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Use RNG to get random behaviour

PATCH Superseded matthias.bgg at kernel.org 4 participants 8 messages Dec 16, 2020

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#0 lore raw

cover Use RNG to get random behaviour

From: Matthias Brugger <[email protected]>

For now bootp and uuid code use a weak seed for generating random data. U-Boot as support for RNG devices now, so we should change to code to use them if they are present. This will help mitigate issues like seen in CVE-2019-11690.

Matthias Brugger (2):
lib: uuid: use RNG device if present
net: Use NDRNG device in srand_mac()

 lib/uuid.c     | 20 +++++++++++++++++---
 net/net_rand.h | 18 +++++++++++++++++-
 2 files changed, 34 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
Signature · 1 line
2.29.2
#1 lore raw

PATCH 1/2 lib: uuid: use RNG device if present

From: Matthias Brugger <[email protected]>

When calculating a random UUID we use a weak seed. Use a RNG device if present to increase entropy.

---

 lib/uuid.c | 20 +++++++++++++++++---
 1 file changed, 17 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
lib/uuid.c +17 -3
index e62d5ca264..219d4b7767 100644
@@ -15,6 +15,7 @@
 #include <asm/io.h>
 #include <part_efi.h>
 #include <malloc.h>
+#include <rng.h>
 
 /*
  * UUID - Universally Unique IDentifier - 128 bits unique number.
@@ -249,9 +250,22 @@ void gen_rand_uuid(unsigned char *uuid_bin)
 {
 	u32 ptr[4];
 	struct uuid *uuid = (struct uuid *)ptr;
-	int i;
-
-	srand(get_ticks() + rand());
+	int i, ret;
+	struct udevice *devp;
+	u8 randv = 0;
+
+#if defined(CONFIG_DM_RNG)
+	ret = uclass_get_device(UCLASS_RNG, 0, &devp);
+	if (ret) {
+		ret = dm_rng_read(dev, randv, sizeof(randv));
+		if (ret < 0)
+			randv = 0;
+	}
+	if (randv)
+		srand(randv);
+	else
+#endif
+		srand(get_ticks() + rand());
 
 	/* Set all fields randomly */
 	for (i = 0; i < 4; i++)
Signature · 1 line
2.29.2
#2 lore raw

PATCH 1/2 lib: uuid: use RNG device if present

Quoted 5 lines · On Wed, 16 Dec 2020 11:41:16 +0100 matthias.bgg at kernel.org wrote:
lib/uuid.c +0 -1
@@ -249,9 +250,22 @@ void gen_rand_uuid(unsigned char *uuid_bin)
 {
 	u32 ptr[4];
 	struct uuid *uuid = (struct uuid *)ptr;
-	int i;

lib/uuid.c void gen_rand_uuid(unsigned char *uuid_bin) · line 260

Quoted 10 lines
lib/uuid.c +8 -2
-
-	srand(get_ticks() + rand());
+	int i, ret;
+	struct udevice *devp;
+	u8 randv = 0;
+
+#if defined(CONFIG_DM_RNG)
+	ret = uclass_get_device(UCLASS_RNG, 0, &devp);
+	if (ret) {
+		ret = dm_rng_read(dev, randv, sizeof(randv));
		                     ^ ^

same as patch 2/2

Quoted 11 lines
lib/uuid.c +8 -0
+		if (ret < 0)
+			randv = 0;
+	}
+	if (randv)
+		srand(randv);
+	else
+#endif
+		srand(get_ticks() + rand());
 
 	/* Set all fields randomly */
 	for (i = 0; i < 4; i++)
#3 lore raw

PATCH 2/2 net: Use NDRNG device in srand_mac()

In reply to matthias.bgg at kernel.org

From: Matthias Brugger <[email protected]>

When calling srand_mac we use a weak seed dependent on the mac address. If present, use a RNG device instead to incerase entropy.

---

 net/net_rand.h | 18 +++++++++++++++++-
 1 file changed, 17 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
net/net_rand.h +17 -1
index 4bf9bd817e..600c3d825e 100644
@@ -10,6 +10,7 @@
 #define __NET_RAND_H__
 
 #include <common.h>
+#include <rng.h>
 
 /*
  * Return a seed for the PRNG derived from the eth0 MAC address.
@@ -37,7 +38,22 @@ static inline unsigned int seed_mac(void)
  */
 static inline void srand_mac(void)
 {
-	srand(seed_mac());
+#if defined(CONFIG_DM_RNG)
+	int ret;
+	struct udevice *devp;
+	u32 randv = 0;
+
+	ret = uclass_get_device(UCLASS_RNG, 0, &devp);
+	if (ret) {
+		ret = dm_rng_read(dev, randv, sizeof(randv));
+		if (ret < 0)
+			randv = 0;
+	}
+	if (randv)
+		srand(randv);
+	else
+#endif
+		srand(seed_mac());
 }
 
 #endif /* __NET_RAND_H__ */
Signature · 1 line
2.29.2
#4 lore raw

PATCH 2/2 net: Use NDRNG device in srand_mac()

Quoted 27 lines · On Wed, 16 Dec 2020 11:41:17 +0100 matthias.bgg at kernel.org wrote:

From: Matthias Brugger <[email protected]>

When calling srand_mac we use a weak seed dependent on the mac address. If present, use a RNG device instead to incerase entropy.

