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Fix out-of-bounds reading in sctp_asoc_get_hmac()

PATCH Applied Dan Rosenberg 3 participants 3 messages Oct 1, 2010 – Oct 4, 2010

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#0 lore raw

PATCH 1/1 Fix out-of-bounds reading in sctp_asoc_get_hmac()

The sctp_asoc_get_hmac() function iterates through a peer's hmac_ids array and attempts to ensure that only a supported hmac entry is returned. The current code fails to do this properly - if the last id in the array is out of range (greater than SCTP_AUTH_HMAC_ID_MAX), the id integer remains set after exiting the loop, and the address of an out-of-bounds entry will be returned and subsequently used in the parent function, causing potentially ugly memory corruption. This patch resets the id integer to 0 on encountering an invalid id so that NULL will be returned after finishing the loop if no valid ids are found.

net/sctp/auth.c +6 -2
@@ -543,16 +543,20 @@ struct sctp_hmac *sctp_auth_asoc_get_hma
 		id = ntohs(hmacs->hmac_ids[i]);
 
 		/* Check the id is in the supported range */
-		if (id > SCTP_AUTH_HMAC_ID_MAX)
+		if (id > SCTP_AUTH_HMAC_ID_MAX) {
+			id = 0;
 			continue;
+		}
 
 		/* See is we support the id.  Supported IDs have name and
 		 * length fields set, so that we can allocated and use
 		 * them.  We can safely just check for name, for without the
 		 * name, we can't allocate the TFM.
 		 */
-		if (!sctp_hmac_list[id].hmac_name)
+		if (!sctp_hmac_list[id].hmac_name) {
+			id = 0;
 			continue;
+		}
 
 		break;
 	}
Acked-by on v1 1/1
#1 lore raw
Quoted 11 lines · Dan Rosenberg

The sctp_asoc_get_hmac() function iterates through a peer's hmac_ids array and attempts to ensure that only a supported hmac entry is returned. The current code fails to do this properly - if the last id in the array is out of range (greater than SCTP_AUTH_HMAC_ID_MAX), the id integer remains set after exiting the loop, and the address of an out-of-bounds entry will be returned and subsequently used in the parent function, causing potentially ugly memory corruption. This patch resets the id integer to 0 on encountering an invalid id so that NULL will be returned after finishing the loop if no valid ids are found.

Good catch.

-vlad

Quoted 28 lines
net/sctp/auth.c +6 -2
@@ -543,16 +543,20 @@ struct sctp_hmac *sctp_auth_asoc_get_hma
  		id = ntohs(hmacs->hmac_ids[i]);
 
  		/* Check the id is in the supported range */
-		if (id>  SCTP_AUTH_HMAC_ID_MAX)
+		if (id>  SCTP_AUTH_HMAC_ID_MAX) {
+			id = 0;
  			continue;
+		}
 
  		/* See is we support the id.  Supported IDs have name and
  		 * length fields set, so that we can allocated and use
  		 * them.  We can safely just check for name, for without the
  		 * name, we can't allocate the TFM.
  		 */
-		if (!sctp_hmac_list[id].hmac_name)
+		if (!sctp_hmac_list[id].hmac_name) {
+			id = 0;
  			continue;
+		}
 
  		break;
  	}
maintainer Applied
#2 lore raw

From: Vlad Yasevich <[email protected]>
Date: Fri, 01 Oct 2010 18:13:34 -0400

Quoted 13 lines · Dan Rosenberg
Quoted 12 lines

The sctp_asoc_get_hmac() function iterates through a peer's hmac_ids array and attempts to ensure that only a supported hmac entry is returned. The current code fails to do this properly - if the last id in the array is out of range (greater than SCTP_AUTH_HMAC_ID_MAX), the id integer remains set after exiting the loop, and the address of an out-of-bounds entry will be returned and subsequently used in the parent
function, causing potentially ugly memory corruption. This patch resets
the id integer to 0 on encountering an invalid id so that NULL will be returned after finishing the loop if no valid ids are found.

Quoted 5 lines
Quoted 1 line

Good catch.

Applied.