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Various UI/security-related fixes

PATCH In review Marc-André Lureau 5 participants 18 messages Jul 6 – Jul 27

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#0 lore raw

cover Various UI/security-related fixes

---
Marc-André Lureau (5):
i386/tdx: fix uninitialized variable warning in tdx_check_features ui/vnc: fix OOB write in vnc_refresh_lossy_rect ui/vnc: validate color shifts in SetPixelFormat ui/vnc: use RFB wire types for client message handlers ui/input-barrier: fix off-by-one in keycode bounds check

 target/i386/kvm/tdx.c |  2 +-
 ui/input-barrier.c    |  2 +-
 ui/vnc.c              | 56 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------------------
 3 files changed, 35 insertions(+), 25 deletions(-)

---
base-commit: 4ee536fac748b70e6f3d8568ddd20cfbaa9cf7bf
change-id: 20260706-fix-cca462e358c9

Best regards,

Signature · 1 line
Marc-André Lureau <[email protected]>
#1 lore raw

PATCH 1/5 i386/tdx: fix uninitialized variable warning in tdx_check_features

tdx_fetch_cpuid() only sets the output ret parameter on the error path. GCC cannot prove that r is always initialized before use in the caller, triggering -Werror=maybe-uninitialized.

Initialize r to -1 to silence the warning.

Fixes 228e40f33048 ("i386/tdx: Fetch and validate CPUID of TD guest")
---
 target/i386/kvm/tdx.c | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
target/i386/kvm/tdx.c +1 -1
index c9c3b05d5fe..8294dbde3aa 100644
@@ -887,7 +887,7 @@ static int tdx_check_features(X86ConfidentialGuest *cg, CPUState *cs)
     FeatureWordInfo *wi;
     FeatureWord w;
     bool mismatch = false;
-    int r;
+    int r = -1;
 
     fetch_cpuid = tdx_fetch_cpuid(cs, &r);
     if (!fetch_cpuid) {
Signature · 1 line
2.55.0
Reviewed-by on v1 1/5
#2 lore raw

Re: [PATCH 1/5] i386/tdx: fix uninitialized variable warning in tdx_check_features

Quoted 17 lines · Marc-André Lureau

tdx_fetch_cpuid() only sets the output ret parameter on the error path. GCC cannot prove that r is always initialized before use in the caller, triggering -Werror=maybe-uninitialized.

Initialize r to -1 to silence the warning.

Fixes 228e40f33048 ("i386/tdx: Fetch and validate CPUID of TD guest")
---
  target/i386/kvm/tdx.c | 2 +-
  1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
target/i386/kvm/tdx.c +0 -0
index c9c3b05d5fe..8294dbde3aa 100644

target/i386/kvm/tdx.c static int tdx_check_features(X86ConfidentialGuest *cg, CPUState *cs) · line 893

Quoted 8 lines
target/i386/kvm/tdx.c +1 -1
@@ -887,7 +887,7 @@ static int tdx_check_features(X86ConfidentialGuest *cg, CPUState *cs)
      FeatureWordInfo *wi;
      FeatureWord w;
      bool mismatch = false;
-    int r;
+    int r = -1;
 
      fetch_cpuid = tdx_fetch_cpuid(cs, &r);
      if (!fetch_cpuid) {

Alternatively, 'return -1;' here.

#3 lore raw

PATCH 2/5 ui/vnc: fix OOB write in vnc_refresh_lossy_rect

In reply to Marc-André Lureau

vnc_refresh_lossy_rect() always marks a full VNC_STAT_RECT (64) rows as dirty when refreshing a lossy tile. When the display height is not a multiple of VNC_STAT_RECT (e.g. VNC_MAX_HEIGHT = 2160), the bottom tile is partial -- the last tile at y=2112 has only 48 valid rows. The unclamped loop writes to vs->dirty[2160..2175], past the end of the VNC_MAX_HEIGHT-sized array.

Clamp the row count to the actual surface height so partial bottom tiles only mark valid dirty bitmap entries.

