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TOMOYO Linux

RFC Toshiharu Harada 7 participants 16 messages Jun 13, 2007 – Jun 15, 2007

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#0 lore raw

Hello,

A couple of years ago, we tried to build a tool to generate SELinux policy (*1). To do that, we had to gather the access requests information. So we researched a profiling method and got to the idea of having a process to store its invocation history information (or ancestors).

Here are examples:
/bin/bash process invoked from mingetty: /sbin/mingetty /bin/bash
/bin/bash process invoked from sshd: /usr/sbin/sshd /bin/bash
/bin/bash process invoked from /bin/bash which was invoked from sshd: /usr/sbin/sshd /bin/bash /bin/bash

It seemed to us that this clarification would be familiar to users/administrators and could be used for various purposes. We did implement this by making use of the Linux's traditional fork & exec mechanisms, and built a pathname-based MAC using this implementation. We named the result as "TOMOYO Linux" and made it open source at SourceForge.jp (*2).

TOMOYO Linux kernel keeps track of process invocation and distinguishes every different process invocation history as a "domain". TOMOYO Linux can accumulate the accesses requests for each domain.

TOMOYO Linux has a utility called "ccstree". It prints the invocation history for each process in addition to the output of "pstree" command:

[root@tomoyo ~]# ccstree
init (1) <kernel> /sbin/init
+- udevd (388) <kernel> /sbin/udevd
...

  +- automount (1970) <kernel> /etc/rc.d/init.d/autofs /usr/sbin/automount
  +- acpid (1993) <kernel> /etc/rc.d/init.d/acpid /bin/bash /usr/sbin/acpid
  +- cupsd (2008) <kernel> /etc/rc.d/init.d/cups /bin/bash /usr/sbin/cupsd
  +- sshd (2026) <kernel> /usr/sbin/sshd
  +- sshd (2269) <kernel> /usr/sbin/sshd
    +- bash (2271) <kernel> /usr/sbin/sshd /bin/bash
      +- ccstree (15125) <kernel> /usr/sbin/sshd /bin/bash /root/ccstools/ccstree

(symbol, "<kernel>" indicates a virtual base.)

We had a presentation and a tutorial session of TOMOYO Linux version 1.4 at the ELC2007 (*3). Version 1.4.1 is the latest and has a rich set of MAC functions for files, networking, and capabilities and so on. For historical reasons, it is not using LSM or auditd. We decided to share this idea with the Linux community and totally rewrote the code. The result was TOMOYO Linux 2.0, which is now using LSM and auditd. To make discussion smooth, we cut off MAC functions other than for files.

We are posting this message because we believe that this process invocation history idea might be a useful addition to Linux. Please take some time to see what this small piece of software can do with your own eyes. Your feedback will be greatly appreciated.

If some of you are interested in TOMOYO Linux as a method for access control, please be advised to try full-featured version 1.4.1 (*4). It is quite easy to install and maintain TOMOYO Linux, but it should not be considered as a replacement of SELinux.

All right, that's almost everything. Please visit the following URL for the code and documents:
http://tomoyo.sourceforge.jp/wiki-e/
If you want to see the code first, then:
http://tomoyo.sourceforge.jp/cgi-bin/lxr/source/security/tomoyo/?v=linux-2.6.21.3-tomoyo-2.0

We will have a TOMOYO Linux BOF session at the OLS2007 (*5). Please come along and let's talk.

Thank you.

Toshiharu Harada (project manager)
Tetsuo Handa (main architect, version 1 author)
Kentaro Takeda (version 2.0 author)
NTT DATA CORPORATION
http://www.nttdata.co.jp/en/index.html

*1) http://sourceforge.jp/projects/tomoyo/document/nsf2003-en.pdf
*2) http://tomoyo.sourceforge.jp/
*3) http://www.celinux.org/elc2007/
http://tree.celinuxforum.org/CelfPubWiki/ELC2007Presentations
*4) http://tomoyo.sourceforge.jp/en/1.4.1/
*5) http://www.linuxsymposium.org/2007/

#1 lore raw
Quoted 8 lines · Toshiharu Harada

Hello,

A couple of years ago, we tried to build a tool to generate SELinux policy (*1). To do that, we had to gather the access requests information. So we researched a profiling method and got to the idea of having a process to store its invocation history information (or ancestors).

