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Add a new permission to db_procedure

PATCH New KaiGai Kohei 4 participants 8 messages Jan 18, 2009 – Jan 23, 2009 SELinux security module

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#0 lore raw

PATCH 1/1 Add a new permission to db_procedure

Hi,

The attached patch add a new permission named as "install" to db_procedure.

The purpose of this permission is to prevent malicious functions are invoked as a part of server's internal tasks.

PostgreSQL allows user-defined functions to use its internal tasks. For example, it can be used to implement an output/input handler of new data types, an index access method, implementation of operator classes and so on.

When we defines a new type, it requires to specify its output/input handler at least. No need to say, these functions should not be malicious ones, because user implicitly invokes these function when he uses the type. This permission is checked when we defines a new system catalog entry which has a possibility to invoke user defined functions.

In the attached patch, only sepgsql_proc_t is allowed to { install }, because any other user defined functions are not checked by DBA, so it is not safe to use it as a part of internal/common processes.
If DBA want to apply user defined functions as a part of internal task, he has to confirm its safeness and relabel to sepgsql_proc_t at first.

Please apply it, if no matter.

Thanks,

Signature · 8 lines
KaiGai Kohei <[email protected]>
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#1 lore raw

PATCH 1/1 Add a new permission to db_procedure

This is just an aside, I would like to make a rapid conclusion due to the current (v8.4) PostgreSQL development cycle, if possible.

http://wiki.postgresql.org/wiki/CommitFestInProgress

Quoted 26 lines · KaiGai Kohei

Hi,

The attached patch add a new permission named as "install" to db_procedure.

The purpose of this permission is to prevent malicious functions are invoked as a part of server's internal tasks.

PostgreSQL allows user-defined functions to use its internal tasks. For example, it can be used to implement an output/input handler of new data types, an index access method, implementation of operator classes and so on.

When we defines a new type, it requires to specify its output/input handler at least. No need to say, these functions should not be malicious ones, because user implicitly invokes these function when he uses the type. This permission is checked when we defines a new system catalog entry which has a possibility to invoke user defined functions.

In the attached patch, only sepgsql_proc_t is allowed to { install }, because any other user defined functions are not checked by DBA, so it is not safe to use it as a part of internal/common processes.
If DBA want to apply user defined functions as a part of internal task, he has to confirm its safeness and relabel to sepgsql_proc_t at first.

Please apply it, if no matter.

Thanks,

Signature · 2 lines
OSS Platform Development Division, NEC
KaiGai Kohei <[email protected]>
#2 lore raw
Quoted 28 lines · KaiGai Kohei

This is just an aside, I would like to make a rapid conclusion due to the current (v8.4) PostgreSQL development cycle, if possible.

http://wiki.postgresql.org/wiki/CommitFestInProgress

Quoted 22 lines · KaiGai Kohei

The attached patch add a new permission named as "install" to db_procedure.

The purpose of this permission is to prevent malicious functions are invoked as a part of server's internal tasks.

PostgreSQL allows user-defined functions to use its internal tasks. For example, it can be used to implement an output/input handler of new data types, an index access method, implementation of operator classes and so on.

When we defines a new type, it requires to specify its output/input handler at least. No need to say, these functions should not be malicious ones, because user implicitly invokes these function when he uses the type. This permission is checked when we defines a new system catalog entry which has a possibility to invoke user defined functions.

In the attached patch, only sepgsql_proc_t is allowed to { install }, because any other user defined functions are not checked by DBA, so it is not safe to use it as a part of internal/common processes.
If DBA want to apply user defined functions as a part of internal task, he has to confirm its safeness and relabel to sepgsql_proc_t at first.

Please apply it, if no matter.

Changes to object classes need to be discussed on the SELinux list.

Signature · 3 lines
Chris PeBenito
Tresys Technology, LLC
(410) 290-1411 x150
#3 lore raw
Quoted 1 line

Changes to object classes need to be discussed on the SELinux list.

OK, I send the patch again for folks in selinux-list only.

Quoted 9 lines
Quoted 9 lines
Quoted 9 lines

The attached patch add a new permission named as "install" to db_procedure.

The purpose of this permission is to prevent malicious functions are invoked as a part of server's internal tasks.

PostgreSQL allows user-defined functions to use its internal tasks. For example, it can be used to implement an output/input handler of new data types, an index access method, implementation of operator classes and so on.

Quoted 5 lines
Quoted 5 lines
Quoted 5 lines

When we defines a new type, it requires to specify its output/input handler at least. No need to say, these functions should not be malicious ones, because user implicitly invokes these function when he uses the type. This permission is checked when we defines a new system catalog entry which has a possibility to invoke user defined functions.

