Secure IPL Support for SCSI Scheme of virtio-blk/virtio-scsi Devices
Subsystems (2)
v10 cover Secure IPL Support for SCSI Scheme of virtio-blk/virtio-scsi Devices
Changelog v9->v10
[PATCH v9 09/30] s390x/diag: Implemented DIAG 320 subcode 2
- Reworded documentation.
- Used vce->len directly from handle_diag320_store_vc().
- Dropped entry_offset; used vcb->out_len from handle_diag320_store_vc().
[PATCH v9 13/30] s390x/ipl: Introduced IPL Information Report Block (IIRB)
- Clarified IIRB in documentation and commit message.
- Reviewed-by: Collin Walling <[email protected]>
[PATCH v9 19/30] pc-bios/s390-ccw: Added signature verification for secure IPL in audit mode
- Removed trailing newline from sclp_get_fac_ipl().
- Zeroed VCB on error path in request_certificate() using memset().
- Introduced component-entry tracking struct to reduce parameter passing.
- Fixed signed/unsigned error-code mismatches in zipl_run_secure().
- Fixed sig_len/comp_len type mismatch causing negative error misinterpretation.
- Dropped unnecessary initialization of cert_len and cert_table_idx in zipl_run_secure().
[PATCH v9 20/30] pc-bios/s390-ccw: Added signed component address overlap checks
- Updated is_comp_overlap() comment.
- Tracked component ranges using SecureIplCompAddrRangeList.
[PATCH v9 22/30] pc-bios/s390-ccw: Added additional security checks for secure boot
- Refactored functions to reduce parameters.
- Renamed set_comp_cei_with_log() to validate_comp_condition() and returned a status flag.
- Renamed security-check helpers for clarity.
- check_nuc → check_no_unsigned_comp
- check_sc → check_single_comp
- check_signed_comp → check_has_signed_comp
- Added signed and unsigned counters to SecureIplSclabInfo.
- Added comment for SCLAB helper struct.
[PATCH v9 25/30] pc-bios/s390-ccw: Handled true secure IPL mode
- Removed ZIPL_BOOT_MODE_INVALID; failed immediately on invalid boot mode.
- Reviewed-by: Collin Walling <[email protected]>
------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Description
This patch series is an external requirement by Linux distribution partners to verify secure IPL process. Additional secure IPL checks are also included in this series to address security holes in the original secure IPL design to prevent malicious actors to boot modified or unsigned code despite secure IPL being enforced.
Secure IPL is enabled when the QEMU options for secure IPL are specified in the command line.
During this process, additional security checks are performed to ensure system integrity.
As components are loaded from disk, DIAG 508 subcode 2 performs signature verification if a signature entry is identified. Upon successful verification, DIAG 320 subcode 2 will request the corresponding certificate from QEMU key store to the BIOS.
Secure IPL will continue until all the components are loaded if no error occurs during True secure IPL mode or in Audit mode (see explanation below).
After that, an IPL Information report block (IIRB) is initialized immediately following an IPL Parameter Information Block. The IIRB is populated with information about the components, verification results and certificate data.
Finally, the guest system proceeds to boot.
Only List-Directed-IPL contains the relevant zIPL data structures to perform secure IPL. This patch series only adds support for the SCSI scheme of virtio-blk/virtio-scsi devices. Secure IPL for other device types will be considered as follow-up work at a later date.
** Note: "secure IPL" and "secure boot" are used interchangeably throughout the design. **
# True Secure IPL Mode and Audit Mode
## True Secure IPL Mode
When secure IPL is enabled and certificates are provided, all the secure IPL checks will performed. The boot process will abort if any error occurs during the secure IPL checks.
## Audit Mode
When the secure IPL option is not selected and certificates are provided, all the secure IPL checks will still be performed. However, the boot process will continue if any errors occur, with messages logged to the console during the secure IPL checks.
The audit mode is also considered as simulated secure IPL because it is less pervasive, and allows the guest to boot regardless of the secure checking results.
# How to Enable Secure IPL
## QEMU Build Notes
When building QEMU, enable the cryptographic libraries.
Run configure script in QEMU repository with either parameter:
./configure … --enable-gnutls
## Create Certificates via certtool
Generate and use an RSA private key for signing.
certtool --generate-privkey > key.pem
A self-signed certificate requires the organization name. Use the cert.info template to pre-fill values and avoid interactive prompts from certtool.
cat > cert.info <<EOF cn = "My Name" expiration_days = 36500 cert_signing_key EOF certtool --generate-self-signed \ --load-privkey key.pem \ --template cert.info \ --hash=SHA256 \ --outfile cert.pem
It is recommended to store the certificate(s) in the /…/qemu/certs directory for easy identification.
## Sign Kernel and Prepare zipl
All actions must be performed on a guest.
Copy the sign-file script (located in Linux source repository), generated private key(s), and certificate(s) to guest's file system.
Sign guest image(s) and stage3 binary:
./sign-file sha256 key.pem cert.pem /boot/vmlinuz-… ./sign-file sha256 key.pem cert.pem /usr/lib/s390-tools/stage3.bin
Run zipl with secure boot enabled.
zipl --secure 1 -V
Guest image(s) are now signed, stored on disk, and can be verified.
## New QEMU Command Options for Secure IPL
New parameters have been added to the s390-ccw-virtio machine type to enable Secure IPL and provide certificates for signature verification.
This parameter enables or disables Secure IPL/boot. If not specified, it defaults to off.
qemu-system-s390x -machine s390-ccw-virtio,secure-boot=on|off
This parameter specifies one or more paths to boot certificates, used for signature verification. You can provide a single certificate file or a directory.
qemu-system-s390x -machine s390-ccw-virtio, \
boot-certs.0.path=/.../qemu/certs, \
boot-certs.1.path=/another/path/cert.pemExample:
qemu-system-s390x -machine s390-ccw-virtio,
secure-boot=on, \
boot-certs.0.path=/.../qemu/certs, \
boot-certs.1.path=/another/path/cert.pemSecure IPL command options overview:
If neither the -secure-boot nor the -boot-certs options are specified, the guest will boot in normal mode, and no security checks will be conducted.
If the -secure-boot option is not specified or is set to off, and the -boot-certs option is provided, the guest will boot in audit mode. In this mode, all security checks are performed; however, any errors encountered will not interrupt the boot process.
If the -secure-boot option is set to on and the -boot-certs option is provided, the guest will boot in true secure IPL mode. In this mode, all security checks are performed, and any errors encountered will terminate the boot process.
- If the -boot-certs option is not provided in true secure IPL mode, the boot process will fail for the corresponding device.
## Constraints
- z16 or "qemu" CPU model
- certificates must be in X.509 PEM format
- only support for SCSI scheme of virtio-blk/virtio-scsi devices
- The boot process will terminate if secure boot is enabled without
specifying a boot device.
- If enabling secure boot with multiple boot devices, any
unsupported devices or non-eligible devices will cause the entire boot process terminating early with an error logged to the console.
- attempting to perform secure IPL outside of these constraints will result in a failure.
# DIAGNOSE 508 - IPL Extensions
Signature verification is performed during IPL via DIAG 508. Component address, component length, signature address and signature length are obtained in the BIOS and pass to DIAG 508 subcode 2 to perform signature verification in QEMU. If verification succeeds, DIAG 508 subcode 2 (signature verification) will return the length and index of the certificate in the QemuCertificateStore that was used for verification.
## Data Structures
Diag508SignatureVerificationBlock (SVB) — stores addresses and lengths of the component and signature to be used for signature verification. Upon verification, an index and the length of the certificate used is stored.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Changelog v8->v9
Documentation
- Replaced "userspace" with "guest code".
[PATCH v8 01/30] Add boot-certs to s390-ccw-virtio machine type option
- Fixed typo and formatting issues in documentation.
[PATCH v8 04/30] hw/s390x/ipl: Create certificate store
- Fixed coding-style issues.
- Corrected the maximum certificate count check.
- Removed QEMU_BUILD_BUG_MSG from cert-store.h.
- Reviewed-by: Farhan Ali <[email protected]>
[PATCH v8 05/30] s390x/diag: Introduce DIAG 320 for Certificate Store Facility
- Updated documentation.
- Reviewed-by: Thomas Huth <[email protected]>
[PATCH v8 06/30] s390x/diag: Refactor address validation check from diag308_parm_check
- Reviewed-by: Thomas Huth <[email protected]>
[PATCH v8 07/30] s390x/diag: Implement DIAG 320 subcode 1
- Adjusted return code in handle_diag320_query_vcsi().
- Changed double-word boundary handling to use a specification interrupt rather than an address interrupt.
[PATCH v8 09/30] s390x/diag: Implement DIAG 320 subcode 2
- Fixed a build error caused by a missing include.
- Added a comment documenting VCE_INVALID_LEN usage.
- Enforced 4 KB alignment for the subcode 2 address.
[PATCH v8 12/30] s390x/diag: Implement DIAG 508 subcode 1 for signature verification
- Reviewed-by: Farhan Ali <[email protected]>
[PATCH v8 13/30] s390x/ipl: Introduce IPL Information Report Block (IIRB)
- Reviewed-by: Farhan Ali <[email protected]>
[PATCH v8 14/30] pc-bios/s390-ccw: Define memory for IPLB and convert IPLB to pointers
- Reviewed-by: Thomas Huth <[email protected]>
[PATCH v8 16/30] s390x: Guest support for Secure-IPL Facility
- Reviewed-by: Thomas Huth <[email protected]>
[PATCH v8 19/30] pc-bios/s390-ccw: Add signature verification for secure IPL in audit mode
- Corrected ROUND_UP usage and added a remark similar to the one in osdep.h.
- Merged sclp_is_diag320_on() and sclp_get_fac134().
- Declared vcssb_data as static.
- Ensured vcssb_data is double-word aligned as required by DIAG 320 subcode 1.
- Reset vcssb->length on errors (e.g., set to 0).
- Defined vcb_data as a static array with 4 KB alignment, as required by DIAG 320 subcode 2.
- Ensured the boot process exits when required facilities are missing in secure/audit mode.
[PATCH v8 20/30] pc-bios/s390-ccw: Add signed component address overlap checks
- Handled out-of-range component address range indices according to the active boot mode.
[PATCH v8 21/30] s390x: Guest support for Secure-IPL Code Loading Attributes Facility (SCLAF)
- Fixed a documentation build issue.
[PATCH v8 22/30] pc-bios/s390-ccw: Add additional security checks for secure boot
- Fixed coding-style issues.
[PATCH v8 24/30] hw/s390x/ipl: Set IPIB flags for secure IPL
- Reviewed-by: Thomas Huth <[email protected]>
[PATCH v8 25/30] pc-bios/s390-ccw: Handle true secure IPL mode
- Removed ZIPL_BOOT_MODE_INVALID case from zipl_run() and allowed the default case to handle it.
[PATCH v8 26/30] hw/s390x/ipl: Handle secure boot with multiple boot devices
- Reviewed-by: Thomas Huth <[email protected]>
[PATCH v8 28/30] tests/functional/s390x: Add secure IPL functional test
- Made the test executable (chmod a+x) to allow direct execution outside the Meson harness.
- Updated the test to operate on a copied asset using qemu-img -b.
