secid reconciliation-v04: Add LSM hooks
Subsystems (4)
PATCH 2/9 secid reconciliation-v04: Add LSM hooks
Add skb_policy_check and skb_netfilter_check hooks to LSM to enable reconciliation of the various security identifiers as well as enforce flow control on inbound (PREROUTING/INPUT) and outbound (OUTPUT/FORWARD/POSTROUTING) traffic.
--- include/linux/security.h | 41 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++- security/dummy.c | 13 +++++++++++ 2 files changed, 53 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
include/linux/security.h +40 -1
@@ -828,6 +828,15 @@ #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY* Sets the new child socket's sid to the openreq sid. * @req_classify_flow: * Sets the flow's sid to the openreq sid. +* @skb_flow_in: +* Checks to see if security policy would allow skb into the system +* while also reconciling the xfrm secid, cipso, etc, if any, and +* relabeling the skb with the reconciled secid. +* Returns 1 if skb allowed into system, 0 otherwise. +* @skb_flow_out: +* Checks to see if security policy would allow skb to go out of system. +* Returns 1 if skb allowed out of system, 0 if not, and -ENOENT if there's +* no hook defined. * * Security hooks for XFRM operations. *
@@ -1372,6 +1381,8 @@ #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK struct request_sock *req);void (*inet_csk_clone)(struct sock *newsk,const struct request_sock *req);void (*req_classify_flow)(const struct request_sock *req,struct flowi *fl); +int (*skb_flow_in)(struct sk_buff *skb,unsigned short family); +int (*skb_flow_out)(struct sk_buff *skb,u32 nf_secid);#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK */ #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM
@@ -2946,6 +2957,18 @@ static inline void security_req_classify security_ops->req_classify_flow (req, fl); } +static inline int security_skb_flow_in (struct sk_buff *skb, +unsigned short family) +{ +return security_ops->skb_flow_in (skb, family); +} + +static inline int security_skb_flow_out (struct sk_buff *skb, +u32 nf_secid) +{ +return security_ops->skb_flow_out (skb, nf_secid); +} +static inline void security_sock_graft (struct sock * sk,struct socket *parent) { security_ops->sock_graft (sk, parent);
@@ -3097,6 +3120,18 @@ static inline void security_req_classify { } +static inline int security_skb_flow_in (struct sk_buff *skb, +unsigned short family) +{ +return 1 ; +} + +static inline int security_skb_flow_out (struct sk_buff *skb, +u32 nf_secid) +{ +return -ENOENT ; +} +static inline void security_sock_graft (struct sock * sk,struct socket *parent) { }
@@ -3150,7 +3185,11 @@ static inline int security_xfrm_state_al {if (!polsec)return 0 ; -return security_ops->xfrm_state_alloc_security (x,NULL , polsec, secid); +/* +* No need to pass polsec along since we want the context to be +* taken from secid which is usually from the sock. +*/ +return security_ops->xfrm_state_alloc_security (x,NULL ,NULL , secid); }static inline int security_xfrm_state_delete (struct xfrm_state *x)
security/dummy.c +13 -0
@@ -832,6 +832,17 @@ static inline void dummy_req_classify_fl struct flowi *fl) { } + +static inline int dummy_skb_flow_in (struct sk_buff *skb, +unsigned short family) +{ +return -ENOENT ; +} + +static inline int dummy_skb_flow_out (struct sk_buff *skb,u32 nf_secid) +{ +return -ENOENT ; +}#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK */ #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM
@@ -1108,6 +1119,8 @@ #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORKset_to_dummy_if_null (ops, inet_conn_request);set_to_dummy_if_null (ops, inet_csk_clone);set_to_dummy_if_null (ops, req_classify_flow); +set_to_dummy_if_null (ops, skb_flow_in); +set_to_dummy_if_null (ops, skb_flow_out);#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK */ #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM set_to_dummy_if_null (ops, xfrm_policy_alloc_security);
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Quoted 12 lines · Venkat Yekkirala
Add
skb_policy_checkandskb_netfilter_checkhooks to LSM to enable reconciliation of the various security identifiers as well as enforce flow control on inbound (PREROUTING/INPUT) and outbound (OUTPUT/FORWARD/POSTROUTING) traffic.Signed-off-by Venkat Yekkirala <[email protected]>--- include/linux/security.h | 41 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++- security/dummy.c | 13 +++++++++++ 2 files changed, 53 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
include/linux/security.h static inline int security_xfrm_state_al · line 3193
Quoted 10 lines
include/linux/security.h +5
-1@@ -3150,7 +3185,11 @@ static inline int security_xfrm_state_al {if (!polsec)return 0 ; -return security_ops->xfrm_state_alloc_security (x,NULL , polsec, secid); +/* +* No need to pass polsec along since we want the context to be +* taken from secid which is usually from the sock. +*/ +return security_ops->xfrm_state_alloc_security (x,NULL ,NULL , secid); }
As a follow-up patch, you could then drop polsec from the hook interface in security_ops (but not the static inline function interface), and from the underlying selinux functions. That would simplify selinux_xfrm_sec_ctx_alloc() a bit and make the logic clearer.
Signature · 2 lines
Stephen Smalley National Security Agency