Quoted 4 lines

Here are examples:
/bin/bash process invoked from mingetty: /sbin/mingetty /bin/bash
/bin/bash process invoked from sshd: /usr/sbin/sshd /bin/bash
/bin/bash process invoked from /bin/bash which was invoked from sshd: /usr/sbin/sshd /bin/bash /bin/bash

Why can't you do this via SELinux domain transitions? That lets you do it by equivalence class rather than per-binary, and let's you just encode the security-relevant parts of the "invocation history" aka call chain. For example, the above could be expressed in SELinux policy already as:
domain_auto_trans(getty_t, shell_exec_t, local_shell_t) domain_auto_trans(sshd_t, shell_exec_t, remote_shell_t) domain_auto_trans(remote_shell_t, shell_exec_t, remote_subshell_t)
or whatever you like. But you don't have to keep extending it indefinitely when you don't need to distinguish in policy, so you might choose to entirely omit the last one, and just have it stay in remote_shell_t.

Quoted 76 lines

It seemed to us that this clarification would be familiar to users/administrators and could be used for various purposes. We did implement this by making use of the Linux's traditional fork & exec mechanisms, and built a pathname-based MAC using this implementation. We named the result as "TOMOYO Linux" and made it open source at SourceForge.jp (*2).

TOMOYO Linux kernel keeps track of process invocation and distinguishes every different process invocation history as a "domain". TOMOYO Linux can accumulate the accesses requests for each domain.

TOMOYO Linux has a utility called "ccstree". It prints the invocation history for each process in addition to the output of "pstree" command:

[root@tomoyo ~]# ccstree
init (1) <kernel> /sbin/init
+- udevd (388) <kernel> /sbin/udevd
...

   +- automount (1970) <kernel> /etc/rc.d/init.d/autofs /usr/sbin/automount
   +- acpid (1993) <kernel> /etc/rc.d/init.d/acpid /bin/bash /usr/sbin/acpid
   +- cupsd (2008) <kernel> /etc/rc.d/init.d/cups /bin/bash /usr/sbin/cupsd
   +- sshd (2026) <kernel> /usr/sbin/sshd
   +- sshd (2269) <kernel> /usr/sbin/sshd
     +- bash (2271) <kernel> /usr/sbin/sshd /bin/bash
       +- ccstree (15125) <kernel> /usr/sbin/sshd /bin/bash /root/ccstools/ccstree

(symbol, "<kernel>" indicates a virtual base.)

We had a presentation and a tutorial session of TOMOYO Linux version 1.4 at the ELC2007 (*3). Version 1.4.1 is the latest and has a rich set of MAC functions for files, networking, and capabilities and so on. For historical reasons, it is not using LSM or auditd. We decided to share this idea with the Linux community and totally rewrote the code. The result was TOMOYO Linux 2.0, which is now using LSM and auditd. To make discussion smooth, we cut off MAC functions other than for files.

We are posting this message because we believe that this process invocation history idea might be a useful addition to Linux. Please take some time to see what this small piece of software can do with your own eyes. Your feedback will be greatly appreciated.

If some of you are interested in TOMOYO Linux as a method for access control, please be advised to try full-featured version 1.4.1 (*4). It is quite easy to install and maintain TOMOYO Linux, but it should not be considered as a replacement of SELinux.

All right, that's almost everything. Please visit the following URL for the code and documents:
http://tomoyo.sourceforge.jp/wiki-e/
If you want to see the code first, then:

   http://tomoyo.sourceforge.jp/cgi-bin/lxr/source/security/tomoyo/?v=linux-2.6.21.3-tomoyo-2.0

We will have a TOMOYO Linux BOF session at the OLS2007 (*5). Please come along and let's talk.

Thank you.

Toshiharu Harada (project manager)
Tetsuo Handa (main architect, version 1 author)
Kentaro Takeda (version 2.0 author)
NTT DATA CORPORATION
http://www.nttdata.co.jp/en/index.html

*1) http://sourceforge.jp/projects/tomoyo/document/nsf2003-en.pdf
*2) http://tomoyo.sourceforge.jp/
*3) http://www.celinux.org/elc2007/
http://tree.celinuxforum.org/CelfPubWiki/ELC2007Presentations
*4) http://tomoyo.sourceforge.jp/en/1.4.1/
*5) http://www.linuxsymposium.org/2007/

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Signature · 2 lines
Stephen Smalley
National Security Agency
#2 lore raw

