TPM2 key protector follow-up patches
v5 cover TPM2 key protector follow-up patches
git: https://github.com/lcp/grub2/tree/tpm2-follow-up-v5
This patchset is the collection of several enhancements for TPM2 key protector.
* Patch 1 introduces the PCR dump to help debugging policy fail.
* Patch 2 adds the new command to dump PCRs in GRUB shell and the
* documentation of the command.
* Patch 3 fixes a minor issue in tss2.
* Patch 4~7 extend the NV index mode to support 'NV index' handles and TPM 2.0 Key File format.
- Thanks to James Bottomley for how to detect TPM 2.0 Key File format.
https://lists.gnu.org/archive/html/grub-devel/2024-11/msg00078.html
* Patch 8~11 update the test cases and the documentation for NV index mode.
* Patch 12 documents the external packages needed for TPM2 key protector tests.
* Patch 13 addresses the long options for tpm2_key_protector_init.
v5:
- Updating the TPM2 test script to exit with 1 when a test case fails
- Fixing the string matching in the TPM2 test script
- Adding the long options for tpm2_key_protector_init in the document
v4:
- Updating the commit messages and the documentation
- Merging the tpm2_dump_pcr documentation patch
- Splitting the testcase patch into 3 smaller patches
- Documenting the extern packages needed for TPM2 key protector tests
v3:
- Amending the function names to make them more comprehensive
- Fixing a few more typos and the indentations
- Improving the document
v2:
- Amending the commit messages and the error messages
- Fixing the return values and the checks for 'bool'
- Removing 'policywrite' when defining the NV index handle
- Fixing the typo and the stray whitespace
- Removing grub_tpm2_flushcontext() from the functions to remove the persistent handle and the NV index handle
- Avoiding one failure test case to stop the whole test
- Improving the document
Gary Lin (13):
tpm2_key_protector: dump PCRs on policy fail
tpm2_key_protector: Add 'tpm2_dump_pcr' command
tss2: Fix the missing authCommand
tss2: Add TPM 2.0 NV index commands
tpm2_key_protector: Unseal key from a buffer
tpm2_key_protector: Support NV index handles util/grub-protect: Support NV index mode tests/tpm2_key_protector_test: Simplify the NV index mode test tests/tpm2_key_protector_test: Reset 'ret' on fail tests/tpm2_key_protector_test: Add more NV index mode tests
docs: Update NV index mode of TPM2 key protector
INSTALL: Document the packages needed for TPM2 key protector tests
docs: Document the long options of tpm2_key_protect_init
INSTALL | 1 + docs/grub.texi | 216 +++++++++-- .../commands/tpm2_key_protector/module.c | 345 +++++++++++++++--- grub-core/lib/tss2/tpm2_cmd.c | 211 ++++++++++- grub-core/lib/tss2/tpm2_cmd.h | 32 ++ grub-core/lib/tss2/tss2_mu.c | 39 ++ grub-core/lib/tss2/tss2_mu.h | 12 + grub-core/lib/tss2/tss2_types.h | 6 + tests/tpm2_key_protector_test.in | 161 +++----- util/grub-protect.c | 343 ++++++++++++++--- 10 files changed, 1126 insertions(+), 240 deletions(-)
Range-diff against v4:
-: --------- > 1: bbd534f6b tpm2_key_protector: dump PCRs on policy fail -: --------- > 2: a0c949ba8 tpm2_key_protector: Add 'tpm2_dump_pcr' command -: --------- > 3: bbd4ad377 tss2: Fix the missing authCommand 1: d2fba3963 ! 4: b7204597d tss2: Add TPM 2.0 NV index commands
@@ Commit message
+ Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <[email protected]>
## grub-core/lib/tss2/tpm2_cmd.c ##
@@ grub-core/lib/tss2/tpm2_cmd.c: grub_tpm2_testparms (const TPMT_PUBLIC_PARMS_t *parms,
2: 9b7ebc818 ! 5: 13d22cfbf tpm2_key_protector: Unseal key from a buffer
@@ Commit message
Besides this, to avoid introducing more options for the NV index mode, the file format is detected automatically before unmarshalling the data, so there is no need to use the command option to specify the file format
- anymore. In other words, '--tpm2key' and '--keyfile' are the same now.
+ anymore. In other words, '-T' and '-k' are the same now.
Also update grub.text to address the change.
3: c78c78763 = 6: a5da556bf tpm2_key_protector: Support NV index handles 4: 10eb6a6b0 ! 7: 93262aafe util/grub-protect: Support NV index mode
@@ Commit message
+ Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <[email protected]>
## util/grub-protect.c ##
@@ util/grub-protect.c: typedef enum protect_opt
5: 3d5836268 ! 8: f3d54722f tests/tpm2_key_protector_test: Simplify the NV index mode test
@@ Commit message
'tpm2_evictcontrol' is also replaced with 'grub-protect --tpm2-evict'.
+ Reviewed-by: Stefan Berger <[email protected]>
+ Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <[email protected]>
## tests/tpm2_key_protector_test.in ##
@@ tests/tpm2_key_protector_test.in: EOF
6: b835df89e < -: --------- tests/tpm2_key_protector_test: Reset 'ret' on fail
-: --------- > 9: 717d11f22 tests/tpm2_key_protector_test: Reset 'ret' on fail
7: 4c0cc50a5 ! 10: a37b136a7 tests/tpm2_key_protector_test: Add more NV index mode tests
@@ Commit message
unsealing with the NV index handle 0x1000000.
Signed-off-by: Gary Lin <[email protected]>
+ Reviewed-by: Stefan Berger <[email protected]>
## tests/tpm2_key_protector_test.in ##
@@ tests/tpm2_key_protector_test.in: EOF
@@ tests/tpm2_key_protector_test.in: EOF
+ extra_opt=""
+ extra_grub_opt=""
+
-+ if [ "$handle_type" == "nvindex" ]; then
++ if [ "$handle_type" = "nvindex" ]; then
+ nv_index="0x1000000"
+ else
+ nv_index="0x81000000"
+ fi
+
-+ if [ "$key_type" == "tpm2key" ]; then
++ if [ "$key_type" = "tpm2key" ]; then
+ extra_opt="--tpm2key"
+ else
+ extra_grub_opt="--pcrs=0,1"
@@ tests/tpm2_key_protector_test.in: tpm2_seal_unseal_nv() {
if cryptomount -a --protector tpm2; then
cat (crypto0)+1
fi
-@@ tests/tpm2_key_protector_test.in: srktests+=("ECC transient fallback_srk")
+@@ tests/tpm2_key_protector_test.in: exit_status=0
for i in "${!srktests[@]}"; do
tpm2_seal_unseal ${srktests[$i]} || ret=$?
if [ "${ret}" -eq 0 ]; then
@@ tests/tpm2_key_protector_test.in: srktests+=("ECC transient fallback_srk")
- echo "TPM2 [${srktests[$i]}]: FAIL"
+ echo "TPM2 [SRK][${srktests[$i]}]: FAIL"
ret=0
+ exit_status=1
else
- echo "Unexpected failure [${srktests[$i]}]" >&2
+ echo "Unexpected failure [SRK][${srktests[$i]}]" >&2
@@ tests/tpm2_key_protector_test.in: srktests+=("ECC transient fallback_srk")
-elif [ "${ret}" -eq 1 ]; then
- echo "TPM2 [NV Index]: FAIL"
- ret=0
+- exit_status=1
-else
- echo "Unexpected failure [NV index]" >&2
- exit ${ret}
@@ tests/tpm2_key_protector_test.in: srktests+=("ECC transient fallback_srk")
+ elif [ "${ret}" -eq 1 ]; then
+ echo "TPM2 [NV Index][${nvtests[$i]}]: FAIL"
+ ret=0
++ exit_status=1
+ else
+ echo "Unexpected failure [NV index][${nvtests[$i]}]" >&2
+ exit ${ret}
+ fi
+done
- exit 0
+ exit ${exit_status}
8: 156c81422 = 11: 116f052d0 docs: Update NV index mode of TPM2 key protector
9: f47758510 ! 12: a648c09a2 INSTALL: Document the packages needed for TPM2 key protector tests @@ Commit message
tests.
+ Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <[email protected]>
## INSTALL ##
@@ INSTALL: Prerequisites for make-check:
-: --------- > 13: 0c36afc66 docs: Document the long options of tpm2_key_protect_init
Signature · 7 lines
2.43.0 _______________________________________________ Grub-devel mailing list [email protected] https://lists.gnu.org/mailman/listinfo/grub-devel
PATCH v5 1/13 tpm2_key_protector: dump PCRs on policy fail
PCR mismatching is one common cause of TPM key unsealing fail. Since the system may be compromised, it is not safe to boot into OS to get the PCR values and TPM eventlog for the further investigation.
To provide some hints, GRUB now dumps PCRs on policy fail, so the user can check the current PCR values. PCR 0~15 are chosen to cover the firmware, bootloader, and OS.
The sample output:
PCR Mismatch! Check firmware and bootloader before typing passphrase!
TPM PCR [sha256]:
00: 17401f37710984c1d8a03a81fff3ab567ae9291bac61e21715b890ee28879738
01: 7a114329ba388445a96e8db2a072785937c1b7a8803ed7cc682b87f3ff3dd7a8
02: 11c2776849e8e24b7d80c926cbc4257871bffa744dadfefd3ed049ce25143e05
03: 6c33b362073e28e30b47302bbdd3e6f9cee4debca3a304e646f8c68245724350
04: 62d38838483ecfd2484ee3a2e5450d8ca3b35fc72cda6a8c620f9f43521c37d1
05: d8a85cb37221ab7d1f2cc5f554dbe0463acb6784b5b8dc3164ccaa66d8fff0e1
06: 9262e37cbe71ed4daf815b4a4881fb7251c9d371092dde827557d5368121e10e
07: 219d542233be492d62b079ffe46cf13396a8c27e520e88b08eaf2e6d3b7e70f5
08: de1f61c973b673e505adebe0d7e8fb65fde6c24dd4ab4fbaff9e28b18df6ecd3
09: c1de7274fa3e879a16d7e6e7629e3463d95f68adcfd17c477183846dccc41c89
10: 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000
11: 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000
12: 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000
13: 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000
14: 9ab9ebe4879a7f4dd00c04f37e79cfd69d0dd7a8bcc6b01135525b67676a3e40
15: 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000
16: 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000
17: ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff
18: ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff
19: ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff
20: ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff
21: ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff
22: ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff
23: 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000
error: failed to unseal sealed key (TPM2_Unseal: 0x99d).
error: no key protector provided a usable key for luks (af16e48f-746b-4a12-aae1-c14dcee429e0).
If the user happens to have the PCR values for key sealing, the PCR dump can be used to identify the changed PCRs and narrow down the scope for closer inspection.
Please note that the PCR dump is trustworthy only if the GRUB binary is authentic, so the user has to check the GRUB binary thoroughly before using the PCR dump.