---

 net/net_rand.h | 18 +++++++++++++++++-
 1 file changed, 17 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
net/net_rand.h +1 -0
index 4bf9bd817e..600c3d825e 100644
@@ -10,6 +10,7 @@
 #define __NET_RAND_H__
 
 #include <common.h>
+#include <rng.h>
 
 /*
  * Return a seed for the PRNG derived from the eth0 MAC address.
@@ -37,7 +38,22 @@ static inline unsigned int seed_mac(void)
  */
 static inline void srand_mac(void)

net/net_rand.h static inline unsigned int seed_mac(void) · line 48

Quoted 10 lines
net/net_rand.h +8 -1
 {
-	srand(seed_mac());
+#if defined(CONFIG_DM_RNG)
+	int ret;
+	struct udevice *devp;
+	u32 randv = 0;
+
+	ret = uclass_get_device(UCLASS_RNG, 0, &devp);
+	if (ret) {
+		ret = dm_rng_read(dev, randv, sizeof(randv));

Haven't tested this (yet), but shouldn't this be

		ret = dm_rng_read(devp, &randv, sizeof(randv));
		                     ^  ^ ?
Quoted 11 lines
net/net_rand.h +8 -0
+		if (ret < 0)
+			randv = 0;
+	}
+	if (randv)
+		srand(randv);
+	else
+#endif
+		srand(seed_mac());
 }
 
 #endif /* __NET_RAND_H__ */
#5 lore raw

PATCH 2/2 net: Use NDRNG device in srand_mac()

Quoted 41 lines · Torsten Duwe
Quoted 27 lines · On Wed, 16 Dec 2020 11:41:17 +0100 matthias.bgg at kernel.org wrote:

From: Matthias Brugger <[email protected]>

When calling srand_mac we use a weak seed dependent on the mac address. If present, use a RNG device instead to incerase entropy.

---

 net/net_rand.h | 18 +++++++++++++++++-
 1 file changed, 17 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
net/net_rand.h +1 -0
index 4bf9bd817e..600c3d825e 100644
@@ -10,6 +10,7 @@
 #define __NET_RAND_H__
 
 #include <common.h>
+#include <rng.h>
 
 /*
  * Return a seed for the PRNG derived from the eth0 MAC address.
@@ -37,7 +38,22 @@ static inline unsigned int seed_mac(void)
  */
 static inline void srand_mac(void)

net/net_rand.h static inline unsigned int seed_mac(void) · line 48

Quoted 10 lines
net/net_rand.h +8 -1
 {
-	srand(seed_mac());
+#if defined(CONFIG_DM_RNG)
+	int ret;
+	struct udevice *devp;
+	u32 randv = 0;
+
+	ret = uclass_get_device(UCLASS_RNG, 0, &devp);
+	if (ret) {
+		ret = dm_rng_read(dev, randv, sizeof(randv));

Haven't tested this (yet), but shouldn't this be

Quoted 2 lines
		ret = dm_rng_read(devp, &randv, sizeof(randv));
		                     ^  ^ ?

Ups, yes you are right. I'll send a v2.

Regards,
Matthias

#6 lore raw

cover Use RNG to get random behaviour

In reply to matthias.bgg at kernel.org
Quoted 7 lines · On Wed, 16 Dec 2020 11:41:15 +0100 matthias.bgg at kernel.org wrote:

From: Matthias Brugger <[email protected]>

For now bootp and uuid code use a weak seed for generating random data. U-Boot as support for RNG devices now, so we should change to code to use them if they are present. This will help mitigate issues like seen in CVE-2019-11690.

First of all: thanks for bringing this up. These patches are a big improvement over the current state.

But: thinking about this further, it could be possible to give U-Boot a lightweight version of a complete entropy keeper, with /dev/random and /dev/urandom functionality. Linux, for example, will happily randomise the kernel address layout, if it's configured and the boot loader provides enough entropy...

But for now this should be good enough.

Torsten

#7 lore raw

cover Use RNG to get random behaviour

Quoted 12 lines · Torsten Duwe
Quoted 7 lines · On Wed, 16 Dec 2020 11:41:15 +0100 matthias.bgg at kernel.org wrote:

From: Matthias Brugger <[email protected]>

For now bootp and uuid code use a weak seed for generating random data. U-Boot as support for RNG devices now, so we should change to code to use them if they are present. This will help mitigate issues like seen in CVE-2019-11690.

Quoted 8 lines

First of all: thanks for bringing this up. These patches are a big improvement over the current state.

But: thinking about this further, it could be possible to give U-Boot a lightweight version of a complete entropy keeper, with /dev/random and /dev/urandom functionality. Linux, for example, will happily randomise the kernel address layout, if it's configured and the boot loader provides enough entropy...

That functionality is already available with U-Boot via the UEFI random seed functionality if you're booting Linux using U-Boot's UEFI support.