2007/6/13, Stephen Smalley <[email protected]>:

Quoted 6 lines · Toshiharu Harada
Quoted 4 lines

Here are examples:
/bin/bash process invoked from mingetty: /sbin/mingetty /bin/bash
/bin/bash process invoked from sshd: /usr/sbin/sshd /bin/bash
/bin/bash process invoked from /bin/bash which was invoked from sshd: /usr/sbin/sshd /bin/bash /bin/bash

Quoted 12 lines

Why can't you do this via SELinux domain transitions? That lets you do it by equivalence class rather than per-binary, and let's you just encode the security-relevant parts of the "invocation history" aka call chain. For example, the above could be expressed in SELinux policy already as:
domain_auto_trans(getty_t, shell_exec_t, local_shell_t) domain_auto_trans(sshd_t, shell_exec_t, remote_shell_t) domain_auto_trans(remote_shell_t, shell_exec_t, remote_subshell_t)
or whatever you like. But you don't have to keep extending it indefinitely when you don't need to distinguish in policy, so you might choose to entirely omit the last one, and just have it stay in remote_shell_t.

The above SELinux policy looks similar to the one I wrote, but that is not very true. Because in my example, path name corresponds to a file while local_shell_t are bound to multiple.
I understand the advantages of label, but it needs to be translated to human understandable form of path name.
So I think pathname based call chains are advantages for
at least auditing and profiling.

Signature · 2 lines
Toshiharu Harada
[email protected]
#3 lore raw
Quoted 20 lines · Toshiharu Harada

2007/6/13, Stephen Smalley <[email protected]>:

Quoted 6 lines · Toshiharu Harada
Quoted 4 lines

Here are examples:
/bin/bash process invoked from mingetty: /sbin/mingetty /bin/bash
/bin/bash process invoked from sshd: /usr/sbin/sshd /bin/bash
/bin/bash process invoked from /bin/bash which was invoked from sshd: /usr/sbin/sshd /bin/bash /bin/bash

Quoted 12 lines

Why can't you do this via SELinux domain transitions? That lets you do it by equivalence class rather than per-binary, and let's you just encode the security-relevant parts of the "invocation history" aka call chain. For example, the above could be expressed in SELinux policy already as:
domain_auto_trans(getty_t, shell_exec_t, local_shell_t) domain_auto_trans(sshd_t, shell_exec_t, remote_shell_t) domain_auto_trans(remote_shell_t, shell_exec_t, remote_subshell_t)
or whatever you like. But you don't have to keep extending it indefinitely when you don't need to distinguish in policy, so you might choose to entirely omit the last one, and just have it stay in remote_shell_t.

Quoted 7 lines

The above SELinux policy looks similar to the one I wrote, but that is not very true. Because in my example, path name corresponds to a file while local_shell_t are bound to multiple.
I understand the advantages of label, but it needs to be translated to human understandable form of path name.
So I think pathname based call chains are advantages for
at least auditing and profiling.

Well, not to get into a debate, but think about whether "/usr/sbin/sshd /bin/bash" and "/sbin/mingetty /bin/bash" is more understandable to an administrator than "remote shell" vs. "local shell"
- the label-based approach lets you map the low-level detail of individual programs/pathnames to abstract equivalence classes that are more understandable, not less. Further, think about the advantages of being able to encode only the security-relevant invocations, not all of them.

On a different note, from a quick look, it looks like TOMOYO is AppArmor
+ invocation history from a user perspective. Plus a wider range of controls in your original implementation, but your LSM implementation seems to be just getting started and only deals with files. So what's the case for having a whole separate security module vs. a small extension to AppArmor?

Signature · 2 lines
Stephen Smalley
National Security Agency
#4 lore raw
Quoted 27 lines · Stephen Smalley
Quoted 18 lines · Toshiharu Harada

2007/6/13, Stephen Smalley <[email protected]>:

Quoted 5 lines · Toshiharu Harada
Quoted 4 lines

Here are examples:
/bin/bash process invoked from mingetty: /sbin/mingetty /bin/bash
/bin/bash process invoked from sshd: /usr/sbin/sshd /bin/bash
/bin/bash process invoked from /bin/bash which was invoked from sshd: /usr/sbin/sshd /bin/bash /bin/bash

Quoted 12 lines

Why can't you do this via SELinux domain transitions? That lets you do it by equivalence class rather than per-binary, and let's you just encode the security-relevant parts of the "invocation history" aka call chain. For example, the above could be expressed in SELinux policy already as:
domain_auto_trans(getty_t, shell_exec_t, local_shell_t) domain_auto_trans(sshd_t, shell_exec_t, remote_shell_t) domain_auto_trans(remote_shell_t, shell_exec_t, remote_subshell_t)
or whatever you like. But you don't have to keep extending it indefinitely when you don't need to distinguish in policy, so you might choose to entirely omit the last one, and just have it stay in remote_shell_t.