Fixes CVE-2026-48002
Fixes 7d964c9d2fc6 ("vnc: refresh lossy rect after a given timeout")

Resolves: https://gitlab.com/qemu-project/qemu/-/work_items/3950

Reported-by huntr bubble
---
 ui/vnc.c | 10 +++++++++-
 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
ui/vnc.c +9 -1
index b2b69923b75..559d3954b87 100644
@@ -3004,10 +3004,18 @@ static int vnc_refresh_lossy_rect(VncDisplay *vd, int x, int y)
     int sty = y / VNC_STAT_RECT;
     int stx = x / VNC_STAT_RECT;
     int has_dirty = 0;
+    int height = MIN(pixman_image_get_height(vd->guest.fb),
+                     pixman_image_get_height(vd->server));
+    int rows;
 
     y = QEMU_ALIGN_DOWN(y, VNC_STAT_RECT);
     x = QEMU_ALIGN_DOWN(x, VNC_STAT_RECT);
 
+    rows = MIN(VNC_STAT_RECT, height - y);
+    if (rows <= 0) {
+        return 0;
+    }
+
     QTAILQ_FOREACH(vs, &vd->clients, next) {
         VncConnection *vc = container_of(vs, VncConnection, vs);
         int j;
@@ -3022,7 +3030,7 @@ static int vnc_refresh_lossy_rect(VncDisplay *vd, int x, int y)
         }
 
         vc->worker.lossy_rect[sty][stx] = 0;
-        for (j = 0; j < VNC_STAT_RECT; ++j) {
+        for (j = 0; j < rows; ++j) {
             bitmap_set(vs->dirty[y + j],
                        x / VNC_DIRTY_PIXELS_PER_BIT,
                        VNC_STAT_RECT / VNC_DIRTY_PIXELS_PER_BIT);
Signature · 1 line
2.55.0
Reviewed-by on v1 2/5
#4 lore raw

Re: [PATCH 2/5] ui/vnc: fix OOB write in vnc_refresh_lossy_rect

Quoted 24 lines · Marc-André Lureau

vnc_refresh_lossy_rect() always marks a full VNC_STAT_RECT (64) rows as dirty when refreshing a lossy tile. When the display height is not a multiple of VNC_STAT_RECT (e.g. VNC_MAX_HEIGHT = 2160), the bottom tile is partial -- the last tile at y=2112 has only 48 valid rows. The unclamped loop writes to vs->dirty[2160..2175], past the end of the VNC_MAX_HEIGHT-sized array.

Clamp the row count to the actual surface height so partial bottom tiles only mark valid dirty bitmap entries.

Fixes CVE-2026-48002
Fixes 7d964c9d2fc6 ("vnc: refresh lossy rect after a given timeout")

Resolves: https://gitlab.com/qemu-project/qemu/-/work_items/3950

Reported-by huntr bubble
---
  ui/vnc.c | 10 +++++++++-
  1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
ui/vnc.c +0 -0
index b2b69923b75..559d3954b87 100644

ui/vnc.c static int vnc_refresh_lossy_rect(VncDisplay *vd, int x, int y) · line 3008

Quoted 5 lines
ui/vnc.c +2 -0
@@ -3004,10 +3004,18 @@ static int vnc_refresh_lossy_rect(VncDisplay *vd, int x, int y)
      int sty = y / VNC_STAT_RECT;
      int stx = x / VNC_STAT_RECT;
      int has_dirty = 0;
+    int height = MIN(pixman_image_get_height(vd->guest.fb),
+                     pixman_image_get_height(vd->server));

This could deserve some helper, anyway:

Quoted 9 lines
ui/vnc.c +5 -0
+    int rows;
 
      y = QEMU_ALIGN_DOWN(y, VNC_STAT_RECT);
      x = QEMU_ALIGN_DOWN(x, VNC_STAT_RECT);
 
+    rows = MIN(VNC_STAT_RECT, height - y);
+    if (rows <= 0) {
+        return 0;
+    }
#5 lore raw

Re: [PATCH 2/5] ui/vnc: fix OOB write in vnc_refresh_lossy_rect

In reply to Marc-André Lureau
Quoted 7 lines · Marc-André Lureau

vnc_refresh_lossy_rect() always marks a full VNC_STAT_RECT (64) rows as dirty when refreshing a lossy tile. When the display height is not a multiple of VNC_STAT_RECT (e.g. VNC_MAX_HEIGHT = 2160), the bottom tile is partial -- the last tile at y=2112 has only 48 valid rows. The unclamped loop writes to vs->dirty[2160..2175], past the end of the VNC_MAX_HEIGHT-sized array.

Quoted 8 lines

Clamp the row count to the actual surface height so partial bottom tiles only mark valid dirty bitmap entries.

Fixes CVE-2026-48002
Fixes 7d964c9d2fc6 ("vnc: refresh lossy rect after a given timeout")

Resolves: https://gitlab.com/qemu-project/qemu/-/work_items/3950

Reported-by huntr bubble

This patch has already been merged to the qemu master branch (as commit 3543c2b855c), but it seems it's important to mention still.

There already was a fix for CVE-2026-48002 earlier:

commit 46ee49034d26d04d95ba8f3183d4fbfa9d2b89b4

Author: Daniel P. Berrangé <[email protected]>
Date:   Thu May 21 11:33:52 2026 +0100

ui/vnc: fix OOB write in lossy rect worker code

which touched the same code. Now this one, with a very similar subject.