--- .../commands/tpm2_key_protector/module.c | 118 +++++++++++++++++- 1 file changed, 114 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
grub-core/commands/tpm2_key_protector/module.c +114 -4
@@ -790,7 +790,7 @@ tpm2_protector_simple_policy_seq (const tpm2_protector_context_t *ctx,static grub_err_t tpm2_protector_unseal (tpm2key_policy_t policy_seq,TPM_HANDLE_t sealed_handle, -grub_uint8_t **key,grub_size_t *key_size) +grub_uint8_t **key,grub_size_t *key_size,bool *dump_pcr) {TPMS_AUTH_COMMAND_t authCmd = {0 };TPM2B_SENSITIVE_DATA_t data;
@@ -801,6 +801,8 @@ tpm2_protector_unseal (tpm2key_policy_t policy_seq, TPM_HANDLE_t sealed_handle,TPM_RC_t rc;grub_err_t err; + *dump_pcr = false; +/* Start Auth Session */ nonceCaller.size =TPM_SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE ; symmetric.algorithm =TPM_ALG_NULL ;
@@ -820,6 +822,13 @@ tpm2_protector_unseal (tpm2key_policy_t policy_seq, TPM_HANDLE_t sealed_handle, rc =grub_tpm2_unseal (sealed_handle, &authCmd, &data,NULL );if (rc !=TPM_RC_SUCCESS ) { +/* +* Trigger PCR dump on policy fail +* TPM_RC_S (0x800) | TPM_RC_1 (0x100) | RC_FMT (0x80) | TPM_RC_POLICY_FAIL (0x1D) +*/ +if (rc ==0x99D ) + *dump_pcr = true; + err =grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_DEVICE ,"failed to unseal sealed key (TPM2_Unseal: 0x%x)" , rc); goto error; }
@@ -845,6 +854,91 @@ tpm2_protector_unseal (tpm2key_policy_t policy_seq, TPM_HANDLE_t sealed_handle,return err; } +#define TPM_PCR_STR_SIZE (sizeof (TPMU_HA_t) * 2 + 1) + +static grub_err_t +tpm2_protector_get_pcr_str (const TPM_ALG_ID_t algo,grub_uint32_t index,char *pcr_str,grub_uint16_t buf_size) +{ +TPML_PCR_SELECTION_t pcr_sel = { + .count =1 , + .pcrSelections = { + { + .hash = algo, + .sizeOfSelect =3 , + .pcrSelect = {0 } + }, + } + }; +TPML_DIGEST_t digest = {0 }; +grub_uint16_t i; +TPM_RC_t rc; + +if (buf_size <TPM_PCR_STR_SIZE ) + { +grub_snprintf (pcr_str, buf_size,"insufficient buffer" ); +return GRUB_ERR_OUT_OF_MEMORY ; + } + +TPMS_PCR_SELECTION_SelectPCR (&pcr_sel.pcrSelections[0 ], index); + + rc =grub_tpm2_pcr_read (NULL , &pcr_sel,NULL ,NULL , &digest,NULL ); +if (rc !=TPM_RC_SUCCESS ) + { +grub_snprintf (pcr_str, buf_size,"TPM2_PCR_Read: 0x%x" , rc); +return GRUB_ERR_BAD_DEVICE ; + } + +/* Check the returned digest number and size */ +if (digest.count !=1 || digest.digests[0 ].size >sizeof (TPMU_HA_t)) + { +grub_snprintf (pcr_str, buf_size,"invalid digest" ); +return GRUB_ERR_BAD_DEVICE ; + } + +/* Print the digest to the buffer */ +for (i =0 ; i < digest.digests[0 ].size; i++) +grub_snprintf (pcr_str +2 * i, buf_size -2 * i,"%02x" , digest.digests[0 ].buffer[i]); + +return GRUB_ERR_NONE ; +} + +static void +tpm2_protector_dump_pcr (const TPM_ALG_ID_t bank) +{ +const char *algo_name; +char pcr_str[TPM_PCR_STR_SIZE ]; +grub_uint8_t i; +grub_err_t err; + +if (bank ==TPM_ALG_SHA1 ) + algo_name ="sha1" ; +else if (bank ==TPM_ALG_SHA256 ) + algo_name ="sha256" ; +else if (bank ==TPM_ALG_SHA384 ) + algo_name ="sha384" ; +else if (bank ==TPM_ALG_SHA512 ) + algo_name ="sha512" ; +else + algo_name ="other" ; + +/* Try to fetch PCR 0 */ + err =tpm2_protector_get_pcr_str (bank,0 , pcr_str,sizeof (pcr_str)); +if (err !=GRUB_ERR_NONE ) + { +grub_printf ("Unsupported PCR bank [%s]: %s\n" , algo_name, pcr_str); +return ; + } + +grub_printf ("TPM PCR [%s]:\n" , algo_name); + +grub_printf (" %02d: %s\n" ,0 , pcr_str); +for (i =1 ; i <TPM_MAX_PCRS ; i++) + { +tpm2_protector_get_pcr_str (bank, i, pcr_str,sizeof (pcr_str)); +grub_printf (" %02d: %s\n" , i, pcr_str); + } +} +static grub_err_t tpm2_protector_srk_recover (const tpm2_protector_context_t *ctx,grub_uint8_t **key,grub_size_t *key_size)
@@ -859,6 +953,7 @@ tpm2_protector_srk_recover (const tpm2_protector_context_t *ctx,tpm2key_policy_t policy_seq =NULL ;tpm2key_authpolicy_t authpol =NULL ;tpm2key_authpolicy_t authpol_seq =NULL ; +bool dump_pcr = false;grub_err_t err;/*
@@ -924,7 +1019,7 @@ tpm2_protector_srk_recover (const tpm2_protector_context_t *ctx,/* Iterate the authpolicy sequence to find one that unseals the key */ FOR_LIST_ELEMENTS (authpol, authpol_seq) { - err =tpm2_protector_unseal (authpol->policy_seq, sealed_handle, key, key_size); + err =tpm2_protector_unseal (authpol->policy_seq, sealed_handle, key, key_size, &dump_pcr);if (err ==GRUB_ERR_NONE )break ;
@@ -952,13 +1047,20 @@ tpm2_protector_srk_recover (const tpm2_protector_context_t *ctx, goto exit2; } - err =tpm2_protector_unseal (policy_seq, sealed_handle, key, key_size); + err =tpm2_protector_unseal (policy_seq, sealed_handle, key, key_size, &dump_pcr); }/* Pop error messages on success */ if (err ==GRUB_ERR_NONE )while (grub_error_pop ()); +/* Dump PCRs if necessary */ +if (dump_pcr == true) + { +grub_printf ("PCR Mismatch! Check firmware and bootloader before typing passphrase!\n" ); +tpm2_protector_dump_pcr (ctx->bank); + } + exit2:grub_tpm2_flushcontext (sealed_handle);
@@ -978,6 +1080,7 @@ tpm2_protector_nv_recover (const tpm2_protector_context_t *ctx, {TPM_HANDLE_t sealed_handle = ctx->nv;tpm2key_policy_t policy_seq =NULL ; +bool dump_pcr = false;grub_err_t err;/* Create a basic policy sequence based on the given PCR selection */
@@ -985,7 +1088,14 @@ tpm2_protector_nv_recover (const tpm2_protector_context_t *ctx,if (err !=GRUB_ERR_NONE ) goto exit; - err =tpm2_protector_unseal (policy_seq, sealed_handle, key, key_size); + err =tpm2_protector_unseal (policy_seq, sealed_handle, key, key_size, &dump_pcr); + +/* Dump PCRs if necessary */ +if (dump_pcr == true) + { +grub_printf ("PCR Mismatch! Check firmware and bootloader before typing passphrase!\n" ); +tpm2_protector_dump_pcr (ctx->bank); + } exit:grub_tpm2_flushcontext (sealed_handle);
Signature · 7 lines
2.43.0 _______________________________________________ Grub-devel mailing list [email protected] https://lists.gnu.org/mailman/listinfo/grub-devel
PATCH v5 2/13 tpm2_key_protector: Add 'tpm2_dump_pcr' command
In reply to Gary Lin via Grub-develThe user may need to inspect the TPM 2.0 PCR values with the GRUB shell, so the new 'tpm2_dump_pcr' command is added to print all PCRs of the specified bank.
Also update the document for the new command.
--- docs/grub.texi | 13 +++++++ .../commands/tpm2_key_protector/module.c | 35 +++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 48 insertions(+)
docs/grub.texi +13 -0
@@ -6488,6 +6488,7 @@ you forget a command, you can run the command @command{help} * test:: Check file types and compare values * tpm2_key_protector_init:: Initialize the TPM2 key protector * tpm2_key_protector_clear:: Clear the TPM2 key protector +* tpm2_dump_pcr:: Dump TPM2 PCRs * true:: Do nothing, successfully * trust:: Add public key to list of trusted keys * unset:: Unset an environment variable
@@ -8104,6 +8105,18 @@ key and unseal it with the given PCR list and bank. Clear the TPM2 key protector if previously initialized. @end deffn +@node tpm2_dump_pcr +@subsection tpm2_dump_pcr + +@deffn Command tpm2_dump_pcr [@var{bank}] +Print all PCRs of the specified TPM 2.0 @var{bank}. The supported banks are +@samp{sha1}, @samp{sha256}, @samp{sha384}, and @samp{sha512}. If @var{bank} +is not specified, @samp{sha256} is chosen by default. + +Since GRUB measures every command into PCR 8, invoking @command{tpm2_dump_pcr} +also extends PCR 8, so PCR 8 will not be a stable value in GRUB shell. +@end deffn + @node true @subsection true
grub-core/commands/tpm2_key_protector/module.c +35 -0
@@ -160,6 +160,8 @@ static grub_extcmd_t tpm2_protector_init_cmd;static grub_extcmd_t tpm2_protector_clear_cmd;static tpm2_protector_context_t tpm2_protector_ctx = {0 }; +static grub_command_t tpm2_dump_pcr_cmd; +static grub_err_t tpm2_protector_srk_read_file (const char *filepath,void **buffer,grub_size_t *buffer_size) {
@@ -1315,6 +1317,33 @@ static struct grub_key_protector tpm2_key_protector = .recover_key = tpm2_protector_recover_key }; +static grub_err_t +tpm2_dump_pcr (grub_command_t cmd __attribute__((__unused__)), +int argc,char *argv[]) +{ +TPM_ALG_ID_t pcr_bank; + +if (argc ==0 ) + pcr_bank =TPM_ALG_SHA256 ; +else if (grub_strcmp (argv[0 ],"sha1" ) ==0 ) + pcr_bank =TPM_ALG_SHA1 ; +else if (grub_strcmp (argv[0 ],"sha256" ) ==0 ) + pcr_bank =TPM_ALG_SHA256 ; +else if (grub_strcmp (argv[0 ],"sha384" ) ==0 ) + pcr_bank =TPM_ALG_SHA384 ; +else if (grub_strcmp (argv[0 ],"sha512" ) ==0 ) + pcr_bank =TPM_ALG_SHA512 ; +else + { +grub_printf ("Unknown PCR bank\n" ); +return GRUB_ERR_BAD_ARGUMENT ; + } + +tpm2_protector_dump_pcr (pcr_bank); + +return GRUB_ERR_NONE ; +} +GRUB_MOD_INIT (tpm2_key_protector) { tpm2_protector_init_cmd =
@@ -1336,6 +1365,10 @@ GRUB_MOD_INIT (tpm2_key_protector)N_ ("Clear the TPM2 key protector if previously initialized." ), NULL);grub_key_protector_register (&tpm2_key_protector); + + tpm2_dump_pcr_cmd = +grub_register_command ("tpm2_dump_pcr" , tpm2_dump_pcr,N_ ("Dump TPM2 PCRs" ), +N_ ("Print all PCRs of the specified TPM 2.0 bank" )); }GRUB_MOD_FINI (tpm2_key_protector)
@@ -1345,4 +1378,6 @@ GRUB_MOD_FINI (tpm2_key_protector)grub_key_protector_unregister (&tpm2_key_protector);grub_unregister_extcmd (tpm2_protector_clear_cmd);grub_unregister_extcmd (tpm2_protector_init_cmd); + +grub_unregister_command (tpm2_dump_pcr_cmd); }
Signature · 7 lines
2.43.0 _______________________________________________ Grub-devel mailing list [email protected] https://lists.gnu.org/mailman/listinfo/grub-devel
PATCH v5 3/13 tss2: Fix the missing authCommand
In reply to Gary Lin via Grub-develgrub_tpm2_readpublic() and grub_tpm2_testparms() didn't check 'authCommand' when marshaling the input data buffer. Currently, there is no caller using non-NULL 'authCommand'. However, to avoid the potential issue, the conditional check is added to insert 'authCommand' into the input buffer if necessary.
Also fix a few pointer checks.
--- grub-core/lib/tss2/tpm2_cmd.c | 10 +++++++--- 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
grub-core/lib/tss2/tpm2_cmd.c +7 -3
@@ -341,6 +341,8 @@ grub_tpm2_readpublic (const TPMI_DH_OBJECT_t objectHandle,/* Marshal */ grub_tpm2_buffer_init (&in);grub_tpm2_buffer_pack_u32 (&in, objectHandle); +if (authCommand !=NULL ) +grub_Tss2_MU_TPMS_AUTH_COMMAND_Marshal (&in, authCommand);if (in.error !=0 )return TPM_RC_FAILURE ;
@@ -398,7 +400,7 @@ grub_tpm2_load (const TPMI_DH_OBJECT_t parent_handle,/* Marshal */ grub_tpm2_buffer_init (&in);grub_tpm2_buffer_pack_u32 (&in, parent_handle); -if (authCommand) +if (authCommand !=NULL )grub_Tss2_MU_TPMS_AUTH_COMMAND_Marshal (&in, authCommand);grub_Tss2_MU_TPM2B_Marshal (&in, inPrivate->size, inPrivate->buffer);grub_Tss2_MU_TPM2B_PUBLIC_Marshal (&in, inPublic);
@@ -461,9 +463,9 @@ grub_tpm2_loadexternal (const TPMS_AUTH_COMMAND_t *authCommand,/* Marshal */ grub_tpm2_buffer_init (&in); -if (authCommand) +if (authCommand !=NULL )grub_Tss2_MU_TPMS_AUTH_COMMAND_Marshal (&in, authCommand); -if (inPrivate) +if (inPrivate !=NULL )grub_Tss2_MU_TPM2B_SENSITIVE_Marshal (&in, inPrivate);else grub_tpm2_buffer_pack_u16 (&in,0 );
@@ -1023,6 +1025,8 @@ grub_tpm2_testparms (const TPMT_PUBLIC_PARMS_t *parms,/* Marshal */ grub_tpm2_buffer_init (&in);grub_Tss2_MU_TPMT_PUBLIC_PARMS_Marshal (&in, parms); +if (authCommand !=NULL ) +grub_Tss2_MU_TPMS_AUTH_COMMAND_Marshal (&in, authCommand);if (in.error !=0 )return TPM_RC_FAILURE ;
Signature · 7 lines
2.43.0 _______________________________________________ Grub-devel mailing list [email protected] https://lists.gnu.org/mailman/listinfo/grub-devel
PATCH v5 4/13 tss2: Add TPM 2.0 NV index commands
In reply to Gary Lin via Grub-develThe following TPM 2.0 commands are introduced to tss2 to access the TPM non-volatile memory associated with the NV index handles.
