current->mm, args->addr);
 
 	if (offset_in_page(args->addr | args->size))
 		return -EINVAL;
drivers/gpu/drm/radeon/radeon_gem.c +1 -1
index 261fcbae88d7..cba2f4b19838 100644
@@ -371,7 +371,7 @@ int radeon_gem_userptr_ioctl(struct drm_device *dev, void *data,
 	uint32_t handle;
 	int r;
 
-	args->addr = untagged_addr(args->addr);
+	args->addr = untagged_addr(current->mm, args->addr);
 
 	if (offset_in_page(args->addr | args->size))
 		return -EINVAL;
drivers/infiniband/hw/mlx4/mr.c +1 -1
index a40bf58bcdd3..383ac9e40dfa 100644
@@ -379,7 +379,7 @@ static struct ib_umem *mlx4_get_umem_mr(struct ib_device *device, u64 start,
 	 * again
 	 */
 	if (!ib_access_writable(access_flags)) {
-		unsigned long untagged_start = untagged_addr(start);
+		unsigned long untagged_start = untagged_addr(current->mm, start);
 		struct vm_area_struct *vma;
 
 		mmap_read_lock(current->mm);
drivers/media/common/videobuf2/frame_vector.c +1 -1
index 542dde9d2609..7e62f7a2555d 100644
@@ -47,7 +47,7 @@ int get_vaddr_frames(unsigned long start, unsigned int nr_frames,
 	if (WARN_ON_ONCE(nr_frames > vec->nr_allocated))
 		nr_frames = vec->nr_allocated;
 
-	start = untagged_addr(start);
+	start = untagged_addr(mm, start);
 
 	ret = pin_user_pages_fast(start, nr_frames,
 				  FOLL_FORCE | FOLL_WRITE | FOLL_LONGTERM,
drivers/media/v4l2-core/videobuf-dma-contig.c +1 -1
index 52312ce2ba05..a1444f8afa05 100644
@@ -157,8 +157,8 @@ static void videobuf_dma_contig_user_put(struct videobuf_dma_contig_memory *mem)
 static int videobuf_dma_contig_user_get(struct videobuf_dma_contig_memory *mem,
 					struct videobuf_buffer *vb)
 {
-	unsigned long untagged_baddr = untagged_addr(vb->baddr);
 	struct mm_struct *mm = current->mm;
+	unsigned long untagged_baddr = untagged_addr(mm, vb->baddr);
 	struct vm_area_struct *vma;
 	unsigned long prev_pfn, this_pfn;
 	unsigned long pages_done, user_address;
drivers/staging/media/atomisp/pci/hmm/hmm_bo.c +1 -1
index f50494123f03..a43c65950554 100644
@@ -794,7 +794,7 @@ static int alloc_user_pages(struct hmm_buffer_object *bo,
 	 * and map to user space
 	 */
 
-	userptr = untagged_addr(userptr);
+	userptr = untagged_addr(current->mm, userptr);
 
 	if (vma->vm_flags & (VM_IO | VM_PFNMAP)) {
 		page_nr = pin_user_pages((unsigned long)userptr, bo->pgnr,
drivers/tee/tee_shm.c +1 -1
index 27295bda3e0b..5c85445f3a65 100644
@@ -262,7 +262,7 @@ register_shm_helper(struct tee_context *ctx, unsigned long addr,
 	shm->flags = flags;
 	shm->ctx = ctx;
 	shm->id = id;
-	addr = untagged_addr(addr);
+	addr = untagged_addr(current->mm, addr);
 	start = rounddown(addr, PAGE_SIZE);
 	shm->offset = addr - start;
 	shm->size = length;
drivers/vfio/vfio_iommu_type1.c +1 -1
index 23c24fe98c00..74b6aecea8b0 100644
@@ -573,7 +573,7 @@ static int vaddr_get_pfns(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned long vaddr,
 		goto done;
 	}
 
-	vaddr = untagged_addr(vaddr);
+	vaddr = untagged_addr(mm, vaddr);
 
 retry:
 	vma = vma_lookup(mm, vaddr);
fs/proc/task_mmu.c +1 -1
index 8b4f3073f8f5..665e36885f21 100644
@@ -1685,7 +1685,7 @@ static ssize_t pagemap_read(struct file *file, char __user *buf,
 	/* watch out for wraparound */
 	start_vaddr = end_vaddr;
 	if (svpfn <= (ULONG_MAX >> PAGE_SHIFT))
-		start_vaddr = untagged_addr(svpfn << PAGE_SHIFT);
+		start_vaddr = untagged_addr(mm, svpfn << PAGE_SHIFT);
 
 	/* Ensure the address is inside the task */
 	if (start_vaddr > mm->task_size)
include/linux/mm.h +0 -11
index 8bbcccbc5565..bfac5a166cb8 100644
@@ -95,17 +95,6 @@ extern int mmap_rnd_compat_bits __read_mostly;
 #include <asm/page.h>
 #include <asm/processor.h>
 
-/*
- * Architectures that support memory tagging (assigning tags to memory regions,
- * embedding these tags into addresses that point to these memory regions, and
- * checking that the memory and the pointer tags match on memory accesses)
- * redefine this macro to strip tags from pointers.
- * It's defined as noop for architectures that don't support memory tagging.
- */
-#ifndef untagged_addr
-#define untagged_addr(addr) (addr)
-#endif
-
 #ifndef __pa_symbol
 #define __pa_symbol(x)  __pa(RELOC_HIDE((unsigned long)(x), 0))
 #endif
include/linux/uaccess.h +15 -0
index afb18f198843..46680189d761 100644
@@ -10,6 +10,21 @@
 
 #include <asm/uaccess.h>
 
+/*
+ * Architectures that support memory tagging (assigning tags to memory regions,
+ * embedding these tags into addresses that point to these memory regions, and
+ * checking that the memory and the pointer tags match on memory accesses)
+ * redefine this macro to strip tags from pointers.
+ *
+ * Passing down mm_struct allows to define untagging rules on per-process
+ * basis.
+ *
+ * It's defined as noop for architectures that don't support memory tagging.
+ */
+#ifndef untagged_addr
+#define untagged_addr(mm, addr) (addr)
+#endif
+
 /*
  * Architectures should provide two primitives (raw_copy_{to,from}_user())
  * and get rid of their private instances of copy_{to,from}_user() and
lib/strncpy_from_user.c +1 -1
index 6432b8c3e431..6e1e2aa0c994 100644
@@ -121,7 +121,7 @@ long strncpy_from_user(char *dst, const char __user *src, long count)
 		return 0;
 
 	max_addr = TASK_SIZE_MAX;
-	src_addr = (unsigned long)untagged_addr(src);
+	src_addr = (unsigned long)untagged_addr(current->mm, src);
 	if (likely(src_addr < max_addr)) {
 		unsigned long max = max_addr - src_addr;
 		long retval;
lib/strnlen_user.c +1 -1
index feeb935a2299..abc096a68f05 100644
@@ -97,7 +97,7 @@ long strnlen_user(const char __user *str, long count)
 		return 0;
 
 	max_addr = TASK_SIZE_MAX;
-	src_addr = (unsigned long)untagged_addr(str);
+	src_addr = (unsigned long)untagged_addr(current->mm, str);
 	if (likely(src_addr < max_addr)) {
 		unsigned long max = max_addr - src_addr;
 		long retval;
mm/gup.c +3 -3
index fe195d47de74..f585e4a185ca 100644
@@ -1168,7 +1168,7 @@ static long __get_user_pages(struct mm_struct *mm,
 	if (!nr_pages)
 		return 0;
 
-	start = untagged_addr(start);
+	start = untagged_addr(mm, start);
 
 	VM_BUG_ON(!!pages != !!(gup_flags & (FOLL_GET | FOLL_PIN)));
 
@@ -1342,7 +1342,7 @@ int fixup_user_fault(struct mm_struct *mm,
 	struct vm_area_struct *vma;
 	vm_fault_t ret;
 
-	address = untagged_addr(address);
+	address = untagged_addr(mm, address);
 
 	if (unlocked)
 		fault_flags |= FAULT_FLAG_ALLOW_RETRY | FAULT_FLAG_KILLABLE;
@@ -3027,7 +3027,7 @@ static int internal_get_user_pages_fast(unsigned long start,
 	if (!(gup_flags & FOLL_FAST_ONLY))
 		might_lock_read(&current->mm->mmap_lock);
 
-	start = untagged_addr(start) & PAGE_MASK;
+	start = untagged_addr(current->mm, start) & PAGE_MASK;
 	len = nr_pages << PAGE_SHIFT;
 	if (check_add_overflow(start, len, &end))
 		return 0;
mm/madvise.c +1 -1
index 2baa93ca2310..1319a18da8bc 100644
@@ -1382,7 +1382,7 @@ int do_madvise(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned long start, size_t len_in, int beh
 	size_t len;
 	struct blk_plug plug;
 
-	start = untagged_addr(start);
+	start = untagged_addr(mm, start);
 
 	if (!madvise_behavior_valid(behavior))
 		return -EINVAL;
mm/mempolicy.c +3 -3
index a937eaec5b68..4fdeef477fbd 100644
@@ -1467,7 +1467,7 @@ static long kernel_mbind(unsigned long start, unsigned long len,
 	int lmode = mode;
 	int err;
 
-	start = untagged_addr(start);
+	start = untagged_addr(current->mm, start);
 	err = sanitize_mpol_flags(&lmode, &mode_flags);
 	if (err)
 		return err;
@@ -1491,7 +1491,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE4(set_mempolicy_home_node, unsigned long, start, unsigned long, le
 	int err = -ENOENT;
 	VMA_ITERATOR(vmi, mm, start);
 
-	start = untagged_addr(start);
+	start = untagged_addr(mm, start);
 	if (start & ~PAGE_MASK)
 		return -EINVAL;
 	/*
@@ -1692,7 +1692,7 @@ static int kernel_get_mempolicy(int __user *policy,
 	if (nmask != NULL && maxnode < nr_node_ids)
 		return -EINVAL;
 
-	addr = untagged_addr(addr);
+	addr = untagged_addr(current->mm, addr);
 
 	err = do_get_mempolicy(&pval, &nodes, addr, flags);
 
mm/migrate.c +1 -1
index 1379e1912772..8e7823bef31d 100644
@@ -1795,7 +1795,7 @@ static int do_pages_move(struct mm_struct *mm, nodemask_t task_nodes,
 			goto out_flush;
 		if (get_user(node, nodes + i))
 			goto out_flush;
-		addr = (unsigned long)untagged_addr(p);
+		addr = (unsigned long)untagged_addr(mm, p);
 
 		err = -ENODEV;
 		if (node < 0 || node >= MAX_NUMNODES)
mm/mincore.c +1 -1
index fa200c14185f..72c55bd9d184 100644
@@ -236,7 +236,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE3(mincore, unsigned long, start, size_t, len,
 	unsigned long pages;
 	unsigned char *tmp;
 
-	start = untagged_addr(start);
+	start = untagged_addr(current->mm, start);
 
 	/* Check the start address: needs to be page-aligned.. */
 	if (start & ~PAGE_MASK)
mm/mlock.c +2 -2
index 7032f6dd0ce1..d969703c08ff 100644
@@ -570,7 +570,7 @@ static __must_check int do_mlock(unsigned long start, size_t len, vm_flags_t fla
 	unsigned long lock_limit;
 	int error = -ENOMEM;
 
-	start = untagged_addr(start);
+	start = untagged_addr(current->mm, start);
 
 	if (!can_do_mlock())
 		return -EPERM;
@@ -633,7 +633,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE2(munlock, unsigned long, start, size_t, len)
 {
 	int ret;
 
-	start = untagged_addr(start);
+	start = untagged_addr(current->mm, start);
 
 	len = PAGE_ALIGN(len + (offset_in_page(start)));
 	start &= PAGE_MASK;
mm/mmap.c +1 -1
index bf2122af94e7..bb8037840160 100644
@@ -2796,7 +2796,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(vm_munmap);
 
