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Smack update for file capabilities

RFC PATCH In review Casey Schaufler 2 participants 2 messages Feb 19, 2008

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Casey Schaufler

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#0 lore raw

RFC PATCH 1/1 Smack update for file capabilities

From: Casey Schaufler <[email protected]>

This patch assumes "Smack unlabeled outgoing ambient packets - v4" which is one reason it's RFC.

Update the Smack LSM to allow the registration of the capability "module" as a secondary LSM. Integrate the new hooks required for file based capabilities.

---

security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 63 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--

1 file changed, 60 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
security/smack/smack_lsm.c +0 -0
diff -uprN -X linux-2.6.25-g0216-precap//Documentation/dontdiff linux-2.6.25-g0216-precap/security/smack/smack_lsm.c linux-2.6.25-g0216/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
@@ -584,6 +584,12 @@ static int smack_inode_getattr(struct vf

static int smack_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, char *name,
void *value, size_t size, int flags)
{
+ int rc;
+
+ rc = cap_inode_setxattr(dentry, name, value, size, flags);
+ if (rc != 0)
+ return rc;
+

	if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN)) {
		if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACK) == 0 ||
		    strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKIPIN) == 0 ||

@@ -658,6 +664,12 @@ static int smack_inode_getxattr(struct d
*/
static int smack_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, char *name) {
+ int rc;
+
+ rc = cap_inode_removexattr(dentry, name);
+ if (rc != 0)
+ return rc;
+

	if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACK) == 0 && !capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
		return -EPERM;

@@ -1016,7 +1028,12 @@ static void smack_task_getsecid(struct t
*/
static int smack_task_setnice(struct task_struct *p, int nice) {
- return smk_curacc(p->security, MAY_WRITE);
+ int rc;
+
+ rc = cap_task_setnice(p, nice);
+ if (rc == 0)
+ rc = smk_curacc(p->security, MAY_WRITE);
+ return rc;
}

/**
@@ -1028,7 +1045,12 @@ static int smack_task_setnice(struct tas
*/
static int smack_task_setioprio(struct task_struct *p, int ioprio) {
- return smk_curacc(p->security, MAY_WRITE);
+ int rc;
+
+ rc = cap_task_setioprio(p, ioprio);
+ if (rc == 0)
+ rc = smk_curacc(p->security, MAY_WRITE);
+ return rc;
}

/**
@@ -1053,7 +1075,12 @@ static int smack_task_getioprio(struct t static int smack_task_setscheduler(struct task_struct *p, int policy,
struct sched_param *lp)
{
- return smk_curacc(p->security, MAY_WRITE);
+ int rc;
+
+ rc = cap_task_setscheduler(p, policy, lp);
+ if (rc == 0)
+ rc = smk_curacc(p->security, MAY_WRITE);
+ return rc;
}

/**
@@ -1093,6 +1120,11 @@ static int smack_task_movememory(struct static int smack_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct siginfo *info,
int sig, u32 secid)
{
+ int rc;
+
+ rc = cap_task_kill(p, info, sig, secid);
+ if (rc != 0)
+ return rc;
/*
* Special cases where signals really ought to go through
* in spite of policy. Stephen Smalley suggests it may
@@ -1778,6 +1810,27 @@ static int smack_ipc_permission(struct k

	return smk_curacc(isp, may);
}

+/* module stacking operations */
+
+/**
+ * smack_register_security - stack capability module
+ * @name: module name
+ * @ops: module operations - ignored
+ *
+ * Allow the capability module to register.
+ */
+static int smack_register_security(const char *name,
+ struct security_operations *ops)
+{
+ if (strcmp(name, "capability") != 0)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ printk(KERN_INFO "%s: Registering secondary module %s\n",
+ __func__, name);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
/**
* smack_d_instantiate - Make sure the blob is correct on an inode
* @opt_dentry: unused
@@ -2412,6 +2465,8 @@ static struct security_operations smack_
.inode_post_setxattr = smack_inode_post_setxattr,
.inode_getxattr = smack_inode_getxattr,
.inode_removexattr = smack_inode_removexattr,
+ .inode_need_killpriv = cap_inode_need_killpriv,
+ .inode_killpriv = cap_inode_killpriv,
.inode_getsecurity = smack_inode_getsecurity,
.inode_setsecurity = smack_inode_setsecurity,
.inode_listsecurity = smack_inode_listsecurity,
@@ -2471,6 +2526,8 @@ static struct security_operations smack_

	.netlink_send =			cap_netlink_send,
	.netlink_recv = 		cap_netlink_recv,

+ .register_security = smack_register_security,
+
.d_instantiate = smack_d_instantiate,

.getprocattr = smack_getprocattr,

#1 lore raw
Quoted 20 lines · Casey Schaufler

From: Casey Schaufler <[email protected]>

This patch assumes "Smack unlabeled outgoing ambient packets - v4" which is one reason it's RFC.

Update the Smack LSM to allow the registration of the capability "module" as a secondary LSM. Integrate the new hooks required for file based capabilities.

