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New: DEADLOOP in kernel network module

Bugme-new Andrew Morton 3 participants 5 messages Jul 9, 2008 1 message not in the archive

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#1 lore raw

(switched to email. Please respond via emailed reply-to-all, not via the bugzilla web interface).

Quoted 89 lines · On Tue, 8 Jul 2008 20:13:20 -0700 (PDT) [email protected] wrote:

http://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=11058

           Summary: DEADLOOP in kernel network module
           Product: Networking
           Version: 2.5
     KernelVersion: 2.6.16.1
          Platform: All
        OS/Version: Linux
              Tree: Mainline
            Status: NEW
          Severity: high
          Priority: P1
         Component: Netfilter/Iptables
        AssignedTo: [email protected]
        ReportedBy: [email protected]

Latest working kernel version:2.6.16.1
Earliest failing kernel version:2.6.16.1
Distribution:FC3
Hardware Environment:
Software Environment:

Problem Description:

We have seen a deadloop in softirq and we got the cause by creating and analysising the core dump of the kernel.I dont know where to submit a patch , so I report it here,wish you can apply it to furthur version of linux kernel.

The Cause:

Both ctnetlink_del_conntrack() and the tcp_packet() run the code below:

    if (del_timer(&ct->timeout))                /*deactive the timer*/
       ct->timeout.function((unsigned long) ct);/*remove conntrack from

conntrack table*/

the ctnetlink_del_conntrack() context is:
................

        if (cda[CTA_ID-1]) {
                u_int32_t id = ntohl(*(u_int32_t *)NFA_DATA(cda[CTA_ID-1]));
                if (ct->id != id) {
                        ip_conntrack_put(ct);
                        return -ENOENT;
                }
        }       

* if (del_timer(&ct->timeout))
* ct->timeout.function((unsigned long)ct);

        ip_conntrack_put(ct);

...........

the tcp_packet() context is:
...........

        case TCP_CONNTRACK_SYN_SENT:
                if (old_state < TCP_CONNTRACK_TIME_WAIT)
                        break;
                if ((conntrack->proto.tcp.seen[dir].flags &
                         IP_CT_TCP_FLAG_CLOSE_INIT)
                    || after(ntohl(th->seq),
                             conntrack->proto.tcp.seen[dir].td_end)) {  
                        /* Attempt to reopen a closed connection.
                        * Delete this connection and look up again. */
                        write_unlock_bh(&tcp_lock);
*                       if (del_timer(&conntrack->timeout))
*                               conntrack->timeout.function((unsigned long)
*                                                           conntrack);
                        return -NF_REPEAT;

......

How the DEADLOOP happened?

(1)in ctnetlink_del_conntrack()(runs in system call context): the del_timer
is called and then goes to timeout.function.
(2)before timeout.function finish excution(means the conntrack not
removed),an interrupt happens and a SYN packet of the same conntrack comes.CPU goes to irq handle and enventually runs tcp_packet().
(3)in tcp_packet() ,del_timer() will fail because the timer was
already deleted. the timeout.function in tcp_packet will not run, -NF_REPEAT is returned, the SYN packet will be passed back again.
(4)Neither side has the chance to run timeout.function,the
conntrack remains there,deadloop happen,the SYN packet will be passed back again and again.

The fix maybe,add lock the softirq when doing conntrack removing:

+++    local_bh_disable();
      if (del_timer(&ct->timeout))                /*deactive the timer*/
         ct->timeout.function((unsigned long) ct);/*remove conntrack from
Quoted 8 lines

conntrack table*/
+++ local_bh_enable();

Thanks, may this be helpful.
My email: [email protected]

It is hard to reproduce , but it really happen on our linux box.

Thanks.

Please submit patches via email as described in Documentation/SubmittingPatches. The file ./MAINTAINERS can be used to determine which individuals and mailing lists the patch should be sent to.

But that's for next time - this patch is small enough for the netfilter developers to be able to type in again ;)

#2 lore raw
Quoted 86 lines · Andrew Morton

(switched to email. Please respond via emailed reply-to-all, not via the bugzilla web interface).

