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Pass external callchain entry to get_perf_callchain

PATCH Superseded Tao Chen 3 participants 8 messages Nov 9, 2025 – Nov 10, 2025

Subsystems (3)

v5 of 8 Superseded Latest is v8 →

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Tao Chen

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#0 lore raw

v5 cover Pass external callchain entry to get_perf_callchain

Background
==========
Alexei noted we should use preempt_disable to protect get_perf_callchain in bpf stackmap.
https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/CAADnVQ+s8B7-fvR1TNO-bniSyKv57cH_ihRszmZV7pQDyV=VDQ@mail.gmail.com

A previous patch was submitted to attempt fixing this issue. And Andrii suggested teach get_perf_callchain to let us pass that buffer directly to avoid that unnecessary copy.
https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/[email protected]

Proposed Solution
=================
Add external perf_callchain_entry parameter for get_perf_callchain to allow us to use external buffer from BPF side. The biggest advantage is that it can reduce unnecessary copies.

Todo
====
But I'm not sure if this modification is appropriate. After all, the implementation of get_callchain_entry in the perf subsystem seems much more complex than directly using an external buffer.

Comments and suggestions are always welcome.

Change list:
- v1 -> v2
From Jiri
- rebase code, fix conflict
- v1: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/[email protected]

- v2 -> v3:
From Andrii
- entries per CPU used in a stack-like fashion
- v2: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/[email protected]

- v3 -> v4:
From Peter
- refactor get_perf_callchain and add three new APIs to use perf callchain easily.
From Andrii
- reuse the perf callchain management.

- rename patch1 and patch2.
- v3: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/[email protected]

- v4 -> v5:
From Yonghong
- keep add_mark false in stackmap when refactor get_perf_callchain in

     patch1.
   - add atomic operation in get_recursion_context in patch2.
   - rename bpf_put_callchain_entry with bpf_put_perf_callchain in
     patch3.

- rebase bpf-next master.
- v4: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/[email protected]

Tao Chen (3):
perf: Refactor get_perf_callchain
perf: Add atomic operation in get_recursion_context
bpf: Hold the perf callchain entry until used completely

 include/linux/perf_event.h |  9 +++++
 kernel/bpf/stackmap.c      | 62 +++++++++++++++++++++++++-------
 kernel/events/callchain.c  | 73 ++++++++++++++++++++++++--------------
 kernel/events/internal.h   |  5 +--
 4 files changed, 107 insertions(+), 42 deletions(-)
Signature · 1 line
2.48.1
author
#1 lore raw

PATCH v5 1/3 perf: Refactor get_perf_callchain

From BPF stack map, we want to ensure that the callchain buffer will not be overwritten by other preemptive tasks. Peter suggested provide more flexible stack-sampling APIs, which can be used in BPF, and we can still use the perf callchain entry with the help of these APIs. The next patch will modify the BPF part.

In the future, these APIs will also make it convenient for us to add stack-sampling kfuncs in the eBPF subsystem, just as Andrii and Alexei discussed earlier.

---
 include/linux/perf_event.h |  9 +++++
 kernel/events/callchain.c  | 73 ++++++++++++++++++++++++--------------
 2 files changed, 56 insertions(+), 26 deletions(-)
include/linux/perf_event.h +9 -0
index fd1d91017b9..edd3058e4d8 100644
@@ -67,6 +67,7 @@ struct perf_callchain_entry_ctx {
 	u32				nr;
 	short				contexts;
 	bool				contexts_maxed;
+	bool				add_mark;
 };
 
 typedef unsigned long (*perf_copy_f)(void *dst, const void *src,
@@ -1718,6 +1719,14 @@ DECLARE_PER_CPU(struct perf_callchain_entry, perf_callchain_entry);
 
 extern void perf_callchain_user(struct perf_callchain_entry_ctx *entry, struct pt_regs *regs);
 extern void perf_callchain_kernel(struct perf_callchain_entry_ctx *entry, struct pt_regs *regs);
+
+extern void __init_perf_callchain_ctx(struct perf_callchain_entry_ctx *ctx,
+				      struct perf_callchain_entry *entry,
+				      u32 max_stack, bool add_mark);
+
+extern void __get_perf_callchain_kernel(struct perf_callchain_entry_ctx *ctx, struct pt_regs *regs);
+extern void __get_perf_callchain_user(struct perf_callchain_entry_ctx *ctx, struct pt_regs *regs);
+
 extern struct perf_callchain_entry *
 get_perf_callchain(struct pt_regs *regs, bool kernel, bool user,
 		   u32 max_stack, bool crosstask, bool add_mark);
kernel/events/callchain.c +47 -26

