ipipe: Prevent unwritable pages after mprotect
Subsystems (2)
PATCH 1/1 ipipe: Prevent unwritable pages after mprotect
From: Jan Kiszka <[email protected]>
Page protection changes issued via mprotect, e.g. to enable executable stacks, cause spurious minor faults as they remove the write permission from the modified range again. Avoid this by faking shared pages so that vm_get_page_prot returns the desired page permissions.
--- mm/mprotect.c | 12 +++++++++++- 1 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 1 deletions(-)
mm/mprotect.c +11 -1
@@ -147,6 +147,7 @@ mprotect_fixup(struct vm_area_struct *vma, struct vm_area_struct **pprev, {struct mm_struct *mm = vma->vm_mm;unsigned long oldflags = vma->vm_flags; +unsigned long protflags;long nrpages = (end - start) >>PAGE_SHIFT ;unsigned long charged =0 ;pgoff_t pgoff;
@@ -205,8 +206,17 @@ success:* held in write mode. */ vma->vm_flags = newflags; + protflags = newflags; +#ifdef CONFIG_IPIPE +/* +* Enforce non-COW vm_page_prot by faking VM_SHARED on locked regions. +*/ +if (test_bit (MMF_VM_PINNED , &mm->flags) && + ((vma->vm_flags | mm->def_flags) &VM_LOCKED )) + protflags |=VM_SHARED ; +#endif vma->vm_page_prot =pgprot_modify (vma->vm_page_prot, -vm_get_page_prot (newflags)); +vm_get_page_prot (protflags));if (vma_wants_writenotify (vma)) { vma->vm_page_prot =vm_get_page_prot (newflags & ~VM_SHARED );
Signature · 1 line
1.7.1
Quoted 6 lines · Jan Kiszka
From: Jan Kiszka <[email protected]>
Page protection changes issued via mprotect, e.g. to enable executable stacks, cause spurious minor faults as they remove the write permission from the modified range again. Avoid this by faking shared pages so that
vm_get_page_protreturns the desired page permissions.
This looks dangerous to me. Have you checked that write to private heaps will not end up corrupting shared data?
Signature · 1 line
Gilles.
Quoted 10 lines · Gilles Chanteperdrix
Quoted 6 lines · Jan Kiszka
From: Jan Kiszka <[email protected]>
Page protection changes issued via mprotect, e.g. to enable executable stacks, cause spurious minor faults as they remove the write permission from the modified range again. Avoid this by faking shared pages so that
vm_get_page_protreturns the desired page permissions.This looks dangerous to me. Have you checked that write to private heaps will not end up corrupting shared data?
Can't follow this yet.
If you check the comment on protection_map in mm/mmap.c, the difference between private and shared is in real write vs. COW-able write. That's what my patch is exploiting to get the proper arch-dependent page protection bits.
Are you aware of side effects or do you know a better way to inject write permissions into the protection flags?
Jan
Quoted 14 lines · Jan Kiszka
Quoted 10 lines · Gilles Chanteperdrix
Quoted 6 lines · Jan Kiszka
From: Jan Kiszka <[email protected]>
Page protection changes issued via mprotect, e.g. to enable executable stacks, cause spurious minor faults as they remove the write permission from the modified range again. Avoid this by faking shared pages so that
vm_get_page_protreturns the desired page permissions.This looks dangerous to me. Have you checked that write to private heaps will not end up corrupting shared data?
Can't follow this yet.
Quoted 7 lines
If you check the comment on
protection_mapinmm/mmap.c, the difference between private and shared is in real write vs. COW-able write. That's what my patch is exploiting to get the proper arch-dependent page protection bits.Are you aware of side effects or do you know a better way to inject write permissions into the protection flags?
I would tend to think that shared and private mappings do not react the same way when we write to them.
In order to avoid the fault on first access, I would trigger a fault for each page of the mapping, the way we do it in __rthal_arm_fault_range (in ksrc/arch/arm/hal.c), but in the I-pipe kernel.
Signature · 1 line
Gilles.
Quoted 20 lines · Gilles Chanteperdrix
Quoted 19 lines · Jan Kiszka
Quoted 10 lines · Gilles Chanteperdrix
Quoted 6 lines · Jan Kiszka
From: Jan Kiszka <[email protected]>
Page protection changes issued via mprotect, e.g. to enable executable stacks, cause spurious minor faults as they remove the write permission from the modified range again. Avoid this by faking shared pages so that
vm_get_page_protreturns the desired page permissions.This looks dangerous to me. Have you checked that write to private heaps will not end up corrupting shared data?
Can't follow this yet.
If you check the comment on
protection_mapinmm/mmap.c, the difference between private and shared is in real write vs. COW-able write. That's what my patch is exploiting to get the proper arch-dependent page protection bits.
Quoted 5 lines
Quoted 2 lines
Are you aware of side effects or do you know a better way to inject write permissions into the protection flags?
I would tend to think that shared and private mappings do not react the same way when we write to them.
Yes, private mappings can undergo COW.
Quoted 4 lines
In order to avoid the fault on first access, I would trigger a fault for each page of the mapping, the way we do it in
__rthal_arm_fault_range(inksrc/arch/arm/hal.c), but in the I-pipe kernel.
That sounds like overkill, and it's potentially racy (mprotect may open a short window where the active PTEs do not allow writes for concurrently running threads).
Jan
Quoted 21 lines · Jan Kiszka
Quoted 20 lines · Gilles Chanteperdrix
Quoted 19 lines · Jan Kiszka
Quoted 10 lines · Gilles Chanteperdrix
Quoted 6 lines · Jan Kiszka
From: Jan Kiszka <[email protected]>
Page protection changes issued via mprotect, e.g. to enable executable stacks, cause spurious minor faults as they remove the write permission from the modified range again. Avoid this by faking shared pages so that
vm_get_page_protreturns the desired page permissions.This looks dangerous to me. Have you checked that write to private heaps will not end up corrupting shared data?