- TPM2_NV_DefineSpace
- TPM2_NV_UndefineSpace
- TPM2_NV_ReadPublic
- TPM2_NV_Read
- TPM2_NV_Write
The related marshal/unmarshal functions are also introduced.
--- grub-core/lib/tss2/tpm2_cmd.c | 201 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ grub-core/lib/tss2/tpm2_cmd.h | 32 +++++ grub-core/lib/tss2/tss2_mu.c | 39 +++++++ grub-core/lib/tss2/tss2_mu.h | 12 ++ grub-core/lib/tss2/tss2_types.h | 6 + 5 files changed, 290 insertions(+)
grub-core/lib/tss2/tpm2_cmd.c +201 -0
@@ -1045,3 +1045,204 @@ grub_tpm2_testparms (const TPMT_PUBLIC_PARMS_t *parms,return TPM_RC_SUCCESS ; } + +TPM_RC_t +grub_tpm2_nv_definespace (const TPMI_RH_PROVISION_t authHandle, +const TPMS_AUTH_COMMAND_t *authCommand, +const TPM2B_AUTH_t *auth, +const TPM2B_NV_PUBLIC_t *publicInfo) +{ +TPM_RC_t rc; +struct grub_tpm2_buffer in; +struct grub_tpm2_buffer out; +TPMI_ST_COMMAND_TAG_t tag = authCommand ?TPM_ST_SESSIONS :TPM_ST_NO_SESSIONS ; +TPM_RC_t responseCode; + +if (publicInfo ==NULL ) +return TPM_RC_VALUE ; + +/* Marshal */ +grub_tpm2_buffer_init (&in); +grub_tpm2_buffer_pack_u32 (&in, authHandle); +if (authCommand !=NULL ) +grub_Tss2_MU_TPMS_AUTH_COMMAND_Marshal (&in, authCommand); +if (auth !=NULL ) +grub_Tss2_MU_TPM2B_Marshal (&in, auth->size, auth->buffer); +else +grub_tpm2_buffer_pack_u16 (&in,0 ); +grub_Tss2_MU_TPM2B_NV_PUBLIC_Marshal (&in, publicInfo); +if (in.error !=0 ) +return TPM_RC_FAILURE ; + +/* Submit */ +grub_tpm2_buffer_init (&out); + rc =tpm2_submit_command (tag, TPM_CC_NV_DefineSpace, &responseCode, &in, &out); +if (rc !=TPM_RC_SUCCESS ) +return rc; +if (responseCode !=TPM_RC_SUCCESS ) +return responseCode; + +/* Unmarshal */ +if (out.error !=0 ) +return TPM_RC_FAILURE ; + +return TPM_RC_SUCCESS ; +} + +TPM_RC_t +grub_tpm2_nv_undefinespace (const TPMI_RH_PROVISION_t authHandle, +const TPMI_RH_NV_INDEX_t nvIndex, +const TPMS_AUTH_COMMAND_t *authCommand) +{ +TPM_RC_t rc; +struct grub_tpm2_buffer in; +struct grub_tpm2_buffer out; +TPMI_ST_COMMAND_TAG_t tag = authCommand ?TPM_ST_SESSIONS :TPM_ST_NO_SESSIONS ; +TPM_RC_t responseCode; + +/* Marshal */ +grub_tpm2_buffer_init (&in); +grub_tpm2_buffer_pack_u32 (&in, authHandle); +grub_tpm2_buffer_pack_u32 (&in, nvIndex); +if (authCommand !=NULL ) +grub_Tss2_MU_TPMS_AUTH_COMMAND_Marshal (&in, authCommand); +if (in.error !=0 ) +return TPM_RC_FAILURE ; + +/* Submit */ +grub_tpm2_buffer_init (&out); + rc =tpm2_submit_command (tag, TPM_CC_NV_UndefineSpace, &responseCode, &in, &out); +if (rc !=TPM_RC_SUCCESS ) +return rc; +if (responseCode !=TPM_RC_SUCCESS ) +return responseCode; + +/* Unmarshal */ +if (out.error !=0 ) +return TPM_RC_FAILURE ; + +return TPM_RC_SUCCESS ; +} + +TPM_RC_t +grub_tpm2_nv_readpublic (const TPMI_RH_NV_INDEX_t nvIndex, +const TPMS_AUTH_COMMAND_t *authCommand, +TPM2B_NV_PUBLIC_t *nvPublic, +TPM2B_NAME_t *nvName) +{ +TPM_RC_t rc; +struct grub_tpm2_buffer in; +struct grub_tpm2_buffer out; +TPMI_ST_COMMAND_TAG_t tag = authCommand ?TPM_ST_SESSIONS :TPM_ST_NO_SESSIONS ; +TPM_RC_t responseCode; +grub_uint32_t param_size; + +/* Marshal */ +grub_tpm2_buffer_init (&in); +grub_tpm2_buffer_pack_u32 (&in, nvIndex); +if (authCommand !=NULL ) +grub_Tss2_MU_TPMS_AUTH_COMMAND_Marshal (&in, authCommand); +if (in.error !=0 ) +return TPM_RC_FAILURE ; + +/* Submit */ +grub_tpm2_buffer_init (&out); + rc =tpm2_submit_command (tag, TPM_CC_NV_ReadPublic, &responseCode, &in, &out); +if (rc !=TPM_RC_SUCCESS ) +return rc; +if (responseCode !=TPM_RC_SUCCESS ) +return responseCode; + +/* Unmarshal */ +if (tag ==TPM_ST_SESSIONS ) +grub_tpm2_buffer_unpack_u32 (&out, ¶m_size); +grub_Tss2_MU_TPM2B_NV_PUBLIC_Unmarshal (&out, nvPublic); +grub_Tss2_MU_TPM2B_NAME_Unmarshal (&out, nvName); +if (out.error !=0 ) +return TPM_RC_FAILURE ; + +return TPM_RC_SUCCESS ; +} + +TPM_RC_t +grub_tpm2_nv_read (const TPMI_RH_NV_AUTH_t authHandle, +const TPMI_RH_NV_INDEX_t nvIndex, +const TPMS_AUTH_COMMAND_t *authCommand, +const grub_uint16_t size, +const grub_uint16_t offset, +TPM2B_MAX_NV_BUFFER_t *data) +{ +TPM_RC_t rc; +struct grub_tpm2_buffer in; +struct grub_tpm2_buffer out; +TPMI_ST_COMMAND_TAG_t tag = authCommand ?TPM_ST_SESSIONS :TPM_ST_NO_SESSIONS ; +TPM_RC_t responseCode; +grub_uint32_t param_size; + +/* Marshal */ +grub_tpm2_buffer_init (&in); +grub_tpm2_buffer_pack_u32 (&in, authHandle); +grub_tpm2_buffer_pack_u32 (&in, nvIndex); +if (authCommand !=NULL ) +grub_Tss2_MU_TPMS_AUTH_COMMAND_Marshal (&in, authCommand); +grub_tpm2_buffer_pack_u16 (&in, size); +grub_tpm2_buffer_pack_u16 (&in, offset); +if (in.error !=0 ) +return TPM_RC_FAILURE ; + +/* Submit */ +grub_tpm2_buffer_init (&out); + rc =tpm2_submit_command (tag, TPM_CC_NV_Read, &responseCode, &in, &out); +if (rc !=TPM_RC_SUCCESS ) +return rc; +if (responseCode !=TPM_RC_SUCCESS ) +return responseCode; + +/* Unmarshal */ +if (tag ==TPM_ST_SESSIONS ) +grub_tpm2_buffer_unpack_u32 (&out, ¶m_size); +grub_Tss2_MU_TPM2B_NAX_NV_BUFFER_Unmarshal (&out, data); +if (out.error !=0 ) +return TPM_RC_FAILURE ; + +return TPM_RC_SUCCESS ; +} + +TPM_RC_t +grub_tpm2_nv_write (const TPMI_RH_NV_AUTH_t authHandle, +const TPMI_RH_NV_INDEX_t nvIndex, +const TPMS_AUTH_COMMAND_t *authCommand, +const TPM2B_MAX_NV_BUFFER_t *data, +const grub_uint16_t offset) +{ +TPM_RC_t rc; +struct grub_tpm2_buffer in; +struct grub_tpm2_buffer out; +TPMI_ST_COMMAND_TAG_t tag = authCommand ?TPM_ST_SESSIONS :TPM_ST_NO_SESSIONS ; +TPM_RC_t responseCode; + +/* Marshal */ +grub_tpm2_buffer_init (&in); +grub_tpm2_buffer_pack_u32 (&in, authHandle); +grub_tpm2_buffer_pack_u32 (&in, nvIndex); +if (authCommand !=NULL ) +grub_Tss2_MU_TPMS_AUTH_COMMAND_Marshal (&in, authCommand); +grub_Tss2_MU_TPM2B_Marshal (&in, data->size, data->buffer); +grub_tpm2_buffer_pack_u16 (&in, offset); +if (in.error !=0 ) +return TPM_RC_FAILURE ; + +/* Submit */ +grub_tpm2_buffer_init (&out); + rc =tpm2_submit_command (tag, TPM_CC_NV_Write, &responseCode, &in, &out); +if (rc !=TPM_RC_SUCCESS ) +return rc; +if (responseCode !=TPM_RC_SUCCESS ) +return responseCode; + +/* Unmarshal */ +if (out.error !=0 ) +return TPM_RC_FAILURE ; + +return TPM_RC_SUCCESS ; +}
grub-core/lib/tss2/tpm2_cmd.h +32 -0
@@ -154,4 +154,36 @@ extern TPM_RC_t grub_tpm2_testparms (const TPMT_PUBLIC_PARMS_t *parms, const TPMS_AUTH_COMMAND_t *authCommand); +extern TPM_RC_t +grub_tpm2_nv_definespace (const TPMI_RH_PROVISION_t authHandle, +const TPMS_AUTH_COMMAND_t *authCommand, +const TPM2B_AUTH_t *auth, +const TPM2B_NV_PUBLIC_t *publicInfo); + +extern TPM_RC_t +grub_tpm2_nv_undefinespace (const TPMI_RH_PROVISION_t authHandle, +const TPMI_RH_NV_INDEX_t nvIndex, +const TPMS_AUTH_COMMAND_t *authCommand); + +extern TPM_RC_t +grub_tpm2_nv_readpublic (const TPMI_RH_NV_INDEX_t nvIndex, +const TPMS_AUTH_COMMAND_t *authCommand, +TPM2B_NV_PUBLIC_t *nvPublic, +TPM2B_NAME_t *nvName); + +extern TPM_RC_t +grub_tpm2_nv_read (const TPMI_RH_NV_AUTH_t authHandle, +const TPMI_RH_NV_INDEX_t nvIndex, +const TPMS_AUTH_COMMAND_t *authCommand, +const grub_uint16_t size, +const grub_uint16_t offset, +TPM2B_MAX_NV_BUFFER_t *data); + +extern TPM_RC_t +grub_tpm2_nv_write (const TPMI_RH_NV_AUTH_t authHandle, +const TPMI_RH_NV_INDEX_t nvIndex, +const TPMS_AUTH_COMMAND_t *authCommand, +const TPM2B_MAX_NV_BUFFER_t *data, +const grub_uint16_t offset); +#endif /* ! GRUB_TPM2_COMMANDS_HEADER */
grub-core/lib/tss2/tss2_mu.c +39 -0
@@ -17,6 +17,7 @@* along with GRUB. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>. */ +#include <grub/mm.h> #include <grub/misc.h> #include <tss2_mu.h>
@@ -572,6 +573,37 @@ grub_Tss2_MU_TPMT_TK_VERIFIED_Marshal (grub_tpm2_buffer_t buffer,grub_Tss2_MU_TPM2B_Marshal (buffer, p->digest.size, p->digest.buffer); } +void +grub_Tss2_MU_TPMS_NV_PUBLIC_Marshal (grub_tpm2_buffer_t buffer, +const TPMS_NV_PUBLIC_t *p) +{ +grub_tpm2_buffer_pack_u32 (buffer, p->nvIndex); +grub_tpm2_buffer_pack_u16 (buffer, p->nameAlg); +grub_tpm2_buffer_pack_u32 (buffer, p->attributes); +grub_Tss2_MU_TPM2B_Marshal (buffer, p->authPolicy.size, p->authPolicy.buffer); +grub_tpm2_buffer_pack_u16 (buffer, p->dataSize); +} + +void +grub_Tss2_MU_TPM2B_NV_PUBLIC_Marshal (grub_tpm2_buffer_t buffer, +const TPM2B_NV_PUBLIC_t *p) +{ +grub_uint32_t start; +grub_uint16_t size; + +if (p !=NULL ) + { +grub_tpm2_buffer_pack_u16 (buffer, p->size); + + start = buffer->size; +grub_Tss2_MU_TPMS_NV_PUBLIC_Marshal (buffer, &p->nvPublic); + size =grub_cpu_to_be16 (buffer->size - start); +grub_memcpy (&buffer->data[start -sizeof (grub_uint16_t)], &size,sizeof (size)); + } +else +grub_tpm2_buffer_pack_u16 (buffer,0 ); +} +static void __Tss2_MU_TPM2B_BUFFER_Unmarshal (grub_tpm2_buffer_t buffer,TPM2B_t *p,grub_uint16_t bound)
@@ -982,6 +1014,13 @@ grub_Tss2_MU_TPM2B_NV_PUBLIC_Unmarshal (grub_tpm2_buffer_t buffer,grub_Tss2_MU_TPMS_NV_PUBLIC_Unmarshal (buffer, &p->nvPublic); } +void +grub_Tss2_MU_TPM2B_NAX_NV_BUFFER_Unmarshal (grub_tpm2_buffer_t buffer, +TPM2B_MAX_NV_BUFFER_t *p) +{ +TPM2B_BUFFER_UNMARSHAL (buffer, TPM2B_MAX_NV_BUFFER_t, p); +} +void grub_Tss2_MU_TPM2B_NAME_Unmarshal (grub_tpm2_buffer_t buffer,TPM2B_NAME_t *n)
grub-core/lib/tss2/tss2_mu.h +12 -0
@@ -193,6 +193,14 @@ extern void grub_Tss2_MU_TPMT_TK_VERIFIED_Marshal (grub_tpm2_buffer_t buffer, const TPMT_TK_VERIFIED_t *p); +extern void +grub_Tss2_MU_TPMS_NV_PUBLIC_Marshal (grub_tpm2_buffer_t buffer, +const TPMS_NV_PUBLIC_t *p); + +extern void +grub_Tss2_MU_TPM2B_NV_PUBLIC_Marshal (grub_tpm2_buffer_t buffer, +const TPM2B_NV_PUBLIC_t *p); +extern void grub_Tss2_MU_TPMS_AUTH_RESPONSE_Unmarshal (grub_tpm2_buffer_t buffer,TPMS_AUTH_RESPONSE_t *p);
@@ -336,6 +344,10 @@ extern void grub_Tss2_MU_TPM2B_NV_PUBLIC_Unmarshal (grub_tpm2_buffer_t buffer, TPM2B_NV_PUBLIC_t *p); +extern void +grub_Tss2_MU_TPM2B_NAX_NV_BUFFER_Unmarshal (grub_tpm2_buffer_t buffer, +TPM2B_MAX_NV_BUFFER_t *p); +extern void grub_Tss2_MU_TPM2B_NAME_Unmarshal (grub_tpm2_buffer_t buffer,TPM2B_NAME_t *n);
grub-core/lib/tss2/tss2_types.h +6 -0
@@ -270,6 +270,7 @@ typedef TPM_HANDLE_t TPMI_RH_NV_INDEX_t;/* TPM_HT_t Constants */ typedef grub_uint8_t TPM_HT_t ; +#define TPM_HT_NV_INDEX ((TPM_HT_t) 0x01)#define TPM_HT_PERMANENT ((TPM_HT_t) 0x40)#define TPM_HT_PERSISTENT ((TPM_HT_t) 0x81)
@@ -300,6 +301,7 @@ typedef TPM_HANDLE_t TPM_HC_t;#define TPM_HR_HANDLE_MASK ((TPM_HC_t) 0x00FFFFFF)#define TPM_HR_RANGE_MASK ((TPM_HC_t) 0xFF000000)#define TPM_HR_SHIFT ((TPM_HC_t) 24) +#define TPM_HR_NV_INDEX ((TPM_HC_t) (TPM_HT_NV_INDEX << TPM_HR_SHIFT))#define TPM_HR_PERSISTENT ((TPM_HC_t) (TPM_HT_PERSISTENT << TPM_HR_SHIFT))#define TPM_HR_PERMANENT ((TPM_HC_t) (TPM_HT_PERMANENT << TPM_HR_SHIFT))#define TPM_PERSISTENT_FIRST ((TPM_HC_t) (TPM_HR_PERSISTENT + 0))