94 lines not on this page · raw message

Signature · 1 line
2.48.1
#2 lore raw

Re: [PATCH bpf-next v5 1/3] perf: Refactor get_perf_callchain

Can this break uprobe trampoline fixups? The original code used entry->nr for start_entry_idx, but the refactored version uses ctx->nr.
Quoted 10 lines
include/linux/perf_event.h +1 -0
index fd1d91017..edd3058e4 100644
@@ -67,6 +67,7 @@ struct perf_callchain_entry_ctx {
 	u32				nr;
 	short				contexts;
 	bool				contexts_maxed;
+	bool				add_mark;
 };

[ ... ]

Quoted 4 lines
kernel/events/callchain.c +0 -0
index 808c0d7a3..fb1f26be2 100644

[ ... ]

Quoted 4 lines
kernel/events/callchain.c +4 -0
+void __get_perf_callchain_user(struct perf_callchain_entry_ctx *ctx, struct pt_regs *regs)
+{
+	int start_entry_idx;
+

kernel/events/callchain.c static void fixup_uretprobe_trampoline_entries(struct perf_callchain_entry *entr · line 255

Quoted 10 lines
kernel/events/callchain.c +10 -0
+	if (!user_mode(regs)) {
+		if (current->flags & (PF_KTHREAD | PF_USER_WORKER))
+			return;
+		regs = task_pt_regs(current);
+	}
+
+	if (ctx->add_mark)
+		perf_callchain_store_context(ctx, PERF_CONTEXT_USER);
+
+	start_entry_idx = ctx->nr;
                          ^^^^^^^^

kernel/events/callchain.c static void fixup_uretprobe_trampoline_entries(struct perf_callchain_entry *entr · line 258

Quoted 3 lines
kernel/events/callchain.c +3 -0
+	perf_callchain_user(ctx, regs);
+	fixup_uretprobe_trampoline_entries(ctx->entry, start_entry_idx);
+}

Can this break uprobe trampoline fixups? The original code used entry->nr for start_entry_idx, but the refactored version uses ctx->nr.

These two counters track different things:
- entry->nr counts ALL entries (incremented by both perf_callchain_store_context() and perf_callchain_store())
- ctx->nr only counts regular callchain entries (incremented only by perf_callchain_store(), not by perf_callchain_store_context())

When add_mark is true, perf_callchain_store_context() increments entry->nr but not ctx->nr, causing them to become out of sync.

For example, if kernel callchain collection runs first with add_mark set:

Initial: ctx->nr = entry->nr = 0

In __get_perf_callchain_kernel():
perf_callchain_store_context() stores PERF_CONTEXT_KERNEL marker
-> entry->nr becomes 1, ctx->nr still 0
perf_callchain_kernel() stores N kernel frames
-> entry->nr becomes 1+N, ctx->nr becomes N

In __get_perf_callchain_user():
perf_callchain_store_context() stores PERF_CONTEXT_USER marker
-> entry->nr becomes 2+N, ctx->nr still N
start_entry_idx = ctx->nr assigns N (should be 2+N) fixup_uretprobe_trampoline_entries() scans from wrong index

This causes fixup_uretprobe_trampoline_entries() to scan kernel callchain entries instead of user callchain entries, missing the uretprobe trampolines that need to be fixed up.

Should this use ctx->entry->nr instead of ctx->nr?

