Add MMC Password Protection (lock/unlock) support V6
cover Add MMC Password Protection (lock/unlock) support V6
Hi all,
New in this version:
- MMC_CAP_BYTEBLOCK capability support added.
- Spin lock added to protect data into mmc_lock_unlock function.
- Specific OMAP platform adjustment regarding DMA transfers.
- Some minor fixes pointed by Pierre Ossman on V5 version.
This series of patches add support for MultiMediaCard (MMC) password protection, as described in the MMC Specification v4.1. This feature is supported by all compliant MMC cards, and used by some devices such as Symbian OS cell phones to optionally protect MMC cards with a password.
By default, a MMC card with no password assigned is always in "unlocked" state. After password assignment, in the next power cycle the card switches to a "locked" state where only the "basic" and "lock card" command classes are accepted by the card. Only after unlocking it with the correct password the card can be normally used for operations like block I/O.
Password management and caching is done through the "Kernel Key Retention Service" mechanism and the sysfs filesystem. A new sysfs attribute was added to the MMC driver for unlocking the card, assigning a password to an unlocked card, change a card's password, remove the password and check locked/unlocked status.
A sample text-mode reference UI written in shell script (using the keyctl command from the keyutils package), can be found at:
http://www.indt.org.br/10le/mmc_pwd/mmc_reference_ui-20060130.tar.bz2
TODO:
- Ongoing: Extend the MMC PWD Scheme to SD Cards.
- Password caching: when inserting a locked card, the driver should try to unlock it with the currently stored password (if any), and if it fails, revoke the key containing it and fallback to the normal "no password present" situation.
Known Issue:
- Some cards have an incorrect behaviour (hardware bug?) regarding password acceptance: if an affected card has password <pwd>, it accepts <pwd><xxx> as the correct password too, where <xxx> is any sequence of characters, of any length. In other words, on these cards only the first <password length> bytes need to match the correct password.
Comments and suggestions are always welcome.
--
Anderson Briglia,
Carlos Eduardo Aguiar
Embedded Linux Lab - 10LE
Nokia Institute of Technology - INdT
Manaus - Brazil
--
Quoted 4 lines · Anderson Briglia
- Password caching: when inserting a locked card, the driver should try to unlock it with the currently stored password (if any), and if it fails, revoke the key containing it and fallback to the normal "no password present" situation.
Is there some reason why the key isn't associated with the MMC/SD card identifier(s)? It should be practical to swap several cards in/out without the kernel _needing_ to discard their keys. What you're saying is that you'll cache only one key at a time, and that it won't have anything associating it with a particular card. That's not at all how the key retention service is designed to work...
Quoted 6 lines
- Some cards have an incorrect behaviour (hardware bug?) regarding password acceptance: if an affected card has password <pwd>, it accepts <pwd><xxx> as the correct password too, where <xxx> is any sequence of characters, of any length. In other words, on these cards only the first <password length> bytes need to match the correct password.
I thought the MMC vendors expected to see the actual user-typed password get SHA1-hashed into a value which would take up the whole buffer? In general that's a good idea, since it promotes use of longer passphrases (more information) over short ones (easy2crack).
Plus, such hashing would prevent this issue ... if vendor tests are done with hashed passphrases, that would explain why this class of hardware issue got past design validation.
- Dave
Quoted 5 lines · David Brownell
I thought the MMC vendors expected to see the actual user-typed password get SHA1-hashed into a value which would take up the whole buffer? In general that's a good idea, since it promotes use of longer passphrases (more information) over short ones (easy2crack).
This sounds like policy though, so it is something user space should concern itself with. We should just provide the infrastructure.
Rgds
Signature · 5 lines
-- Pierre Ossman Linux kernel, MMC maintainer http://www.kernel.org PulseAudio, core developer http://pulseaudio.org rdesktop, core developer http://www.rdesktop.org
Quoted 9 lines · Pierre Ossman
Quoted 5 lines · David Brownell
I thought the MMC vendors expected to see the actual user-typed password get SHA1-hashed into a value which would take up the whole buffer? In general that's a good idea, since it promotes use of longer passphrases (more information) over short ones (easy2crack).
This sounds like policy though, so it is something user space should concern itself with. We should just provide the infrastructure.
The kernel shouldn't hash, right. But the userspace toos probably should be doing that ... they're the other part of the infrastructure. :)
- Dave
Hi David,
Quoted 8 lines · David Brownell
Quoted 7 lines · Pierre Ossman
Quoted 5 lines · David Brownell
I thought the MMC vendors expected to see the actual user-typed password get SHA1-hashed into a value which would take up the whole buffer? In general that's a good idea, since it promotes use of longer passphrases (more information) over short ones (easy2crack).
Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 2 lines
This sounds like policy though, so it is something user space should concern itself with. We should just provide the infrastructure.
The kernel shouldn't hash, right. But the userspace toos probably should be doing that ... they're the other part of the infrastructure. :)
Interesting idea, indeed. We'll implement this in our reference UI (which currently is just a bunch of shell scripts) so we can test the feasibility of this approach. Additionally, I think it's a good idea to investigate how other vendors currently support password protection on their products (for now I've just seen Nokia cellphones with such support, maybe PDAs or other mobile devices support this?), so we can have compatible policies, allowing to lock/unlock cards across devices.
Anyway, I also agree this is out of scope of the kernel support, but still it's very important for a complete support.
Regards,
Signature · 4 lines
Anderson Lizardo Open Source Mobile Research Center - OSMRC Nokia Institute of Technology - INdT Manaus - Brazil