Changelog v7->v8
- Edited documentation
[PATCH v7 01/29] Add boot-certs to s390-ccw-virtio machine type option
- Updated version number from 10.2 to 11.0
[PATCH v7 02/29] crypto/x509-utils: Refactor with GNUTLS fallback
- Added Reviewed-by: Thomas Huth <[email protected]>
[PATCH v7 03/29] crypto/x509-utils: Add helper functions for certificate store
- Added Reviewed-by: Thomas Huth <[email protected]>
[PATCH v7 04/29] hw/s390x/ipl: Create certificate store
- Merged init_cert_x509() with init_cert()
- Simplified certificate path handling; removed redundant NULL checks in get_cert_paths()
- Added warnings for empty certificate directories and non-.pem files
- Renamed variables: VC_* → CERT_* and max_cert_size → largest_cert_size
- Made certificate store initialization independent of kernel/IPLB state
- Fixed memory leak
- Added comments explaining why DER data is not stored in S390IPLCertificate
[PATCH v7 05/29] s390x/diag: Introduce DIAG 320 for Certificate Store Facility
- Simplified control flow in handle_diag_320()
- Removed the word "Provide" from description text
[PATCH v7 06/29] s390x/diag: Refactor address validation check from diag308_parm_check()
- Added Reviewed-by: Collin Walling <[email protected]>
- Added Reviewed-by: Hendrik Brueckner <[email protected]>
[PATCH v7 07/29] s390x/diag: Implement DIAG 320 subcode 1
- Added upper-bound validation for vcssb->length
- Added Reviewed-by: Collin Walling <[email protected]>
[PATCH v7 08/29] crypto/x509-utils: Add helper functions for DIAG 320 subcode 2
- Simplified ECC curve validation logic
- Moved public-key algorithm detection to internal helpers
- Removed unused QCRYPTO_PK_ALGO enum
- Fixed commit message
[PATCH v7 09/29] s390x/diag: Implement DIAG 320 subcode 2
- Added sanity checks for key ID retrieval; mark certificates invalid if extraction fails
- Reworked VCE construction logic
- Pass S390IPLCertificate as const pointers instead of copying structs
[PATCH v7 10/29] s390x/diag: Introduce DIAG 508 for secure IPL operations
- Added Reviewed-by: Thomas Huth <[email protected]>
[PATCH v7 11/29] crypto/x509-utils: Add helper functions for DIAG 508 subcode 1
- Fixed typos
- Added Reviewed-by: Thomas Huth <[email protected]>
- Added Reviewed-by: Farhan Ali <[email protected]>
[PATCH v7 12/29] s390x/diag: Implement DIAG 508 subcode 1 for signature verification
- Added comments on maximum component and signature lengths
- Added warning indicating failures due to oversize signature or component
- Added Reviewed-by: Thomas Huth <[email protected]>
[PATCH v7 13/29] pc-bios/s390-ccw: Introduce IPL Information Report Block (IIRB)
- Updated documentation describing guest kernel usage of certificate data in the IIRB
- Simplified and renamed flags and type definitions
- Merged unused and reserved fields
- Moved IIRB definitions from pc-bios/s390-ccw/iplb.h to include/hw/s390x/ipl/qipl.h
[PATCH v7 14/29] pc-bios/s390-ccw: Define memory for IPLB and convert IPLB to pointers
- Moved IplBlocks struct from pc-bios/s390-ccw/iplb.h to include/hw/s390x/ipl/qipl.h
- Moved attribute annotations to the ipl_data declaration in main.c
* Note: checkpatch.pl flags the following:
ERROR: externs should be avoided in .c files
#88: FILE: pc-bios/s390-ccw/main.c:26:
+IplBlocks ipl_data __attribute__((__aligned__(PAGE_SIZE)));This appears to be a false positive, as IplBlocks is not declared as an extern in a .c file, and checkpatch.pl reports the same warning for the existing IplParameterBlock declaration in main.c even before this patch.
[PATCH v7 15/29] hw/s390x/ipl: Add IPIB flags to IPL Parameter Block
- Added Reviewed-by: Thomas Huth <[email protected]>
[PATCH v7 16/29] s390x: Guest support for Secure-IPL Facility
- Fixed reserved-field off-by-one error
[PATCH v7 17/29] pc-bios/s390-ccw: Refactor zipl_run()
- Added Reviewed-by: Thomas Huth <[email protected]>
[PATCH v7 19/29] pc-bios/s390-ccw: Add signature verification for secure IPL in audit mode
- Updated warning message
- Simplified control flow and error handling in zipl_run()
- Removed UNSPECIFIED boot mode and defaulted to NORMAL
- Refactored zipl_run_secure()
- Renamed variables and functions
- Adjusted index handling in verify_signature(), accounting for DIAG 320 when retrieving certificates
[PATCH v7 21/29] pc-bios/s390-ccw: Add additional security checks for secure boot
- Renamed constants:
S390_IPL_INFO_IIEI_* → S390_IIEI_*
S390_IPL_COMPONENT_CEI_* → S390_CEI_*- Improved readability by reducing function parameter counts
- Fixed check_sc() to allow only a single signed binary component
- Moved address-range/overlap checks to a separate patch
[PATCH v7 22/29] Add secure-boot to s390-ccw-virtio machine type option
- Added Reviewed-by: Thomas Huth <[email protected]>
[PATCH v7 23/29] hw/s390x/ipl: Set IPIB flags for secure IPL
- Fixed commit message
[PATCH v7 24/29] pc-bios/s390-ccw: Handle true secure IPL mode
- Updated documentation
- Fixed typo
[PATCH v7 25/29] pc-bios/s390-ccw: Handle secure boot with multiple boot devices
- Handled support for multiple secure boot devices on the QEMU side
[PATCH v7 26/29] hw/s390x/ipl: Handle secure boot without a specified boot device
- Added Reviewed-by: Thomas Huth <[email protected]>
[PATCH v7 27/29] tests/functional/s390x: Add secure IPL
- Cleaned up test code
- Switched from time.sleep() to wait_for_console_pattern()
Changelog v6->v7
Add functional test for secure IPL
Secure IPL documentation
- Merged command line into one line
- Limited line length to 80 columns
[PATCH v6 01/28] Add boot-certs to s390-ccw-virtio machine type option
- Renamed BootCertificate to BootCertificates
- Added Acked-by: Markus Armbruster <[email protected]>
[PATCH v6 02/28] crypto/x509-utils: Refactor with GNUTLS fallback
- Edited commit message
- Added Acked-by: Daniel P. Berrangé <[email protected]>
[PATCH v6 03/28] crypto/x509-utils: Add helper functions for certificate store
- Added Acked-by: Daniel P. Berrangé <[email protected]>
[PATCH v6 04/28] hw/s390x/ipl: Create certificate store
- Removed QEMU_PAKCED
- Inlined cert2buf wrapper function to reduce lines of code
- Reported error and handled exit in s390_ipl_create_cert_store()
[PATCH v6 05/28] s390x/diag: Introduce DIAG 320 for Certificate Store Facility
- Fixed typos
- Added Reviewed-by: Farhan Ali <[email protected]>
[PATCH v6 06/28] s390x/diag: Refactor address validation check from diag308_parm_check
- Moved diag_parm_addr_valid() to target/s390x/diag.c
- Added Reviewed-by: Farhan Ali <[email protected]>
[PATCH v6 07/28] s390x/diag: Implement DIAG 320 subcode 1
- Added Reviewed-by: Farhan Ali <[email protected]>
[PATCH v6 08/28] crypto/x509-utils: Add helper functions for DIAG 320 subcode 2
- Edited commit message
- Handled negative return value from gnutls_x509_crt_get_pk_algorithm() in qcrypto_x509_get_pk_algorithm
- Checked boundary before using hash_alg in qcrypto_x509_get_cert_key_id()
- Rename qcrypto_x509_is_ecc_curve_p521() to qcrypto_x509_check_ecc_curve_p521()
[PATCH v6 09/28] s390x/diag: Implement DIAG 320 subcode 2
- Removed redundant set vce->len
- Added check to make sure data doesn't exceed buffer bounds
[PATCH v6 10/28] s390x/diag: Introduce DIAG 508 for secure IPL operations
- Reworded document to avoid the term “KVM”
- Added Reviewed-by: Farhan Ali <[email protected]>
[PATCH v6 11/28] crypto/x509-utils: Add helper functions for DIAG 508 subcode 1
- Fixed indentation
- Replaced g_new0() and memcpy() with g_memdup2()
[PATCH v6 12/28] s390x/diag: Implement DIAG 508 subcode 1 for signature verification
- Edit commit message and documentation in handle_diag508_sig_verif()
- Changed diag_508_verify_sig function return type from int to bool
- Set upper limit for comp_len and sig_len to avoid malicious memory allocation
- Fixed coding style - eliminate unnecessary variables
[PATCH v6 13/28] pc-bios/s390-ccw: Introduce IPL Information Report Block (IIRB)
- Removed bios structs packing
[PATCH v6 14/28] pc-bios/s390-ccw: Define memory for IPLB and convert IPLB to pointers
- specify ipl_data attribute in the pc-bios/s390-ccw/main.c
[PATCH v6 15/28] hw/s390x/ipl: Add IPIB flags to IPL Parameter Block
- Moved the setting of iplb->len to when the DIAG308_IPIB_FLAGS_IPLIR is set
[PATCH v6 17/28] pc-bios/s390-ccw: Refactor zipl_run()
- Preserved return error value from zipl_run_normal()
[PATCH v6 18/28] pc-bios/s390-ccw: Rework zipl_load_segment function
- Fixed typoes
- Added Reviewed-by: Thomas Huth <[email protected]>
[PATCH v6 19/28] pc-bios/s390-ccw: Add signature verification for secure IPL in audit mode
- Edited documentation
- Removed bios structs packing
- Be more specific in the error message and mention Passthrough (vfio) CCW device does not support secure boot
- Allocated memory for vcb using max_single_vcb_len instead of MAX_SECTOR_SIZE in request_certificate()
- Rename variables in zipl_run_secure()cert_index → cert_entry_idxcomp_index → comp_entry_idxcert_idx → cert_table_idx
- Refactored handle_certificate(): only handles certificate related operations and moved the increment of cert_entry_idx and cert to zipl_run_secure()
[PATCH v6 21/28] pc-bios/s390-ccw: Add additional security checks for secure boot
- Fixed coding style
- Added out of range warning in comp_addr_range_add()
- Fixed end address issue in is_psw_valid() and is_comp_overlap()
- Inlined comparison functions
[PATCH v6 22/28] Add secure-boot to s390-ccw-virtio machine type option
- Moved bool secure_boot next to other bool variables to avoid additional padding
[PATCH v6 24/28] pc-bios/s390-ccw: Handle true secure IPL mode
- Edited documentation
- Used panic instead of IPL_assert() in zipl_secure_handle()
[PATCH v6 25/28] pc-bios/s390-ccw: Handle secure boot with multiple boot devices
- Used a stack variable for QemuIplParameters instead of a malloc in check_secure_boot_support()
Changelog v5->v6
Add boot-certs to s390-ccw-virtio machine type option
- Renamed struct BootCertPath to BootCertificate
- Defined DummyBootCertificates struct for QMP to use BootCertificateList internally
crypto/x509-utils
- Used gnutls_x509_crt_export2() in qcrypto_x509_convert_cert_der()
- Allocated buffers with g_new for results in qcrypto_x509_convert_cert_der() and qcrypto_pkcs7_convert_sig_pem()
- Added check for qcrypto_to_gnutls_hash_alg_map bounds in qcrypto_x509_get_cert_key_id()
- Added qcrypto_x509_is_ecc_curve_p521() function to determine if an ECC public key algorithm uses P521 curve
- Fixed typo
hw/s390x/ipl: Create certificate store
- Made any configuration errors fatal when loading certificates into the cert store
- Removed key_id_size and hash_size from S390IPLCertificate and defined them as constants
- Do not reinitialize the cert store if it already exists
- Handled memory cleanup
s390x/diag: Implement DIAG 320 subcode 1
- Added QEMU_BUILD_BUG_MSG
s390x/diag: Implement DIAG 320 subcode 2
- Refactored build_vce_header() and created a new function for getting key type
- Added QEMU_BUILD_BUG_MSG
s390x/diag: Implement DIAG 508 subcode 1 for signature verification
- Updated Diag508SigVerifBlock
hw/s390x/ipl: Add IPIB flags to IPL Parameter Block
- Override IPLB length only when DIAG308_IPIB_FLAGS_IPLIR flag is set
- Dropped hw/s390x/ipl: Set iplb->len to maximum length of IPL Parameter Block patch
pc-bios/s390-ccw: Add signature verification for secure IPL in audit mode
- Added validation for VCB and VCE before retrieving information in request_certificate()
- Replaced uint64_t *cert with uint8_t *cert in zipl_run_secure()
Changelog v4->v5
- Segmented documentation by introducing them alongside the patches that add the relevant functionality
- Removed hash-type restriction from S390IPLCertificateStore
Add boot-certs to s390-ccw-virtio machine type option
- Added boot-certs property to the s390-ccw-virtio machine type
- Changed to use an array property for passing certificate instead
of colo-delimited strings.