Quoted 70 lines · On Tue, 8 Jul 2008 20:13:20 -0700 (PDT) [email protected] wrote:

http://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=11058

Summary: DEADLOOP in kernel network module
...
Problem Description:

We have seen a deadloop in softirq and we got the cause by creating and analysising the core dump of the kernel.I dont know where to submit a patch , so I report it here,wish you can apply it to furthur version of linux kernel.

The Cause:

Both ctnetlink_del_conntrack() and the tcp_packet() run the code below:

    if (del_timer(&ct->timeout))                /*deactive the timer*/
       ct->timeout.function((unsigned long) ct);/*remove conntrack from

conntrack table*/

the ctnetlink_del_conntrack() context is:
................

        if (cda[CTA_ID-1]) {
                u_int32_t id = ntohl(*(u_int32_t *)NFA_DATA(cda[CTA_ID-1]));
                if (ct->id != id) {
                        ip_conntrack_put(ct);
                        return -ENOENT;
                }
        }       

* if (del_timer(&ct->timeout))
* ct->timeout.function((unsigned long)ct);

        ip_conntrack_put(ct);

...........

the tcp_packet() context is:
...........

        case TCP_CONNTRACK_SYN_SENT:
                if (old_state < TCP_CONNTRACK_TIME_WAIT)
                        break;
                if ((conntrack->proto.tcp.seen[dir].flags &
                         IP_CT_TCP_FLAG_CLOSE_INIT)
                    || after(ntohl(th->seq),
                             conntrack->proto.tcp.seen[dir].td_end)) {  
                        /* Attempt to reopen a closed connection.
                        * Delete this connection and look up again. */
                        write_unlock_bh(&tcp_lock);
*                       if (del_timer(&conntrack->timeout))
*                               conntrack->timeout.function((unsigned long)
*                                                           conntrack);
                        return -NF_REPEAT;

......

How the DEADLOOP happened?

(1)in ctnetlink_del_conntrack()(runs in system call context): the del_timer
is called and then goes to timeout.function.
(2)before timeout.function finish excution(means the conntrack not
removed),an interrupt happens and a SYN packet of the same conntrack comes.CPU goes to irq handle and enventually runs tcp_packet().
(3)in tcp_packet() ,del_timer() will fail because the timer was
already deleted. the timeout.function in tcp_packet will not run, -NF_REPEAT is returned, the SYN packet will be passed back again.
(4)Neither side has the chance to run timeout.function,the
conntrack remains there,deadloop happen,the SYN packet will be passed back again and again.

The fix maybe,add lock the softirq when doing conntrack removing:

+++    local_bh_disable();
      if (del_timer(&ct->timeout))                /*deactive the timer*/
         ct->timeout.function((unsigned long) ct);/*remove conntrack from
Quoted 8 lines

conntrack table*/
+++ local_bh_enable();

Thanks, may this be helpful.
My email: [email protected]

It is hard to reproduce , but it really happen on our linux box.

Thanks.

Quoted 6 lines

Please submit patches via email as described in Documentation/SubmittingPatches. The file ./MAINTAINERS can be used to determine which individuals and mailing lists the patch should be sent to.

But that's for next time - this patch is small enough for the netfilter developers to be able to type in again ;)

Good catch, thanks. Basically all del_timer()/timeout.function calls in conntrack can happen in process context, so we'd have to disable BHs every time we do this. I think this fix should also work. The only spot where we return NF_REPEAT is in TCP conntrack, so we can simply make sure we only do this if we actually managed to kill the connection.

Jozsef, what do you think?

[patch for review against net-next, I'll backport it later unless there are objections]

include/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack.h +8 -8
index d5d76ec..15ce3fb 100644
@@ -223,23 +223,23 @@ static inline void nf_ct_refresh(struct nf_conn *ct,
 	__nf_ct_refresh_acct(ct, 0, skb, extra_jiffies, 0);
 }
 
-extern void __nf_ct_kill_acct(struct nf_conn *ct,
-				enum ip_conntrack_info ctinfo,
-				const struct sk_buff *skb,
-				int do_acct);
+extern int __nf_ct_kill_acct(struct nf_conn *ct,
+			     enum ip_conntrack_info ctinfo,
+			     const struct sk_buff *skb,
+			     int do_acct);
 