Can't follow this yet.
If you check the comment on
protection_mapinmm/mmap.c, the difference between private and shared is in real write vs. COW-able write. That's what my patch is exploiting to get the proper arch-dependent page protection bits.
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 5 lines
Quoted 2 lines
Are you aware of side effects or do you know a better way to inject write permissions into the protection flags?
I would tend to think that shared and private mappings do not react the same way when we write to them.
Yes, private mappings can undergo COW.
My point exactly, so, say, if the mapping is an anonymous mapping with only the zero page mapped, you will allow writing to the zero page, this does not look like a sane thing to do. The same goes for private file mappings where the code need to be modified (for instance relocations when mixing non PIC code with PIC code).
Quoted 9 lines
Quoted 5 lines
In order to avoid the fault on first access, I would trigger a fault for each page of the mapping, the way we do it in
__rthal_arm_fault_range(inksrc/arch/arm/hal.c), but in the I-pipe kernel.That sounds like overkill, and it's potentially racy (mprotect may open a short window where the active PTEs do not allow writes for concurrently running threads).
If a program starts writing to a mapping before mprotect returns, it is already bogus anyway (I am talking about triggering the fault in mprotect code of course).
Quoted 3 lines
Jan
Signature · 1 line
Gilles.
Quoted 28 lines · Gilles Chanteperdrix
Quoted 27 lines · Jan Kiszka
Quoted 25 lines · Gilles Chanteperdrix
Quoted 14 lines · Jan Kiszka
Quoted 10 lines · Gilles Chanteperdrix
Quoted 6 lines · Jan Kiszka
From: Jan Kiszka <[email protected]>
Page protection changes issued via mprotect, e.g. to enable executable stacks, cause spurious minor faults as they remove the write permission from the modified range again. Avoid this by faking shared pages so that
vm_get_page_protreturns the desired page permissions.This looks dangerous to me. Have you checked that write to private heaps will not end up corrupting shared data?
Can't follow this yet.
Quoted 7 lines
If you check the comment on
protection_mapinmm/mmap.c, the difference between private and shared is in real write vs. COW-able write. That's what my patch is exploiting to get the proper arch-dependent page protection bits.Are you aware of side effects or do you know a better way to inject write permissions into the protection flags?
I would tend to think that shared and private mappings do not react the same way when we write to them.
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 1 line
Yes, private mappings can undergo COW.
My point exactly, so, say, if the mapping is an anonymous mapping with only the zero page mapped, you will allow writing to the zero page, this does not look like a sane thing to do. The same goes for private file mappings where the code need to be modified (for instance relocations when mixing non PIC code with PIC code).
To my understanding, and testing seems to confirm this, the branch under vma_wants_writenotify in mprotect_fixup: if there is a need to fault even on shared pages (or pseudo-shared in our case), vm_page_prot will be overwritten anyway.
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 6 lines
In order to avoid the fault on first access, I would trigger a fault for each page of the mapping, the way we do it in
__rthal_arm_fault_range(inksrc/arch/arm/hal.c), but in the I-pipe kernel.
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 3 lines
That sounds like overkill, and it's potentially racy (mprotect may open a short window where the active PTEs do not allow writes for concurrently running threads).
If a program starts writing to a mapping before mprotect returns, it is already bogus anyway (I am talking about triggering the fault in mprotect code of course).
Unfortunately, there is also the case where the page was writable before mprotect and should remains so afterward, e.g. if you flip the execution right. So this race is real.
Jan
Signature · 2 lines
Siemens AG, Corporate Technology, CT T DE IT 1 Corporate Competence Center Embedded Linux
Quoted 31 lines · Jan Kiszka
Quoted 30 lines · Gilles Chanteperdrix
Quoted 28 lines · Jan Kiszka
Quoted 20 lines · Gilles Chanteperdrix
Quoted 19 lines · Jan Kiszka
Quoted 10 lines · Gilles Chanteperdrix
Quoted 6 lines · Jan Kiszka
From: Jan Kiszka <[email protected]>
Page protection changes issued via mprotect, e.g. to enable executable stacks, cause spurious minor faults as they remove the write permission from the modified range again. Avoid this by faking shared pages so that
vm_get_page_protreturns the desired page permissions.This looks dangerous to me. Have you checked that write to private heaps will not end up corrupting shared data?
Can't follow this yet.
If you check the comment on
protection_mapinmm/mmap.c, the difference between private and shared is in real write vs. COW-able write. That's what my patch is exploiting to get the proper arch-dependent page protection bits.Quoted 5 lines
Quoted 2 lines
Are you aware of side effects or do you know a better way to inject write permissions into the protection flags?
I would tend to think that shared and private mappings do not react the same way when we write to them.
Yes, private mappings can undergo COW.
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 5 lines
My point exactly, so, say, if the mapping is an anonymous mapping with only the zero page mapped, you will allow writing to the zero page, this does not look like a sane thing to do. The same goes for private file mappings where the code need to be modified (for instance relocations when mixing non PIC code with PIC code).
To my understanding, and testing seems to confirm this, the branch under
vma_wants_writenotifyinmprotect_fixup: if there is a need to fault
^handles this
Quoted 3 lines
even on shared pages (or pseudo-shared in our case),
vm_page_protwill be overwritten anyway.
Jan
Signature · 2 lines
Siemens AG, Corporate Technology, CT T DE IT 1 Corporate Competence Center Embedded Linux