compute_creds fixup in -mm
Subsystems (5)
A message that is not in the archive (sent off-list or not yet received): [email protected]
A message that is not in the archive (sent off-list or not yet received): [email protected]
Apparently my mailer converts single leading spaces into pairs of leading spaces. Time to find a new mailer. Here's my patch again as an attachment.
--Andy
include/linux/security.h renamed from include/linux/security.h.ptlock +13 -6
@@ -44,7 +44,7 @@extern int cap_capset_check (struct task_struct *target,kernel_cap_t *effective,kernel_cap_t *inheritable,kernel_cap_t *permitted);extern void cap_capset_set (struct task_struct *target,kernel_cap_t *effective,kernel_cap_t *inheritable,kernel_cap_t *permitted);extern int cap_bprm_set_security (struct linux_binprm *bprm); -extern void cap_bprm_apply_creds (struct linux_binprm *bprm); +extern void cap_bprm_apply_creds (struct linux_binprm *bprm,int unsafe);extern int cap_bprm_secureexec (struct linux_binprm *bprm);extern int cap_inode_setxattr (struct dentry *dentry,char *name,void *value,size_t size,int flags);extern int cap_inode_removexattr (struct dentry *dentry,char *name);
@@ -86,6 +86,11 @@struct sched_param ;struct swap_info_struct ; +/* brpm_apply_creds unsafe reasons */ +#define LSM_UNSAFE_SHARE 1 +#define LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE 2 +#define LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE_CAP 4 +#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY /**
@@ -112,6 +117,8 @@* also perform other state changes on the process (e.g. closing open * file descriptors to which access is no longer granted if the attributes * were changed). +* bprm_apply_creds is called under task_lock. @unsafe indicates various +* reasons why it may be unsafe to change security state. * @bprm contains the linux_binprm structure. * @bprm_set_security: * Save security information in the bprm->security field, typically based
@@ -1026,7 +1033,7 @@int (*bprm_alloc_security) (struct linux_binprm * bprm);void (*bprm_free_security) (struct linux_binprm * bprm); -void (*bprm_apply_creds) (struct linux_binprm * bprm); +void (*bprm_apply_creds) (struct linux_binprm * bprm,int unsafe);int (*bprm_set_security) (struct linux_binprm * bprm);int (*bprm_check_security) (struct linux_binprm * bprm);int (*bprm_secureexec) (struct linux_binprm * bprm);
@@ -1290,9 +1297,9 @@ { security_ops->bprm_free_security (bprm); } -static inline void security_bprm_apply_creds (struct linux_binprm *bprm) +static inline void security_bprm_apply_creds (struct linux_binprm *bprm,int unsafe) { - security_ops->bprm_apply_creds (bprm); + security_ops->bprm_apply_creds (bprm, unsafe); }static inline int security_bprm_set (struct linux_binprm *bprm) {
@@ -1962,9 +1969,9 @@static inline void security_bprm_free (struct linux_binprm *bprm) { } -static inline void security_bprm_apply_creds (struct linux_binprm *bprm) +static inline void security_bprm_apply_creds (struct linux_binprm *bprm,int unsafe) { -cap_bprm_apply_creds (bprm); +cap_bprm_apply_creds (bprm, unsafe); }static inline int security_bprm_set (struct linux_binprm *bprm)
fs/exec.c renamed from fs/exec.c.ptlock +19 -15
@@ -919,24 +919,28 @@EXPORT_SYMBOL (prepare_binprm); -/* -* This function is used to produce the new IDs and capabilities -* from the old ones and the file's capabilities. -* -* The formula used for evolving capabilities is: -* -* pI' = pI -* (***) pP' = (fP & X) | (fI & pI) -* pE' = pP' & fE [NB. fE is 0 or ~0] -* -* I=Inheritable, P=Permitted, E=Effective // p=process, f=file -* ' indicates post-exec(), and X is the global 'cap_bset'. -* -*/ +static inline int must_not_trace_exec (struct task_struct *p) +{ +int unsafe =0 ; +if (p->ptrace &PT_PTRACED ) { +if (p->ptrace &PT_PTRACE_CAP ) + unsafe |=LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE_CAP ; +else + unsafe |=LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE ; + } +if (atomic_read (&p->fs->count) >1 || +atomic_read (&p->files->count) >1 || +atomic_read (&p->sighand->count) >1 ) + unsafe |=LSM_UNSAFE_SHARE ; + +return unsafe; +}void compute_creds (struct linux_binprm *bprm) { -security_bprm_apply_creds (bprm); +task_lock (current); +security_bprm_apply_creds (bprm,must_not_trace_exec (current)); +task_unlock (current); }EXPORT_SYMBOL (compute_creds);
security/selinux/hooks.c renamed from security/selinux/hooks.c.ptlock +4 -9
@@ -1746,7 +1746,7 @@spin_unlock (&files->file_lock); } -static void selinux_bprm_apply_creds (struct linux_binprm *bprm) +static void selinux_bprm_apply_creds (struct linux_binprm *bprm,int unsafe) {struct task_security_struct *tsec, *psec;struct bprm_security_struct *bsec;
@@ -1756,7 +1756,7 @@struct rlimit *rlim, *initrlim;int rc, i; - secondary_ops->bprm_apply_creds (bprm); + secondary_ops->bprm_apply_creds (bprm, unsafe); tsec = current->security;
@@ -1767,9 +1767,7 @@if (tsec->sid != sid) {/* Check for shared state. If not ok, leave SID unchanged and kill. */ -if ((atomic_read (¤t->fs->count) >1 || -atomic_read (¤t->files->count) >1 || -atomic_read (¤t->sighand->count) >1 )) { +if (unsafe &LSM_UNSAFE_SHARE ) { rc =avc_has_perm (tsec->sid, sid,SECCLASS_PROCESS ,PROCESS__SHARE ,NULL ,NULL );
@@ -1781,15 +1779,13 @@/* Check for ptracing, and update the task SID if ok. Otherwise, leave SID unchanged and kill. */ -task_lock (current); -if (current->ptrace &PT_PTRACED ) { +if (unsafe & (LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE |LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE_CAP )) { psec = current->parent->security; rc =avc_has_perm_noaudit (psec->sid, sid,SECCLASS_PROCESS ,PROCESS__PTRACE ,NULL , &avd);if (!rc) tsec->sid = sid; -task_unlock (current);avc_audit (psec->sid, sid,SECCLASS_PROCESS ,PROCESS__PTRACE , &avd, rc,NULL );if (rc) {
@@ -1798,7 +1794,6 @@ } }else { tsec->sid = sid; -task_unlock (current); }/* Close files for which the new task SID is not authorized. */
security/commoncap.c renamed from security/commoncap.c.ptlock +12 -26
@@ -115,15 +115,7 @@return 0 ; } -static inline int must_not_trace_exec (struct task_struct *p) -{ -return ((p->ptrace &PT_PTRACED ) && !(p->ptrace &PT_PTRACE_CAP )) - ||atomic_read (&p->fs->count) >1 - ||atomic_read (&p->files->count) >1 - ||atomic_read (&p->sighand->count) >1 ; -} - -void cap_bprm_apply_creds (struct linux_binprm *bprm) +void cap_bprm_apply_creds (struct linux_binprm *bprm,int unsafe) {/* Derived from fs/exec.c:compute_creds. */ kernel_cap_t new_permitted, working;
@@ -133,30 +125,25 @@ current->cap_inheritable); new_permitted =cap_combine (new_permitted, working); -task_lock (current); - -if (bprm->e_uid != current->uid || bprm->e_gid != current->gid) { +if (bprm->e_uid != current->uid || bprm->e_gid != current->gid || + !cap_issubset (new_permitted, current->cap_permitted)) { current->mm->dumpable =0 ; -if (must_not_trace_exec (current) && !capable (CAP_SETUID )) { - bprm->e_uid = current->uid; - bprm->e_gid = current->gid; +if (unsafe & ~LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE_CAP ) { +if (!capable (CAP_SETUID )) { + bprm->e_uid = current->uid; + bprm->e_gid = current->gid; + } +if (!capable (CAP_SETPCAP )) { + new_permitted =cap_intersect (new_permitted, + current->cap_permitted); + } } } current->suid = current->euid = current->fsuid = bprm->e_uid; current->sgid = current->egid = current->fsgid = bprm->e_gid; -if (!cap_issubset (new_permitted, current->cap_permitted)) { - current->mm->dumpable =0 ; - -if (must_not_trace_exec (current) && !capable (CAP_SETPCAP )) { - new_permitted =cap_intersect (new_permitted, - current-> - cap_permitted); - } - } -/* For init, we want to retain the capabilities set * in the init_task struct. Thus we skip the usual * capability rules */
@@ -167,7 +154,6 @@ }/* AUD: Audit candidate if current->cap_effective is set */ -task_unlock (current); current->keep_capabilities =0 ; }
security/dummy.c renamed from security/dummy.c.ptlock +2 -13
@@ -171,21 +171,12 @@return ; } -static inline int must_not_trace_exec (struct task_struct *p) +static void dummy_bprm_apply_creds (struct linux_binprm *bprm,int unsafe) { -return ((p->ptrace &PT_PTRACED ) && !(p->ptrace &PT_PTRACE_CAP )) - ||atomic_read (&p->fs->count) >1 - ||atomic_read (&p->files->count) >1 - ||atomic_read (&p->sighand->count) >1 ; -} - -static void dummy_bprm_apply_creds (struct linux_binprm *bprm) -{ -task_lock (current);if (bprm->e_uid != current->uid || bprm->e_gid != current->gid) { current->mm->dumpable =0 ; -if (must_not_trace_exec (current) && !capable (CAP_SETUID )) { +if (unsafe && !capable (CAP_SETUID )) { bprm->e_uid = current->uid; bprm->e_gid = current->gid; }
@@ -193,8 +184,6 @@ current->suid = current->euid = current->fsuid = bprm->e_uid; current->sgid = current->egid = current->fsgid = bprm->e_gid; - -task_unlock (current); }static int dummy_bprm_set_security (struct linux_binprm *bprm)