 /* kill conntrack and do accounting */
-static inline void nf_ct_kill_acct(struct nf_conn *ct,
+static inline int nf_ct_kill_acct(struct nf_conn *ct,
 				enum ip_conntrack_info ctinfo,
 				const struct sk_buff *skb)
 {
-	__nf_ct_kill_acct(ct, ctinfo, skb, 1);
+	return __nf_ct_kill_acct(ct, ctinfo, skb, 1);
 }
 
 /* kill conntrack without accounting */
-static inline void nf_ct_kill(struct nf_conn *ct)
+static inline int nf_ct_kill(struct nf_conn *ct)
 {
-	__nf_ct_kill_acct(ct, 0, NULL, 0);
+	return __nf_ct_kill_acct(ct, 0, NULL, 0);
 }
 
 /* These are for NAT.  Icky. */
net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_core.c +8 -5
index 212a088..aad9585 100644
@@ -848,10 +848,10 @@ acct:
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(__nf_ct_refresh_acct);
 
-void __nf_ct_kill_acct(struct nf_conn *ct,
-		enum ip_conntrack_info ctinfo,
-		const struct sk_buff *skb,
-		int do_acct)
+int __nf_ct_kill_acct(struct nf_conn *ct,
+		      enum ip_conntrack_info ctinfo,
+		      const struct sk_buff *skb,
+		      int do_acct)
 {
 #ifdef CONFIG_NF_CT_ACCT
 	if (do_acct) {
@@ -862,8 +862,11 @@ void __nf_ct_kill_acct(struct nf_conn *ct,
 		spin_unlock_bh(&nf_conntrack_lock);
 	}
 #endif
-	if (del_timer(&ct->timeout))
+	if (del_timer(&ct->timeout)) {
 		ct->timeout.function((unsigned long)ct);
+		return 1;
+	}
+	return 0;
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(__nf_ct_kill_acct);
 
net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_proto_tcp.c +5 -1
index 740acd6..41032d2 100644
@@ -844,7 +844,11 @@ static int tcp_packet(struct nf_conn *ct,
 			/* Attempt to reopen a closed/aborted connection.
 			 * Delete this connection and look up again. */
 			write_unlock_bh(&tcp_lock);
-			nf_ct_kill(ct);
+			/* The connection might be killed in parallel in process
+			 * context. Don't repeat lookup so it gets a chance to
+			 * complete. */
+			if (!nf_ct_kill(ct))
+				return -NF_DROP;
 			return -NF_REPEAT;
 		}
 		/* Fall through */
#3 lore raw
Quoted 10 lines · Patrick McHardy
Quoted 9 lines · Andrew Morton

(switched to email. Please respond via emailed reply-to-all, not via the bugzilla web interface).

Quoted 3 lines · On Tue, 8 Jul 2008 20:13:20 -0700 (PDT) [email protected] wrote:

http://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=11058

Summary: DEADLOOP in kernel network module

[...]

Quoted 37 lines
Quoted 30 lines
Quoted 19 lines

How the DEADLOOP happened?

(1)in ctnetlink_del_conntrack()(runs in system call context): the
del_timer
is called and then goes to timeout.function.
(2)before timeout.function finish excution(means the conntrack not
removed),an interrupt happens and a SYN packet of the same conntrack comes.CPU goes to irq handle and enventually runs tcp_packet().
(3)in tcp_packet() ,del_timer() will fail because the timer was
already deleted. the timeout.function in tcp_packet will not run, -NF_REPEAT is returned, the SYN packet will be passed back again.
(4)Neither side has the chance to run timeout.function,the
conntrack remains there,deadloop happen,the SYN packet will be passed back again and again.

The fix maybe,add lock the softirq when doing conntrack removing:

+++    local_bh_disable();
      if (del_timer(&ct->timeout))                /*deactive the timer*/
         ct->timeout.function((unsigned long) ct);/*remove conntrack from
Quoted 8 lines

conntrack table*/
+++ local_bh_enable();

Thanks, may this be helpful.
My email: [email protected]

It is hard to reproduce , but it really happen on our linux box.