 SYSCALL_DEFINE2(munmap, unsigned long, addr, size_t, len)
 {
-	addr = untagged_addr(addr);
+	addr = untagged_addr(current->mm, addr);
 	return __vm_munmap(addr, len, true);
 }
 
mm/mprotect.c +1 -1
index 668bfaa6ed2a..dee44e3a0527 100644
@@ -680,7 +680,7 @@ static int do_mprotect_pkey(unsigned long start, size_t len,
 	struct mmu_gather tlb;
 	MA_STATE(mas, &current->mm->mm_mt, 0, 0);
 
-	start = untagged_addr(start);
+	start = untagged_addr(current->mm, start);
 
 	prot &= ~(PROT_GROWSDOWN|PROT_GROWSUP);
 	if (grows == (PROT_GROWSDOWN|PROT_GROWSUP)) /* can't be both */
mm/mremap.c +1 -1
index e465ffe279bb..81c857281a52 100644
@@ -909,7 +909,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(mremap, unsigned long, addr, unsigned long, old_len,
 	 *
 	 * See Documentation/arm64/tagged-address-abi.rst for more information.
 	 */
-	addr = untagged_addr(addr);
+	addr = untagged_addr(mm, addr);
 
 	if (flags & ~(MREMAP_FIXED | MREMAP_MAYMOVE | MREMAP_DONTUNMAP))
 		return ret;
mm/msync.c +1 -1
index ac4c9bfea2e7..f941e9bb610f 100644
@@ -37,7 +37,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE3(msync, unsigned long, start, size_t, len, int, flags)
 	int unmapped_error = 0;
 	int error = -EINVAL;
 
-	start = untagged_addr(start);
+	start = untagged_addr(mm, start);
 
 	if (flags & ~(MS_ASYNC | MS_INVALIDATE | MS_SYNC))
 		goto out;
virt/kvm/kvm_main.c +1 -1
index e30f1b4ecfa5..8c86b06b35da 100644
@@ -1945,7 +1945,7 @@ int __kvm_set_memory_region(struct kvm *kvm,
 		return -EINVAL;
 	/* We can read the guest memory with __xxx_user() later on. */
 	if ((mem->userspace_addr & (PAGE_SIZE - 1)) ||
-	    (mem->userspace_addr != untagged_addr(mem->userspace_addr)) ||
+	    (mem->userspace_addr != untagged_addr(kvm->mm, mem->userspace_addr)) ||
 	     !access_ok((void __user *)(unsigned long)mem->userspace_addr,
 			mem->memory_size))
 		return -EINVAL;
Signature · 1 line
2.38.0
#4 lore raw

PATCH v10 4/15 x86/mm: Handle LAM on context switch

In reply to Kirill A. Shutemov

Linear Address Masking mode for userspace pointers encoded in CR3 bits. The mode is selected per-process and stored in mm_context_t.

switch_mm_irqs_off() now respects selected LAM mode and constructs CR3 accordingly.

The active LAM mode gets recorded in the tlb_state.

---
 arch/x86/include/asm/mmu.h         |  3 ++
 arch/x86/include/asm/mmu_context.h | 24 +++++++++++++++
 arch/x86/include/asm/tlbflush.h    | 35 ++++++++++++++++++++++
 arch/x86/mm/tlb.c                  | 48 ++++++++++++++++++++----------
 4 files changed, 94 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-)
arch/x86/include/asm/mmu.h +3 -0
index 5d7494631ea9..002889ca8978 100644
@@ -40,6 +40,9 @@ typedef struct {
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
 	unsigned short flags;
+
+	/* Active LAM mode:  X86_CR3_LAM_U48 or X86_CR3_LAM_U57 or 0 (disabled) */
+	unsigned long lam_cr3_mask;
 #endif
 
 	struct mutex lock;
arch/x86/include/asm/mmu_context.h +24 -0
index b8d40ddeab00..69c943b2ae90 100644
@@ -91,6 +91,29 @@ static inline void switch_ldt(struct mm_struct *prev, struct mm_struct *next)
 }
 #endif
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
+static inline unsigned long mm_lam_cr3_mask(struct mm_struct *mm)
+{
+	return mm->context.lam_cr3_mask;
+}
+
+static inline void dup_lam(struct mm_struct *oldmm, struct mm_struct *mm)
+{
+	mm->context.lam_cr3_mask = oldmm->context.lam_cr3_mask;
+}
+
+#else
+
+static inline unsigned long mm_lam_cr3_mask(struct mm_struct *mm)
+{
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static inline void dup_lam(struct mm_struct *oldmm, struct mm_struct *mm)
+{
+}
+#endif
+
 #define enter_lazy_tlb enter_lazy_tlb
 extern void enter_lazy_tlb(struct mm_struct *mm, struct task_struct *tsk);
 
@@ -168,6 +191,7 @@ static inline int arch_dup_mmap(struct mm_struct *oldmm, struct mm_struct *mm)
 {
 	arch_dup_pkeys(oldmm, mm);
 	paravirt_arch_dup_mmap(oldmm, mm);
+	dup_lam(oldmm, mm);
 	return ldt_dup_context(oldmm, mm);
 }
 
arch/x86/include/asm/tlbflush.h +35 -0
index cda3118f3b27..1ad080163363 100644
@@ -101,6 +101,16 @@ struct tlb_state {
 	 */
 	bool invalidate_other;
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
+	/*
+	 * Active LAM mode.
+	 *
+	 * X86_CR3_LAM_U57/U48 shifted right by X86_CR3_LAM_U57_BIT or 0 if LAM
+	 * disabled.
+	 */
+	u8 lam;
+#endif
+
 	/*
 	 * Mask that contains TLB_NR_DYN_ASIDS+1 bits to indicate
 	 * the corresponding user PCID needs a flush next time we
@@ -357,6 +367,30 @@ static inline bool huge_pmd_needs_flush(pmd_t oldpmd, pmd_t newpmd)
 }
 #define huge_pmd_needs_flush huge_pmd_needs_flush
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
+static inline unsigned long tlbstate_lam_cr3_mask(void)
+{
+	unsigned long lam = this_cpu_read(cpu_tlbstate.lam);
+
+	return lam << X86_CR3_LAM_U57_BIT;
+}
+
+static inline void set_tlbstate_cr3_lam_mask(unsigned long mask)
+{
+	this_cpu_write(cpu_tlbstate.lam, mask >> X86_CR3_LAM_U57_BIT);
+}
+
+#else
+
+static inline unsigned long tlbstate_lam_cr3_mask(void)
+{
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static inline void set_tlbstate_cr3_lam_mask(u64 mask)
+{
+}
+#endif
 #endif /* !MODULE */
 
 static inline void __native_tlb_flush_global(unsigned long cr4)
@@ -364,4 +398,5 @@ static inline void __native_tlb_flush_global(unsigned long cr4)
 	native_write_cr4(cr4 ^ X86_CR4_PGE);
 	native_write_cr4(cr4);
 }
+
 #endif /* _ASM_X86_TLBFLUSH_H */
arch/x86/mm/tlb.c +32 -16

135 lines not on this page · raw message

Signature · 1 line
2.38.0
#5 lore raw

PATCH v10 5/15 x86/uaccess: Provide untagged_addr() and remove tags before address check

In reply to Kirill A. Shutemov

untagged_addr() is a helper used by the core-mm to strip tag bits and get the address to the canonical shape. In only handles userspace addresses. The untagging mask is stored in mmu_context and will be set on enabling LAM for the process.

The tags must not be included into check whether it's okay to access the userspace address.

Strip tags in access_ok().

get_user() and put_user() don't use access_ok(), but check access against TASK_SIZE directly in assembly. Strip tags, before calling into the assembly helper.

---
 arch/x86/include/asm/mmu.h         |  3 +++
 arch/x86/include/asm/mmu_context.h | 11 ++++++++
 arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h     | 42 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++---
 arch/x86/kernel/process.c          |  3 +++
 4 files changed, 56 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
arch/x86/include/asm/mmu.h +3 -0
index 002889ca8978..2fdb390040b5 100644
@@ -43,6 +43,9 @@ typedef struct {
 
 	/* Active LAM mode:  X86_CR3_LAM_U48 or X86_CR3_LAM_U57 or 0 (disabled) */
 	unsigned long lam_cr3_mask;
+
+	/* Significant bits of the virtual address. Excludes tag bits. */
+	u64 untag_mask;
 #endif
 
 	struct mutex lock;
arch/x86/include/asm/mmu_context.h +11 -0
index 69c943b2ae90..5bd3d46685dc 100644
@@ -100,6 +100,12 @@ static inline unsigned long mm_lam_cr3_mask(struct mm_struct *mm)
 static inline void dup_lam(struct mm_struct *oldmm, struct mm_struct *mm)
 {
 	mm->context.lam_cr3_mask = oldmm->context.lam_cr3_mask;
+	mm->context.untag_mask = oldmm->context.untag_mask;
+}
+
+static inline void mm_reset_untag_mask(struct mm_struct *mm)
+{
+	mm->context.untag_mask = -1UL;
 }
 
 #else
@@ -112,6 +118,10 @@ static inline unsigned long mm_lam_cr3_mask(struct mm_struct *mm)
 static inline void dup_lam(struct mm_struct *oldmm, struct mm_struct *mm)
 {
 }
+
+static inline void mm_reset_untag_mask(struct mm_struct *mm)
+{
+}
 #endif
 
 #define enter_lazy_tlb enter_lazy_tlb
@@ -138,6 +148,7 @@ static inline int init_new_context(struct task_struct *tsk,
 		mm->context.execute_only_pkey = -1;
 	}
 #endif
+	mm_reset_untag_mask(mm);
 	init_new_context_ldt(mm);
 	return 0;
 }
arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h +39 -3

72 lines not on this page · raw message

arch/x86/kernel/process.c +3 -0
index c21b7347a26d..d1e83ba21130 100644
@@ -47,6 +47,7 @@
 #include <asm/frame.h>
 #include <asm/unwind.h>
 #include <asm/tdx.h>
+#include <asm/mmu_context.h>
 
 #include "process.h"
 
@@ -367,6 +368,8 @@ void arch_setup_new_exec(void)
 		task_clear_spec_ssb_noexec(current);
 		speculation_ctrl_update(read_thread_flags());
 	}
+
+	mm_reset_untag_mask(current->mm);
 }
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_X86_IOPL_IOPERM
Signature · 1 line
2.38.0
#6 lore raw

PATCH v10 6/15 KVM: Serialize tagged address check against tagging enabling

In reply to Kirill A. Shutemov

KVM forbids usage of tagged userspace addresses for memslots. It is done by checking if the address stays the same after untagging.

It is works fine for ARM TBI, but it the check gets racy for LAM. TBI enabling happens per-thread, so nobody can enable tagging for the thread while the memslot gets added.

LAM gets enabled per-process. If it gets enabled after the untagged_addr() check, but before access_ok() check the kernel can wrongly allow tagged userspace_addr.

Use mmap lock to protect against parallel LAM enabling.

---
 virt/kvm/kvm_main.c | 12 +++++++++++-
 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
virt/kvm/kvm_main.c +11 -1
index 8c86b06b35da..833742c21c91 100644
@@ -1943,12 +1943,22 @@ int __kvm_set_memory_region(struct kvm *kvm,
 		return -EINVAL;
 	if (mem->guest_phys_addr & (PAGE_SIZE - 1))
 		return -EINVAL;
+
+	/* Serialize against tagging enabling */
+	if (mmap_read_lock_killable(kvm->mm))
+		return -EINTR;
+
 	/* We can read the guest memory with __xxx_user() later on. */
 	if ((mem->userspace_addr & (PAGE_SIZE - 1)) ||
 	    (mem->userspace_addr != untagged_addr(kvm->mm, mem->userspace_addr)) ||
 	     !access_ok((void __user *)(unsigned long)mem->userspace_addr,
-			mem->memory_size))
+			mem->memory_size)) {
+		mmap_read_unlock(kvm->mm);
 		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	mmap_read_unlock(kvm->mm);
+
 	if (as_id >= KVM_ADDRESS_SPACE_NUM || id >= KVM_MEM_SLOTS_NUM)
 		return -EINVAL;
 	if (mem->guest_phys_addr + mem->memory_size < mem->guest_phys_addr)
Signature · 1 line
2.38.0
#7 lore raw

PATCH v10 7/15 x86/mm: Provide arch_prctl() interface for LAM

In reply to Kirill A. Shutemov

Add a couple of arch_prctl() handles:

- ARCH_ENABLE_TAGGED_ADDR enabled LAM. The argument is required number of tag bits. It is rounded up to the nearest LAM mode that can provide it. For now only LAM_U57 is supported, with 6 tag bits.

