crypto: dh - infrastructure for NVM in-band auth and FIPS conformance
Subsystems (5)
v2 cover crypto: dh - infrastructure for NVM in-band auth and FIPS conformance
Hi all,
first of all, to the people primarily interested in security/keys/, there's a rather trivial change to security/keys/dh.c in patch 2/18. It would be great to get ACKs for that...
This is v2, v1 can be found at
https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
For a list of changes, see below.
Quote from v1's cover letter:
===
Hannes' recent work on NVME in-band authentication ([1]) needs access to the RFC 7919 DH group parameters and also some means to generate ephemeral keys. He currently implements both as part of his patchset (patches 3/12 and 8/12). After some internal discussion, we decided to split off the bits needed from crypto/dh into a separate series, i.e. this one here:
- for the RFC 7919 DH group parameters, it's undesirable from a performance POV to serialize the well-known domain parameters via crypto_dh_encode_key() just to deserialize them shortly after again,
- from an architectural POV, it would be preferrable to have the key generation code in crypto/dh.c rather than in drivers/nvme/, just in analogy to how key generation is supported by crypto/ecdh.c already.
Patches 1-13/18 implement all that is needed for the NVME in-band authentication support.
Unfortunately, due to the lack of HW, I have not been able to test the changes to the QAT or HPRE drivers (other than mere compile tests). Yet I figured it would be a good idea to have them behave consistently with dh_generic, and so I chose to introduce support for privkey generation to these as well.
By coincidence, NIST SP800-56Arev3 compliance effectively requires that the domain parameters are checked against an approved set, which happens to consists of those safe-prime group parameters specified in RFC 7919, among others. Thus, introducing the RFC 7919 parameters to the kernel allows for making the DH implementation to conform to SP800-56Arev3 with only little effort. I used the opportunity to work crypto/dh towards SP800-56Arev3 conformance with the rest of this patch series, i.e. patches 14-18/18. I can split these into another series on its own, if you like. But as they depend on the earlier patches 1-13/18, I sent them alongside for now.
===
This patchset has been tested with and without fips_enabled on x86_64, ppc64le and s390x, the latter being big endian.
Changes v1 -> v2:
- Throughout the patchset:
- Upcase enum group_id members and strip superfluous _RFCXYZ_ parts from the names.
- Carry Hannes' Reviewed-bys from v1 over for those patches which have not changed (except for that group_id member renaming)
- [03/18] ("crypto: dh - optimize domain parameter serialization for well-known groups"):
- For better portability, don't serialize/deserialize directly from/to an enum group_id, but use an intermediate int for that.
- [05/18] ("crypto: testmgr - add DH RFC 7919 ffdhe2048 test vector")
- Use ffdhe3072 TVs rather than ones for ffdhe2048. Requested by Hannes, because "the NVMe spec mandates for its TLS profile the ffdhe3072 group".
- [13/18] ("crypto: testmgr - add DH test vectors for key generation")
- Use ffdhe3072 in place of ffdhe2048 here as well.
- Rather than introducing completely new keypairs, reuse the ones from the known answer test introduced previously in this patchset.
Thanks,
Nicolai
[1] https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Nicolai Stange (18):
crypto: dh - remove struct dh's ->q member
crypto: dh - constify struct dh's pointer members
crypto: dh - optimize domain parameter serialization for well-known
groups
crypto: dh - introduce RFC 7919 safe-prime groups
crypto: testmgr - add DH RFC 7919 ffdhe3072 test vector
crypto: dh - introduce RFC 3526 safe-prime groups
crypto: testmgr - add DH RFC 3526 modp2048 test vector
crypto: testmgr - run only subset of DH vectors based on config
crypto: dh - implement private key generation primitive
crypto: dh - introduce support for ephemeral key generation to
dh-generic
crypto: dh - introduce support for ephemeral key generation to hpre
driver
crypto: dh - introduce support for ephemeral key generation to qat
driver
crypto: testmgr - add DH test vectors for key generation lib/mpi: export mpi_rshift
crypto: dh - store group id in dh-generic's dh_ctx
crypto: dh - calculate Q from P for the full public key verification
crypto: dh - try to match domain parameters to a known safe-prime
group
crypto: dh - accept only approved safe-prime groups in FIPS mode
crypto/Kconfig | 20 +- crypto/dh.c | 73 +- crypto/dh_helper.c | 691 +++++++++++++++++- crypto/testmgr.h | 388 +++++++++- drivers/crypto/hisilicon/hpre/hpre_crypto.c | 11 + drivers/crypto/qat/qat_common/qat_asym_algs.c | 9 + include/crypto/dh.h | 52 +- lib/mpi/mpi-bit.c | 1 + security/keys/dh.c | 2 +- 9 files changed, 1189 insertions(+), 58 deletions(-)
Signature · 1 line
2.26.2
PATCH v2 1/18 crypto: dh - remove struct dh's ->q member
The only current user of the DH KPP algorithm, the keyctl(KEYCTL_DH_COMPUTE) syscall, doesn't set the domain parameter ->q in struct dh. Remove it and any associated (de)serialization code in crypto_dh_encode_key() and crypto_dh_decode_key. Adjust the encoded ->secret values in testmgr's DH test vectors accordingly.
Note that the dh-generic implementation would have initialized its struct dh_ctx's ->q from the decoded struct dh's ->q, if present. If this struct dh_ctx's ->q would ever have been non-NULL, it would have enabled a full key validation as specified in NIST SP800-56A in dh_is_pubkey_valid(). However, as outlined above, ->q is always NULL in practice and the full key validation code is effectively dead. A later patch will make dh_is_pubkey_valid() to calculate Q from P on the fly, if possible, so don't remove struct dh_ctx's ->q now, but leave it there until that has happened.
--- crypto/dh.c | 6 ------ crypto/dh_helper.c | 17 ++++------------- crypto/testmgr.h | 16 ++++++---------- include/crypto/dh.h | 4 ---- 4 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 33 deletions(-)
crypto/dh.c +0 -6
@@ -59,12 +59,6 @@ static int dh_set_params(struct dh_ctx *ctx, struct dh *params)if (!ctx->p)return -EINVAL ; -if (params->q && params->q_size) { - ctx->q =mpi_read_raw_data (params->q, params->q_size); -if (!ctx->q) -return -EINVAL ; - } - ctx->g =mpi_read_raw_data (params->g, params->g_size);if (!ctx->g)return -EINVAL ;
crypto/dh_helper.c +4 -13
@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@#include <crypto/dh.h> #include <crypto/kpp.h> -#define DH_KPP_SECRET_MIN_SIZE (sizeof(struct kpp_secret) + 4 * sizeof(int)) +#define DH_KPP_SECRET_MIN_SIZE (sizeof(struct kpp_secret) + 3 * sizeof(int))static inline u8 *dh_pack_data (u8 *dst,u8 *end,const void *src,size_t size) {
@@ -28,7 +28,7 @@ static inline const u8 *dh_unpack_data(void *dst, const void *src, size_t size)static inline unsigned int dh_data_size (const struct dh *p) { -return p->key_size + p->p_size + p->q_size + p->g_size; +return p->key_size + p->p_size + p->g_size; }unsigned int crypto_dh_key_len (const struct dh *p)
@@ -53,11 +53,9 @@ int crypto_dh_encode_key(char *buf, unsigned int len, const struct dh *params) ptr =dh_pack_data (ptr, end, ¶ms->key_size,sizeof (params->key_size)); ptr =dh_pack_data (ptr, end, ¶ms->p_size,sizeof (params->p_size)); - ptr =dh_pack_data (ptr, end, ¶ms->q_size,sizeof (params->q_size)); ptr =dh_pack_data (ptr, end, ¶ms->g_size,sizeof (params->g_size)); ptr =dh_pack_data (ptr, end, params->key, params->key_size); ptr =dh_pack_data (ptr, end, params->p, params->p_size); - ptr =dh_pack_data (ptr, end, params->q, params->q_size); ptr =dh_pack_data (ptr, end, params->g, params->g_size);if (ptr != end)return -EINVAL ;
@@ -79,7 +77,6 @@ int crypto_dh_decode_key(const char *buf, unsigned int len, struct dh *params) ptr =dh_unpack_data (¶ms->key_size, ptr,sizeof (params->key_size)); ptr =dh_unpack_data (¶ms->p_size, ptr,sizeof (params->p_size)); - ptr =dh_unpack_data (¶ms->q_size, ptr,sizeof (params->q_size)); ptr =dh_unpack_data (¶ms->g_size, ptr,sizeof (params->g_size));if (secret.len !=crypto_dh_key_len (params))return -EINVAL ;
@@ -89,7 +86,7 @@ int crypto_dh_decode_key(const char *buf, unsigned int len, struct dh *params)* some drivers assume otherwise. */ if (params->key_size > params->p_size || - params->g_size > params->p_size || params->q_size > params->p_size) + params->g_size > params->p_size)return -EINVAL ;/* Don't allocate memory. Set pointers to data within
@@ -97,9 +94,7 @@ int crypto_dh_decode_key(const char *buf, unsigned int len, struct dh *params)*/ params->key = (void *)ptr; params->p = (void *)(ptr + params->key_size); - params->q = (void *)(ptr + params->key_size + params->p_size); - params->g = (void *)(ptr + params->key_size + params->p_size + - params->q_size); + params->g = (void *)(ptr + params->key_size + params->p_size);/* * Don't permit 'p' to be 0. It's not a prime number, and it's subject
@@ -109,10 +104,6 @@ int crypto_dh_decode_key(const char *buf, unsigned int len, struct dh *params)if (memchr_inv (params->p,0 , params->p_size) ==NULL )return -EINVAL ; -/* It is permissible to not provide Q. */ -if (params->q_size ==0 ) - params->q =NULL ; -return 0 ; }EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL (crypto_dh_decode_key);
crypto/testmgr.h +6 -10
@@ -1244,17 +1244,15 @@ static const struct kpp_testvec dh_tv_template[] = { .secret =#ifdef __LITTLE_ENDIAN"\x01\x00" /* type */ -"\x15\x02" /* len */ +"\x11\x02" /* len */ "\x00\x01\x00\x00" /* key_size */ "\x00\x01\x00\x00" /* p_size */ -"\x00\x00\x00\x00" /* q_size */ "\x01\x00\x00\x00" /* g_size */#else "\x00\x01" /* type */ -"\x02\x15" /* len */ +"\x02\x11" /* len */ "\x00\x00\x01\x00" /* key_size */ "\x00\x00\x01\x00" /* p_size */ -"\x00\x00\x00\x00" /* q_size */ "\x00\x00\x00\x01" /* g_size */#endif /* xa */
@@ -1344,7 +1342,7 @@ static const struct kpp_testvec dh_tv_template[] = {"\xd3\x34\x49\xad\x64\xa6\xb1\xc0\x59\x28\x75\x60\xa7\x8a\xb0\x11" "\x56\x89\x42\x74\x11\xf5\xf6\x5e\x6f\x16\x54\x6a\xb1\x76\x4d\x50" "\x8a\x68\xc1\x5b\x82\xb9\x0d\x00\x32\x50\xed\x88\x87\x48\x92\x17", - .secret_size = 533, + .secret_size = 529, .b_public_size = 256, .expected_a_public_size = 256, .expected_ss_size = 256,
@@ -1353,17 +1351,15 @@ static const struct kpp_testvec dh_tv_template[] = { .secret =#ifdef __LITTLE_ENDIAN"\x01\x00" /* type */ -"\x15\x02" /* len */ +"\x11\x02" /* len */ "\x00\x01\x00\x00" /* key_size */ "\x00\x01\x00\x00" /* p_size */ -"\x00\x00\x00\x00" /* q_size */ "\x01\x00\x00\x00" /* g_size */#else "\x00\x01" /* type */ -"\x02\x15" /* len */ +"\x02\x11" /* len */ "\x00\x00\x01\x00" /* key_size */ "\x00\x00\x01\x00" /* p_size */ -"\x00\x00\x00\x00" /* q_size */ "\x00\x00\x00\x01" /* g_size */#endif /* xa */
@@ -1453,7 +1449,7 @@ static const struct kpp_testvec dh_tv_template[] = {"\x5e\x5a\x64\xbd\xf6\x85\x04\xe8\x28\x6a\xac\xef\xce\x19\x8e\x9a" "\xfe\x75\xc0\x27\x69\xe3\xb3\x7b\x21\xa7\xb1\x16\xa4\x85\x23\xee" "\xb0\x1b\x04\x6e\xbd\xab\x16\xde\xfd\x86\x6b\xa9\x95\xd7\x0b\xfd", - .secret_size = 533, + .secret_size = 529, .b_public_size = 256, .expected_a_public_size = 256, .expected_ss_size = 256,
include/crypto/dh.h +0 -4
@@ -24,21 +24,17 @@* * @key: Private DH key * @p: Diffie-Hellman parameter P -* @q: Diffie-Hellman parameter Q * @g: Diffie-Hellman generator G * @key_size: Size of the private DH key * @p_size: Size of DH parameter P -* @q_size: Size of DH parameter Q * @g_size: Size of DH generator G */ struct dh {void *key;void *p; -void *q;void *g;unsigned int key_size;unsigned int p_size; -unsigned int q_size;unsigned int g_size; };
Signature · 1 line
2.26.2
PATCH v2 2/18 crypto: dh - constify struct dh's pointer members
In reply to Nicolai Stangestruct dh contains several pointer members corresponding to DH parameters:
->key, ->p and ->g. A subsequent commit will make the struct dh deserialization function, crypto_dh_decode_key(), to set these to constant static storage arrays for some of the well-known safe-prime groups.
Turn the struct dh pointer members' types into "pointer to const" in preparation for this.
--- include/crypto/dh.h | 6 +++--- security/keys/dh.c | 2 +- 2 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
include/crypto/dh.h +3 -3
@@ -30,9 +30,9 @@* @g_size: Size of DH generator G */ struct dh { -void *key; -void *p; -void *g; +const void *key; +const void *p; +const void *g;unsigned int key_size;unsigned int p_size;unsigned int g_size;
security/keys/dh.c +1 -1
@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@#include <keys/user-type.h> #include "internal.h" -static ssize_t dh_data_from_key (key_serial_t keyid,void **data) +static ssize_t dh_data_from_key (key_serial_t keyid,const void **data) {struct key *key;key_ref_t key_ref;
Signature · 1 line
2.26.2
PATCH v2 3/18 crypto: dh - optimize domain parameter serialization for well-known groups
In reply to Nicolai StangeDH users are supposed to set a struct dh instance's ->p and ->g domain parameters (as well as the secret ->key), serialize the whole struct dh instance via the crypto_dh_encode_key() helper and pass the encoded blob on to the DH's ->set_secret(). All three currently available DH implementations (generic, drivers/crypto/hisilicon/hpre/ and drivers/crypto/qat/) would then proceed to call the crypto_dh_decode_key() helper for unwrapping the encoded struct dh instance again.
Up to now, the only DH user has been the keyctl(KEYCTL_DH_COMPUTE) syscall and thus, all domain parameters have been coming from userspace. The domain parameter encoding scheme for DH's ->set_secret() has been a perfectly reasonable approach in this setting and the potential extra copy of ->p and ->g during the encoding phase didn't harm much.
However, recently, the need for working with the well-known safe-prime groups' domain parameters from RFC 3526 and RFC 7919 resp. arose from two independent developments:
- The NVME in-band authentication support currently being worked on ([1]) needs to install the RFC 7919 ffdhe groups' domain parameters for DH tfms.
- In FIPS mode, there's effectively no sensible way for the DH implementation to conform to SP800-56Arev3 other than rejecting any parameter set not corresponding to some approved safe-prime group specified in either of these two RFCs.
As the ->p arrays' lengths are in the range from 256 to 1024 bytes, it would be nice if that extra copy during the crypto_dh_encode_key() step from the NVME in-band authentication code could be avoided. Likewise, it would be great if the DH implementation's FIPS handling code could avoid attempting to match the input ->p and ->g against the individual approved groups' parameters via memcmp() if it's known in advance that the input corresponds to such one, as is the case for NVME.
Introduce a enum dh_group_id for referring to any of the safe-prime groups known to the kernel. The introduction of actual such safe-prime groups alongside with their resp. P and G parameters will be deferred to later patches. As of now, the new enum contains only a single member, DH_GROUP_ID_UNKNOWN, which is meant to be associated with parameter sets not corresponding to any of the groups known to the kernel, as is needed to continue to support the current keyctl(KEYCTL_DH_COMPUTE) syscall semantics.
Add a new 'group_id' member of type enum group_id to struct dh. Make crypto_dh_encode_key() include it in the serialization and to encode ->p and ->g only if it equals DH_GROUP_ID_UNKNOWN. For all other possible values of the encoded ->group_id, the receiving decoding primitive, crypto_dh_decode_key(), is made to not decode ->p and ->g from the encoded data, but to look them up in a central registry instead.
The intended usage pattern is that users like NVME wouldn't set any of the struct dh's ->p or ->g directly, but only the ->group_id for the group they're interested in. They'd then proceed as usual and call crypto_dh_encode_key() on the struct dh instance, pass the encoded result on to DH's ->set_secret() and the latter would then invoke crypto_dh_decode_key(), which would then in turn lookup the parameters associated with the passed ->group_id.
Note that this will avoid the extra copy of the ->p and ->g for the groups (to be made) known to the kernel and also, that a future patch can easily introduce a validation of ->group_id if in FIPS mode.
As mentioned above, the introduction of actual safe-prime groups will be deferred to later patches, so for now, only introduce an empty placeholder array safe_prime_groups[] to be queried by crypto_dh_decode_key() for domain parameters associated with a given ->group_id as outlined above. Make its elements to be of the new internal struct safe_prime_group type. Among the members ->group_id, ->p and ->p_size with obvious meaning, there will also be a ->max_strength member for storing the maximum security strength supported by the associated group -- its value will be needed for the upcoming private key generation support.
Finally, update the encoded secrets provided by the testmgr's DH test vectors in order to account for the additional ->group_id field expected by crypto_dh_decode_key() now.
[1] https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
--- crypto/dh_helper.c | 90 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------- crypto/testmgr.h | 16 +++++--- include/crypto/dh.h | 6 +++ 3 files changed, 88 insertions(+), 24 deletions(-)
crypto/dh_helper.c +72 -18
@@ -10,7 +10,31 @@#include <crypto/dh.h> #include <crypto/kpp.h> -#define DH_KPP_SECRET_MIN_SIZE (sizeof(struct kpp_secret) + 3 * sizeof(int)) +#define DH_KPP_SECRET_MIN_SIZE (sizeof(struct kpp_secret) + 4 * sizeof(int)) + +static const struct safe_prime_group +{ +enum dh_group_id group_id; +unsigned int max_strength; +unsigned int p_size; +const char *p; +} safe_prime_groups[] = {}; + +/* 2 is used as a generator for all safe-prime groups. */ +static const char safe_prime_group_g[] = {2 }; + +static inline const struct safe_prime_group * +get_safe_prime_group (enum dh_group_id group_id) +{ +int i; + +for (i =0 ; i <ARRAY_SIZE (safe_prime_groups); ++i) { +if (safe_prime_groups[i].group_id == group_id) +return &safe_prime_groups[i]; + } + +return NULL ; +}static inline u8 *dh_pack_data (u8 *dst,u8 *end,const void *src,size_t size) {
@@ -28,7 +52,10 @@ static inline const u8 *dh_unpack_data(void *dst, const void *src, size_t size)static inline unsigned int dh_data_size (const struct dh *p) { -return p->key_size + p->p_size + p->g_size; +if (p->group_id ==DH_GROUP_ID_UNKNOWN ) +return p->key_size + p->p_size + p->g_size; +else +return p->key_size; }unsigned int crypto_dh_key_len (const struct dh *p)
@@ -45,18 +72,24 @@ int crypto_dh_encode_key(char *buf, unsigned int len, const struct dh *params) .type = CRYPTO_KPP_SECRET_TYPE_DH, .len = len }; +int group_id;if (unlikely (!len))return -EINVAL ; ptr =dh_pack_data (ptr, end, &secret,sizeof (secret)); + group_id = (int )params->group_id; + ptr =dh_pack_data (ptr, end, &group_id,sizeof (group_id)); ptr =dh_pack_data (ptr, end, ¶ms->key_size,sizeof (params->key_size)); ptr =dh_pack_data (ptr, end, ¶ms->p_size,sizeof (params->p_size)); ptr =dh_pack_data (ptr, end, ¶ms->g_size,sizeof (params->g_size)); ptr =dh_pack_data (ptr, end, params->key, params->key_size); - ptr =dh_pack_data (ptr, end, params->p, params->p_size); - ptr =dh_pack_data (ptr, end, params->g, params->g_size); +if (params->group_id ==DH_GROUP_ID_UNKNOWN ) { + ptr =dh_pack_data (ptr, end, params->p, params->p_size); + ptr =dh_pack_data (ptr, end, params->g, params->g_size); + } +if (ptr != end)return -EINVAL ;return 0 ;
@@ -67,6 +100,7 @@ int crypto_dh_decode_key(const char *buf, unsigned int len, struct dh *params) {const u8 *ptr = buf;struct kpp_secret secret; +int group_id;if (unlikely (!buf || len <DH_KPP_SECRET_MIN_SIZE ))return -EINVAL ;
@@ -75,12 +109,46 @@ int crypto_dh_decode_key(const char *buf, unsigned int len, struct dh *params)if (secret.type !=CRYPTO_KPP_SECRET_TYPE_DH )return -EINVAL ; + ptr =dh_unpack_data (&group_id, ptr,sizeof (group_id)); + params->group_id = (enum dh_group_id )group_id; ptr =dh_unpack_data (¶ms->key_size, ptr,sizeof (params->key_size)); ptr =dh_unpack_data (¶ms->p_size, ptr,sizeof (params->p_size)); ptr =dh_unpack_data (¶ms->g_size, ptr,sizeof (params->g_size));if (secret.len !=crypto_dh_key_len (params))return -EINVAL ; +if (params->group_id ==DH_GROUP_ID_UNKNOWN ) { +/* Don't allocate memory. Set pointers to data within +* the given buffer +*/ + params->key = (void *)ptr; + params->p = (void *)(ptr + params->key_size); + params->g = (void *)(ptr + params->key_size + params->p_size); + +/* +* Don't permit 'p' to be 0. It's not a prime number, +* and it's subject to corner cases such as 'mod 0' +* being undefined or crypto_kpp_maxsize() returning +* 0. +*/ +if (memchr_inv (params->p,0 , params->p_size) ==NULL ) +return -EINVAL ; + + }else { +const struct safe_prime_group *g; + + g =get_safe_prime_group (params->group_id); +if (!g) +return -EINVAL ; + + params->key = (void *)ptr; + + params->p = g->p; + params->p_size = g->p_size; + params->g = safe_prime_group_g; + params->g_size =sizeof (safe_prime_group_g); + } +/* * Don't permit the buffer for 'key' or 'g' to be larger than 'p', since * some drivers assume otherwise.