---
AI reviewed your patch. Please fix the bug or email reply why it's not a bug.
See: https://github.com/kernel-patches/vmtest/blob/master/ci/claude/README.md

CI run summary: https://github.com/kernel-patches/bpf/actions/runs/19211481431

author
#3 lore raw

Re: [PATCH bpf-next v5 1/3] perf: Refactor get_perf_callchain

Quoted 68 lines · 在 2025/11/10 00:58, [email protected] 写道:
Quoted 10 lines
include/linux/perf_event.h +1 -0
index fd1d91017..edd3058e4 100644
@@ -67,6 +67,7 @@ struct perf_callchain_entry_ctx {
  	u32				nr;
  	short				contexts;
  	bool				contexts_maxed;
+	bool				add_mark;
  };

[ ... ]

Quoted 4 lines
kernel/events/callchain.c +0 -0
index 808c0d7a3..fb1f26be2 100644

[ ... ]

Quoted 4 lines
kernel/events/callchain.c +4 -0
+void __get_perf_callchain_user(struct perf_callchain_entry_ctx *ctx, struct pt_regs *regs)
+{
+	int start_entry_idx;
+

kernel/events/callchain.c static void fixup_uretprobe_trampoline_entries(struct perf_callchain_entry *entr · line 255

Quoted 10 lines
kernel/events/callchain.c +10 -0
+	if (!user_mode(regs)) {
+		if (current->flags & (PF_KTHREAD | PF_USER_WORKER))
+			return;
+		regs = task_pt_regs(current);
+	}
+
+	if (ctx->add_mark)
+		perf_callchain_store_context(ctx, PERF_CONTEXT_USER);
+
+	start_entry_idx = ctx->nr;
                           ^^^^^^^^

kernel/events/callchain.c static void fixup_uretprobe_trampoline_entries(struct perf_callchain_entry *entr · line 258

Quoted 3 lines
kernel/events/callchain.c +3 -0
+	perf_callchain_user(ctx, regs);
+	fixup_uretprobe_trampoline_entries(ctx->entry, start_entry_idx);
+}

Can this break uprobe trampoline fixups? The original code used entry->nr for start_entry_idx, but the refactored version uses ctx->nr.

These two counters track different things:
- entry->nr counts ALL entries (incremented by both perf_callchain_store_context() and perf_callchain_store())
- ctx->nr only counts regular callchain entries (incremented only by perf_callchain_store(), not by perf_callchain_store_context())

When add_mark is true, perf_callchain_store_context() increments entry->nr but not ctx->nr, causing them to become out of sync.

For example, if kernel callchain collection runs first with add_mark set:

   Initial: ctx->nr = entry->nr = 0

   In __get_perf_callchain_kernel():
     perf_callchain_store_context() stores PERF_CONTEXT_KERNEL marker
       -> entry->nr becomes 1, ctx->nr still 0
     perf_callchain_kernel() stores N kernel frames
       -> entry->nr becomes 1+N, ctx->nr becomes N

   In __get_perf_callchain_user():
     perf_callchain_store_context() stores PERF_CONTEXT_USER marker
       -> entry->nr becomes 2+N, ctx->nr still N
     start_entry_idx = ctx->nr assigns N (should be 2+N)
     fixup_uretprobe_trampoline_entries() scans from wrong index
Quoted 6 lines

This causes fixup_uretprobe_trampoline_entries() to scan kernel callchain entries instead of user callchain entries, missing the uretprobe trampolines that need to be fixed up.

Should this use ctx->entry->nr instead of ctx->nr?

Use ctx->entry->nr looks better, will change it.

Quoted 6 lines

---
AI reviewed your patch. Please fix the bug or email reply why it's not a bug.
See: https://github.com/kernel-patches/vmtest/blob/master/ci/claude/README.md

CI run summary: https://github.com/kernel-patches/bpf/actions/runs/19211481431

Signature · 2 lines
Best Regards
Tao Chen
author
#4 lore raw

PATCH v5 2/3 perf: Add atomic operation in get_recursion_context

In reply to Tao Chen

From BPF side, preemption usually is enabled. Yonghong said, it is possible that both tasks (at process level) may reach right before "recursion[rctx]++;". In such cases, both tasks will be able to get buffer and this is not right.