Quoted 7 lines

The above SELinux policy looks similar to the one I wrote, but that is not very true. Because in my example, path name corresponds to a file while local_shell_t are bound to multiple.
I understand the advantages of label, but it needs to be translated to human understandable form of path name.
So I think pathname based call chains are advantages for
at least auditing and profiling.

Quoted 8 lines

Well, not to get into a debate, but think about whether "/usr/sbin/sshd /bin/bash" and "/sbin/mingetty /bin/bash" is more understandable to an administrator than "remote shell" vs. "local shell"
- the label-based approach lets you map the low-level detail of individual programs/pathnames to abstract equivalence classes that are more understandable, not less. Further, think about the advantages of being able to encode only the security-relevant invocations, not all of them.

With our sample implmentation of "automated process invocation history tracking system" (or TOMOYO Linux, in short :)), no domain transition design and definition is needed. All you have to do is just run the kernel.
So limiting to encode does not matter much.

Quoted 6 lines

On a different note, from a quick look, it looks like TOMOYO is AppArmor
+ invocation history from a user perspective. Plus a wider range of controls in your original implementation, but your LSM implementation seems to be just getting started and only deals with files. So what's the case for having a whole separate security module vs. a small extension to AppArmor?

The reason we cut off various MAC controls was to make the code as small as possible (we knew lkml readers are busy). If AA would merge the TOMOYO Linux's "automated proccess invocation history tracking system" and "real-time policy learning system", I would be fine.

Cheers,
Toshiharu Harada

#5 lore raw
In reply to Toshiharu Harada
Quoted 2 lines · Toshiharu Harada

So I think pathname based call chains are advantages for at least auditing and profiling.

SELinux audit logs (well, whatever is in /var/log/audit on my system) does show the path names of objects that fail to be accessed as well as the name and context of the processes trying to access them.

This is with standard Fedora and RHEL installations.

Signature · 1 line
All Rights Reversed
#6 lore raw

2007/6/14, Rik van Riel <[email protected]>:

Quoted 9 lines
Quoted 2 lines

So I think pathname based call chains are advantages for at least auditing and profiling.

SELinux audit logs (well, whatever is in /var/log/audit on my system) does show the path names of objects that fail to be accessed as well as the name and context of the processes trying to access them.

This is with standard Fedora and RHEL installations.

Thank you for your comment.

SELinux has a well designed robust and flexible functions. So it should be used for everywhere. I understand it. As you mentioned one can analyze the system (process) behaviors from AVC logs. But the maintenance cost is not trivial.

If logging with process context is the only purpose, current TOMOYO Linux can do it with no hustle at all. Installation takes just 15 minutes. Please think it as something like TOYOTA Prius. It's a compact and economical car.
Volvo is known by its security, but we don't have to use only Volvo.

TOMOYO Linux and its underlying idea are free and
you don't have to find a garage. :-)

Cheers,
Toshiharu Harada

#7 lore raw
Quoted 13 lines · Toshiharu Harada

2007/6/14, Rik van Riel <[email protected]>:

Quoted 9 lines
Quoted 2 lines

So I think pathname based call chains are advantages for at least auditing and profiling.

SELinux audit logs (well, whatever is in /var/log/audit on my system) does show the path names of objects that fail to be accessed as well as the name and context of the processes trying to access them.

This is with standard Fedora and RHEL installations.

Thank you for your comment.

Quoted 7 lines

SELinux has a well designed robust and flexible functions. So it should be used for everywhere. I understand it. As you mentioned one can analyze the system (process) behaviors from AVC logs. But the maintenance cost is not trivial.

If logging with process context is the only purpose, current TOMOYO Linux can do it with no hustle at all.

Yes, but so does standard SELinux.

You are making me curious: what does TOMOYO do that is not done by regular SELinux?