@@ -89,20 +157,6 @@ int crypto_dh_decode_key(const char *buf, unsigned int len, struct dh *params) params->g_size > params->p_size)return -EINVAL ; -/* Don't allocate memory. Set pointers to data within -* the given buffer -*/ - params->key = (void *)ptr; - params->p = (void *)(ptr + params->key_size); - params->g = (void *)(ptr + params->key_size + params->p_size); - -/* -* Don't permit 'p' to be 0. It's not a prime number, and it's subject -* to corner cases such as 'mod 0' being undefined or -* crypto_kpp_maxsize() returning 0. -*/ -if (memchr_inv (params->p,0 , params->p_size) ==NULL ) -return -EINVAL ;return 0 ; }
crypto/testmgr.h +10 -6
@@ -1244,13 +1244,15 @@ static const struct kpp_testvec dh_tv_template[] = { .secret =#ifdef __LITTLE_ENDIAN"\x01\x00" /* type */ -"\x11\x02" /* len */ +"\x15\x02" /* len */ +"\x00\x00\x00\x00" /* group_id == DH_GROUP_ID_UNKNOWN */ "\x00\x01\x00\x00" /* key_size */ "\x00\x01\x00\x00" /* p_size */ "\x01\x00\x00\x00" /* g_size */#else "\x00\x01" /* type */ -"\x02\x11" /* len */ +"\x02\x15" /* len */ +"\x00\x00\x00\x00" /* group_id == DH_GROUP_ID_UNKNOWN */ "\x00\x00\x01\x00" /* key_size */ "\x00\x00\x01\x00" /* p_size */ "\x00\x00\x00\x01" /* g_size */
@@ -1342,7 +1344,7 @@ static const struct kpp_testvec dh_tv_template[] = {"\xd3\x34\x49\xad\x64\xa6\xb1\xc0\x59\x28\x75\x60\xa7\x8a\xb0\x11" "\x56\x89\x42\x74\x11\xf5\xf6\x5e\x6f\x16\x54\x6a\xb1\x76\x4d\x50" "\x8a\x68\xc1\x5b\x82\xb9\x0d\x00\x32\x50\xed\x88\x87\x48\x92\x17", - .secret_size = 529, + .secret_size = 533, .b_public_size = 256, .expected_a_public_size = 256, .expected_ss_size = 256,
@@ -1351,13 +1353,15 @@ static const struct kpp_testvec dh_tv_template[] = { .secret =#ifdef __LITTLE_ENDIAN"\x01\x00" /* type */ -"\x11\x02" /* len */ +"\x15\x02" /* len */ +"\x00\x00\x00\x00" /* group_id == DH_GROUP_ID_UNKNOWN */ "\x00\x01\x00\x00" /* key_size */ "\x00\x01\x00\x00" /* p_size */ "\x01\x00\x00\x00" /* g_size */#else "\x00\x01" /* type */ -"\x02\x11" /* len */ +"\x02\x15" /* len */ +"\x00\x00\x00\x00" /* group_id == DH_GROUP_ID_UNKNOWN */ "\x00\x00\x01\x00" /* key_size */ "\x00\x00\x01\x00" /* p_size */ "\x00\x00\x00\x01" /* g_size */
@@ -1449,7 +1453,7 @@ static const struct kpp_testvec dh_tv_template[] = {"\x5e\x5a\x64\xbd\xf6\x85\x04\xe8\x28\x6a\xac\xef\xce\x19\x8e\x9a" "\xfe\x75\xc0\x27\x69\xe3\xb3\x7b\x21\xa7\xb1\x16\xa4\x85\x23\xee" "\xb0\x1b\x04\x6e\xbd\xab\x16\xde\xfd\x86\x6b\xa9\x95\xd7\x0b\xfd", - .secret_size = 529, + .secret_size = 533, .b_public_size = 256, .expected_a_public_size = 256, .expected_ss_size = 256,
include/crypto/dh.h +6 -0
@@ -19,6 +19,11 @@* the KPP API function call of crypto_kpp_set_secret. */ +/** enum dh_group_id - identify well-known domain parameter sets */ +enum dh_group_id { +DH_GROUP_ID_UNKNOWN =0 ,/* Constants are used in test vectors. */ +}; +/** * struct dh - define a DH private key *
@@ -30,6 +35,7 @@* @g_size: Size of DH generator G */ struct dh { +enum dh_group_id group_id;const void *key;const void *p;const void *g;
Signature · 1 line
2.26.2
Re: [PATCH v2 03/18] crypto: dh - optimize domain parameter serialization for well-known groups
Quoted 135 lines · Nicolai Stange
DH users are supposed to set a struct dh instance's ->p and ->g domain parameters (as well as the secret ->key), serialize the whole struct dh instance via the
crypto_dh_encode_key()helper and pass the encoded blob on to the DH's ->set_secret(). All three currently available DH implementations (generic,drivers/crypto/hisilicon/hpre/anddrivers/crypto/qat/) would then proceed to call thecrypto_dh_decode_key()helper for unwrapping the encoded struct dh instance again.Up to now, the only DH user has been the
keyctl(KEYCTL_DH_COMPUTE)syscall and thus, all domain parameters have been coming from userspace. The domain parameter encoding scheme for DH's ->set_secret() has been a perfectly reasonable approach in this setting and the potential extra copy of ->p and ->g during the encoding phase didn't harm much.However, recently, the need for working with the well-known safe-prime groups' domain parameters from RFC 3526 and RFC 7919 resp. arose from two independent developments:
- The NVME in-band authentication support currently being worked on ([1]) needs to install the RFC 7919 ffdhe groups' domain parameters for DH tfms.
- In FIPS mode, there's effectively no sensible way for the DH implementation to conform to SP800-56Arev3 other than rejecting any parameter set not corresponding to some approved safe-prime group specified in either of these two RFCs.As the ->p arrays' lengths are in the range from 256 to 1024 bytes, it would be nice if that extra copy during the
crypto_dh_encode_key()step from the NVME in-band authentication code could be avoided. Likewise, it would be great if the DH implementation's FIPS handling code could avoid attempting to match the input ->p and ->g against the individual approved groups' parameters viamemcmp()if it's known in advance that the input corresponds to such one, as is the case for NVME.Introduce a enum
dh_group_idfor referring to any of the safe-prime groups known to the kernel. The introduction of actual such safe-prime groups alongside with their resp. P and G parameters will be deferred to later patches. As of now, the new enum contains only a single member,DH_GROUP_ID_UNKNOWN, which is meant to be associated with parameter sets not corresponding to any of the groups known to the kernel, as is needed to continue to support the currentkeyctl(KEYCTL_DH_COMPUTE)syscall semantics.Add a new '
group_id' member of type enumgroup_idto struct dh. Makecrypto_dh_encode_key()include it in the serialization and to encode ->p and ->g only if it equalsDH_GROUP_ID_UNKNOWN. For all other possible values of the encoded ->group_id, the receiving decoding primitive,crypto_dh_decode_key(), is made to not decode ->p and ->g from the encoded data, but to look them up in a central registry instead.The intended usage pattern is that users like NVME wouldn't set any of the struct dh's ->p or ->g directly, but only the ->group_id for the group they're interested in. They'd then proceed as usual and call
crypto_dh_encode_key()on the struct dh instance, pass the encoded result on to DH's ->set_secret() and the latter would then invokecrypto_dh_decode_key(), which would then in turn lookup the parameters associated with the passed ->group_id.Note that this will avoid the extra copy of the ->p and ->g for the groups (to be made) known to the kernel and also, that a future patch can easily introduce a validation of ->group_id if in FIPS mode.
As mentioned above, the introduction of actual safe-prime groups will be deferred to later patches, so for now, only introduce an empty placeholder array safe_prime_groups[] to be queried by
crypto_dh_decode_key()for domain parameters associated with a given ->group_id as outlined above. Make its elements to be of the new internal structsafe_prime_grouptype. Among the members ->group_id, ->p and ->p_size with obvious meaning, there will also be a ->max_strength member for storing the maximum security strength supported by the associated group -- its value will be needed for the upcoming private key generation support.Finally, update the encoded secrets provided by the testmgr's DH test vectors in order to account for the additional ->group_id field expected by
crypto_dh_decode_key()now.[1] https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by Nicolai Stange <[email protected]>--- crypto/dh_helper.c | 90 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------- crypto/testmgr.h | 16 +++++--- include/crypto/dh.h | 6 +++ 3 files changed, 88 insertions(+), 24 deletions(-)crypto/dh_helper.c +29
-2@@ -10,7 +10,31 @@#include <crypto/dh.h> #include <crypto/kpp.h> -#define DH_KPP_SECRET_MIN_SIZE (sizeof(struct kpp_secret) + 3 * sizeof(int)) +#define DH_KPP_SECRET_MIN_SIZE (sizeof(struct kpp_secret) + 4 * sizeof(int)) + +static const struct safe_prime_group +{ +enum dh_group_id group_id; +unsigned int max_strength; +unsigned int p_size; +const char *p; +} safe_prime_groups[] = {}; + +/* 2 is used as a generator for all safe-prime groups. */ +static const char safe_prime_group_g[] = {2 }; + +static inline const struct safe_prime_group * +get_safe_prime_group (enum dh_group_id group_id) +{ +int i; + +for (i =0 ; i <ARRAY_SIZE (safe_prime_groups); ++i) { +if (safe_prime_groups[i].group_id == group_id) +return &safe_prime_groups[i]; + } + +return NULL ; +}static inline u8 *dh_pack_data (u8 *dst,u8 *end,const void *src,size_t size) {@@ -28,7 +52,10 @@ static inline const u8 *dh_unpack_data(void *dst, const void *src, size_t size)static inline unsigned int dh_data_size (const struct dh *p) { -return p->key_size + p->p_size + p->g_size; +if (p->group_id ==DH_GROUP_ID_UNKNOWN ) +return p->key_size + p->p_size + p->g_size; +else +return p->key_size; }unsigned int crypto_dh_key_len (const struct dh *p)@@ -45,18 +72,24 @@ int crypto_dh_encode_key(char *buf, unsigned int len, const struct dh *params) .type = CRYPTO_KPP_SECRET_TYPE_DH,
crypto/dh_helper.c int crypto_dh_encode_key(char *buf, unsigned int len, const struct dh *params) · line 82
Quoted 10 lines
crypto/dh_helper.c +3
-0.len = len }; +int group_id;if (unlikely (!len))return -EINVAL ; ptr =dh_pack_data (ptr, end, &secret,sizeof (secret)); + group_id = (int )params->group_id; + ptr =dh_pack_data (ptr, end, &group_id,sizeof (group_id));
Me being picky again.
To my knowledge, 'int' doesn't have a fixed width, but is rather only guaranteed to hold certain values.
So as soon as one relies on any fixed size (as this one does) I tend to use fixed size type like 'u32' to make it absolutely clear what is to be expected here.
But the I don't know the conventions in the crypto code; if an 'int' is assumed to be 32 bits throughout the crypto code I guess we should be fine.
Cheers,
Hannes
Signature · 4 lines
Dr. Hannes Reinecke Kernel Storage Architect [email protected] +49 911 74053 688 SUSE Software Solutions Germany GmbH, Maxfeldstr. 5, 90409 Nürnberg HRB 36809 (AG Nürnberg), GF: Felix Imendörffer
Re: [PATCH v2 03/18] crypto: dh - optimize domain parameter serialization for well-known groups
Quoted 25 lines · Hannes Reinecke
Quoted 6 lines · Nicolai Stange
crypto/dh_helper.c +0
-0@@ -45,18 +72,24 @@ int crypto_dh_encode_key(char *buf, unsigned int len, const struct dh *params) .type = CRYPTO_KPP_SECRET_TYPE_DH,crypto/dh_helper.c int crypto_dh_encode_key(char *buf, unsigned int len, const struct dh *params) · line 82
Quoted 10 lines
crypto/dh_helper.c +3
-0.len = len }; +int group_id;if (unlikely (!len))return -EINVAL ; ptr =dh_pack_data (ptr, end, &secret,sizeof (secret)); + group_id = (int )params->group_id; + ptr =dh_pack_data (ptr, end, &group_id,sizeof (group_id));Me being picky again.
To my knowledge, 'int' doesn't have a fixed width, but is rather only guaranteed to hold certain values.
So as soon as one relies on any fixed size (as this one does) I tend to use fixed size type like 'u32' to make it absolutely clear what is to be expected here.
Quoted 2 lines
But the I don't know the conventions in the crypto code; if an 'int' is assumed to be 32 bits throughout the crypto code I guess we should be fine.
Yes, I thought about this, too. However, the other, already existing fields like ->key_size and ->p_size are getting serialized as unsigned ints and I decided to stick to that for ->group_id as well. Except for the testmgr vectors, the encoding is internal to the crypto_dh_encode_key() and crypto_dh_decode_key() pair anyway -- all that would happen if sizeof(int) != 4 is that the tests would fail.
So, IMO, making the serialization of struct dh to use u32 throughout is not really in scope for this series and would probably deserve a patch on its own, if desired.
Thanks,
Nicolai
Signature · 2 lines
SUSE Software Solutions Germany GmbH, Maxfeldstr. 5, 90409 Nürnberg, Germany (HRB 36809, AG Nürnberg), GF: Ivo Totev
Hannes Reinecke
Reviewed-byRe: [PATCH v2 03/18] crypto: dh - optimize domain parameter serialization for well-known groups
Quoted 37 lines · Nicolai Stange
Quoted 25 lines · Hannes Reinecke
Quoted 6 lines · Nicolai Stange
crypto/dh_helper.c +0
-0@@ -45,18 +72,24 @@ int crypto_dh_encode_key(char *buf, unsigned int len, const struct dh *params) .type = CRYPTO_KPP_SECRET_TYPE_DH,crypto/dh_helper.c int crypto_dh_encode_key(char *buf, unsigned int len, const struct dh *params) · line 82
Quoted 10 lines
crypto/dh_helper.c +3
-0.len = len }; +int group_id;if (unlikely (!len))return -EINVAL ; ptr =dh_pack_data (ptr, end, &secret,sizeof (secret)); + group_id = (int )params->group_id; + ptr =dh_pack_data (ptr, end, &group_id,sizeof (group_id));Me being picky again.
To my knowledge, 'int' doesn't have a fixed width, but is rather only guaranteed to hold certain values.
So as soon as one relies on any fixed size (as this one does) I tend to use fixed size type like 'u32' to make it absolutely clear what is to be expected here.Quoted 2 lines
But the I don't know the conventions in the crypto code; if an 'int' is assumed to be 32 bits throughout the crypto code I guess we should be fine.
Yes, I thought about this, too. However, the other, already existing fields like ->key_size and ->p_size are getting serialized as unsigned ints and I decided to stick to that for ->group_id as well. Except for the testmgr vectors, the encoding is internal to the
crypto_dh_encode_key()andcrypto_dh_decode_key()pair anyway -- all that would happen if sizeof(int) != 4 is that the tests would fail.
Quoted 4 lines
So, IMO, making the serialization of struct dh to use u32 throughout is not really in scope for this series and would probably deserve a patch on its own, if desired.
As I thought.
So that's okay, then.
Cheers,
Hannes
Signature · 4 lines
Dr. Hannes Reinecke Kernel Storage Architect [email protected] +49 911 74053 688 SUSE Software Solutions Germany GmbH, Maxfeldstr. 5, 90409 Nürnberg HRB 36809 (AG Nürnberg), GF: Felix Imendörffer
Herbert Xu
maintainerRe: [PATCH v2 03/18] crypto: dh - optimize domain parameter serialization for well-known groups
In reply to Nicolai Stangeinclude/crypto/dh.h line 25
Quoted 12 lines · Nicolai Stange
include/crypto/dh.h
Quoted 1 line
include/crypto/dh.h +0
-0index
67f3f6bca527..f0ed899e2168100644include/crypto/dh.h +4
-0@@ -19,6 +19,11 @@* the KPP API function call of crypto_kpp_set_secret. */ +/** enum dh_group_id - identify well-known domain parameter sets */ +enum dh_group_id { +DH_GROUP_ID_UNKNOWN =0 ,/* Constants are used in test vectors. */ +};
We try to avoid hard-coded ID lists like these in the Crypto API.
I've had a look at your subsequent patches and I don't think you really need this.
For instance, instead of shoehorning this into "dh", you could instead create new kpp algorithms modpXXXX and ffdheXXXX which can be templates around the underlying dh algorithm. Sure this might involve a copy of the parameters but given the speed of the algorithms that we're talking about here I don't think it's really relevant.
That way the underlying drivers don't need to be touched at all.
Yes I do realise that this means the keyrings DH user-space API cannot be used in FIPS mode, but that is probably a good thing as users who care about modp/ffdhe shouldn't really have to stuff the raw vectors into this interface just to access the kernel DH implementation.
On a side note, are there really keyrings DH users out there in the wild? If not can we deprecate and remove this interface completely?
Cheers,
Signature · 3 lines
Email: Herbert Xu <[email protected]> Home Page: http://gondor.apana.org.au/~herbert/ PGP Key: http://gondor.apana.org.au/~herbert/pubkey.txt
Re: [PATCH v2 03/18] crypto: dh - optimize domain parameter serialization for well-known groups
Hello Herbert,
Quoted 9 lines · Herbert Xu
Quoted 8 lines · Nicolai Stange
include/crypto/dh.h
Quoted 1 line
include/crypto/dh.h +0
-0index
67f3f6bca527..f0ed899e2168100644include/crypto/dh.h +0
-0@@ -19,6 +19,11 @@* the KPP API function call of crypto_kpp_set_secret. */
Quoted 6 lines
include/crypto/dh.h line 25
Quoted 4 lines
include/crypto/dh.h +4
-0+/** enum dh_group_id - identify well-known domain parameter sets */ +enum dh_group_id { +DH_GROUP_ID_UNKNOWN =0 ,/* Constants are used in test vectors. */ +};We try to avoid hard-coded ID lists like these in the Crypto API.
Just for my understanding: the problem here is having a (single) enum for the representation of all the possible "known" groups in the first place or more that the individual group id enum members have hard-coded values assigned to them each?
Quoted 6 lines
I've had a look at your subsequent patches and I don't think you really need this.
For instance, instead of shoehorning this into "dh", you could instead create new kpp algorithms modpXXXX and ffdheXXXX which can be templates around the underlying dh algorithm.
FWIW, when implementing this, I considered aligning more to the ecdh API, namely to register separate algorithms for each dh group as you suggested above: "dh-ffdhe2048" etc. in analogy to "ecdh-nist-p192" and alike.
The various (three in total) ecdh-nist-* kpp_alg variants differ only in their ->init(), which would all set ->curve_id to the corresponding ECC_CURVE_NIST_* constant as appropriate.
However, after some back and forth, I opted against doing something similar for dh at the time, because there are quite some more possible parameter sets than there are for ecdh, namely ten vs. three. If we were to render the KEYCTL_DH_COMPUTE functionality unusable in FIPS mode alltogether (see below), I could drop the MODP* group support, but that would still leave me with the five FFDHE* kpp_alg variants I had to at least provide separate test vectors for. I think that these five TVs would be quite redundant as they'd all merely test the implementation of dh_set_secret() + dh_compute_value() with different input parameters. This might be acceptable though, I only wanted to bring it up.
Anyway, just to make sure I'm getting it right: when you're saying "template", you mean to implement a crypto_template for instantiating patterns like "dh(ffdhe2048)", "dh(ffdhe3072)" and so on? The dh(...) template instantiations would keep a crypto_spawn for referring to the underlying, non-template "dh" kpp_alg so that "dh" implementations of higher priority (hpre + qat) would take over once they'd become available, correct?
AFAICS, it would make sense to introduce something like struct kpp_instance, crypto_kpp_spawn and associated helpers as a prerequisite then. Which wouldn't be a problem by me, just saying that it's not there yet. I'm not sure there would be other potential users of such an infrastructure, perhaps Stephan's SP800-108 KDF ([1]) is a candidate?
Quoted 3 lines
Sure this might involve a copy of the parameters but given the speed of the algorithms that we're talking about here I don't think it's really relevant.
Ok, understood. I'm by no means a FIPS expert, but I bet I'd still have to somehow convey a flag like "this group parameter P is approved" from the frontend template instantiations like "dh(ffdhe2048)" to the underlying "dh" implementation and make the latter reject any non-approved groups. That is, with my limited experience with FIPS, I'd expect that disabling the only known path to get non-approved parameters into "dh", i.e. KEYCTL_DH_COMPUTE, would not be sufficient for achieving conformance. Note that those dh_group_id's previously serialized via crypto_dh_encode_key() served this purpose, in addition to enabling that optimization of not copying the Ps when possible.
I'm not really sure, but simply introducing a flag like ->fips_approved to struct dh and serializing that as an alternative would probably not work out, because it would in theory still allow potential "dh" users to set it (e.g. by accident) even when specifying non-approved Ps.
Stephan?
Quoted 2 lines
That way the underlying drivers don't need to be touched at all.
FWIW, I touched the drivers only for consistency with ecdh and the related drivers/crypto implementations, which all invoke the privkey generation from their resp. ->set_secret().
As an alternative, I could have also made crypto_dh_encode_key() to generate an ephemeral key on the fly for input ->key_size == 0. This wouldn't be much different from how I'd imagine a dh(...) template based approach to work: its ->set_secret() would take a private key, if any, and
- generate a private key if none has been specified,
- kmalloc() a buffer for crypto_dh_encode_key(),
- serialize the key, P and G for the underlying "dh" implementation via crypto_dh_encode_key(),
- pass the encoded result onwards to the underlying "dh"'s ->set_secret() and
- kfree() the buffer again.
So instead of having the proposed template's ->set_secret() wrapper around crypto_dh_encode_key() to take care of generating ephemeral keys, I could have made the latter to do that as well, I think.
Quoted 5 lines
Yes I do realise that this means the keyrings DH user-space API cannot be used in FIPS mode, but that is probably a good thing as users who care about modp/ffdhe shouldn't really have to stuff the raw vectors into this interface just to access the kernel DH implementation.
The sole purpose of introducing the MODP* parameters with this patchset had been to keep KEYCTL_DH_COMPUTE functional in FIPS mode to the extent
possible: NVMe in-band authentication OTOH needs only FFHDE*. If it would be acceptable or even desirable to render KEYCTL_DH_COMPUTE unusable in FIPS mode, I'd drop the MODP* related patches.
However, it would perhaps be fair to reflect KEYCTL_DH_COMPUTE's new dependency on !fips_enabled in keyctl_capabilities() then, but this can probably be done with a separate follow-up patch.
Quoted 4 lines
On a side note, are there really keyrings DH users out there in the wild? If not can we deprecate and remove this interface completely?
I wondered the same when first looking into this -- a web search returned the Embedded Linux library ([2]), which seems to rely on KEYCTL_DH_COMPUTE for implementing TLS (web servers for embedded devices?). Then there's the keyctl(1) utility, which exposes this interface via its "dh_compute" subcommand. Lastly, there exist some Rust and Go bindings also -- hard to say if anything is using those.
Thanks!
Nicolai
[1] https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
[2] https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/libs/ell/ell.git/
Signature · 2 lines
SUSE Software Solutions Germany GmbH, Maxfeldstr. 5, 90409 Nürnberg, Germany (HRB 36809, AG Nürnberg), GF: Ivo Totev
Herbert Xu
maintainerRe: [PATCH v2 03/18] crypto: dh - optimize domain parameter serialization for well-known groups
Quoted 5 lines · Nicolai Stange
Just for my understanding: the problem here is having a (single) enum for the representation of all the possible "known" groups in the first place or more that the individual group id enum members have hard-coded values assigned to them each?
Yes the fact that you need to have a list of all "known" groups is the issue.
Quoted 3 lines
However, after some back and forth, I opted against doing something similar for dh at the time, because there are quite some more possible parameter sets than there are for ecdh, namely ten vs. three. If we were
I don't understand why we can't support ten or an even larger number of parameter sets.
If you are concerned about code duplication then there are ways around that. Or do you have another specific concern in mind with respect to a large number of parameter sets under this scheme?
Quoted 7 lines
Anyway, just to make sure I'm getting it right: when you're saying "template", you mean to implement a
crypto_templatefor instantiating patterns like "dh(ffdhe2048)", "dh(ffdhe3072)" and so on? The dh(...) template instantiations would keep acrypto_spawnfor referring to the underlying, non-template "dh"kpp_algso that "dh" implementations of higher priority (hpre + qat) would take over once they'd become available, correct?
The template would work in the other dirirection. It would look like ffdhe2048(dh) with dh being implemented in either software or hardware.
The template wrapper would simply supply the relevant parameters.
Cheers,
Signature · 3 lines
Email: Herbert Xu <[email protected]> Home Page: http://gondor.apana.org.au/~herbert/ PGP Key: http://gondor.apana.org.au/~herbert/pubkey.txt
Re: [PATCH v2 03/18] crypto: dh - optimize domain parameter serialization for well-known groups
Am Mittwoch, 29. Dezember 2021, 03:14:41 CET schrieb Herbert Xu:
Hi Herbert,
Quoted 28 lines · Nicolai Stange
Quoted 4 lines
Just for my understanding: the problem here is having a (single) enum for the representation of all the possible "known" groups in the first place or more that the individual group id enum members have hard-coded values assigned to them each?