- ARCH_GET_UNTAG_MASK returns untag mask. It can indicates where tag bits located in the address.

- ARCH_GET_MAX_TAG_BITS returns the maximum tag bits user can request. Zero if LAM is not supported.

---
 arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/prctl.h |  4 ++
 arch/x86/kernel/process_64.c      | 65 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
 2 files changed, 68 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/prctl.h +4 -0
index 500b96e71f18..a31e27b95b19 100644
@@ -20,4 +20,8 @@
 #define ARCH_MAP_VDSO_32		0x2002
 #define ARCH_MAP_VDSO_64		0x2003
 
+#define ARCH_GET_UNTAG_MASK		0x4001
+#define ARCH_ENABLE_TAGGED_ADDR		0x4002
+#define ARCH_GET_MAX_TAG_BITS		0x4003
+
 #endif /* _ASM_X86_PRCTL_H */
arch/x86/kernel/process_64.c +64 -1

77 lines not on this page · raw message

Signature · 1 line
2.38.0
#8 lore raw

PATCH v10 8/15 x86/mm: Reduce untagged_addr() overhead until the first LAM user

In reply to Kirill A. Shutemov

Use static key to reduce untagged_addr() overhead.

The key only gets enabled when the first process enables LAM.

---
 arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h | 8 ++++++--
 arch/x86/kernel/process_64.c   | 4 ++++
 2 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h +6 -2
index c6062c07ccd2..820234f1f750 100644
@@ -23,6 +23,8 @@ static inline bool pagefault_disabled(void);
 #endif
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
+DECLARE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(tagged_addr_key);
+
 /*
  * Mask out tag bits from the address.
  *
@@ -31,8 +33,10 @@ static inline bool pagefault_disabled(void);
  */
 #define untagged_addr(mm, addr)	({					\
 	u64 __addr = (__force u64)(addr);				\
-	s64 sign = (s64)__addr >> 63;					\
-	__addr &= (mm)->context.untag_mask | sign;			\
+	if (static_branch_likely(&tagged_addr_key)) {			\
+		s64 sign = (s64)__addr >> 63;				\
+		__addr &= (mm)->context.untag_mask | sign;		\
+	}								\
 	(__force __typeof__(addr))__addr;				\
 })
 
arch/x86/kernel/process_64.c +4 -0
index a98536101447..9952e9f517ec 100644
@@ -743,6 +743,9 @@ static long prctl_map_vdso(const struct vdso_image *image, unsigned long addr)
 }
 #endif
 
+DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(tagged_addr_key);
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tagged_addr_key);
+
 static void enable_lam_func(void *mm)
 {
 	struct mm_struct *loaded_mm = this_cpu_read(cpu_tlbstate.loaded_mm);
@@ -792,6 +795,7 @@ static int prctl_enable_tagged_addr(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned long nr_bits)
 	}
 
 	on_each_cpu_mask(mm_cpumask(mm), enable_lam_func, mm, true);
+	static_branch_enable(&tagged_addr_key);
 out:
 	mmap_write_unlock(mm);
 	return ret;
Signature · 1 line
2.38.0
#9 lore raw

PATCH v10 9/15 x86: Expose untagging mask in /proc/$PID/arch_status

In reply to Kirill A. Shutemov

Add a line in /proc/$PID/arch_status to report untag_mask. It can be used to find out LAM status of the process from the outside. It is useful for debuggers.

---
 arch/x86/include/asm/mmu_context.h | 10 +++++
 arch/x86/kernel/Makefile           |  2 +
 arch/x86/kernel/fpu/xstate.c       | 47 -----------------------
 arch/x86/kernel/proc.c             | 60 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 4 files changed, 72 insertions(+), 47 deletions(-)
 create mode 100644 arch/x86/kernel/proc.c
arch/x86/include/asm/mmu_context.h +10 -0
index 5bd3d46685dc..b0e9ea23758b 100644
@@ -103,6 +103,11 @@ static inline void dup_lam(struct mm_struct *oldmm, struct mm_struct *mm)
 	mm->context.untag_mask = oldmm->context.untag_mask;
 }
 
+static inline unsigned long mm_untag_mask(struct mm_struct *mm)
+{
+	return mm->context.untag_mask;
+}
+
 static inline void mm_reset_untag_mask(struct mm_struct *mm)
 {
 	mm->context.untag_mask = -1UL;
@@ -119,6 +124,11 @@ static inline void dup_lam(struct mm_struct *oldmm, struct mm_struct *mm)
 {
 }
 
+static inline unsigned long mm_untag_mask(struct mm_struct *mm)
+{
+	return -1UL;
+}
+
 static inline void mm_reset_untag_mask(struct mm_struct *mm)
 {
 }
arch/x86/kernel/Makefile +2 -0
index f901658d9f7c..d99fd065aba8 100644
@@ -143,6 +143,8 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT)		+= sev.o
 
 obj-$(CONFIG_CFI_CLANG)			+= cfi.o
 
+obj-$(CONFIG_PROC_FS)			+= proc.o
+
 ###
 # 64 bit specific files
 ifeq ($(CONFIG_X86_64),y)
arch/x86/kernel/fpu/xstate.c +0 -47

56 lines not on this page · raw message

arch/x86/kernel/proc.c new file +60 -0

60 lines not on this page · raw message

Signature · 1 line
2.38.0
#10 lore raw

Re: [PATCHv10 09/15] x86: Expose untagging mask in /proc/$PID/arch_status

Quoted 3 lines · Kirill A. Shutemov

Add a line in /proc/$PID/arch_status to report untag_mask. It can be used to find out LAM status of the process from the outside. It is useful for debuggers.

Considering that address masking is not x86-specific, it seems like this needs a better home (another file in /proc).

This could even be left out of the series for now, right? Nothing, including the selftests, depends on it.

#11 lore raw

Re: [PATCHv10 09/15] x86: Expose untagging mask in /proc/$PID/arch_status

Quoted 7 lines · Dave Hansen
Quoted 3 lines · Kirill A. Shutemov

Add a line in /proc/$PID/arch_status to report untag_mask. It can be used to find out LAM status of the process from the outside. It is useful for debuggers.

Considering that address masking is not x86-specific, it seems like this needs a better home (another file in /proc).

In generic /proc/$PID/status?

And I'm not sure if it is a good idea at this stage. Semantics around tags is not settled across architectures: somewhere it is per-thread, somewhere per-process, somewhere it is global.

Maybe keep it arch-specific?

Quoted 2 lines

This could even be left out of the series for now, right? Nothing, including the selftests, depends on it.

GDB folks wanted to know the mask.

Signature · 1 line
  Kiryl Shutsemau / Kirill A. Shutemov
#12 lore raw

Re: [PATCHv10 09/15] x86: Expose untagging mask in /proc/$PID/arch_status

Quoted 8 lines · Kirill A. Shutemov
Quoted 6 lines · Dave Hansen
Quoted 3 lines · Kirill A. Shutemov

Add a line in /proc/$PID/arch_status to report untag_mask. It can be used to find out LAM status of the process from the outside. It is useful for debuggers.

Considering that address masking is not x86-specific, it seems like this needs a better home (another file in /proc).

In generic /proc/$PID/status?

Seems like a sane place to me.

Quoted 5 lines

And I'm not sure if it is a good idea at this stage. Semantics around tags is not settled across architectures: somewhere it is per-thread, somewhere per-process, somewhere it is global.

Maybe keep it arch-specific?

Yeah, but all of those things could be served by a thread-specific ABI. The per-thread ABI won't enumerate the scope of the thing, of course. But, it _can_ precisely communicate what semantics the thread has.

#13 lore raw

PATCH v10 10/15 x86/mm, iommu/sva: Make LAM and SVM mutually exclusive

In reply to Kirill A. Shutemov

IOMMU and SVM-capable devices know nothing about LAM and only expect canonical addresses. Attempt to pass down tagged pointer will lead to address translation failure.

By default do not allow to enable both LAM and use SVM in the same process.

The new ARCH_FORCE_TAGGED_SVM arch_prctl() overrides the limitation. By using the arch_prctl() userspace takes responsibility to never pass tagged address to the device.

---
 arch/x86/include/asm/mmu.h         |  6 ++++--
 arch/x86/include/asm/mmu_context.h |  2 ++
 arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/prctl.h  |  1 +
 arch/x86/kernel/process_64.c       | 13 +++++++++++++
 drivers/iommu/iommu-sva-lib.c      | 12 ++++++++++++
 include/linux/mmu_context.h        |  4 ++++
 6 files changed, 36 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
arch/x86/include/asm/mmu.h +4 -2
index 2fdb390040b5..cce9b32b0d6d 100644
@@ -9,9 +9,11 @@
 #include <linux/bits.h>
 
 /* Uprobes on this MM assume 32-bit code */
-#define MM_CONTEXT_UPROBE_IA32	BIT(0)
+#define MM_CONTEXT_UPROBE_IA32		BIT(0)
 /* vsyscall page is accessible on this MM */
-#define MM_CONTEXT_HAS_VSYSCALL	BIT(1)
+#define MM_CONTEXT_HAS_VSYSCALL		BIT(1)
+/* Allow LAM and SVM coexisting */
+#define MM_CONTEXT_FORCE_TAGGED_SVM	BIT(2)
 
 /*
  * x86 has arch-specific MMU state beyond what lives in mm_struct.
arch/x86/include/asm/mmu_context.h +2 -0
index b0e9ea23758b..6b9ac2c60cec 100644
@@ -113,6 +113,8 @@ static inline void mm_reset_untag_mask(struct mm_struct *mm)
 	mm->context.untag_mask = -1UL;
 }
 
+#define arch_pgtable_dma_compat(mm)	\
+	(!mm_lam_cr3_mask(mm) || (mm->context.flags & MM_CONTEXT_FORCE_TAGGED_SVM))
 #else
 
 static inline unsigned long mm_lam_cr3_mask(struct mm_struct *mm)
arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/prctl.h +1 -0
index a31e27b95b19..7bd22defb558 100644
@@ -23,5 +23,6 @@
 #define ARCH_GET_UNTAG_MASK		0x4001
 #define ARCH_ENABLE_TAGGED_ADDR		0x4002
 #define ARCH_GET_MAX_TAG_BITS		0x4003
+#define ARCH_FORCE_TAGGED_SVM		0x4004
 
 #endif /* _ASM_X86_PRCTL_H */
arch/x86/kernel/process_64.c +13 -0
index 9952e9f517ec..8faa8774bb93 100644
@@ -783,6 +783,13 @@ static int prctl_enable_tagged_addr(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned long nr_bits)
 		goto out;
 	}
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_IOMMU_SVA
+	if (pasid_valid(mm->pasid) &&
+	    !(mm->context.flags & MM_CONTEXT_FORCE_TAGGED_SVM)) {
+		ret = -EBUSY;
+		goto out;
+	}
+#endif
 	if (!nr_bits) {
 		ret = -EINVAL;
 		goto out;
@@ -893,6 +900,12 @@ long do_arch_prctl_64(struct task_struct *task, int option, unsigned long arg2)
 				(unsigned long __user *)arg2);
 	case ARCH_ENABLE_TAGGED_ADDR:
 		return prctl_enable_tagged_addr(task->mm, arg2);
+	case ARCH_FORCE_TAGGED_SVM:
+		if (mmap_write_lock_killable(task->mm))
+			return -EINTR;
+		task->mm->context.flags |= MM_CONTEXT_FORCE_TAGGED_SVM;
+		mmap_write_unlock(task->mm);
+		return 0;
 	case ARCH_GET_MAX_TAG_BITS:
 		if (!cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_LAM))
 			return put_user(0, (unsigned long __user *)arg2);
drivers/iommu/iommu-sva-lib.c +12 -0
index 106506143896..593ae2472e2c 100644
@@ -2,6 +2,8 @@
 /*
  * Helpers for IOMMU drivers implementing SVA
  */
+#include <linux/mm.h>
+#include <linux/mmu_context.h>
 #include <linux/mutex.h>
 #include <linux/sched/mm.h>
 
