bpf: permits pointers on stack for helper calls
Subsystems (4)
v2 cover bpf: permits pointers on stack for helper calls
This patch permits pointers on stack for helper calls if permission is granted. Patch #1 described the detailed usecase and Patch #2 added a test.
Changelog:
v1 -> v2:
- fix a verifier test failure due to verifier change.
Yonghong Song (2):
bpf: permits pointers on stack for helper calls selftests/bpf: add a test for ptr_to_map_value on stack for helper
access
kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 3 ++- tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/bpf_iter_task.c | 3 ++- tools/testing/selftests/bpf/verifier/unpriv.c | 5 +++-- 3 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
Signature · 1 line
2.24.1
PATCH v2 1/2 bpf: permits pointers on stack for helper calls
Currently, when checking stack memory accessed by helper calls, for spills, only PTR_TO_BTF_ID and SCALAR_VALUE are allowed.
Song discovered an issue where the below bpf program
int dump_task(struct bpf_iter__task *ctx)
{
struct seq_file *seq = ctx->meta->seq;
static char[] info = "abc";
BPF_SEQ_PRINTF(seq, "%s\n", info);
return 0; }
may cause a verifier failure.
The verifier output looks like:
; struct seq_file *seq = ctx->meta->seq;
1: (79) r1 = *(u64 *)(r1 +0)
; BPF_SEQ_PRINTF(seq, "%s\n", info);
2: (18) r2 = 0xffff9054400f6000
4: (7b) *(u64 *)(r10 -8) = r2
5: (bf) r4 = r10
;
6: (07) r4 += -8
; BPF_SEQ_PRINTF(seq, "%s\n", info);
7: (18) r2 = 0xffff9054400fe000
9: (b4) w3 = 4
10: (b4) w5 = 8
11: (85) call bpf_seq_printf#126
R1_w=ptr_seq_file(id=0,off=0,imm=0) R2_w=map_value(id=0,off=0,ks=4,vs=4,imm=0)
R3_w=inv4 R4_w=fp-8 R5_w=inv8 R10=fp0 fp-8_w=map_value
last_idx 11 first_idx 0
regs=8 stack=0 before 10: (b4) w5 = 8
regs=8 stack=0 before 9: (b4) w3 = 4
invalid indirect read from stack off -8+0 size 8
Basically, the verifier complains the map_value pointer at "fp-8" location. To fix the issue, if env->allow_ptr_leaks is true, let us also permit pointers on the stack to be accessible by the helper.
--- kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
kernel/bpf/verifier.c +2 -1
@@ -3769,7 +3769,8 @@ static int check_stack_boundary(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno, goto mark;if (state->stack[spi].slot_type[0 ] ==STACK_SPILL && - state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr.type ==SCALAR_VALUE ) { + (state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr.type ==SCALAR_VALUE || + env->allow_ptr_leaks)) {__mark_reg_unknown (env, &state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr);for (j =0 ; j <BPF_REG_SIZE ; j++) state->stack[spi].slot_type[j] =STACK_MISC ;
Signature · 1 line
2.24.1
Quoted 39 lines · Yonghong Song
Currently, when checking stack memory accessed by helper calls, for spills, only
PTR_TO_BTF_IDandSCALAR_VALUEare allowed.Song discovered an issue where the below bpf program
intdump_task(struct bpf_iter__task *ctx){ struct seq_file *seq = ctx->meta->seq; static char[] info = "abc"; BPF_SEQ_PRINTF(seq, "%s\n", info); return 0;}
may cause a verifier failure.The verifier output looks like:
; structseq_file*seq =ctx->meta->seq;
1: (79) r1 = *(u64 *)(r1 +0)
;BPF_SEQ_PRINTF(seq, "%s\n", info);
2: (18) r2 =0xffff9054400f6000
4: (7b) *(u64 *)(r10 -8) = r2
5: (bf) r4 = r10
;
6: (07) r4 += -8
;BPF_SEQ_PRINTF(seq, "%s\n", info);
7: (18) r2 =0xffff9054400fe000
9: (b4) w3 = 4
10: (b4) w5 = 8
11: (85) call bpf_seq_printf#126
R1_w=ptr_seq_file(id=0,off=0,imm=0) R2_w=map_value(id=0,off=0,ks=4,vs=4,imm=0)
R3_w=inv4 R4_w=fp-8 R5_w=inv8 R10=fp0 fp-8_w=map_value
last_idx11first_idx0
regs=8 stack=0 before 10: (b4) w5 = 8
regs=8 stack=0 before 9: (b4) w3 = 4
invalid indirect read from stack off -8+0 size 8
Quoted 7 lines
Basically, the verifier complains the
map_valuepointer at "fp-8" location. To fix the issue, ifenv->allow_ptr_leaksis true, let us also permit pointers on the stack to be accessible by the helper.Suggested-by Alexei Starovoitov <[email protected]>Reported-by Song Liu <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Yonghong Song <[email protected]>
Thanks for the fix!