Unfortunately this (additional) fix does not mention the previous fix, so there's some confusion about which commit actually fixed this issue. It looks like the first fix was incomplete and this additional fix were needed.

Thanks,

/mjt

#6 lore raw

Re: [PATCH 2/5] ui/vnc: fix OOB write in vnc_refresh_lossy_rect

Hi

Quoted 30 lines · Michael Tokarev
Quoted 7 lines · Marc-André Lureau

vnc_refresh_lossy_rect() always marks a full VNC_STAT_RECT (64) rows as dirty when refreshing a lossy tile. When the display height is not a multiple of VNC_STAT_RECT (e.g. VNC_MAX_HEIGHT = 2160), the bottom tile is partial -- the last tile at y=2112 has only 48 valid rows. The unclamped loop writes to vs->dirty[2160..2175], past the end of the VNC_MAX_HEIGHT-sized array.

Quoted 8 lines

Clamp the row count to the actual surface height so partial bottom tiles only mark valid dirty bitmap entries.

Fixes CVE-2026-48002
Fixes 7d964c9d2fc6 ("vnc: refresh lossy rect after a given timeout")

Resolves: https://gitlab.com/qemu-project/qemu/-/work_items/3950

Reported-by huntr bubble

This patch has already been merged to the qemu master branch (as commit 3543c2b855c), but it seems it's important to mention still.

There already was a fix for CVE-2026-48002 earlier:

commit 46ee49034d26d04d95ba8f3183d4fbfa9d2b89b4

Author: Daniel P. Berrangé <[email protected]>
Date:   Thu May 21 11:33:52 2026 +0100

ui/vnc: fix OOB write in lossy rect worker code

Quoted 7 lines

which touched the same code. Now this one, with a very similar subject.

Unfortunately this (additional) fix does not mention the previous fix, so there's some confusion about which commit actually fixed this issue. It looks like the first fix was incomplete and this additional fix were needed.

That's correct, we reused the same CVE

Daniel P. Berrangé said on the issue:
We didn't release master yet. As long as we also didn't release any stable branches that claimed to fix it, we could re-use it IMHO.

#7 lore raw

Re: [PATCH 2/5] ui/vnc: fix OOB write in vnc_refresh_lossy_rect

On 7/26/26 20:07, Marc-André Lureau wrote:
...>> Unfortunately this (additional) fix does not mention the

Quoted 9 lines
Quoted 3 lines

previous fix, so there's some confusion about which commit actually fixed this issue. It looks like the first fix was incomplete and this additional fix were needed.

That's correct, we reused the same CVE

Daniel P. Berrangé said on the issue:
We didn't release master yet. As long as we also didn't release any stable branches that claimed to fix it, we could re-use it IMHO.

Heh. This is exactly what actually happened - there were 2 stable releases on Jun-25 (v10.0.11 and v11.0.2) which contained the first half. Now there are 2 more stable releases from Jul-24 which contains the second half.

Unfortunately I haven't noticed this duplicated CVE#, or else I'd add a note to the second half in the stable pick-ups.

I know you don't like me rushing things to the stable series, and this is an example why this might be bad. Fortunately this is not a regression, at least. And usually security fixes come in faster anyway. Ohwell.. I'm sorry to disappoint you further.

Anyway, thank you for the clarification - everything's clear now, the confusion is no-more.

Thank you!

/mjt

#8 lore raw

Re: [PATCH 2/5] ui/vnc: fix OOB write in vnc_refresh_lossy_rect

Hi

Quoted 22 lines · Michael Tokarev

On 7/26/26 20:07, Marc-André Lureau wrote:
...>> Unfortunately this (additional) fix does not mention the

Quoted 9 lines
Quoted 3 lines

previous fix, so there's some confusion about which commit actually fixed this issue. It looks like the first fix was incomplete and this additional fix were needed.

That's correct, we reused the same CVE

Daniel P. Berrangé said on the issue:
We didn't release master yet. As long as we also didn't release any stable branches that claimed to fix it, we could re-use it IMHO.

Heh. This is exactly what actually happened - there were 2 stable releases on Jun-25 (v10.0.11 and v11.0.2) which contained the first half. Now there are 2 more stable releases from Jul-24 which contains the second half.

Unfortunately I haven't noticed this duplicated CVE#, or else I'd add a note to the second half in the stable pick-ups.

