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libnl: fix CVE-2017-0553

PATCH In review Andre McCurdy 2 participants 3 messages May 17, 2018 – Jun 26, 2018

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PATCH 1/1 libnl: fix CVE-2017-0553

An elevation of privilege vulnerability in libnl could enable a local malicious application to execute arbitrary code within the context of the Wi-Fi service. This issue is rated as Moderate because it first requires compromising a privileged process and is mitigated by current platform configurations. Product: Android. Versions: 5.0.2, 5.1.1, 6.0, 6.0.1, 7.0, 7.1.1. Android ID: A-32342065. NOTE: this issue also exists in the upstream libnl before 3.3.0 library.

https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2017-0553

Backport fix from upstream 3.3.0 release:

https://github.com/thom311/libnl/commit/3e18948f17148e6a3c4255bdeaaf01ef6081ceeb
http://lists.infradead.org/pipermail/libnl/2017-May/002313.html

---
 ...eck-for-integer-overflow-in-nlmsg_reserve.patch | 43 ++++++++++++++++++++++
 meta/recipes-support/libnl/libnl_3.2.28.bb         |  1 +
 2 files changed, 44 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-support/libnl/libnl/lib-check-for-integer-overflow-in-nlmsg_reserve.patch
meta/recipes-support/libnl/libnl/lib-check-for-integer-overflow-in-nlmsg_reserve.patch new file +43 -0
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..9e22c40
@@ -0,0 +1,43 @@
+From 1db543374db3e58faacdfd91e5061a8a595ce505 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Thomas Haller <[email protected]>
+Date: Mon, 6 Feb 2017 22:23:52 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] lib: check for integer-overflow in nlmsg_reserve()
+
+In general, libnl functions are not robust against calling with
+invalid arguments. Thus, never call libnl functions with invalid
+arguments. In case of nlmsg_reserve() this means never provide
+a @len argument that causes overflow.
+
+Still, add an additional safeguard to avoid exploiting such bugs.
+
+Assume that @pad is a trusted, small integer.
+Assume that n->nm_size is a valid number of allocated bytes (and thus
+much smaller then SIZE_T_MAX).
+Assume, that @len may be set to an untrusted value. Then the patch
+avoids an integer overflow resulting in reserving too few bytes.
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/thom311/libnl/commit/3e18948f17148e6a3c4255bdeaaf01ef6081ceeb]
+CVE: CVE-2017-0553
+
+Signed-off-by: Andre McCurdy <[email protected]>
+---
+ lib/msg.c | 3 +++
+ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/lib/msg.c b/lib/msg.c
+index e8a7e99..f30fd2d 100644
+--- a/lib/msg.c
++++ b/lib/msg.c
+@@ -410,6 +410,9 @@ void *nlmsg_reserve(struct nl_msg *n, size_t len, int pad)
+ 	size_t nlmsg_len = n->nm_nlh->nlmsg_len;
+ 	size_t tlen;
+ 
++	if (len > n->nm_size)
++		return NULL;
++
+ 	tlen = pad ? ((len + (pad - 1)) & ~(pad - 1)) : len;
+ 
+ 	if ((tlen + nlmsg_len) > n->nm_size)
+-- 
+1.9.1
+
meta/recipes-support/libnl/libnl_3.2.28.bb +1 -0
index 26982f3..a74b455 100644
@@ -12,6 +12,7 @@ DEPENDS = "flex-native bison-native"
 SRC_URI = "https://github.com/thom311/${BPN}/releases/download/${BPN}${@d.getVar('PV', True).replace('.','_')}/${BP}.tar.gz \
            file://fix-pktloc_syntax_h-race.patch \
            file://fix-pc-file.patch \
+           file://lib-check-for-integer-overflow-in-nlmsg_reserve.patch \
            file://0001-lib-add-utility-function-nl_strerror_l.patch \
            file://0002-lib-switch-to-using-strerror_l-instead-of-strerror_r.patch \
            file://0003-src-switch-to-using-strerror_l-instead-of-strerror_r.patch \
Signature · 1 line
1.9.1
#1 lore raw
Quoted 8 lines · Andre McCurdy

An elevation of privilege vulnerability in libnl could enable a local malicious application to execute arbitrary code within the context of the Wi-Fi service. This issue is rated as Moderate because it first requires compromising a privileged process and is mitigated by current platform configurations. Product: Android. Versions: 5.0.2, 5.1.1, 6.0, 6.0.1, 7.0, 7.1.1. Android ID: A-32342065. NOTE: this issue also exists in the upstream libnl before 3.3.0 library.