Quoted 21 lines
---
kernel/bpf/verifier.c| 3 ++-1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)kernel/bpf/verifier.c +2
-1@@ -3769,7 +3769,8 @@ static int check_stack_boundary(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno, goto mark;if (state->stack[spi].slot_type[0 ] ==STACK_SPILL && - state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr.type ==SCALAR_VALUE ) { + (state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr.type ==SCALAR_VALUE || + env->allow_ptr_leaks)) {__mark_reg_unknown (env, &state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr);for (j =0 ; j <BPF_REG_SIZE ; j++) state->stack[spi].slot_type[j] =STACK_MISC ;Signature · 1 line
2.24.1
Daniel Borkmann
maintainerQuoted 51 lines · Yonghong Song
Currently, when checking stack memory accessed by helper calls, for spills, only
PTR_TO_BTF_IDandSCALAR_VALUEare allowed.Song discovered an issue where the below bpf program
intdump_task(struct bpf_iter__task *ctx){ struct seq_file *seq = ctx->meta->seq; static char[] info = "abc"; BPF_SEQ_PRINTF(seq, "%s\n", info); return 0;}
may cause a verifier failure.The verifier output looks like:
; struct seq_file *seq = ctx->meta->seq; 1: (79) r1 = *(u64 *)(r1 +0) ; BPF_SEQ_PRINTF(seq, "%s\n", info); 2: (18) r2 = 0xffff9054400f6000 4: (7b) *(u64 *)(r10 -8) = r2 5: (bf) r4 = r10 ; 6: (07) r4 += -8 ; BPF_SEQ_PRINTF(seq, "%s\n", info); 7: (18) r2 = 0xffff9054400fe000 9: (b4) w3 = 4 10: (b4) w5 = 8 11: (85) call bpf_seq_printf#126 R1_w=ptr_seq_file(id=0,off=0,imm=0) R2_w=map_value(id=0,off=0,ks=4,vs=4,imm=0) R3_w=inv4 R4_w=fp-8 R5_w=inv8 R10=fp0 fp-8_w=map_value last_idx 11 first_idx 0 regs=8 stack=0 before 10: (b4) w5 = 8 regs=8 stack=0 before 9: (b4) w3 = 4 invalid indirect read from stack off -8+0 size 8Basically, the verifier complains the
map_valuepointer at "fp-8" location. To fix the issue, ifenv->allow_ptr_leaksis true, let us also permit pointers on the stack to be accessible by the helper.Suggested-by Alexei Starovoitov <[email protected]>Reported-by Song Liu <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Yonghong Song <[email protected]>--- kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)kernel/bpf/verifier.c +0
-0
kernel/bpf/verifier.c static int check_stack_boundary(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno, · line 3773
Quoted 6 lines
kernel/bpf/verifier.c +2
-1@@ -3769,7 +3769,8 @@ static int check_stack_boundary(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno, goto mark;if (state->stack[spi].slot_type[0 ] ==STACK_SPILL && - state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr.type ==SCALAR_VALUE ) { + (state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr.type ==SCALAR_VALUE || + env->allow_ptr_leaks)) {
Afaik, in check_stack_write() we mark some of the spilled_ptr.type as NOT_INIT, shouldn't we at least avoid an implicit transition of NOT_INIT into SCALAR_VALUE?