Yes the fact that you need to have a list of all "known" groups is the issue.
Quoted 3 lines
However, after some back and forth, I opted against doing something similar for dh at the time, because there are quite some more possible parameter sets than there are for ecdh, namely ten vs. three. If we were
I don't understand why we can't support ten or an even larger number of parameter sets.
If you are concerned about code duplication then there are ways around that. Or do you have another specific concern in mind with respect to a large number of parameter sets under this scheme?
Quoted 7 lines
Anyway, just to make sure I'm getting it right: when you're saying "template", you mean to implement a
crypto_templatefor instantiating patterns like "dh(ffdhe2048)", "dh(ffdhe3072)" and so on? The dh(...) template instantiations would keep acrypto_spawnfor referring to the underlying, non-template "dh"kpp_algso that "dh" implementations of higher priority (hpre + qat) would take over once they'd become available, correct?
Quoted 5 lines
The template would work in the other dirirection. It would look like ffdhe2048(dh) with dh being implemented in either software or hardware.
The template wrapper would simply supply the relevant parameters.
I fully agree with you. However, there is a small wrinkle we should consider. In FIPS mode, we must only allow DH together with the safe primes provided by the templates of ffdheXX and modpXX.
This means in FIPS mode, invoking the algo of "dh" should not be possible. Yet, on the other hand, we cannot mark "dh" as fips_allowed == 0 as the templates would not be able to instantiate them.
Therefore, I think we should mark "dh" as CRYPTO_ALG_INTERNAL if in FIPS mode. To do so, I would think that dh_init should contain something like:
if (fips_enabled)
dh.base.cra_flags |= CRYPTO_ALG_INTERNAL;
When encapsulating this small flag setting code into a helper function (just like xts_check_key or xts_verify_key) this helper can be added to other / new DH implementations QAT to make them FIPS-compliant. This would be the same approach as we currently take for XTS where each XTS implementation must have a callback to xts_check_key.
Marking "dh" as INTERNAL implies it cannot be allocated in FIPS mode. Some may think this is a small inconsistency as this algo is marked fips_allowed == 1. I personally think there is no inconsistency because DH *is* allowed, however with a small policy caveat (the requirement to use it with safe-primes). So, having "dh" with fips_allowed == 1 but marking it as INTERNAL should be also consistent.
Yes, it is a small misuse of the INTERNAL flag. But the alternative would be to create a "__dh" implementation that is wrapped by "dh". In turn this implies a big churn as we would need to touch all drivers implementing "dh".
Quoted 2 lines
Cheers,
Ciao
Stephan
Herbert Xu
maintainerRe: [PATCH v2 03/18] crypto: dh - optimize domain parameter serialization for well-known groups
Quoted 4 lines · Stephan Mueller
This means in FIPS mode, invoking the algo of "dh" should not be possible. Yet, on the other hand, we cannot mark "dh" as
fips_allowed== 0 as the templates would not be able to instantiate them.
Right, we have exactly the same problem with sha1 where sha1 per se should be not be allowed in FIPS mode but hmac(sha1) should be.
Quoted 1 line
Therefore, I think we should mark "dh" as
CRYPTO_ALG_INTERNALif in FIPS mode.
I think the annotation should be added to testmgr.c. We could mark dh and sha1 as not fips_allowed but allowed as the parameter of a template. This could then be represented in the crypto_alg object by a new flag.
This flag could then be set automatically in crypto_grab_* to allow them to be picked up automatically for templates.
I'm already writing this up for sha1 anyway so let me polish it off and I'll post it soon which you can then reuse it for dh.
Cheers,
Signature · 3 lines
Email: Herbert Xu <[email protected]> Home Page: http://gondor.apana.org.au/~herbert/ PGP Key: http://gondor.apana.org.au/~herbert/pubkey.txt
Re: [PATCH v2 03/18] crypto: dh - optimize domain parameter serialization for well-known groups
Quoted 16 lines · Herbert Xu
Quoted 4 lines · Stephan Mueller
This means in FIPS mode, invoking the algo of "dh" should not be possible. Yet, on the other hand, we cannot mark "dh" as
fips_allowed== 0 as the templates would not be able to instantiate them.Right, we have exactly the same problem with sha1 where sha1 per se should be not be allowed in FIPS mode but hmac(sha1) should be.
Quoted 1 line
Therefore, I think we should mark "dh" as
CRYPTO_ALG_INTERNALif in FIPS mode.I think the annotation should be added to
testmgr.c. We could mark dh and sha1 as notfips_allowedbut allowed as the parameter of a template. This could then be represented in thecrypto_algobject by a new flag.
Quoted 5 lines
This flag could then be set automatically in crypto_grab_* to allow them to be picked up automatically for templates.
I'm already writing this up for sha1 anyway so let me polish it off and I'll post it soon which you can then reuse it for dh.
Perfect, this will solve my problem with how to handle "dh" vs. fips_enabled quite nicely.
Many thanks!
Nicolai
Signature · 2 lines
SUSE Software Solutions Germany GmbH, Maxfeldstr. 5, 90409 Nürnberg, Germany (HRB 36809, AG Nürnberg), GF: Ivo Totev
Herbert Xu
maintainerPATCH 1/1 crypto: api - Disallow sha1 in FIPS-mode while allowing hmac(sha1)
In reply to Herbert XuQuoted 3 lines · Herbert Xu
I'm already writing this up for sha1 anyway so let me polish it off and I'll post it soon which you can then reuse it for dh.
Here is something that seems to work for sha1/hmac. Please let me know if you see any issues with this approach for dh.
Thanks,
---8<---
Currently we do not distinguish between algorithms that fail on the self-test vs. those which are disabled in FIPS mode (not allowed). Both are marked as having failed the self-test.
As it has been requested that we need to disable sha1 in FIPS mode while still allowing hmac(sha1) this approach needs to change.
This patch allows this scenario by adding a new flag FIPS_INTERNAL to indicate those algorithms that have passed the self-test and are not FIPS-allowed. They can then be used for the self-testing of other algorithms or by those that are explicitly allowed to use them (currently just hmac).
Note that as a side-effect of this patch algorithms which are not FIPS-allowed will now return ENOENT instead of ELIBBAD. Hopefully this is not an issue as some people were relying on this already.
crypto/algapi.c +7 -1
@@ -322,7 +322,13 @@ void crypto_alg_tested(const char *name, int err) found: q->cra_flags |=CRYPTO_ALG_DEAD ; alg = test->adult; -if (err ||list_empty (&alg->cra_list)) + +if (list_empty (&alg->cra_list)) + goto complete; + +if (err == -ECANCELED ) + alg->cra_flags |=CRYPTO_ALG_FIPS_INTERNAL ; +else if (err) goto complete; alg->cra_flags |=CRYPTO_ALG_TESTED ;
crypto/api.c +4 -0
@@ -314,6 +314,10 @@ struct crypto_alg *crypto_alg_mod_lookup(const char *name, u32 type, u32 mask)if (!((type | mask) &CRYPTO_ALG_INTERNAL )) mask |=CRYPTO_ALG_INTERNAL ; +/* Ditto for FIPS_INTERNAL. */ +if (!((type | mask) &CRYPTO_ALG_FIPS_INTERNAL )) + mask |=CRYPTO_ALG_FIPS_INTERNAL ; + larval =crypto_larval_lookup (name, type, mask);if (IS_ERR (larval) || !crypto_is_larval (larval))return larval;
crypto/hmac.c +3 -1
@@ -169,6 +169,7 @@ static int hmac_create(struct crypto_template *tmpl, struct rtattr **tb)struct crypto_alg *alg;struct shash_alg *salg;u32 mask; +u32 type;int err;int ds;int ss;
@@ -182,8 +183,9 @@ static int hmac_create(struct crypto_template *tmpl, struct rtattr **tb)return -ENOMEM ; spawn =shash_instance_ctx (inst); + type =CRYPTO_ALG_FIPS_INTERNAL ; err =crypto_grab_shash (spawn,shash_crypto_instance (inst), -crypto_attr_alg_name (tb[1 ]),0 , mask); +crypto_attr_alg_name (tb[1 ]), type, mask);if (err) goto err_free_inst; salg =crypto_spawn_shash_alg (spawn);
crypto/testmgr.c +15 -12
@@ -1664,7 +1664,8 @@ static int test_hash_vs_generic_impl(const char *generic_driver,if (strcmp (generic_driver, driver) ==0 )/* Already the generic impl? */ return 0 ; - generic_tfm =crypto_alloc_shash (generic_driver,0 ,0 ); + generic_tfm =crypto_alloc_shash (generic_driver, +CRYPTO_ALG_FIPS_INTERNAL ,0 );if (IS_ERR (generic_tfm)) { err =PTR_ERR (generic_tfm);if (err == -ENOENT ) {
@@ -2387,7 +2388,8 @@ static int test_aead_vs_generic_impl(struct aead_extra_tests_ctx *ctx)if (strcmp (generic_driver, driver) ==0 )/* Already the generic impl? */ return 0 ; - generic_tfm =crypto_alloc_aead (generic_driver,0 ,0 ); + generic_tfm =crypto_alloc_aead (generic_driver, +CRYPTO_ALG_FIPS_INTERNAL ,0 );if (IS_ERR (generic_tfm)) { err =PTR_ERR (generic_tfm);if (err == -ENOENT ) {
@@ -2986,7 +2988,8 @@ static int test_skcipher_vs_generic_impl(const char *generic_driver,if (strcmp (generic_driver, driver) ==0 )/* Already the generic impl? */ return 0 ; - generic_tfm =crypto_alloc_skcipher (generic_driver,0 ,0 ); + generic_tfm =crypto_alloc_skcipher (generic_driver, +CRYPTO_ALG_FIPS_INTERNAL ,0 );if (IS_ERR (generic_tfm)) { err =PTR_ERR (generic_tfm);if (err == -ENOENT ) {
@@ -5328,7 +5331,6 @@ static const struct alg_test_desc alg_test_descs[] = { }, { .alg = "sha1", .test = alg_test_hash, - .fips_allowed = 1, .suite = { .hash = __VECS(sha1_tv_template) }
@@ -5637,9 +5639,6 @@ int alg_test(const char *driver, const char *alg, u32 type, u32 mask)if (i <0 ) goto notest; -if (fips_enabled && !alg_test_descs[i].fips_allowed) - goto non_fips_alg; - rc =alg_test_cipher (alg_test_descs + i, driver, type, mask); goto test_done; }
@@ -5649,8 +5648,7 @@ int alg_test(const char *driver, const char *alg, u32 type, u32 mask)if (i <0 && j <0 ) goto notest; -if (fips_enabled && ((i >=0 && !alg_test_descs[i].fips_allowed) || - (j >=0 && !alg_test_descs[j].fips_allowed))) +if (fips_enabled && (j >=0 && !alg_test_descs[j].fips_allowed)) goto non_fips_alg; rc =0 ;
@@ -5671,10 +5669,15 @@ int alg_test(const char *driver, const char *alg, u32 type, u32 mask) }WARN (1 ,"alg: self-tests for %s (%s) failed (rc=%d)" , driver, alg, rc); - }else { -if (fips_enabled) -pr_info ("alg: self-tests for %s (%s) passed\n" , + }else if (fips_enabled) { +pr_info ("alg: self-tests for %s (%s) passed\n" , + driver, alg); + +if (i >=0 && !alg_test_descs[i].fips_allowed) { +pr_info ("alg: %s (%s) is disabled due to FIPS\n" , driver, alg); + rc = -ECANCELED ; + } }return rc;
include/linux/crypto.h +9 -0
@@ -132,6 +132,15 @@*/ #define CRYPTO_ALG_ALLOCATES_MEMORY 0x00010000 +/* +* Mark an algorithm as a service implementation only usable by a +* template and never by a normal user of the kernel crypto API. +* This is intended to be used by algorithms that are themselves +* not FIPS-approved but may instead be used to implement parts of +* a FIPS-approved algorithm (e.g., sha1 vs. hmac(sha1)). +*/ +#define CRYPTO_ALG_FIPS_INTERNAL 0x00020000 +/* * Transform masks and values (for crt_flags). */
Signature · 3 lines
Email: Herbert Xu <[email protected]> Home Page: http://gondor.apana.org.au/~herbert/ PGP Key: http://gondor.apana.org.au/~herbert/pubkey.txt
Re: [PATCH] crypto: api - Disallow sha1 in FIPS-mode while allowing hmac(sha1)
Hi Herbert,
Quoted 15 lines · Herbert Xu
Quoted 3 lines · Herbert Xu
I'm already writing this up for sha1 anyway so let me polish it off and I'll post it soon which you can then reuse it for dh.
Here is something that seems to work for sha1/hmac. Please let me know if you see any issues with this approach for dh.
Thanks,
---8<---
Currently we do not distinguish between algorithms that fail on the self-test vs. those which are disabled in FIPS mode (not allowed). Both are marked as having failed the self-test.
Quoted 8 lines
As it has been requested that we need to disable sha1 in FIPS mode while still allowing hmac(sha1) this approach needs to change.
This patch allows this scenario by adding a new flag
FIPS_INTERNALto indicate those algorithms that have passed the self-test and are not FIPS-allowed. They can then be used for the self-testing of other algorithms or by those that are explicitly allowed to use them (currently just hmac).
I haven't tried, but wouldn't this allow the instantiation of e.g. hmac(blake2s-256) in FIPS mode?
Thanks,
Nicolai
Quoted 7 lines
Note that as a side-effect of this patch algorithms which are not FIPS-allowed will now return ENOENT instead of ELIBBAD. Hopefully this is not an issue as some people were relying on this already.
Signed-off-by Herbert Xu <[email protected]>
Signature · 2 lines
SUSE Software Solutions Germany GmbH, Maxfeldstr. 5, 90409 Nürnberg, Germany (HRB 36809, AG Nürnberg), GF: Ivo Totev
Herbert Xu
maintainerRe: [PATCH] crypto: api - Disallow sha1 in FIPS-mode while allowing hmac(sha1)
Quoted 3 lines · Nicolai Stange
I haven't tried, but wouldn't this allow the instantiation of e.g. hmac(blake2s-256) in FIPS mode?
You're right. The real issue is that any algorithm with no tests at all is allowed in FIPS mode. That's clearly suboptimal. But we can't just ban every unknown algorithm because we rely on that to let things like echainiv through.
Let me figure out a way to differentiate these two cases.
Thanks,
Signature · 3 lines
Email: Herbert Xu <[email protected]> Home Page: http://gondor.apana.org.au/~herbert/ PGP Key: http://gondor.apana.org.au/~herbert/pubkey.txt
Herbert Xu
maintainerPATCH v2 1/1 crypto: api - Disallow sha1 in FIPS-mode while allowing hmac(sha1)
Quoted 7 lines · Herbert Xu
You're right. The real issue is that any algorithm with no tests at all is allowed in FIPS mode. That's clearly suboptimal. But we can't just ban every unknown algorithm because we rely on that to let things like echainiv through.
Let me figure out a way to differentiate these two cases.
So what I've done is modify hmac so that if the underlying algo is FIPS_INTERNAL, then we pre-emptively set FIPS_INTERNAL on the hmac side as well. This can then be cleared if the hmac algorithm is explicitly listed as fips_allowed.
---8<---
Currently we do not distinguish between algorithms that fail on the self-test vs. those which are disabled in FIPS mode (not allowed). Both are marked as having failed the self-test.
As it has been requested that we need to disable sha1 in FIPS mode while still allowing hmac(sha1) this approach needs to change.
This patch allows this scenario by adding a new flag FIPS_INTERNAL to indicate those algorithms that have passed the self-test and are not FIPS-allowed. They can then be used for the self-testing of other algorithms or by those that are explicitly allowed to use them (currently just hmac).
Note that as a side-effect of this patch algorithms which are not FIPS-allowed will now return ENOENT instead of ELIBBAD. Hopefully this is not an issue as some people were relying on this already.
crypto/algapi.c +9 -1
@@ -322,8 +322,16 @@ void crypto_alg_tested(const char *name, int err) found: q->cra_flags |=CRYPTO_ALG_DEAD ; alg = test->adult; -if (err ||list_empty (&alg->cra_list)) + +if (list_empty (&alg->cra_list)) + goto complete; + +if (err == -ECANCELED ) + alg->cra_flags |=CRYPTO_ALG_FIPS_INTERNAL ; +else if (err) goto complete; +else + alg->cra_flags &= ~CRYPTO_ALG_FIPS_INTERNAL ; alg->cra_flags |=CRYPTO_ALG_TESTED ;
crypto/api.c +17 -2
@@ -223,6 +223,8 @@ static struct crypto_alg *crypto_larval_wait(struct crypto_alg *alg)else if (crypto_is_test_larval (larval) && !(alg->cra_flags &CRYPTO_ALG_TESTED )) alg =ERR_PTR (-EAGAIN ); +else if (alg->cra_flags &CRYPTO_ALG_FIPS_INTERNAL ) + alg =ERR_PTR (-EAGAIN );else if (!crypto_mod_get (alg)) alg =ERR_PTR (-EAGAIN );crypto_mod_put (&larval->alg);
@@ -233,6 +235,7 @@ static struct crypto_alg *crypto_larval_wait(struct crypto_alg *alg)static struct crypto_alg *crypto_alg_lookup (const char *name,u32 type,u32 mask) { +const u32 fips =CRYPTO_ALG_FIPS_INTERNAL ;struct crypto_alg *alg;u32 test =0 ;
@@ -240,8 +243,20 @@ static struct crypto_alg *crypto_alg_lookup(const char *name, u32 type, test |=CRYPTO_ALG_TESTED ;down_read (&crypto_alg_sem); - alg =__crypto_alg_lookup (name, type | test, mask | test); -if (!alg && test) { + alg =__crypto_alg_lookup (name, (type | test) & ~fips, + (mask | test) & ~fips); +if (alg) { +if (((type | mask) ^ fips) & fips) + mask |= fips; + mask &= fips; + +if (!crypto_is_larval (alg) && + ((type ^ alg->cra_flags) & mask)) { +/* Algorithm is disallowed in FIPS mode. */ +crypto_mod_put (alg); + alg =ERR_PTR (-ENOENT ); + } + }else if (test) { alg =__crypto_alg_lookup (name, type, mask);if (alg && !crypto_is_larval (alg)) {/* Test failed */
crypto/hmac.c +4 -1
@@ -169,6 +169,7 @@ static int hmac_create(struct crypto_template *tmpl, struct rtattr **tb)struct crypto_alg *alg;struct shash_alg *salg;u32 mask; +u32 type;int err;int ds;int ss;
@@ -182,8 +183,9 @@ static int hmac_create(struct crypto_template *tmpl, struct rtattr **tb)return -ENOMEM ; spawn =shash_instance_ctx (inst); + type =CRYPTO_ALG_FIPS_INTERNAL ; err =crypto_grab_shash (spawn,shash_crypto_instance (inst), -crypto_attr_alg_name (tb[1 ]),0 , mask); +crypto_attr_alg_name (tb[1 ]), type, mask);if (err) goto err_free_inst; salg =crypto_spawn_shash_alg (spawn);
@@ -204,6 +206,7 @@ static int hmac_create(struct crypto_template *tmpl, struct rtattr **tb)if (err) goto err_free_inst; + inst->alg.base.cra_flags = alg->cra_flags &CRYPTO_ALG_FIPS_INTERNAL ; inst->alg.base.cra_priority = alg->cra_priority; inst->alg.base.cra_blocksize = alg->cra_blocksize; inst->alg.base.cra_alignmask = alg->cra_alignmask;
crypto/testmgr.c +24 -13
@@ -1664,7 +1664,8 @@ static int test_hash_vs_generic_impl(const char *generic_driver,if (strcmp (generic_driver, driver) ==0 )/* Already the generic impl? */ return 0 ; - generic_tfm =crypto_alloc_shash (generic_driver,0 ,0 ); + generic_tfm =crypto_alloc_shash (generic_driver, +CRYPTO_ALG_FIPS_INTERNAL ,0 );if (IS_ERR (generic_tfm)) { err =PTR_ERR (generic_tfm);if (err == -ENOENT ) {
@@ -2387,7 +2388,8 @@ static int test_aead_vs_generic_impl(struct aead_extra_tests_ctx *ctx)if (strcmp (generic_driver, driver) ==0 )/* Already the generic impl? */ return 0 ; - generic_tfm =crypto_alloc_aead (generic_driver,0 ,0 ); + generic_tfm =crypto_alloc_aead (generic_driver, +CRYPTO_ALG_FIPS_INTERNAL ,0 );if (IS_ERR (generic_tfm)) { err =PTR_ERR (generic_tfm);if (err == -ENOENT ) {
@@ -2986,7 +2988,8 @@ static int test_skcipher_vs_generic_impl(const char *generic_driver,if (strcmp (generic_driver, driver) ==0 )/* Already the generic impl? */ return 0 ; - generic_tfm =crypto_alloc_skcipher (generic_driver,0 ,0 ); + generic_tfm =crypto_alloc_skcipher (generic_driver, +CRYPTO_ALG_FIPS_INTERNAL ,0 );if (IS_ERR (generic_tfm)) { err =PTR_ERR (generic_tfm);if (err == -ENOENT ) {
@@ -5328,7 +5331,6 @@ static const struct alg_test_desc alg_test_descs[] = { }, { .alg = "sha1", .test = alg_test_hash, - .fips_allowed = 1, .suite = { .hash = __VECS(sha1_tv_template) }
@@ -5613,6 +5615,13 @@ static int alg_find_test(const char *alg)return -1 ; } +static int alg_fips_disabled (const char *driver,const char *alg) +{ +pr_info ("alg: %s (%s) is disabled due to FIPS\n" , alg, driver); + +return -ECANCELED ; +} +int alg_test (const char *driver,const char *alg,u32 type,u32 mask) {int i;
@@ -5637,9 +5646,6 @@ int alg_test(const char *driver, const char *alg, u32 type, u32 mask)if (i <0 ) goto notest; -if (fips_enabled && !alg_test_descs[i].fips_allowed) - goto non_fips_alg; - rc =alg_test_cipher (alg_test_descs + i, driver, type, mask); goto test_done; }
@@ -5649,8 +5655,7 @@ int alg_test(const char *driver, const char *alg, u32 type, u32 mask)if (i <0 && j <0 ) goto notest; -if (fips_enabled && ((i >=0 && !alg_test_descs[i].fips_allowed) || - (j >=0 && !alg_test_descs[j].fips_allowed))) +if (fips_enabled && (j >=0 && !alg_test_descs[j].fips_allowed)) goto non_fips_alg; rc =0 ;
@@ -5671,16 +5676,22 @@ int alg_test(const char *driver, const char *alg, u32 type, u32 mask) }WARN (1 ,"alg: self-tests for %s (%s) failed (rc=%d)" , driver, alg, rc); - }else { -if (fips_enabled) -pr_info ("alg: self-tests for %s (%s) passed\n" , - driver, alg); + }else if (fips_enabled) { +pr_info ("alg: self-tests for %s (%s) passed\n" , + driver, alg); + +if (i >=0 && !alg_test_descs[i].fips_allowed) + rc =alg_fips_disabled (driver, alg); }return rc; notest:printk (KERN_INFO "alg: No test for %s (%s)\n" , alg, driver); + +if (type &CRYPTO_ALG_FIPS_INTERNAL ) +return alg_fips_disabled (driver, alg); +return 0 ; non_fips_alg:return -EINVAL ;
include/linux/crypto.h +9 -0
@@ -132,6 +132,15 @@*/ #define CRYPTO_ALG_ALLOCATES_MEMORY 0x00010000 +/* +* Mark an algorithm as a service implementation only usable by a +* template and never by a normal user of the kernel crypto API. +* This is intended to be used by algorithms that are themselves +* not FIPS-approved but may instead be used to implement parts of +* a FIPS-approved algorithm (e.g., sha1 vs. hmac(sha1)). +*/ +#define CRYPTO_ALG_FIPS_INTERNAL 0x00020000 +/* * Transform masks and values (for crt_flags). */
Signature · 3 lines
Email: Herbert Xu <[email protected]> Home Page: http://gondor.apana.org.au/~herbert/ PGP Key: http://gondor.apana.org.au/~herbert/pubkey.txt
Re: [v2 PATCH] crypto: api - Disallow sha1 in FIPS-mode while allowing hmac(sha1)
Hi Herbert,
many thanks for this, I think this approach can be applied as-is to the ffdheXYZ(dh) situation. I have some questions/comments inline.