Logging with process name, path name and contexts is already done. I must have missed some other TOMOYO feature in your initial email...

Signature · 1 line
All Rights Reversed
#8 lore raw

2007/6/14, Rik van Riel <[email protected]>:

Quoted 10 lines
Quoted 8 lines · Toshiharu Harada

2007/6/14, Rik van Riel <[email protected]>:
SELinux has a well designed robust and flexible functions. So it should be used for everywhere. I understand it. As you mentioned one can analyze the system (process) behaviors from AVC logs. But the maintenance cost is not trivial.

If logging with process context is the only purpose, current TOMOYO Linux can do it with no hustle at all.

Quoted 8 lines

Yes, but so does standard SELinux.

You are making me curious: what does TOMOYO do that is not done by regular SELinux?

Logging with process name, path name and contexts is already done. I must have missed some other TOMOYO feature in your initial email...

I see SELinux can log with process name, path name and contexts, but "contexts" must be defined beforehand. TOMOYO Linux kernel does that with pathname, so no label definitions needed.
You can confirm the process (domain) transitions any time and access occurred are clarified per domain basis automatically. Security context in TOMOYO Linux is represented and stored as a call chain and very intuitive.

TOMOYO Linux has a mode called "learning"
in addition to "permissive" and "enforce". You can easily get the TOMOYO Linux policy with learning mode that SELinux does not have. In addition, access control mode of TOMOYO Linux can be managed for every difference domain.

Signature · 2 lines
Toshiharu Harada
[email protected]
#9 lore raw
Quoted 4 lines · Toshiharu Harada

TOMOYO Linux has a mode called "learning"
in addition to "permissive" and "enforce". You can easily get the TOMOYO Linux policy with learning mode that SELinux does not have.

Blindly generating security policy through observation of the system is potentially dangerous for many reasons.

See
<http://securityblog.org/brindle/2006/03/25/security-anti-pattern-status-quo-encapsulation/>

Note that while SELinux does also have a similar capability with the audit2allow tool, it should be considered an expert tool, the output of which needs to be understood before use (as noted in its man page).

Quoted 2 lines

In addition, access control mode of
TOMOYO Linux can be managed for every difference domain.

We have considered per-domain enforcing mode a couple of times in the past, but figured that it could be implemented via policy alone (e.g. run the task in a domain where all accesses are allowed and logged); and it would also be of limited usefulness because of the aforementioned problems with learning mode security policy.

- James

Signature · 2 lines
James Morris
<[email protected]>
#10 lore raw

Morris, thank you for your comment.

2007/6/14, James Morris <[email protected]>:

Quoted 7 lines · Toshiharu Harada
Quoted 5 lines

TOMOYO Linux has a mode called "learning"
in addition to "permissive" and "enforce". You can easily get the TOMOYO Linux policy with learning mode that SELinux does not have.

Quoted 5 lines

Blindly generating security policy through observation of the system is potentially dangerous for many reasons.
See
<http://securityblog.org/brindle/2006/03/25/security-anti-pattern-status-quo-encapsulation/>

When I saw Russell Coker and showed him a demonstration of TOMOYO Linux, he told the same comment.
Also after tracing an AppAmor's long thread, I'm convinced of the meaning of label base. That's why I don't think TOMOYO Linux as a replace of SELinux. "Professional policy (or reference policy)" makes sense to me.

However it may be safe for audition and profiling purpose. Policy learning feature of TOMOYO Linux will help understanding the behavior of Linux boxes.
That is my point.

I will double check the link you showed me. Thank you. (It's wonderful to receive comments from you and Stephen!)

Quoted 3 lines

Note that while SELinux does also have a similar capability with the audit2allow tool, it should be considered an expert tool, the output of which needs to be understood before use (as noted in its man page).

Yes. But I remember Frank said "don't use it :-)" when he gave a presentation in Japan.

Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 2 lines

In addition, access control mode of
TOMOYO Linux can be managed for every difference domain.

We have considered per-domain enforcing mode a couple of times in the past, but figured that it could be implemented via policy alone (e.g. run the task in a domain where all accesses are allowed and logged); and it would also be of limited usefulness because of the aforementioned problems with learning mode security policy.

I'll reply this part in later.

Thanks!
Toshiharu Harada

#11 lore raw
In reply to James Morris

Hello.