Quoted 5 lines

I know you don't like me rushing things to the stable series, and this is an example why this might be bad. Fortunately this is not a regression, at least. And usually security fixes come in faster anyway. Ohwell.. I'm sorry to disappoint you further.

for the record, I do appreciate your work, and I make mistake too :) Next time I'll check if a release was made already with the CVE#

#9 lore raw

Re: [PATCH 2/5] ui/vnc: fix OOB write in vnc_refresh_lossy_rect

Quoted 25 lines · Marc-André Lureau

Hi

Quoted 22 lines · Michael Tokarev

On 7/26/26 20:07, Marc-André Lureau wrote:
...>> Unfortunately this (additional) fix does not mention the

Quoted 9 lines
Quoted 3 lines

previous fix, so there's some confusion about which commit actually fixed this issue. It looks like the first fix was incomplete and this additional fix were needed.

That's correct, we reused the same CVE

Daniel P. Berrangé said on the issue:
We didn't release master yet. As long as we also didn't release any stable branches that claimed to fix it, we could re-use it IMHO.

Heh. This is exactly what actually happened - there were 2 stable releases on Jun-25 (v10.0.11 and v11.0.2) which contained the first half. Now there are 2 more stable releases from Jul-24 which contains the second half.

Unfortunately I haven't noticed this duplicated CVE#, or else I'd add a note to the second half in the stable pick-ups.

Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 5 lines

I know you don't like me rushing things to the stable series, and this is an example why this might be bad. Fortunately this is not a regression, at least. And usually security fixes come in faster anyway. Ohwell.. I'm sorry to disappoint you further.

for the record, I do appreciate your work, and I make mistake too :) Next time I'll check if a release was made already with the CVE#

Or we just declare a strict "never reuse a CVE once a patch is merged to master" rule.

With regards,
Daniel

Signature · 3 lines
|: https://berrange.com       ~~        https://hachyderm.io/@berrange :|
|: https://libvirt.org          ~~          https://entangle-photo.org :|
|: https://pixelfed.art/berrange   ~~    https://fstop138.berrange.com :|
#10 lore raw

PATCH 3/5 ui/vnc: validate color shifts in SetPixelFormat

In reply to Marc-André Lureau

A malicious VNC client can send a SetPixelFormat message with shift values >= 32, causing UB mask computation
(e.g. red_max << red_shift where red_shift is 255). Apparently, this is not covered by -fwrapv.

Reject color shifts >= bits_per_pixel before computing masks, and cast the max values to uint32_t to avoid signed integer overflow when a valid shift (e.g. 24) would set bit 31 of a signed int.

Fixes 9f64916da20 ("pixman/vnc: use pixman images in vnc.")

Resolves: https://gitlab.com/qemu-project/qemu/-/work_items/3948

Reported-by huntr bubble
---
 ui/vnc.c | 13 ++++++++++---
 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
ui/vnc.c +10 -3
index 559d3954b87..94a38242c56 100644
@@ -2276,18 +2276,25 @@ static void set_pixel_format(VncState *vs, int bits_per_pixel,
         return;
     }
 
+    if (red_shift >= bits_per_pixel ||
+        green_shift >= bits_per_pixel ||
+        blue_shift >= bits_per_pixel) {
+        vnc_client_error(vs);
+        return;
+    }
+
     vs->client_pf.rmax = red_max ? red_max : 0xFF;
     vs->client_pf.rbits = ctpopl(red_max);
     vs->client_pf.rshift = red_shift;
-    vs->client_pf.rmask = red_max << red_shift;
+    vs->client_pf.rmask = (uint32_t)red_max << red_shift;
     vs->client_pf.gmax = green_max ? green_max : 0xFF;
     vs->client_pf.gbits = ctpopl(green_max);
     vs->client_pf.gshift = green_shift;
-    vs->client_pf.gmask = green_max << green_shift;
+    vs->client_pf.gmask = (uint32_t)green_max << green_shift;
     vs->client_pf.bmax = blue_max ? blue_max : 0xFF;
     vs->client_pf.bbits = ctpopl(blue_max);
     vs->client_pf.bshift = blue_shift;
-    vs->client_pf.bmask = blue_max << blue_shift;
+    vs->client_pf.bmask = (uint32_t)blue_max << blue_shift;
     vs->client_pf.bits_per_pixel = bits_per_pixel;
     vs->client_pf.bytes_per_pixel = bits_per_pixel / 8;
     vs->client_pf.depth = bits_per_pixel == 32 ? 24 : bits_per_pixel;
Signature · 1 line
2.55.0
#11 lore raw

Re: [PATCH 3/5] ui/vnc: validate color shifts in SetPixelFormat

Quoted 41 lines · Marc-André Lureau

A malicious VNC client can send a SetPixelFormat message with shift values >= 32, causing UB mask computation
(e.g. red_max << red_shift where red_shift is 255). Apparently, this is not covered by -fwrapv.