@@ -308,6 +310,7 @@ typedef TPM_HANDLE_t TPM_HC_t;#define TPM_PERMANENT_LAST ((TPM_HC_t) TPM_RH_LAST)/* TPM Handle Type Checks */ +#define TPM_HT_IS_NVINDEX (HANDLE ) (((HANDLE) >> TPM_HR_SHIFT) == TPM_HT_NV_INDEX)#define TPM_HT_IS_PERMANENT (HANDLE ) (((HANDLE) >> TPM_HR_SHIFT) == TPM_HT_PERMANENT)#define TPM_HT_IS_PERSISTENT (HANDLE ) (((HANDLE) >> TPM_HR_SHIFT) == TPM_HT_PERSISTENT)
@@ -334,8 +337,11 @@ typedef grub_uint32_t TPM_CC_t;#define TPM_CC_ReadPublic ((TPM_CC_t) 0x00000173)#define TPM_CC_StartAuthSession ((TPM_CC_t) 0x00000176)#define TPM_CC_PolicyPCR ((TPM_CC_t) 0x0000017f) +#define TPM_CC_NV_DefineSpace ((TPM_CC_t) 0x0000012a)#define TPM_CC_NV_Read ((TPM_CC_t) 0x0000014e)#define TPM_CC_NV_ReadPublic ((TPM_CC_t) 0x00000169) +#define TPM_CC_NV_Write ((TPM_CC_t) 0x00000137) +#define TPM_CC_NV_UndefineSpace ((TPM_CC_t) 0x00000122)#define TPM_CC_GetCapability ((TPM_CC_t) 0x0000017a)#define TPM_CC_PCR_Read ((TPM_CC_t) 0x0000017e)#define TPM_CC_Load ((TPM_CC_t) 0x00000157)
Signature · 7 lines
2.43.0 _______________________________________________ Grub-devel mailing list [email protected] https://lists.gnu.org/mailman/listinfo/grub-devel
PATCH v5 5/13 tpm2_key_protector: Unseal key from a buffer
In reply to Gary Lin via Grub-develExtract the logic to handle the file buffer from the SRK recover function to prepare to load the sealed key from the NV index handle, so the NV index mode can share the same code path in the later patch. The SRK recover function now only reads the file and sends the file buffer to the new function.
Besides this, to avoid introducing more options for the NV index mode, the file format is detected automatically before unmarshalling the data, so there is no need to use the command option to specify the file format anymore. In other words, '-T' and '-k' are the same now.
Also update grub.text to address the change.
--- docs/grub.texi | 13 +- .../commands/tpm2_key_protector/module.c | 122 +++++++++++++----- 2 files changed, 96 insertions(+), 39 deletions(-)
docs/grub.texi +7 -6
@@ -8075,12 +8075,13 @@ options are @option{-T}, @option{-k}, @option{-a}, and @option{-s}. On the other hand, the NV index-specific option is @option{-n}. The key file for SRK mode can be supplied with either @option{-T} or -@option{-k}. The @option{-T} option is for the path to the key file in -TPM 2.0 Key File format. Since the parameters for the TPM commands are written -in the file, there is no need to set the PCR list(@option{-p}) and -bank(@option{-b}) when using the @option{-T} option. The @option{-k} option -is for the key file in the raw format, and the @option{-p} and @option{-b} -options are necessary for the non-default PCR list or bank. In general, +@option{-k}. Those two options were used to distinguish the file formats but +are same now. There are two supported file formats: raw format and TPM 2.0 +Key File format. When using the key file in the raw format, the @option{-p} +and @option{-b} options are necessary for the non-default PCR list or bank. +On the other hand, when using the key file in TPM 2.0 Key File format, the +the parameters for the TPM commands are written in the file, and there is no +need to set the PCR list(@option{-p}) and bank(@option{-b}). In general, TPM 2.0 Key File format is preferred due to the simplified GRUB command options and the authorized policy support
grub-core/commands/tpm2_key_protector/module.c +89 -33
164 lines not on this page · raw message
Signature · 7 lines
2.43.0 _______________________________________________ Grub-devel mailing list [email protected] https://lists.gnu.org/mailman/listinfo/grub-devel
Re: [PATCH v5 05/13] tpm2_key_protector: Unseal key from a buffer
Quoted 11 lines · Gary Lin
Extract the logic to handle the file buffer from the SRK recover function to prepare to load the sealed key from the NV index handle, so the NV index mode can share the same code path in the later patch. The SRK recover function now only reads the file and sends the file buffer to the new function.
Besides this, to avoid introducing more options for the NV index mode, the file format is detected automatically before unmarshalling the data, so there is no need to use the command option to specify the file format anymore. In other words, '-T' and '-k' are the same now.
Quoted 4 lines
Also update grub.text to address the change.
Signed-off-by Gary Lin <[email protected]>Reviewed-by Stefan Berger <[email protected]>
Daniel
_______________________________________________
Grub-devel mailing list
[email protected]
https://lists.gnu.org/mailman/listinfo/grub-devel
PATCH v5 6/13 tpm2_key_protector: Support NV index handles
In reply to Gary Lin via Grub-develPreviously, NV index mode only supported persistent handles which are only for TPM objects.
On the other hand, the "NV index" handle allows the user-defined data, so it can be an alternative to the key file and support TPM 2.0 Key File format immediately.
The following tpm2-tools commands store the given key file, sealed.tpm, in either TPM 2.0 Key File format or the raw format into the NV index handle 0x1000000.
# tpm2_nvdefine -C o \
-a "ownerread|ownerwrite" \
-s $(stat -c %s sealed.tpm) \
0x1000000
# tpm2_nvwrite -C o -i sealed.tpm 0x1000000To unseal the key in GRUB, add the 'tpm2_key_protector_init' command to grub.cfg:
tpm2_key_protector_init --mode=nv --nvindex=0x1000000 cryptomount -u <UUID> --protector tpm2
To remove the NV index handle:
# tpm2_nvundefine -C o 0x1000000
--- .../commands/tpm2_key_protector/module.c | 70 ++++++++++++++++--- 1 file changed, 60 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
grub-core/commands/tpm2_key_protector/module.c +60 -10
@@ -1133,10 +1133,9 @@ tpm2_protector_srk_recover (const tpm2_protector_context_t *ctx, }static grub_err_t -tpm2_protector_nv_recover (const tpm2_protector_context_t *ctx, -grub_uint8_t **key,grub_size_t *key_size) +tpm2_protector_load_persistent (const tpm2_protector_context_t *ctx,TPM_HANDLE_t sealed_handle, +grub_uint8_t **key,grub_size_t *key_size) { -TPM_HANDLE_t sealed_handle = ctx->nv;tpm2key_policy_t policy_seq =NULL ;bool dump_pcr = false;grub_err_t err;
@@ -1163,6 +1162,51 @@ tpm2_protector_nv_recover (const tpm2_protector_context_t *ctx,return err; } +static grub_err_t +tpm2_protector_key_from_nvindex (const tpm2_protector_context_t *ctx,TPM_HANDLE_t nvindex, +grub_uint8_t **key,grub_size_t *key_size) +{ +TPMS_AUTH_COMMAND_t authCmd = {0 }; +TPM2B_NV_PUBLIC_t nv_public; +TPM2B_NAME_t nv_name; +grub_uint16_t data_size; +TPM2B_MAX_NV_BUFFER_t data; +TPM_RC_t rc; + +/* Get the data size in the NV index handle */ + rc =grub_tpm2_nv_readpublic (nvindex,NULL , &nv_public, &nv_name); +if (rc !=TPM_RC_SUCCESS ) +return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_ARGUMENT ,"failed to retrieve info from 0x%x (TPM2_NV_ReadPublic: 0x%x)" , nvindex, rc); + + data_size = nv_public.nvPublic.dataSize; +if (data_size >TPM_MAX_NV_BUFFER_SIZE ) +return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_ARGUMENT ,"insufficient data buffer" ); + +/* Read the data from the NV index handle */ + authCmd.sessionHandle =TPM_RS_PW ; + rc =grub_tpm2_nv_read (TPM_RH_OWNER , nvindex, &authCmd, data_size,0 , &data); +if (rc !=TPM_RC_SUCCESS ) +return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_ARGUMENT ,"failed to read data from 0x%x (TPM2_NV_Read: 0x%x)" , nvindex, rc); + +return tpm2_protector_key_from_buffer (ctx, data.buffer, data_size, key, key_size); +} + +static grub_err_t +tpm2_protector_nv_recover (const tpm2_protector_context_t *ctx, +grub_uint8_t **key,grub_size_t *key_size) +{ +grub_err_t err; + +if (TPM_HT_IS_PERSISTENT (ctx->nv) == true) + err =tpm2_protector_load_persistent (ctx, ctx->nv, key, key_size); +else if (TPM_HT_IS_NVINDEX (ctx->nv) == true) + err =tpm2_protector_key_from_nvindex (ctx, ctx->nv, key, key_size); +else + err =GRUB_ERR_BAD_ARGUMENT ; + +return err; +} +static grub_err_t tpm2_protector_recover (const tpm2_protector_context_t *ctx,grub_uint8_t **key,grub_size_t *key_size)
@@ -1215,14 +1259,15 @@ tpm2_protector_check_args (tpm2_protector_context_t *ctx)if (ctx->mode ==TPM2_PROTECTOR_MODE_NV && (ctx->tpm2key !=NULL || ctx->keyfile !=NULL )) -return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_ARGUMENT ,N_ ("in NV Index mode, a keyfile cannot be specified" )); +return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_ARGUMENT ,N_ ("a key file cannot be specified when using NV index mode" )); -if (ctx->mode ==TPM2_PROTECTOR_MODE_NV && ctx->srk !=0 ) -return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_ARGUMENT ,N_ ("in NV Index mode, an SRK cannot be specified" )); +if (ctx->mode ==TPM2_PROTECTOR_MODE_NV &&TPM_HT_IS_PERSISTENT (ctx->nv) == true && + (ctx->srk !=0 || ctx->srk_type.type !=TPM_ALG_ERROR )) +return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_ARGUMENT ,N_ ("an SRK cannot be specified when using NV index mode with a persistent handle" ));if (ctx->mode ==TPM2_PROTECTOR_MODE_NV && - ctx->srk_type.type !=TPM_ALG_ERROR ) -return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_ARGUMENT ,N_ ("in NV Index mode, an asymmetric key type cannot be specified" )); + (TPM_HT_IS_PERSISTENT (ctx->nv) == false &&TPM_HT_IS_NVINDEX (ctx->nv) == false)) +return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_ARGUMENT ,N_ ("an NV index must be either a persistent handle or an NV index handle when using NV index mode" ));/* Defaults assignment */ if (ctx->bank ==TPM_ALG_ERROR )
@@ -1234,8 +1279,13 @@ tpm2_protector_check_args (tpm2_protector_context_t *ctx) ctx->pcr_count =1 ; } -if (ctx->mode ==TPM2_PROTECTOR_MODE_SRK && - ctx->srk_type.type ==TPM_ALG_ERROR ) +/* +* Set ECC_NIST_P256 as the default SRK when using SRK mode or NV mode with +* an NV index handle +*/ +if (ctx->srk_type.type ==TPM_ALG_ERROR && + (ctx->mode ==TPM2_PROTECTOR_MODE_SRK || + (ctx->mode ==TPM2_PROTECTOR_MODE_NV &&TPM_HT_IS_NVINDEX (ctx->nv) == true))) { ctx->srk_type.type =TPM_ALG_ECC ; ctx->srk_type.detail.ecc_curve =TPM_ECC_NIST_P256 ;
Signature · 7 lines
2.43.0 _______________________________________________ Grub-devel mailing list [email protected] https://lists.gnu.org/mailman/listinfo/grub-devel
PATCH v5 7/13 util/grub-protect: Support NV index mode
In reply to Gary Lin via Grub-develThis commit implements the missing NV index mode support in 'grub-protect'. NV index mode stores the sealed key in the TPM non-volatile memory (NVRAM) instead of a file. There are two supported types of TPM handles.