Quoted 7 lines · Herbert Xu
Quoted 6 lines · Herbert Xu
You're right. The real issue is that any algorithm with no tests at all is allowed in FIPS mode. That's clearly suboptimal. But we can't just ban every unknown algorithm because we rely on that to let things like echainiv through.
Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 1 line
Let me figure out a way to differentiate these two cases.
So what I've done is modify hmac so that if the underlying algo is
FIPS_INTERNAL, then we pre-emptively setFIPS_INTERNALon the hmac side as well. This can then be cleared if the hmac algorithm is explicitly listed asfips_allowed.
I wonder whether this can be made more generic. I.e. would it be possible to make crypto_grab_spawn() to or in FIPS_INTERNAL into type (iff !(mask & FIPS_INTERNAL)) and to make crypto_register_instance() to propagate FIPS_INTERNAL from the template instance's spawns upwards into the instance's ->cra_flags?
Quoted 7 lines
---8<---
Currently we do not distinguish between algorithms that fail on the self-test vs. those which are disabled in FIPS mode (not allowed). Both are marked as having failed the self-test.As it has been requested that we need to disable sha1 in FIPS mode while still allowing hmac(sha1) this approach needs to change.
On an unrelated note, this will break trusted_key_tpm_ops->init() in FIPS mode, because trusted_shash_alloc() would fail to get a hold of sha1. AFAICT, this could potentially make the init_trusted() module_init to fail, and, as encrypted-keys.ko imports key_type_trusted, prevent the loading of that one as well. Not sure that's desired...
Quoted 39 lines
This patch allows this scenario by adding a new flag
FIPS_INTERNALto indicate those algorithms that have passed the self-test and are not FIPS-allowed. They can then be used for the self-testing of other algorithms or by those that are explicitly allowed to use them (currently just hmac).Note that as a side-effect of this patch algorithms which are not FIPS-allowed will now return ENOENT instead of ELIBBAD. Hopefully this is not an issue as some people were relying on this already.
Signed-off-by Herbert Xu <[email protected]>crypto/algapi.c +9
-1@@ -322,8 +322,16 @@ void crypto_alg_tested(const char *name, int err) found: q->cra_flags |=CRYPTO_ALG_DEAD ; alg = test->adult; -if (err ||list_empty (&alg->cra_list)) + +if (list_empty (&alg->cra_list)) + goto complete; + +if (err == -ECANCELED ) + alg->cra_flags |=CRYPTO_ALG_FIPS_INTERNAL ; +else if (err) goto complete; +else + alg->cra_flags &= ~CRYPTO_ALG_FIPS_INTERNAL ; alg->cra_flags |=CRYPTO_ALG_TESTED ;crypto/api.c +0
-0
crypto/api.c static struct crypto_alg *crypto_larval_wait(struct crypto_alg *alg) · line 227
Quoted 5 lines
crypto/api.c +2
-0@@ -223,6 +223,8 @@ static struct crypto_alg *crypto_larval_wait(struct crypto_alg *alg)else if (crypto_is_test_larval (larval) && !(alg->cra_flags &CRYPTO_ALG_TESTED )) alg =ERR_PTR (-EAGAIN ); +else if (alg->cra_flags &CRYPTO_ALG_FIPS_INTERNAL ) + alg =ERR_PTR (-EAGAIN );
I might be mistaken, but I think this would cause hmac(sha1) instantiation to fail if sha1 is not already there. I.e. if hmac(sha1) instantiation would load sha1, then it would invoke crypto_larval_wait() on the sha1 larval, see the FIPS_INTERNAL and fail?
However, wouldn't it be possible to simply implement FIPS_INTERNAL lookups in analogy to the INTERNAL ones instead? That is, would adding
if (!((type | mask) & CRYPTO_ALG_FIPS_INTERNAL)) mask |= CRYPTO_ALG_FIPS_INTERNAL;
to the preamble of crypto_alg_mod_lookup() work instead?
AFAICS, ...
Quoted 21 lines
crypto/api.c +5
-2else if (!crypto_mod_get (alg)) alg =ERR_PTR (-EAGAIN );crypto_mod_put (&larval->alg);@@ -233,6 +235,7 @@ static struct crypto_alg *crypto_larval_wait(struct crypto_alg *alg)static struct crypto_alg *crypto_alg_lookup (const char *name,u32 type,u32 mask) { +const u32 fips =CRYPTO_ALG_FIPS_INTERNAL ;struct crypto_alg *alg;u32 test =0 ;@@ -240,8 +243,20 @@ static struct crypto_alg *crypto_alg_lookup(const char *name, u32 type, test |=CRYPTO_ALG_TESTED ;down_read (&crypto_alg_sem); - alg =__crypto_alg_lookup (name, type | test, mask | test); -if (!alg && test) { + alg =__crypto_alg_lookup (name, (type | test) & ~fips, + (mask | test) & ~fips); +if (alg) { +if (((type | mask) ^ fips) & fips)
crypto/api.c static struct crypto_alg *crypto_alg_lookup(const char *name, u32 type, · line 259
Quoted 10 lines
crypto/api.c +10
-0+ mask |= fips; + mask &= fips; + +if (!crypto_is_larval (alg) && + ((type ^ alg->cra_flags) & mask)) { +/* Algorithm is disallowed in FIPS mode. */ +crypto_mod_put (alg); + alg =ERR_PTR (-ENOENT ); + } + }else if (test) {
... this check here would not be needed anymore then? But I might be missing something.
Quoted 127 lines
crypto/api.c +0
-0alg =__crypto_alg_lookup (name, type, mask);if (alg && !crypto_is_larval (alg)) {/* Test failed */ crypto/hmac.c +4
-1@@ -169,6 +169,7 @@ static int hmac_create(struct crypto_template *tmpl, struct rtattr **tb)struct crypto_alg *alg;struct shash_alg *salg;u32 mask; +u32 type;int err;int ds;int ss;@@ -182,8 +183,9 @@ static int hmac_create(struct crypto_template *tmpl, struct rtattr **tb)return -ENOMEM ; spawn =shash_instance_ctx (inst); + type =CRYPTO_ALG_FIPS_INTERNAL ; err =crypto_grab_shash (spawn,shash_crypto_instance (inst), -crypto_attr_alg_name (tb[1 ]),0 , mask); +crypto_attr_alg_name (tb[1 ]), type, mask);if (err) goto err_free_inst; salg =crypto_spawn_shash_alg (spawn);@@ -204,6 +206,7 @@ static int hmac_create(struct crypto_template *tmpl, struct rtattr **tb)if (err) goto err_free_inst; + inst->alg.base.cra_flags = alg->cra_flags &CRYPTO_ALG_FIPS_INTERNAL ; inst->alg.base.cra_priority = alg->cra_priority; inst->alg.base.cra_blocksize = alg->cra_blocksize; inst->alg.base.cra_alignmask = alg->cra_alignmask;crypto/testmgr.c +20
-13@@ -1664,7 +1664,8 @@ static int test_hash_vs_generic_impl(const char *generic_driver,if (strcmp (generic_driver, driver) ==0 )/* Already the generic impl? */ return 0 ; - generic_tfm =crypto_alloc_shash (generic_driver,0 ,0 ); + generic_tfm =crypto_alloc_shash (generic_driver, +CRYPTO_ALG_FIPS_INTERNAL ,0 );if (IS_ERR (generic_tfm)) { err =PTR_ERR (generic_tfm);if (err == -ENOENT ) {@@ -2387,7 +2388,8 @@ static int test_aead_vs_generic_impl(struct aead_extra_tests_ctx *ctx)if (strcmp (generic_driver, driver) ==0 )/* Already the generic impl? */ return 0 ; - generic_tfm =crypto_alloc_aead (generic_driver,0 ,0 ); + generic_tfm =crypto_alloc_aead (generic_driver, +CRYPTO_ALG_FIPS_INTERNAL ,0 );if (IS_ERR (generic_tfm)) { err =PTR_ERR (generic_tfm);if (err == -ENOENT ) {@@ -2986,7 +2988,8 @@ static int test_skcipher_vs_generic_impl(const char *generic_driver,if (strcmp (generic_driver, driver) ==0 )/* Already the generic impl? */ return 0 ; - generic_tfm =crypto_alloc_skcipher (generic_driver,0 ,0 ); + generic_tfm =crypto_alloc_skcipher (generic_driver, +CRYPTO_ALG_FIPS_INTERNAL ,0 );if (IS_ERR (generic_tfm)) { err =PTR_ERR (generic_tfm);if (err == -ENOENT ) {@@ -5328,7 +5331,6 @@ static const struct alg_test_desc alg_test_descs[] = { }, { .alg = "sha1", .test = alg_test_hash, - .fips_allowed = 1, .suite = { .hash = __VECS(sha1_tv_template) }@@ -5613,6 +5615,13 @@ static int alg_find_test(const char *alg)return -1 ; } +static int alg_fips_disabled (const char *driver,const char *alg) +{ +pr_info ("alg: %s (%s) is disabled due to FIPS\n" , alg, driver); + +return -ECANCELED ; +} +int alg_test (const char *driver,const char *alg,u32 type,u32 mask) {int i;@@ -5637,9 +5646,6 @@ int alg_test(const char *driver, const char *alg, u32 type, u32 mask)if (i <0 ) goto notest; -if (fips_enabled && !alg_test_descs[i].fips_allowed) - goto non_fips_alg; - rc =alg_test_cipher (alg_test_descs + i, driver, type, mask); goto test_done; }@@ -5649,8 +5655,7 @@ int alg_test(const char *driver, const char *alg, u32 type, u32 mask)if (i <0 && j <0 ) goto notest; -if (fips_enabled && ((i >=0 && !alg_test_descs[i].fips_allowed) || - (j >=0 && !alg_test_descs[j].fips_allowed))) +if (fips_enabled && (j >=0 && !alg_test_descs[j].fips_allowed)) goto non_fips_alg; rc =0 ;@@ -5671,16 +5676,22 @@ int alg_test(const char *driver, const char *alg, u32 type, u32 mask) }WARN (1 ,"alg: self-tests for %s (%s) failed (rc=%d)" , driver, alg, rc); - }else { -if (fips_enabled) -pr_info ("alg: self-tests for %s (%s) passed\n" , - driver, alg); + }else if (fips_enabled) { +pr_info ("alg: self-tests for %s (%s) passed\n" , + driver, alg); + +if (i >=0 && !alg_test_descs[i].fips_allowed) + rc =alg_fips_disabled (driver, alg); }return rc;
crypto/testmgr.c int alg_test(const char *driver, const char *alg, u32 type, u32 mask) · line 5697
Quoted 10 lines
crypto/testmgr.c +4
-0notest:printk (KERN_INFO "alg: No test for %s (%s)\n" , alg, driver); + +if (type &CRYPTO_ALG_FIPS_INTERNAL ) +return alg_fips_disabled (driver, alg); +return 0 ; non_fips_alg:return -EINVAL ;
This looks all good to me, but as !->fips_allowed tests aren't skipped over anymore now, it would perhaps make sense to make their failure non-fatal in FIPS mode. Because in FIPS mode a failure could mean a panic and some of the existing TVs might not pass because of e.g. some key length checks or so active only for fips_enabled...
Many thanks again!
Nicolai
Quoted 20 lines
include/linux/crypto.h +9
-0@@ -132,6 +132,15 @@*/ #define CRYPTO_ALG_ALLOCATES_MEMORY 0x00010000 +/* +* Mark an algorithm as a service implementation only usable by a +* template and never by a normal user of the kernel crypto API. +* This is intended to be used by algorithms that are themselves +* not FIPS-approved but may instead be used to implement parts of +* a FIPS-approved algorithm (e.g., sha1 vs. hmac(sha1)). +*/ +#define CRYPTO_ALG_FIPS_INTERNAL 0x00020000 +/* * Transform masks and values (for crt_flags). */
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SUSE Software Solutions Germany GmbH, Maxfeldstr. 5, 90409 Nürnberg, Germany (HRB 36809, AG Nürnberg), GF: Ivo Totev
Herbert Xu
maintainerRe: [v2 PATCH] crypto: api - Disallow sha1 in FIPS-mode while allowing hmac(sha1)
Quoted 6 lines · Nicolai Stange
I wonder whether this can be made more generic. I.e. would it be possible to make
crypto_grab_spawn()to or inFIPS_INTERNALinto type (iff !(mask &FIPS_INTERNAL)) and to makecrypto_register_instance()to propagateFIPS_INTERNALfrom the template instance's spawns upwards into the instance's ->cra_flags?
We could certainly do something like that in future. But it isn't that easy because crypto_register_instance doesn't know what the paramter algorithm(s) is/are.
Quoted 5 lines
On an unrelated note, this will break
trusted_key_tpm_ops->init()in FIPS mode, becausetrusted_shash_alloc()would fail to get a hold of sha1. AFAICT, this could potentially make theinit_trusted()module_initto fail, and, as encrypted-keys.ko importskey_type_trusted, prevent the loading of that one as well. Not sure that's desired...
Well if sha1 is supposed to be forbidden in FIPS mode why should TPM be allowed to use it? If it must be allowed, then we could change TPM to set the FIPS_INTERNAL flag.
I think I'll simply leave out the line that actually disables sha1 for now.
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 7 lines
crypto/api.c +0
-0@@ -223,6 +223,8 @@ static struct crypto_alg *crypto_larval_wait(struct crypto_alg *alg)else if (crypto_is_test_larval (larval) && !(alg->cra_flags &CRYPTO_ALG_TESTED ))
Quoted 8 lines
crypto/api.c static struct crypto_alg *crypto_larval_wait(struct crypto_alg *alg) · line 227
Quoted 3 lines
crypto/api.c +2
-0alg =ERR_PTR (-EAGAIN ); + else if (alg->cra_flags & CRYPTO_ALG_FIPS_INTERNAL) + alg =ERR_PTR (-EAGAIN );I might be mistaken, but I think this would cause hmac(sha1) instantiation to fail if sha1 is not already there. I.e. if hmac(sha1) instantiation would load sha1, then it would invoke
crypto_larval_wait()on the sha1 larval, see theFIPS_INTERNALand fail?
When EAGAIN is returned the lookup is automatically retried.
Quoted 7 lines
However, wouldn't it be possible to simply implement
FIPS_INTERNALlookups in analogy to the INTERNAL ones instead? That is, would addingif (!((type | mask) & CRYPTO_ALG_FIPS_INTERNAL)) mask |= CRYPTO_ALG_FIPS_INTERNAL;to the preamble of
crypto_alg_mod_lookup()work instead?
If you do that then you will end up creating an infinite number of failed templates if you lookup something like hmac(md5). Once the first hmac(md5) is created it must then match all subsequent lookups of hmac(md5) in order to prevent any further creation.
Quoted 5 lines
This looks all good to me, but as !->fips_allowed tests aren't skipped over anymore now, it would perhaps make sense to make their failure non-fatal in FIPS mode. Because in FIPS mode a failure could mean a panic and some of the existing TVs might not pass because of e.g. some key length checks or so active only for
fips_enabled...
You mean a buggy non-FIPS algorithm that fails when tested in FIPS mode? I guess we could skip the panic in that case if everyone is happy with that. Stephan?
Thanks,
Signature · 3 lines
Email: Herbert Xu <[email protected]> Home Page: http://gondor.apana.org.au/~herbert/ PGP Key: http://gondor.apana.org.au/~herbert/pubkey.txt
Re: [v2 PATCH] crypto: api - Disallow sha1 in FIPS-mode while allowing hmac(sha1)
Quoted 11 lines · Herbert Xu
Quoted 6 lines · Nicolai Stange
I wonder whether this can be made more generic. I.e. would it be possible to make
crypto_grab_spawn()to or inFIPS_INTERNALinto type (iff !(mask &FIPS_INTERNAL)) and to makecrypto_register_instance()to propagateFIPS_INTERNALfrom the template instance's spawns upwards into the instance's ->cra_flags?We could certainly do something like that in future. But it isn't that easy because
crypto_register_instancedoesn't know what the paramter algorithm(s) is/are.
I was thinking of simply walking through the inst->spawns list for that.
Quoted 9 lines
Quoted 6 lines
On an unrelated note, this will break
trusted_key_tpm_ops->init()in FIPS mode, becausetrusted_shash_alloc()would fail to get a hold of sha1. AFAICT, this could potentially make theinit_trusted()module_initto fail, and, as encrypted-keys.ko importskey_type_trusted, prevent the loading of that one as well. Not sure that's desired...Well if sha1 is supposed to be forbidden in FIPS mode why should TPM be allowed to use it?
Yes, I only wanted to point out that doing that could potentially have unforseen consequences as it currently stands, like
e.g. encrypted-keys.ko loading failures, even though the latter doesn't even seem to use sha1 by itself.
However, this scenario would be possible only for CONFIG_TRUSTED_KEYS=m, CONFIG_TEE=n and tpm_default_chip() returning something.
Quoted 22 lines
If it must be allowed, then we could change TPM to set the
FIPS_INTERNALflag.I think I'll simply leave out the line that actually disables sha1 for now.
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 7 lines
crypto/api.c +0
-0@@ -223,6 +223,8 @@ static struct crypto_alg *crypto_larval_wait(struct crypto_alg *alg)else if (crypto_is_test_larval (larval) && !(alg->cra_flags &CRYPTO_ALG_TESTED ))Quoted 8 lines
crypto/api.c static struct crypto_alg *crypto_larval_wait(struct crypto_alg *alg) · line 227
Quoted 3 lines
crypto/api.c +2
-0alg =ERR_PTR (-EAGAIN ); + else if (alg->cra_flags & CRYPTO_ALG_FIPS_INTERNAL) + alg =ERR_PTR (-EAGAIN );I might be mistaken, but I think this would cause hmac(sha1) instantiation to fail if sha1 is not already there. I.e. if hmac(sha1) instantiation would load sha1, then it would invoke
crypto_larval_wait()on the sha1 larval, see theFIPS_INTERNALand fail?
Quoted 1 line
When EAGAIN is returned the lookup is automatically retried.
Ah right, just found the loop in cryptomgr_probe().
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 7 lines
However, wouldn't it be possible to simply implement
FIPS_INTERNALlookups in analogy to the INTERNAL ones instead? That is, would addingif (!((type | mask) & CRYPTO_ALG_FIPS_INTERNAL)) mask |= CRYPTO_ALG_FIPS_INTERNAL;
Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 1 line
to the preamble of
crypto_alg_mod_lookup()work instead?If you do that then you will end up creating an infinite number of failed templates if you lookup something like hmac(md5). Once the first hmac(md5) is created it must then match all subsequent lookups of hmac(md5) in order to prevent any further creation.
Thanks for the explanation, it makes sense now.
Quoted 9 lines
Quoted 6 lines
This looks all good to me, but as !->fips_allowed tests aren't skipped over anymore now, it would perhaps make sense to make their failure non-fatal in FIPS mode. Because in FIPS mode a failure could mean a panic and some of the existing TVs might not pass because of e.g. some key length checks or so active only for
fips_enabled...You mean a buggy non-FIPS algorithm that fails when tested in FIPS mode?
Yes, I can't tell how realistic that is though.
Quoted 3 lines
I guess we could skip the panic in that case if everyone is happy with that. Stephan?
Thanks,
Nicolai
Signature · 2 lines
SUSE Software Solutions Germany GmbH, Maxfeldstr. 5, 90409 Nürnberg, Germany (HRB 36809, AG Nürnberg), GF: Ivo Totev
Re: [v2 PATCH] crypto: api - Disallow sha1 in FIPS-mode while allowing hmac(sha1)
In reply to Herbert XuAm Freitag, 14. Januar 2022, 11:55:26 CET schrieb Herbert Xu:
Hi Herbert,
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 5 lines
On an unrelated note, this will break
trusted_key_tpm_ops->init()in FIPS mode, becausetrusted_shash_alloc()would fail to get a hold of sha1. AFAICT, this could potentially make theinit_trusted()module_initto fail, and, as encrypted-keys.ko importskey_type_trusted, prevent the loading of that one as well. Not sure that's desired...Well if sha1 is supposed to be forbidden in FIPS mode why should
SHA-1 is approved in all use cases except signatures.
Ciao
Stephan
Re: [v2 PATCH] crypto: api - Disallow sha1 in FIPS-mode while allowing hmac(sha1)
Quoted 11 lines · Stephan Mueller
Am Freitag, 14. Januar 2022, 11:55:26 CET schrieb Herbert Xu:
Hi Herbert,
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 6 lines
On an unrelated note, this will break
trusted_key_tpm_ops->init()in FIPS mode, becausetrusted_shash_alloc()would fail to get a hold of sha1. AFAICT, this could potentially make theinit_trusted()module_initto fail, and, as encrypted-keys.ko importskey_type_trusted, prevent the loading of that one as well. Not sure that's desired...
Quoted 3 lines
Quoted 1 line
Well if sha1 is supposed to be forbidden in FIPS mode why should
SHA-1 is approved in all use cases except signatures.
Actually, even that's not quite true: you can't use it in a FIPS compliant system to *generate* signatures, but you can still use it in a FIPS compliant system to verify legacy signatures (signatures created before sha-1 was deprecated). It's still also completely acceptable as a hash for HMAC.
The supporting document is this one:
https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-131Ar1.pdf
The bottom line is removing SHA-1 to achieve "FIPS compliance" is the wrong approach. You just have to make sure you can never use it to generate signatures.
James
Re: [v2 PATCH] crypto: api - Disallow sha1 in FIPS-mode while allowing hmac(sha1)
In reply to Herbert XuAm Freitag, 14. Januar 2022, 11:55:26 CET schrieb Herbert Xu:
Hi Herbert,
Quoted 10 lines
Quoted 6 lines
This looks all good to me, but as !->fips_allowed tests aren't skipped over anymore now, it would perhaps make sense to make their failure non-fatal in FIPS mode. Because in FIPS mode a failure could mean a panic and some of the existing TVs might not pass because of e.g. some key length checks or so active only for
fips_enabled...You mean a buggy non-FIPS algorithm that fails when tested in FIPS mode? I guess we could skip the panic in that case if everyone is happy with that. Stephan?
As we consider FIPS 140-3, we can allow a "degrated mode of operation". A degraded mode of operation disables only the algorithm that caused the failure. With a failing self test and not having a panic(), the offending algorithm implementation will not be available to the kernel crypto API and thus to a user.
In this case, we can replace the panic with a graceful error.
If that change is applied, I would like to mention to anybody that wants to backport the change: this change is not appropriate for FIPS 140-2.
Ciao
Stephan
Re: [v2 PATCH] crypto: api - Disallow sha1 in FIPS-mode while allowing hmac(sha1)
In reply to Herbert XuQuoted 11 lines · Herbert Xu
Quoted 5 lines · Nicolai Stange
This looks all good to me, but as !->fips_allowed tests aren't skipped over anymore now, it would perhaps make sense to make their failure non-fatal in FIPS mode. Because in FIPS mode a failure could mean a panic and some of the existing TVs might not pass because of e.g. some key length checks or so active only for
fips_enabled...You mean a buggy non-FIPS algorithm that fails when tested in FIPS mode? I guess we could skip the panic in that case if everyone is happy with that. Stephan?
One more thing I just realized: dracut's fips module ([1]) modprobes tcrypt (*) and failure is considered fatal, i.e. the system would not boot up.
First of all this would mean that tcrypt_test() needs to ignore -ECANCELED return values from alg_test() in FIPS mode, in addition to the -EINVAL it is already prepared for.
However, chances are that some of the !fips_allowed algorithms looped over by tcrypt are not available (i.e. not enabled at build time) and as this change here makes alg_test() to unconditionally attempt a test execution now, this would fail with -ENOENT AFAICS.
One way to work around this is to make tcrypt_test() to ignore -ENOENT in addition to -EINVAL and -ECANCELED.