Reject color shifts >= bits_per_pixel before computing masks, and cast the max values to uint32_t to avoid signed integer overflow when a valid shift (e.g. 24) would set bit 31 of a signed int.

Fixes 9f64916da20 ("pixman/vnc: use pixman images in vnc.")

Resolves: https://gitlab.com/qemu-project/qemu/-/work_items/3948

Reported-by huntr bubble
---
  ui/vnc.c | 13 ++++++++++---
  1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
ui/vnc.c +8 -1
index 559d3954b87..94a38242c56 100644
@@ -2276,18 +2276,25 @@ static void set_pixel_format(VncState *vs, int bits_per_pixel,
          return;
      }
 
+    if (red_shift >= bits_per_pixel ||
+        green_shift >= bits_per_pixel ||
+        blue_shift >= bits_per_pixel) {
+        vnc_client_error(vs);
+        return;
+    }
+
      vs->client_pf.rmax = red_max ? red_max : 0xFF;
      vs->client_pf.rbits = ctpopl(red_max);
      vs->client_pf.rshift = red_shift;
-    vs->client_pf.rmask = red_max << red_shift;
+    vs->client_pf.rmask = (uint32_t)red_max << red_shift;
      vs->client_pf.gmax = green_max ? green_max : 0xFF;
      vs->client_pf.gbits = ctpopl(green_max);
      vs->client_pf.gshift = green_shift;

ui/vnc.c static void set_pixel_format(VncState *vs, int bits_per_pixel, · line 2300

Quoted 10 lines
ui/vnc.c +2 -2
-    vs->client_pf.gmask = green_max << green_shift;
+    vs->client_pf.gmask = (uint32_t)green_max << green_shift;
      vs->client_pf.bmax = blue_max ? blue_max : 0xFF;
      vs->client_pf.bbits = ctpopl(blue_max);
      vs->client_pf.bshift = blue_shift;
-    vs->client_pf.bmask = blue_max << blue_shift;
+    vs->client_pf.bmask = (uint32_t)blue_max << blue_shift;
      vs->client_pf.bits_per_pixel = bits_per_pixel;
      vs->client_pf.bytes_per_pixel = bits_per_pixel / 8;
      vs->client_pf.depth = bits_per_pixel == 32 ? 24 : bits_per_pixel;

What about instead of the casts (keeping the if(shift) block):

-static void set_pixel_format(VncState *vs, int bits_per_pixel,

-                             int big_endian_flag, int true_color_flag,
-                             int red_max, int green_max, int blue_max,
-                             int red_shift, int green_shift, int blue_shift)
+static void set_pixel_format(VncState *vs, uint8_t bits_per_pixel,
+                             bool big_endian_flag, bool true_color_flag,
+                             uint16_t red_max, uint16_t green_max, uint16_t blue_max,
+                             uint8_t red_shift, uint8_t green_shift, uint8_t blue_shift)

?

#12 lore raw

Re: [PATCH 3/5] ui/vnc: validate color shifts in SetPixelFormat

Quoted 67 lines · Philippe Mathieu-Daudé
Quoted 41 lines · Marc-André Lureau

A malicious VNC client can send a SetPixelFormat message with shift values >= 32, causing UB mask computation
(e.g. red_max << red_shift where red_shift is 255). Apparently, this is not covered by -fwrapv.

Reject color shifts >= bits_per_pixel before computing masks, and cast the max values to uint32_t to avoid signed integer overflow when a valid shift (e.g. 24) would set bit 31 of a signed int.

Fixes 9f64916da20 ("pixman/vnc: use pixman images in vnc.")

Resolves: https://gitlab.com/qemu-project/qemu/-/work_items/3948

Reported-by huntr bubble

---
  ui/vnc.c | 13 ++++++++++---

  1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
ui/vnc.c +8 -1
index 559d3954b87..94a38242c56 100644
@@ -2276,18 +2276,25 @@ static void set_pixel_format(VncState *vs, int 
 bits_per_pixel,
           return;
       }
+    if (red_shift >= bits_per_pixel ||
+        green_shift >= bits_per_pixel ||
+        blue_shift >= bits_per_pixel) {
+        vnc_client_error(vs);
+        return;
+    }
+
       vs->client_pf.rmax = red_max ? red_max : 0xFF;
       vs->client_pf.rbits = ctpopl(red_max);
       vs->client_pf.rshift = red_shift;
-    vs->client_pf.rmask = red_max << red_shift;
+    vs->client_pf.rmask = (uint32_t)red_max << red_shift;
       vs->client_pf.gmax = green_max ? green_max : 0xFF;
       vs->client_pf.gbits = ctpopl(green_max);
       vs->client_pf.gshift = green_shift;