Quoted 3 lines · James Morris

Note that while SELinux does also have a similar capability with the audit2allow tool, it should be considered an expert tool, the output of which needs to be understood before use (as noted in its man page).

Yes, adding "allow" statement without understanding what the statement means is dangerous.
But regarding TOMOYO Linux, "allow" statement that needs to be added to grant requested access is quite easy for human to understand. This helps administrator understand what will be allowed before allowing it.

For example, if "allow foo_t bin_t:execute" (sorry, I don't know proper SELinux's policy syntax) statement is shown to an administrator, he/she has to understand what programs belongs to bin_t before adding this statement, for some files may be exposed (if /bin/cat is bin_t) or some files may be deleted (if /bin/rm is bin_t).
But if "allow execute /bin/cat" statement is shown to an administrator, he/she can easily understand what will happen because
only programs that are accessible via the pathname /bin/cat can be executed.

People assumes and expects that /bin/cat is a program that prints the content of files, /usr/share/doc is a directory for shared documents, /tmp is a directory for temporaly files and so on.
I know you worry about symlinks, chroots, bind mounts and private namespaces. TOMOYO Linux solves all symlinks and traverses up to namespace's root so that /bin/cat is exactly /bin/cat and nothing else
(e.g. /tmp/cat or /var/chroot/bin/cat, where /tmp/cat is a malicious program). TOMOYO Linux restricts mount related operations to make sure
/bin is not a bind mount of /tmp and /bin/cat is not an alias of /tmp/cat . TOMOYO Linux restricts modification of /bin/cat by not giving processes write permission to /bin/cat unless needed.

TOMOYO Linux's way is respect pathnames and try to keep meaning of pathnames unchanged as hard as possible so that the system can provide files which poeple assumes and expects.

I know respecting pathnames will crash if the systems need complicated namespace manipuration like shared subtree or overlay mounts. For such systems, the only choice is label based access control.

But I think many systems don't need complicated namespace manipuration. For such systems, both label based and pathname based access control are possible choice.

Quoted 5 lines

We have considered per-domain enforcing mode a couple of times in the past, but figured that it could be implemented via policy alone (e.g. run the task in a domain where all accesses are allowed and logged); and it would also be of limited usefulness because of the aforementioned problems with learning mode security policy.

If there were only "disabled" and "enforcing" modes,
per-domain enforcing mode would not be useful.
The development of TOMOYO Linux's policy starts from scratch
and builds up step by step for all domains.
If I use "enforcing mode but allows everything" approach,
it becomes impossible to develop policy using "learning" and "permissive" modes where some of domains are already in enforcing mode but the rests are not yet. At least, per-domain enforcing mode is useful for TOMOYO Linux.

Thanks.

#12 lore raw
In reply to Toshiharu Harada
Quoted 29 lines · Toshiharu Harada

2007/6/14, Rik van Riel <[email protected]>:

Quoted 10 lines
Quoted 8 lines · Toshiharu Harada

2007/6/14, Rik van Riel <[email protected]>:
SELinux has a well designed robust and flexible functions. So it should be used for everywhere. I understand it. As you mentioned one can analyze the system (process) behaviors from AVC logs. But the maintenance cost is not trivial.

If logging with process context is the only purpose, current TOMOYO Linux can do it with no hustle at all.

Quoted 8 lines

Yes, but so does standard SELinux.

You are making me curious: what does TOMOYO do that is not done by regular SELinux?

Logging with process name, path name and contexts is already done. I must have missed some other TOMOYO feature in your initial email...

I see SELinux can log with process name, path name and contexts, but "contexts" must be defined beforehand. TOMOYO Linux kernel does that with pathname, so no label definitions needed.
You can confirm the process (domain) transitions any time and access occurred are clarified per domain basis automatically. Security context in TOMOYO Linux is represented and stored as a call chain and very intuitive.

Quoted 5 lines

TOMOYO Linux has a mode called "learning"
in addition to "permissive" and "enforce". You can easily get the TOMOYO Linux policy with learning mode that SELinux does not have. In addition, access control mode of TOMOYO Linux can be managed for every difference domain.

