lib: sbi_init: Avoid thundering hurd problem with coldboot_lock
PATCH v3 1/2 lib: sbi_init: Avoid thundering hurd problem with coldboot_lock
We can have thundering hurd problem with coldboot_lock where the boot HART can potentially starve trying to acquire coldboot_lock because some of the non-boot HARTs are continuously acquiring and releasing coldboot_lock. This can happen if MIP.MSIP bit is already set for some of the non-boot HARTs.
To avoid thundering hurd problem for coldboot_lock, we use the __smp_load_acquire() and __smp_store_release() for coldboot_done flag and use coldboot_lock only for coldboot_wait_hmask.
--- lib/sbi/sbi_init.c | 20 +++++++++++++------- 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
lib/sbi/sbi_init.c +13 -7
@@ -9,6 +9,7 @@#include <sbi/riscv_asm.h> #include <sbi/riscv_atomic.h> +#include <sbi/riscv_barrier.h> #include <sbi/riscv_locks.h> #include <sbi/sbi_console.h> #include <sbi/sbi_ecall.h>
@@ -85,9 +86,10 @@ static void sbi_boot_prints(struct sbi_scratch *scratch, u32 hartid) }static spinlock_t coldboot_lock =SPIN_LOCK_INITIALIZER ; -static unsigned long coldboot_done =0 ;static struct sbi_hartmask coldboot_wait_hmask = {0 }; +static unsigned long coldboot_done; +static void wait_for_coldboot (struct sbi_scratch *scratch,u32 hartid) {unsigned long saved_mie, cmip;
@@ -105,16 +107,20 @@ static void wait_for_coldboot(struct sbi_scratch *scratch, u32 hartid)/* Mark current HART as waiting */ sbi_hartmask_set_hart (hartid, &coldboot_wait_hmask); +/* Release coldboot lock */ +spin_unlock (&coldboot_lock); +/* Wait for coldboot to finish using WFI */ -while (!coldboot_done) { -spin_unlock (&coldboot_lock); +while (!__smp_load_acquire (&coldboot_done)) {do {wfi (); cmip =csr_read (CSR_MIP ); }while (!(cmip &MIP_MSIP )); -spin_lock (&coldboot_lock); }; +/* Acquire coldboot lock */ +spin_lock (&coldboot_lock); +/* Unmark current HART as waiting */ sbi_hartmask_clear_hart (hartid, &coldboot_wait_hmask);
@@ -132,12 +138,12 @@ static void wake_coldboot_harts(struct sbi_scratch *scratch, u32 hartid) {const struct sbi_platform *plat =sbi_platform_ptr (scratch); +/* Mark coldboot done */ +__smp_store_release (&coldboot_done,1 ); +/* Acquire coldboot lock */ spin_lock (&coldboot_lock); -/* Mark coldboot done */ - coldboot_done =1 ; -/* Send an IPI to all HARTs waiting for coldboot */ for (int i =0 ; i <=sbi_scratch_last_hartid (); i++) { if ((i != hartid) &&
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
PATCH v3 2/2 lib: sbi: Handle the case where MTVAL has illegal instruction address
The Kendryte K210 follows RISC-V v1.9 spec so MTVAL has instruction address (instead of instruction encoding) on illegal instruction trap.
To handle above case, we fix sbi_illegal_insn_handler() without any impact on RISC-V v1.10 (or higher) systems. This achieved by exploiting the fact that program counter (and instruction address) is always 2-byte aligned in RISC-V world.
--- lib/sbi/sbi_illegal_insn.c | 21 +++++++++++++++------ 1 file changed, 15 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
lib/sbi/sbi_illegal_insn.c +15 -6
@@ -118,13 +118,22 @@ int sbi_illegal_insn_handler(ulong insn, struct sbi_trap_regs *regs) {struct sbi_trap_info uptrap; +/* +* We only deal with 32-bit (or longer) illegal instructions. If we +* see instruction is zero OR instruction is 16-bit then we fetch and +* check the instruction encoding using unprivilege access. +* +* The program counter (PC) in RISC-V world is always 2-byte aligned +* so handling only 32-bit (or longer) illegal instructions also help +* the case where MTVAL CSR contains instruction address for illegal +* instruction trap. +*/ +if (unlikely ((insn &3 ) !=3 )) { -if (insn ==0 ) { - insn =sbi_get_insn (regs->mepc, &uptrap); -if (uptrap.cause) { - uptrap.epc = regs->mepc; -return sbi_trap_redirect (regs, &uptrap); - } + insn =sbi_get_insn (regs->mepc, &uptrap); +if (uptrap.cause) { + uptrap.epc = regs->mepc; +return sbi_trap_redirect (regs, &uptrap); }if ((insn &3 ) !=3 )return truly_illegal_insn (insn, regs);
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
Anup Patel
AppliedPATCH v3 2/2 lib: sbi: Handle the case where MTVAL has illegal instruction address
Quoted 63 lines
-----Original Message-----
From: Anup Patel <[email protected]>
Sent: 18 August 2020 09:37
To: Atish Patra <[email protected]>; Alistair Francis <[email protected]>
Cc: Heinrich Schuchardt <[email protected]>; Anup Patel <[email protected]>; opensbi at lists.infradead.org; Anup Patel <[email protected]>; Bin Meng <[email protected]>
Subject: [PATCH v3 2/2] lib: sbi: Handle the case where MTVAL has illegal instruction addressThe Kendryte K210 follows RISC-V v1.9 spec so MTVAL has instruction address (instead of instruction encoding) on illegal instruction trap.