1. Persistent handle (0x81000000~0x81FFFFFF)
Only the raw format is supported due to the limitation of persistent handles. This 'grub-protect' command seals the key into the persistent handle 0x81000000.
# grub-protect \
--protector=tpm2 \
--action=add \
--tpm2-bank=sha256 \
--tpm2-pcrs=7,11 \
--tpm2-keyfile=luks-key \
--tpm2-nvindex=0x810000002. NV index handle (0x1000000~0x1FFFFFF)
Both TPM 2.0 Key File format and the raw format are supported by NV index handles. Here is the 'grub-protect' command to seal the key in TPM 2.0 Key File format into the NV index handle 0x1000000.
# grub-protect \
--protector=tpm2 \
--action=add \
--tpm2key \
--tpm2-bank=sha256 \
--tpm2-pcrs=7,11 \
--tpm2-keyfile=luks-key \
--tpm2-nvindex=0x1000000Besides the 'add' action, the corresponding 'remove' action is also introduced. To remove the data from a persistent or NV index handle, just use '--tpm2-nvindex=HANDLE' combining with '--tpm2-evict'. This sample command removes the data from the NV index handle 0x1000000.
# grub-protect \
--protector=tpm2 \
--action=remove \
--tpm2-evict \
--tpm2-nvindex=0x1000000Also set and check the boolean variables with true/false instead of 1/0.
--- util/grub-protect.c | 343 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------- 1 file changed, 287 insertions(+), 56 deletions(-)
util/grub-protect.c +287 -56
@@ -61,7 +61,8 @@ typedef enum protect_optPROTECT_OPT_TPM2_KEYFILE ,PROTECT_OPT_TPM2_OUTFILE ,PROTECT_OPT_TPM2_EVICT , - PROTECT_OPT_TPM2_TPM2KEY +PROTECT_OPT_TPM2_TPM2KEY , +PROTECT_OPT_TPM2_NVINDEX , } protect_opt_t;/* Option flags to keep track of specified arguments */
@@ -79,7 +80,8 @@ typedef enum protect_argPROTECT_ARG_TPM2_KEYFILE =1 <<7 ,PROTECT_ARG_TPM2_OUTFILE =1 <<8 ,PROTECT_ARG_TPM2_EVICT =1 <<9 , - PROTECT_ARG_TPM2_TPM2KEY = 1 << 10 +PROTECT_ARG_TPM2_TPM2KEY =1 <<10 , + PROTECT_ARG_TPM2_NVINDEX = 1 << 11 } protect_arg_t; typedef enum protect_protector
@@ -111,6 +113,7 @@ typedef struct protect_argsconst char *tpm2_outfile;bool tpm2_evict;bool tpm2_tpm2key; +TPM_HANDLE_t tpm2_nvindex; } protect_args_t; static struct argp_option protect_options[] =
@@ -224,6 +227,15 @@ static struct argp_option protect_options[] = N_("Use TPM 2.0 Key File format."), .group =0 }, + { + .name = "tpm2-nvindex", + .key = PROTECT_OPT_TPM2_NVINDEX, + .arg = "NUM", + .flags = 0, + .doc = + N_("Store the sealed key in a persistent or NV index handle."), + .group =0 + },/* End of list */ { 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0 } };
@@ -668,8 +680,8 @@ extern asn1_static_node tpm2key_asn1_tab[];#define TPM2KEY_SEALED_KEY_OID "2.23.133.10.1.5"static grub_err_t -protect_tpm2_export_tpm2key (const protect_args_t *args, -tpm2_sealed_key_t *sealed_key) +protect_tpm2_export_tpm2key (const protect_args_t *args,tpm2_sealed_key_t *sealed_key, +void **der_buf,int *der_buf_size) {const char *sealed_key_oid =TPM2KEY_SEALED_KEY_OID ;asn1_node asn1_def =NULL ;
@@ -689,12 +701,13 @@ protect_tpm2_export_tpm2key (const protect_args_t *args, };struct grub_tpm2_buffer pub_buf;struct grub_tpm2_buffer priv_buf; -void *der_buf =NULL ; -int der_buf_size =0 ;int i;int ret;grub_err_t err; +if (der_buf ==NULL ) +return GRUB_ERR_BAD_ARGUMENT ; +for (i =0 ; i < args->tpm2_pcr_count; i++)TPMS_PCR_SELECTION_SelectPCR (&pcr_sel.pcrSelections[0 ], args->tpm2_pcrs[i]);
@@ -844,8 +857,8 @@ protect_tpm2_export_tpm2key (const protect_args_t *args, }/* Create the DER binary */ - der_buf_size =0 ; - ret =asn1_der_coding (tpm2key,"" ,NULL , &der_buf_size,NULL ); + *der_buf_size =0 ; + ret =asn1_der_coding (tpm2key,"" ,NULL , der_buf_size,NULL );if (ret !=ASN1_MEM_ERROR ) {fprintf (stderr,"Failed to get DER size: 0x%x\n" , ret);
@@ -853,15 +866,15 @@ protect_tpm2_export_tpm2key (const protect_args_t *args, goto error; } - der_buf =grub_malloc (der_buf_size); -if (der_buf ==NULL ) + *der_buf =grub_malloc (*der_buf_size); +if (*der_buf ==NULL ) {fprintf (stderr,"Failed to allocate memory for DER encoding\n" ); err =GRUB_ERR_OUT_OF_MEMORY ; goto error; } - ret =asn1_der_coding (tpm2key,"" , der_buf, &der_buf_size,NULL ); + ret =asn1_der_coding (tpm2key,"" , *der_buf, der_buf_size,NULL );if (ret !=ASN1_SUCCESS ) {fprintf (stderr,"DER coding error: 0x%x\n" , ret);
@@ -869,13 +882,7 @@ protect_tpm2_export_tpm2key (const protect_args_t *args, goto error; } - err =protect_write_file (args->tpm2_outfile, der_buf, der_buf_size); -if (err !=GRUB_ERR_NONE ) -fprintf (stderr,N_ ("Could not write tpm2key file (%s).\n" ),strerror (errno)); - error: -grub_free (der_buf); -if (tpm2key)asn1_delete_structure (&tpm2key);
@@ -883,10 +890,8 @@ protect_tpm2_export_tpm2key (const protect_args_t *args, }static grub_err_t -protect_tpm2_export_sealed_key (const char *filepath, -tpm2_sealed_key_t *sealed_key) +protect_tpm2_export_raw (tpm2_sealed_key_t *sealed_key,void **out_buf,int *out_buf_size) { -grub_err_t err;struct grub_tpm2_buffer buf;grub_tpm2_buffer_init (&buf);
@@ -896,13 +901,98 @@ protect_tpm2_export_sealed_key (const char *filepath,if (buf.error !=0 )return GRUB_ERR_BAD_ARGUMENT ; - err =protect_write_file (filepath, buf.data, buf.size); -if (err !=GRUB_ERR_NONE ) -fprintf (stderr,N_ ("Could not write sealed key file (%s).\n" ),strerror (errno)); + *out_buf_size = buf.size; + *out_buf =grub_malloc (buf.size); + +if (*out_buf ==NULL ) + { +fprintf (stderr,N_ ("Could not allocate memory for the raw format key.\n" )); +return GRUB_ERR_OUT_OF_MEMORY ; + } + +grub_memcpy (*out_buf, buf.data, buf.size); + +return GRUB_ERR_NONE ; +} + +static grub_err_t +protect_tpm2_export_persistent (protect_args_t *args, +TPM_HANDLE_t srk_handle, +tpm2_sealed_key_t *sealed_key) +{ +TPMS_AUTH_COMMAND_t authCmd = {0 }; +TPM2B_NAME_t name = {0 }; +TPM_HANDLE_t sealed_handle; +TPM_RC_t rc; +grub_err_t err =GRUB_ERR_NONE ; + +/* Load the sealed key and associate it with the SRK */ + authCmd.sessionHandle =TPM_RS_PW ; + rc =grub_tpm2_load (srk_handle, &authCmd, &sealed_key->private, &sealed_key->public, + &sealed_handle, &name,NULL ); +if (rc !=TPM_RC_SUCCESS ) + { +fprintf (stderr,"Failed to load sealed key (TPM2_Load: %x).\n" , rc); +return GRUB_ERR_BAD_DEVICE ; + } + +/* Make the sealed key object persistent */ + authCmd.sessionHandle =TPM_RS_PW ; + rc =grub_tpm2_evictcontrol (TPM_RH_OWNER , sealed_handle, &authCmd, args->tpm2_nvindex,NULL ); +if (rc !=TPM_RC_SUCCESS ) + { +fprintf (stderr,"Failed to make sealed key persistent with handle 0x%x (TPM2_EvictControl: 0x%x).\n" , args->tpm2_nvindex, rc); + err =GRUB_ERR_BAD_DEVICE ; + goto exit; + } + + exit: +grub_tpm2_flushcontext (sealed_handle);return err; } +static grub_err_t +protect_tpm2_export_nvindex (protect_args_t *args,void *data,int data_size) +{ +TPMS_AUTH_COMMAND_t authCmd = {0 }; +TPM2B_NV_PUBLIC_t pub_info = {0 }; +TPM2B_MAX_NV_BUFFER_t nv_data = {0 }; +TPM_RC_t rc; + +if (data_size >TPM_MAX_NV_BUFFER_SIZE || data_size <0 ) + { +fprintf (stderr,N_ ("Invalid tpm2key size for TPM NV buffer\n" )); +return GRUB_ERR_OUT_OF_RANGE ; + } + + pub_info.nvPublic.nvIndex = args->tpm2_nvindex; + pub_info.nvPublic.nameAlg =TPM_ALG_SHA256 ; + pub_info.nvPublic.attributes =TPMA_NV_OWNERWRITE |TPMA_NV_OWNERREAD ; + pub_info.nvPublic.dataSize = (grub_uint16_t ) data_size; + + authCmd.sessionHandle =TPM_RS_PW ; + rc =grub_tpm2_nv_definespace (TPM_RH_OWNER , &authCmd,NULL , &pub_info); +if (rc !=TPM_RC_SUCCESS ) + { +fprintf (stderr,"Failed to define NV space for 0x%x (TPM2_NV_DefineSpace: 0x%x)\n" , args->tpm2_nvindex, rc); +return GRUB_ERR_BAD_DEVICE ; + } + + authCmd.sessionHandle =TPM_RS_PW ; +grub_memcpy (nv_data.buffer, data, data_size); + nv_data.size = (grub_uint16_t ) data_size; + + rc =grub_tpm2_nv_write (TPM_RH_OWNER , args->tpm2_nvindex, &authCmd, &nv_data,0 ); +if (rc !=TPM_RC_SUCCESS ) + { +fprintf (stderr,"Failed to write data into 0x%x (TPM2_NV_Write: 0x%x)\n" , args->tpm2_nvindex, rc); +return GRUB_ERR_BAD_DEVICE ; + } + +return GRUB_ERR_NONE ; +} +static grub_err_t protect_tpm2_add (protect_args_t *args) {