ui/vnc.c static void set_pixel_format(VncState *vs, int · line 2300

Quoted 10 lines
ui/vnc.c +2 -2
-    vs->client_pf.gmask = green_max << green_shift;
+    vs->client_pf.gmask = (uint32_t)green_max << green_shift;
       vs->client_pf.bmax = blue_max ? blue_max : 0xFF;
       vs->client_pf.bbits = ctpopl(blue_max);
       vs->client_pf.bshift = blue_shift;
-    vs->client_pf.bmask = blue_max << blue_shift;
+    vs->client_pf.bmask = (uint32_t)blue_max << blue_shift;
       vs->client_pf.bits_per_pixel = bits_per_pixel;
       vs->client_pf.bytes_per_pixel = bits_per_pixel / 8;
       vs->client_pf.depth = bits_per_pixel == 32 ? 24 : bits_per_pixel;

What about instead of the casts (keeping the if(shift) block):

-static void set_pixel_format(VncState *vs, int bits_per_pixel, -                             int big_endian_flag, int true_color_flag, -                             int red_max, int green_max, int blue_max, -                             int red_shift, int green_shift, int blue_shift)
+static void set_pixel_format(VncState *vs, uint8_t bits_per_pixel, +                             bool big_endian_flag, bool true_color_flag, +                             uint16_t red_max, uint16_t green_max, uint16_t blue_max,
+                             uint8_t red_shift, uint8_t green_shift, uint8_t blue_shift)

Quoted 1 line

?

Haha this is what the next patch does ;) I got confused by the (uint32_t) casts, they belong to the next patch.

So with only the if(shift) here:

#13 lore raw

PATCH 4/5 ui/vnc: use RFB wire types for client message handlers

In reply to Marc-André Lureau

Use exact-width unsigned types for the static functions that process RFB client messages, matching the types returned by read_u8(), read_u16(), and read_u32():

- set_pixel_format: uint8_t/uint16_t for pixel format fields
- pointer_event: uint8_t button_mask, uint16_t x/y
- key_event/ext_key_event: bool down, uint32_t sym/keycode
- do_key_event: uint32_t sym
- framebuffer_update_request: uint8_t incremental, uint16_t x/y/w/h

Drop needless declarations.

---
 ui/vnc.c | 33 ++++++++++++++-------------------
 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 19 deletions(-)
ui/vnc.c +14 -19
index 94a38242c56..14ce2816907 100644
@@ -608,15 +608,7 @@ bool vnc_display_reload_certs(const char *id, Error **errp)
    3) resolutions > 1024
 */
 
-static int vnc_update_client(VncState *vs, int has_dirty);
-static void vnc_disconnect_start(VncState *vs);
-
 static void vnc_colordepth(VncState *vs);
-static void framebuffer_update_request(VncState *vs, int incremental,
-                                       int x_position, int y_position,
-                                       int w, int h);
-static void vnc_refresh(DisplayChangeListener *dcl);
-static int vnc_refresh_server_surface(VncDisplay *vd);
 
 static int vnc_width(VncDisplay *vd)
 {
@@ -1763,7 +1755,8 @@ static void check_pointer_type_change(Notifier *notifier, void *data)
     vs->absolute = absolute;
 }
 
-static void pointer_event(VncState *vs, int button_mask, int x, int y)
+static void pointer_event(VncState *vs, uint8_t button_mask,
+                          uint16_t x, uint16_t y)
 {
     static uint32_t bmap[INPUT_BUTTON__MAX] = {
         [INPUT_BUTTON_LEFT]       = 0x01,
@@ -1841,7 +1834,7 @@ static void kbd_leds(Notifier *notifier, void *data)
     }
 }
 
-static void do_key_event(VncState *vs, int down, int keycode, int sym)
+static void do_key_event(VncState *vs, int down, int keycode, uint32_t sym)
 {
     unsigned int lnx = qemu_input_key_number_to_linux(keycode);
 
@@ -2019,7 +2012,7 @@ static const char *code2name(int keycode)
     return QKeyCode_str(qemu_input_key_number_to_qcode(keycode));
 }
 
-static void key_event(VncState *vs, int down, uint32_t sym)
+static void key_event(VncState *vs, bool down, uint32_t sym)
 {
     int keycode;
     int lsym = sym;
@@ -2034,8 +2027,8 @@ static void key_event(VncState *vs, int down, uint32_t sym)
     do_key_event(vs, down, keycode, sym);
 }
 