This sounds a like like feature differences "compared" at:
http://www.novell.com/linux/security/apparmor/selinux_comparison.html

Signature · 3 lines
William Leibzon
Elan Networks
[email protected]
#13 lore raw
Quoted 31 lines · william(at)elan.net
Quoted 29 lines · Toshiharu Harada

2007/6/14, Rik van Riel <[email protected]>:

Quoted 10 lines
Quoted 8 lines · Toshiharu Harada

2007/6/14, Rik van Riel <[email protected]>:
SELinux has a well designed robust and flexible functions. So it should be used for everywhere. I understand it. As you mentioned one can analyze the system (process) behaviors from AVC logs. But the maintenance cost is not trivial.

If logging with process context is the only purpose, current TOMOYO Linux can do it with no hustle at all.

Quoted 8 lines

Yes, but so does standard SELinux.

You are making me curious: what does TOMOYO do that is not done by regular SELinux?

Logging with process name, path name and contexts is already done. I must have missed some other TOMOYO feature in your initial email...

I see SELinux can log with process name, path name and contexts, but "contexts" must be defined beforehand. TOMOYO Linux kernel does that with pathname, so no label definitions needed.
You can confirm the process (domain) transitions any time and access occurred are clarified per domain basis automatically. Security context in TOMOYO Linux is represented and stored as a call chain and very intuitive.

Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 5 lines

TOMOYO Linux has a mode called "learning"
in addition to "permissive" and "enforce". You can easily get the TOMOYO Linux policy with learning mode that SELinux does not have. In addition, access control mode of TOMOYO Linux can be managed for every difference domain.

This sounds a like like feature differences "compared" at:
http://www.novell.com/linux/security/apparmor/selinux_comparison.html

Amazing, per that table, AppArmor is better in every way than SELinux. Nothing like an unbiased and fair-minded comparison.

Signature · 2 lines
Stephen Smalley
National Security Agency
#14 lore raw
In reply to Stephen Smalley

Stephen,

Thank you for your interests and comment.
I'm beginning to feel that you might be misunderstanding my message. Let me explain.

Quoted 11 lines · Stephen Smalley
Quoted 10 lines · Toshiharu Harada

A couple of years ago, we tried to build a tool to generate SELinux policy (*1). To do that, we had to gather the access requests information. So we researched a profiling method and got to the idea of having a process to store its invocation history information (or ancestors).

Here are examples:
/bin/bash process invoked from mingetty: /sbin/mingetty /bin/bash
/bin/bash process invoked from sshd: /usr/sbin/sshd /bin/bash
/bin/bash process invoked from /bin/bash which was invoked from sshd: /usr/sbin/sshd /bin/bash /bin/bash

"The idea":
If we let process to inherit the name of its ancestors (usualy starts from /sbin/init), then Linux kernel will be able to know ancestors for each process.

"Above examples" are:
examples of how we can distinguish the same /bin/bash processes.

Quoted 1 line

Why can't you do this via SELinux domain transitions? That lets you do

What do you mean by "this" here?
I was not talking about MAC nor policy definitions.

Quoted 4 lines

it by equivalence class rather than per-binary, and let's you just encode the security-relevant parts of the "invocation history" aka call chain. For example, the above could be expressed in SELinux policy already as:

I might have confused you and I am sorry for that. The above three lines are not TOMOYO Linux plicy.

Quoted 7 lines

domain_auto_trans(getty_t, shell_exec_t, local_shell_t) domain_auto_trans(sshd_t, shell_exec_t, remote_shell_t) domain_auto_trans(remote_shell_t, shell_exec_t, remote_subshell_t)
or whatever you like. But you don't have to keep extending it indefinitely when you don't need to distinguish in policy, so you might choose to entirely omit the last one, and just have it stay in remote_shell_t.

In your SELinux policy examples, someone must write down them. To do that someone must know what will happen beforehands. But if you use TOMOYO Linux, you'll get domain transition information easily. The example of the result can be found here:

http://tomoyo.sourceforge.jp/cgi-bin/lxr/source/?v=policy-sample
(choose whatever distribution and open the link for "domain_policy.txt")

For example, from http://tomoyo.sourceforge.jp/cgi-bin/lxr/source/centos4.4/domain_policy.txt?v=policy-sample#L4564
you will know:

/bin/cp which was invoked from
/usr/bin/makewhatis which was invoked from
/etc/cron.weekly/00-makewhatis.cron which was invoked from
/usr/bin/run-parts which was invoked from
/bin/bash which was invoked from
/usr/sbin/crond

that /bin/cp process needs to

read /dev/null, /etc/selinux/config, /proc/filesystems, and write /var/cache/man/whatis, and truncate /var/cache/man/whatis.