Thanks.

Quoted 6 lines

Please submit patches via email as described in Documentation/SubmittingPatches. The file ./MAINTAINERS can be used to determine which individuals and mailing lists the patch should be sent to.

But that's for next time - this patch is small enough for the netfilter developers to be able to type in again ;)

Quoted 8 lines

Good catch, thanks. Basically all del_timer()/timeout.function calls in conntrack can happen in process context, so we'd have to disable BHs every time we do this. I think this fix should also work. The only spot where we return NF_REPEAT is in TCP conntrack, so we can simply make sure we only do this if we actually managed to kill the connection.

Jozsef, what do you think?

I agree with you completely - and nice catch, indeed! Your proposed patch looks just fine.

Best regards,
Jozsef
-
E-mail : [email protected], [email protected] PGP key : http://www.kfki.hu/~kadlec/pgp_public_key.txt
Address : KFKI Research Institute for Particle and Nuclear Physics

          H-1525 Budapest 114, POB. 49, Hungary
#4 lore raw
Quoted 9 lines · Jozsef Kadlecsik
Quoted 7 lines · Patrick McHardy

Good catch, thanks. Basically all del_timer()/timeout.function calls in conntrack can happen in process context, so we'd have to disable BHs every time we do this. I think this fix should also work. The only spot where we return NF_REPEAT is in TCP conntrack, so we can simply make sure we only do this if we actually managed to kill the connection.

Quoted 3 lines
Quoted 1 line

Jozsef, what do you think?

I agree with you completely - and nice catch, indeed! Your proposed patch looks just fine.

Thanks, I'll send a backport for 2.6.26 to Dave tonight.

#5 lore raw
Quoted 10 lines · Patrick McHardy
Quoted 9 lines · Jozsef Kadlecsik
Quoted 7 lines · Patrick McHardy

Good catch, thanks. Basically all del_timer()/timeout.function calls in conntrack can happen in process context, so we'd have to disable BHs every time we do this. I think this fix should also work. The only spot where we return NF_REPEAT is in TCP conntrack, so we can simply make sure we only do this if we actually managed to kill the connection.

Quoted 5 lines
Quoted 3 lines
Quoted 1 line

Jozsef, what do you think?

I agree with you completely - and nice catch, indeed! Your proposed patch looks just fine.

Thanks, I'll send a backport for 2.6.26 to Dave tonight.

OK, this is the patch I'll send upstream.

commit baa04a1fb3dbef550ed1dc5acd15e21e7dde3b85

Author: Patrick McHardy <[email protected]>
Date:   Wed Jul 9 18:32:29 2008 +0200

netfilter: nf_conntrack_tcp: fix endless loop

When a conntrack entry is destroyed in process context and destruction is interrupted by packet processing and the packet is an attempt to reopen a closed connection, TCP conntrack tries to kill the old entry itself and returns NF_REPEAT to pass the packet through the hook again. This may lead to an endless loop: TCP conntrack repeatedly finds the old entry, but can not kill it itself since destruction is already in progress, but destruction in process context can not complete since TCP conntrack is keeping the CPU busy.

Drop the packet in TCP conntrack if we can't kill the connection ourselves to avoid this.

Reported by: [email protected] [ Kernel bugzilla #11058 ]

net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_proto_tcp.c +8 -2
index 271cd01..dd28fb2 100644
@@ -844,9 +844,15 @@ static int tcp_packet(struct nf_conn *ct,
 			/* Attempt to reopen a closed/aborted connection.
 			 * Delete this connection and look up again. */
 			write_unlock_bh(&tcp_lock);
-			if (del_timer(&ct->timeout))
+			/* Only repeat if we can actually remove the timer.
+			 * Destruction may already be in progress in process
+			 * context and we must give it a chance to terminate.
+			 */
+			if (del_timer(&ct->timeout)) {
 				ct->timeout.function((unsigned long)ct);
-			return -NF_REPEAT;
+				return -NF_REPEAT;
+			}
+			return -NF_DROP;
 		}
 		/* Fall through */
 	case TCP_CONNTRACK_IGNORE: