Taking strlen of buffers copied from userspace
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Quoted 10 lines · Artem Frolov
Hello,
I am in the process of testing static defect analyzer on a Linux kernel source code (see disclosure below).
I found some potential array bounds violations. The pattern is as
follows: bytes are copied from the user space and then buffer is accessed on index strlen(buf)-1. This is a defect if user data start from 0. So the question is: can we make any assumptions what data may be received from the user or it could be arbitrary?
In general I don't think any such assumptions should be made. In the case of the two below I'm assuming that root access is required to write those files, preventing any serious security hole, but it shouldn't really be permitted to corrupt kernel memory like this, as would likely happen if somebody wrote some data that contained a null as the first character.
Quoted 12 lines
For example, in
./drivers/block/cciss.c, functioncciss_proc_write(line numbers are taken form 2.6.11.3):.... 293 if (count > sizeof(cmd)-1) return -EINVAL; 294 if (copy_from_user(cmd, buffer, count)) return -EFAULT; 295 cmd[count] = '\0'; 296 len = strlen(cmd); // above 3 lines ensure safety 297 if (cmd[len-1] == '\n') 298 cmd[--len] = '\0'; .....
Quoted 9 lines
Another example is
arch/i386/kernel/cpu/mtrr/if.c, functionmtrr_write:.... 107 if (copy_from_user(line, buf, len - 1)) 108 return -EFAULT; 109 ptr = line + strlen(line) - 1; 110 if (*ptr == '\n') 111 *ptr = '\0'; ....
This one is also unsafe if somebody writes some data which is not null-terminated (assuming that that's possible), since strlen will run off the end of the buffer. The first example doesn't have that problem.
Signature · 3 lines
Robert Hancock Saskatoon, SK, Canada To email, remove "nospam" from [email protected] Home Page: http://www.roberthancock.com/
Quoted 38 lines · Robert Hancock
Quoted 10 lines · Artem Frolov
Hello,
I am in the process of testing static defect analyzer on a Linux kernel source code (see disclosure below).
I found some potential array bounds violations. The pattern is as
follows: bytes are copied from the user space and then buffer is accessed on index strlen(buf)-1. This is a defect if user data start from 0. So the question is: can we make any assumptions what data may be received from the user or it could be arbitrary?In general I don't think any such assumptions should be made. In the case of the two below I'm assuming that root access is required to write those files, preventing any serious security hole, but it shouldn't really be permitted to corrupt kernel memory like this, as would likely happen if somebody wrote some data that contained a null as the first character.
Quoted 12 lines
For example, in
./drivers/block/cciss.c, functioncciss_proc_write(line numbers are taken form 2.6.11.3):.... 293 if (count > sizeof(cmd)-1) return -EINVAL; 294 if (copy_from_user(cmd, buffer, count)) return -EFAULT; 295 cmd[count] = '\0'; 296 len = strlen(cmd); // above 3 lines ensure safety 297 if (cmd[len-1] == '\n') 298 cmd[--len] = '\0'; .....Quoted 9 lines
Another example is
arch/i386/kernel/cpu/mtrr/if.c, functionmtrr_write:.... 107 if (copy_from_user(line, buf, len - 1)) 108 return -EFAULT; 109 ptr = line + strlen(line) - 1; 110 if (*ptr == '\n') 111 *ptr = '\0'; ....
Quoted 1 line
This one is also unsafe if somebody writes some data which is not null-terminated (assuming that that's possible), since strlen will run off the end of the buffer. The first example doesn't have that problem.
The latter one does (before the listed code):
memset(line, 0, LINE_SIZE); if (len > LINE_SIZE) len = LINE_SIZE; if (copy_from_user(line, buf, len - 1)) return -EFAULT;
so isn't line[LINE_SIZE - 1] always 0 ?
Signature · 1 line
~Randy