---
 kernel/events/internal.h | 5 +----
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 4 deletions(-)
kernel/events/internal.h +1 -4
index d9cc5708309..684bde972ba 100644
@@ -214,12 +214,9 @@ static inline int get_recursion_context(u8 *recursion)
 {
 	unsigned char rctx = interrupt_context_level();
 
-	if (recursion[rctx])
+	if (cmpxchg(&recursion[rctx], 0, 1) != 0)
 		return -1;
 
-	recursion[rctx]++;
-	barrier();
-
 	return rctx;
 }
 
Signature · 1 line
2.48.1
maintainer
#5 lore raw

Re: [PATCH bpf-next v5 2/3] perf: Add atomic operation in get_recursion_context

Quoted 8 lines · Tao Chen

From BPF side, preemption usually is enabled. Yonghong said, it is possible that both tasks (at process level) may reach right before "recursion[rctx]++;". In such cases, both tasks will be able to get buffer and this is not right.

---

Nope, this function really is meant to be used with preemption disabled. If BPF doesn't abide, fix that.

Quoted 24 lines
 kernel/events/internal.h | 5 +----
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 4 deletions(-)
kernel/events/internal.h +1 -4
index d9cc5708309..684bde972ba 100644
@@ -214,12 +214,9 @@ static inline int get_recursion_context(u8 *recursion)
 {
 	unsigned char rctx = interrupt_context_level();
 
-	if (recursion[rctx])
+	if (cmpxchg(&recursion[rctx], 0, 1) != 0)
 		return -1;
 
-	recursion[rctx]++;
-	barrier();
-
 	return rctx;
 }
 
Signature · 1 line
2.48.1
author
#6 lore raw

Re: [PATCH bpf-next v5 2/3] perf: Add atomic operation in get_recursion_context

Quoted 6 lines · Peter Zijlstra
Quoted 5 lines · Tao Chen

From BPF side, preemption usually is enabled. Yonghong said, it is
possible that both tasks (at process level) may reach right before "recursion[rctx]++;". In such cases, both tasks will be able to get buffer and this is not right.

Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 3 lines

---

Nope, this function really is meant to be used with preemption disabled. If BPF doesn't abide, fix that.

Ok, let us use preempt_disable in bpf stackmap, thanks. I will change it in v6.

Quoted 24 lines
Quoted 24 lines
  kernel/events/internal.h | 5 +----
  1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 4 deletions(-)
kernel/events/internal.h +1 -4
index d9cc5708309..684bde972ba 100644
@@ -214,12 +214,9 @@ static inline int get_recursion_context(u8 *recursion)
  {
  	unsigned char rctx = interrupt_context_level();
 
-	if (recursion[rctx])
+	if (cmpxchg(&recursion[rctx], 0, 1) != 0)
  		return -1;
 
-	recursion[rctx]++;
-	barrier();
-
  	return rctx;
  }
 
Signature · 1 line
2.48.1
Signature · 2 lines
Best Regards
Tao Chen
author
#7 lore raw

PATCH v5 3/3 bpf: Hold the perf callchain entry until used completely

In reply to Tao Chen

As Alexei noted, get_perf_callchain() return values may be reused if a task is preempted after the BPF program enters migrate disable mode. The perf_callchain_entres has a small stack of entries, and we can reuse it as follows:

1. get the perf callchain entry
2. BPF use...
3. put the perf callchain entry

---
 kernel/bpf/stackmap.c | 62 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------
 1 file changed, 50 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
kernel/bpf/stackmap.c +50 -12
index 2365541c81d..58b4432ab00 100644
@@ -210,13 +210,12 @@ static void stack_map_get_build_id_offset(struct bpf_stack_build_id *id_offs,
 }
 
 static struct perf_callchain_entry *
-get_callchain_entry_for_task(struct task_struct *task, u32 max_depth)
+get_callchain_entry_for_task(int *rctx, struct task_struct *task, u32 max_depth)
 {
 #ifdef CONFIG_STACKTRACE
 	struct perf_callchain_entry *entry;
-	int rctx;
 
-	entry = get_callchain_entry(&rctx);
+	entry = get_callchain_entry(rctx);
 
 	if (!entry)
 		return NULL;
@@ -238,8 +237,6 @@ get_callchain_entry_for_task(struct task_struct *task, u32 max_depth)
 			to[i] = (u64)(from[i]);
 	}
 
-	put_callchain_entry(rctx);
-
 	return entry;
 #else /* CONFIG_STACKTRACE */
 	return NULL;
@@ -320,6 +317,31 @@ static long __bpf_get_stackid(struct bpf_map *map,
 	return id;
 }
 