Quoted 4 lines
kernel/bpf/verifier.c +0
-0__mark_reg_unknown (env, &state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr);for (j =0 ; j <BPF_REG_SIZE ; j++) state->stack[spi].slot_type[j] =STACK_MISC ;
Quoted 47 lines · Daniel Borkmann
Quoted 46 lines · Yonghong Song
Currently, when checking stack memory accessed by helper calls, for spills, only
PTR_TO_BTF_IDandSCALAR_VALUEare allowed.Song discovered an issue where the below bpf program int
dump_task(struct bpf_iter__task *ctx){
structseq_file*seq =ctx->meta->seq; static char[] info = "abc";BPF_SEQ_PRINTF(seq, "%s\n", info); return 0;
}
may cause a verifier failure.The verifier output looks like:
; structseq_file*seq =ctx->meta->seq;
1: (79) r1 = *(u64 *)(r1 +0)
;BPF_SEQ_PRINTF(seq, "%s\n", info);
2: (18) r2 =0xffff9054400f6000
4: (7b) *(u64 *)(r10 -8) = r2
5: (bf) r4 = r10
;
6: (07) r4 += -8
;BPF_SEQ_PRINTF(seq, "%s\n", info);
7: (18) r2 =0xffff9054400fe000
9: (b4) w3 = 4
10: (b4) w5 = 8
11: (85) call bpf_seq_printf#126 R1_w=ptr_seq_file(id=0,off=0,imm=0) R2_w=map_value(id=0,off=0,ks=4,vs=4,imm=0) R3_w=inv4 R4_w=fp-8 R5_w=inv8 R10=fp0 fp-8_w=map_value
last_idx11first_idx0
regs=8 stack=0 before 10: (b4) w5 = 8
regs=8 stack=0 before 9: (b4) w3 = 4
invalid indirect read from stack off -8+0 size 8Basically, the verifier complains the
map_valuepointer at "fp-8" location. To fix the issue, ifenv->allow_ptr_leaksis true, let us also permit pointers on the stack to be accessible by the helper.Suggested-by Alexei Starovoitov <[email protected]>Reported-by Song Liu <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Yonghong Song <[email protected]>---
kernel/bpf/verifier.c| 3 ++-1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
Quoted 14 lines
Quoted 11 lines
kernel/bpf/verifier.c +0
-0@@ -3769,7 +3769,8 @@ static int check_stack_boundary(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno, goto mark;if (state->stack[spi].slot_type[0] ==
STACK_SPILL&& - state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr.type ==SCALAR_VALUE) { + (state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr.type ==SCALAR_VALUE|| +env->allow_ptr_leaks)) {Afaik, in
check_stack_write()we mark some of the spilled_ptr.type asNOT_INIT, shouldn't we at least avoid an implicit transition ofNOT_INITintoSCALAR_VALUE?
Make sense! here we check env->allow_ptr_leaks and we should the spilled_ptr.type for allow_ptr_leaks should be a pointer (!= NOT_INIT). Will send v3 soon.
Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 5 lines
__mark_reg_unknown(env, &state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr); for (j = 0; j <BPF_REG_SIZE; j++) state->stack[spi].slot_type[j] =STACK_MISC;
PATCH v2 2/2 selftests/bpf: add a test for ptr_to_map_value on stack for helper access
In reply to Yonghong SongChange bpf_iter_task.c such that pointer to map_value may appear on the stack for bpf_seq_printf() to access. Without previous verifier patch, the bpf_iter test will fail.
--- tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/bpf_iter_task.c | 3 ++- tools/testing/selftests/bpf/verifier/unpriv.c | 5 +++-- 2 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/bpf_iter_task.c +2 -1
@@ -11,9 +11,10 @@ int dump_task(struct bpf_iter__task *ctx) {struct seq_file *seq = ctx->meta->seq;struct task_struct *task = ctx->task; +static char info[] =" === END ===" ;if (task == (void *)0 ) { -BPF_SEQ_PRINTF (seq," === END ===\n" ); +BPF_SEQ_PRINTF (seq,"%s\n" , info);return 0 ; }
tools/testing/selftests/bpf/verifier/unpriv.c +3 -2
@@ -108,8 +108,9 @@ BPF_EXIT_INSN(), }, .fixup_map_hash_8b = { 3 }, - .errstr = "invalid indirect read from stack off -8+0 size 8", - .result =REJECT , + .errstr_unpriv = "invalid indirect read from stack off -8+0 size 8", + .result_unpriv = REJECT, + .result =ACCEPT , }, { "unpriv: mangle pointer on stack 1",
Signature · 1 line
2.24.1
Re: [PATCH bpf-next v2 2/2] selftests/bpf: add a test for ptr_to_map_value on stack for helper access
Quoted 9 lines · Yonghong Song
Change
bpf_iter_task.csuch that pointer tomap_valuemay appear on the stack forbpf_seq_printf()to access. Without previous verifier patch, thebpf_itertest will fail.Signed-off-by Yonghong Song <[email protected]>
Quoted 40 lines
---
tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/bpf_iter_task.c| 3 ++-tools/testing/selftests/bpf/verifier/unpriv.c| 5 +++--2 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/bpf_iter_task.c +2
-1@@ -11,9 +11,10 @@ int dump_task(struct bpf_iter__task *ctx) {struct seq_file *seq = ctx->meta->seq;struct task_struct *task = ctx->task; +static char info[] =" === END ===" ;if (task == (void *)0 ) { -BPF_SEQ_PRINTF (seq," === END ===\n" ); +BPF_SEQ_PRINTF (seq,"%s\n" , info);return 0 ; }tools/testing/selftests/bpf/verifier/unpriv.c +3
-2@@ -108,8 +108,9 @@ BPF_EXIT_INSN(), }, .fixup_map_hash_8b = { 3 }, - .errstr = "invalid indirect read from stack off -8+0 size 8", - .result =REJECT , + .errstr_unpriv = "invalid indirect read from stack off -8+0 size 8", + .result_unpriv = REJECT, + .result =ACCEPT , }, { "unpriv: mangle pointer on stack 1",Signature · 1 line
2.24.1