tpm: vtpm_proxy: Avoid device-originated buffer overflow
Subsystems (2)
PATCH 1/1 tpm: vtpm_proxy: Avoid device-originated buffer overflow
When building with -Warray-bounds, this warning was emitted:
In function 'memset',
inlined from 'vtpm_proxy_fops_read' at drivers/char/tpm/tpm_vtpm_proxy.c:102:2:./include/linux/fortify-string.h:43:33: warning: '__builtin_memset' pointer overflow between offset 164 and size [2147483648, 4294967295] [-Warray-bounds]
43 | #define __underlying_memset __builtin_memset
| ^There was no checking of the req_len value from the device. A malicious (or buggy) device could end up leaking (and when wiping) memory contents beyond the end of the proxy buffer.
--- drivers/char/tpm/tpm_vtpm_proxy.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/char/tpm/tpm_vtpm_proxy.c +1 -1
@@ -91,7 +91,7 @@ static ssize_t vtpm_proxy_fops_read(struct file *filp, char __user *buf, len = proxy_dev->req_len; -if (count < len) { +if (count < len || len >sizeof (proxy_dev->buffer)) {mutex_unlock (&proxy_dev->buf_lock);pr_debug ("Invalid size in recv: count=%zd, req_len=%zd\n" , count, len);
Signature · 1 line
2.30.2
Quoted 27 lines · Kees Cook
When building with -Warray-bounds, this warning was emitted:
In function 'memset',
inlined from 'vtpm_proxy_fops_read' atdrivers/char/tpm/tpm_vtpm_proxy.c:102:2:./include/linux/fortify-string.h:43:33: warning: '__builtin_memset' pointer overflow between offset 164 and size [2147483648, 4294967295] [-Warray-bounds]43 | #define __underlying_memset __builtin_memset | ^There was no checking of the
req_lenvalue from the device. A malicious (or buggy) device could end up leaking (and when wiping) memory contents beyond the end of the proxy buffer.Cc Peter Huewe <[email protected]>Cc Jarkko Sakkinen <[email protected]>Cc Jason Gunthorpe <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Kees Cook <[email protected]>--- drivers/char/tpm/tpm_vtpm_proxy.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)drivers/char/tpm/tpm_vtpm_proxy.c +0
-0
drivers/char/tpm/tpm_vtpm_proxy.c static ssize_t vtpm_proxy_fops_read(struct file *filp, char __user *buf, · line 97
Quoted 8 lines
drivers/char/tpm/tpm_vtpm_proxy.c +1
-1@@ -91,7 +91,7 @@ static ssize_t vtpm_proxy_fops_read(struct file *filp, char __user *buf, len = proxy_dev->req_len; -if (count < len) { +if (count < len || len >sizeof (proxy_dev->buffer)) {mutex_unlock (&proxy_dev->buf_lock);pr_debug ("Invalid size in recv: count=%zd, req_len=%zd\n" , count, len);
Thanks for this patch.
I just want to clarify this. In vtpm_proxy_tpm_op_send() we have the only place that sets req_len to a value larger than 0:
static int vtpm_proxy_tpm_op_send(struct tpm_chip *chip, u8 *buf, size_t count) {
struct proxy_dev *proxy_dev = dev_get_drvdata(&chip->dev);
if (count > sizeof(proxy_dev->buffer)) { dev_err(&chip->dev,
"Invalid size in send: count=%zd, buffer size=%zd\n", count, sizeof(proxy_dev->buffer));
return -EIO;
}
[...]
proxy_dev->req_len = count;
memcpy(proxy_dev->buffer, buf, count);
[...]
}
The above makes sure that we cannot copy more bytes into the proxy_dev->buffer than the what the buffer has bytes for.
It then sets req_len to a valid value that is less or equal to the buffer size.
Considering this your check above seems to only be there to make the compiler happy but otherwise I don't see that this is a real problem with a buffer overflow?!
Nevertheless, let all those compilers be happy:
Quoted 31 lines · Stefan Berger
I just want to clarify this. In
vtpm_proxy_tpm_op_send()we have the only place that setsreq_lento a value larger than 0:static int
vtpm_proxy_tpm_op_send(struct tpm_chip *chip, u8 *buf, size_t count)
{
structproxy_dev*proxy_dev=dev_get_drvdata(&chip->dev);if (count >
sizeof(proxy_dev->buffer)) { dev_err(&chip->dev,
"Invalid size in send: count=%zd, buffer size=%zd\n", count,sizeof(proxy_dev->buffer));
return-EIO;
}[...]
proxy_dev->req_len= count;
memcpy(proxy_dev->buffer, buf, count);[...]
}
The above makes sure that we cannot copy more bytes into the
proxy_dev->bufferthan the what the buffer has bytes for.It then sets
req_lento a valid value that is less or equal to the buffer size.
Quoted 7 lines
Considering this your check above seems to only be there to make the compiler happy but otherwise I don't see that this is a real problem with a buffer overflow?!
Nevertheless, let all those compilers be happy:
Reviewed-by Stefan Berger <[email protected]>
Ah yes, thanks! I'll reword the commit log for v2. :)
Signature · 1 line
Kees Cook