+static struct perf_callchain_entry *
+bpf_get_perf_callchain(int *rctx, struct pt_regs *regs, bool kernel, bool user,
+		       int max_stack, bool crosstask)
+{
+	struct perf_callchain_entry_ctx ctx;
+	struct perf_callchain_entry *entry;
+
+	entry = get_callchain_entry(rctx);
+	if (unlikely(!entry))
+		return NULL;
+
+	__init_perf_callchain_ctx(&ctx, entry, max_stack, false);
+	if (kernel)
+		__get_perf_callchain_kernel(&ctx, regs);
+	if (user && !crosstask)
+		__get_perf_callchain_user(&ctx, regs);
+
+	return entry;
+}
+
+static void bpf_put_perf_callchain(int rctx)
+{
+	put_callchain_entry(rctx);
+}
+
 BPF_CALL_3(bpf_get_stackid, struct pt_regs *, regs, struct bpf_map *, map,
 	   u64, flags)
 {
@@ -328,20 +350,24 @@ BPF_CALL_3(bpf_get_stackid, struct pt_regs *, regs, struct bpf_map *, map,
 	struct perf_callchain_entry *trace;
 	bool kernel = !user;
 	u32 max_depth;
+	int rctx, ret;
 
 	if (unlikely(flags & ~(BPF_F_SKIP_FIELD_MASK | BPF_F_USER_STACK |
 			       BPF_F_FAST_STACK_CMP | BPF_F_REUSE_STACKID)))
 		return -EINVAL;
 
 	max_depth = stack_map_calculate_max_depth(map->value_size, elem_size, flags);
-	trace = get_perf_callchain(regs, kernel, user, max_depth,
-				   false, false);
+	trace = bpf_get_perf_callchain(&rctx, regs, kernel, user, max_depth,
+				       false);
 
 	if (unlikely(!trace))
 		/* couldn't fetch the stack trace */
 		return -EFAULT;
 
-	return __bpf_get_stackid(map, trace, flags);
+	ret = __bpf_get_stackid(map, trace, flags);
+	bpf_put_perf_callchain(rctx);
+
+	return ret;
 }
 
 const struct bpf_func_proto bpf_get_stackid_proto = {
@@ -435,6 +461,7 @@ static long __bpf_get_stack(struct pt_regs *regs, struct task_struct *task,
 	bool kernel = !user;
 	int err = -EINVAL;
 	u64 *ips;
+	int rctx;
 
 	if (unlikely(flags & ~(BPF_F_SKIP_FIELD_MASK | BPF_F_USER_STACK |
 			       BPF_F_USER_BUILD_ID)))
@@ -467,18 +494,26 @@ static long __bpf_get_stack(struct pt_regs *regs, struct task_struct *task,
 		trace = trace_in;
 		trace->nr = min_t(u32, trace->nr, max_depth);
 	} else if (kernel && task) {
-		trace = get_callchain_entry_for_task(task, max_depth);
+		trace = get_callchain_entry_for_task(&rctx, task, max_depth);
 	} else {
-		trace = get_perf_callchain(regs, kernel, user, max_depth,
-					   crosstask, false);
+		trace = bpf_get_perf_callchain(&rctx, regs, kernel, user, max_depth,
+					       crosstask);
 	}
 
-	if (unlikely(!trace) || trace->nr < skip) {
+	if (unlikely(!trace)) {
 		if (may_fault)
 			rcu_read_unlock();
 		goto err_fault;
 	}
 
+	if (trace->nr < skip) {
+		if (may_fault)
+			rcu_read_unlock();
+		if (!trace_in)
+			bpf_put_perf_callchain(rctx);
+		goto err_fault;
+	}
+
 	trace_nr = trace->nr - skip;
 	copy_len = trace_nr * elem_size;
 
@@ -497,6 +532,9 @@ static long __bpf_get_stack(struct pt_regs *regs, struct task_struct *task,
 	if (may_fault)
 		rcu_read_unlock();
 
+	if (!trace_in)
+		bpf_put_perf_callchain(rctx);
+
 	if (user_build_id)
 		stack_map_get_build_id_offset(buf, trace_nr, user, may_fault);
 
Signature · 1 line
2.48.1