It might be undesirable though that the test executions triggered from tcrypt would still instantiate/load a ton of !fips_allowed algorithms at boot, most of which will effectively be inaccessible (because they're not used as FIPS_INTERNAL arguments to fips_allowed == 1 template instances).
So how about making alg_test() to skip the !fips_allowed tests in FIPS mode as before, but to return -ECANCELED and eventually set FIPS_INTERNAL as implemented with this patch here.
This would imply that FIPS_INTERNAL algorithms by themselves remain untested, but I think this might be Ok as they would be usable only as template arguments in fips_allowed instantiations. That is, they will still receive some form of testing when the larger construction they're part of gets tested.
For example, going with the "dh" example, where "dh" and "ffdhe3072(dh)" would have fips_allowed unset and set respecively, ffdhe3072(dh) as a whole would get tested, but not the "dh" argument individually.
Stephan, would this approach work from a FIPS 140-3 perspective?
Thanks!
Nicolai
[1] https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/boot/dracut/dracut.git/tree/modules.d/01fips/fips.sh#n106
(*) I'm not sure why this is being done, but it is what it is.
Signature · 2 lines
SUSE Software Solutions Germany GmbH, Maxfeldstr. 5, 90409 Nürnberg, Germany (HRB 36809, AG Nürnberg), GF: Ivo Totev
Re: [v2 PATCH] crypto: api - Disallow sha1 in FIPS-mode while allowing hmac(sha1)
Am Freitag, 28. Januar 2022, 15:14:39 CET schrieb Nicolai Stange:
Hi Nicolai,
Quoted 44 lines
Quoted 10 lines · Herbert Xu
Quoted 5 lines · Nicolai Stange
This looks all good to me, but as !->fips_allowed tests aren't skipped over anymore now, it would perhaps make sense to make their failure non-fatal in FIPS mode. Because in FIPS mode a failure could mean a panic and some of the existing TVs might not pass because of e.g. some key length checks or so active only for
fips_enabled...You mean a buggy non-FIPS algorithm that fails when tested in FIPS mode? I guess we could skip the panic in that case if everyone is happy with that. Stephan?
One more thing I just realized: dracut's fips module ([1]) modprobes tcrypt (*) and failure is considered fatal, i.e. the system would not boot up.
First of all this would mean that
tcrypt_test()needs to ignore-ECANCELEDreturn values fromalg_test()in FIPS mode, in addition to the-EINVALit is already prepared for.However, chances are that some of the !fips_allowed algorithms looped over by tcrypt are not available (i.e. not enabled at build time) and as this change here makes
alg_test()to unconditionally attempt a test execution now, this would fail with-ENOENTAFAICS.One way to work around this is to make
tcrypt_test()to ignore-ENOENTin addition to-EINVALand-ECANCELED.It might be undesirable though that the test executions triggered from tcrypt would still instantiate/load a ton of !fips_allowed algorithms at boot, most of which will effectively be inaccessible (because they're not used as
FIPS_INTERNALarguments tofips_allowed== 1 template instances).So how about making
alg_test()to skip the !fips_allowed tests in FIPS mode as before, but to return-ECANCELEDand eventually setFIPS_INTERNALas implemented with this patch here.This would imply that
FIPS_INTERNALalgorithms by themselves remain untested, but I think this might be Ok as they would be usable only as template arguments infips_allowedinstantiations. That is, they will still receive some form of testing when the larger construction they're part of gets tested.
Quoted 5 lines
For example, going with the "dh" example, where "dh" and "ffdhe3072(dh)" would have
fips_allowedunset and set respecively, ffdhe3072(dh) as a whole would get tested, but not the "dh" argument individually.Stephan, would this approach work from a FIPS 140-3 perspective?
Are we sure that we always will have power-up tests of the compound algorithms when we disable the lower-level algorithm testing?
For example, consider the DH work you are preparing: we currently have a self test for dh - which then will be marked as FIPS_INTERNAL and not executed. Would we now have self tests for modpXXX(dh) or ffdheXXX(dh)? If not, how would it be guaranteed that DH is tested?
The important part is that the algorithm testing is guaranteed. I see a number of alg_test_null in testmgr.c. I see the potential that some algorithms do not get tested at all when we skip FIPS_INTERNAL algorithms.
From a FIPS perspective it is permissible that compound algo power up tests are claimed to cover respective lower-level algos.
Quoted 8 lines
Thanks!
Nicolai
[1]
https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/boot/dracut/dracut.git/tree/modules.d/01fips
/fips.sh#n106 (*) I'm not sure why this is being done, but it is what it is.
Ciao
Stephan
Re: [v2 PATCH] crypto: api - Disallow sha1 in FIPS-mode while allowing hmac(sha1)
Hi Stephan,
Quoted 46 lines · Stephan Mueller
Am Freitag, 28. Januar 2022, 15:14:39 CET schrieb Nicolai Stange:
Quoted 44 lines
Quoted 10 lines · Herbert Xu
Quoted 5 lines · Nicolai Stange
This looks all good to me, but as !->fips_allowed tests aren't skipped over anymore now, it would perhaps make sense to make their failure non-fatal in FIPS mode. Because in FIPS mode a failure could mean a panic and some of the existing TVs might not pass because of e.g. some key length checks or so active only for
fips_enabled...You mean a buggy non-FIPS algorithm that fails when tested in FIPS mode? I guess we could skip the panic in that case if everyone is happy with that. Stephan?
One more thing I just realized: dracut's fips module ([1]) modprobes tcrypt (*) and failure is considered fatal, i.e. the system would not boot up.
First of all this would mean that
tcrypt_test()needs to ignore-ECANCELEDreturn values fromalg_test()in FIPS mode, in addition to the-EINVALit is already prepared for.However, chances are that some of the !fips_allowed algorithms looped over by tcrypt are not available (i.e. not enabled at build time) and as this change here makes
alg_test()to unconditionally attempt a test execution now, this would fail with-ENOENTAFAICS.One way to work around this is to make
tcrypt_test()to ignore-ENOENTin addition to-EINVALand-ECANCELED.It might be undesirable though that the test executions triggered from tcrypt would still instantiate/load a ton of !fips_allowed algorithms at boot, most of which will effectively be inaccessible (because they're not used as
FIPS_INTERNALarguments tofips_allowed== 1 template instances).So how about making
alg_test()to skip the !fips_allowed tests in FIPS mode as before, but to return-ECANCELEDand eventually setFIPS_INTERNALas implemented with this patch here.This would imply that
FIPS_INTERNALalgorithms by themselves remain untested, but I think this might be Ok as they would be usable only as template arguments infips_allowedinstantiations. That is, they will still receive some form of testing when the larger construction they're part of gets tested.
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 5 lines
For example, going with the "dh" example, where "dh" and "ffdhe3072(dh)" would have
fips_allowedunset and set respecively, ffdhe3072(dh) as a whole would get tested, but not the "dh" argument individually.Stephan, would this approach work from a FIPS 140-3 perspective?
Are we sure that we always will have power-up tests of the compound algorithms when we disable the lower-level algorithm testing?
Yes. The compound algorithms having ->fips_allowed == 1 and alg_test_null entries are:
authenc(hmac(sha1),ctr(aes))
authenc(hmac(sha1),rfc3686(ctr(aes)))
authenc(hmac(sha256),ctr(aes))
authenc(hmac(sha256),rfc3686(ctr(aes)))
authenc(hmac(sha384),ctr(aes))
authenc(hmac(sha384),rfc3686(ctr(aes)))
authenc(hmac(sha512),ctr(aes))
authenc(hmac(sha512),rfc3686(ctr(aes)))
The hmac(sha*), ctr(aes) and rfc3686(ctr(aes)) all have ->fips_allowed == 1 and proper non-alg_test_null test entries. So no change here.
cbc(paes)
ctr(paes)
ecb(paes)
ofb(paes)
xts(paes)
xts4096(paes)
xts512(paes)
cts(cbc(paes))
As ecb(paes) has only a alg_test_null() entry, no test would have been performed at all before this change for these. So no change here either.
ecb(cipher_null)
No change here either.
pkcs1pad(rsa,sha224)
pkcs1pad(rsa,sha384)
pkcs1pad(rsa,sha512)
The sha* and rsa all have ->fips_allowed == 1 and proper non-alg_test_null test entries. So no change here.
Quoted 4 lines
For example, consider the DH work you are preparing: we currently have a self test for dh - which then will be marked as
FIPS_INTERNALand not executed. Would we now have self tests for modpXXX(dh) or ffdheXXX(dh)?
Yes, exactly.
Quoted 5 lines
If not, how would it be guaranteed that DH is tested?
The important part is that the algorithm testing is guaranteed. I see a number of
alg_test_nullintestmgr.c. I see the potential that some algorithms do not get tested at all when we skipFIPS_INTERNALalgorithms.
See above. But of course one needs to be careful not to add ->fips_allowed + alg_test_null entries for compound algorithms where any of the template arguments isn't approved in the future.
Quoted 2 lines
From a FIPS perspective it is permissible that compound algo power up tests are claimed to cover respective lower-level algos.
Perfect.
Thanks,
Nicolai
Signature · 2 lines
SUSE Software Solutions Germany GmbH, Maxfeldstr. 5, 90409 Nürnberg, Germany (HRB 36809, AG Nürnberg), GF: Ivo Totev
Re: [PATCH v2 03/18] crypto: dh - optimize domain parameter serialization for well-known groups
In reply to Herbert XuQuoted 9 lines · Herbert Xu
Quoted 5 lines · Nicolai Stange
Just for my understanding: the problem here is having a (single) enum for the representation of all the possible "known" groups in the first place or more that the individual group id enum members have hard-coded values assigned to them each?
Yes the fact that you need to have a list of all "known" groups is the issue.
Ok, understood. Thanks for the clarification.
Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 3 lines
However, after some back and forth, I opted against doing something similar for dh at the time, because there are quite some more possible parameter sets than there are for ecdh, namely ten vs. three. If we were
I don't understand why we can't support ten or an even larger number of parameter sets.
There's no real reason. I just didn't dare to promote what I considered mere input parameter sets to full-fledged crypto_alg instances with their associated overhead each:
- the global crypto_alg_list will get longer, which might have an impact on the lookup searches,
- every ffdheXYZ(dh) template instance will need to have individual TVs associated with it.
However, I take it as that's fine and I'd be more than happy to implement the ffhdheXYZ(dh) template approach you suggested in a v3.
Quoted 13 lines
If you are concerned about code duplication then there are ways around that. Or do you have another specific concern in mind with respect to a large number of parameter sets under this scheme?
Quoted 7 lines
Anyway, just to make sure I'm getting it right: when you're saying "template", you mean to implement a
crypto_templatefor instantiating patterns like "dh(ffdhe2048)", "dh(ffdhe3072)" and so on? The dh(...) template instantiations would keep acrypto_spawnfor referring to the underlying, non-template "dh"kpp_algso that "dh" implementations of higher priority (hpre + qat) would take over once they'd become available, correct?
Quoted 5 lines
The template would work in the other dirirection. It would look like ffdhe2048(dh) with dh being implemented in either software or hardware.
The template wrapper would simply supply the relevant parameters.
Makes sense.
Thanks!
Nicolai
Signature · 2 lines
SUSE Software Solutions Germany GmbH, Maxfeldstr. 5, 90409 Nürnberg, Germany (HRB 36809, AG Nürnberg), GF: Ivo Totev
PATCH v2 4/18 crypto: dh - introduce RFC 7919 safe-prime groups
In reply to Nicolai StangeThe FFDHE groups specified by RFC 7919 are needed for the current work on NVME ([1]) and also among the safe-prime groups approved by SP800-56Arev3. Make them known to the kernel.
More specifically, introduce corresponding members to enum dh_group_id as well as entries with the resp. domain parameters to the safe_prime_groups[] array queried by crypto_dh_decode_key(). The resp. ->max_strength value is set to the maximum supported security strength as specified in SP800-56Arev3.
As the domain parameters consume an substantial amount of space, make RFC 7919 safe-prime group support selectable by means of the new CRYPTO_DH_GROUPS_RFC7919 Kconfig option.
[1] https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
--- crypto/Kconfig | 11 ++- crypto/dh_helper.c | 219 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++- include/crypto/dh.h | 7 ++ 3 files changed, 235 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
crypto/Kconfig +10 -1
@@ -224,13 +224,22 @@ config CRYPTO_RSA help Generic implementation of the RSA public key algorithm. -config CRYPTO_DH +menuconfig CRYPTO_DH tristate "Diffie-Hellman algorithm" select CRYPTO_KPP select MPILIB help Generic implementation of the Diffie-Hellman algorithm. +if CRYPTO_DH +config CRYPTO_DH_GROUPS_RFC7919 + bool "Support for RFC 7919 FFDHE group parameters" + help + Enable to allow for the use of RFC 7919 DH parameters in FIPS mode, + e.g. via keyctl(KEYCTL_DH_COMPUTE). Otherwise it's safe to say N. + +endif + config CRYPTO_ECC tristate select CRYPTO_RNG_DEFAULT
crypto/dh_helper.c +218 -1
225 lines not on this page · raw message
include/crypto/dh.h +7 -0
@@ -22,6 +22,13 @@/** enum dh_group_id - identify well-known domain parameter sets */ enum dh_group_id {DH_GROUP_ID_UNKNOWN =0 ,/* Constants are used in test vectors. */ +#ifdef CONFIG_CRYPTO_DH_GROUPS_RFC7919 +DH_GROUP_ID_FFDHE2048 =1 , +DH_GROUP_ID_FFDHE3072 =2 , +DH_GROUP_ID_FFDHE4096 =3 , +DH_GROUP_ID_FFDHE6144 =4 , +DH_GROUP_ID_FFDHE8192 =5 , +#endif };/**
Signature · 1 line
2.26.2
Re: [PATCH v2 04/18] crypto: dh - introduce RFC 7919 safe-prime groups
Quoted 14 lines · Nicolai Stange
The FFDHE groups specified by RFC 7919 are needed for the current work on NVME ([1]) and also among the safe-prime groups approved by SP800-56Arev3. Make them known to the kernel.
More specifically, introduce corresponding members to enum
dh_group_idas well as entries with the resp. domain parameters to the safe_prime_groups[] array queried bycrypto_dh_decode_key(). The resp. ->max_strength value is set to the maximum supported security strength as specified in SP800-56Arev3.As the domain parameters consume an substantial amount of space, make RFC 7919 safe-prime group support selectable by means of the new
CRYPTO_DH_GROUPS_RFC7919Kconfigoption.
Quoted 9 lines
[1] https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by Nicolai Stange <[email protected]>--- crypto/Kconfig | 11 ++- crypto/dh_helper.c | 219 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++- include/crypto/dh.h | 7 ++ 3 files changed, 235 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
Cheers,
Hannes
Signature · 4 lines
Dr. Hannes Reinecke Kernel Storage Architect [email protected] +49 911 74053 688 SUSE Software Solutions Germany GmbH, Maxfeldstr. 5, 90409 Nürnberg HRB 36809 (AG Nürnberg), GF: Felix Imendörffer
PATCH v2 5/18 crypto: testmgr - add DH RFC 7919 ffdhe3072 test vector
In reply to Nicolai StangeThe previous patch introduced support for the safe-prime groups specified by RFC 7919. In order to test this functionality, add a corresponding ffdhe3072 test vector to testmgr. The choice of ffdhe3072 over e.g. ffdhe2048 is justified by the fact that the NVMe spec mandates it for its TLS profile.
The test data has been generated with OpenSSL.
Note that this new entry provides test coverage for the recent change to crypto_dh_encode_key(), which made it to skip the serialization of domain parameters for known groups, i.e. those with
->group_id != DH_GROUP_ID_UNKNOWN.
Moreover, a future patch will make the DH implementation to reject domain parameters not corresponding to some safe-prime group approved by SP800-56Arev3 in FIPS mode and the existing DH test vectors don't qualify. So this patch here will ensure that there's still some suitable test vector available.
--- crypto/testmgr.h | 124 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 124 insertions(+)
crypto/testmgr.h +124 -0