We implemnted the above mentioned idea and TOMOYO Linux is a sample system which use distinguished process as a "domain". In some sense it is a system analyzing tool.

Again, we intended to share the idea to people on the lkml. MAC (TOMOYO Linux) is just a sample.
Any feedback will be appreciated.

Quoted 70 lines
Quoted 70 lines

It seemed to us that this clarification would be familiar to users/administrators and could be used for various purposes. We did implement this by making use of the Linux's traditional fork & exec mechanisms, and built a pathname-based MAC using this implementation. We named the result as "TOMOYO Linux" and made it open source at SourceForge.jp (*2).

TOMOYO Linux kernel keeps track of process invocation and distinguishes every different process invocation history as a "domain". TOMOYO Linux can accumulate the accesses requests for each domain.

TOMOYO Linux has a utility called "ccstree". It prints the invocation history for each process in addition to the output of "pstree" command:

[root@tomoyo ~]# ccstree
init (1) <kernel> /sbin/init
+- udevd (388) <kernel> /sbin/udevd
...

   +- automount (1970) <kernel> /etc/rc.d/init.d/autofs /usr/sbin/automount
   +- acpid (1993) <kernel> /etc/rc.d/init.d/acpid /bin/bash /usr/sbin/acpid
   +- cupsd (2008) <kernel> /etc/rc.d/init.d/cups /bin/bash /usr/sbin/cupsd
   +- sshd (2026) <kernel> /usr/sbin/sshd
   +- sshd (2269) <kernel> /usr/sbin/sshd
     +- bash (2271) <kernel> /usr/sbin/sshd /bin/bash
       +- ccstree (15125) <kernel> /usr/sbin/sshd /bin/bash /root/ccstools/ccstree

(symbol, "<kernel>" indicates a virtual base.)

We had a presentation and a tutorial session of TOMOYO Linux version 1.4 at the ELC2007 (*3). Version 1.4.1 is the latest and has a rich set of MAC functions for files, networking, and capabilities and so on. For historical reasons, it is not using LSM or auditd. We decided to share this idea with the Linux community and totally rewrote the code. The result was TOMOYO Linux 2.0, which is now using LSM and auditd. To make discussion smooth, we cut off MAC functions other than for files.

We are posting this message because we believe that this process invocation history idea might be a useful addition to Linux. Please take some time to see what this small piece of software can do with your own eyes. Your feedback will be greatly appreciated.

If some of you are interested in TOMOYO Linux as a method for access control, please be advised to try full-featured version 1.4.1 (*4). It is quite easy to install and maintain TOMOYO Linux, but it should not be considered as a replacement of SELinux.

All right, that's almost everything. Please visit the following URL for the code and documents:
http://tomoyo.sourceforge.jp/wiki-e/
If you want to see the code first, then:

   http://tomoyo.sourceforge.jp/cgi-bin/lxr/source/security/tomoyo/?v=linux-2.6.21.3-tomoyo-2.0

We will have a TOMOYO Linux BOF session at the OLS2007 (*5). Please come along and let's talk.

Thank you.

Toshiharu Harada (project manager)
Tetsuo Handa (main architect, version 1 author)
Kentaro Takeda (version 2.0 author)
NTT DATA CORPORATION
http://www.nttdata.co.jp/en/index.html

*1) http://sourceforge.jp/projects/tomoyo/document/nsf2003-en.pdf
*2) http://tomoyo.sourceforge.jp/
*3) http://www.celinux.org/elc2007/
http://tree.celinuxforum.org/CelfPubWiki/ELC2007Presentations
*4) http://tomoyo.sourceforge.jp/en/1.4.1/
*5) http://www.linuxsymposium.org/2007/

#15 lore raw

Hello.

I just now made demo movies how TOMOYO Linux looks like.

http://tomoyo.sourceforge.jp/data/CentOS5-install.avi is
a movie that demonstrates how to install TOMOYO Linux 1.4.1 on CentOS 5.

http://tomoyo.sourceforge.jp/data/CentOS5-learning.avi is
a movie that demonstrates how the TOMOYO Linux kernel creates domains and accumulates access requests from scratch using "learning" mode. Please see CentOS5-install.avi once before seeing CentOS5-learning.avi to help your understanding.

Although there is no explanation text in the movies for now, I'm sure you can feel how TOMOYO Linux works.

Thanks.