e.g. boot-certs.0.path=/path/to/dir,
boot-certs.1.path=/to/other/dir,
boot-certs.2.path=/some/...crypto/x509-utils
- Refactored fallback handling into a separated commit
- Removed QCryptoKeyidFlags and qcrypto_x509_get_keyid_len() function
- Removed qcrypto_x509_get_cert_version() and qcrypto_x509_get_signature_algorithm()
- Passed QCryptoHashAlgo to qcrypto_x509_get_cert_key_id() instead of QCryptoKeyidFlags
- Improved memory cleanup
hw/s390x/ipl: Create certificate store
- Fixed error handling and memory management
- Added condition to only accept files with ".pem" extension
s390x: Guest support for Certificate Store Facility (CS)
- Renamed "S390_FEAT_DIAG_320" to "S390_FEAT_CERT_STORE"
- Merged this patch with s390x/diag: Introduce DIAG 320 for certificate store facility patch
s390x/diag: Introduce DIAG 320 for certificate store facility
- Added bit zero to indicate subcode 0 is supported
- Set response code to 0x0102 when the subcode is not supported
- Added check to ensure subcode fits within one byte
s390x/diag: Implement DIAG 320 subcode 1
- Refactored and moved implementation to a helper function
- Added check to ensure VCSSB length is set to a minimum of 128 bytes from the userspace
- Removed max_vce_len field from the VCSSB data structure
s390x/diag: Implement DIAG 320 subcode 2
- Refactored and split functions for extracting certificate information
- Set VCE length to 72 if certificate is invalid
- Returned VCE even if the certificate is invalid
pc-bios/s390-ccw: Refactor zipl_run()
- Refactor zipl_run_normal() to reduce duplicate code
pc-bios/s390-ccw: Add signature verification for secure IPL in audit mode
- Moved secure-boot related functions into secure-ipl.c/h files
- Rename zipl_handle_sig_entry() to zipl_load_signature()
- Refactored zipl_run_secure() to use switch cases for different entry types instead of a while loop
- Renamed ZiplBootMode enumerations with "ZIPL_BOOT_MODE" prefix
- Added meaningful file header to secure-ipl.c
- Renamed zipl_secure_print() to zipl_secure_handle()
Changelog v3->v4:
cyrpto/x590-utils
- Updated patch descriptions to summarize what each patch introduces.
- Restricted accepted certificate format on the QEMU command line to PEM only.
- Added internal conversion routines to handle PEM-to-DER and
DER-to-PEM as needed.
- Renamed crypto functions using the qcrypto_x509_ prefix.
- Replaced QAPI enums with plain C enums.
- Improved GNUTLS error propagation throughout the crypto API.
- Standardized error returns to -1 (instead of using errno values) for consistency.
- Removed unused helpers: qcrypto_check_x509_cert_fmt() and qcrypto_get_x509_hash_len().
- Added bounds checking before converting GNUTLS enums to internal crypto enums.
- Modified qcrypto_get_x509_cert_key_id() to dynamically allocate the result.
- Fixed a typo in the crypto API documentation.
hw/s390x/ipl: Create certificate store
- Removed max_size check when loading certificate.
- Removed check_path_type() and use the stat() & S_ISXXX checks inline where needed.
- Initialized all g_autofree variables.
- Refactored get_cert_paths()
- Used g_auto(GStrv) and g_autoptr(GPtrArray) for automatic cleanup.
- Renamed misleading variables and dropped unnecessary intermediates.
- Replaced check_path_type() with stat(), and treated failures as fatal.
- Treated empty path components as fatal configuration errors.
- Used GError with g_dir_open() and handled errors properly.
- Removed redundant casts and manual cleanup.
- Treated providing 65 or more certificates as a fatal error.
- Modified S390IPLCertificate
- Changed raw from char * to uint8_t * for API consistency.
- Added cert_der field to calculate certificate data buffer size for
DIAG 320 and format conversion.
s390x/diag
- Handled error propagation from crypto API correctly.
- Added g_autofree to variables to ensure proper memory cleanup.
- Initialized all g_autofree variables.
pc-bios/s390-ccw: Add signature verification for secure IPL in audit mode
- Allocated certificate buffer based on calculated size instead of static MAX_CERT_SIZE.
pc-bios/s390-ccw: Add additional security checks for secure boot
- Refactored to improve readability.
- Handled SCLAB Single Component/No Unsigned Component flags.
docs: Add secure IPL documentation
- Updated documentation.
- Illustrated with gnutls ‘certtool’ instead of ‘openssl’ for consistency with other certificate creation docs.
- Updated cover letter with corresponding changes.
Changelog v2->v3:
- Fixed typos in patches
- Edited and corrected patch description
- Enabled secure IPL feature in TCG
- Split crypto subsystem changes from s390x subsystem changes
- Added API documentation for each helper function
- Removed qcrypto_get_x509_cert_fmt()
- Reworked qcrypto_check_x509_cert_fmt() to return 0 on success and
negative error code on errors
- Rephrased error messages when GNUTLS is not enabled
- Changed dev cycle reference from 9.2 to 10.1
hw/s390x/ipl: Create certificate store
- Passed *cert_buf to g_file_get_contents() directly in cert2buf()
- Returned NULL for early returns
- Added check to only allow maximum of 64 certificates in the certificate store
s390x: Guest support for Certificate Store Facility (CS)
- Renamed “diag320” to “cstore”
s390x/diag: Implement DIAG 320 subcode 1
- Removed QEMU_PACKED from VCStorageSizeBlock
- Removed unnecessary error check from subcode 1 implementation
s390x/diag: Implement DIAG 320 subcode 2
- Removed QEMU_PACKED from VCBlock and VCEngtry
- Reworked diag_320_is_cert_valid() to return 0 on success and negative error code on errors
- Set *key_id_data and *hash_data to NULL after g_free()
- Moved DIAG_320_SUBC_STORE_VC case block implementation to a separate function
s390x/diag: Implement DIAG 508 subcode 1 for signature verification
- Added a reserved field to Diag508CertificateStoreInfo
- Removed QEMU_PACKED from Diag508CertificateStoreInfo and Diag508SignatureVerificationBlock
- Applied g_autofree to svb, svb_comp and svb_sig varaibles
- Moved DIAG_508_SUBC_SIG_VERIF case block implementation to a separate function
pc-bios/s390-ccw: Refactor zipl_load_segment function
- Removed casting when calculating comp_len
pc-bios/s390-ccw: Add signature verification for secure IPL in audit mode
- Used malloc() to allocate certificate buffer instead of statically allocating
- Reworked zipl_secure_print()
s390x: Guest support for Secure-IPL Code Loading Attributes Facility (SCLAF)
- Added check to make sure SIPL is enabled when SCLAF is enabled
docs: Add secure IPL documentation
- Split document into two parts:
- docs/specs/s390x-secure-ipl.rst (developer reference)
- docs/system/s390x/secure-ipl.rst (user guide)
Changelog v1->v2:
- Fixed typos in patches
- Edited cover letter
- Added secure IPL documentation
QEMU Command-Line Interface:
- Moved boot-certificates under the machine-type option for s390x-virtio-ccw
- Moved secure-boot under the machine-type option for s390x-virtio-ccw
hw/s390x/ipl: Create Certificate Store
- Defined internal GNUTLS-related APIs
- Added check to only accept certificates using SHA-256 hashing
- Recalculated data_buf_size to ensure word alignment
- Cleaned up memory allocation
- Refactored functions for clarity
s390x: Guest Support for Certificate Store Facility (CS)
- Updated patch description to clarify:
- Why Secure IPL is not available with Secure Execution
- Why this feature requires S390_FEAT_EXTENDED_LENGTH_SCCB
-Restricted features to z16 due to additional layers requiring z16
s390x/diag: Implement DIAG 320 Subcode 1
- Renamed VerificationCertificate prefix to VC
- Byte-swap written values for endianness correctness
s390x/diag: Implement DIAG 320 Subcode 2
- Edited commit message for clarity
- Defined internal GNUTLS-related APIs
- Renamed data structure variables
- Ensured length fields in VCE are word-aligned
- Handled the VC index 0 case
- General refactoring
s390x/diag: Implement DIAG 508 Subcode 2 for Signature Verification
- Defined subcode from 2 to 1
- Removed unused error codes
- Defined internal GNUTLS-related APIs
- Byte-swap read values
hw/s390x/ipl: Add IPIB Flags to IPL Parameter Block
- Moved DIAG308 flags to a new header file
s390x: Guest Support for Secure-IPL Facility
- Renamed SCLP variable from cbl to fac_ipl
pc-bios/s390-ccw: Add Signature Verification for Secure Boot (Audit Mode)
- Moved Secure IPL-related functions to pc-bios/s390-ccw/secure-ip.c|h
- Refactored code for clarity
Collin L. Walling (2):
s390x/diag: Introduce DIAG 508 for secure IPL operations s390x/diag: Implement DIAG 508 subcode 1 for signature verification
Zhuoying Cai (28):
Add boot-certs to s390-ccw-virtio machine type option crypto/x509-utils: Refactor with GNUTLS fallback crypto/x509-utils: Add helper functions for certificate store hw/s390x/ipl: Create certificate store
s390x/diag: Introduce DIAG 320 for Certificate Store Facility s390x/diag: Refactor address validation check from diag308_parm_check s390x/diag: Implement DIAG 320 subcode 1 crypto/x509-utils: Add helper functions for DIAG 320 subcode 2 s390x/diag: Implement DIAG 320 subcode 2 crypto/x509-utils: Add helper functions for DIAG 508 subcode 1 s390x/ipl: Introduce IPL Information Report Block (IIRB) pc-bios/s390-ccw: Define memory for IPLB and convert IPLB to pointers hw/s390x/ipl: Add IPIB flags to IPL Parameter Block
s390x: Guest support for Secure-IPL Facility pc-bios/s390-ccw: Refactor zipl_run()
pc-bios/s390-ccw: Rework zipl_load_segment function pc-bios/s390-ccw: Add signature verification for secure IPL in audit
mode
pc-bios/s390-ccw: Add signed component address overlap checks
s390x: Guest support for Secure-IPL Code Loading Attributes Facility
(SCLAF)
pc-bios/s390-ccw: Add additional security checks for secure boot Add secure-boot to s390-ccw-virtio machine type option hw/s390x/ipl: Set IPIB flags for secure IPL pc-bios/s390-ccw: Handle true secure IPL mode hw/s390x/ipl: Handle secure boot with multiple boot devices hw/s390x/ipl: Handle secure boot without specifying a boot device tests/functional/s390x: Add secure IPL functional test docs/specs: Add secure IPL documentation docs/system/s390x: Add secure IPL documentation
crypto/meson.build | 2 +- crypto/x509-utils.c | 409 +++++++++++++ docs/specs/index.rst | 1 + docs/specs/s390x-secure-ipl.rst | 193 ++++++ docs/system/s390x/secure-ipl.rst | 177 ++++++ docs/system/target-s390x.rst | 1 + hw/s390x/cert-store.c | 221 +++++++ hw/s390x/cert-store.h | 38 ++ hw/s390x/ipl.c | 87 +++ hw/s390x/ipl.h | 24 +- hw/s390x/meson.build | 1 + hw/s390x/s390-virtio-ccw.c | 52 ++ hw/s390x/sclp.c | 2 + include/crypto/x509-utils.h | 113 ++++ include/hw/s390x/ipl/diag308.h | 34 ++ include/hw/s390x/ipl/diag320.h | 97 +++ include/hw/s390x/ipl/diag508.h | 45 ++ include/hw/s390x/ipl/qipl.h | 97 ++- include/hw/s390x/s390-virtio-ccw.h | 3 + include/hw/s390x/sclp.h | 4 +- pc-bios/s390-ccw/Makefile | 2 +- pc-bios/s390-ccw/bootmap.c | 100 +++- pc-bios/s390-ccw/bootmap.h | 11 + pc-bios/s390-ccw/iplb.h | 5 +- pc-bios/s390-ccw/jump2ipl.c | 6 +- pc-bios/s390-ccw/main.c | 37 +- pc-bios/s390-ccw/netmain.c | 8 +- pc-bios/s390-ccw/s390-ccw.h | 29 + pc-bios/s390-ccw/sclp.c | 45 ++ pc-bios/s390-ccw/sclp.h | 7 + pc-bios/s390-ccw/secure-ipl.c | 688 ++++++++++++++++++++++ pc-bios/s390-ccw/secure-ipl.h | 177 ++++++ qapi/machine-s390x.json | 23 + qapi/pragma.json | 1 + qemu-options.hx | 10 +- target/s390x/cpu_features.c | 7 + target/s390x/cpu_features.h | 1 + target/s390x/cpu_features_def.h.inc | 5 + target/s390x/cpu_models.c | 7 + target/s390x/diag.c | 585 +++++++++++++++++- target/s390x/gen-features.c | 7 + target/s390x/kvm/kvm.c | 34 ++ target/s390x/s390x-internal.h | 4 + target/s390x/tcg/misc_helper.c | 14 + tests/functional/s390x/meson.build | 2 + tests/functional/s390x/test_secure_ipl.py | 148 +++++ 46 files changed, 3496 insertions(+), 68 deletions(-) create mode 100644 docs/specs/s390x-secure-ipl.rst create mode 100644 docs/system/s390x/secure-ipl.rst create mode 100644 hw/s390x/cert-store.c create mode 100644 hw/s390x/cert-store.h create mode 100644 include/hw/s390x/ipl/diag308.h create mode 100644 include/hw/s390x/ipl/diag320.h create mode 100644 include/hw/s390x/ipl/diag508.h create mode 100644 pc-bios/s390-ccw/secure-ipl.c create mode 100644 pc-bios/s390-ccw/secure-ipl.h create mode 100755 tests/functional/s390x/test_secure_ipl.py
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
PATCH v10 1/30 Add boot-certs to s390-ccw-virtio machine type option
Introduce a new boot-certs machine type option for the s390-ccw-virtio machine. This allows users to specify one or more certificate file paths or directories to be used during secure boot.