@@ -911,6 +1001,8 @@ protect_tpm2_add (protect_args_t *args)grub_size_t key_size;TPM_HANDLE_t srk;TPM2B_DIGEST_t policy_digest; +void *out_buf =NULL ; +int out_buf_size;tpm2_sealed_key_t sealed_key; err =protect_tpm2_open_device (args->tpm2_device);
@@ -940,15 +1032,51 @@ protect_tpm2_add (protect_args_t *args)if (err !=GRUB_ERR_NONE ) goto exit3; -if (args->tpm2_tpm2key !=0 ) - err =protect_tpm2_export_tpm2key (args, &sealed_key); +if (args->tpm2_tpm2key == true) + { + err =protect_tpm2_export_tpm2key (args, &sealed_key, &out_buf, &out_buf_size); +if (err !=GRUB_ERR_NONE ) + { +fprintf (stderr,N_ ("Could not export to TPM 2.0 Key File format\n" )); + goto exit3; + } + }else - err =protect_tpm2_export_sealed_key (args->tpm2_outfile, &sealed_key); -if (err !=GRUB_ERR_NONE ) - goto exit3; + { + err =protect_tpm2_export_raw (&sealed_key, &out_buf, &out_buf_size); +if (err !=GRUB_ERR_NONE ) + { +fprintf (stderr,N_ ("Could not export to the raw format\n" )); + goto exit3; + } + } + +if (args->tpm2_outfile !=NULL ) + { + err =protect_write_file (args->tpm2_outfile, out_buf, out_buf_size); +if (err !=GRUB_ERR_NONE ) + { +fprintf (stderr,N_ ("Could not write key file (%s).\n" ),strerror (errno)); + goto exit3; + } + } + +if (TPM_HT_IS_NVINDEX (args->tpm2_nvindex) == true) + { + err =protect_tpm2_export_nvindex (args, out_buf, out_buf_size); +if (err !=GRUB_ERR_NONE ) + goto exit3; + } +else if (TPM_HT_IS_PERSISTENT (args->tpm2_nvindex) == true) + { + err =protect_tpm2_export_persistent (args, srk, &sealed_key); +if (err !=GRUB_ERR_NONE ) + goto exit3; + } exit3:grub_tpm2_flushcontext (srk); +grub_free (out_buf); exit2:grub_free (key);
@@ -960,14 +1088,66 @@ protect_tpm2_add (protect_args_t *args) }static grub_err_t -protect_tpm2_remove (protect_args_t *args) +protect_tpm2_evict (TPM_HANDLE_t handle) {TPM_RC_t rc;TPM2B_PUBLIC_t public; -TPMS_AUTH_COMMAND_t authCommand = {0 }; +TPMS_AUTH_COMMAND_t authCmd = {0 }; + +/* Find the persistent handle */ + rc =grub_tpm2_readpublic (handle,NULL , &public); +if (rc !=TPM_RC_SUCCESS ) + { +fprintf (stderr,"Handle 0x%x not found.\n" , handle); +return GRUB_ERR_BAD_ARGUMENT ; + } + +/* Evict the persistent handle */ + authCmd.sessionHandle =TPM_RS_PW ; + rc =grub_tpm2_evictcontrol (TPM_RH_OWNER , handle, &authCmd, handle,NULL ); +if (rc !=TPM_RC_SUCCESS ) + { +fprintf (stderr,"Failed to evict handle 0x%x (TPM2_EvictControl: 0x%x).\n" , handle, rc); +return GRUB_ERR_BAD_DEVICE ; + } + +return GRUB_ERR_NONE ; +} + +static grub_err_t +protect_tpm2_nv_undefine (TPM_HANDLE_t handle) +{ +TPM_RC_t rc; +TPM2B_NV_PUBLIC_t nv_public; +TPMS_AUTH_COMMAND_t authCmd = {0 }; +TPM2B_NAME_t nv_name; + +/* Find the nvindex handle */ + rc =grub_tpm2_nv_readpublic (handle,NULL , &nv_public, &nv_name); +if (rc !=TPM_RC_SUCCESS ) + { +fprintf (stderr,"Handle 0x%x not found.\n" , handle); +return GRUB_ERR_BAD_ARGUMENT ; + } + +/* Undefine the nvindex handle */ + authCmd.sessionHandle =TPM_RS_PW ; + rc =grub_tpm2_nv_undefinespace (TPM_RH_OWNER , handle, &authCmd); +if (rc !=TPM_RC_SUCCESS ) + { +fprintf (stderr,"Failed to undefine handle 0x%x (TPM2_NV_UndefineSpace: 0x%x).\n" , handle, rc); +return GRUB_ERR_BAD_DEVICE ; + } + +return GRUB_ERR_NONE ; +} + +static grub_err_t +protect_tpm2_remove (protect_args_t *args) +{grub_err_t err; -if (args->tpm2_evict ==0 ) +if (args->tpm2_evict == false) {printf ("--tpm2-evict not specified, nothing to do.\n" );return GRUB_ERR_NONE ;
@@ -977,35 +1157,41 @@ protect_tpm2_remove (protect_args_t *args)if (err !=GRUB_ERR_NONE )return err; -/* Find SRK */ - rc =grub_tpm2_readpublic (args->tpm2_srk,NULL , &public); -if (rc !=TPM_RC_SUCCESS ) +if (args->tpm2_srk !=0 ) { -fprintf (stderr,"SRK with handle 0x%x not found.\n" , args->tpm2_srk); - err =GRUB_ERR_BAD_ARGUMENT ; - goto exit1; + err =protect_tpm2_evict (args->tpm2_srk); +if (err !=GRUB_ERR_NONE ) + goto exit; } -/* Evict SRK */ - authCommand.sessionHandle =TPM_RS_PW ; - - rc =grub_tpm2_evictcontrol (TPM_RH_OWNER , args->tpm2_srk, &authCommand, args->tpm2_srk,NULL ); -if (rc !=TPM_RC_SUCCESS ) +if (args->tpm2_nvindex !=0 ) { -fprintf (stderr,"Failed to evict SRK with handle 0x%x (TPM2_EvictControl: 0x%x).\n" , args->tpm2_srk, rc); - err =GRUB_ERR_BAD_DEVICE ; - goto exit2; +if (TPM_HT_IS_PERSISTENT (args->tpm2_nvindex) == true) + { + err =protect_tpm2_evict (args->tpm2_nvindex); +if (err !=GRUB_ERR_NONE ) + goto exit; + } +else if (TPM_HT_IS_NVINDEX (args->tpm2_nvindex) == true) + { + err =protect_tpm2_nv_undefine (args->tpm2_nvindex); +if (err !=GRUB_ERR_NONE ) + goto exit; + } +else + { +fprintf (stderr,"Unsupported handle 0x%x\n" , args->tpm2_nvindex); + err =GRUB_ERR_BAD_ARGUMENT ; + goto exit; + } } err =GRUB_ERR_NONE ; - exit2: -grub_tpm2_flushcontext (args->tpm2_srk); - - exit1: + exit:protect_tpm2_close_device (); -return GRUB_ERR_NONE ; +return err; } static grub_err_t
@@ -1045,9 +1231,36 @@ protect_tpm2_args_verify (protect_args_t *args)return GRUB_ERR_BAD_ARGUMENT ; } -if (args->tpm2_outfile ==NULL ) +if (args->tpm2_outfile ==NULL && args->tpm2_nvindex ==0 ) { -fprintf (stderr,N_ ("--tpm2-outfile must be specified.\n" )); +fprintf (stderr,N_ ("--tpm2-outfile or --tpm2-nvindex must be specified.\n" )); +return GRUB_ERR_BAD_ARGUMENT ; + } + +if (args->tpm2_nvindex !=0 ) + { +if (args->tpm2_tpm2key == true &&TPM_HT_IS_PERSISTENT (args->tpm2_nvindex) == true) + { +fprintf (stderr,N_ ("Persistent handle does not support TPM 2.0 Key File format.\n" )); +return GRUB_ERR_BAD_ARGUMENT ; + } + +if (TPM_HT_IS_PERSISTENT (args->tpm2_nvindex) == false &&TPM_HT_IS_NVINDEX (args->tpm2_nvindex) == false) + { +fprintf (stderr,N_ ("--tpm2-nvindex must be a persistent or NV index handle.\n" )); +return GRUB_ERR_BAD_ARGUMENT ; + } + +if (args->tpm2_nvindex == args->tpm2_srk) + { +fprintf (stderr,N_ ("--tpm2-nvindex and --tpm2-srk must be different.\n" )); +return GRUB_ERR_BAD_ARGUMENT ; + } + } + +if (args->tpm2_srk !=0 &&TPM_HT_IS_PERSISTENT (args->tpm2_srk) == false) + { +fprintf (stderr,N_ ("--tpm2-srk must be a persistent handle, e.g. 0x81000000.\n" ));return GRUB_ERR_BAD_ARGUMENT ; }
@@ -1099,9 +1312,9 @@ protect_tpm2_args_verify (protect_args_t *args)return GRUB_ERR_BAD_ARGUMENT ; } -if (args->tpm2_srk ==0 ) +if (args->tpm2_srk ==0 && args->tpm2_nvindex ==0 ) { -fprintf (stderr,N_ ("--tpm2-srk is not specified when --action is 'remove'.\n" )); +fprintf (stderr,N_ ("missing --tpm2-srk or --tpm2-nvindex for --action 'remove'.\n" ));return GRUB_ERR_BAD_ARGUMENT ; }
@@ -1274,7 +1487,7 @@ protect_argp_parser (int key, char *arg, struct argp_state *state)return EINVAL ; } - args->tpm2_evict =1 ; + args->tpm2_evict = true; args->args |=PROTECT_ARG_TPM2_EVICT ;break ;
@@ -1285,10 +1498,28 @@ protect_argp_parser (int key, char *arg, struct argp_state *state)return EINVAL ; } - args->tpm2_tpm2key =1 ; + args->tpm2_tpm2key = true; args->args |=PROTECT_ARG_TPM2_TPM2KEY ;break ; +case PROTECT_OPT_TPM2_NVINDEX : +if (args->args &PROTECT_ARG_TPM2_NVINDEX ) + { +fprintf (stderr,N_ ("--tpm2-nvindex can only be specified once.\n" )); +return EINVAL ; + } + + err =grub_tpm2_protector_parse_tpm_handle (arg, &args->tpm2_nvindex); +if (err !=GRUB_ERR_NONE ) + { +if (grub_errno !=GRUB_ERR_NONE ) +grub_print_error (); +return EINVAL ; + } + + args->args |=PROTECT_ARG_TPM2_NVINDEX ; +break ; +default :return ARGP_ERR_UNKNOWN ; }
Signature · 7 lines
2.43.0 _______________________________________________ Grub-devel mailing list [email protected] https://lists.gnu.org/mailman/listinfo/grub-devel
PATCH v5 8/13 tests/tpm2_key_protector_test: Simplify the NV index mode test
In reply to Gary Lin via Grub-develSince 'grub-protect' already supports NV index mode, tpm2_seal_nv() is replaced with one 'grub-protect' command to simplify the test script.
'tpm2_evictcontrol' is also replaced with 'grub-protect --tpm2-evict'.