@@ -1240,6 +1240,130 @@ static const struct akcipher_testvec pkcs1pad_rsa_tv_template[] = { };static const struct kpp_testvec dh_tv_template[] = { +#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_CRYPTO_DH_GROUPS_RFC7919) + { + .secret = +#ifdef __LITTLE_ENDIAN + "\x01\x00" /* type */ + "\x94\x01" /* len */ + "\x02\x00\x00\x00" /* group_id == DH_GROUP_ID_FFDHE3072 */ + "\x80\x01\x00\x00" /* key_size */ + "\x00\x00\x00\x00" /* p_size */ + "\x00\x00\x00\x00" /* g_size */ +#else + "\x00\x01" /* type */ + "\x01\x94" /* len */ + "\x00\x00\x00\x02" /* group_id == DH_GROUP_ID_FFDHE3072 */ + "\x00\x00\x01\x80" /* key_size */ + "\x00\x00\x00\x00" /* p_size */ + "\x00\x00\x00\x00" /* g_size */ +#endif +/* xa */ +"\x6b\xb4\x97\x23\xfa\xc8\x5e\xa9\x7b\x63\xe7\x3e\x0e\x99\xc3\xb9" +"\xda\xb7\x48\x0d\xc3\xb1\xbf\x4f\x17\xc7\xa9\x51\xf6\x64\xff\xc4" +"\x31\x58\x87\x25\x83\x2c\x00\xf0\x41\x29\xf7\xee\xf9\xe6\x36\x76" +"\xd6\x3a\x24\xbe\xa7\x07\x0b\x93\xc7\x9f\x6c\x75\x0a\x26\x75\x76" +"\xe3\x0c\x42\xe0\x00\x04\x69\xd9\xec\x0b\x59\x54\x28\x8f\xd7\x9a" +"\x63\xf4\x5b\xdf\x85\x65\xc4\xe1\x95\x27\x4a\x42\xad\x36\x47\xa9" +"\x0a\xf8\x14\x1c\xf3\x94\x3b\x7e\x47\x99\x35\xa8\x18\xec\x70\x10" +"\xdf\xcb\xd2\x78\x88\xc1\x2d\x59\x93\xc1\xa4\x6d\xd7\x1d\xb9\xd5" +"\xf8\x30\x06\x7f\x98\x90\x0c\x74\x5e\x89\x2f\x64\x5a\xad\x5f\x53" +"\xb2\xa3\xa8\x83\xbf\xfc\x37\xef\xb8\x36\x0a\x5c\x62\x81\x64\x74" +"\x16\x2f\x45\x39\x2a\x91\x26\x87\xc0\x12\xcc\x75\x11\xa3\xa1\xc5" +"\xae\x20\xcf\xcb\x20\x25\x6b\x7a\x31\x93\x9d\x38\xb9\x57\x72\x46" +"\xd4\x84\x65\x87\xf1\xb5\xd3\xab\xfc\xc3\x4d\x40\x92\x94\x1e\xcd" +"\x1c\x87\xec\x3f\xcd\xbe\xd0\x95\x6b\x40\x02\xdd\x62\xeb\x0a\xda" +"\x4f\xbe\x8e\x32\x48\x8b\x6d\x83\xa0\x96\x62\x23\xec\x83\x91\x44" +"\xf9\x72\x01\xac\xa0\xe4\x72\x1d\x5a\x75\x05\x57\x90\xae\x7e\xb4" +"\x71\x39\x01\x05\xdc\xe9\xee\xcb\xf0\x61\x28\x91\x69\x8c\x31\x03" +"\x7a\x92\x15\xa1\x58\x67\x3d\x70\x82\xa6\x2c\xfe\x10\x56\x58\xd3" +"\x94\x67\xe1\xbe\xee\xc1\x64\x5c\x4b\xc8\x28\x3d\xc5\x66\x3a\xab" +"\x22\xc1\x7e\xa1\xbb\xf3\x19\x3b\xda\x46\x82\x45\xd4\x3c\x7c\xc6" +"\xce\x1f\x7f\x95\xa2\x17\xff\x88\xba\xd6\x4d\xdb\xd2\xea\xde\x39" +"\xd6\xa5\x18\x73\xbb\x64\x6e\x79\xe9\xdc\x3f\x92\x7f\xda\x1f\x49" +"\x33\x70\x65\x73\xa2\xd9\x06\xb8\x1b\x29\x29\x1a\xe0\xa3\xe6\x05" +"\x9a\xa8\xc2\x4e\x7a\x78\x1d\x22\x57\x21\xc8\xa3\x8d\x66\x3e\x23" , + .b_public = +"\x73\x40\x8b\xce\xe8\x6a\x1c\x03\x50\x54\x42\x36\x22\xc6\x1d\xe8" +"\xe1\xef\x5c\x89\xa5\x55\xc1\xc4\x1c\xd7\x4f\xee\x5d\xba\x62\x60" +"\xfe\x93\x2f\xfd\x93\x2c\x8f\x70\xc6\x47\x17\x25\xb2\x95\xd7\x7d" +"\x41\x81\x4d\x52\x1c\xbe\x4d\x57\x3e\x26\x51\x28\x03\x8f\x67\xf5" +"\x22\x16\x1c\x67\xf7\x62\xcb\xfd\xa3\xee\x8d\xe0\xfa\x15\x9a\x53" +"\xbe\x7b\x9f\xc0\x12\x7a\xfc\x5e\x77\x2d\x60\x06\xba\x71\xc5\xca" +"\xd7\x26\xaf\x3b\xba\x6f\xd3\xc4\x82\x57\x19\x26\xb0\x16\x7b\xbd" +"\x83\xf2\x21\x03\x79\xff\x0a\x6f\xc5\x7b\x00\x15\xad\x5b\xf4\x42" +"\x1f\xcb\x7f\x3d\x34\x77\x3c\xc3\xe0\x38\xa5\x40\x51\xbe\x6f\xd9" +"\xc9\x77\x9c\xfc\x0d\xc1\x8e\xef\x0f\xaa\x5e\xa8\xbb\x16\x4a\x3e" +"\x26\x55\xae\xc1\xb6\x3e\xfd\x73\xf7\x59\xd2\xe5\x4b\x91\x8e\x28" +"\x77\x1e\x5a\xe2\xcd\xce\x92\x35\xbb\x1e\xbb\xcf\x79\x94\xdf\x31" +"\xde\x31\xa8\x75\xf6\xe0\xaa\x2e\xe9\x4f\x44\xc8\xba\xb9\xab\x80" +"\x29\xa1\xea\x58\x2e\x40\x96\xa0\x1a\xf5\x2c\x38\x47\x43\x5d\x26" +"\x2c\xd8\xad\xea\xd3\xad\xe8\x51\x49\xad\x45\x2b\x25\x7c\xde\xe4" +"\xaf\x03\x2a\x39\x26\x86\x66\x10\xbc\xa8\x71\xda\xe0\xe8\xf1\xdd" +"\x50\xff\x44\xb2\xd3\xc7\xff\x66\x63\xf6\x42\xe3\x97\x9d\x9e\xf4" +"\xa6\x89\xb9\xab\x12\x17\xf2\x85\x56\x9c\x6b\x24\x71\x83\x57\x7d" +"\x3c\x7b\x2b\x88\x92\x19\xd7\x1a\x00\xd5\x38\x94\x43\x60\x4d\xa7" +"\x12\x9e\x0d\xf6\x5c\x9a\xd3\xe2\x9e\xb1\x21\xe8\xe2\x9e\xe9\x1e" +"\x9d\xa5\x94\x95\xa6\x3d\x12\x15\xd8\x8b\xac\xe0\x8c\xde\xe6\x40" +"\x98\xaa\x5e\x55\x4f\x3d\x86\x87\x0d\xe3\xc6\x68\x15\xe6\xde\x17" +"\x78\x21\xc8\x6c\x06\xc7\x94\x56\xb4\xaf\xa2\x35\x0b\x0c\x97\xd7" +"\xa4\x12\xee\xf4\xd2\xef\x80\x28\xb3\xee\xe9\x15\x8b\x01\x32\x79" , + .expected_a_public = +"\x1b\x6a\xba\xea\xa3\xcc\x50\x69\xa9\x41\x89\xaf\x04\xe1\x44\x22" +"\x97\x20\xd1\xf6\x1e\xcb\x64\x36\x6f\xee\x0b\x16\xc1\xd9\x91\xbe" +"\x57\xc8\xd9\xf2\xa1\x96\x91\xec\x41\xc7\x79\x00\x1a\x48\x25\x55" +"\xbe\xf3\x20\x8c\x38\xc6\x7b\xf2\x8b\x5a\xc3\xb5\x87\x0a\x86\x3d" +"\xb7\xd6\xce\xb0\x96\x2e\x5d\xc4\x00\x5e\x42\xe4\xe5\x50\x4f\xb8" +"\x6f\x18\xa4\xe1\xd3\x20\xfc\x3c\xf5\x0a\xff\x23\xa6\x5b\xb4\x17" +"\x3e\x7b\xdf\xb9\xb5\x3c\x1b\x76\x29\xcd\xb4\x46\x4f\x27\x8f\xd2" +"\xe8\x27\x66\xdb\xe8\xb3\xf5\xe1\xd0\x04\xcd\x89\xff\xba\x76\x67" +"\xe8\x4d\xcf\x86\x1c\x8a\xd1\xcf\x99\x27\xfb\xa9\x78\xcc\x94\xaf" +"\x3d\x04\xfd\x25\xc0\x47\xfa\x29\x80\x05\xf4\xde\xad\xdb\xab\x12" +"\xb0\x2b\x8e\xca\x02\x06\x6d\xad\x3e\x09\xb1\x22\xa3\xf5\x4c\x6d" +"\x69\x99\x58\x8b\xd8\x45\x2e\xe0\xc9\x3c\xf7\x92\xce\x21\x90\x6b" +"\x3b\x65\x9f\x64\x79\x8d\x67\x22\x1a\x37\xd3\xee\x51\xe2\xe7\x5a" +"\x93\x51\xaa\x3c\x4b\x04\x16\x32\xef\xe3\x66\xbe\x18\x94\x88\x64" +"\x79\xce\x06\x3f\xb8\xd6\xee\xdc\x13\x79\x6f\x20\x14\xc2\x6b\xce" +"\xc8\xda\x42\xa5\x93\x5b\xe4\x7f\x1a\xe6\xda\x0f\xb3\xc1\x5f\x30" +"\x50\x76\xe8\x37\x3d\xca\x77\x2c\xa8\xe4\x3b\xf9\x6f\xe0\x17\xed" +"\x0e\xef\xb7\x31\x14\xb5\xea\xd9\x39\x22\x89\xb6\x40\x57\xcc\x84" +"\xef\x73\xa7\xe9\x27\x21\x85\x89\xfa\xaf\x03\xda\x9c\x8b\xfd\x52" +"\x7d\xb0\xa4\xe4\xf9\xd8\x90\x55\xc4\x39\xd6\x9d\xaf\x3b\xce\xac" +"\xaa\x36\x14\x7a\x9b\x8b\x12\x43\xe1\xca\x61\xae\x46\x5b\xe7\xe5" +"\x88\x32\x80\xa0\x2d\x51\xbb\x2f\xea\xeb\x3c\x71\xb2\xae\xce\xca" +"\x61\xd2\x76\xe0\x45\x46\x78\x4e\x09\x2d\xc2\x54\xc2\xa9\xc7\xa8" +"\x55\x8e\x72\xa4\x8b\x8a\xc9\x01\xdb\xe9\x58\x11\xa1\xc4\xe7\x12" , + .expected_ss = +"\x47\x8e\xb2\x19\x09\xf0\x46\x99\x6b\x41\x86\xf7\x34\xad\xbf\x2a" +"\x18\x1b\x7d\xec\xa9\xb2\x47\x2f\x40\xfb\x9a\x64\x30\x44\xf3\x4c" +"\x01\x67\xad\x57\x5a\xbc\xd4\xc8\xef\x7e\x8a\x14\x74\x1d\x6d\x8c" +"\x7b\xce\xc5\x57\x5f\x95\xe8\x72\xba\xdf\xa3\xcd\x00\xbe\x09\x4c" +"\x06\x72\xe7\x17\xb0\xe5\xe5\xb7\x20\xa5\xcb\xd9\x68\x99\xad\x3f" +"\xde\xf3\xde\x1d\x1c\x00\x74\xd2\xd1\x57\x55\x5d\xce\x76\x0c\xc4" +"\x7a\xc4\x65\x7c\x19\x17\x0a\x09\x66\x7d\x3a\xab\xf7\x61\x3a\xe3" +"\x5b\xac\xcf\x69\xb0\x8b\xee\x5d\x28\x36\xbb\x3f\x74\xce\x6e\x38" +"\x1e\x39\xab\x26\xca\x89\xdc\x58\x59\xcb\x95\xe4\xbc\xd6\x19\x48" +"\xd0\x55\x68\x7b\xb4\x27\x95\x3c\xd9\x58\x10\x4f\x8f\x55\x1c\x3f" +"\x04\xce\x89\x1f\x82\x28\xe9\x48\x17\x47\x8f\xee\xb7\x8f\xeb\xb1" +"\x29\xa8\x23\x18\x73\x33\x9f\x83\x08\xca\xcd\x54\x6e\xca\xec\x78" +"\x7b\x16\x83\x3f\xdb\x0a\xef\xfd\x87\x94\x19\x08\x6e\x6e\x22\x57" +"\xd7\xd2\x79\xf9\xf6\xeb\xe0\x6c\x93\x9d\x95\xfa\x41\x7a\xa9\xd6" +"\x2a\xa3\x26\x9b\x24\x1b\x8b\xa0\xed\x04\xb2\xe4\x6c\x4e\xc4\x3f" +"\x61\xe5\xe0\x4d\x09\x28\xaf\x58\x35\x25\x0b\xd5\x38\x18\x69\x51" +"\x18\x51\x73\x7b\x28\x19\x9f\xe4\x69\xfc\x2c\x25\x08\x99\x8f\x62" +"\x65\x62\xa5\x28\xf1\xf4\xfb\x02\x29\x27\xb0\x5e\xbb\x4f\xf9\x1a" +"\xa7\xc4\x38\x63\x5b\x01\xfe\x00\x66\xe3\x47\x77\x21\x85\x17\xd5" +"\x34\x19\xd3\x87\xab\x44\x62\x08\x59\xb2\x6b\x1f\x21\x0c\x23\x84" +"\xf7\xba\x92\x67\xf9\x16\x85\x6a\xe0\xeb\xe7\x4f\x06\x80\x81\x81" +"\x28\x9c\xe8\x2e\x71\x97\x48\xe0\xd1\xbc\xce\xe9\x42\x2c\x89\xdf" +"\x0b\xa9\xa1\x07\x84\x33\x78\x7f\x49\x2f\x1c\x55\xc3\x7f\xc3\x37" +"\x40\xdf\x13\xf4\xa0\x21\x79\x6e\x3a\xe3\xb8\x23\x9e\x8a\x6e\x9c" , + .secret_size =404 , + .b_public_size =384 , + .expected_a_public_size =384 , + .expected_ss_size =384 , + }, +#endif /* IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_CRYPTO_DH_GROUPS_RFC7919) */ { .secret = #ifdef __LITTLE_ENDIAN
Signature · 1 line
2.26.2
Re: [PATCH v2 05/18] crypto: testmgr - add DH RFC 7919 ffdhe3072 test vector
Quoted 19 lines · Nicolai Stange
The previous patch introduced support for the safe-prime groups specified by RFC 7919. In order to test this functionality, add a corresponding ffdhe3072 test vector to testmgr. The choice of ffdhe3072 over e.g. ffdhe2048 is justified by the fact that the NVMe spec mandates it for its TLS profile.
The test data has been generated with OpenSSL.
Note that this new entry provides test coverage for the recent change to
crypto_dh_encode_key(), which made it to skip the serialization of domain parameters for known groups, i.e. those with
->group_id !=DH_GROUP_ID_UNKNOWN.Moreover, a future patch will make the DH implementation to reject domain parameters not corresponding to some safe-prime group approved by SP800-56Arev3 in FIPS mode and the existing DH test vectors don't qualify. So this patch here will ensure that there's still some suitable test vector available.
Quoted 5 lines
Signed-off-by Nicolai Stange <[email protected]>--- crypto/testmgr.h | 124 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 124 insertions(+)
Cheers,
Hannes
Signature · 4 lines
Dr. Hannes Reinecke Kernel Storage Architect [email protected] +49 911 74053 688 SUSE Software Solutions Germany GmbH, Maxfeldstr. 5, 90409 Nürnberg HRB 36809 (AG Nürnberg), GF: Felix Imendörffer
PATCH v2 6/18 crypto: dh - introduce RFC 3526 safe-prime groups
In reply to Nicolai StangeA future patch will make the DH implementation to reject domain parameters not corresponding to any of the safe-prime groups approved by SP800-56Arev3 in FIPS mode.
The MODP groups specified by RFC 3526 are among those approved safe-prime groups. Make them known to the kernel in order to enable the DH implementation to recognize those when passed in from e.g. the keyctl(KEYCTL_DH_COMPUTE) syscall.
More specifically, introduce corresponding members to enum dh_group_id as well as entries with the resp. domain parameters to the safe_prime_groups[] array queried by crypto_dh_decode_key(). The resp. ->max_strength value is set to the maximum supported security strength as specified in SP800-56Arev3.
As the domain parameters consume an substantial amount of space, make RFC 3526 safe-prime group support selectable by means of the new CRYPTO_DH_GROUPS_RFC3526 Kconfig option.
--- crypto/Kconfig | 6 ++ crypto/dh_helper.c | 216 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ include/crypto/dh.h | 7 ++ 3 files changed, 229 insertions(+)
crypto/Kconfig +6 -0
@@ -238,6 +238,12 @@ config CRYPTO_DH_GROUPS_RFC7919 Enable to allow for the use of RFC 7919 DH parameters in FIPS mode, e.g. via keyctl(KEYCTL_DH_COMPUTE). Otherwise it's safe to say N. +config CRYPTO_DH_GROUPS_RFC3526 + bool "Support for RFC 3526 MODP group parameters" + help + Enable to allow for the use of RFC 3526 DH parameters in FIPS mode, + e.g. via keyctl(KEYCTL_DH_COMPUTE). Otherwise it's safe to say N. + endif config CRYPTO_ECC
crypto/dh_helper.c +216 -0
222 lines not on this page · raw message
include/crypto/dh.h +7 -0
@@ -29,6 +29,13 @@ enum dh_group_id { DH_GROUP_ID_FFDHE6144 = 4, DH_GROUP_ID_FFDHE8192 = 5,#endif +#ifdef CONFIG_CRYPTO_DH_GROUPS_RFC3526 +DH_GROUP_ID_MODP2048 =6 , +DH_GROUP_ID_MODP3072 =7 , +DH_GROUP_ID_MODP4096 =8 , +DH_GROUP_ID_MODP6144 =9 , + DH_GROUP_ID_MODP8192 = 10, +#endif };/**
Signature · 1 line
2.26.2
Re: [PATCH v2 06/18] crypto: dh - introduce RFC 3526 safe-prime groups
Quoted 19 lines · Nicolai Stange
A future patch will make the DH implementation to reject domain parameters not corresponding to any of the safe-prime groups approved by SP800-56Arev3 in FIPS mode.
The MODP groups specified by RFC 3526 are among those approved safe-prime groups. Make them known to the kernel in order to enable the DH implementation to recognize those when passed in from e.g. the
keyctl(KEYCTL_DH_COMPUTE)syscall.More specifically, introduce corresponding members to enum
dh_group_idas well as entries with the resp. domain parameters to the safe_prime_groups[] array queried bycrypto_dh_decode_key(). The resp. ->max_strength value is set to the maximum supported security strength as specified in SP800-56Arev3.As the domain parameters consume an substantial amount of space, make RFC 3526 safe-prime group support selectable by means of the new
CRYPTO_DH_GROUPS_RFC3526Kconfigoption.
Quoted 7 lines
Signed-off-by Nicolai Stange <[email protected]>--- crypto/Kconfig | 6 ++ crypto/dh_helper.c | 216 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ include/crypto/dh.h | 7 ++ 3 files changed, 229 insertions(+)
Cheers,
Hannes
Signature · 4 lines
Dr. Hannes Reinecke Kernel Storage Architect [email protected] +49 911 74053 688 SUSE Software Solutions Germany GmbH, Maxfeldstr. 5, 90409 Nürnberg HRB 36809 (AG Nürnberg), GF: Felix Imendörffer
PATCH v2 7/18 crypto: testmgr - add DH RFC 3526 modp2048 test vector
In reply to Nicolai StangeThe previous patch introduced support for the safe-prime groups specified by RFC 3526. In order to test this functionality, add a corresponding test vector to testmgr. The test data has been generated with OpenSSL.
Note that this new entry provides test coverage for the recent change to crypto_dh_encode_key(), which made it to skip the serialization of domain parameters for known groups, i.e. those with
->group_id != DH_GROUP_ID_UNKNOWN.
Moreover, a future patch will make the DH implementation to reject domain parameters not corresponding to some safe-prime group approved by SP800-56Arev3 in FIPS mode and the existing DH test vectors don't qualify. So this patch here will ensure that there's still some suitable test vector available.
--- crypto/testmgr.h | 92 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 92 insertions(+)
crypto/testmgr.h +92 -0
@@ -1364,6 +1364,98 @@ static const struct kpp_testvec dh_tv_template[] = { .expected_ss_size = 384, },#endif /* IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_CRYPTO_DH_GROUPS_RFC7919) */ +#if IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_CRYPTO_DH_GROUPS_RFC3526 ) + { + .secret = +#ifdef __LITTLE_ENDIAN +"\x01\x00" /* type */ +"\x14\x01" /* len */ +"\x06\x00\x00\x00" /* group_id == DH_GROUP_ID_MODP2048 */ +"\x00\x01\x00\x00" /* key_size */ +"\x00\x00\x00\x00" /* p_size */ + "\x00\x00\x00\x00" /* g_size */ +#else +"\x00\x01" /* type */ +"\x01\x14" /* len */ +"\x00\x00\x00\x06" /* group_id == DH_GROUP_ID_MODP2048 */ +"\x00\x00\x01\x00" /* key_size */ +"\x00\x00\x00\x00" /* p_size */ + "\x00\x00\x00\x00" /* g_size */ +#endif +/* xa */ +"\x38\x77\xec\x02\xc5\xae\xc2\x1c\x4c\x5e\xf5\xa2\xfb\x7e\x06\xf2" +"\xa0\x32\x0f\x3d\xf5\xcb\x75\xd0\xd7\x47\x12\x06\xca\x11\x55\xe4" +"\x16\xff\x35\xd3\xda\x36\x69\x04\xc4\xd8\x63\x96\xd4\x1d\x92\x6d" +"\xd6\x1f\x4b\x22\x7f\xa8\x68\xae\x53\x46\x49\x5a\x06\xfd\x33\xb9" +"\x47\x7b\x2c\xaf\x5f\x52\x76\x2d\xe5\x46\x44\xd7\xf1\x5e\xdf\xaa" +"\x17\xb5\x3c\x86\x5e\x69\xf9\xf5\x4a\x86\xc6\x58\x77\x81\x88\x78" +"\x7d\x5b\xf6\xe3\xd7\x46\x4c\xaf\x75\xf8\x53\x76\xf6\xcc\x6d\xd2" +"\x8e\xb7\x0f\x4c\xea\x3e\x82\x55\x82\x34\x5c\x99\x32\x7c\x22\x4b" +"\xcc\xd7\xfd\x39\x72\x64\x27\xc6\x5a\x10\xc2\x97\x38\x20\x51\xd2" +"\xf3\xf0\x95\xe7\xe4\xfb\x5a\x1e\xb6\x08\x81\xda\xac\x7e\xdf\x85" +"\xad\xa5\xdb\xd1\x96\xc6\xab\x9c\x9b\x8e\xa5\x80\x0a\xf0\xce\xf6" +"\x60\xb2\x88\xc1\x3a\x77\xb3\x87\xd1\x39\x68\x56\x7b\x8c\x8a\xb4" +"\xb5\x35\xd6\x93\xdf\x8e\x43\x3c\x41\xb5\xb5\x5d\xdd\xd2\x36\x93" +"\xa3\x09\xeb\x9f\x6c\x13\xac\xcb\xa0\x50\x4e\x7c\x49\x20\xcf\xf7" +"\xa6\xfc\xd1\x1d\x50\x72\xdf\x76\x24\xc5\xb9\xb3\x68\x1d\xe2\xdd" + "\xd1\xcb\x1b\x53\x2c\xed\x75\xfc\xeb\x36\x20\x9d\x82\xca\xe5\xa7", + .b_public = +"\x75\x98\x23\x19\xc9\xc2\xe1\x59\x73\xc2\x1d\xc5\x2c\xad\x22\x90" +"\xa8\xa4\xb4\xfa\xd7\x67\x5b\xe9\xa1\x0e\x15\x3b\x5d\xae\xd3\x25" +"\x29\xfc\x26\x79\xd6\x86\xf2\x21\x20\x86\xd7\x17\xce\xe7\x6a\x74" +"\x3e\x2e\x8b\x62\x87\x62\xe9\x27\xc0\x57\xca\x5b\xaf\x86\x22\xd6" +"\xdd\xf6\x88\xd2\x86\x21\xf7\x39\x6a\x3f\x52\x17\x03\xdc\xb9\x44" +"\x03\xdf\xb5\x6e\x5d\x15\x50\x6f\xf8\x9a\x3c\xee\x9f\xc5\x01\x23" +"\xd8\x2d\xb8\x18\x37\xc8\xed\x7d\x46\x27\x03\xc9\xae\x3b\xbf\x9e" +"\x4e\x98\x91\x30\x56\xcb\x09\x6b\x8e\xd3\xe5\x87\xfe\x82\x66\x36" +"\x2c\xee\x88\x74\x00\x8a\x2d\x36\x39\x2b\xe7\xbd\x18\x21\x36\xd0" +"\x98\x34\x6c\xb1\x4f\xbf\xd0\x0c\xd3\x6c\x64\x2e\x04\xfa\x68\x13" +"\x51\xaf\x1b\xc8\xc3\xbd\x13\x44\x72\x89\xd5\xa3\xd8\x83\x22\xf1" +"\x92\xeb\x5a\x70\x5e\x91\x1e\x86\xb9\x2f\x18\x44\x8c\x5a\xe0\x18" +"\x6c\x7a\xc6\x20\x27\x27\xae\x6a\x9e\x1b\x9b\xae\x13\xc9\x73\x22" +"\x0c\x0d\xdf\x97\x9c\x87\x06\x48\xdc\xe0\x8d\x83\xe1\x32\x8a\x8f" +"\x80\x60\x70\x7c\x7e\x10\x10\xf0\xd7\x49\x09\xfc\xf0\x0e\x11\x3f" + "\xb4\x5a\x9e\x3d\x38\x28\x3d\x46\x5a\x63\x6c\x9e\x14\xe3\x7c\x13", + .expected_a_public = +"\xca\x88\x57\x90\x69\x2d\x30\x40\xbc\x97\xd0\x79\x4b\x9e\x8c\x3c" +"\x55\x78\x01\x81\x0c\x62\xa3\x51\x80\xcb\x83\x56\x70\x50\xe8\x41" +"\x2d\x72\x0c\x7a\x1d\x9b\xf7\x0d\xe6\x81\x2b\x51\xca\xf7\x6c\xf0" +"\x45\x92\x9d\x7e\x3c\xe3\x22\xbc\x16\x5a\x2f\x92\x79\xbe\xea\xbe" +"\xa5\x73\xf7\xfa\xbf\x86\x71\x9b\x28\x4f\x32\x86\x44\xdb\xc4\x0f" +"\xb6\x30\xdd\x95\xa5\xcb\xa8\x16\x96\x76\x51\x27\xfb\x6e\xc1\x06" +"\x19\x28\x8a\xf0\x3d\x92\xe8\x6b\x57\x2a\xfc\x63\x96\xea\xf0\x9b" +"\x4e\xbe\xeb\x42\x38\x66\x0d\x47\x6b\xc6\x2b\xb1\xe6\x49\xe4\x82" +"\xcf\x74\xb4\x5a\x13\x7b\xaf\x22\x53\x34\x5b\xf2\x6f\xda\x5e\x51" +"\x00\xd1\x37\x9d\x9c\x8b\x3e\xe9\x05\x37\x8d\x01\xb9\x64\x06\xdd" +"\xee\x10\xa2\x96\xa1\x18\xbf\xb8\xb5\x77\x24\xda\xb0\x7f\x07\x7e" +"\x98\xf4\xeb\x0e\x80\x39\x54\x1e\x7e\xf6\x5c\x6b\x02\xf5\x91\x5e" +"\x3e\xb2\xa5\xe0\x13\x25\x9b\x04\xf9\xb3\x42\x82\xfe\x6a\x11\x94" +"\x4b\x01\x35\x43\xb5\x32\x20\x6e\xc0\x91\xad\x1e\xbe\xdf\xb6\x11" +"\x5c\x91\x83\x66\xa0\xe5\x27\x82\x7d\x45\xa8\x70\xa1\x37\xcd\x24" + "\xab\xb3\xb5\x13\x97\x61\x72\x7b\x03\x58\x06\xd9\x90\x78\x3c\xd1", + .expected_ss = +"\xba\x1e\x8c\x44\x39\x9e\xab\xe4\xe2\x75\xae\x54\xe3\xa9\xde\xb8" +"\x21\x3f\x46\x54\xb8\xea\xe7\xe3\xd6\x1e\xd0\xf3\x33\x2c\xb9\xb7" +"\xbd\x76\x63\xf1\xec\x2e\xf9\xe7\x3b\xa4\xa8\x94\xba\x9b\x34\x1b" +"\xfc\xa8\xbd\x89\xd2\x11\xb1\xa0\x02\x76\xe1\xb3\xe9\x89\x63\xc0" +"\xc2\xda\x77\x53\xc5\x53\x2d\x1d\x0e\xa5\x14\xac\xf1\x91\xfa\x5b" +"\x52\x8e\xeb\x73\x54\x7f\x99\xa6\x39\x17\x32\xcc\x4d\x59\x3a\x4c" +"\xd7\xea\xb3\x70\x84\xb4\x04\xb8\xb2\xcd\x77\x6e\x2b\xa1\xc6\xeb" +"\xa1\x2e\x0c\x8f\xaa\xd1\x83\xe5\x66\x12\x2c\x99\x72\x52\x2a\xfd" +"\x67\x0d\x14\xd7\x11\xd3\xf1\x77\x5f\x86\x06\x21\xcb\x7a\x14\x78" +"\x94\x6f\x42\xe9\xa9\xf4\x22\x8e\x94\x6a\x74\xfb\x13\x30\xd3\x41" +"\xde\xd3\xac\x36\x88\xc9\x24\xe6\x55\x20\x79\xfb\xd7\x81\x6a\xac" +"\x3b\x91\xcb\x34\x33\xb8\x61\x86\xf6\x2c\x88\x14\xe7\x64\x23\xaf" +"\x05\x34\x31\x9a\x56\x1e\xe5\xd5\xb6\xe6\x79\xd0\x2d\xcf\x4c\x41" +"\x95\x16\x08\xa8\x2c\xdd\x7a\xde\xe0\x77\x10\x71\x9b\x98\xfc\xc1" +"\x2c\x48\xd4\xfa\x54\x45\x44\xed\x7f\x42\x92\x63\x9c\xf6\x81\x7f" + "\xe0\x66\x55\x6e\x69\xa5\x52\x0b\x4d\x86\x06\x85\xb2\xb0\x7e\x47", + .secret_size = 276, + .b_public_size = 256, + .expected_a_public_size = 256, + .expected_ss_size = 256, + }, +#endif /* IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_CRYPTO_DH_GROUPS_RFC3526) */ { .secret = #ifdef __LITTLE_ENDIAN
Signature · 1 line
2.26.2
PATCH v2 8/18 crypto: testmgr - run only subset of DH vectors based on config
In reply to Nicolai StangeWith the previous patches, the testmgr now has up to four test vectors for DH which all test more or less the same thing:
- the two vectors from before this series,
- the vector for the ffdhe3072 group, enabled if CONFIG_CRYPTO_DH_GROUPS_RFC7919 is set and
- the vector for the modp2048 group, similarly enabled if CONFIG_CRYPTO_DH_GROUPS_RFC3526 is set.