Each entry is specified using the syntax:
boot-certs.<index>.path=/path/to/cert.pem
Multiple paths can be specify using array properties:
boot-certs.0.path=/path/to/cert.pem, boot-certs.1.path=/path/to/cert-dir, boot-certs.2.path=/path/to/another-dir...
--- docs/system/s390x/secure-ipl.rst | 20 ++++++++++++++++++++ docs/system/target-s390x.rst | 1 + hw/s390x/s390-virtio-ccw.c | 30 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ include/hw/s390x/s390-virtio-ccw.h | 2 ++ qapi/machine-s390x.json | 23 +++++++++++++++++++++++ qapi/pragma.json | 1 + qemu-options.hx | 6 +++++- 7 files changed, 82 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) create mode 100644 docs/system/s390x/secure-ipl.rst
docs/system/s390x/secure-ipl.rst new file +20 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,20 @@ +.. SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later + +Secure IPL Command Line Options +=============================== + +The s390-ccw-virtio machine type supports secure IPL. These parameters allow +users to provide certificates and enable secure IPL directly via the command +line. + +Providing Certificates +---------------------- + +The certificate store can be populated by supplying a list of X.509 certificate +file paths or directories containing certificate files on the command-line: + +Note: certificate files must have a .pem extension. + +.. code-block:: shell + + qemu-system-s390x -machine s390-ccw-virtio,boot-certs.0.path=/.../qemu/certs,boot-certs.1.path=/another/path/cert.pem ...
docs/system/target-s390x.rst +1 -0
@@ -35,3 +35,4 @@ Architectural features s390x/bootdevices s390x/protvirt s390x/cpu-topology + s390x/secure-ipl
hw/s390x/s390-virtio-ccw.c +30 -0
@@ -44,6 +44,7 @@#include "target/s390x/kvm/pv.h" #include "migration/blocker.h" #include "qapi/visitor.h" +#include "qapi/qapi-visit-machine-s390x.h" #include "hw/s390x/cpu-topology.h" #include "kvm/kvm_s390x.h" #include "hw/virtio/virtio-md-pci.h"
@@ -788,6 +789,30 @@ static void machine_set_loadparm(Object *obj, Visitor *v,g_free (val); } +static void machine_get_boot_certs (Object *obj,Visitor *v, +const char *name,void *opaque, +Error **errp) +{ +S390CcwMachineState *ms =S390_CCW_MACHINE (obj); +BootCertificatesList **certs = &ms->boot_certs; + +visit_type_BootCertificatesList (v, name, certs, errp); +} + +static void machine_set_boot_certs (Object *obj,Visitor *v,const char *name, +void *opaque,Error **errp) +{ +S390CcwMachineState *ms =S390_CCW_MACHINE (obj); +BootCertificatesList *cert_list =NULL ; + +visit_type_BootCertificatesList (v, name, &cert_list, errp); +if (!cert_list) { +return ; + } + + ms->boot_certs = cert_list; +} +static void ccw_machine_class_init (ObjectClass *oc,const void *data) {MachineClass *mc =MACHINE_CLASS (oc);
@@ -841,6 +866,11 @@ static void ccw_machine_class_init(ObjectClass *oc, const void *data)"Up to 8 chars in set of [A-Za-z0-9. ] (lower case chars converted" " to upper case) to pass to machine loader, boot manager," " and guest kernel"); + +object_class_property_add (oc,"boot-certs" ,"BootCertificatesList" , + machine_get_boot_certs, machine_set_boot_certs,NULL ,NULL ); +object_class_property_set_description (oc,"boot-certs" , +"provide paths to a directory and/or a certificate file for secure boot" ); }static inline void s390_machine_initfn (Object *obj)
include/hw/s390x/s390-virtio-ccw.h +2 -0
@@ -14,6 +14,7 @@#include "hw/core/boards.h" #include "qom/object.h" #include "hw/s390x/sclp.h" +#include "qapi/qapi-types-machine-s390x.h" #define TYPE_S390_CCW_MACHINE "s390-ccw-machine"
@@ -31,6 +32,7 @@ struct S390CcwMachineState {uint8_t loadparm[8 ];uint64_t memory_limit;uint64_t max_pagesize; +BootCertificatesList *boot_certs;SCLPDevice *sclp; };
qapi/machine-s390x.json +23 -0
@@ -140,3 +140,26 @@ { 'event': 'SCLP_CPI_INFO_AVAILABLE', 'features': [ 'unstable' ] } + +## +# @BootCertificates: +# +# Boot certificates for secure IPL. +# +# @path: path to an X.509 certificate file or a directory containing +# certificate files. +# +# Since: 11.1 +## +{ 'struct': 'BootCertificates', + 'data': {'path': 'str'} } + +## +# @DummyBootCertificates: +# +# Not used by QMP; hack to let us use BootCertificatesList internally. +# +# Since: 11.1 +## +{ 'struct': 'DummyBootCertificates', + 'data': {'unused-boot-certs': ['BootCertificates'] } }
qapi/pragma.json +1 -0
@@ -49,6 +49,7 @@ 'DisplayProtocol', 'DriveBackupWrapper', 'DummyBlockCoreForceArrays', + 'DummyBootCertificates', 'DummyForceArrays', 'DummyVirtioForceArrays', 'HotKeyMod',
qemu-options.hx +5 -1
@@ -45,7 +45,8 @@ DEF("machine", HAS_ARG, QEMU_OPTION_machine, \ " memory-backend='backend-id' specifies explicitly provided backend for main RAM (default=none)\n" " cxl-fmw.0.targets.0=firsttarget,cxl-fmw.0.targets.1=secondtarget,cxl-fmw.0.size=size[,cxl-fmw.0.interleave-granularity=granularity]\n" " sgx-epc.0.memdev=memid,sgx-epc.0.node=numaid\n" - " smp-cache.0.cache=cachename,smp-cache.0.topology=topologylevel\n", + " smp-cache.0.cache=cachename,smp-cache.0.topology=topologylevel\n" + " boot-certs.0.path=/path/directory,boot-certs.1.path=/path/file provides paths to a directory and/or a certificate file\n", QEMU_ARCH_ALL) SRST ``-machine [type=]name[,prop=value[,...]]``
@@ -209,6 +210,9 @@ SRST :: -machine smp-cache.0.cache=l1d,smp-cache.0.topology=core,smp-cache.1.cache=l1i,smp-cache.1.topology=core + + ``boot-certs.0.path=/path/directory,boot-certs.1.path=/path/file`` + Provide paths to a directory and/or a certificate file on the host [s390x only]. ERST DEF("M", HAS_ARG, QEMU_OPTION_M,
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
PATCH v10 2/30 crypto/x509-utils: Refactor with GNUTLS fallback
In reply to Zhuoying CaiAlways compile x509-utils.c and add a fallback when GNUTLS is unavailable.
These functions will be needed in the s390x code regardless of whether GNUTLS is available.
--- crypto/meson.build | 2 +- crypto/x509-utils.c | 16 ++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 17 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
crypto/meson.build +1 -1
@@ -22,12 +22,12 @@ crypto_ss.add(files( 'tlscredsx509.c', 'tlssession.c', 'rsakey.c', + 'x509-utils.c', )) if gnutls.found() crypto_ss.add(files( 'tlscredsbox.c', - 'x509-utils.c', )) endif
crypto/x509-utils.c +16 -0
@@ -11,6 +11,8 @@#include "qemu/osdep.h" #include "qapi/error.h" #include "crypto/x509-utils.h" + +#ifdef CONFIG_GNUTLS #include <gnutls/gnutls.h> #include <gnutls/crypto.h> #include <gnutls/x509.h>
@@ -78,3 +80,17 @@ int qcrypto_get_x509_cert_fingerprint(uint8_t *cert, size_t size,gnutls_x509_crt_deinit (crt); return ret; } + +#else /* ! CONFIG_GNUTLS */ + +int qcrypto_get_x509_cert_fingerprint (uint8_t *cert,size_t size, +QCryptoHashAlgo hash, +uint8_t *result, +size_t *resultlen, +Error **errp) +{ +error_setg (errp,"GNUTLS is required to get fingerprint" ); +return -1 ; +} + +#endif /* ! CONFIG_GNUTLS */
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
PATCH v10 3/30 crypto/x509-utils: Add helper functions for certificate store
In reply to Zhuoying CaiIntroduce new helper functions for x509 certificate, which will be used by the certificate store:
qcrypto_x509_convert_cert_der() - converts a certificate from PEM to DER format
These functions provide support for certificate format conversion.