--- tests/tpm2_key_protector_test.in | 108 +++++-------------------------- 1 file changed, 15 insertions(+), 93 deletions(-)
tests/tpm2_key_protector_test.in +15 -93
@@ -225,105 +225,22 @@ EOF fi } -tpm2_seal_nv () { - keyfile="$1" - nv_index="$2" - pcr_list="$3" - - primary_file=${tpm2testdir}/primary.ctx - session_file=${tpm2testdir}/session.dat - policy_file=${tpm2testdir}/policy.dat - keypub_file=${tpm2testdir}/key.pub - keypriv_file=${tpm2testdir}/key.priv - name_file=${tpm2testdir}/sealing.name - sealing_ctx_file=${tpm2testdir}/sealing.ctx - - # Since we don't run a resource manager on our swtpm instance, it has - # to flush the transient handles after tpm2_createprimary, tpm2_create - # and tpm2_load to avoid the potential out-of-memory (0x902) errors. - # Ref: https://github.com/tpm2-software/tpm2-tools/issues/1338#issuecomment-469689398 - - # Create the primary object - tpm2_createprimary -Q -C o -g sha256 -G ecc -c "${primary_file}" || ret=$? - if [ "${ret}" -ne 0 ]; then - echo "Failed to create the primary object: ${ret}" >&2 - return 1 - fi - tpm2_flushcontext -t || ret=$? - if [ "${ret}" -ne 0 ]; then - echo "Failed to flush the transient handles: ${ret}" >&2 - return 1 - fi - - # Create the policy object - tpm2_startauthsession -S "${session_file}" || ret=$? - if [ "${ret}" -ne 0 ]; then - echo "Failed to start auth session: ${ret}" >&2 - return 1 - fi - tpm2_policypcr -Q -S "${session_file}" -l "${pcr_list}" -L "${policy_file}" || ret=$? - if [ "${ret}" -ne 0 ]; then - echo "Failed to create the policy object: ${ret}" >&2 - return 1 - fi - tpm2_flushcontext "${session_file}" || ret=$? - if [ "${ret}" -ne 0 ]; then - echo "Failed to flush the transient handles: ${ret}" >&2 - return 1 - fi - - # Seal the key into TPM - tpm2_create -Q \ - -C "${primary_file}" \ - -u "${keypub_file}" \ - -r "${keypriv_file}" \ - -L "${policy_file}" \ - -i "${keyfile}" || ret=$? - if [ "${ret}" -ne 0 ]; then - echo "Failed to seal \"${keyfile}\": ${ret}" >&2 - return 1 - fi - tpm2_flushcontext -t || ret=$? - if [ "${ret}" -ne 0 ]; then - echo "Failed to flush the transient handles: ${ret}" >&2 - return 1 - fi - - tpm2_load -Q \ - -C "${primary_file}" \ - -u "${keypub_file}" \ - -r "${keypriv_file}" \ - -n "${name_file}" \ - -c "${sealing_ctx_file}" || ret=$? - if [ "${ret}" -ne 0 ]; then - echo "Failed to load the sealed key into TPM: ${ret}" >&2 - return 1 - fi - tpm2_flushcontext -t || ret=$? - if [ "${ret}" -ne 0 ]; then - echo "Failed to flush the transient handles: ${ret}" >&2 - return 1 - fi - - tpm2_evictcontrol -Q -C o -c "${sealing_ctx_file}" ${nv_index} || ret=$? - if [ "${ret}" -ne 0 ]; then - echo "Failed to store the sealed key into ${nv_index}: ${ret}" >&2 - return 1 - fi - - return 0 -} - tpm2_seal_unseal_nv() { nv_index="0x81000000" - pcr_list="sha256:0,1" grub_cfg=${tpm2testdir}/testcase.cfg # Seal the key into a NV index guarded by PCR 0 and 1 - tpm2_seal_nv "${lukskeyfile}" ${nv_index} ${pcr_list} || ret=$? + grub-protect ${extra_opt} \ + --tpm2-device="${tpm2dev}" \ + --action=add \ + --protector=tpm2 \ + --tpm2-bank=sha256 \ + --tpm2-pcrs=0,1 \ + --tpm2-keyfile="${lukskeyfile}" \ + --tpm2-nvindex="${nv_index}" || ret=$? if [ "${ret}" -ne 0 ]; then - echo "Failed to seal the secret key into ${nv_index}" >&2 + echo "Failed to seal the secret key into ${nv_index}: ${ret}" >&2 return 99 fi
@@ -340,7 +257,12 @@ EOF ${grubshell} --timeout=${timeout} --emu-opts="-t ${tpm2dev}" < "${grub_cfg}" > "${testoutput}" || ret=$? # Remove the object from the NV index - tpm2_evictcontrol -Q -C o -c "${nv_index}" || : + grub-protect \ + --tpm2-device="${tpm2dev}" \ + --protector=tpm2 \ + --action=remove \ + --tpm2-nvindex=${nv_index} \ + --tpm2-evict || : if [ "${ret}" -eq 0 ]; then if ! grep -q "^${vtext}$" "${testoutput}"; then
Signature · 7 lines
2.43.0 _______________________________________________ Grub-devel mailing list [email protected] https://lists.gnu.org/mailman/listinfo/grub-devel
PATCH v5 9/13 tests/tpm2_key_protector_test: Reset 'ret' on fail
In reply to Gary Lin via Grub-develReset 'ret' to 0 when a test case fails so that the other test cases could continue.
Also set the exit status to 1 when encountering a failure to reflect the test result.
--- tests/tpm2_key_protector_test.in | 8 +++++++- 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
tests/tpm2_key_protector_test.in +7 -1
@@ -285,12 +285,16 @@ srktests+=("ECC persistent no_fallback_srk") srktests+=("RSA transient fallback_srk") srktests+=("ECC transient fallback_srk") +exit_status=0 + for i in "${!srktests[@]}"; do tpm2_seal_unseal ${srktests[$i]} || ret=$? if [ "${ret}" -eq 0 ]; then echo "TPM2 [${srktests[$i]}]: PASS" elif [ "${ret}" -eq 1 ]; then echo "TPM2 [${srktests[$i]}]: FAIL" + ret=0 + exit_status=1 else echo "Unexpected failure [${srktests[$i]}]" >&2 exit ${ret}
@@ -303,9 +307,11 @@ if [ "${ret}" -eq 0 ]; then echo "TPM2 [NV Index]: PASS" elif [ "${ret}" -eq 1 ]; then echo "TPM2 [NV Index]: FAIL" + ret=0 + exit_status=1 else echo "Unexpected failure [NV index]" >&2 exit ${ret} fi -exit 0 +exit ${exit_status}
Signature · 7 lines
2.43.0 _______________________________________________ Grub-devel mailing list [email protected] https://lists.gnu.org/mailman/listinfo/grub-devel
Re: [PATCH v5 09/13] tests/tpm2_key_protector_test: Reset 'ret' on fail
Quoted 7 lines · Gary Lin
Reset 'ret' to 0 when a test case fails so that the other test cases could continue.
Also set the exit status to 1 when encountering a failure to reflect the test result.
Signed-off-by Gary Lin <[email protected]>
Quoted 28 lines
--- tests/tpm2_key_protector_test.in | 8 +++++++- 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)tests/tpm2_key_protector_test.in +4
-0@@ -285,12 +285,16 @@ srktests+=("ECC persistent no_fallback_srk") srktests+=("RSA transient fallback_srk") srktests+=("ECC transient fallback_srk") +exit_status=0 + for i in "${!srktests[@]}"; do tpm2_seal_unseal ${srktests[$i]} || ret=$? if [ "${ret}" -eq 0 ]; then echo "TPM2 [${srktests[$i]}]: PASS" elif [ "${ret}" -eq 1 ]; then echo "TPM2 [${srktests[$i]}]: FAIL" + ret=0 + exit_status=1 else echo "Unexpected failure [${srktests[$i]}]" >&2 exit ${ret}@@ -303,9 +307,11 @@ if [ "${ret}" -eq 0 ]; then echo "TPM2 [NV Index]: PASS" elif [ "${ret}" -eq 1 ]; then
tests/tpm2_key_protector_test.in if [ "${ret}" -eq 0 ]; then · line 317
Quoted 10 lines
tests/tpm2_key_protector_test.in +3
-1echo "TPM2 [NV Index]: FAIL" + ret=0 + exit_status=1 else echo "Unexpected failure [NV index]" >&2 exit ${ret} fi -exit 0 +exit ${exit_status}
_______________________________________________
Grub-devel mailing list
[email protected]
https://lists.gnu.org/mailman/listinfo/grub-devel
Daniel Kiper via Grub-devel
Reviewed-by Daniel KiperRe: [PATCH v5 09/13] tests/tpm2_key_protector_test: Reset 'ret' on fail
Quoted 10 lines · Stefan Berger
Quoted 7 lines · Gary Lin
Reset 'ret' to 0 when a test case fails so that the other test cases could continue.
Also set the exit status to 1 when encountering a failure to reflect the test result.
Signed-off-by Gary Lin <[email protected]>Reviewed-by Stefan Berger <[email protected]>
Daniel
_______________________________________________
Grub-devel mailing list
[email protected]
https://lists.gnu.org/mailman/listinfo/grub-devel
PATCH v5 10/13 tests/tpm2_key_protector_test: Add more NV index mode tests
In reply to Gary Lin via Grub-develTwo more NV index test cases are added to test key sealing and unsealing with the NV index handle 0x1000000.
--- tests/tpm2_key_protector_test.in | 57 ++++++++++++++++++++++---------- 1 file changed, 40 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-)
tests/tpm2_key_protector_test.in +40 -17
@@ -226,7 +226,23 @@ EOF } tpm2_seal_unseal_nv() { - nv_index="0x81000000" + handle_type="$1" + key_type="$2" + + extra_opt="" + extra_grub_opt="" + + if [ "$handle_type" = "nvindex" ]; then + nv_index="0x1000000" + else + nv_index="0x81000000" + fi + + if [ "$key_type" = "tpm2key" ]; then + extra_opt="--tpm2key" + else + extra_grub_opt="--pcrs=0,1" + fi grub_cfg=${tpm2testdir}/testcase.cfg
@@ -247,7 +263,7 @@ tpm2_seal_unseal_nv() { # Write the TPM unsealing script cat > ${grub_cfg} <<EOF loopback luks (host)${luksfile} -tpm2_key_protector_init --mode=nv --nvindex=${nv_index} --pcrs=0,1 +tpm2_key_protector_init --mode=nv --nvindex=${nv_index} ${extra_grub_opt} if cryptomount -a --protector tpm2; then cat (crypto0)+1 fi
@@ -290,28 +306,35 @@ exit_status=0 for i in "${!srktests[@]}"; do tpm2_seal_unseal ${srktests[$i]} || ret=$? if [ "${ret}" -eq 0 ]; then - echo "TPM2 [${srktests[$i]}]: PASS" + echo "TPM2 [SRK][${srktests[$i]}]: PASS" elif [ "${ret}" -eq 1 ]; then - echo "TPM2 [${srktests[$i]}]: FAIL" + echo "TPM2 [SRK][${srktests[$i]}]: FAIL" ret=0 exit_status=1 else - echo "Unexpected failure [${srktests[$i]}]" >&2 + echo "Unexpected failure [SRK][${srktests[$i]}]" >&2 exit ${ret} fi done -# Testcase for NV index mode -tpm2_seal_unseal_nv || ret=$? -if [ "${ret}" -eq 0 ]; then - echo "TPM2 [NV Index]: PASS" -elif [ "${ret}" -eq 1 ]; then - echo "TPM2 [NV Index]: FAIL" - ret=0 - exit_status=1 -else - echo "Unexpected failure [NV index]" >&2 - exit ${ret} -fi +# Testcases for NV index mode +declare -a nvtests=() +nvtests+=("persistent raw") +nvtests+=("nvindex raw") +nvtests+=("nvindex tpm2key") + +for i in "${!nvtests[@]}"; do + tpm2_seal_unseal_nv ${nvtests[$i]} || ret=$? + if [ "${ret}" -eq 0 ]; then + echo "TPM2 [NV Index][${nvtests[$i]}]: PASS" + elif [ "${ret}" -eq 1 ]; then + echo "TPM2 [NV Index][${nvtests[$i]}]: FAIL" + ret=0 + exit_status=1 + else + echo "Unexpected failure [NV index][${nvtests[$i]}]" >&2 + exit ${ret} + fi +done exit ${exit_status}
Signature · 7 lines
2.43.0 _______________________________________________ Grub-devel mailing list [email protected] https://lists.gnu.org/mailman/listinfo/grub-devel
Re: [PATCH v5 10/13] tests/tpm2_key_protector_test: Add more NV index mode tests
Quoted 5 lines · Gary Lin
Two more NV index test cases are added to test key sealing and unsealing with the NV index handle
0x1000000.Signed-off-by Gary Lin <[email protected]>Reviewed-by Stefan Berger <[email protected]>
Daniel
_______________________________________________
Grub-devel mailing list
[email protected]
https://lists.gnu.org/mailman/listinfo/grub-devel
PATCH v5 11/13 docs: Update NV index mode of TPM2 key protector
In reply to Gary Lin via Grub-develThis commit updates the NV index mode section and the grub-protect section to reflect the recent changes in TPM2 key protector and grub-protect.