To handle above case, we fix
sbi_illegal_insn_handler()without any impact on RISC-V v1.10 (or higher) systems. This achieved by exploiting the fact that program counter (and instruction address) is always 2-byte aligned in RISC-V world.Signed-off-by Anup Patel <[email protected]>Tested-by Heinrich Schuchardt <[email protected]>Reviewed-by Bin Meng <[email protected]>Reviewed-by Atish Patra <[email protected]>--- lib/sbi/sbi_illegal_insn.c | 21 +++++++++++++++------ 1 file changed, 15 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)lib/sbi/sbi_illegal_insn.c index renamed from lib/sbi/sbi_illegal_insn.c +0
-00e5523f..9af3d24 100644
lib/sbi/sbi_illegal_insn.c +15
-7@@ -118,13 +118,22 @@ int sbi_illegal_insn_handler(ulong insn, struct sbi_trap_regs *regs) {struct sbi_trap_info uptrap; +/* +* We only deal with 32-bit (or longer) illegal instructions. If we +* see instruction is zero OR instruction is 16-bit then we fetch and +* check the instruction encoding using unprivilege access. +* +* The program counter (PC) in RISC-V world is always 2-byte aligned +* so handling only 32-bit (or longer) illegal instructions also help +* the case where MTVAL CSR contains instruction address for illegal +* instruction trap. +*/ +if (unlikely ((insn &3 ) !=3 )) { -if (insn ==0 ) { - insn =sbi_get_insn (regs->mepc, &uptrap); -if (uptrap.cause) { - uptrap.epc = regs->mepc; -return sbi_trap_redirect (regs, &uptrap); - } + insn =sbi_get_insn (regs->mepc, &uptrap); +if (uptrap.cause) { + uptrap.epc = regs->mepc; +return sbi_trap_redirect (regs, &uptrap); }if ((insn &3 ) !=3 )return truly_illegal_insn (insn, regs); --
Quoted 1 line
2.25.1
Applied this patch to the riscv/opensbi repo
Regards,
Anup
PATCH v3 1/2 lib: sbi_init: Avoid thundering hurd problem with coldboot_lock
In reply to Anup PatelQuoted 11 lines · Anup Patel
We can have thundering hurd problem with
coldboot_lockwhere the boot HART can potentially starve trying to acquirecoldboot_lockbecause some of the non-boot HARTs are continuously acquiring and releasingcoldboot_lock. This can happen if MIP.MSIP bit is already set for some of the non-boot HARTs.To avoid thundering hurd problem for
coldboot_lock, we use the__smp_load_acquire()and__smp_store_release()forcoldboot_doneflag and usecoldboot_lockonly forcoldboot_wait_hmask.