--- crypto/x509-utils.c | 49 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ include/crypto/x509-utils.h | 21 ++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 70 insertions(+)
crypto/x509-utils.c +49 -0
@@ -81,6 +81,46 @@ int qcrypto_get_x509_cert_fingerprint(uint8_t *cert, size_t size,return ret; } +int qcrypto_x509_convert_cert_der (uint8_t *cert,size_t size, +uint8_t **result,size_t *resultlen, +Error **errp) +{ +int ret =-1 ; +int rc; +gnutls_x509_crt_t crt; +gnutls_datum_t datum = {.data = cert, .size = size}; +gnutls_datum_t datum_der = {.data =NULL , .size =0 }; + + rc =gnutls_x509_crt_init (&crt); +if (rc <0 ) { +error_setg (errp,"Failed to initialize certificate: %s" ,gnutls_strerror (rc)); +return ret; + } + + rc =gnutls_x509_crt_import (crt, &datum,GNUTLS_X509_FMT_PEM ); +if (rc !=0 ) { +error_setg (errp,"Failed to import certificate: %s" ,gnutls_strerror (rc)); + goto cleanup; + } + + rc =gnutls_x509_crt_export2 (crt,GNUTLS_X509_FMT_DER , &datum_der); +if (rc !=0 ) { +error_setg (errp,"Failed to convert certificate to DER format: %s" , +gnutls_strerror (rc)); + goto cleanup; + } + + *resultlen = datum_der.size; + *result =g_memdup2 (datum_der.data, datum_der.size); + + ret =0 ; + +cleanup: +gnutls_x509_crt_deinit (crt); +gnutls_free (datum_der.data); +return ret; +} +#else /* ! CONFIG_GNUTLS */ int qcrypto_get_x509_cert_fingerprint(uint8_t *cert, size_t size,
@@ -93,4 +133,13 @@ int qcrypto_get_x509_cert_fingerprint(uint8_t *cert, size_t size, return -1; } +int qcrypto_x509_convert_cert_der (uint8_t *cert,size_t size, +uint8_t **result, +size_t *resultlen, +Error **errp) +{ +error_setg (errp,"GNUTLS is required to export X.509 certificate" ); +return -1 ; +} +#endif /* ! CONFIG_GNUTLS */
include/crypto/x509-utils.h +21 -0
@@ -19,4 +19,25 @@ int qcrypto_get_x509_cert_fingerprint(uint8_t *cert, size_t size,size_t *resultlen, Error **errp); +/** +* qcrypto_x509_convert_cert_der +* @cert: pointer to the raw certificate data in PEM format +* @size: size of the certificate +* @result: output location for the allocated buffer for the certificate +* in DER format +* (the function allocates memory which must be freed by the caller) +* @resultlen: pointer to the size of the buffer (will be updated with the +* actual size of the DER-encoded certificate) +* @errp: error pointer +* +* Convert the given @cert from PEM to DER format. +* +* Returns: 0 on success, +* -1 on error. +*/ +int qcrypto_x509_convert_cert_der (uint8_t *cert,size_t size, +uint8_t **result, +size_t *resultlen, +Error **errp); +#endif
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Re: [PATCH v10 03/30] crypto/x509-utils: Add helper functions for certificate store
Quoted 52 lines · Zhuoying Cai
Introduce new helper functions for x509 certificate, which will be used by the certificate store:
qcrypto_x509_convert_cert_der()- converts a certificate from PEM to DER formatThese functions provide support for certificate format conversion.
Signed-off-by Zhuoying Cai <[email protected]>Reviewed-by Daniel P. Berrangé <[email protected]>Reviewed-by Farhan Ali <[email protected]>Reviewed-by Thomas Huth <[email protected]>--- crypto/x509-utils.c | 49 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ include/crypto/x509-utils.h | 21 ++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 70 insertions(+)crypto/x509-utils.c +27
-0@@ -81,6 +81,46 @@ int qcrypto_get_x509_cert_fingerprint(uint8_t *cert, size_t size,return ret; } +int qcrypto_x509_convert_cert_der (uint8_t *cert,size_t size, +uint8_t **result,size_t *resultlen, +Error **errp) +{ +int ret =-1 ; +int rc; +gnutls_x509_crt_t crt; +gnutls_datum_t datum = {.data = cert, .size = size}; +gnutls_datum_t datum_der = {.data =NULL , .size =0 }; + + rc =gnutls_x509_crt_init (&crt); +if (rc <0 ) { +error_setg (errp,"Failed to initialize certificate: %s" ,gnutls_strerror (rc)); +return ret; + } + + rc =gnutls_x509_crt_import (crt, &datum,GNUTLS_X509_FMT_PEM ); +if (rc !=0 ) { +error_setg (errp,"Failed to import certificate: %s" ,gnutls_strerror (rc)); + goto cleanup; + } + + rc =gnutls_x509_crt_export2 (crt,GNUTLS_X509_FMT_DER , &datum_der); +if (rc !=0 ) { +error_setg (errp,"Failed to convert certificate to DER format: %s" , +gnutls_strerror (rc)); + goto cleanup;
crypto/x509-utils.c int qcrypto_get_x509_cert_fingerprint(uint8_t *cert, size_t size, · line 120
Quoted 10 lines
crypto/x509-utils.c +10
-0+ } + + *resultlen = datum_der.size; + *result =g_memdup2 (datum_der.data, datum_der.size); + + ret =0 ; + +cleanup: +gnutls_x509_crt_deinit (crt); +gnutls_free (datum_der.data);
Please use "g_free" here.
gnutls_free does nothing since gnutls deprecated gnutls_global_set_mem_functions and turned its impl into a no-op, but the use of gnutls_free will break builds with CFI enabled.
Same comment for the later patches to x509-utils.c that use gnutls_free.
With regards,
Daniel
Signature · 3 lines
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Re: [PATCH v10 03/30] crypto/x509-utils: Add helper functions for certificate store
Quoted 66 lines · Daniel P. Berrangé
Quoted 52 lines · Zhuoying Cai
Introduce new helper functions for x509 certificate, which will be used by the certificate store:
qcrypto_x509_convert_cert_der()- converts a certificate from PEM to DER formatThese functions provide support for certificate format conversion.
Signed-off-by Zhuoying Cai <[email protected]>Reviewed-by Daniel P. Berrangé <[email protected]>Reviewed-by Farhan Ali <[email protected]>Reviewed-by Thomas Huth <[email protected]>--- crypto/x509-utils.c | 49 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ include/crypto/x509-utils.h | 21 ++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 70 insertions(+)crypto/x509-utils.c +27
-0@@ -81,6 +81,46 @@ int qcrypto_get_x509_cert_fingerprint(uint8_t *cert, size_t size,return ret; } +int qcrypto_x509_convert_cert_der (uint8_t *cert,size_t size, +uint8_t **result,size_t *resultlen, +Error **errp) +{ +int ret =-1 ; +int rc; +gnutls_x509_crt_t crt; +gnutls_datum_t datum = {.data = cert, .size = size}; +gnutls_datum_t datum_der = {.data =NULL , .size =0 }; + + rc =gnutls_x509_crt_init (&crt); +if (rc <0 ) { +error_setg (errp,"Failed to initialize certificate: %s" ,gnutls_strerror (rc)); +return ret; + } + + rc =gnutls_x509_crt_import (crt, &datum,GNUTLS_X509_FMT_PEM ); +if (rc !=0 ) { +error_setg (errp,"Failed to import certificate: %s" ,gnutls_strerror (rc)); + goto cleanup; + } + + rc =gnutls_x509_crt_export2 (crt,GNUTLS_X509_FMT_DER , &datum_der); +if (rc !=0 ) { +error_setg (errp,"Failed to convert certificate to DER format: %s" , +gnutls_strerror (rc)); + goto cleanup;crypto/x509-utils.c int qcrypto_get_x509_cert_fingerprint(uint8_t *cert, size_t size, · line 120
Quoted 10 lines
crypto/x509-utils.c +10
-0+ } + + *resultlen = datum_der.size; + *result =g_memdup2 (datum_der.data, datum_der.size); + + ret =0 ; + +cleanup: +gnutls_x509_crt_deinit (crt); +gnutls_free (datum_der.data);Please use "
g_free" here.
Quoted 8 lines
gnutls_freedoes nothing since gnutls deprecatedgnutls_global_set_mem_functionsand turned its impl into a no-op, but the use ofgnutls_freewill break builds with CFI enabled.Same comment for the later patches to
x509-utils.cthat usegnutls_free.With regards,
Daniel
Thank you for the review! I’ll address this in the next version.
PATCH v10 4/30 hw/s390x/ipl: Create certificate store
In reply to Zhuoying CaiCreate a certificate store for boot certificates used for secure IPL.
Load certificates from the boot-certs parameter of s390-ccw-virtio machine type option into the cert store.
Currently, only X.509 certificates in PEM format are supported, as the QEMU command line accepts certificates in PEM format only.
--- docs/specs/index.rst | 1 + docs/specs/s390x-secure-ipl.rst | 16 +++ hw/s390x/cert-store.c | 221 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ hw/s390x/cert-store.h | 39 ++++++ hw/s390x/ipl.c | 10 ++ hw/s390x/ipl.h | 3 + hw/s390x/meson.build | 1 + include/hw/s390x/ipl/qipl.h | 2 + 8 files changed, 293 insertions(+) create mode 100644 docs/specs/s390x-secure-ipl.rst create mode 100644 hw/s390x/cert-store.c create mode 100644 hw/s390x/cert-store.h
docs/specs/index.rst +1 -0
@@ -40,3 +40,4 @@ guest hardware that is specific to QEMU. riscv-aia aspeed-intc iommu-testdev + s390x-secure-ipl
docs/specs/s390x-secure-ipl.rst new file +16 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@ +.. SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later + +s390 Certificate Store and Functions +==================================== + +s390 Certificate Store +---------------------- + +A certificate store is implemented for s390-ccw guests to retain within +memory all certificates provided by the user via the command-line, which +are expected to be stored somewhere on the host's file system. The store +will keep track of the number of certificates, their respective size, +and a summation of the sizes. + +Note: A maximum of 64 certificates are allowed to be stored in the certificate +store.
hw/s390x/cert-store.c new file +221 -0
221 lines not on this page · raw message
hw/s390x/cert-store.h new file +39 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,39 @@ +/* +* S390 certificate store +* +* Copyright 2025 IBM Corp. +* Author(s): Zhuoying Cai <[email protected]> +* +* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later +*/ + +#ifndef HW_S390_CERT_STORE_H +#define HW_S390_CERT_STORE_H + +#include "hw/s390x/ipl/qipl.h" +#include "crypto/x509-utils.h" + +#define CERT_NAME_MAX_LEN 64 + +#define CERT_KEY_ID_LEN QCRYPTO_HASH_DIGEST_LEN_SHA256 +#define CERT_HASH_LEN QCRYPTO_HASH_DIGEST_LEN_SHA256 + +struct S390IPLCertificate { +uint8_t name[CERT_NAME_MAX_LEN ]; +size_t size; +size_t der_size; +uint8_t *raw; +}; +typedef struct S390IPLCertificate S390IPLCertificate ; + +struct S390IPLCertificateStore { +uint16_t count; +size_t largest_cert_size; +size_t total_bytes; +S390IPLCertificate certs[MAX_CERTIFICATES ]; +}; +typedef struct S390IPLCertificateStore S390IPLCertificateStore ; + +void s390_ipl_create_cert_store (S390IPLCertificateStore *cert_store); + +#endif
hw/s390x/ipl.c +10 -0
@@ -38,6 +38,7 @@#include "qemu/option.h" #include "qemu/ctype.h" #include "standard-headers/linux/virtio_ids.h" +#include "cert-store.h" #define KERN_IMAGE_START 0x010000UL#define LINUX_MAGIC_ADDR 0x010008UL
@@ -453,6 +454,13 @@ void s390_ipl_convert_loadparm(char *ascii_lp, uint8_t *ebcdic_lp) } } +S390IPLCertificateStore *s390_ipl_get_certificate_store (void ) +{ +S390IPLState *ipl =get_ipl_device (); + +return &ipl->cert_store; +} +static bool s390_build_iplb (DeviceState *dev_st,IplParameterBlock *iplb) {CcwDevice *ccw_dev =NULL ;
@@ -771,6 +779,8 @@ void s390_ipl_prepare_cpu(S390CPU *cpu) cpu->env.psw.addr = ipl->start_addr; cpu->env.psw.mask =IPL_PSW_MASK ; +s390_ipl_create_cert_store (&ipl->cert_store); +if (!ipl->kernel || ipl->iplb_valid) { cpu->env.psw.addr = ipl->bios_start_addr;if (!ipl->iplb_valid) {
hw/s390x/ipl.h +3 -0
@@ -13,6 +13,7 @@#ifndef HW_S390_IPL_H #define HW_S390_IPL_H +#include "cert-store.h" #include "cpu.h" #include "exec/target_page.h" #include "system/address-spaces.h"
@@ -35,6 +36,7 @@ int s390_ipl_pv_unpack(struct S390PVResponse *pv_resp);void s390_ipl_prepare_cpu (S390CPU *cpu);IplParameterBlock *s390_ipl_get_iplb (void );IplParameterBlock *s390_ipl_get_iplb_pv (void ); +S390IPLCertificateStore *s390_ipl_get_certificate_store (void );enum s390_reset {/* default is a reset not triggered by a CPU e.g. issued by QMP */
@@ -63,6 +65,7 @@ struct S390IPLState {IplParameterBlock iplb;IplParameterBlock iplb_pv;QemuIplParameters qipl; +S390IPLCertificateStore cert_store;uint64_t start_addr;uint64_t compat_start_addr;uint64_t bios_start_addr;
hw/s390x/meson.build +1 -0
@@ -17,6 +17,7 @@ s390x_ss.add(files( 'sclpcpu.c', 'sclpquiesce.c', 'tod.c', + 'cert-store.c', )) s390x_ss.add(when: 'CONFIG_KVM', if_true: files( 'tod-kvm.c',
include/hw/s390x/ipl/qipl.h +2 -0
@@ -31,6 +31,8 @@ typedef enum S390IplType S390IplType;#define QEMU_DEFAULT_IPL S390_IPL_TYPE_CCW +#define MAX_CERTIFICATES 64 +/* * The QEMU IPL Parameters will be stored at absolute address * 204 (0xcc) which means it is 32-bit word aligned but not
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
PATCH v10 5/30 s390x/diag: Introduce DIAG 320 for Certificate Store Facility
In reply to Zhuoying CaiDIAGNOSE 320 is introduced to support Certificate Store (CS) Facility, which includes operations such as query certificate storage information and provide certificates in the certificate store.