-static void ext_key_event(VncState *vs, int down,
-                          uint32_t sym, uint16_t keycode)
+static void ext_key_event(VncState *vs, bool down,
+                          uint32_t sym, uint32_t keycode)
 {
     /* if the user specifies a keyboard layout, always use it */
     if (keyboard_layout) {
@@ -2046,8 +2039,9 @@ static void ext_key_event(VncState *vs, int down,
     }
 }
 
-static void framebuffer_update_request(VncState *vs, int incremental,
-                                       int x, int y, int w, int h)
+static void framebuffer_update_request(VncState *vs, uint8_t incremental,
+                                       uint16_t x, uint16_t y,
+                                       uint16_t w, uint16_t h)
 {
     if (incremental) {
         if (vs->update != VNC_STATE_UPDATE_FORCE) {
@@ -2250,10 +2244,11 @@ static void send_color_map(VncState *vs)
     vnc_unlock_output(vs);
 }
 
-static void set_pixel_format(VncState *vs, int bits_per_pixel,
-                             int big_endian_flag, int true_color_flag,
-                             int red_max, int green_max, int blue_max,
-                             int red_shift, int green_shift, int blue_shift)
+static void set_pixel_format(VncState *vs, uint8_t bits_per_pixel,
+                             uint8_t big_endian_flag, uint8_t true_color_flag,
+                             uint16_t red_max, uint16_t green_max,
+                             uint16_t blue_max, uint8_t red_shift,
+                             uint8_t green_shift, uint8_t blue_shift)
 {
     if (!true_color_flag) {
         /* Expose a reasonable default 256 color map */
Signature · 1 line
2.55.0
Reviewed-by on v1 4/5
#14 lore raw

Re: [PATCH 4/5] ui/vnc: use RFB wire types for client message handlers

Quoted 48 lines · Marc-André Lureau

Use exact-width unsigned types for the static functions that process RFB client messages, matching the types returned by read_u8(), read_u16(), and read_u32():

- set_pixel_format: uint8_t/uint16_t for pixel format fields
- pointer_event: uint8_t button_mask, uint16_t x/y
- key_event/ext_key_event: bool down, uint32_t sym/keycode
- do_key_event: uint32_t sym
- framebuffer_update_request: uint8_t incremental, uint16_t x/y/w/h

Drop needless declarations.

---
  ui/vnc.c | 33 ++++++++++++++-------------------
  1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 19 deletions(-)
ui/vnc.c +2 -9
index 94a38242c56..14ce2816907 100644
@@ -608,15 +608,7 @@ bool vnc_display_reload_certs(const char *id, Error **errp)
     3) resolutions > 1024
  */
 
-static int vnc_update_client(VncState *vs, int has_dirty);
-static void vnc_disconnect_start(VncState *vs);
-
  static void vnc_colordepth(VncState *vs);
-static void framebuffer_update_request(VncState *vs, int incremental,
-                                       int x_position, int y_position,
-                                       int w, int h);
-static void vnc_refresh(DisplayChangeListener *dcl);
-static int vnc_refresh_server_surface(VncDisplay *vd);
 
  static int vnc_width(VncDisplay *vd)
  {
@@ -1763,7 +1755,8 @@ static void check_pointer_type_change(Notifier *notifier, void *data)
      vs->absolute = absolute;
  }
 
-static void pointer_event(VncState *vs, int button_mask, int x, int y)
+static void pointer_event(VncState *vs, uint8_t button_mask,
+                          uint16_t x, uint16_t y)
  {
      static uint32_t bmap[INPUT_BUTTON__MAX] = {
          [INPUT_BUTTON_LEFT]       = 0x01,

ui/vnc.c static void kbd_leds(Notifier *notifier, void *data) · line 1837

Quoted 5 lines
ui/vnc.c +1 -1
@@ -1841,7 +1834,7 @@ static void kbd_leds(Notifier *notifier, void *data)
      }
  }
 
-static void do_key_event(VncState *vs, int down, int keycode, int sym)
+static void do_key_event(VncState *vs, int down, int keycode, uint32_t sym)

bool down.

Quoted 36 lines
ui/vnc.c +6 -5
  {
      unsigned int lnx = qemu_input_key_number_to_linux(keycode);
 
@@ -2019,7 +2012,7 @@ static const char *code2name(int keycode)
      return QKeyCode_str(qemu_input_key_number_to_qcode(keycode));
  }
 
-static void key_event(VncState *vs, int down, uint32_t sym)
+static void key_event(VncState *vs, bool down, uint32_t sym)
  {
      int keycode;
      int lsym = sym;
@@ -2034,8 +2027,8 @@ static void key_event(VncState *vs, int down, uint32_t sym)
      do_key_event(vs, down, keycode, sym);
  }
 