Quoted 7 lines
Signed-off-by Anup Patel <[email protected]>Tested-by Heinrich Schuchardt <[email protected]>Reviewed-by Atish Patra <[email protected]>--- lib/sbi/sbi_init.c | 20 +++++++++++++------- 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
Anup Patel
AppliedPATCH v3 1/2 lib: sbi_init: Avoid thundering hurd problem with coldboot_lock
Quoted 32 lines
-----Original Message-----
From: Bin Meng <[email protected]>
Sent: 18 August 2020 14:46
To: Anup Patel <[email protected]>
Cc: Atish Patra <[email protected]>; Alistair Francis <[email protected]>; Heinrich Schuchardt <[email protected]>; OpenSBI <[email protected]>; Anup Patel <[email protected]>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v3 1/2] lib:sbi_init: Avoid thundering hurd problem withcoldboot_lockQuoted 11 lines · Anup Patel
We can have thundering hurd problem with
coldboot_lockwhere the boot HART can potentially starve trying to acquirecoldboot_lockbecause some of the non-boot HARTs are continuously acquiring and releasingcoldboot_lock. This can happen if MIP.MSIP bit is already set for some of the non-boot HARTs.To avoid thundering hurd problem for
coldboot_lock, we use the__smp_load_acquire()and__smp_store_release()forcoldboot_doneflag and usecoldboot_lockonly forcoldboot_wait_hmask.Quoted 7 lines
Signed-off-by Anup Patel <[email protected]>Tested-by Heinrich Schuchardt <[email protected]>Reviewed-by Atish Patra <[email protected]>--- lib/sbi/sbi_init.c | 20 +++++++++++++------- 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
Quoted 1 line
Reviewed-by Bin Meng <[email protected]>
Applied this patch to the riscv/opensbi repo
Regards,
Anup
PATCH v3 1/2 lib: sbi_init: Avoid thundering hurd problem with coldboot_lock
In reply to Anup PatelQuoted 6 lines · Anup Patel
We can have thundering hurd problem with
coldboot_lockwhere the boot HART can potentially starve trying to acquirecoldboot_lockbecause some of the non-boot HARTs are continuously acquiring and releasingcoldboot_lock. This can happen if MIP.MSIP bit is already set for some of the non-boot HARTs.
Quoted 7 lines
To avoid thundering hurd problem for
coldboot_lock, we use the__smp_load_acquire()and__smp_store_release()forcoldboot_doneflag and usecoldboot_lockonly forcoldboot_wait_hmask.Signed-off-by Anup Patel <[email protected]>Tested-by Heinrich Schuchardt <[email protected]>Reviewed-by Atish Patra <[email protected]>
Just curious, what are the changes from v1 and v2?
--Sean
PATCH v3 1/2 lib: sbi_init: Avoid thundering hurd problem with coldboot_lock
Quoted 11 lines · Sean Anderson
Quoted 10 lines · Anup Patel
We can have thundering hurd problem with
coldboot_lockwhere the boot HART can potentially starve trying to acquirecoldboot_lockbecause some of the non-boot HARTs are continuously acquiring and releasingcoldboot_lock. This can happen if MIP.MSIP bit is already set for some of the non-boot HARTs.To avoid thundering hurd problem for
coldboot_lock, we use the__smp_load_acquire()and__smp_store_release()forcoldboot_doneflag and usecoldboot_lockonly forcoldboot_wait_hmask.
Quoted 5 lines
Quoted 3 lines
Signed-off-by Anup Patel <[email protected]>Tested-by Heinrich Schuchardt <[email protected]>Reviewed-by Atish Patra <[email protected]>Just curious, what are the changes from v1 and v2?
Barriers are realized in a different way in patch 1.
Except for the barriers patch 1 follows what I proposed in my original patch and the following discussion.
And for sure Jessica was right that at least compiler barriers are needed.
Best regards
Heinrich
PATCH v3 1/2 lib: sbi_init: Avoid thundering hurd problem with coldboot_lock
Quoted 30 lines
-----Original Message-----
From: Heinrich Schuchardt <[email protected]>
Sent: 19 August 2020 17:39
To: Sean Anderson <[email protected]>; Anup Patel <[email protected]>; Atish Patra <[email protected]>; Alistair Francis <[email protected]>
Cc: opensbi at lists.infradead.org; Anup Patel <[email protected]>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v3 1/2] lib:sbi_init: Avoid thundering hurd problem withcoldboot_lockQuoted 2 lines · Sean Anderson
Quoted 1 line · Anup Patel
We can have thundering hurd problem with
coldboot_lockwhere theboot
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 7 lines
HART can potentially starve trying to acquire
coldboot_lockbecause some of the non-boot HARTs are continuously acquiring and releasingcoldboot_lock. This can happen if MIP.MSIP bit is already set for some of the non-boot HARTs.To avoid thundering hurd problem for
coldboot_lock, we use the__smp_load_acquire()and__smp_store_release()forcoldboot_doneflag
Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 5 lines
and use
coldboot_lockonly forcoldboot_wait_hmask.Signed-off-by Anup Patel <[email protected]>Tested-by Heinrich Schuchardt <[email protected]>Reviewed-by Atish Patra <[email protected]>
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 1 line
Just curious, what are the changes from v1 and v2?
Barriers are realized in a different way in patch 1.
Except for the barriers patch 1 follows what I proposed in my original patch and the following discussion.
And for sure Jessica was right that at least compiler barriers are needed.
Yes, v1->v2 is replacing use of atomic_read/write() with__smp_load/store_xyz().
v2->v3 is only a typo-fix in PATCH1 subject.
Regards,
Anup