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Smack: check for SMACK xattr max size in smack_inode_setxattr

PATCH In review Etienne Basset 2 participants 6 messages Apr 14, 2009 – Apr 17, 2009

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#0 lore raw

PATCH 1/1 Smack: check for SMACK xattr max size in smack_inode_setxattr

the following patch move the check for SMACK xattr size >= SMK_LABELLEN from smack_inode_post_setxattr (which cannot return an error to the user) to smack_inode_setxattr (which can return an error).

without patch a SMACK setxattr with size >= SMK_LABELLEN returns success although it doesn't

---

security/smack/smack_lsm.c +2 -4
index 9215149..da6954d 100644
@@ -610,7 +610,8 @@ static int smack_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
 		if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
 			rc = -EPERM;
 		/* a label cannot be void and cannot begin with '-' */
-		if (size == 0 || (size > 0 && ((char *)value)[0] == '-'))
+		if (size == 0 || size >= SMK_LABELLEN ||
+		   (size > 0 && ((char *)value)[0] == '-'))
 			rc = -EINVAL;
 	} else
 		rc = cap_inode_setxattr(dentry, name, value, size, flags);
@@ -644,9 +645,6 @@ static void smack_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
 	if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACK))
 		return;
 
-	if (size >= SMK_LABELLEN)
-		return;
-
 	isp = dentry->d_inode->i_security;
 
 	/*
maintainer
#1 lore raw
Quoted 6 lines · Etienne Basset

the following patch move the check for SMACK xattr size >= SMK_LABELLEN from smack_inode_post_setxattr (which cannot return an error to the user) to smack_inode_setxattr (which can return an error).

without patch a SMACK setxattr with size >= SMK_LABELLEN returns success although it doesn't

How about an early call to smk_import() to determine if the label if legitimate, rather than checking the length? That could save grief for other "invalid label" issues.

Quoted 35 lines

---

security/smack/smack_lsm.c +2 -5
index 9215149..da6954d 100644
@@ -610,7 +610,8 @@ static int smack_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
 		if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
 			rc = -EPERM;
 		/* a label cannot be void and cannot begin with '-' */
-		if (size == 0 || (size > 0 && ((char *)value)[0] == '-'))
+		if (size == 0 || size >= SMK_LABELLEN ||
+		   (size > 0 && ((char *)value)[0] == '-'))
 			rc = -EINVAL;
 	} else
 		rc = cap_inode_setxattr(dentry, name, value, size, flags);
@@ -644,9 +645,6 @@ static void smack_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
 	if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACK))
 		return;
 
-	if (size >= SMK_LABELLEN)
-		return;
-
 	isp = dentry->d_inode->i_security;
 
 	/*
 
--

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#2 lore raw
Quoted 11 lines · Casey Schaufler
Quoted 6 lines · Etienne Basset

the following patch move the check for SMACK xattr size >= SMK_LABELLEN from smack_inode_post_setxattr (which cannot return an error to the user) to smack_inode_setxattr (which can return an error).

without patch a SMACK setxattr with size >= SMK_LABELLEN returns success although it doesn't

How about an early call to smk_import() to determine if the label if legitimate, rather than checking the length? That could save grief for other "invalid label" issues.

Hi,

both are needed. And we'll need one call in setxattr to check the validity and one in postsetxattr/ inode_setsecurity (to set the security blob)
(which make me think we should split smk_import in 2, smk_check/smk_import_nocheck or whatever)

The harder issue is that smk_import can change the value/size of the xattr and smk_import can fail for 2 reasons : ENOMEM or EINVAL (not sure this is an issue though) (we should really split)

root@etienne-desktop:/tmp# attr -S -s SMACK64 -V '123////' toto
Attribute "SMACK64" set to a 7 byte value for toto:
123////
root@etienne-desktop:/tmp# attr -S -g SMACK64 toto
Attribute "SMACK64" had a 4 byte value for toto:
123

maybe it would be nicer to fail than change the label under the foot of the-user-who-hasnt-read-the-doc?

Etienne

Quoted 38 lines
Quoted 36 lines

---

security/smack/smack_lsm.c +2 -5
index 9215149..da6954d 100644
@@ -610,7 +610,8 @@ static int smack_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
 		if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
 			rc = -EPERM;
 		/* a label cannot be void and cannot begin with '-' */
-		if (size == 0 || (size > 0 && ((char *)value)[0] == '-'))
+		if (size == 0 || size >= SMK_LABELLEN ||
+		   (size > 0 && ((char *)value)[0] == '-'))
 			rc = -EINVAL;
 	} else
 		rc = cap_inode_setxattr(dentry, name, value, size, flags);
@@ -644,9 +645,6 @@ static void smack_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
 	if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACK))
 		return;
 
-	if (size >= SMK_LABELLEN)
-		return;
-
 	isp = dentry->d_inode->i_security;
 
 	/*
 
--

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maintainer
#3 lore raw
Quoted 26 lines · Etienne Basset
Quoted 6 lines · Casey Schaufler
Quoted 4 lines · Etienne Basset

the following patch move the check for SMACK xattr size >= SMK_LABELLEN from smack_inode_post_setxattr (which cannot return an error to the user) to smack_inode_setxattr (which can return an error).

Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 3 lines

without patch a SMACK setxattr with size >= SMK_LABELLEN returns success although it doesn't

How about an early call to smk_import() to determine if the label if legitimate, rather than checking the length? That could save grief for other "invalid label" issues.

Hi,

both are needed. And we'll need one call in setxattr to check the validity and one in postsetxattr/ inode_setsecurity (to set the security blob)
(which make me think we should split smk_import in 2, smk_check/smk_import_nocheck or whatever)

The harder issue is that smk_import can change the value/size of the xattr and smk_import can fail for 2 reasons : ENOMEM or EINVAL (not sure this is an issue though) (we should really split)

Quoted 9 lines
root@etienne-desktop:/tmp# attr -S -s SMACK64 -V '123////' toto
Attribute "SMACK64" set to a 7 byte value for toto:
123////
root@etienne-desktop:/tmp# attr -S -g SMACK64 toto
Attribute "SMACK64" had a 4 byte value for toto:
123

maybe it would be nicer to fail than change the label under the foot of the-user-who-hasnt-read-the-doc?

Clumsy attribute setting (trailing spaces, NULLs, etc) is just too easy. I like the existing behavior.

Quoted 42 lines

Etienne

Quoted 37 lines
Quoted 36 lines

---

security/smack/smack_lsm.c +2 -5
index 9215149..da6954d 100644
@@ -610,7 +610,8 @@ static int smack_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
 		if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
 			rc = -EPERM;
 		/* a label cannot be void and cannot begin with '-' */
-		if (size == 0 || (size > 0 && ((char *)value)[0] == '-'))
+		if (size == 0 || size >= SMK_LABELLEN ||
+		   (size > 0 && ((char *)value)[0] == '-'))
 			rc = -EINVAL;
 	} else
 		rc = cap_inode_setxattr(dentry, name, value, size, flags);
@@ -644,9 +645,6 @@ static void smack_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
 	if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACK))
 		return;
 
-	if (size >= SMK_LABELLEN)
-		return;
-
 	isp = dentry->d_inode->i_security;
 
 	/*
 
--

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Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/

#4 lore raw

PATCH 1/1 Smack: check for SMACK xattr validity in smack_inode_setxattr

the following patch moves checks for SMACK xattr validity from smack_inode_post_setxattr (which cannot return an error to the user) to smack_inode_setxattr (which can return an error).

---

security/smack/smack_lsm.c +6 -5
index 9215149..98b3195 100644
@@ -609,8 +609,12 @@ static int smack_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
 	    strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKIPOUT) == 0) {
 		if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
 			rc = -EPERM;
-		/* a label cannot be void and cannot begin with '-' */
-		if (size == 0 || (size > 0 && ((char *)value)[0] == '-'))
+		/*
+		 * check label validity here so import wont fail on
+		 * post_setxattr
+		 */
+		if (size == 0 || size >= SMK_LABELLEN ||
+		    smk_import(value, size) == NULL)
 			rc = -EINVAL;
 	} else
 		rc = cap_inode_setxattr(dentry, name, value, size, flags);
@@ -644,9 +648,6 @@ static void smack_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
 	if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACK))
 		return;
 
-	if (size >= SMK_LABELLEN)
-		return;
-
 	isp = dentry->d_inode->i_security;
 
 	/*
maintainer Acked-by on v1 1/1
#5 lore raw

Re: [PATCH] Smack: check for SMACK xattr validity in smack_inode_setxattr

Quoted 6 lines · Etienne Basset

the following patch moves checks for SMACK xattr validity from smack_inode_post_setxattr (which cannot return an error to the user) to smack_inode_setxattr (which can return an error).

Quoted 34 lines

---

security/smack/smack_lsm.c +6 -5
index 9215149..98b3195 100644
@@ -609,8 +609,12 @@ static int smack_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
 	    strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKIPOUT) == 0) {
 		if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
 			rc = -EPERM;
-		/* a label cannot be void and cannot begin with '-' */
-		if (size == 0 || (size > 0 && ((char *)value)[0] == '-'))
+		/*
+		 * check label validity here so import wont fail on
+		 * post_setxattr
+		 */
+		if (size == 0 || size >= SMK_LABELLEN ||
+		    smk_import(value, size) == NULL)
 			rc = -EINVAL;
 	} else
 		rc = cap_inode_setxattr(dentry, name, value, size, flags);
@@ -644,9 +648,6 @@ static void smack_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
 	if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACK))
 		return;
 
-	if (size >= SMK_LABELLEN)
-		return;
-
 	isp = dentry->d_inode->i_security;
 
 	/*