Currently, only subcode 0 is supported with this patch, which is used to query the Installed Subcodes Mask (ISM).
This subcode is only supported when the CS facility is enabled.
Availability of CS facility is determined by byte 134 bit 5 of the SCLP Read Info block. Byte 134's facilities cannot be represented without the availability of the extended-length-SCCB, so add it as a check for consistency.
Note: secure IPL is not available for Secure Execution (SE) guests, as their images are already integrity protected, and an additional protection of the kernel by secure IPL is not necessary.
This feature is available starting with the gen16 CPU model.
--- docs/specs/s390x-secure-ipl.rst | 12 +++++++++ include/hw/s390x/ipl/diag320.h | 20 ++++++++++++++ target/s390x/cpu_features.c | 1 + target/s390x/cpu_features_def.h.inc | 1 + target/s390x/cpu_models.c | 2 ++ target/s390x/diag.c | 42 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ target/s390x/gen-features.c | 3 +++ target/s390x/kvm/kvm.c | 16 +++++++++++ target/s390x/s390x-internal.h | 2 ++ target/s390x/tcg/misc_helper.c | 7 +++++ 10 files changed, 106 insertions(+) create mode 100644 include/hw/s390x/ipl/diag320.h
docs/specs/s390x-secure-ipl.rst +12 -0
@@ -14,3 +14,15 @@ and a summation of the sizes. Note: A maximum of 64 certificates are allowed to be stored in the certificate store. + +DIAGNOSE function code 'X'320' - Certificate Store Facility +----------------------------------------------------------- + +DIAGNOSE 'X'320' is used to provide support for guest code to directly +query the s390 certificate store. Guest code may be the s390-ccw BIOS or +the guest kernel. + +Subcode 0 - query installed subcodes + Returns a 256-bit installed subcodes mask (ISM) stored in the installed + subcodes block (ISB). This mask indicates which subcodes are currently + installed and available for use.
include/hw/s390x/ipl/diag320.h new file +20 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,20 @@ +/* +* S/390 DIAGNOSE 320 definitions and structures +* +* Copyright 2025 IBM Corp. +* Author(s): Zhuoying Cai <[email protected]> +* +* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later +*/ + +#ifndef S390X_DIAG320_H +#define S390X_DIAG320_H + +#define DIAG_320_SUBC_QUERY_ISM 0 + +#define DIAG_320_RC_OK 0x0001 +#define DIAG_320_RC_NOT_SUPPORTED 0x0102 + +#define DIAG_320_ISM_QUERY_SUBCODES 0x80000000 + +#endif
target/s390x/cpu_features.c +1 -0
@@ -147,6 +147,7 @@ void s390_fill_feat_block(const S390FeatBitmap features, S390FeatType type,break ;case S390_FEAT_TYPE_SCLP_FAC134 :clear_be_bit (s390_feat_def (S390_FEAT_DIAG_318 )->bit, data); +clear_be_bit (s390_feat_def (S390_FEAT_CERT_STORE )->bit, data);break ;default :return ;
target/s390x/cpu_features_def.h.inc +1 -0
@@ -138,6 +138,7 @@ DEF_FEAT(SIE_IBS, "ibs", SCLP_CONF_CHAR_EXT, 10, "SIE: Interlock-and-broadcast-s /* Features exposed via SCLP SCCB Facilities byte 134 (bit numbers relative to byte-134) */ DEF_FEAT(DIAG_318, "diag318", SCLP_FAC134, 0, "Control program name and version codes") +DEF_FEAT(CERT_STORE, "cstore", SCLP_FAC134, 5, "Certificate Store functions") /* Features exposed via SCLP CPU info. */ DEF_FEAT(SIE_F2, "sief2", SCLP_CPU, 4, "SIE: interception format 2 (Virtual SIE)")
target/s390x/cpu_models.c +2 -0
@@ -248,6 +248,7 @@ bool s390_has_feat(S390Feat feat)if (s390_is_pv ()) {switch (feat) {case S390_FEAT_DIAG_318 : +case S390_FEAT_CERT_STORE :case S390_FEAT_HPMA2 :case S390_FEAT_SIE_F2 :case S390_FEAT_SIE_SKEY :
@@ -505,6 +506,7 @@ static void check_consistency(const S390CPUModel *model) { S390_FEAT_PTFF_STOUE, S390_FEAT_MULTIPLE_EPOCH }, { S390_FEAT_AP_QUEUE_INTERRUPT_CONTROL, S390_FEAT_AP }, { S390_FEAT_DIAG_318, S390_FEAT_EXTENDED_LENGTH_SCCB }, + { S390_FEAT_CERT_STORE, S390_FEAT_EXTENDED_LENGTH_SCCB }, { S390_FEAT_NNPA, S390_FEAT_VECTOR }, { S390_FEAT_RDP, S390_FEAT_LOCAL_TLB_CLEARING }, { S390_FEAT_UV_FEAT_AP, S390_FEAT_AP },
target/s390x/diag.c +42 -0
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target/s390x/gen-features.c +3 -0
@@ -720,6 +720,7 @@ static uint16_t full_GEN16_GA1[] = {S390_FEAT_PAIE ,S390_FEAT_UV_FEAT_AP ,S390_FEAT_UV_FEAT_AP_INTR , + S390_FEAT_CERT_STORE, }; static uint16_t full_GEN17_GA1[] = {
@@ -919,6 +920,8 @@ static uint16_t qemu_MAX[] = {S390_FEAT_KIMD_SHA_512 ,S390_FEAT_KLMD_SHA_512 ,S390_FEAT_PRNO_TRNG , +S390_FEAT_EXTENDED_LENGTH_SCCB , + S390_FEAT_CERT_STORE, };/****** END FEATURE DEFS ******/
target/s390x/kvm/kvm.c +16 -0
@@ -98,6 +98,7 @@#define DIAG_TIMEREVENT 0x288#define DIAG_IPL 0x308#define DIAG_SET_CONTROL_PROGRAM_CODES 0x318 +#define DIAG_CERT_STORE 0x320#define DIAG_KVM_HYPERCALL 0x500#define DIAG_KVM_BREAKPOINT 0x501
@@ -1560,6 +1561,16 @@ static void handle_diag_318(S390CPU *cpu, struct kvm_run *run) } } +static void kvm_handle_diag_320 (S390CPU *cpu,struct kvm_run *run) +{ +uint64_t r1, r3; + + r1 = (run->s390_sieic.ipa &0x00f0 ) >>4 ; + r3 = run->s390_sieic.ipa &0x000f ; + +handle_diag_320 (&cpu->env, r1, r3,RA_IGNORED ); +} +#define DIAG_KVM_CODE_MASK 0x000000000000ffffstatic int handle_diag (S390CPU *cpu,struct kvm_run *run,uint32_t ipb)
@@ -1590,6 +1601,9 @@ static int handle_diag(S390CPU *cpu, struct kvm_run *run, uint32_t ipb)case DIAG_KVM_BREAKPOINT : r =handle_sw_breakpoint (cpu, run);break ; +case DIAG_CERT_STORE : +kvm_handle_diag_320 (cpu, run); +break ;default :trace_kvm_insn_diag (func_code);kvm_s390_program_interrupt (cpu,PGM_SPECIFICATION );
@@ -2488,6 +2502,8 @@ bool kvm_s390_get_host_cpu_model(S390CPUModel *model, Error **errp)set_bit (S390_FEAT_DIAG_318 , model->features); } +set_bit (S390_FEAT_CERT_STORE , model->features); +/* Test for Ultravisor features that influence secure guest behavior */ query_uv_feat_guest (model->features);
target/s390x/s390x-internal.h +2 -0
@@ -388,6 +388,8 @@ int mmu_translate_real(CPUS390XState *env, hwaddr raddr, int rw,int handle_diag_288 (CPUS390XState *env,uint64_t r1,uint64_t r3);void handle_diag_308 (CPUS390XState *env,uint64_t r1,uint64_t r3,uintptr_t ra); +void handle_diag_320 (CPUS390XState *env,uint64_t r1,uint64_t r3, +uintptr_t ra);/* translate.c */
target/s390x/tcg/misc_helper.c +7 -0
@@ -142,6 +142,13 @@ void HELPER(diag)(CPUS390XState *env, uint32_t r1, uint32_t r3, uint32_t num)/* time bomb (watchdog) */ r =handle_diag_288 (env, r1, r3);break ; +case 0x320 : +/* cert store */ +bql_lock (); +handle_diag_320 (env, r1, r3,GETPC ()); +bql_unlock (); + r =0 ; +break ;default : r =-1 ;break ;
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
PATCH v10 6/30 s390x/diag: Refactor address validation check from diag308_parm_check
In reply to Zhuoying CaiCreate a function to validate the address parameter of DIAGNOSE.
Refactor the function for reuse in the next patch, which allows address validation in read or write operation of DIAGNOSE.
--- target/s390x/diag.c | 10 +++++++--- 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
target/s390x/diag.c +7 -3
@@ -26,6 +26,12 @@#include "qemu/error-report.h" +static inline bool diag_parm_addr_valid (uint64_t addr,size_t size,bool write) +{ +return address_space_access_valid (&address_space_memory, addr, + size, write,MEMTXATTRS_UNSPECIFIED ); +} +int handle_diag_288 (CPUS390XState *env,uint64_t r1,uint64_t r3) {uint64_t func = env->regs[r1];
@@ -65,9 +71,7 @@ static int diag308_parm_check(CPUS390XState *env, uint64_t r1, uint64_t addr,s390_program_interrupt (env,PGM_SPECIFICATION , ra);return -1 ; } -if (!address_space_access_valid (&address_space_memory, addr, -sizeof (IplParameterBlock), write, -MEMTXATTRS_UNSPECIFIED )) { +if (!diag_parm_addr_valid (addr,sizeof (IplParameterBlock), write)) {s390_program_interrupt (env,PGM_ADDRESSING , ra);return -1 ; }
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
PATCH v10 7/30 s390x/diag: Implement DIAG 320 subcode 1
In reply to Zhuoying CaiDIAG 320 subcode 1 provides information needed to determine the amount of storage to store one or more certificates from the certificate store.
Upon successful completion, this subcode returns information of the current cert store, such as the number of certificates stored and allowed in the cert store, amount of space may need to be allocate to store a certificate, etc for verification-certificate blocks (VCBs).
The subcode value is denoted by setting the left-most bit of an 8-byte field.
The verification-certificate-storage-size block (VCSSB) contains the output data when the operation completes successfully. A VCSSB length of 4 indicates that no certificate are available in the cert store.