Quoted 6 lines

https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2017-0553

Backport fix from upstream 3.3.0 release:

https://github.com/thom311/libnl/commit/3e18948f17148e6a3c4255bdeaaf01ef6081ceeb
http://lists.infradead.org/pipermail/libnl/2017-May/002313.html

Ping.

Quoted 71 lines
---
 ...eck-for-integer-overflow-in-nlmsg_reserve.patch | 43 ++++++++++++++++++++++
 meta/recipes-support/libnl/libnl_3.2.28.bb         |  1 +
 2 files changed, 44 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-support/libnl/libnl/lib-check-for-integer-overflow-in-nlmsg_reserve.patch
meta/recipes-support/libnl/libnl/lib-check-for-integer-overflow-in-nlmsg_reserve.patch new file +43 -0
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..9e22c40
@@ -0,0 +1,43 @@
+From 1db543374db3e58faacdfd91e5061a8a595ce505 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Thomas Haller <[email protected]>
+Date: Mon, 6 Feb 2017 22:23:52 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] lib: check for integer-overflow in nlmsg_reserve()
+
+In general, libnl functions are not robust against calling with
+invalid arguments. Thus, never call libnl functions with invalid
+arguments. In case of nlmsg_reserve() this means never provide
+a @len argument that causes overflow.
+
+Still, add an additional safeguard to avoid exploiting such bugs.
+
+Assume that @pad is a trusted, small integer.
+Assume that n->nm_size is a valid number of allocated bytes (and thus
+much smaller then SIZE_T_MAX).
+Assume, that @len may be set to an untrusted value. Then the patch
+avoids an integer overflow resulting in reserving too few bytes.
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/thom311/libnl/commit/3e18948f17148e6a3c4255bdeaaf01ef6081ceeb]
+CVE: CVE-2017-0553
+
+Signed-off-by: Andre McCurdy <[email protected]>
+---
+ lib/msg.c | 3 +++
+ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/lib/msg.c b/lib/msg.c
+index e8a7e99..f30fd2d 100644
+--- a/lib/msg.c
++++ b/lib/msg.c
+@@ -410,6 +410,9 @@ void *nlmsg_reserve(struct nl_msg *n, size_t len, int pad)
+       size_t nlmsg_len = n->nm_nlh->nlmsg_len;
+       size_t tlen;
+
++      if (len > n->nm_size)
++              return NULL;
++
+       tlen = pad ? ((len + (pad - 1)) & ~(pad - 1)) : len;
+
+       if ((tlen + nlmsg_len) > n->nm_size)
+--
+1.9.1
+
meta/recipes-support/libnl/libnl_3.2.28.bb +1 -1
index 26982f3..a74b455 100644
@@ -12,6 +12,7 @@ DEPENDS = "flex-native bison-native"
 SRC_URI = "https://github.com/thom311/${BPN}/releases/download/${BPN}${@d.getVar('PV', True).replace('.','_')}/${BP}.tar.gz \
            file://fix-pktloc_syntax_h-race.patch \
            file://fix-pc-file.patch \
+           file://lib-check-for-integer-overflow-in-nlmsg_reserve.patch \
            file://0001-lib-add-utility-function-nl_strerror_l.patch \
            file://0002-lib-switch-to-using-strerror_l-instead-of-strerror_r.patch \
            file://0003-src-switch-to-using-strerror_l-instead-of-strerror_r.patch \
--

1.9.1

#2 lore raw
Quoted 9 lines · Andre McCurdy
Quoted 8 lines · Andre McCurdy

An elevation of privilege vulnerability in libnl could enable a local malicious application to execute arbitrary code within the context of the Wi-Fi service. This issue is rated as Moderate because it first requires compromising a privileged process and is mitigated by current platform configurations. Product: Android. Versions: 5.0.2, 5.1.1, 6.0, 6.0.1, 7.0, 7.1.1. Android ID: A-32342065. NOTE: this issue also exists in the upstream libnl before 3.3.0 library.

Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 6 lines

https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2017-0553

Backport fix from upstream 3.3.0 release:

https://github.com/thom311/libnl/commit/3e18948f17148e6a3c4255bdeaaf01ef6081ceeb
http://lists.infradead.org/pipermail/libnl/2017-May/002313.html

Ping.

Thanks for the reminder. it in morty mut build.
- armin

Quoted 72 lines
Quoted 72 lines
---
 ...eck-for-integer-overflow-in-nlmsg_reserve.patch | 43 ++++++++++++++++++++++
 meta/recipes-support/libnl/libnl_3.2.28.bb         |  1 +
 2 files changed, 44 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-support/libnl/libnl/lib-check-for-integer-overflow-in-nlmsg_reserve.patch
meta/recipes-support/libnl/libnl/lib-check-for-integer-overflow-in-nlmsg_reserve.patch new file +43 -0
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..9e22c40
@@ -0,0 +1,43 @@
+From 1db543374db3e58faacdfd91e5061a8a595ce505 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Thomas Haller <[email protected]>
+Date: Mon, 6 Feb 2017 22:23:52 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] lib: check for integer-overflow in nlmsg_reserve()
+
+In general, libnl functions are not robust against calling with
+invalid arguments. Thus, never call libnl functions with invalid
+arguments. In case of nlmsg_reserve() this means never provide
+a @len argument that causes overflow.
+
+Still, add an additional safeguard to avoid exploiting such bugs.
+
+Assume that @pad is a trusted, small integer.
+Assume that n->nm_size is a valid number of allocated bytes (and thus
+much smaller then SIZE_T_MAX).
+Assume, that @len may be set to an untrusted value. Then the patch
+avoids an integer overflow resulting in reserving too few bytes.
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/thom311/libnl/commit/3e18948f17148e6a3c4255bdeaaf01ef6081ceeb]
+CVE: CVE-2017-0553
+
+Signed-off-by: Andre McCurdy <[email protected]>
+---
+ lib/msg.c | 3 +++
+ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/lib/msg.c b/lib/msg.c
+index e8a7e99..f30fd2d 100644
+--- a/lib/msg.c
++++ b/lib/msg.c
+@@ -410,6 +410,9 @@ void *nlmsg_reserve(struct nl_msg *n, size_t len, int pad)
+       size_t nlmsg_len = n->nm_nlh->nlmsg_len;
+       size_t tlen;
+
++      if (len > n->nm_size)
++              return NULL;
++
+       tlen = pad ? ((len + (pad - 1)) & ~(pad - 1)) : len;
+
+       if ((tlen + nlmsg_len) > n->nm_size)
+--
+1.9.1
+
meta/recipes-support/libnl/libnl_3.2.28.bb +1 -1
index 26982f3..a74b455 100644
@@ -12,6 +12,7 @@ DEPENDS = "flex-native bison-native"
 SRC_URI = "https://github.com/thom311/${BPN}/releases/download/${BPN}${@d.getVar('PV', True).replace('.','_')}/${BP}.tar.gz \
            file://fix-pktloc_syntax_h-race.patch \
            file://fix-pc-file.patch \
+           file://lib-check-for-integer-overflow-in-nlmsg_reserve.patch \
            file://0001-lib-add-utility-function-nl_strerror_l.patch \
            file://0002-lib-switch-to-using-strerror_l-instead-of-strerror_r.patch \
            file://0003-src-switch-to-using-strerror_l-instead-of-strerror_r.patch \
--

1.9.1