Auditing the TPM

I have been experimenting with the TPM and the TrouSerS package some and have so far come up with this list of possible events that could be interesting from a OS auditing perspective:

* Taking Ownership of the TPM
* Clearing Ownership
* Dis/Enabling the TPM
* Dis/Activating the TPM
* Recording PCR values
* Adjustments to PCR values
* Remote attestation connections/commands and their results
* Requests of the Public Endorsement Key (EK)
* Adjustments to the access controls on the EK
* Creating/Destroying the EK
* Changes to the TPM locked status (set/reset)

For some of these events it makes sense that the auditing would happen in the TPM kernel driver, other events will need to be audited up in user space to accurately capture all the important information. Has anyone in this community begun looking at what TPM events are interesting from an audit perspective?

thanks
-matt

Not that I know of. No one has contacted me for event types. Are there any standards that define what is supposed to be audited?

-Steve

The Trusted Computing Group spec 1.2 allow for auditing events that the TPM processes, but it only says that the owner should be able to set which events get audited and which shouldn't, suggesting "There will be a very limited number of audited commands, most likely those commands that provide identities and control of the TPM. Commands such as unseal would not be audited, they would use the logging functions of a transport session."

Other than that spec I am unaware of other standards that might be applicable. I will investigate that further, but if anyone can think of any please let me know.

-matt