---

 security/smack/smack_lsm.c |   63 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
 1 file changed, 60 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

diff -uprN -X linux-2.6.25-g0216-precap//Documentation/dontdiff linux-2.6.25-g0216-precap/security/smack/smack_lsm.c linux-2.6.25-g0216/security/smack/smack_lsm.c

security/smack/smack_lsm.c static int smack_inode_getattr(struct vf · line 591

Quoted 8 lines
security/smack/smack_lsm.c +5 -0
@@ -584,6 +584,12 @@ static int smack_inode_getattr(struct vf
 static int smack_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, char *name,
 				void *value, size_t size, int flags)
 {
+	int rc;
+
+	rc = cap_inode_setxattr(dentry, name, value, size, flags);
+	if (rc != 0)
+		return rc;

You only want to do that if the attribute isn't one of the Smack attributes. Otherwise, the capability module will apply a CAP_SYS_ADMIN check on setting anything in the security namespace, including the Smack attributes.

security/smack/smack_lsm.c static int smack_inode_getxattr(struct d · line 671

Quoted 13 lines
security/smack/smack_lsm.c +6 -0
+
 	if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN)) {
 		if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACK) == 0 ||
 		    strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKIPIN) == 0 ||
@@ -658,6 +664,12 @@ static int smack_inode_getxattr(struct d
  */
 static int smack_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, char *name)
 {
+	int rc;
+
+	rc = cap_inode_removexattr(dentry, name);
+	if (rc != 0)
+		return rc;

Ditto.

Quoted 109 lines
security/smack/smack_lsm.c +49 -4
+
 	if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACK) == 0 && !capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
 		return -EPERM;
 
@@ -1016,7 +1028,12 @@ static void smack_task_getsecid(struct t
  */
 static int smack_task_setnice(struct task_struct *p, int nice)
 {
-	return smk_curacc(p->security, MAY_WRITE);
+	int rc;
+
+	rc = cap_task_setnice(p, nice);
+	if (rc == 0)
+		rc = smk_curacc(p->security, MAY_WRITE);
+	return rc;
 }
 
 /**
@@ -1028,7 +1045,12 @@ static int smack_task_setnice(struct tas
  */
 static int smack_task_setioprio(struct task_struct *p, int ioprio)
 {
-	return smk_curacc(p->security, MAY_WRITE);
+	int rc;
+
+	rc = cap_task_setioprio(p, ioprio);
+	if (rc == 0)
+		rc = smk_curacc(p->security, MAY_WRITE);
+	return rc;
 }
 
 /**
@@ -1053,7 +1075,12 @@ static int smack_task_getioprio(struct t
 static int smack_task_setscheduler(struct task_struct *p, int policy,
 				   struct sched_param *lp)
 {
-	return smk_curacc(p->security, MAY_WRITE);
+	int rc;
+
+	rc = cap_task_setscheduler(p, policy, lp);
+	if (rc == 0)
+		rc = smk_curacc(p->security, MAY_WRITE);
+	return rc;
 }
 
 /**
@@ -1093,6 +1120,11 @@ static int smack_task_movememory(struct 
 static int smack_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct siginfo *info,
 			   int sig, u32 secid)
 {
+	int rc;
+
+	rc = cap_task_kill(p, info, sig, secid);
+	if (rc != 0)
+		return rc;
 	/*
 	 * Special cases where signals really ought to go through
 	 * in spite of policy. Stephen Smalley suggests it may
@@ -1778,6 +1810,27 @@ static int smack_ipc_permission(struct k
 	return smk_curacc(isp, may);
 }
 
+/* module stacking operations */
+
+/**
+ * smack_register_security - stack capability module
+ * @name: module name
+ * @ops: module operations - ignored
+ *
+ * Allow the capability module to register.
+ */
+static int smack_register_security(const char *name,
+				   struct security_operations *ops)
+{
+	if (strcmp(name, "capability") != 0)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	printk(KERN_INFO "%s:  Registering secondary module %s\n",
+	       __func__, name);
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
 /**
  * smack_d_instantiate - Make sure the blob is correct on an inode
  * @opt_dentry: unused
@@ -2412,6 +2465,8 @@ static struct security_operations smack_
 	.inode_post_setxattr = 		smack_inode_post_setxattr,
 	.inode_getxattr = 		smack_inode_getxattr,
 	.inode_removexattr = 		smack_inode_removexattr,
+	.inode_need_killpriv =		cap_inode_need_killpriv,
+	.inode_killpriv =		cap_inode_killpriv,
 	.inode_getsecurity = 		smack_inode_getsecurity,
 	.inode_setsecurity = 		smack_inode_setsecurity,
 	.inode_listsecurity = 		smack_inode_listsecurity,
@@ -2471,6 +2526,8 @@ static struct security_operations smack_
 	.netlink_send =			cap_netlink_send,
 	.netlink_recv = 		cap_netlink_recv,
 
+	.register_security = 		smack_register_security,
+
 	.d_instantiate = 		smack_d_instantiate,
 
 	.getprocattr = 			smack_getprocattr,
 
-

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Signature · 2 lines
Stephen Smalley
National Security Agency