--- docs/grub.texi | 188 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------ 1 file changed, 166 insertions(+), 22 deletions(-)
docs/grub.texi +166 -22
@@ -9142,46 +9142,120 @@ When/After the shim or GRUB are updated, it only requires to run the last @subsection NV index mode Instead of storing the sealed key in a file, NV index mode uses the TPM -non-volatile memory to store the sealed key. +non-volatile memory to store the sealed key and could be useful when accessing +the file is not possible. -The following sample commands use tpm2-tools (@url{https://github.com/tpm2-software/tpm2-tools}) -commands to seal @file{luks.key} into the specific NV index: @kbd{0x81000000}. +However, the Linux root user must be careful who she/he gives access to the +TPM (tss group) since those users will also be able to modify the NV index +that's holding the key. -First, we need to create the object file for the primary key, i.e. storage -root key (SRK) with the default key settings in GRUB: SHA256 hash algorithm -and ECC key algorithm. +There are two types of TPM handles supported by NV index mode: persistent +handle and NV index handle. + +@subsubsection Persistent handle + +The range of persistent handles is from @kbd{0x81000000} to @kbd{0x81FFFFFF}. +The persistent handle is designed to make TPM objects persistent through +power cycles, and only TPM objects, such as RSA or EC keys, are accepted. +Thus, only the raw format is supported by persistent handles. The following +shows the @command{grub-protect} command to seal the disk key @file{luks.key} +into the persistent handle @kbd{0x81000000} with the PCRs @kbd{0,2,4,7}. @example -# @kbd{tpm2_createprimary -C o -g sha256 -G ecc -c primary.ctx} +@group +# @kbd{grub-protect \ + --protector=tpm2 \ + --action=add \ + --tpm2-bank=sha256 \ + --tpm2-pcrs=0,2,4,7 \ + --tpm2-keyfile=luks.key \ + --tpm2-nvindex=0x81000000} +@end group @end example -The next commands collect the current values of PCR 0, 2, 4, and 7 and saves -them in @file{pcr.dat}. +To unseal the key, we have to specify the mode @kbd{nv}, the persistent handle +@kbd{0x81000000}, and the PCRs @kbd{0,2,4,7} for the @command{tpm2_key_protector_init} +command. @example -# @kbd{tpm2_startauthsession -S session.dat} -# @kbd{tpm2_policypcr -S session.dat -l sha256:0,2,4,7 -f pcrs.dat -L policy.dat} -# @kbd{tpm2_flushcontext session.dat} +grub> @kbd{tpm2_key_protector_init --mode=nv --nvindex=0x81000000 --pcrs=0,2,4,7} +grub> @kbd{cryptomount -u <UUID> --protector tpm2} @end example -The last commands seal @file{luks.key} with the primary key and stores the -result in @kbd{0x81000000}. +If the key in the persistent handle becomes unwanted, the following +@command{grub-protect} command removes the specified persistent handle +@kbd{0x81000000}. @example -# @kbd{cat luks.key | tpm2_create -C primary.ctx -u key.pub -r key.priv -L policy.dat -i-} -# @kbd{tpm2_load -C primary.ctx -u key.pub -r key.priv -n sealing.name -c sealing.ctx} -# @kbd{tpm2_evictcontrol -C o -c sealing.ctx 0x81000000} +@group +# @kbd{grub-protect \ + --protector=tpm2 \ + --action=remove \ + --tpm2-evict \ + --tpm2-nvindex=0x81000000} +@end group @end example -To unseal the key, we have to specify the mode @kbd{nv}, the NV index -@kbd{0x81000000}, and the PCRs @kbd{0,2,4,7} for the @command{tpm2_key_protector_init} -command. +@subsubsection NV index handle + +The range of NV index handles is from @kbd{0x1000000} to @kbd{0x1FFFFFF}. +Unlike the persistent handle, the NV index handle allows user-defined data, +so it can easily support both the TPM 2.0 Key File format as well as the raw +format. + +The following @kbd{grub-protect} command seals the disk key @file{luks.key} +into the NV index handle @kbd{0x1000000} with the PCRs @kbd{0,2,4,7} while +using the TPM 2.0 Key File format. @example -grub> @kbd{tpm2_key_protector_init --mode=nv --nvindex=0x81000000 --pcrs=0,2,4,7} +@group +# @kbd{grub-protect \ + --protector=tpm2 \ + --action=add \ + --tpm2key \ + --tpm2-bank=sha256 \ + --tpm2-pcrs=0,2,4,7 \ + --tpm2-keyfile=luks.key \ + --tpm2-nvindex=0x1000000} +@end group +@end example + +Furthermore, it is also possible to insert an existing key file, +@file{sealed.tpm}, into a specific NV index handle using the following +tpm2-tools (@url{https://github.com/tpm2-software/tpm2-tools}) commands. + +@example +@group +# @kbd{tpm2_nvdefine -C o \ + -a "ownerread|ownerwrite" \ + -s $(stat -c %s sealed.tpm) \ + 0x1000000} +@end group +# @kbd{tpm2_nvwrite -C o -i sealed.tpm 0x1000000} +@end example + +When unsealing the key in TPM 2.0 Key File format, only the mode @kbd{nv} +and the NV index handle @kbd{0x1000000} have to be specified for the +@command{tpm2_key_protector_init} command. + +@example +grub> @kbd{tpm2_key_protector_init --mode=nv --nvindex=0x1000000} grub> @kbd{cryptomount -u <UUID> --protector tpm2} @end example +The following @command{grub-protect} command allows to remove the specified +NV index handle @kbd{0x1000000}. + +@example +@group +# @kbd{grub-protect \ + --protector=tpm2 \ + --action=remove \ + --tpm2-evict \ + --tpm2-nvindex=0x1000000} +@end group +@end example + @subsection Setting up software TPM for EMU platform In order to test TPM2 key protector and TPM2 Software Stack (TSS2), it is
@@ -10136,11 +10210,16 @@ unsealing. (default: @samp{7}) @item --tpm2-srk=@var{handle} Set the SRK handle, e.g. @samp{0x81000000}, if the SRK is to be made persistent. +@item --tpm2-nvindex=@var{handle} +Set the handle, e.g. @samp{0x81000000} or @samp{0x1000000}, for NV index mode. + @item --tpm2key Use TPM 2.0 Key File format. @end table +@subsection 'Add' action + Before sealing the key, please check the TPM PCR usage (@pxref{TPM2 key protector, TPM PCR usage}) to choose a proper set of PCRs.
@@ -10166,12 +10245,77 @@ grub> @kbd{tpm2_key_protector_init -T (hd0,gpt1)/efi/grub/sealed.tpm} grub> @kbd{cryptomount -u <UUID> -P tpm2} @end example +Besides writing the PCR-sealed key into a file, @command{grub-protect} can +write the sealed key into TPM non-volatile memory. Here is the +@command{grub-protect} command to write the sealed key into the NV index +handle @samp{0x1000000}. + +@example +@group +# @kbd{grub-protect --action=add \ + --protector=tpm2 \ + --tpm2-pcrs=0,2,4,7 \ + --tpm2key \ + --tpm2-keyfile=luks.key \ + --tpm2-nvindex=0x1000000} +@end group +@end example + +Later, GRUB can fetch the key from @samp{0x1000000}. + +@example +grub> @kbd{tpm2_key_protector_init --mode=nv --nvindex=0x1000000} +grub> @kbd{cryptomount -u <UUID> -P tpm2} +@end example + In most of cases, the user only needs to create the key with the `add' action. If auto-unlocking is unwanted, just remove the file and the @command{tpm2_key_protector_init} command and invoke the @command{cryptomount} command without @kbd{-P tpm2}. -The only use case for the `remove' action is when the SRK is made persistent. +@subsection 'Remove' action + +The `remove' action is used to remove the handles for NV index mode and the +persistent SRK. + +@subsubsection Handles for NV index mode + +There are two types of TPM handles supported by NV index mode: persistent +handles and NV index handles, and @command{tpm2_getcap} can be used to +check the existing handles. + +To display the list of existing persistent handles: + +@example +@group +# @kbd{tpm2_getcap handles-persistent} +- 0x81000000 +@end group +@end example + +Similarly, to display the list of existing NV index handles: + +@example +@group +# @kbd{tpm2_getcap handles-nv-index} +- 0x1000000 +@end group +@end example + +If the sealed key at an NV index handle is not needed anymore, the user can +remove the handle with @kbd{--tpm2-nvindex} and @kbd{--tpm2-evict}. For +example, this command removes the data from NV index @samp{0x1000000}: + +@example +@group +# @kbd{grub-protect --action=remove \ + --protector=tpm2 \ + --tpm2-evict \ + --tpm2-nvindex 0x1000000} \ +@end group +@end example + +@subsubsection Persistent SRK There are two supported SRKs in @command{grub-protect}: @samp{RSA} and @samp{ECC}. Due to slower key generation, some users of the @samp{RSA} SRK may prefer
Signature · 7 lines
2.43.0 _______________________________________________ Grub-devel mailing list [email protected] https://lists.gnu.org/mailman/listinfo/grub-devel
Re: [PATCH v5 11/13] docs: Update NV index mode of TPM2 key protector
Quoted 5 lines · Gary Lin
This commit updates the NV index mode section and the grub-protect section to reflect the recent changes in TPM2 key protector and grub-protect.
Signed-off-by Gary Lin <[email protected]>
Daniel
_______________________________________________
Grub-devel mailing list
[email protected]
https://lists.gnu.org/mailman/listinfo/grub-devel
PATCH v5 12/13 INSTALL: Document the packages needed for TPM2 key protector tests
In reply to Gary Lin via Grub-develThe TPM2 key protector tests require two external packages: swtpm-tools and tpm2-tools. Add those two packages to the INSTALL file to inform the user to install those packages before starting the TPM2 key protector tests.
--- INSTALL | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
INSTALL +1 -0
@@ -74,6 +74,7 @@ Prerequisites for make-check: * wamerican, for grub-fs-tester * mtools, FAT tools for EFI platforms * xfonts-unifont, for the functional tests +* swtpm-tools and tpm2-tools, for TPM2 key protector tests * If running a Linux kernel the following modules must be loaded: - fuse, loop
Signature · 7 lines
2.43.0 _______________________________________________ Grub-devel mailing list [email protected] https://lists.gnu.org/mailman/listinfo/grub-devel
Re: [PATCH v5 12/13] INSTALL: Document the packages needed for TPM2 key protector tests
Quoted 7 lines · Gary Lin via Grub-devel
The TPM2 key protector tests require two external packages: swtpm-tools and tpm2-tools. Add those two packages to the INSTALL file to inform the user to install those packages before starting the TPM2 key protector tests.
Signed-off-by Gary Lin <[email protected]>Reviewed-by Daniel Kiper <[email protected]>
Quoted 9 lines
--- INSTALL | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)INSTALL +0
-0
INSTALL Prerequisites for make-check: · line 80
Quoted 7 lines
INSTALL +1
-0@@ -74,6 +74,7 @@ Prerequisites for make-check: * wamerican, for grub-fs-tester * mtools, FAT tools for EFI platforms * xfonts-unifont, for the functional tests +* swtpm-tools and tpm2-tools, for TPM2 key protector tests * If running a Linux kernel the following modules must be loaded: - fuse, loop
_______________________________________________
Grub-devel mailing list
[email protected]
https://lists.gnu.org/mailman/listinfo/grub-devel
PATCH v5 13/13 docs: Document the long options of tpm2_key_protect_init
In reply to Gary Lin via Grub-develAdd the long options of tpm2_key_protect_init along with the short options.
--- docs/grub.texi | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
docs/grub.texi +1 -1
@@ -8055,7 +8055,7 @@ either @var{expression1} or @var{expression2} is true @node tpm2_key_protector_init @subsection tpm2_key_protector_init -@deffn Command tpm2_key_protector_init [@option{-m} mode] | [@option{-p} pcrlist] | [@option{-b} pcrbank] | [ [@option{-T} tpm2key_file] | [@option{-k} keyfile] ] | [@option{-s} handle] | [@option{-a} srk_type] | [@option{-n} nv_index] +@deffn Command tpm2_key_protector_init [@option{--mode} | @option{-m} mode] | [@option{--pcrs} | @option{-p} pcrlist] | [@option{--bank} | @option{-b} pcrbank] | [ [@option{--tpm2key} | @option{-T} tpm2key_file] | [@option{--keyfile} | @option{-k} keyfile] ] | [@option{--srk} | @option{-s} handle] | [@option{--asymmetric} | @option{-a} srk_type] | [@option{--nvindex} | @option{-n} nv_index] Initialize the TPM2 key protector to unseal the key for the @command{cryptomount} (@pxref{cryptomount}) command. There are two supported modes, SRK(@kbd{srk}) and NV index(@kbd{nv}), to be specified by the option
Signature · 7 lines
2.43.0 _______________________________________________ Grub-devel mailing list [email protected] https://lists.gnu.org/mailman/listinfo/grub-devel
Re: [PATCH v5 13/13] docs: Document the long options of tpm2_key_protect_init
Quoted 4 lines · Gary Lin
Add the long options of
tpm2_key_protect_initalong with the short options.Signed-off-by Gary Lin <[email protected]>
Daniel
_______________________________________________
Grub-devel mailing list
[email protected]
https://lists.gnu.org/mailman/listinfo/grub-devel