@@ -31,6 +33,15 @@ int iommu_sva_alloc_pasid(struct mm_struct *mm, ioasid_t min, ioasid_t max)
 	    min == 0 || max < min)
 		return -EINVAL;
 
+	/* Serialize against address tagging enabling */
+	if (mmap_write_lock_killable(mm))
+		return -EINTR;
+
+	if (!arch_pgtable_dma_compat(mm)) {
+		mmap_write_unlock(mm);
+		return -EBUSY;
+	}
+
 	mutex_lock(&iommu_sva_lock);
 	/* Is a PASID already associated with this mm? */
 	if (pasid_valid(mm->pasid)) {
@@ -46,6 +57,7 @@ int iommu_sva_alloc_pasid(struct mm_struct *mm, ioasid_t min, ioasid_t max)
 		mm_pasid_set(mm, pasid);
 out:
 	mutex_unlock(&iommu_sva_lock);
+	mmap_write_unlock(mm);
 	return ret;
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(iommu_sva_alloc_pasid);
include/linux/mmu_context.h +4 -0
index b9b970f7ab45..115e2b518079 100644
@@ -28,4 +28,8 @@ static inline void leave_mm(int cpu) { }
 # define task_cpu_possible(cpu, p)	cpumask_test_cpu((cpu), task_cpu_possible_mask(p))
 #endif
 
+#ifndef arch_pgtable_dma_compat
+#define arch_pgtable_dma_compat(mm)	true
+#endif
+
 #endif
Signature · 1 line
2.38.0
Reviewed-by on v10 10/15
#14 lore raw

Re: [PATCHv10 10/15] x86/mm, iommu/sva: Make LAM and SVM mutually exclusive

Quoted 10 lines · Kirill A. Shutemov

IOMMU and SVM-capable devices know nothing about LAM and only expect canonical addresses. Attempt to pass down tagged pointer will lead to address translation failure.

By default do not allow to enable both LAM and use SVM in the same process.

The new ARCH_FORCE_TAGGED_SVM arch_prctl() overrides the limitation. By using the arch_prctl() userspace takes responsibility to never pass tagged address to the device.

Quoted 16 lines
---
 arch/x86/include/asm/mmu.h         |  6 ++++--
 arch/x86/include/asm/mmu_context.h |  2 ++
 arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/prctl.h  |  1 +
 arch/x86/kernel/process_64.c       | 13 +++++++++++++
 drivers/iommu/iommu-sva-lib.c      | 12 ++++++++++++
 include/linux/mmu_context.h        |  4 ++++
 6 files changed, 36 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
arch/x86/include/asm/mmu.h +0 -0
index 2fdb390040b5..cce9b32b0d6d 100644

arch/x86/include/asm/mmu.h line 14

Quoted 8 lines
arch/x86/include/asm/mmu.h +2 -2
@@ -9,9 +9,11 @@
 #include <linux/bits.h>
 
 /* Uprobes on this MM assume 32-bit code */
-#define MM_CONTEXT_UPROBE_IA32	BIT(0)
+#define MM_CONTEXT_UPROBE_IA32		BIT(0)
 /* vsyscall page is accessible on this MM */
-#define MM_CONTEXT_HAS_VSYSCALL	BIT(1)
+#define MM_CONTEXT_HAS_VSYSCALL		BIT(1)

Nit: Looks like the two above format changes got in here :-)

Cheers,
Ashok

#15 lore raw

Re: [PATCHv10 10/15] x86/mm, iommu/sva: Make LAM and SVM mutually exclusive

Quoted 5 lines · Ashok Raj
Quoted 4 lines · Kirill A. Shutemov

IOMMU and SVM-capable devices know nothing about LAM and only expect canonical addresses. Attempt to pass down tagged pointer will lead to address translation failure.

Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 6 lines

By default do not allow to enable both LAM and use SVM in the same process.

The new ARCH_FORCE_TAGGED_SVM arch_prctl() overrides the limitation. By using the arch_prctl() userspace takes responsibility to never pass tagged address to the device.

Thanks!

Quoted 17 lines
Quoted 17 lines
---
 arch/x86/include/asm/mmu.h         |  6 ++++--
 arch/x86/include/asm/mmu_context.h |  2 ++
 arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/prctl.h  |  1 +
 arch/x86/kernel/process_64.c       | 13 +++++++++++++
 drivers/iommu/iommu-sva-lib.c      | 12 ++++++++++++
 include/linux/mmu_context.h        |  4 ++++
 6 files changed, 36 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
arch/x86/include/asm/mmu.h +0 -0
index 2fdb390040b5..cce9b32b0d6d 100644
@@ -9,9 +9,11 @@
 #include <linux/bits.h>
 
Quoted 8 lines

arch/x86/include/asm/mmu.h line 14

Quoted 6 lines
arch/x86/include/asm/mmu.h +2 -2
 /* Uprobes on this MM assume 32-bit code */
-#define MM_CONTEXT_UPROBE_IA32	BIT(0)
+#define MM_CONTEXT_UPROBE_IA32		BIT(0)
 /* vsyscall page is accessible on this MM */
-#define MM_CONTEXT_HAS_VSYSCALL	BIT(1)
+#define MM_CONTEXT_HAS_VSYSCALL		BIT(1)

Nit: Looks like the two above format changes got in here :-)

That's side effect of keeping the new longer flag aligned to the rest.

A separate patch looks like an overkill, no?

Signature · 1 line
  Kiryl Shutsemau / Kirill A. Shutemov
#16 lore raw

Re: [PATCHv10 10/15] x86/mm, iommu/sva: Make LAM and SVM mutually exclusive

Quoted 10 lines · Kirill A. Shutemov
Quoted 9 lines

arch/x86/include/asm/mmu.h line 14

Quoted 7 lines

/* Uprobes on this MM assume 32-bit code */

arch/x86/include/asm/mmu.h +2 -2
-#define MM_CONTEXT_UPROBE_IA32	BIT(0)
+#define MM_CONTEXT_UPROBE_IA32		BIT(0)
 /* vsyscall page is accessible on this MM */
-#define MM_CONTEXT_HAS_VSYSCALL	BIT(1)
+#define MM_CONTEXT_HAS_VSYSCALL		BIT(1)

Nit: Looks like the two above format changes got in here :-)

Quoted 3 lines

That's side effect of keeping the new longer flag aligned to the rest.

A separate patch looks like an overkill, no?

Agree, just thought i'll flag it, but I don't think a new patch is required.

#17 lore raw

Re: [PATCHv10 10/15] x86/mm, iommu/sva: Make LAM and SVM mutually exclusive

In reply to Kirill A. Shutemov
Quoted 2 lines · Kirill A. Shutemov

IOMMU and SVM-capable devices know nothing about LAM and only expect canonical addresses. Attempt to pass down tagged pointer will lead to

		      ^ An attempt...
Quoted 42 lines

address translation failure.

By default do not allow to enable both LAM and use SVM in the same process.

The new ARCH_FORCE_TAGGED_SVM arch_prctl() overrides the limitation. By using the arch_prctl() userspace takes responsibility to never pass tagged address to the device.

---
 arch/x86/include/asm/mmu.h         |  6 ++++--
 arch/x86/include/asm/mmu_context.h |  2 ++
 arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/prctl.h  |  1 +
 arch/x86/kernel/process_64.c       | 13 +++++++++++++
 drivers/iommu/iommu-sva-lib.c      | 12 ++++++++++++
 include/linux/mmu_context.h        |  4 ++++
 6 files changed, 36 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
arch/x86/include/asm/mmu.h +4 -2
index 2fdb390040b5..cce9b32b0d6d 100644
@@ -9,9 +9,11 @@
 #include <linux/bits.h>
 
 /* Uprobes on this MM assume 32-bit code */
-#define MM_CONTEXT_UPROBE_IA32	BIT(0)
+#define MM_CONTEXT_UPROBE_IA32		BIT(0)
 /* vsyscall page is accessible on this MM */
-#define MM_CONTEXT_HAS_VSYSCALL	BIT(1)
+#define MM_CONTEXT_HAS_VSYSCALL		BIT(1)
+/* Allow LAM and SVM coexisting */
+#define MM_CONTEXT_FORCE_TAGGED_SVM	BIT(2)
 
 /*
  * x86 has arch-specific MMU state beyond what lives in mm_struct.
arch/x86/include/asm/mmu_context.h +0 -0
index b0e9ea23758b..6b9ac2c60cec 100644

arch/x86/include/asm/mmu_context.h static inline void mm_reset_untag_mask(struct mm_struct *mm) · line 118

Quoted 6 lines
arch/x86/include/asm/mmu_context.h +2 -0
@@ -113,6 +113,8 @@ static inline void mm_reset_untag_mask(struct mm_struct *mm)
 	mm->context.untag_mask = -1UL;
 }
 
+#define arch_pgtable_dma_compat(mm)	\
+	(!mm_lam_cr3_mask(mm) || (mm->context.flags & MM_CONTEXT_FORCE_TAGGED_SVM))
 #else

This needs to be a 'static inline' unless there's a compelling and documented reason that it can't be.

Quoted 17 lines
arch/x86/include/asm/mmu_context.h +0 -0
 static inline unsigned long mm_lam_cr3_mask(struct mm_struct *mm)
arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/prctl.h +1 -0
index a31e27b95b19..7bd22defb558 100644
@@ -23,5 +23,6 @@
 #define ARCH_GET_UNTAG_MASK		0x4001
 #define ARCH_ENABLE_TAGGED_ADDR		0x4002
 #define ARCH_GET_MAX_TAG_BITS		0x4003
+#define ARCH_FORCE_TAGGED_SVM		0x4004
 
 #endif /* _ASM_X86_PRCTL_H */
arch/x86/kernel/process_64.c +0 -0
index 9952e9f517ec..8faa8774bb93 100644

arch/x86/kernel/process_64.c static int prctl_enable_tagged_addr(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned long nr_bits) · line 792

Quoted 10 lines
arch/x86/kernel/process_64.c +7 -0
@@ -783,6 +783,13 @@ static int prctl_enable_tagged_addr(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned long nr_bits)
 		goto out;
 	}
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_IOMMU_SVA
+	if (pasid_valid(mm->pasid) &&
+	    !(mm->context.flags & MM_CONTEXT_FORCE_TAGGED_SVM)) {
+		ret = -EBUSY;
+		goto out;
+	}
+#endif

Is this #ifdef really necessary? CONFIG_IOMMU_SVA selects IOASID, without which pasid_valid() is just stubbed out to 0.