A supplement:
PostgreSQL allows user to define his own data type, like "struct xxx" in C language, and he can also define its input/output handler. The input/output handler is invoked when user send a text representation, to translate it into internal data structure, implicitly. For example, a function similar to atoi() is configured for INTEGER type in default.

I'm worrying about a malicious one secretly installs a malicious function which leaks given information to somewhere as a implementation of type input/output handler, in typical scenario.

In addition, it allows to install user-defined functions to implement database index access methods, multibyte encoding conversions, operator classes and so on.

Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 7 lines

In the attached patch, only sepgsql_proc_t is allowed to { install }, because any other user defined functions are not checked by DBA, so it is not safe to use it as a part of internal/common processes.
If DBA want to apply user defined functions as a part of internal task, he has to confirm its safeness and relabel to sepgsql_proc_t at first.

Please apply it, if no matter.

Thanks,

Signature · 8 lines
KaiGai Kohei <[email protected]>
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#4 lore raw

Folks,

Do you have any opinion, question, approval or opposition for the new permission to db_procedure class?

Quoted 43 lines · KaiGai Kohei
Quoted 1 line

Changes to object classes need to be discussed on the SELinux list.

OK, I send the patch again for folks in selinux-list only.

Quoted 9 lines
Quoted 9 lines
Quoted 9 lines

The attached patch add a new permission named as "install" to db_procedure.

The purpose of this permission is to prevent malicious functions are invoked as a part of server's internal tasks.

PostgreSQL allows user-defined functions to use its internal tasks. For example, it can be used to implement an output/input handler of new data types, an index access method, implementation of operator classes and so on.

Quoted 5 lines
Quoted 5 lines
Quoted 5 lines

When we defines a new type, it requires to specify its output/input handler at least. No need to say, these functions should not be malicious ones, because user implicitly invokes these function when he uses the type. This permission is checked when we defines a new system catalog entry which has a possibility to invoke user defined functions.

A supplement:
PostgreSQL allows user to define his own data type, like "struct xxx" in C language, and he can also define its input/output handler. The input/output handler is invoked when user send a text representation, to translate it into internal data structure, implicitly. For example, a function similar to atoi() is configured for INTEGER type in default.

I'm worrying about a malicious one secretly installs a malicious function which leaks given information to somewhere as a implementation of type input/output handler, in typical scenario.

In addition, it allows to install user-defined functions to implement database index access methods, multibyte encoding conversions, operator classes and so on.

Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 7 lines

In the attached patch, only sepgsql_proc_t is allowed to { install }, because any other user defined functions are not checked by DBA, so it is not safe to use it as a part of internal/common processes.
If DBA want to apply user defined functions as a part of internal task, he has to confirm its safeness and relabel to sepgsql_proc_t at first.

Please apply it, if no matter.

Thanks,

Signature · 1 line
KaiGai Kohei <[email protected]>
#5 lore raw
Quoted 47 lines · KaiGai Kohei

Folks,

Do you have any opinion, question, approval or opposition for the new permission to db_procedure class?

Quoted 40 lines · KaiGai Kohei
Quoted 1 line

Changes to object classes need to be discussed on the SELinux list.

OK, I send the patch again for folks in selinux-list only.

Quoted 9 lines
Quoted 9 lines
Quoted 9 lines

The attached patch add a new permission named as "install" to db_procedure.

The purpose of this permission is to prevent malicious functions are invoked as a part of server's internal tasks.

PostgreSQL allows user-defined functions to use its internal tasks. For example, it can be used to implement an output/input handler of new data types, an index access method, implementation of operator classes and so on.

Quoted 5 lines
Quoted 5 lines
Quoted 5 lines

When we defines a new type, it requires to specify its output/input handler at least. No need to say, these functions should not be malicious ones, because user implicitly invokes these function when he uses the type. This permission is checked when we defines a new system catalog entry which has a possibility to invoke user defined functions.

A supplement:
PostgreSQL allows user to define his own data type, like "struct xxx" in C language, and he can also define its input/output handler. The input/output handler is invoked when user send a text representation, to translate it into internal data structure, implicitly. For example, a function similar to atoi() is configured for INTEGER type in default.

I'm worrying about a malicious one secretly installs a malicious function which leaks given information to somewhere as a implementation of type input/output handler, in typical scenario.

In addition, it allows to install user-defined functions to implement database index access methods, multibyte encoding conversions, operator classes and so on.

Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 7 lines

In the attached patch, only sepgsql_proc_t is allowed to { install }, because any other user defined functions are not checked by DBA, so it is not safe to use it as a part of internal/common processes.
If DBA want to apply user defined functions as a part of internal task, he has to confirm its safeness and relabel to sepgsql_proc_t at first.

Please apply it, if no matter.