--- docs/specs/s390x-secure-ipl.rst | 12 +++++++ include/hw/s390x/ipl/diag320.h | 22 ++++++++++++ target/s390x/diag.c | 63 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++- 3 files changed, 96 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
docs/specs/s390x-secure-ipl.rst +12 -0
@@ -26,3 +26,15 @@ Subcode 0 - query installed subcodes Returns a 256-bit installed subcodes mask (ISM) stored in the installed subcodes block (ISB). This mask indicates which subcodes are currently installed and available for use. + +Subcode 1 - query verification certificate storage information + Provides the information required to determine the amount of memory needed + to store one or more verification-certificates (VCs) from the certificate + store (CS). + + Upon successful completion, this subcode returns various storage size values + for verification-certificate blocks (VCBs). + + The output is returned in the verification-certificate-storage-size block + (VCSSB). A VCSSB length of 4 indicates that no certificates are available + in the CS.
include/hw/s390x/ipl/diag320.h +22 -0
@@ -11,10 +11,32 @@#define S390X_DIAG320_H #define DIAG_320_SUBC_QUERY_ISM 0 +#define DIAG_320_SUBC_QUERY_VCSI 1#define DIAG_320_RC_OK 0x0001#define DIAG_320_RC_NOT_SUPPORTED 0x0102 +#define DIAG_320_RC_INVAL_VCSSB_LEN 0x0202#define DIAG_320_ISM_QUERY_SUBCODES 0x80000000 +#define DIAG_320_ISM_QUERY_VCSI 0x40000000 + +#define VCSSB_NO_VC 4 +#define VCSSB_MIN_LEN 128 +#define VCE_HEADER_LEN 128 +#define VCB_HEADER_LEN 64 + +struct VCStorageSizeBlock { +uint32_t length; +uint8_t reserved0[3 ]; +uint8_t version; +uint32_t reserved1[6 ]; +uint16_t total_vc_ct; +uint16_t max_vc_ct; +uint32_t reserved3[11 ]; +uint32_t max_single_vcb_len; +uint32_t total_vcb_len; +uint32_t reserved4[10 ]; +}; +typedef struct VCStorageSizeBlock VCStorageSizeBlock ;#endif
target/s390x/diag.c +62 -1
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Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
PATCH v10 8/30 crypto/x509-utils: Add helper functions for DIAG 320 subcode 2
In reply to Zhuoying CaiIntroduce new helper functions to extract certificate metadata:
qcrypto_x509_check_cert_times() - validates the certificate's validity period against the current time qcrypto_x509_get_pk_algorithm() - returns the public key algorithm used in the certificate qcrypto_x509_get_cert_key_id() - extracts the key ID from the certificate qcrypto_x509_check_ecc_curve_p521() - determines the ECC public key algorithm uses P-521 curve
These functions provide support for metadata extraction and validity checking for X.509 certificates.
--- crypto/x509-utils.c | 236 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ include/crypto/x509-utils.h | 51 ++++++++ 2 files changed, 287 insertions(+)
crypto/x509-utils.c +236 -0
@@ -27,6 +27,16 @@ static const int qcrypto_to_gnutls_hash_alg_map[QCRYPTO_HASH_ALGO__MAX] = { [QCRYPTO_HASH_ALGO_RIPEMD160] = GNUTLS_DIG_RMD160, }; +static const int qcrypto_to_gnutls_keyid_flags_map[] = { + [QCRYPTO_HASH_ALGO_MD5 ] =-1 , + [QCRYPTO_HASH_ALGO_SHA1 ] =GNUTLS_KEYID_USE_SHA1 , + [QCRYPTO_HASH_ALGO_SHA224 ] =-1 , + [QCRYPTO_HASH_ALGO_SHA256 ] =GNUTLS_KEYID_USE_SHA256 , + [QCRYPTO_HASH_ALGO_SHA384 ] =-1 , + [QCRYPTO_HASH_ALGO_SHA512 ] =GNUTLS_KEYID_USE_SHA512 , + [QCRYPTO_HASH_ALGO_RIPEMD160 ] =-1 , +}; + int qcrypto_get_x509_cert_fingerprint(uint8_t *cert, size_t size, QCryptoHashAlgo alg, uint8_t *result,
@@ -121,6 +131,210 @@ cleanup:return ret; } +int qcrypto_x509_check_cert_times (uint8_t *cert,size_t size,Error **errp) +{ +int rc; +int ret =-1 ; +gnutls_x509_crt_t crt; +gnutls_datum_t datum = {.data = cert, .size = size}; +time_t now =time (NULL ); +time_t exp_time; +time_t act_time; + +if (now == ((time_t)-1 )) { +error_setg_errno (errp, errno,"Cannot get current time" ); +return ret; + } + + rc =gnutls_x509_crt_init (&crt); +if (rc <0 ) { +error_setg (errp,"Failed to initialize certificate: %s" ,gnutls_strerror (rc)); +return ret; + } + + rc =gnutls_x509_crt_import (crt, &datum,GNUTLS_X509_FMT_PEM ); +if (rc !=0 ) { +error_setg (errp,"Failed to import certificate: %s" ,gnutls_strerror (rc)); + goto cleanup; + } + + exp_time =gnutls_x509_crt_get_expiration_time (crt); +if (exp_time == ((time_t)-1 )) { +error_setg (errp,"Failed to get certificate expiration time" ); + goto cleanup; + } +if (exp_time < now) { +error_setg (errp,"The certificate has expired" ); + goto cleanup; + } + + act_time =gnutls_x509_crt_get_activation_time (crt); +if (act_time == ((time_t)-1 )) { +error_setg (errp,"Failed to get certificate activation time" ); + goto cleanup; + } +if (act_time > now) { +error_setg (errp,"The certificate is not yet active" ); + goto cleanup; + } + + ret =0 ; + +cleanup: +gnutls_x509_crt_deinit (crt); +return ret; +} + +static int qcrypto_x509_get_pk_algorithm (uint8_t *cert,size_t size,Error **errp) +{ +int rc; +int ret =-1 ; +unsigned int bits; +gnutls_x509_crt_t crt; +gnutls_datum_t datum = {.data = cert, .size = size}; + + rc =gnutls_x509_crt_init (&crt); +if (rc <0 ) { +error_setg (errp,"Failed to initialize certificate: %s" ,gnutls_strerror (rc)); +return ret; + } + + rc =gnutls_x509_crt_import (crt, &datum,GNUTLS_X509_FMT_PEM ); +if (rc !=0 ) { +error_setg (errp,"Failed to import certificate: %s" ,gnutls_strerror (rc)); + goto cleanup; + } + + rc =gnutls_x509_crt_get_pk_algorithm (crt, &bits); +if (rc <0 ) { +error_setg (errp,"Unknown public key algorithm %d" , rc); + goto cleanup; + } + + ret = rc; + +cleanup: +gnutls_x509_crt_deinit (crt); +return ret; +} + +int qcrypto_x509_get_cert_key_id (uint8_t *cert,size_t size, +QCryptoHashAlgo hash_alg, +uint8_t **result, +size_t *resultlen, +Error **errp) +{ +int rc; +int ret =-1 ; +gnutls_x509_crt_t crt; +gnutls_datum_t datum = {.data = cert, .size = size}; + +if (hash_alg >=G_N_ELEMENTS (qcrypto_to_gnutls_hash_alg_map)) { +error_setg (errp,"Unknown hash algorithm %d" , hash_alg); +return ret; + } + +if (hash_alg >=G_N_ELEMENTS (qcrypto_to_gnutls_keyid_flags_map) || + qcrypto_to_gnutls_keyid_flags_map[hash_alg] ==-1 ) { +error_setg (errp,"Unsupported key id flag %d" , hash_alg); +return ret; + } + + rc =gnutls_x509_crt_init (&crt); +if (rc <0 ) { +error_setg (errp,"Failed to initialize certificate: %s" ,gnutls_strerror (rc)); +return ret; + } + + rc =gnutls_x509_crt_import (crt, &datum,GNUTLS_X509_FMT_PEM ); +if (rc !=0 ) { +error_setg (errp,"Failed to import certificate: %s" ,gnutls_strerror (rc)); + goto cleanup; + } + + *resultlen =gnutls_hash_get_len (qcrypto_to_gnutls_hash_alg_map[hash_alg]); +if (*resultlen ==0 ) { +error_setg (errp,"Failed to get hash algorithn length: %s" ,gnutls_strerror (rc)); + goto cleanup; + } + + *result =g_malloc0 (*resultlen); +if (gnutls_x509_crt_get_key_id (crt, + qcrypto_to_gnutls_keyid_flags_map[hash_alg], + *result, resultlen) !=0 ) { +error_setg (errp,"Failed to get key ID from certificate" ); +g_clear_pointer (result, g_free); + goto cleanup; + } + + ret =0 ; + +cleanup: +gnutls_x509_crt_deinit (crt); +return ret; +} + +static int qcrypto_x509_get_ecc_curve (uint8_t *cert,size_t size,Error **errp) +{ +int rc; +int ret =-1 ; +gnutls_x509_crt_t crt; +gnutls_datum_t datum = {.data = cert, .size = size}; +gnutls_ecc_curve_t curve_id; +gnutls_datum_t x = {.data =NULL , .size =0 }; +gnutls_datum_t y = {.data =NULL , .size =0 }; + + rc =gnutls_x509_crt_init (&crt); +if (rc <0 ) { +error_setg (errp,"Failed to initialize certificate: %s" ,gnutls_strerror (rc)); +return ret; + } + + rc =gnutls_x509_crt_import (crt, &datum,GNUTLS_X509_FMT_PEM ); +if (rc !=0 ) { +error_setg (errp,"Failed to import certificate: %s" ,gnutls_strerror (rc)); + goto cleanup; + } + + rc =gnutls_x509_crt_get_pk_ecc_raw (crt, &curve_id, &x, &y); +if (rc !=0 ) { +error_setg (errp,"Failed to get ECC public key curve: %s" ,gnutls_strerror (rc)); + goto cleanup; + } + + ret = curve_id; + +cleanup: +gnutls_x509_crt_deinit (crt); +gnutls_free (x.data); +gnutls_free (y.data); +return ret; +} + +int qcrypto_x509_check_ecc_curve_p521 (uint8_t *cert,size_t size,Error **errp) +{ +int algo; +int curve_id; + + algo =qcrypto_x509_get_pk_algorithm (cert, size, errp); +if (algo !=GNUTLS_PK_ECDSA ) { +return 0 ; + } + + curve_id =qcrypto_x509_get_ecc_curve (cert, size, errp); +if (curve_id ==-1 ) { +error_setg (errp,"Failed to get ECC curve" ); +return -1 ; + } + +if (curve_id ==GNUTLS_ECC_CURVE_INVALID ) { +error_setg (errp,"Invalid ECC curve" ); +return -1 ; + } + +return curve_id ==GNUTLS_ECC_CURVE_SECP521R1 ; +} +#else /* ! CONFIG_GNUTLS */ int qcrypto_get_x509_cert_fingerprint(uint8_t *cert, size_t size,
@@ -142,4 +356,26 @@ int qcrypto_x509_convert_cert_der(uint8_t *cert, size_t size, return -1; } +int qcrypto_x509_check_cert_times (uint8_t *cert,size_t size,Error **errp) +{ +error_setg (errp,"GNUTLS is required to get certificate times" ); +return -1 ; +} + +int qcrypto_x509_get_cert_key_id (uint8_t *cert,size_t size, +QCryptoHashAlgo hash_alg, +uint8_t **result, +size_t *resultlen, +Error **errp) +{ +error_setg (errp,"GNUTLS is required to get key ID" ); +return -1 ; +} + +int qcrypto_x509_check_ecc_curve_p521 (uint8_t *cert,size_t size,Error **errp) +{ +error_setg (errp,"GNUTLS is required to determine ecc curve" ); +return -1 ; +} +#endif /* ! CONFIG_GNUTLS */
include/crypto/x509-utils.h +51 -0
55 lines not on this page · raw message
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Re: [PATCH v10 08/30] crypto/x509-utils: Add helper functions for DIAG 320 subcode 2
Quoted 4 lines · Zhuoying Cai
Introduce new helper functions to extract certificate metadata:
qcrypto_x509_check_cert_times()- validates the certificate's validity period against the current timeqcrypto_x509_get_pk_algorithm()- returns the public key algorithm used in the certificate
This is no longer exported, so drop that mention.