Quoted 66 lines
arch/x86/kernel/process_64.c +6 -0
 	if (!nr_bits) {
 		ret = -EINVAL;
 		goto out;
@@ -893,6 +900,12 @@ long do_arch_prctl_64(struct task_struct *task, int option, unsigned long arg2)
 				(unsigned long __user *)arg2);
 	case ARCH_ENABLE_TAGGED_ADDR:
 		return prctl_enable_tagged_addr(task->mm, arg2);
+	case ARCH_FORCE_TAGGED_SVM:
+		if (mmap_write_lock_killable(task->mm))
+			return -EINTR;
+		task->mm->context.flags |= MM_CONTEXT_FORCE_TAGGED_SVM;
+		mmap_write_unlock(task->mm);
+		return 0;
 	case ARCH_GET_MAX_TAG_BITS:
 		if (!cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_LAM))
 			return put_user(0, (unsigned long __user *)arg2);
drivers/iommu/iommu-sva-lib.c +12 -0
index 106506143896..593ae2472e2c 100644
@@ -2,6 +2,8 @@
 /*
  * Helpers for IOMMU drivers implementing SVA
  */
+#include <linux/mm.h>
+#include <linux/mmu_context.h>
 #include <linux/mutex.h>
 #include <linux/sched/mm.h>
 
@@ -31,6 +33,15 @@ int iommu_sva_alloc_pasid(struct mm_struct *mm, ioasid_t min, ioasid_t max)
 	    min == 0 || max < min)
 		return -EINVAL;
 
+	/* Serialize against address tagging enabling */
+	if (mmap_write_lock_killable(mm))
+		return -EINTR;
+
+	if (!arch_pgtable_dma_compat(mm)) {
+		mmap_write_unlock(mm);
+		return -EBUSY;
+	}
+
 	mutex_lock(&iommu_sva_lock);
 	/* Is a PASID already associated with this mm? */
 	if (pasid_valid(mm->pasid)) {
@@ -46,6 +57,7 @@ int iommu_sva_alloc_pasid(struct mm_struct *mm, ioasid_t min, ioasid_t max)
 		mm_pasid_set(mm, pasid);
 out:
 	mutex_unlock(&iommu_sva_lock);
+	mmap_write_unlock(mm);
 	return ret;
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(iommu_sva_alloc_pasid);
include/linux/mmu_context.h +4 -0
index b9b970f7ab45..115e2b518079 100644
@@ -28,4 +28,8 @@ static inline void leave_mm(int cpu) { }
 # define task_cpu_possible(cpu, p)	cpumask_test_cpu((cpu), task_cpu_possible_mask(p))
 #endif
 
+#ifndef arch_pgtable_dma_compat
+#define arch_pgtable_dma_compat(mm)	true
+#endif
+
 #endif
#18 lore raw

Re: [PATCHv10 10/15] x86/mm, iommu/sva: Make LAM and SVM mutually exclusive

Quoted 8 lines · Dave Hansen
Quoted 8 lines
arch/x86/include/asm/mmu_context.h +0 -0
index b0e9ea23758b..6b9ac2c60cec 100644
@@ -113,6 +113,8 @@ static inline void mm_reset_untag_mask(struct mm_struct *mm)
 	mm->context.untag_mask = -1UL;
 }
 
Quoted 6 lines

arch/x86/include/asm/mmu_context.h static inline void mm_reset_untag_mask(struct mm_struct *mm) · line 118

Quoted 3 lines
arch/x86/include/asm/mmu_context.h +2 -0
+#define arch_pgtable_dma_compat(mm)	\
+	(!mm_lam_cr3_mask(mm) || (mm->context.flags & MM_CONTEXT_FORCE_TAGGED_SVM))
 #else

This needs to be a 'static inline' unless there's a compelling and documented reason that it can't be.

Seems work fine.

Quoted 20 lines
Quoted 20 lines
arch/x86/include/asm/mmu_context.h +0 -0
 static inline unsigned long mm_lam_cr3_mask(struct mm_struct *mm)
arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/prctl.h +1 -0
index a31e27b95b19..7bd22defb558 100644
@@ -23,5 +23,6 @@
 #define ARCH_GET_UNTAG_MASK		0x4001
 #define ARCH_ENABLE_TAGGED_ADDR		0x4002
 #define ARCH_GET_MAX_TAG_BITS		0x4003
+#define ARCH_FORCE_TAGGED_SVM		0x4004
 
 #endif /* _ASM_X86_PRCTL_H */
arch/x86/kernel/process_64.c +0 -0
index 9952e9f517ec..8faa8774bb93 100644
@@ -783,6 +783,13 @@ static int prctl_enable_tagged_addr(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned long nr_bits)
 		goto out;
 	}
 
Quoted 10 lines

arch/x86/kernel/process_64.c static int prctl_enable_tagged_addr(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned long nr_bits) · line 792

Quoted 7 lines
arch/x86/kernel/process_64.c +7 -0
+#ifdef CONFIG_IOMMU_SVA
+	if (pasid_valid(mm->pasid) &&
+	    !(mm->context.flags & MM_CONTEXT_FORCE_TAGGED_SVM)) {
+		ret = -EBUSY;
+		goto out;
+	}
+#endif

Is this #ifdef really necessary? CONFIG_IOMMU_SVA selects IOASID, without which pasid_valid() is just stubbed out to 0.

mm->pasid is only defined for CONFIG_IOMMU_SVA=y.

Do you want me to add mm_has_valid_pasid()?

Signature · 1 line
  Kiryl Shutsemau / Kirill A. Shutemov
#19 lore raw

Re: [PATCHv10 10/15] x86/mm, iommu/sva: Make LAM and SVM mutually exclusive

Quoted 5 lines · Kirill A. Shutemov
Quoted 2 lines

Is this #ifdef really necessary? CONFIG_IOMMU_SVA selects IOASID, without which pasid_valid() is just stubbed out to 0.

mm->pasid is only defined for CONFIG_IOMMU_SVA=y.

Do you want me to add mm_has_valid_pasid()?

A quick grep makes it look like pasid_valid() could be *replaced* with mm_has_pasid_valid() since all the places doing pasid_valid() do it with mm->pasid.

#20 lore raw

Re: [PATCHv10 10/15] x86/mm, iommu/sva: Make LAM and SVM mutually exclusive

Quoted 10 lines · Dave Hansen
Quoted 5 lines · Kirill A. Shutemov
Quoted 2 lines

Is this #ifdef really necessary? CONFIG_IOMMU_SVA selects IOASID, without which pasid_valid() is just stubbed out to 0.

mm->pasid is only defined for CONFIG_IOMMU_SVA=y.

Do you want me to add mm_has_valid_pasid()?

A quick grep makes it look like pasid_valid() could be *replaced* with mm_has_pasid_valid() since all the places doing pasid_valid() do it with mm->pasid.

Almost: the second pasid_valid() in iommu_sva_alloc_pasid() called for just allocated pasid.

I guess we can just opencode this case.

Signature · 1 line
  Kiryl Shutsemau / Kirill A. Shutemov
#21 lore raw

Re: [PATCHv10 10/15] x86/mm, iommu/sva: Make LAM and SVM mutually exclusive

In reply to Kirill A. Shutemov

Hi Kirill,

Quoted 8 lines · Kirill A. Shutemov

IOMMU and SVM-capable devices know nothing about LAM and only expect canonical addresses. Attempt to pass down tagged pointer will lead to address translation failure.

By default do not allow to enable both LAM and use SVM in the same process.

The new ARCH_FORCE_TAGGED_SVM arch_prctl() overrides the limitation.

Better s/SVM/SVA/ ? So that its consistent with IOMMU usage.

-Vasant

#22 lore raw

PATCH v10 11/15 selftests/x86/lam: Add malloc and tag-bits test cases for linear-address masking

In reply to Kirill A. Shutemov

From: Weihong Zhang <[email protected]>

LAM is supported only in 64-bit mode and applies only addresses used for data accesses. In 64-bit mode, linear address have 64 bits. LAM is applied to 64-bit linear address and allow software to use high bits for metadata. LAM supports configurations that differ regarding which pointer bits are masked and can be used for metadata.

LAM includes following mode:

- LAM_U57, pointer bits in positions 62:57 are masked (LAM width 6), allows bits 62:57 of a user pointer to be used as metadata.

There are some arch_prctls:
ARCH_ENABLE_TAGGED_ADDR: enable LAM mode, mask high bits of a user pointer.
ARCH_GET_UNTAG_MASK: get current untagged mask.
ARCH_GET_MAX_TAG_BITS: the maximum tag bits user can request. zero if LAM is not supported.

The LAM mode is for pre-process, a process has only one chance to set LAM mode. But there is no API to disable LAM mode. So all of test cases are run under child process.

Functions of this test:

MALLOC

- LAM_U57 masks bits 57:62 of a user pointer. Process on user space can dereference such pointers.

- Disable LAM, dereference a pointer with metadata above 48 bit or 57 bit lead to trigger SIGSEGV.

TAG_BITS

- Max tag bits of LAM_U57 is 6.

---
 tools/testing/selftests/x86/Makefile |   2 +-
 tools/testing/selftests/x86/lam.c    | 326 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 2 files changed, 327 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
 create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/x86/lam.c
tools/testing/selftests/x86/Makefile +1 -1
index 0388c4d60af0..c1a16a9d4f2f 100644
@@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ TARGETS_C_32BIT_ONLY := entry_from_vm86 test_syscall_vdso unwind_vdso \
 			test_FCMOV test_FCOMI test_FISTTP \
 			vdso_restorer
 TARGETS_C_64BIT_ONLY := fsgsbase sysret_rip syscall_numbering \
-			corrupt_xstate_header amx
+			corrupt_xstate_header amx lam
 # Some selftests require 32bit support enabled also on 64bit systems
 TARGETS_C_32BIT_NEEDED := ldt_gdt ptrace_syscall
 
tools/testing/selftests/x86/lam.c new file +326 -0

326 lines not on this page · raw message

Signature · 1 line
2.38.0
#23 lore raw

PATCH v10 12/15 selftests/x86/lam: Add mmap and SYSCALL test cases for linear-address masking

In reply to Kirill A. Shutemov

From: Weihong Zhang <[email protected]>

Add mmap and SYSCALL test cases.

SYSCALL test cases:

- LAM supports set metadata in high bits 62:57 (LAM_U57) of a user pointer, pass the pointer to SYSCALL, SYSCALL can dereference the pointer and return correct result.

- Disable LAM, pass a pointer with metadata in high bits to SYSCALL, SYSCALL returns -1 (EFAULT).

MMAP test cases:

- Enable LAM_U57, MMAP with low address (below bits 47), set metadata in high bits of the address, dereference the address should be allowed.

- Enable LAM_U57, MMAP with high address (above bits 47), set metadata in high bits of the address, dereference the address should be allowed.

---
 tools/testing/selftests/x86/lam.c | 144 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
 1 file changed, 140 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
tools/testing/selftests/x86/lam.c +140 -4
index 900a3a0fb709..cdc6e40e00e0 100644
@@ -7,6 +7,7 @@
 #include <signal.h>
 #include <setjmp.h>
 #include <sys/mman.h>
+#include <sys/utsname.h>
 #include <sys/wait.h>
 #include <inttypes.h>
 
@@ -29,11 +30,18 @@
 /* Specified test function bits */
 #define FUNC_MALLOC             0x1
 #define FUNC_BITS               0x2
+#define FUNC_MMAP               0x4
+#define FUNC_SYSCALL            0x8
 
-#define TEST_MASK               0x3
+#define TEST_MASK               0xf
+
+#define LOW_ADDR                (0x1UL << 30)
+#define HIGH_ADDR               (0x3UL << 48)
 
 #define MALLOC_LEN              32
 
+#define PAGE_SIZE               (4 << 10)
+
 struct testcases {
 	unsigned int later;
 	int expected; /* 2: SIGSEGV Error; 1: other errors */
@@ -49,6 +57,7 @@ jmp_buf segv_env;
 static void segv_handler(int sig)
 {
 	ksft_print_msg("Get segmentation fault(%d).", sig);
+
 	siglongjmp(segv_env, 1);
 }
 
@@ -61,6 +70,16 @@ static inline int cpu_has_lam(void)
 	return (cpuinfo[0] & (1 << 26));
 }
 
+/* Check 5-level page table feature in CPUID.(EAX=07H, ECX=00H):ECX.[bit 16] */
+static inline int cpu_has_la57(void)
+{
+	unsigned int cpuinfo[4];
+
+	__cpuid_count(0x7, 0, cpuinfo[0], cpuinfo[1], cpuinfo[2], cpuinfo[3]);
+
+	return (cpuinfo[2] & (1 << 16));
+}
+
 /*
  * Set tagged address and read back untag mask.
  * check if the untagged mask is expected.
@@ -213,6 +232,68 @@ static int handle_malloc(struct testcases *test)
 	return ret;
 }
 