In order to avoid too much redundancy during DH testing, enable only a subset of these depending on the kernel config:
- if CONFIG_CRYPTO_DH_GROUPS_RFC7919 is set, enable only the ffdhe3072 vector,
- otherwise, if CONFIG_CRYPTO_DH_GROUPS_RFC3526 is set, enable only the modp2048 vector and
- only enable the original two vectors if neither of these options has been selected.
Note that an upcoming patch will make the DH implementation to reject any domain parameters not corresponding to some safe-prime group approved by SP800-56Arev3 in FIPS mode. Thus, having CONFIG_FIPS enabled, but both of CONFIG_CRYPTO_DH_GROUPS_RFC7919 and CONFIG_CRYPTO_DH_GROUPS_RFC3526 unset wouldn't make much sense as it would render the DH implementation unusable in FIPS mode. Conversely, any reasonable configuration would ensure that the original, non-conforming test vectors would not get to run in FIPS mode.
--- crypto/testmgr.h | 6 +++--- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
crypto/testmgr.h +3 -3
@@ -1363,8 +1363,7 @@ static const struct kpp_testvec dh_tv_template[] = { .expected_a_public_size = 384, .expected_ss_size = 384, }, -#endif /* IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_CRYPTO_DH_GROUPS_RFC7919) */ -#if IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_CRYPTO_DH_GROUPS_RFC3526 ) +#elif IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_CRYPTO_DH_GROUPS_RFC3526 ) { .secret =#ifdef __LITTLE_ENDIAN
@@ -1455,7 +1454,7 @@ static const struct kpp_testvec dh_tv_template[] = { .expected_a_public_size = 256, .expected_ss_size = 256, }, -#endif /* IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_CRYPTO_DH_GROUPS_RFC3526) */ +#else { .secret =#ifdef __LITTLE_ENDIAN
@@ -1674,6 +1673,7 @@ static const struct kpp_testvec dh_tv_template[] = { .expected_a_public_size = 256, .expected_ss_size = 256, } +#endif }; static const struct kpp_testvec curve25519_tv_template[] = {
Signature · 1 line
2.26.2
Re: [PATCH v2 08/18] crypto: testmgr - run only subset of DH vectors based on config
Quoted 26 lines · Nicolai Stange
With the previous patches, the testmgr now has up to four test vectors for DH which all test more or less the same thing:
- the two vectors from before this series,
- the vector for the ffdhe3072 group, enabled ifCONFIG_CRYPTO_DH_GROUPS_RFC7919is set and
- the vector for the modp2048 group, similarly enabled ifCONFIG_CRYPTO_DH_GROUPS_RFC3526is set.In order to avoid too much redundancy during DH testing, enable only a subset of these depending on the kernel config:
- ifCONFIG_CRYPTO_DH_GROUPS_RFC7919is set, enable only the ffdhe3072 vector,
- otherwise, ifCONFIG_CRYPTO_DH_GROUPS_RFC3526is set, enable only the modp2048 vector and
- only enable the original two vectors if neither of these options has been selected.Note that an upcoming patch will make the DH implementation to reject any domain parameters not corresponding to some safe-prime group approved by SP800-56Arev3 in FIPS mode. Thus, having
CONFIG_FIPSenabled, but both ofCONFIG_CRYPTO_DH_GROUPS_RFC7919andCONFIG_CRYPTO_DH_GROUPS_RFC3526unset wouldn't make much sense as it would render the DH implementation unusable in FIPS mode. Conversely, any reasonable configuration would ensure that the original, non-conforming test vectors would not get to run in FIPS mode.
Quoted 5 lines
Signed-off-by Nicolai Stange <[email protected]>--- crypto/testmgr.h | 6 +++--- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
Cheers,
Hannes
Signature · 4 lines
Dr. Hannes Reinecke Kernel Storage Architect [email protected] +49 911 74053 688 SUSE Software Solutions Germany GmbH, Maxfeldstr. 5, 90409 Nürnberg HRB 36809 (AG Nürnberg), GF: Felix Imendörffer
PATCH v2 9/18 crypto: dh - implement private key generation primitive
In reply to Nicolai StangeThe support for NVME in-band authentication currently in the works ([1]) needs to generate ephemeral DH keys.
Implement crypto_dh_gen_privkey() which is intended to be used from the DH implementations just in analogy to how ecc_gen_privkey() is used for ECDH.
Make the new crypto_dh_gen_privkey() to follow the approach specified in SP800-56Arev3, sec. 5.6.1.1.3 ("Key-Pair Generation Using Extra Random Bits").
SP800-56Arev3 specifies a lower as well as an upper bound on the generated key's length:
- it must be >= two times the maximum supported security strength of the group in question and
- it must be <= the length of the domain parameter Q.
Both of these are available only for the safe-prime groups from RFC 3526 or RFC 7919, which had been introduced to the kernel with previous
patches: for any safe-prime group Q = (P - 1)/2 by definition and the individual maximum supported security strength as specified by SP800-56Arev3 has already been made available alongside the resp. domain parameters with said previous patches. Restrict crypto_dh_gen_privkey() to these safe-prime groups, i.e. to those groups with any group_id but DH_GROUP_ID_UNKNOWN. Make it pick twice the maximum supported strength rounded up to the next power of two for the output key size. This choice respects both, the lower and upper bounds given by SP800-90Arev3 for all safe-prime groups known to the kernel by now and is also in line with the NVME base spec 2.0, which requires the key size to be >= 256bits.
[1] https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
--- crypto/Kconfig | 1 + crypto/dh_helper.c | 128 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ include/crypto/dh.h | 22 ++++++++ 3 files changed, 151 insertions(+)
crypto/Kconfig +1 -0
@@ -228,6 +228,7 @@ menuconfig CRYPTO_DH tristate "Diffie-Hellman algorithm" select CRYPTO_KPP select MPILIB + select CRYPTO_RNG_DEFAULT help Generic implementation of the Diffie-Hellman algorithm.
crypto/dh_helper.c +128 -0
137 lines not on this page · raw message
include/crypto/dh.h +22 -0
@@ -99,4 +99,26 @@ int crypto_dh_encode_key(char *buf, unsigned int len, const struct dh *params);*/ int crypto_dh_decode_key (const char *buf,unsigned int len,struct dh *params); +/* +* The maximum key length is two times the max. sec. strength of the +* safe-prime groups, rounded up to the next power of two. +*/ +#define CRYPTO_DH_MAX_PRIVKEY_SIZE (512 / 8) + +/** +* crypto_dh_gen_privkey() - generate a DH private key +* @buf: The DH group to generate a key for +* @key: Buffer provided by the caller to receive the generated +* key +* @key_size: Pointer to an unsigned integer the generated key's length +* will be stored in +* +* This function is intended to generate an ephemeral DH key. +* +* Return: Negative error code on failure, 0 on success +*/ +int crypto_dh_gen_privkey (enum dh_group_id group_id, +char key[CRYPTO_DH_MAX_PRIVKEY_SIZE ], +unsigned int *key_size); +#endif
Signature · 1 line
2.26.2
PATCH v2 10/18 crypto: dh - introduce support for ephemeral key generation to dh-generic
In reply to Nicolai StangeThe support for NVME in-band authentication currently in the works ([1]) needs to generate ephemeral DH keys. Make dh-generic's ->set_secret() to generate an ephemeral key via the recently added crypto_dh_gen_privkey() in case the input ->key_size is zero. Note that this behaviour is in analogy to ecdh's ->set_secret().
[1] https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
--- crypto/dh.c | 24 ++++++++++++++++++++---- 1 file changed, 20 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
crypto/dh.c +20 -4
@@ -71,25 +71,41 @@ static int dh_set_secret(struct crypto_kpp *tfm, const void *buf, {struct dh_ctx *ctx =dh_get_ctx (tfm);struct dh params; +char key[CRYPTO_DH_MAX_PRIVKEY_SIZE ]; +int err;/* Free the old MPI key if any */ dh_clear_ctx (ctx); -if (crypto_dh_decode_key (buf, len, ¶ms) <0 ) + err =crypto_dh_decode_key (buf, len, ¶ms); +if (err) goto err_clear_ctx; -if (dh_set_params (ctx, ¶ms) <0 ) +if (!params.key_size) { + err =crypto_dh_gen_privkey (params.group_id, key, + ¶ms.key_size); +if (err) + goto err_clear_ctx; + params.key = key; + } + + err =dh_set_params (ctx, ¶ms); +if (err) goto err_clear_ctx; ctx->xa =mpi_read_raw_data (params.key, params.key_size); -if (!ctx->xa) +if (!ctx->xa) { + err = -EINVAL ; goto err_clear_ctx; + } + +memzero_explicit (key,sizeof (key));return 0 ; err_clear_ctx:dh_clear_ctx (ctx); -return -EINVAL ; +return err; }/*
Signature · 1 line
2.26.2
PATCH v2 11/18 crypto: dh - introduce support for ephemeral key generation to hpre driver
In reply to Nicolai StangeA previous patch made the dh-generic implementation's ->set_secret() to generate an ephemeral key in case the input ->key_size is zero, just in analogy with ecdh. Make the hpre crypto driver's DH implementation to behave consistently by doing the same.
--- drivers/crypto/hisilicon/hpre/hpre_crypto.c | 11 +++++++++++ 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+)
drivers/crypto/hisilicon/hpre/hpre_crypto.c +11 -0
@@ -701,11 +701,20 @@ static int hpre_dh_set_secret(struct crypto_kpp *tfm, const void *buf, {struct hpre_ctx *ctx =kpp_tfm_ctx (tfm);struct dh params; +char key[CRYPTO_DH_MAX_PRIVKEY_SIZE ];int ret;if (crypto_dh_decode_key (buf, len, ¶ms) <0 )return -EINVAL ; +if (!params.key_size) { + ret =crypto_dh_gen_privkey (params.group_id, key, + ¶ms.key_size); +if (ret) +return ret; + params.key = key; + } +/* Free old secret if any */ hpre_dh_clear_ctx (ctx, false);
@@ -716,6 +725,8 @@ static int hpre_dh_set_secret(struct crypto_kpp *tfm, const void *buf,memcpy (ctx->dh.xa_p + (ctx->key_sz - params.key_size), params.key, params.key_size); +memzero_explicit (key,sizeof (key)); +return 0 ; err_clear_ctx:
Signature · 1 line
2.26.2
PATCH v2 12/18 crypto: dh - introduce support for ephemeral key generation to qat driver
In reply to Nicolai StangeA previous patch made the dh-generic implementation's ->set_secret() to generate an ephemeral key in case the input ->key_size is zero, just in analogy with ecdh. Make the qat crypto driver's DH implementation to behave consistently by doing the same.
--- drivers/crypto/qat/qat_common/qat_asym_algs.c | 9 +++++++++ 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+)
drivers/crypto/qat/qat_common/qat_asym_algs.c +9 -0
@@ -441,11 +441,20 @@ static int qat_dh_set_secret(struct crypto_kpp *tfm, const void *buf,struct qat_dh_ctx *ctx =kpp_tfm_ctx (tfm);struct device *dev = &GET_DEV (ctx->inst->accel_dev);struct dh params; +char key[CRYPTO_DH_MAX_PRIVKEY_SIZE ];int ret;if (crypto_dh_decode_key (buf, len, ¶ms) <0 )return -EINVAL ; +if (!params.key_size) { + ret =crypto_dh_gen_privkey (params.group_id, key, + ¶ms.key_size); +if (ret) +return ret; + params.key = key; + } +/* Free old secret if any */ qat_dh_clear_ctx (dev, ctx);
Signature · 1 line
2.26.2
Re: [PATCH v2 12/18] crypto: dh - introduce support for ephemeral key generation to qat driver
Quoted 4 lines · Nicolai Stange
A previous patch made the dh-generic implementation's ->set_secret() to generate an ephemeral key in case the input ->key_size is zero, just in analogy with ecdh. Make the qat crypto driver's DH implementation to behave consistently by doing the same.
I ran a few tests on QAT GEN2 HW and this patch/set does not causes regressions.
On the headline of the commit, should this be crypto: qat - ... ?
Quoted 2 lines
Signed-off-by Nicolai Stange <[email protected]>Reviewed-by Hannes Reinecke <[email protected]>
Signature · 1 line
Giovanni
PATCH v2 13/18 crypto: testmgr - add DH test vectors for key generation
In reply to Nicolai StangeNow that all DH implementations support ephemeral key generation triggered by passing a ->key_size of zero to ->set_secret(), it's certainly worthwhile to build upon the testmgr's do_test_kpp() ->genkey facility to test it.
Add two ->genkey DH test vectors to the testmgr, one for the RFC 7919 ffdhe3072 group and another one for the RFC 3526 modp2048 group. For the resp. party B's keypair, just reuse the already available values previously specified for party A in the existing known answer tests. This will enable the compiler to merge these rather large data strings.
--- crypto/testmgr.h | 164 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 164 insertions(+)
crypto/testmgr.h +164 -0
@@ -1363,6 +1363,96 @@ static const struct kpp_testvec dh_tv_template[] = { .expected_a_public_size = 384, .expected_ss_size = 384, }, + { + .secret = +#ifdef __LITTLE_ENDIAN +"\x01\x00" /* type */ +"\x14\x00" /* len */ +"\x02\x00\x00\x00" /* group_id == DH_GROUP_ID_FFDHE3072 */ +"\x00\x00\x00\x00" /* key_size */ +"\x00\x00\x00\x00" /* p_size */ +"\x00\x00\x00\x00" ,/* g_size */ +#else +"\x00\x01" /* type */ +"\x00\x14" /* len */ +"\x00\x00\x00\x02" /* group_id == DH_GROUP_ID_FFDHE3072 */ +"\x00\x00\x00\x00" /* key_size */ +"\x00\x00\x00\x00" /* p_size */ +"\x00\x00\x00\x00" ,/* g_size */ +#endif + .b_secret = +#ifdef __LITTLE_ENDIAN +"\x01\x00" /* type */ +"\x94\x01" /* len */ +"\x02\x00\x00\x00" /* group_id == DH_GROUP_ID_FFDHE3072 */ +"\x80\x01\x00\x00" /* key_size */ +"\x00\x00\x00\x00" /* p_size */ + "\x00\x00\x00\x00" /* g_size */ +#else +"\x00\x01" /* type */ +"\x01\x94" /* len */ +"\x00\x00\x00\x02" /* group_id == DH_GROUP_ID_FFDHE3072 */ +"\x00\x00\x01\x80" /* key_size */ +"\x00\x00\x00\x00" /* p_size */ + "\x00\x00\x00\x00" /* g_size */ +#endif +/* xa */ +"\x6b\xb4\x97\x23\xfa\xc8\x5e\xa9\x7b\x63\xe7\x3e\x0e\x99\xc3\xb9" +"\xda\xb7\x48\x0d\xc3\xb1\xbf\x4f\x17\xc7\xa9\x51\xf6\x64\xff\xc4" +"\x31\x58\x87\x25\x83\x2c\x00\xf0\x41\x29\xf7\xee\xf9\xe6\x36\x76" +"\xd6\x3a\x24\xbe\xa7\x07\x0b\x93\xc7\x9f\x6c\x75\x0a\x26\x75\x76" +"\xe3\x0c\x42\xe0\x00\x04\x69\xd9\xec\x0b\x59\x54\x28\x8f\xd7\x9a" +"\x63\xf4\x5b\xdf\x85\x65\xc4\xe1\x95\x27\x4a\x42\xad\x36\x47\xa9" +"\x0a\xf8\x14\x1c\xf3\x94\x3b\x7e\x47\x99\x35\xa8\x18\xec\x70\x10" +"\xdf\xcb\xd2\x78\x88\xc1\x2d\x59\x93\xc1\xa4\x6d\xd7\x1d\xb9\xd5" +"\xf8\x30\x06\x7f\x98\x90\x0c\x74\x5e\x89\x2f\x64\x5a\xad\x5f\x53" +"\xb2\xa3\xa8\x83\xbf\xfc\x37\xef\xb8\x36\x0a\x5c\x62\x81\x64\x74" +"\x16\x2f\x45\x39\x2a\x91\x26\x87\xc0\x12\xcc\x75\x11\xa3\xa1\xc5" +"\xae\x20\xcf\xcb\x20\x25\x6b\x7a\x31\x93\x9d\x38\xb9\x57\x72\x46" +"\xd4\x84\x65\x87\xf1\xb5\xd3\xab\xfc\xc3\x4d\x40\x92\x94\x1e\xcd" +"\x1c\x87\xec\x3f\xcd\xbe\xd0\x95\x6b\x40\x02\xdd\x62\xeb\x0a\xda" +"\x4f\xbe\x8e\x32\x48\x8b\x6d\x83\xa0\x96\x62\x23\xec\x83\x91\x44" +"\xf9\x72\x01\xac\xa0\xe4\x72\x1d\x5a\x75\x05\x57\x90\xae\x7e\xb4" +"\x71\x39\x01\x05\xdc\xe9\xee\xcb\xf0\x61\x28\x91\x69\x8c\x31\x03" +"\x7a\x92\x15\xa1\x58\x67\x3d\x70\x82\xa6\x2c\xfe\x10\x56\x58\xd3" +"\x94\x67\xe1\xbe\xee\xc1\x64\x5c\x4b\xc8\x28\x3d\xc5\x66\x3a\xab" +"\x22\xc1\x7e\xa1\xbb\xf3\x19\x3b\xda\x46\x82\x45\xd4\x3c\x7c\xc6" +"\xce\x1f\x7f\x95\xa2\x17\xff\x88\xba\xd6\x4d\xdb\xd2\xea\xde\x39" +"\xd6\xa5\x18\x73\xbb\x64\x6e\x79\xe9\xdc\x3f\x92\x7f\xda\x1f\x49" +"\x33\x70\x65\x73\xa2\xd9\x06\xb8\x1b\x29\x29\x1a\xe0\xa3\xe6\x05" + "\x9a\xa8\xc2\x4e\x7a\x78\x1d\x22\x57\x21\xc8\xa3\x8d\x66\x3e\x23", + .b_public = +"\x1b\x6a\xba\xea\xa3\xcc\x50\x69\xa9\x41\x89\xaf\x04\xe1\x44\x22" +"\x97\x20\xd1\xf6\x1e\xcb\x64\x36\x6f\xee\x0b\x16\xc1\xd9\x91\xbe" +"\x57\xc8\xd9\xf2\xa1\x96\x91\xec\x41\xc7\x79\x00\x1a\x48\x25\x55" +"\xbe\xf3\x20\x8c\x38\xc6\x7b\xf2\x8b\x5a\xc3\xb5\x87\x0a\x86\x3d" +"\xb7\xd6\xce\xb0\x96\x2e\x5d\xc4\x00\x5e\x42\xe4\xe5\x50\x4f\xb8" +"\x6f\x18\xa4\xe1\xd3\x20\xfc\x3c\xf5\x0a\xff\x23\xa6\x5b\xb4\x17" +"\x3e\x7b\xdf\xb9\xb5\x3c\x1b\x76\x29\xcd\xb4\x46\x4f\x27\x8f\xd2" +"\xe8\x27\x66\xdb\xe8\xb3\xf5\xe1\xd0\x04\xcd\x89\xff\xba\x76\x67" +"\xe8\x4d\xcf\x86\x1c\x8a\xd1\xcf\x99\x27\xfb\xa9\x78\xcc\x94\xaf" +"\x3d\x04\xfd\x25\xc0\x47\xfa\x29\x80\x05\xf4\xde\xad\xdb\xab\x12" +"\xb0\x2b\x8e\xca\x02\x06\x6d\xad\x3e\x09\xb1\x22\xa3\xf5\x4c\x6d" +"\x69\x99\x58\x8b\xd8\x45\x2e\xe0\xc9\x3c\xf7\x92\xce\x21\x90\x6b" +"\x3b\x65\x9f\x64\x79\x8d\x67\x22\x1a\x37\xd3\xee\x51\xe2\xe7\x5a" +"\x93\x51\xaa\x3c\x4b\x04\x16\x32\xef\xe3\x66\xbe\x18\x94\x88\x64" +"\x79\xce\x06\x3f\xb8\xd6\xee\xdc\x13\x79\x6f\x20\x14\xc2\x6b\xce" +"\xc8\xda\x42\xa5\x93\x5b\xe4\x7f\x1a\xe6\xda\x0f\xb3\xc1\x5f\x30" +"\x50\x76\xe8\x37\x3d\xca\x77\x2c\xa8\xe4\x3b\xf9\x6f\xe0\x17\xed" +"\x0e\xef\xb7\x31\x14\xb5\xea\xd9\x39\x22\x89\xb6\x40\x57\xcc\x84" +"\xef\x73\xa7\xe9\x27\x21\x85\x89\xfa\xaf\x03\xda\x9c\x8b\xfd\x52" +"\x7d\xb0\xa4\xe4\xf9\xd8\x90\x55\xc4\x39\xd6\x9d\xaf\x3b\xce\xac" +"\xaa\x36\x14\x7a\x9b\x8b\x12\x43\xe1\xca\x61\xae\x46\x5b\xe7\xe5" +"\x88\x32\x80\xa0\x2d\x51\xbb\x2f\xea\xeb\x3c\x71\xb2\xae\xce\xca" +"\x61\xd2\x76\xe0\x45\x46\x78\x4e\x09\x2d\xc2\x54\xc2\xa9\xc7\xa8" + "\x55\x8e\x72\xa4\x8b\x8a\xc9\x01\xdb\xe9\x58\x11\xa1\xc4\xe7\x12", + .secret_size = 20, + .b_secret_size = 404, + .b_public_size = 384, + .expected_a_public_size = 384, + .expected_ss_size = 384, + .genkey = true, + }, #elif IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_CRYPTO_DH_GROUPS_RFC3526) { .secret =
@@ -1454,6 +1544,80 @@ static const struct kpp_testvec dh_tv_template[] = { .expected_a_public_size = 256, .expected_ss_size = 256, }, + { + .secret = +#ifdef __LITTLE_ENDIAN +"\x01\x00" /* type */ +"\x14\x00" /* len */ +"\x06\x00\x00\x00" /* group_id == DH_GROUP_ID_MODP2048 */ +"\x00\x00\x00\x00" /* key_size */ +"\x00\x00\x00\x00" /* p_size */ +"\x00\x00\x00\x00" ,/* g_size */ +#else +"\x00\x01" /* type */ +"\x00\x14" /* len */ +"\x00\x00\x00\x06" /* group_id == DH_GROUP_ID_MODP2048 */ +"\x00\x00\x00\x00" /* key_size */ +"\x00\x00\x00\x00" /* p_size */ +"\x00\x00\x00\x00" ,/* g_size */ +#endif + .b_secret = +#ifdef __LITTLE_ENDIAN +"\x01\x00" /* type */ +"\x14\x01" /* len */ +"\x06\x00\x00\x00" /* group_id == DH_GROUP_ID_MODP2048 */ +"\x00\x01\x00\x00" /* key_size */ +"\x00\x00\x00\x00" /* p_size */ + "\x00\x00\x00\x00" /* g_size */ +#else +"\x00\x01" /* type */ +"\x01\x14" /* len */ +"\x00\x00\x00\x06" /* group_id == DH_GROUP_ID_MODP2048 */ +"\x00\x00\x01\x00" /* key_size */ +"\x00\x00\x00\x00" /* p_size */ + "\x00\x00\x00\x00" /* g_size */ +#endif +/* xa */ +"\x38\x77\xec\x02\xc5\xae\xc2\x1c\x4c\x5e\xf5\xa2\xfb\x7e\x06\xf2" +"\xa0\x32\x0f\x3d\xf5\xcb\x75\xd0\xd7\x47\x12\x06\xca\x11\x55\xe4" +"\x16\xff\x35\xd3\xda\x36\x69\x04\xc4\xd8\x63\x96\xd4\x1d\x92\x6d" +"\xd6\x1f\x4b\x22\x7f\xa8\x68\xae\x53\x46\x49\x5a\x06\xfd\x33\xb9" +"\x47\x7b\x2c\xaf\x5f\x52\x76\x2d\xe5\x46\x44\xd7\xf1\x5e\xdf\xaa" +"\x17\xb5\x3c\x86\x5e\x69\xf9\xf5\x4a\x86\xc6\x58\x77\x81\x88\x78" +"\x7d\x5b\xf6\xe3\xd7\x46\x4c\xaf\x75\xf8\x53\x76\xf6\xcc\x6d\xd2" +"\x8e\xb7\x0f\x4c\xea\x3e\x82\x55\x82\x34\x5c\x99\x32\x7c\x22\x4b" +"\xcc\xd7\xfd\x39\x72\x64\x27\xc6\x5a\x10\xc2\x97\x38\x20\x51\xd2" +"\xf3\xf0\x95\xe7\xe4\xfb\x5a\x1e\xb6\x08\x81\xda\xac\x7e\xdf\x85" +"\xad\xa5\xdb\xd1\x96\xc6\xab\x9c\x9b\x8e\xa5\x80\x0a\xf0\xce\xf6" +"\x60\xb2\x88\xc1\x3a\x77\xb3\x87\xd1\x39\x68\x56\x7b\x8c\x8a\xb4" +"\xb5\x35\xd6\x93\xdf\x8e\x43\x3c\x41\xb5\xb5\x5d\xdd\xd2\x36\x93" +"\xa3\x09\xeb\x9f\x6c\x13\xac\xcb\xa0\x50\x4e\x7c\x49\x20\xcf\xf7" +"\xa6\xfc\xd1\x1d\x50\x72\xdf\x76\x24\xc5\xb9\xb3\x68\x1d\xe2\xdd" + "\xd1\xcb\x1b\x53\x2c\xed\x75\xfc\xeb\x36\x20\x9d\x82\xca\xe5\xa7", + .b_public = +"\xca\x88\x57\x90\x69\x2d\x30\x40\xbc\x97\xd0\x79\x4b\x9e\x8c\x3c" +"\x55\x78\x01\x81\x0c\x62\xa3\x51\x80\xcb\x83\x56\x70\x50\xe8\x41" +"\x2d\x72\x0c\x7a\x1d\x9b\xf7\x0d\xe6\x81\x2b\x51\xca\xf7\x6c\xf0" +"\x45\x92\x9d\x7e\x3c\xe3\x22\xbc\x16\x5a\x2f\x92\x79\xbe\xea\xbe" +"\xa5\x73\xf7\xfa\xbf\x86\x71\x9b\x28\x4f\x32\x86\x44\xdb\xc4\x0f" +"\xb6\x30\xdd\x95\xa5\xcb\xa8\x16\x96\x76\x51\x27\xfb\x6e\xc1\x06" +"\x19\x28\x8a\xf0\x3d\x92\xe8\x6b\x57\x2a\xfc\x63\x96\xea\xf0\x9b" +"\x4e\xbe\xeb\x42\x38\x66\x0d\x47\x6b\xc6\x2b\xb1\xe6\x49\xe4\x82" +"\xcf\x74\xb4\x5a\x13\x7b\xaf\x22\x53\x34\x5b\xf2\x6f\xda\x5e\x51" +"\x00\xd1\x37\x9d\x9c\x8b\x3e\xe9\x05\x37\x8d\x01\xb9\x64\x06\xdd" +"\xee\x10\xa2\x96\xa1\x18\xbf\xb8\xb5\x77\x24\xda\xb0\x7f\x07\x7e" +"\x98\xf4\xeb\x0e\x80\x39\x54\x1e\x7e\xf6\x5c\x6b\x02\xf5\x91\x5e" +"\x3e\xb2\xa5\xe0\x13\x25\x9b\x04\xf9\xb3\x42\x82\xfe\x6a\x11\x94" +"\x4b\x01\x35\x43\xb5\x32\x20\x6e\xc0\x91\xad\x1e\xbe\xdf\xb6\x11" +"\x5c\x91\x83\x66\xa0\xe5\x27\x82\x7d\x45\xa8\x70\xa1\x37\xcd\x24" + "\xab\xb3\xb5\x13\x97\x61\x72\x7b\x03\x58\x06\xd9\x90\x78\x3c\xd1", + .secret_size = 20, + .b_secret_size = 276, + .b_public_size = 256, + .expected_a_public_size = 256, + .expected_ss_size = 256, + .genkey = true, + }, #else { .secret =
Signature · 1 line
2.26.2
Re: [PATCH v2 13/18] crypto: testmgr - add DH test vectors for key generation
Quoted 11 lines · Nicolai Stange
Now that all DH implementations support ephemeral key generation triggered by passing a ->key_size of zero to ->set_secret(), it's certainly worthwhile to build upon the testmgr's
do_test_kpp()->genkey facility to test it.Add two ->genkey DH test vectors to the testmgr, one for the RFC 7919 ffdhe3072 group and another one for the RFC 3526 modp2048 group. For the resp. party B's keypair, just reuse the already available values previously specified for party A in the existing known answer tests. This will enable the compiler to merge these rather large data strings.