-static void ext_key_event(VncState *vs, int down,
-                          uint32_t sym, uint16_t keycode)
+static void ext_key_event(VncState *vs, bool down,
+                          uint32_t sym, uint32_t keycode)
  {
      /* if the user specifies a keyboard layout, always use it */
      if (keyboard_layout) {
@@ -2046,8 +2039,9 @@ static void ext_key_event(VncState *vs, int down,
      }
  }
 
-static void framebuffer_update_request(VncState *vs, int incremental,
-                                       int x, int y, int w, int h)
+static void framebuffer_update_request(VncState *vs, uint8_t incremental,
+                                       uint16_t x, uint16_t y,
+                                       uint16_t w, uint16_t h)
  {
      if (incremental) {
          if (vs->update != VNC_STATE_UPDATE_FORCE) {

ui/vnc.c static void send_color_map(VncState *vs) · line 2248

Quoted 9 lines
ui/vnc.c +2 -4
@@ -2250,10 +2244,11 @@ static void send_color_map(VncState *vs)
      vnc_unlock_output(vs);
  }
 
-static void set_pixel_format(VncState *vs, int bits_per_pixel,
-                             int big_endian_flag, int true_color_flag,
-                             int red_max, int green_max, int blue_max,
-                             int red_shift, int green_shift, int blue_shift)
+static void set_pixel_format(VncState *vs, uint8_t bits_per_pixel,
+                             uint8_t big_endian_flag, uint8_t true_color_flag,

bool flag, bool flag.

ui/vnc.c static void send_color_map(VncState *vs) · line 2254

Quoted 7 lines
ui/vnc.c +3 -0
+                             uint16_t red_max, uint16_t green_max,
+                             uint16_t blue_max, uint8_t red_shift,
+                             uint8_t green_shift, uint8_t blue_shift)
  {
      if (!true_color_flag) {
          /* Expose a reasonable default 256 color map */

Including the (uint32_t) casts in this patch:

#15 lore raw

PATCH 5/5 ui/input-barrier: fix off-by-one in keycode bounds check

In reply to Marc-André Lureau

Use strict "<" to fix the off-by-one.

Fixes 6105683da35b ("ui: add an embedded Barrier client")

Resolves: https://gitlab.com/qemu-project/qemu/-/issues/3951

Reported-by huntr bubble
---
 ui/input-barrier.c | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
ui/input-barrier.c +1 -1
index d07027114af..0a238d4010b 100644
@@ -87,7 +87,7 @@ static kbd_layout_t *kbd_layout;
 static unsigned int input_barrier_to_linux(uint16_t keyid, uint16_t keycode)
 {
     /* keycode is optional, if it is not provided use keyid */
-    if (keycode && keycode <= qemu_input_map_xorgkbd_to_linux_len) {
+    if (keycode && keycode < qemu_input_map_xorgkbd_to_linux_len) {
         return qemu_input_map_xorgkbd_to_linux[keycode];
     }
 
Signature · 1 line
2.55.0
Reviewed-by on v1 5/5
#16 lore raw

Re: [PATCH 5/5] ui/input-barrier: fix off-by-one in keycode bounds check

Quoted 16 lines · Marc-André Lureau

Use strict "<" to fix the off-by-one.

Fixes 6105683da35b ("ui: add an embedded Barrier client")

Resolves: https://gitlab.com/qemu-project/qemu/-/issues/3951

Reported-by huntr bubble
---
  ui/input-barrier.c | 2 +-
  1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
ui/input-barrier.c +0 -0
index d07027114af..0a238d4010b 100644

ui/input-barrier.c static kbd_layout_t *kbd_layout; · line 93

Quoted 8 lines
ui/input-barrier.c +1 -1
@@ -87,7 +87,7 @@ static kbd_layout_t *kbd_layout;
  static unsigned int input_barrier_to_linux(uint16_t keyid, uint16_t keycode)
  {
      /* keycode is optional, if it is not provided use keyid */
-    if (keycode && keycode <= qemu_input_map_xorgkbd_to_linux_len) {
+    if (keycode && keycode < qemu_input_map_xorgkbd_to_linux_len) {
          return qemu_input_map_xorgkbd_to_linux[keycode];
      }
 
Reviewed-by on v1 5/5
#17 lore raw

Re: [PATCH 5/5] ui/input-barrier: fix off-by-one in keycode bounds check

In reply to Marc-André Lureau
Quoted 9 lines · Marc-André Lureau

Use strict "<" to fix the off-by-one.

Fixes 6105683da35b ("ui: add an embedded Barrier client")

Resolves: https://gitlab.com/qemu-project/qemu/-/issues/3951

Reported-by huntr bubble
---
  ui/input-barrier.c | 2 +-
  1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)