nf_conntrack_core.c: fix for dead connection after flushing conntrack cache
Subsystems (3)
PATCH 1/1 nf_conntrack_core.c: fix for dead connection after flushing conntrack cache
Hi,
we encountered a weird problem of a 'stalled' connection when using 'conntrack -F' on a box with heavy network load. 'conntrack -L' gave us sometimes a [UNREPLIED] entry for the traffic in question, but no traffic flow, no matching of packets in or out, only the timer went down from 600 to 0 (it was ESP traffic - the default generic timeout = 600 seconds). After the entry vanished by timeout (or doing a 'conntrack -F' once more), all worked normal again.
The reason we finally found, is a race window in 'nf_conntrack_confirm' when calling '__nf_conntrack_confirm':
In 'nf_conntrack_confirm' is checked (without holding a lock), if the entry to be confirmed is possibly dying: !nf_ct_is_dying(ct).
If not, then __nf_conntrack_confirm will do some sanity checking, grab a spin_lock_bh and insert the 'ct' into the lookup cache.
Now consider the following scenario:
1. a connection has seen the first packet already -> state is UNREPLIED
2. now the answer is to be sent, conntrack wants to confirm the connection
3. the !nf_ct_is_dying(ct) check is passed, __nf_conntrack_confirm is just started
4. in a user context a 'conntrack -F' command is running right now e.g. on another CPU
5. this will flag all unconfirmed connections as 'dying' in get_next_corpse(...), including the entry going to be confirmed!
6. now the already 'dying' entry is included into the hash cache in __nf_conntrack_confirm - BOOM!
After this step the connection in question is dead, because no packets are forwarded until the entry is purged from hash cache. This was a big blocker for us, because each dead IPsec tunnel is a dead branch network for 10 minutes...
For every packet from now on 'nf_conntrack_find_get' will ignore the entry, because it is dying and because __nf_conntrack_confirm finds the hash in the cache already, it will NF_DROP the packet.
The key for finding this was 'NF_CT_STAT_INC(net, insert_failed)' in __nf_conntrack_confirm.
The suggested solution is to check for '!nf_ct_is_dying(ct)' again, _after_ the spin_lock_bh is grabbed in __nf_conntrack_confirm. So it is clear, that no other softirq or user context can set that 'evil' dying flag ;-) The return value in this case should be NF_ACCEPT, so we loose no packets then, this is also important for us.
--- net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_core.c | 5 +++++ 1 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-)
(quoted diff) +0 -0
b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_core.c
index 1374179..e2c8bfe 100644
net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_core.c +5 -0
@@ -413,6 +413,11 @@ __nf_conntrack_confirm(struct sk_buff *skb)spin_lock_bh (&nf_conntrack_lock); +if (unlikely (nf_ct_is_dying (ct))) { +spin_unlock_bh (&nf_conntrack_lock); +return NF_ACCEPT ; + } +/* See if there's one in the list already, including reverse: NAT could have grabbed it without realizing, since we're not in the hash. If there is, we lost race. */
-- 1.5.6.5
Best regards
Joerg.