Thanks,

Chris asked me to look at this and it seems reasonable to me, no objections here.

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#6 lore raw
Quoted 45 lines · Joshua Brindle
Quoted 44 lines · KaiGai Kohei

Folks,

Do you have any opinion, question, approval or opposition for the new permission to db_procedure class?

Quoted 38 lines · KaiGai Kohei
Quoted 1 line

Changes to object classes need to be discussed on the SELinux list.

OK, I send the patch again for folks in selinux-list only.

Quoted 9 lines
Quoted 9 lines
Quoted 9 lines

The attached patch add a new permission named as "install" to db_procedure.

The purpose of this permission is to prevent malicious functions are invoked as a part of server's internal tasks.

PostgreSQL allows user-defined functions to use its internal tasks. For example, it can be used to implement an output/input handler of new data types, an index access method, implementation of operator classes and so on.

Quoted 5 lines
Quoted 5 lines
Quoted 5 lines

When we defines a new type, it requires to specify its output/input handler at least. No need to say, these functions should not be malicious ones, because user implicitly invokes these function when he uses the type. This permission is checked when we defines a new system catalog entry which has a possibility to invoke user defined functions.

A supplement:
PostgreSQL allows user to define his own data type, like "struct xxx" in C language, and he can also define its input/output handler. The input/output handler is invoked when user send a text representation, to translate it into internal data structure, implicitly. For example, a function similar to atoi() is configured for INTEGER type in default.

I'm worrying about a malicious one secretly installs a malicious function which leaks given information to somewhere as a implementation of type input/output handler, in typical scenario.

In addition, it allows to install user-defined functions to implement database index access methods, multibyte encoding conversions, operator classes and so on.

Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 6 lines

In the attached patch, only sepgsql_proc_t is allowed to { install }, because any other user defined functions are not checked by DBA, so it is not safe to use it as a part of internal/common processes.
If DBA want to apply user defined functions as a part of internal task, he has to confirm its safeness and relabel to sepgsql_proc_t at first.

Quoted 5 lines
Quoted 2 lines
Quoted 2 lines
Quoted 1 line
Quoted 1 line
Quoted 1 line

Please apply it, if no matter.

Thanks,

Chris asked me to look at this and it seems reasonable to me, no objections here.

Chris,
If we have no specific objections here, I want the new permission to be included.

Thanks,

Signature · 1 line
KaiGai Kohei <[email protected]>
#7 lore raw
Quoted 47 lines · KaiGai Kohei
Quoted 46 lines · Joshua Brindle
Quoted 45 lines · KaiGai Kohei

Folks,

Do you have any opinion, question, approval or opposition for the new permission to db_procedure class?

Quoted 39 lines · KaiGai Kohei
Quoted 1 line

Changes to object classes need to be discussed on the SELinux list.

OK, I send the patch again for folks in selinux-list only.

Quoted 9 lines
Quoted 9 lines
Quoted 9 lines

The attached patch add a new permission named as "install" to db_procedure.

The purpose of this permission is to prevent malicious functions are invoked as a part of server's internal tasks.

PostgreSQL allows user-defined functions to use its internal tasks. For example, it can be used to implement an output/input handler of new data types, an index access method, implementation of operator classes and so on.

Quoted 5 lines
Quoted 5 lines
Quoted 5 lines

When we defines a new type, it requires to specify its output/input handler at least. No need to say, these functions should not be malicious ones, because user implicitly invokes these function when he uses the type. This permission is checked when we defines a new system catalog entry which has a possibility to invoke user defined functions.

A supplement:
PostgreSQL allows user to define his own data type, like "struct xxx" in C language, and he can also define its input/output handler. The input/output handler is invoked when user send a text representation, to translate it into internal data structure, implicitly. For example, a function similar to atoi() is configured for INTEGER type in default.

I'm worrying about a malicious one secretly installs a malicious function which leaks given information to somewhere as a implementation of type input/output handler, in typical scenario.

In addition, it allows to install user-defined functions to implement database index access methods, multibyte encoding conversions, operator classes and so on.

Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 7 lines

In the attached patch, only sepgsql_proc_t is allowed to { install }, because any other user defined functions are not checked by DBA, so it is not safe to use it as a part of internal/common processes.
If DBA want to apply user defined functions as a part of internal task, he has to confirm its safeness and relabel to sepgsql_proc_t at first.

Please apply it, if no matter.

Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 4 lines
Quoted 1 line
Quoted 1 line

Thanks,

Chris asked me to look at this and it seems reasonable to me, no objections here.

Chris,
If we have no specific objections here, I want the new permission to be included.

Merged.

Signature · 3 lines
Chris PeBenito
Tresys Technology, LLC
(410) 290-1411 x150