+static int handle_mmap(struct testcases *test)
+{
+	void *ptr;
+	unsigned int flags = MAP_PRIVATE | MAP_ANONYMOUS | MAP_FIXED;
+	int ret = 0;
+
+	if (test->later == 0 && test->lam != 0)
+		if (set_lam(test->lam) != 0)
+			return 1;
+
+	ptr = mmap((void *)test->addr, PAGE_SIZE, PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE,
+		   flags, -1, 0);
+	if (ptr == MAP_FAILED) {
+		if (test->addr == HIGH_ADDR)
+			if (!cpu_has_la57())
+				return 3; /* unsupport LA57 */
+		return 1;
+	}
+
+	if (test->later != 0 && test->lam != 0)
+		if (set_lam(test->lam) != 0)
+			ret = 1;
+
+	if (ret == 0) {
+		if (sigsetjmp(segv_env, 1) == 0) {
+			signal(SIGSEGV, segv_handler);
+			ret = handle_lam_test(ptr, test->lam);
+		} else {
+			ret = 2;
+		}
+	}
+
+	munmap(ptr, PAGE_SIZE);
+	return ret;
+}
+
+static int handle_syscall(struct testcases *test)
+{
+	struct utsname unme, *pu;
+	int ret = 0;
+
+	if (test->later == 0 && test->lam != 0)
+		if (set_lam(test->lam) != 0)
+			return 1;
+
+	if (sigsetjmp(segv_env, 1) == 0) {
+		signal(SIGSEGV, segv_handler);
+		pu = (struct utsname *)set_metadata((uint64_t)&unme, test->lam);
+		ret = uname(pu);
+		if (ret < 0)
+			ret = 1;
+	} else {
+		ret = 2;
+	}
+
+	if (test->later != 0 && test->lam != 0)
+		if (set_lam(test->lam) != -1 && ret == 0)
+			ret = 1;
+
+	return ret;
+}
+
 static int fork_test(struct testcases *test)
 {
 	int ret, child_ret;
@@ -241,13 +322,20 @@ static void run_test(struct testcases *test, int count)
 		struct testcases *t = test + i;
 
 		/* fork a process to run test case */
+		tests_cnt++;
 		ret = fork_test(t);
+
+		/* return 3 is not support LA57, the case should be skipped */
+		if (ret == 3) {
+			ksft_test_result_skip(t->msg);
+			continue;
+		}
+
 		if (ret != 0)
 			ret = (t->expected == ret);
 		else
 			ret = !(t->expected);
 
-		tests_cnt++;
 		ksft_test_result(ret, t->msg);
 	}
 }
@@ -268,7 +356,6 @@ static struct testcases malloc_cases[] = {
 	},
 };
 
-
 static struct testcases bits_cases[] = {
 	{
 		.test_func = handle_max_bits,
@@ -276,11 +363,54 @@ static struct testcases bits_cases[] = {
 	},
 };
 
+static struct testcases syscall_cases[] = {
+	{
+		.later = 0,
+		.lam = LAM_U57_BITS,
+		.test_func = handle_syscall,
+		.msg = "SYSCALL: LAM_U57. syscall with metadata\n",
+	},
+	{
+		.later = 1,
+		.expected = 1,
+		.lam = LAM_U57_BITS,
+		.test_func = handle_syscall,
+		.msg = "SYSCALL:[Negative] Disable LAM. Dereferencing pointer with metadata.\n",
+	},
+};
+
+static struct testcases mmap_cases[] = {
+	{
+		.later = 1,
+		.expected = 0,
+		.lam = LAM_U57_BITS,
+		.addr = HIGH_ADDR,
+		.test_func = handle_mmap,
+		.msg = "MMAP: First mmap high address, then set LAM_U57.\n",
+	},
+	{
+		.later = 0,
+		.expected = 0,
+		.lam = LAM_U57_BITS,
+		.addr = HIGH_ADDR,
+		.test_func = handle_mmap,
+		.msg = "MMAP: First LAM_U57, then High address.\n",
+	},
+	{
+		.later = 0,
+		.expected = 0,
+		.lam = LAM_U57_BITS,
+		.addr = LOW_ADDR,
+		.test_func = handle_mmap,
+		.msg = "MMAP: First LAM_U57, then Low address.\n",
+	},
+};
+
 static void cmd_help(void)
 {
 	printf("usage: lam [-h] [-t test list]\n");
 	printf("\t-t test list: run tests specified in the test list, default:0x%x\n", TEST_MASK);
-	printf("\t\t0x1:malloc; 0x2:max_bits;\n");
+	printf("\t\t0x1:malloc; 0x2:max_bits; 0x4:mmap; 0x8:syscall.\n");
 	printf("\t-h: help\n");
 }
 
@@ -320,6 +450,12 @@ int main(int argc, char **argv)
 	if (tests & FUNC_BITS)
 		run_test(bits_cases, ARRAY_SIZE(bits_cases));
 
+	if (tests & FUNC_MMAP)
+		run_test(mmap_cases, ARRAY_SIZE(mmap_cases));
+
+	if (tests & FUNC_SYSCALL)
+		run_test(syscall_cases, ARRAY_SIZE(syscall_cases));
+
 	ksft_set_plan(tests_cnt);
 
 	return ksft_exit_pass();
Signature · 1 line
2.38.0
#24 lore raw

PATCH v10 13/15 selftests/x86/lam: Add io_uring test cases for linear-address masking

In reply to Kirill A. Shutemov

From: Weihong Zhang <[email protected]>

LAM should be supported in kernel thread, using io_uring to verify LAM feature. The test cases implement read a file through io_uring, the test cases choose an iovec array as receiving buffer, which used to receive data, according to LAM mode, set metadata in high bits of these buffer.

io_uring can deal with these buffers that pointed to pointers with the metadata in high bits.

---
 tools/testing/selftests/x86/lam.c | 341 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
 1 file changed, 339 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
tools/testing/selftests/x86/lam.c +339 -2
index cdc6e40e00e0..8ea1fcef4c9f 100644
@@ -9,8 +9,12 @@
 #include <sys/mman.h>
 #include <sys/utsname.h>
 #include <sys/wait.h>
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+#include <fcntl.h>
 #include <inttypes.h>
 
+#include <sys/uio.h>
+#include <linux/io_uring.h>
 #include "../kselftest.h"
 
 #ifndef __x86_64__
@@ -32,8 +36,9 @@
 #define FUNC_BITS               0x2
 #define FUNC_MMAP               0x4
 #define FUNC_SYSCALL            0x8
+#define FUNC_URING              0x10
 
-#define TEST_MASK               0xf
+#define TEST_MASK               0x1f
 
 #define LOW_ADDR                (0x1UL << 30)
 #define HIGH_ADDR               (0x3UL << 48)
@@ -42,6 +47,13 @@
 
 #define PAGE_SIZE               (4 << 10)
 
+#define barrier() ({						\
+		   __asm__ __volatile__("" : : : "memory");	\
+})
+
+#define URING_QUEUE_SZ 1
+#define URING_BLOCK_SZ 2048
+
 struct testcases {
 	unsigned int later;
 	int expected; /* 2: SIGSEGV Error; 1: other errors */
@@ -51,6 +63,33 @@ struct testcases {
 	const char *msg;
 };
 
+/* Used by CQ of uring, source file handler and file's size */
+struct file_io {
+	int file_fd;
+	off_t file_sz;
+	struct iovec iovecs[];
+};
+
+struct io_uring_queue {
+	unsigned int *head;
+	unsigned int *tail;
+	unsigned int *ring_mask;
+	unsigned int *ring_entries;
+	unsigned int *flags;
+	unsigned int *array;
+	union {
+		struct io_uring_cqe *cqes;
+		struct io_uring_sqe *sqes;
+	} queue;
+	size_t ring_sz;
+};
+
+struct io_ring {
+	int ring_fd;
+	struct io_uring_queue sq_ring;
+	struct io_uring_queue cq_ring;
+};
+
 int tests_cnt;
 jmp_buf segv_env;
 
@@ -294,6 +333,285 @@ static int handle_syscall(struct testcases *test)
 	return ret;
 }
 
+int sys_uring_setup(unsigned int entries, struct io_uring_params *p)
+{
+	return (int)syscall(__NR_io_uring_setup, entries, p);
+}
+
+int sys_uring_enter(int fd, unsigned int to, unsigned int min, unsigned int flags)
+{
+	return (int)syscall(__NR_io_uring_enter, fd, to, min, flags, NULL, 0);
+}
+
+/* Init submission queue and completion queue */
+int mmap_io_uring(struct io_uring_params p, struct io_ring *s)
+{
+	struct io_uring_queue *sring = &s->sq_ring;
+	struct io_uring_queue *cring = &s->cq_ring;
+
+	sring->ring_sz = p.sq_off.array + p.sq_entries * sizeof(unsigned int);
+	cring->ring_sz = p.cq_off.cqes + p.cq_entries * sizeof(struct io_uring_cqe);
+
+	if (p.features & IORING_FEAT_SINGLE_MMAP) {
+		if (cring->ring_sz > sring->ring_sz)
+			sring->ring_sz = cring->ring_sz;
+
+		cring->ring_sz = sring->ring_sz;
+	}
+
+	void *sq_ptr = mmap(0, sring->ring_sz, PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE,
+			    MAP_SHARED | MAP_POPULATE, s->ring_fd,
+			    IORING_OFF_SQ_RING);
+
+	if (sq_ptr == MAP_FAILED) {
+		perror("sub-queue!");
+		return 1;
+	}
+
+	void *cq_ptr = sq_ptr;
+
+	if (!(p.features & IORING_FEAT_SINGLE_MMAP)) {
+		cq_ptr = mmap(0, cring->ring_sz, PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE,
+			      MAP_SHARED | MAP_POPULATE, s->ring_fd,
+			      IORING_OFF_CQ_RING);
+		if (cq_ptr == MAP_FAILED) {
+			perror("cpl-queue!");
+			munmap(sq_ptr, sring->ring_sz);
+			return 1;
+		}
+	}
+
+	sring->head = sq_ptr + p.sq_off.head;
+	sring->tail = sq_ptr + p.sq_off.tail;
+	sring->ring_mask = sq_ptr + p.sq_off.ring_mask;
+	sring->ring_entries = sq_ptr + p.sq_off.ring_entries;
+	sring->flags = sq_ptr + p.sq_off.flags;
+	sring->array = sq_ptr + p.sq_off.array;
+
+	/* Map a queue as mem map */
+	s->sq_ring.queue.sqes = mmap(0, p.sq_entries * sizeof(struct io_uring_sqe),
+				     PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE, MAP_SHARED | MAP_POPULATE,
+				     s->ring_fd, IORING_OFF_SQES);
+	if (s->sq_ring.queue.sqes == MAP_FAILED) {
+		munmap(sq_ptr, sring->ring_sz);
+		if (sq_ptr != cq_ptr) {
+			ksft_print_msg("failed to mmap uring queue!");
+			munmap(cq_ptr, cring->ring_sz);
+			return 1;
+		}
+	}
+
+	cring->head = cq_ptr + p.cq_off.head;
+	cring->tail = cq_ptr + p.cq_off.tail;
+	cring->ring_mask = cq_ptr + p.cq_off.ring_mask;
+	cring->ring_entries = cq_ptr + p.cq_off.ring_entries;
+	cring->queue.cqes = cq_ptr + p.cq_off.cqes;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/* Init io_uring queues */
+int setup_io_uring(struct io_ring *s)
+{
+	struct io_uring_params para;
+
+	memset(&para, 0, sizeof(para));
+	s->ring_fd = sys_uring_setup(URING_QUEUE_SZ, &para);
+	if (s->ring_fd < 0)
+		return 1;
+
+	return mmap_io_uring(para, s);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Get data from completion queue. the data buffer saved the file data
+ * return 0: success; others: error;
+ */
+int handle_uring_cq(struct io_ring *s)
+{
+	struct file_io *fi = NULL;
+	struct io_uring_queue *cring = &s->cq_ring;
+	struct io_uring_cqe *cqe;
+	unsigned int head;
+	off_t len = 0;
+
+	head = *cring->head;
+
+	do {
+		barrier();
+		if (head == *cring->tail)
+			break;
+		/* Get the entry */
+		cqe = &cring->queue.cqes[head & *s->cq_ring.ring_mask];
+		fi = (struct file_io *)cqe->user_data;
+		if (cqe->res < 0)
+			break;
+
+		int blocks = (int)(fi->file_sz + URING_BLOCK_SZ - 1) / URING_BLOCK_SZ;
+
+		for (int i = 0; i < blocks; i++)
+			len += fi->iovecs[i].iov_len;
+
+		head++;
+	} while (1);
+
+	*cring->head = head;
+	barrier();
+
+	return (len != fi->file_sz);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Submit squeue. specify via IORING_OP_READV.
+ * the buffer need to be set metadata according to LAM mode
+ */
+int handle_uring_sq(struct io_ring *ring, struct file_io *fi, unsigned long lam)
+{
+	int file_fd = fi->file_fd;
+	struct io_uring_queue *sring = &ring->sq_ring;
+	unsigned int index = 0, cur_block = 0, tail = 0, next_tail = 0;
+	struct io_uring_sqe *sqe;
+
+	off_t remain = fi->file_sz;
+	int blocks = (int)(remain + URING_BLOCK_SZ - 1) / URING_BLOCK_SZ;
+
+	while (remain) {
+		off_t bytes = remain;
+		void *buf;
+
+		if (bytes > URING_BLOCK_SZ)
+			bytes = URING_BLOCK_SZ;
+
+		fi->iovecs[cur_block].iov_len = bytes;
+
+		if (posix_memalign(&buf, URING_BLOCK_SZ, URING_BLOCK_SZ))
+			return 1;
+
+		fi->iovecs[cur_block].iov_base = (void *)set_metadata((uint64_t)buf, lam);
+		remain -= bytes;
+		cur_block++;
+	}
+
+	next_tail = *sring->tail;
+	tail = next_tail;
+	next_tail++;
+
+	barrier();
+
+	index = tail & *ring->sq_ring.ring_mask;
+
+	sqe = &ring->sq_ring.queue.sqes[index];
+	sqe->fd = file_fd;
+	sqe->flags = 0;
+	sqe->opcode = IORING_OP_READV;
+	sqe->addr = (unsigned long)fi->iovecs;
+	sqe->len = blocks;
+	sqe->off = 0;
+	sqe->user_data = (uint64_t)fi;
+
+	sring->array[index] = index;
+	tail = next_tail;
+
+	if (*sring->tail != tail) {
+		*sring->tail = tail;
+		barrier();
+	}
+
+	if (sys_uring_enter(ring->ring_fd, 1, 1, IORING_ENTER_GETEVENTS) < 0)
+		return 1;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Test LAM in async I/O and io_uring, read current binery through io_uring
+ * Set metadata in pointers to iovecs buffer.
+ */
+int do_uring(unsigned long lam)
+{
+	struct io_ring *ring;
+	struct file_io *fi;
+	struct stat st;
+	int ret = 1;
+	char path[PATH_MAX];
+
+	/* get current process path */
+	if (readlink("/proc/self/exe", path, PATH_MAX) <= 0)
+		return 1;
+
+	int file_fd = open(path, O_RDONLY);
+
+	if (file_fd < 0)
+		return 1;
+
+	if (fstat(file_fd, &st) < 0)
+		return 1;
+
+	off_t file_sz = st.st_size;
+
+	int blocks = (int)(file_sz + URING_BLOCK_SZ - 1) / URING_BLOCK_SZ;
+
+	fi = malloc(sizeof(*fi) + sizeof(struct iovec) * blocks);
+	if (!fi)
+		return 1;
+
+	fi->file_sz = file_sz;
+	fi->file_fd = file_fd;
+
+	ring = malloc(sizeof(*ring));
+	if (!ring)
+		return 1;
+
+	memset(ring, 0, sizeof(struct io_ring));
+
+	if (setup_io_uring(ring))
+		goto out;
+
+	if (handle_uring_sq(ring, fi, lam))
+		goto out;
+
+	ret = handle_uring_cq(ring);
+
+out:
+	free(ring);
+
+	for (int i = 0; i < blocks; i++) {
+		if (fi->iovecs[i].iov_base) {
+			uint64_t addr = ((uint64_t)fi->iovecs[i].iov_base);
+
+			switch (lam) {
+			case LAM_U57_BITS: /* Clear bits 62:57 */
+				addr = (addr & ~(0x3fULL << 57));
+				break;
+			}
+			free((void *)addr);
+			fi->iovecs[i].iov_base = NULL;
+		}
+	}
+
+	free(fi);
+
+	return ret;
+}
+
+int handle_uring(struct testcases *test)
+{
+	int ret = 0;
+
+	if (test->later == 0 && test->lam != 0)
+		if (set_lam(test->lam) != 0)
+			return 1;
+
+	if (sigsetjmp(segv_env, 1) == 0) {
+		signal(SIGSEGV, segv_handler);
+		ret = do_uring(test->lam);
+	} else {
+		ret = 2;
+	}
+
+	return ret;
+}
+
 static int fork_test(struct testcases *test)
 {
 	int ret, child_ret;
@@ -340,6 +658,22 @@ static void run_test(struct testcases *test, int count)
 	}
 }
 
+static struct testcases uring_cases[] = {
+	{
+		.later = 0,
+		.lam = LAM_U57_BITS,
+		.test_func = handle_uring,
+		.msg = "URING: LAM_U57. Dereferencing pointer with metadata\n",
+	},
+	{
+		.later = 1,
+		.expected = 1,
+		.lam = LAM_U57_BITS,
+		.test_func = handle_uring,
+		.msg = "URING:[Negative] Disable LAM. Dereferencing pointer with metadata.\n",
+	},
+};
+
 static struct testcases malloc_cases[] = {
 	{
 		.later = 0,
@@ -410,7 +744,7 @@ static void cmd_help(void)
 {
 	printf("usage: lam [-h] [-t test list]\n");
 	printf("\t-t test list: run tests specified in the test list, default:0x%x\n", TEST_MASK);
-	printf("\t\t0x1:malloc; 0x2:max_bits; 0x4:mmap; 0x8:syscall.\n");
+	printf("\t\t0x1:malloc; 0x2:max_bits; 0x4:mmap; 0x8:syscall; 0x10:io_uring.\n");
 	printf("\t-h: help\n");
 }
 
@@ -456,6 +790,9 @@ int main(int argc, char **argv)
 	if (tests & FUNC_SYSCALL)
 		run_test(syscall_cases, ARRAY_SIZE(syscall_cases));
 
+	if (tests & FUNC_URING)
+		run_test(uring_cases, ARRAY_SIZE(uring_cases));
+
 	ksft_set_plan(tests_cnt);
 
 	return ksft_exit_pass();
Signature · 1 line
2.38.0
#25 lore raw

PATCH v10 14/15 selftests/x86/lam: Add inherit test cases for linear-address masking

In reply to Kirill A. Shutemov

From: Weihong Zhang <[email protected]>

LAM is enabled per-thread and gets inherited on fork(2)/clone(2). exec() reverts LAM status to the default disabled state.

There are two test scenarios:

- Fork test cases:

These cases were used to test the inheritance of LAM for per-thread, Child process generated by fork() should inherit LAM feature from parent process, Child process can get the LAM mode same as parent process.

- Execve test cases:

Processes generated by execve() are different from processes generated by fork(), these processes revert LAM status to disabled status.

---
 tools/testing/selftests/x86/lam.c | 125 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
 1 file changed, 121 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
tools/testing/selftests/x86/lam.c +121 -4
index 8ea1fcef4c9f..cfc9073c0262 100644
@@ -37,8 +37,9 @@
 #define FUNC_MMAP               0x4
 #define FUNC_SYSCALL            0x8
 #define FUNC_URING              0x10
+#define FUNC_INHERITE           0x20
 
-#define TEST_MASK               0x1f
+#define TEST_MASK               0x3f
 
 #define LOW_ADDR                (0x1UL << 30)
 #define HIGH_ADDR               (0x3UL << 48)
@@ -174,6 +175,28 @@ static unsigned long get_default_tag_bits(void)
 	return lam;
 }
 
+/*
+ * Set tagged address and read back untag mask.
+ * check if the untag mask is expected.
+ */
+static int get_lam(void)
+{
+	uint64_t ptr = 0;
+	int ret = -1;
+	/* Get untagged mask */
+	if (syscall(SYS_arch_prctl, ARCH_GET_UNTAG_MASK, &ptr) == -1)
+		return -1;
+
+	/* Check mask returned is expected */
+	if (ptr == ~(LAM_U57_MASK))
+		ret = LAM_U57_BITS;
+	else if (ptr == -1ULL)
+		ret = LAM_NONE;
+
+
+	return ret;
+}
+
 /* According to LAM mode, set metadata in high bits */
 static uint64_t set_metadata(uint64_t src, unsigned long lam)
 {
@@ -581,7 +604,7 @@ int do_uring(unsigned long lam)
 
 			switch (lam) {
 			case LAM_U57_BITS: /* Clear bits 62:57 */
-				addr = (addr & ~(0x3fULL << 57));
+				addr = (addr & ~(LAM_U57_MASK));
 				break;
 			}
 			free((void *)addr);
@@ -632,6 +655,72 @@ static int fork_test(struct testcases *test)
 	return ret;
 }
 
+static int handle_execve(struct testcases *test)
+{
+	int ret, child_ret;
+	int lam = test->lam;
+	pid_t pid;
+
+	pid = fork();
+	if (pid < 0) {
+		perror("Fork failed.");
+		ret = 1;
+	} else if (pid == 0) {
+		char path[PATH_MAX];
+
+		/* Set LAM mode in parent process */
+		if (set_lam(lam) != 0)
+			return 1;
+
+		/* Get current binary's path and the binary was run by execve */
+		if (readlink("/proc/self/exe", path, PATH_MAX) <= 0)
+			exit(-1);
+
+		/* run binary to get LAM mode and return to parent process */
+		if (execlp(path, path, "-t 0x0", NULL) < 0) {
+			perror("error on exec");
+			exit(-1);
+		}
+	} else {
+		wait(&child_ret);
+		ret = WEXITSTATUS(child_ret);
+		if (ret != LAM_NONE)
+			return 1;
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int handle_inheritance(struct testcases *test)
+{
+	int ret, child_ret;
+	int lam = test->lam;
+	pid_t pid;
+
+	/* Set LAM mode in parent process */
+	if (set_lam(lam) != 0)
+		return 1;
+
+	pid = fork();
+	if (pid < 0) {
+		perror("Fork failed.");
+		return 1;
+	} else if (pid == 0) {
+		/* Set LAM mode in parent process */
+		int child_lam = get_lam();
+
+		exit(child_lam);
+	} else {
+		wait(&child_ret);
+		ret = WEXITSTATUS(child_ret);
+
+		if (lam != ret)
+			return 1;
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
 static void run_test(struct testcases *test, int count)
 {
 	int i, ret = 0;
@@ -740,11 +829,26 @@ static struct testcases mmap_cases[] = {
 	},
 };
 
+static struct testcases inheritance_cases[] = {
+	{
+		.expected = 0,
+		.lam = LAM_U57_BITS,
+		.test_func = handle_inheritance,
+		.msg = "FORK: LAM_U57, child process should get LAM mode same as parent\n",
+	},
+	{
+		.expected = 0,
+		.lam = LAM_U57_BITS,
+		.test_func = handle_execve,
+		.msg = "EXECVE: LAM_U57, child process should get disabled LAM mode\n",
+	},
+};
+
 static void cmd_help(void)
 {
 	printf("usage: lam [-h] [-t test list]\n");
 	printf("\t-t test list: run tests specified in the test list, default:0x%x\n", TEST_MASK);
-	printf("\t\t0x1:malloc; 0x2:max_bits; 0x4:mmap; 0x8:syscall; 0x10:io_uring.\n");
+	printf("\t\t0x1:malloc; 0x2:max_bits; 0x4:mmap; 0x8:syscall; 0x10:io_uring; 0x20:inherit;\n");
 	printf("\t-h: help\n");
 }
 
@@ -764,7 +868,7 @@ int main(int argc, char **argv)
 		switch (c) {
 		case 't':
 			tests = strtoul(optarg, NULL, 16);
-			if (!(tests & TEST_MASK)) {
+			if (tests && !(tests & TEST_MASK)) {
 				ksft_print_msg("Invalid argument!\n");
 				return -1;
 			}
@@ -778,6 +882,16 @@ int main(int argc, char **argv)
 		}
 	}
 
+	/*
+	 * When tests is 0, it is not a real test case;
+	 * the option used by test case(execve) to check the lam mode in
+	 * process generated by execve, the process read back lam mode and
+	 * check with lam mode in parent process.
+	 */
+	if (!tests)
+		return (get_lam());
+
+	/* Run test cases */
 	if (tests & FUNC_MALLOC)
 		run_test(malloc_cases, ARRAY_SIZE(malloc_cases));
 
@@ -793,6 +907,9 @@ int main(int argc, char **argv)
 	if (tests & FUNC_URING)
 		run_test(uring_cases, ARRAY_SIZE(uring_cases));
 
+	if (tests & FUNC_INHERITE)
+		run_test(inheritance_cases, ARRAY_SIZE(inheritance_cases));
+
 	ksft_set_plan(tests_cnt);
 
 	return ksft_exit_pass();
Signature · 1 line
2.38.0
#26 lore raw

PATCH v10 15/15 selftests/x86/lam: Add ARCH_FORCE_TAGGED_SVM test cases for linear-address masking

In reply to Kirill A. Shutemov

From: Weihong Zhang <[email protected]>

By default do not allow to enable both LAM and use SVM in the same process.
The new ARCH_FORCE_TAGGED_SVM arch_prctl() overrides the limitation.

Add new test cases for the new arch_prctl:
Defore using ARCH_FORCE_TAGGED_SVM, should not allow to enable LAM/SVM coexisting. the test cases should be negative.

The test depands on idxd driver and iommu. before test, need add "intel_iommu=on,sm_on" in kernel command line and insmod idxd driver.

---
 tools/testing/selftests/x86/lam.c | 237 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
 1 file changed, 235 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
tools/testing/selftests/x86/lam.c +235 -2
index cfc9073c0262..4b9da41de5c8 100644
@@ -30,6 +30,7 @@
 #define ARCH_GET_UNTAG_MASK     0x4001
 #define ARCH_ENABLE_TAGGED_ADDR 0x4002
 #define ARCH_GET_MAX_TAG_BITS   0x4003
+#define ARCH_FORCE_TAGGED_SVM	0x4004
 
 /* Specified test function bits */
 #define FUNC_MALLOC             0x1
@@ -38,8 +39,9 @@
 #define FUNC_SYSCALL            0x8
 #define FUNC_URING              0x10
 #define FUNC_INHERITE           0x20
+#define FUNC_PASID              0x40
 
-#define TEST_MASK               0x3f
+#define TEST_MASK               0x7f
 
 #define LOW_ADDR                (0x1UL << 30)
 #define HIGH_ADDR               (0x3UL << 48)
@@ -55,11 +57,19 @@
 #define URING_QUEUE_SZ 1
 #define URING_BLOCK_SZ 2048
 
+/* Pasid test define */
+#define LAM_CMD_BIT 0x1
+#define PAS_CMD_BIT 0x2
+#define SVM_CMD_BIT 0x4
+
+#define PAS_CMD(cmd1, cmd2, cmd3) (((cmd3) << 8) | ((cmd2) << 4) | ((cmd1) << 0))
+
 struct testcases {
 	unsigned int later;
 	int expected; /* 2: SIGSEGV Error; 1: other errors */
 	unsigned long lam;
 	uint64_t addr;
+	uint64_t cmd;
 	int (*test_func)(struct testcases *test);
 	const char *msg;
 };
@@ -556,7 +566,7 @@ int do_uring(unsigned long lam)
 	struct file_io *fi;
 	struct stat st;
 	int ret = 1;
-	char path[PATH_MAX];
+	char path[PATH_MAX] = {0};
 
 	/* get current process path */
 	if (readlink("/proc/self/exe", path, PATH_MAX) <= 0)
@@ -852,6 +862,226 @@ static void cmd_help(void)
 	printf("\t-h: help\n");
 }
 
+/* Check for file existence */
+uint8_t file_Exists(const char *fileName)
+{
+	struct stat buffer;
+
+	uint8_t ret = (stat(fileName, &buffer) == 0);
+
+	return ret;
+}
+
+/* Sysfs idxd files */
+const char *dsa_configs[] = {
+	"echo 1 > /sys/bus/dsa/devices/dsa0/wq0.1/group_id",
+	"echo shared > /sys/bus/dsa/devices/dsa0/wq0.1/mode",
+	"echo 10 > /sys/bus/dsa/devices/dsa0/wq0.1/priority",
+	"echo 16 > /sys/bus/dsa/devices/dsa0/wq0.1/size",
+	"echo 15 > /sys/bus/dsa/devices/dsa0/wq0.1/threshold",
+	"echo user > /sys/bus/dsa/devices/dsa0/wq0.1/type",
+	"echo MyApp1 > /sys/bus/dsa/devices/dsa0/wq0.1/name",
+	"echo 1 > /sys/bus/dsa/devices/dsa0/engine0.1/group_id",
+	"echo dsa0 > /sys/bus/dsa/drivers/idxd/bind",
+	/* bind files and devices, generated a device file in /dev */
+	"echo wq0.1 > /sys/bus/dsa/drivers/user/bind",
+};
+
+/* DSA device file */
+const char *dsaDeviceFile = "/dev/dsa/wq0.1";
+/* file for io*/
+const char *dsaPasidEnable = "/sys/bus/dsa/devices/dsa0/pasid_enabled";
+
+/*
+ * DSA depends on kernel cmdline "intel_iommu=on,sm_on"
+ * return pasid_enabled (0: disable 1:enable)
+ */
+int Check_DSA_Kernel_Setting(void)
+{
+	char command[256] = "";
+	char buf[256] = "";
+	char *ptr;
+	int rv = -1;
+
+	snprintf(command, sizeof(command) - 1, "cat %s", dsaPasidEnable);
+
+	FILE *cmd = popen(command, "r");
+
+	if (cmd) {
+		while (fgets(buf, sizeof(buf) - 1, cmd) != NULL);
+
+		pclose(cmd);
+		rv = strtol(buf, &ptr, 16);
+	}
+
+	return rv;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Config DSA's sysfs files as shared DSA's WQ.
+ * Generated a device file /dev/dsa/wq0.1
+ * Return:  0 OK; 1 Failed; 3 Skip(SVM disabled).
+ */
+int Dsa_Init_Sysfs(void)
+{
+	uint len = ARRAY_SIZE(dsa_configs);
+	const char **p = dsa_configs;
+
+	if (file_Exists(dsaDeviceFile) == 1)
+		return 0;
+
+	/* check the idxd driver */
+	if (file_Exists(dsaPasidEnable) != 1) {
+		printf("Please make sure idxd driver was loaded\n");
+		return 3;
+	}
+
+	/* Check SVM feature */
+	if (Check_DSA_Kernel_Setting() != 1) {
+		printf("Please enable SVM.(Add intel_iommu=on,sm_on in kernel cmdline)\n");
+		return 3;
+	}
+
+	/* Check the idxd device file on /dev/dsa/ */
+	for (int i = 0; i < len; i++) {
+		if (system(p[i]))
+			return 1;
+	}
+
+	/* After config, /dev/dsa/wq0.1 should be generated */
+	return (file_Exists(dsaDeviceFile) != 1);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Open DSA device file, triger API: iommu_sva_alloc_pasid
+ */
+void *allocate_dsa_pasid(void)
+{
+	int fd;
+	void *wq;
+
+	fd = open(dsaDeviceFile, O_RDWR);
+	if (fd < 0) {
+		perror("open");
+		return MAP_FAILED;
+	}
+
+	wq = mmap(NULL, 0x1000, PROT_WRITE,
+			   MAP_SHARED | MAP_POPULATE, fd, 0);
+	if (wq == MAP_FAILED)
+		perror("mmap");
+
+	return wq;
+}
+
+int set_force_svm(void)
+{
+	int ret = 0;
+
+	ret = syscall(SYS_arch_prctl, ARCH_FORCE_TAGGED_SVM);
+
+	return ret;
+}
+
+int handle_pasid(struct testcases *test)
+{
+	uint tmp = test->cmd;
+	uint runed = 0x0;
+	int ret = 0;
+	void *wq = NULL;
+
+	ret = Dsa_Init_Sysfs();
+	if (ret != 0)
+		return ret;
+
+	for (int i = 0; i < 3; i++) {
+		int err = 0;
+
+		if (tmp & 0x1) {
+			/* run set lam mode*/
+			if ((runed & 0x1) == 0)	{
+				err = set_lam(LAM_U57_BITS);
+				runed = runed | 0x1;
+			} else
+				err = 1;
+		} else if (tmp & 0x4) {
+			/* run force svm */
+			if ((runed & 0x4) == 0)	{
+				err = set_force_svm();
+				runed = runed | 0x4;
+			} else
+				err = 1;
+		} else if (tmp & 0x2) {
+			/* run allocate pasid */
+			if ((runed & 0x2) == 0) {
+				runed = runed | 0x2;
+				wq = allocate_dsa_pasid();
+				if (wq == MAP_FAILED)
+					err = 1;
+			} else
+				err = 1;
+		}
+
+		ret = ret + err;
+		if (ret > 0)
+			break;
+
+		tmp = tmp >> 4;
+	}
+
+	if (wq != MAP_FAILED && wq != NULL)
+		if (munmap(wq, 0x1000))
+			printf("munmap failed %d\n", errno);
+
+	if (runed != 0x7)
+		ret = 1;
+
+	return (ret != 0);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Pasid test depends on idxd and SVM, kernel should enable iommu and sm.
+ * command line(intel_iommu=on,sm_on)
+ */
+static struct testcases pasid_cases[] = {
+	{
+		.expected = 1,
+		.cmd = PAS_CMD(LAM_CMD_BIT, PAS_CMD_BIT, SVM_CMD_BIT),
+		.test_func = handle_pasid,
+		.msg = "PASID: [Negative] Execute LAM, PASID, SVM in sequence\n",
+	},
+	{
+		.expected = 0,
+		.cmd = PAS_CMD(LAM_CMD_BIT, SVM_CMD_BIT, PAS_CMD_BIT),
+		.test_func = handle_pasid,
+		.msg = "PASID: Execute LAM, SVM, PASID in sequence\n",
+	},
+	{
+		.expected = 1,
+		.cmd = PAS_CMD(PAS_CMD_BIT, LAM_CMD_BIT, SVM_CMD_BIT),
+		.test_func = handle_pasid,
+		.msg = "PASID: [Negative] Execute PASID, LAM, SVM in sequence\n",
+	},
+	{
+		.expected = 0,
+		.cmd = PAS_CMD(PAS_CMD_BIT, SVM_CMD_BIT, LAM_CMD_BIT),
+		.test_func = handle_pasid,
+		.msg = "PASID: Execute PASID, SVM, LAM in sequence\n",
+	},
+	{
+		.expected = 0,
+		.cmd = PAS_CMD(SVM_CMD_BIT, LAM_CMD_BIT, PAS_CMD_BIT),
+		.test_func = handle_pasid,
+		.msg = "PASID: Execute SVM, LAM, PASID in sequence\n",
+	},
+	{
+		.expected = 0,
+		.cmd = PAS_CMD(SVM_CMD_BIT, PAS_CMD_BIT, LAM_CMD_BIT),
+		.test_func = handle_pasid,
+		.msg = "PASID: Execute SVM, PASID, LAM in sequence\n",
+	},
+};
+
 int main(int argc, char **argv)
 {
 	int c = 0;
@@ -910,6 +1140,9 @@ int main(int argc, char **argv)
 	if (tests & FUNC_INHERITE)
 		run_test(inheritance_cases, ARRAY_SIZE(inheritance_cases));
 
+	if (tests & FUNC_PASID)
+		run_test(pasid_cases, ARRAY_SIZE(pasid_cases));
+
 	ksft_set_plan(tests_cnt);
 
 	return ksft_exit_pass();
Signature · 1 line
2.38.0