perf/x86/amd/uncore: Extend num_umc_pmc to fix UMC discovery
Subsystems (2)
PATCH 1/1 perf/x86/amd/uncore: Extend num_umc_pmc to fix UMC discovery
The number of Unified Memory Controller (UMC) counters is advertised by CPUID 0x80000022[EBX].NumPerfCtrUmc which corresponds to num_umc_pmc. NumPerfCtrUmc was introduced in Zen 4 with a width of six bits (21:16) but Zen 5 documentation revised it to eight bits (23:16).
No issues were observed thus far because the maximum possible count, which depends on the maximum number of UMCs across the product lineup, remained the same as that of Zen 4. Six bits were still enough to accommodate the value. However, Zen 6 can have values as high as 64 in fully-populated configurations and run into discovery issues since the two most significant bits are ignored. Fix this by extending the size of the bitfield to eight bits.
For Zen 4 processors, the two most significant bits that documentation flags as reserved, are guaranteed to be zero.
--- arch/x86/include/asm/perf_event.h | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
arch/x86/include/asm/perf_event.h +1 -1
@@ -298,7 +298,7 @@ union cpuid_0x80000022_ebx {/* Number of Data Fabric Counters */ unsigned int num_df_pmc:6;/* Number of Unified Memory Controller Counters */ - unsigned int num_umc_pmc:6; + unsigned int num_umc_pmc:8; } split;unsigned int full; };
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
[email protected]
AI reviewThank you for your contribution! Sashiko AI review found 1 potential issue(s) to consider: - [High] perf/x86/amd: OOB write on active_mask via unvalidated CPUID --
Thank you for your contribution! Sashiko AI review found 1 potential issue(s) to consider:
- [High] perf/x86/amd: OOB write on active_mask via unvalidated CPUID
--
commit 00612d17a5d2f57d4e77167b7e9d6303f0e776ac
Author: Sandipan Das <[email protected]>
perf/x86/amd/uncore: Extend num_umc_pmc to fix UMC discovery
The commit extends the width of the num_umc_pmc bitfield from six bits to eight bits to match Zen 5 documentation. This allows discovery of Unified Memory Controller (UMC) counters up to 64 in fully-populated Zen 6 configurations.
arch/x86/include/asm/perf_event.h union cpuid_0x80000022_ebx { · line 296
Quoted 10 lines
arch/x86/include/asm/perf_event.h +1
-1@@ -293,7 +293,7 @@ union cpuid_0x80000022_ebx {/* Number of Data Fabric Counters */ unsigned int num_df_pmc:6;/* Number of Unified Memory Controller Counters */ - unsigned int num_umc_pmc:6; + unsigned int num_umc_pmc:8;
[Severity: High]
Does this expansion allow values up to 255 from CPUID to propagate unchecked?
When the field was 6 bits, the natural boundary limited it to 63, which fit safely inside NUM_COUNTERS_MAX (64). With an 8-bit width, a hypervisor could supply a value greater than 64 in EBX.NumPerfCtrUmc.
This value gets propagated down during initialization without validation:
arch/x86/events/amd/uncore.c:amd_uncore_umc_ctx_init() {
...
pmu->num_counters = group_num_pmcs[gid] / group_num_pmus[gid];
...
}If pmu->num_counters exceeds NUM_COUNTERS_MAX, can it cause an out-of-bounds write when starting the event?
arch/x86/events/amd/uncore.c:amd_uncore_umc_start() {
...
__set_bit(hwc->idx, ctx->active_mask);
...
}Since ctx->active_mask is sized by BITS_TO_LONGS(NUM_COUNTERS_MAX), writing a bit greater than 63 might overflow into the adjacent nr_active and hrtimer fields in struct amd_uncore_ctx.
Should we cap pmu->num_counters against NUM_COUNTERS_MAX during initialization to prevent this regression?
Quoted 3 lines
arch/x86/include/asm/perf_event.h +0
-0} split;unsigned int full; };
Signature · 1 line
Sashiko AI review · https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/[email protected]?part=1
Quoted 28 lines · On 07-10-2026 21:10, [email protected] wrote:
Thank you for your contribution! Sashiko AI review found 1 potential issue(s) to consider:
- [High] perf/x86/amd: OOB write onactive_maskvia unvalidated CPUID
--commit
00612d17a5d2f57d4e77167b7e9d6303f0e776ac
Author: Sandipan Das <[email protected]>perf/x86/amd/uncore: Extend
num_umc_pmcto fix UMC discoveryThe commit extends the width of the
num_umc_pmcbitfield from six bits to eight bits to match Zen 5 documentation. This allows discovery of Unified Memory Controller (UMC) counters up to 64 in fully-populated Zen 6 configurations.arch/x86/include/asm/perf_event.h union cpuid_0x80000022_ebx { · line 296
Quoted 10 lines
arch/x86/include/asm/perf_event.h +1
-1@@ -293,7 +293,7 @@ union cpuid_0x80000022_ebx {/* Number of Data Fabric Counters */ unsigned int num_df_pmc:6;/* Number of Unified Memory Controller Counters */ - unsigned int num_umc_pmc:6; + unsigned int num_umc_pmc:8;[Severity: High]
Does this expansion allow values up to 255 from CPUID to propagate unchecked?
Quoted 4 lines
When the field was 6 bits, the natural boundary limited it to 63, which fit safely inside
NUM_COUNTERS_MAX(64). With an 8-bit width, a hypervisor could supply a value greater than 64 in EBX.NumPerfCtrUmc.
Uncore counters are generally not visible to guests.
Quoted 11 lines
This value gets propagated down during initialization without validation:
arch/x86/events/amd/uncore.c:amd_uncore_umc_ctx_init() { ... pmu->num_counters = group_num_pmcs[gid] / group_num_pmus[gid]; ... }If
pmu->num_countersexceedsNUM_COUNTERS_MAX, can it cause an out-of-bounds write when starting the event?
Not for real hardware since each UMC PMU has at most 4 PMCs.
Quoted 17 lines
arch/x86/events/amd/uncore.c:amd_uncore_umc_start() { ... __set_bit(hwc->idx, ctx->active_mask); ... }Since
ctx->active_maskis sized byBITS_TO_LONGS(NUM_COUNTERS_MAX), writing a bit greater than 63 might overflow into the adjacentnr_activeand hrtimer fields in structamd_uncore_ctx.Should we cap
pmu->num_countersagainstNUM_COUNTERS_MAXduring initialization to prevent this regression?Quoted 3 lines
arch/x86/include/asm/perf_event.h +0
-0} split;unsigned int full; };