Quoted 5 lines
Signed-off-by Nicolai Stange <[email protected]>--- crypto/testmgr.h | 164 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 164 insertions(+)
Cheers,
Hannes
Signature · 4 lines
Dr. Hannes Reinecke Kernel Storage Architect [email protected] +49 911 74053 688 SUSE Software Solutions Germany GmbH, Maxfeldstr. 5, 90409 Nürnberg HRB 36809 (AG Nürnberg), GF: Felix Imendörffer
PATCH v2 14/18 lib/mpi: export mpi_rshift
In reply to Nicolai StangeA subsequent patch will make the crypto/dh's dh_is_pubkey_valid() to calculate a safe-prime groups Q parameter from P: Q = (P - 1) / 2. For implementing this, mpi_rshift() will be needed. Export it so that it's accessible from crypto/dh.
--- lib/mpi/mpi-bit.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
lib/mpi/mpi-bit.c +1 -0
@@ -242,6 +242,7 @@ void mpi_rshift(MPI x, MPI a, unsigned int n) }MPN_NORMALIZE (x->d, x->nlimbs); } +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL (mpi_rshift);/**************** * Shift A by COUNT limbs to the left
Signature · 1 line
2.26.2
PATCH v2 15/18 crypto: dh - store group id in dh-generic's dh_ctx
In reply to Nicolai StangeA subsequent patch will make the crypto/dh's dh_is_pubkey_valid() to calculate the Q value from the P domain parameter for safe-prime groups, for which by definition Q = (P - 1)/2. However, dh_is_pubkey_valid() will need to check first whether the group in question is actually a safe-prime group. In order to make this information available, introduce a new ->group_id member to struct dh_ctx and let dh_set_params() set it to the value found in the struct dh as deserialized via crypto_dh_decode_key().
--- crypto/dh.c | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
crypto/dh.c +3 -0
@@ -13,6 +13,7 @@#include <linux/mpi.h> struct dh_ctx { +enum dh_group_id group_id;MPI p;/* Value is guaranteed to be set. */ MPI q;/* Value is optional. */ MPI g;/* Value is guaranteed to be set. */
@@ -55,6 +56,8 @@ static int dh_set_params(struct dh_ctx *ctx, struct dh *params)if (dh_check_params_length (params->p_size <<3 ))return -EINVAL ; + ctx->group_id = params->group_id; + ctx->p =mpi_read_raw_data (params->p, params->p_size);if (!ctx->p)return -EINVAL ;
Signature · 1 line
2.26.2
PATCH v2 16/18 crypto: dh - calculate Q from P for the full public key verification
In reply to Nicolai StangeAs the ->q in struct dh_ctx gets never set anywhere, the code in dh_is_pubkey_valid() for doing the full public key validation in accordance to SP800-56Arev3 is effectively dead.
However, for safe-prime groups, Q = (P - 1)/2 by definition and this enables dh_is_pubkey_valid() to calculate Q on the fly for these groups. Implement this.
With this change, the last code accessing struct dh_ctx's ->q is now gone. Remove this member from struct dh_ctx.
--- crypto/dh.c | 40 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----------- 1 file changed, 29 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
crypto/dh.c +29 -11
@@ -15,7 +15,6 @@struct dh_ctx {enum dh_group_id group_id;MPI p;/* Value is guaranteed to be set. */ -MPI q;/* Value is optional. */ MPI g;/* Value is guaranteed to be set. */ MPI xa;/* Value is guaranteed to be set. */ };
@@ -23,7 +22,6 @@ struct dh_ctx {static void dh_clear_ctx (struct dh_ctx *ctx) {mpi_free (ctx->p); -mpi_free (ctx->q);mpi_free (ctx->g);mpi_free (ctx->xa);memset (ctx,0 ,sizeof (*ctx));
@@ -114,11 +112,12 @@ static int dh_set_secret(struct crypto_kpp *tfm, const void *buf,/* * SP800-56A public key verification: * -* * If Q is provided as part of the domain paramenters, a full validation -* according to SP800-56A section 5.6.2.3.1 is performed. +* * For safe-prime groups, Q can be computed trivially from P and a +* full validation according to SP800-56A section 5.6.2.3.1 is +* performed. * -* * If Q is not provided, a partial validation according to SP800-56A section -* 5.6.2.3.2 is performed. +* * For all other sets of group parameters, only a partial validation +* according to SP800-56A section 5.6.2.3.2 is performed. */ static int dh_is_pubkey_valid (struct dh_ctx *ctx,MPI y) {
@@ -129,21 +128,40 @@ static int dh_is_pubkey_valid(struct dh_ctx *ctx, MPI y)* Step 1: Verify that 2 <= y <= p - 2. * * The upper limit check is actually y < p instead of y < p - 1 -* as the mpi_sub_ui function is yet missing. +* in order to save one mpi_sub_ui() invocation here. Note that +* p - 1 is the non-trivial element of the subgroup of order 2 and +* thus, the check on y^q below would fail if y == p - 1. */ if (mpi_cmp_ui (y,1 ) <1 ||mpi_cmp (y, ctx->p) >=0 )return -EINVAL ; -/* Step 2: Verify that 1 = y^q mod p */ -if (ctx->q) { -MPI val =mpi_alloc (0 ); +/* +* Step 2: Verify that 1 = y^q mod p +* +* For the safe-prime groups q = (p - 1)/2. +*/ +if (ctx->group_id !=DH_GROUP_ID_UNKNOWN ) { +MPI val, q;int ret; + val =mpi_alloc (0 );if (!val)return -ENOMEM ; - ret =mpi_powm (val, y, ctx->q, ctx->p); + q =mpi_alloc (mpi_get_nlimbs (ctx->p)); +if (!q) { +mpi_free (val); +return -ENOMEM ; + } + +/* +* ->p is odd, so no need to explicitly subtract one +* from it before shifting to the right. +*/ +mpi_rshift (q, ctx->p,1 ); + ret =mpi_powm (val, y, q, ctx->p); +mpi_free (q);if (ret) {mpi_free (val);return ret;
Signature · 1 line
2.26.2
PATCH v2 17/18 crypto: dh - try to match domain parameters to a known safe-prime group
In reply to Nicolai StangeA subsequent patch will make the DH implementation to reject any input domain parameter set with ->group_id == DH_GROUP_ID_UNKNOWN in FIPS mode. However, as the keyctl(KEYCTL_DH_COMPUTE) implementation simply passes forward keys from userspace, it does not (and cannot) set ->group_id to anything else than DH_GROUP_ID_UNKNOWN.
In order to still allow for keyctl(KEYCTL_DH_COMPUTE) to work on approved domain parameters passed in from userspace in FIPS mode, make crypto_dh_decode_key() to compare them against any of the known groups and set ->group_id upon having found a match, if any.
--- crypto/dh_helper.c | 33 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 33 insertions(+)
crypto/dh_helper.c +33 -0
@@ -470,6 +470,36 @@ get_safe_prime_group(enum dh_group_id group_id)return NULL ; } +static enum dh_group_id lookup_group_id (const char *g,size_t g_size, +const char *p,size_t p_size) +{ +int i; + +/* All safe-prime groups use a generator of g == 2. */ +while (g_size && !*g) { + ++g; + --g_size; + } + +if (g_size !=1 || *g !=2 ) +return DH_GROUP_ID_UNKNOWN ; + +while (p_size && !*p) { + ++p; + --p_size; + } + +for (i =0 ; i <ARRAY_SIZE (safe_prime_groups); ++i) { +if (safe_prime_groups[i].p_size != p_size) +continue ; + +if (!memcmp (safe_prime_groups[i].p, p, p_size)) +return safe_prime_groups[i].group_id; + } + +return DH_GROUP_ID_UNKNOWN ; +} +static inline u8 *dh_pack_data (u8 *dst,u8 *end,const void *src,size_t size) {if (!dst || size > end - dst)
@@ -568,6 +598,9 @@ int crypto_dh_decode_key(const char *buf, unsigned int len, struct dh *params)if (memchr_inv (params->p,0 , params->p_size) ==NULL )return -EINVAL ; + params->group_id =lookup_group_id (params->g, params->g_size, + params->p, params->p_size); + }else {const struct safe_prime_group *g;
Signature · 1 line
2.26.2
PATCH v2 18/18 crypto: dh - accept only approved safe-prime groups in FIPS mode
In reply to Nicolai StangeSP800-56Arev3, sec. 5.5.2 ("Assurance of Domain-Parameter Validity") asserts that an implementation needs to verify domain paramtere validity, which boils down to either
- the domain parameters corresponding to some known safe-prime group explicitly listed to be approved in the document or
- for parameters conforming to a "FIPS 186-type parameter-size set", that the implementation needs to perform an explicit domain parameter verification, which would require access to the "seed" and "counter" values used in their generation.
The latter is not easily feasible and moreover, SP800-56Arev3 states that safe-prime groups are preferred and that FIPS 186-type parameter sets should only be supported for backward compatibility, if it all.
Make the dh implementations reject any domain parameters which don't correspond to any of the approved safe-prime groups in FIPS mode. The approved safe-prime groups are the ones specified in RFC 7919 and RFC 3526, and given that all possible values of enum dh_group_id correspond to either groups from these RFCs or to DH_GROUP_ID_UNKNOWN, it suffices to make crypto_dh_decode_key() to reject any parameter set where ->group_id == DH_GROUP_ID_UNKNOWN.
As this change will effectively render the dh implementation unusable in FIPS mode if neither of the CRYPTO_DH_GROUPS_RFC7919 or CRYPTO_DH_GROUPS_RFC3526 Kconfig options enabled, make CRYPTO_DH imply these two if CRYPTO_FIPS is set.
--- crypto/Kconfig | 2 ++ crypto/dh_helper.c | 4 ++++ 2 files changed, 6 insertions(+)
crypto/Kconfig +2 -0
@@ -229,6 +229,8 @@ menuconfig CRYPTO_DH select CRYPTO_KPP select MPILIB select CRYPTO_RNG_DEFAULT + imply CRYPTO_DH_GROUPS_RFC7919 if CRYPTO_FIPS + imply CRYPTO_DH_GROUPS_RFC3526 if CRYPTO_FIPS help Generic implementation of the Diffie-Hellman algorithm.
crypto/dh_helper.c +4 -0
@@ -7,6 +7,7 @@#include <linux/export.h> #include <linux/err.h> #include <linux/string.h> +#include <linux/fips.h> #include <crypto/dh.h> #include <crypto/kpp.h> #include <crypto/rng.h>
@@ -624,6 +625,9 @@ int crypto_dh_decode_key(const char *buf, unsigned int len, struct dh *params) params->g_size > params->p_size)return -EINVAL ; +/* Only safe-prime groups are allowed in FIPS mode. */ +if (fips_enabled && params->group_id ==DH_GROUP_ID_UNKNOWN ) +return -EINVAL ;return 0 ; }
Signature · 1 line
2.26.2
Re: [PATCH v2 18/18] crypto: dh - accept only approved safe-prime groups in FIPS mode
Quoted 27 lines · Nicolai Stange
SP800-56Arev3, sec. 5.5.2 ("Assurance of Domain-Parameter Validity") asserts that an implementation needs to verify domain paramtere validity, which boils down to either
- the domain parameters corresponding to some known safe-prime group explicitly listed to be approved in the document or
- for parameters conforming to a "FIPS 186-type parameter-size set", that the implementation needs to perform an explicit domain parameter verification, which would require access to the "seed" and "counter" values used in their generation.The latter is not easily feasible and moreover, SP800-56Arev3 states that safe-prime groups are preferred and that FIPS 186-type parameter sets should only be supported for backward compatibility, if it all.
Make the dh implementations reject any domain parameters which don't correspond to any of the approved safe-prime groups in FIPS mode. The approved safe-prime groups are the ones specified in RFC 7919 and RFC 3526, and given that all possible values of enum
dh_group_idcorrespond to either groups from these RFCs or toDH_GROUP_ID_UNKNOWN, it suffices to makecrypto_dh_decode_key()to reject any parameter set where ->group_id ==DH_GROUP_ID_UNKNOWN.As this change will effectively render the dh implementation unusable in FIPS mode if neither of the
CRYPTO_DH_GROUPS_RFC7919orCRYPTO_DH_GROUPS_RFC3526Kconfigoptions enabled, makeCRYPTO_DHimply these two ifCRYPTO_FIPSis set.
Quoted 6 lines
Signed-off-by Nicolai Stange <[email protected]>--- crypto/Kconfig | 2 ++ crypto/dh_helper.c | 4 ++++ 2 files changed, 6 insertions(+)
Cheers,
Hannes
Signature · 4 lines
Dr. Hannes Reinecke Kernel Storage Architect [email protected] +49 911 74053 688 SUSE Software Solutions Germany GmbH, Maxfeldstr. 5, 90409 Nürnberg HRB 36809 (AG Nürnberg), GF: Felix Imendörffer
Am Donnerstag, 9. Dezember 2021, 10:03:40 CET schrieb Nicolai Stange:
Hi Nicolai,
I successfully tested the entire patch set with the NIST ACVP reference implementation which covers key generation for all safe prime groups defined in your patch set.
Ciao
Stephan
Quoted 7 lines · Stephan Mueller
Am Donnerstag, 9. Dezember 2021, 10:03:40 CET schrieb Nicolai Stange:
I successfully tested the entire patch set with the NIST ACVP reference implementation which covers key generation for all safe prime groups defined in your patch set.
Tested-by Stephan Mueller <[email protected]>
Thank you!
Nicolai
Signature · 2 lines
SUSE Software Solutions Germany GmbH, Maxfeldstr. 5, 90409 Nürnberg, Germany (HRB 36809, AG Nürnberg), GF: Ivo Totev
Quoted 104 lines · Nicolai Stange
Hi all,
first of all, to the people primarily interested in
security/keys/, there's a rather trivial change tosecurity/keys/dh.cin patch 2/18. It would be great to get ACKs for that...This is v2, v1 can be found at
https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
For a list of changes, see below.
Quote from v1's cover letter:
===
Hannes' recent work on NVME in-band authentication ([1]) needs access to the RFC 7919 DH group parameters and also some means to generate ephemeral keys. He currently implements both as part of his patchset (patches 3/12 and 8/12). After some internal discussion, we decided to split off the bits needed fromcrypto/dhinto a separate series, i.e. this one here:
- for the RFC 7919 DH group parameters, it's undesirable from a performance POV to serialize the well-known domain parameters viacrypto_dh_encode_key()just to deserialize them shortly after again,
- from an architectural POV, it would be preferrable to have the key generation code incrypto/dh.crather than indrivers/nvme/, just in analogy to how key generation is supported bycrypto/ecdh.calready.Patches 1-13/18 implement all that is needed for the NVME in-band authentication support.
Unfortunately, due to the lack of HW, I have not been able to test the changes to the QAT or HPRE drivers (other than mere compile tests). Yet I figured it would be a good idea to have them behave consistently with
dh_generic, and so I chose to introduce support for privkey generation to these as well.By coincidence, NIST SP800-56Arev3 compliance effectively requires that the domain parameters are checked against an approved set, which happens to consists of those safe-prime group parameters specified in RFC 7919, among others. Thus, introducing the RFC 7919 parameters to the kernel allows for making the DH implementation to conform to SP800-56Arev3 with only little effort. I used the opportunity to work
crypto/dhtowards SP800-56Arev3 conformance with the rest of this patch series, i.e. patches 14-18/18. I can split these into another series on its own, if you like. But as they depend on the earlier patches 1-13/18, I sent them alongside for now.
===This patchset has been tested with and without
fips_enabledonx86_64, ppc64le and s390x, the latter being big endian.Changes v1 -> v2:
- Throughout the patchset:
- Upcase enumgroup_idmembers and strip superfluous _RFCXYZ_ parts from the names.
- Carry Hannes' Reviewed-bys from v1 over for those patches which have not changed (except for thatgroup_idmember renaming)
- [03/18] ("crypto: dh - optimize domain parameter serialization for well-known groups"):
- For better portability, don't serialize/deserialize directly from/to an enumgroup_id, but use an intermediate int for that.
- [05/18] ("crypto: testmgr - add DH RFC 7919 ffdhe2048 test vector")
- Use ffdhe3072 TVs rather than ones for ffdhe2048. Requested by Hannes, because "the NVMe spec mandates for its TLS profile the ffdhe3072 group".
- [13/18] ("crypto: testmgr - add DH test vectors for key generation")
- Use ffdhe3072 in place of ffdhe2048 here as well.
- Rather than introducing completely new keypairs, reuse the ones from the known answer test introduced previously in this patchset.Thanks,
Nicolai
[1] https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Nicolai Stange (18):
crypto: dh - remove struct dh's ->q member
crypto: dh - constify struct dh's pointer members
crypto: dh - optimize domain parameter serialization for well-known
groups
crypto: dh - introduce RFC 7919 safe-prime groups
crypto: testmgr - add DH RFC 7919 ffdhe3072 test vector
crypto: dh - introduce RFC 3526 safe-prime groups
crypto: testmgr - add DH RFC 3526 modp2048 test vector
crypto: testmgr - run only subset of DH vectors based on config
crypto: dh - implement private key generation primitive
crypto: dh - introduce support for ephemeral key generation to
dh-generic
crypto: dh - introduce support for ephemeral key generation to hpre
driver
crypto: dh - introduce support for ephemeral key generation to qat
driver
crypto: testmgr - add DH test vectors for key generation lib/mpi: exportmpi_rshift
crypto: dh - store group id in dh-generic'sdh_ctx
crypto: dh - calculate Q from P for the full public key verification
crypto: dh - try to match domain parameters to a known safe-prime
group
crypto: dh - accept only approved safe-prime groups in FIPS mode
Quoted 11 lines
crypto/Kconfig | 20 +- crypto/dh.c | 73 +- crypto/dh_helper.c | 691 +++++++++++++++++- crypto/testmgr.h | 388 +++++++++- drivers/crypto/hisilicon/hpre/hpre_crypto.c | 11 + drivers/crypto/qat/qat_common/qat_asym_algs.c | 9 + include/crypto/dh.h | 52 +- lib/mpi/mpi-bit.c | 1 + security/keys/dh.c | 2 +- 9 files changed, 1189 insertions(+), 58 deletions(-)
I have run this implementation against my NVMe In-band authentication test suite and have found no issues.
Cheers,
Hannes
Signature · 4 lines
Dr. Hannes Reinecke Kernel Storage Architect [email protected] +49 911 74053 688 SUSE Software Solutions Germany GmbH, Maxfeldstr. 5, 90409 Nürnberg HRB 36809 (AG Nürnberg), GF: Felix Imendörffer
Quoted 4 lines · Hannes Reinecke
I have run this implementation against my NVMe In-band authentication test suite and have found no issues.
Tested-by Hannes Reinecke <[email protected]>
Thank you!
Nicolai
Signature · 2 lines
SUSE Software Solutions Germany GmbH, Maxfeldstr. 5, 90409 Nürnberg, Germany (HRB 36809, AG Nürnberg), GF: Ivo Totev