Quoted 41 lines
qcrypto_x509_get_cert_key_id()- extracts the key ID from the certificateqcrypto_x509_check_ecc_curve_p521()- determines the ECC public key algorithm uses P-521 curveThese functions provide support for metadata extraction and validity checking for X.509 certificates.
Signed-off-by Zhuoying Cai <[email protected]>Reviewed-by Farhan Ali<[email protected]>--- crypto/x509-utils.c | 236 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ include/crypto/x509-utils.h | 51 ++++++++ 2 files changed, 287 insertions(+)crypto/x509-utils.c +24
-0+static int qcrypto_x509_get_ecc_curve (uint8_t *cert,size_t size,Error **errp) +{ +int rc; +int ret =-1 ; +gnutls_x509_crt_t crt; +gnutls_datum_t datum = {.data = cert, .size = size}; +gnutls_ecc_curve_t curve_id; +gnutls_datum_t x = {.data =NULL , .size =0 }; +gnutls_datum_t y = {.data =NULL , .size =0 }; + + rc =gnutls_x509_crt_init (&crt); +if (rc <0 ) { +error_setg (errp,"Failed to initialize certificate: %s" ,gnutls_strerror (rc)); +return ret; + } + + rc =gnutls_x509_crt_import (crt, &datum,GNUTLS_X509_FMT_PEM ); +if (rc !=0 ) { +error_setg (errp,"Failed to import certificate: %s" ,gnutls_strerror (rc)); + goto cleanup; + } + + rc =gnutls_x509_crt_get_pk_ecc_raw (crt, &curve_id, &x, &y); +if (rc !=0 ) {
crypto/x509-utils.c cleanup: · line 310
Quoted 10 lines
crypto/x509-utils.c +10
-0+error_setg (errp,"Failed to get ECC public key curve: %s" ,gnutls_strerror (rc)); + goto cleanup; + } + + ret = curve_id; + +cleanup: +gnutls_x509_crt_deinit (crt); +gnutls_free (x.data); +gnutls_free (y.data);
Use g_free here instead of gnutls_free
crypto/x509-utils.c
Quoted 2 lines
crypto/x509-utils.c +2
-0+return ret; +}
With those two changes made
With regards,
Daniel
Signature · 3 lines
|: https://berrange.com ~~ https://hachyderm.io/@berrange :| |: https://libvirt.org ~~ https://entangle-photo.org :| |: https://pixelfed.art/berrange ~~ https://fstop138.berrange.com :|
PATCH v10 9/30 s390x/diag: Implement DIAG 320 subcode 2
In reply to Zhuoying CaiDIAG 320 subcode 2 provides verification-certificates (VCs) that are in the certificate store. Only X509 certificates in DER format and SHA-256 hash type are recognized.
The subcode value is denoted by setting the second-left-most bit of an 8-byte field.
The Verification Certificate Block (VCB) contains the output data when the operation completes successfully. It includes a common header followed by zero or more Verification Certificate Entries (VCEs), depending on the VCB input length and the VC range (from the first VC index to the last VC index) in the certificate store.
Each VCE contains information about a certificate retrieved from the S390IPLCertificateStore, such as the certificate name, key type, key ID length, hash length, and the raw certificate data.
The key ID and hash are extracted from the raw certificate by the crypto API.
Note: SHA2-256 VC hash type is required for retrieving the hash (fingerprint) of the certificate.
--- docs/specs/s390x-secure-ipl.rst | 24 +++ hw/s390x/cert-store.h | 3 +- include/hw/s390x/ipl/diag320.h | 55 ++++++ target/s390x/diag.c | 338 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++- 4 files changed, 417 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
docs/specs/s390x-secure-ipl.rst +24 -0
@@ -38,3 +38,27 @@ Subcode 1 - query verification certificate storage information The output is returned in the verification-certificate-storage-size block (VCSSB). A VCSSB length of 4 indicates that no certificates are available in the CS. + +Subcode 2 - store verification certificates + Provides VCs that are in the certificate store. + + The output is provided in a VCB, which includes a common header followed by + zero or more verification-certificate entries (VCEs). + + The instruction expects the cert store to maintain an origin of 1 for the + index (i.e. a retrieval of the first certificate in the store should be + denoted by setting first-VC to 1). + + The first-VC and last-VC fields of the VCB specify the index range of + VCs to be stored in the VCB. Certs are stored sequentially, starting + with first-VC index. As each cert is stored, a "stored count" is + incremented. If there is not enough space to store all certs requested + by the index range, a "remaining count" will be recorded and no more + certificates will be stored. + + Each VCE contains a header followed by information extracted from a + certificate within the certificate store. The information includes: + key-id, hash, and certificate data. This information is stored + contiguously in a VCE (with zero-padding). Following the header, the + key-id is immediately stored. The hash and certificate data follow and + may be accessed via the respective offset fields stored in the VCE.
hw/s390x/cert-store.h +1 -2
@@ -11,10 +11,9 @@#define HW_S390_CERT_STORE_H #include "hw/s390x/ipl/qipl.h" +#include "hw/s390x/ipl/diag320.h" #include "crypto/x509-utils.h" -#define CERT_NAME_MAX_LEN 64 -#define CERT_KEY_ID_LEN QCRYPTO_HASH_DIGEST_LEN_SHA256#define CERT_HASH_LEN QCRYPTO_HASH_DIGEST_LEN_SHA256
include/hw/s390x/ipl/diag320.h +55 -0
78 lines not on this page · raw message
target/s390x/diag.c +337 -1
371 lines not on this page · raw message
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Re: [PATCH v10 09/30] s390x/diag: Implement DIAG 320 subcode 2
Quoted 29 lines · Zhuoying Cai
DIAG 320 subcode 2 provides verification-certificates (VCs) that are in the certificate store. Only X509 certificates in DER format and SHA-256 hash type are recognized.
The subcode value is denoted by setting the second-left-most bit of an 8-byte field.
The Verification Certificate Block (VCB) contains the output data when the operation completes successfully. It includes a common header followed by zero or more Verification Certificate Entries (VCEs), depending on the VCB input length and the VC range (from the first VC index to the last VC index) in the certificate store.
Each VCE contains information about a certificate retrieved from the S390IPLCertificateStore, such as the certificate name, key type, key ID length, hash length, and the raw certificate data.
The key ID and hash are extracted from the raw certificate by the crypto API.Note: SHA2-256 VC hash type is required for retrieving the hash (fingerprint) of the certificate.
Signed-off-by Zhuoying Cai <[email protected]>--- docs/specs/s390x-secure-ipl.rst | 24 +++ hw/s390x/cert-store.h | 3 +- include/hw/s390x/ipl/diag320.h | 55 ++++++ target/s390x/diag.c | 338 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++- 4 files changed, 417 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
[...]
Quoted 4 lines
target/s390x/diag.c +4
-0+ +static int get_key_type (const S390IPLCertificate *cert) +{ +int rc;
target/s390x/diag.c static int handle_diag320_query_vcsi(S390CPU *cpu, uint64_t addr, uint64_t r1, · line 360
Quoted 10 lines
target/s390x/diag.c +10
-0+Error *err =NULL ; + + rc =qcrypto_x509_check_ecc_curve_p521 (cert->raw, cert->size, &err); +if (rc ==-1 ) { +error_report_err (err); +return -1 ; + } + +return (rc ==1 ) ?DIAG_320_VCE_KEYTYPE_ECDSA_P521 : +DIAG_320_VCE_KEYTYPE_SELF_DESCRIBING ;
small nit: remove one space to line up the DIAG_'s.
[...]
Other than that, LGTM!
Signature · 2 lines
Regards, Collin
PATCH v10 10/30 s390x/diag: Introduce DIAG 508 for secure IPL operations
In reply to Zhuoying CaiFrom: Collin Walling <[email protected]>
In order to support secure IPL (aka secure boot) for the s390-ccw BIOS, a new s390 DIAGNOSE instruction is introduced to leverage QEMU for handling operations such as signature verification and certificate retrieval.
Currently, only subcode 0 is supported with this patch, which is used to query a bitmap of which subcodes are supported.
--- docs/specs/s390x-secure-ipl.rst | 18 ++++++++++++++++++ include/hw/s390x/ipl/diag508.h | 15 +++++++++++++++ target/s390x/diag.c | 27 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++ target/s390x/kvm/kvm.c | 14 ++++++++++++++ target/s390x/s390x-internal.h | 2 ++ target/s390x/tcg/misc_helper.c | 7 +++++++ 6 files changed, 83 insertions(+) create mode 100644 include/hw/s390x/ipl/diag508.h
docs/specs/s390x-secure-ipl.rst +18 -0
@@ -62,3 +62,21 @@ Subcode 2 - store verification certificates contiguously in a VCE (with zero-padding). Following the header, the key-id is immediately stored. The hash and certificate data follow and may be accessed via the respective offset fields stored in the VCE. + + +Secure IPL Data Structures, Facilities, and Functions +===================================================== + +DIAGNOSE function code 'X'508' - IPL extensions +--------------------------------------------------- + +DIAGNOSE 'X'508' is reserved for guest use in order to facilitate communication +of additional IPL operations that cannot be handled by guest code, such as +signature verification for secure IPL. + +If the function code specifies 0x508, IPL extension functions are performed. +These functions are meant to provide extended functionality for s390 guest boot +that requires assistance from QEMU. + +Subcode 0 - query installed subcodes + Returns a 64-bit mask indicating which subcodes are supported.
include/hw/s390x/ipl/diag508.h new file +15 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@ +/* +* S/390 DIAGNOSE 508 definitions and structures +* +* Copyright 2025 IBM Corp. +* Author(s): Collin Walling <[email protected]> +* +* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later +*/ + +#ifndef S390X_DIAG508_H +#define S390X_DIAG508_H + +#define DIAG_508_SUBC_QUERY_SUBC 0x0000 + +#endif
target/s390x/diag.c +27 -0
@@ -20,6 +20,7 @@#include "hw/s390x/cert-store.h" #include "hw/s390x/ipl.h" #include "hw/s390x/ipl/diag320.h" +#include "hw/s390x/ipl/diag508.h" #include "hw/s390x/s390-virtio-ccw.h" #include "system/kvm.h" #include "kvm/kvm_s390x.h"
@@ -635,3 +636,29 @@ void handle_diag_320(CPUS390XState *env, uint64_t r1, uint64_t r3, uintptr_t ra)break ; } } + +void handle_diag_508 (CPUS390XState *env,uint64_t r1,uint64_t r3,uintptr_t ra) +{ +uint64_t subcode = env->regs[r3]; +int rc; + +if (env->psw.mask &PSW_MASK_PSTATE ) { +s390_program_interrupt (env,PGM_PRIVILEGED , ra); +return ; + } + +if ((subcode & ~0x0ffffULL ) || (r1 &1 )) { +s390_program_interrupt (env,PGM_SPECIFICATION , ra); +return ; + } + +switch (subcode) { +case DIAG_508_SUBC_QUERY_SUBC : + rc =0 ; +break ; +default : +s390_program_interrupt (env,PGM_SPECIFICATION , ra); +return ; + } + env->regs[r1 +1 ] = rc; +}
target/s390x/kvm/kvm.c +14 -0
@@ -101,6 +101,7 @@#define DIAG_CERT_STORE 0x320#define DIAG_KVM_HYPERCALL 0x500#define DIAG_KVM_BREAKPOINT 0x501 +#define DIAG_SECURE_IPL 0x508#define ICPT_INSTRUCTION 0x04#define ICPT_PROGRAM 0x08
@@ -1571,6 +1572,16 @@ static void kvm_handle_diag_320(S390CPU *cpu, struct kvm_run *run)handle_diag_320 (&cpu->env, r1, r3,RA_IGNORED ); } +static void kvm_handle_diag_508 (S390CPU *cpu,struct kvm_run *run) +{ +uint64_t r1, r3; + + r1 = (run->s390_sieic.ipa &0x00f0 ) >>4 ; + r3 = run->s390_sieic.ipa &0x000f ; + +handle_diag_508 (&cpu->env, r1, r3,RA_IGNORED ); +} +#define DIAG_KVM_CODE_MASK 0x000000000000ffffstatic int handle_diag (S390CPU *cpu,struct kvm_run *run,uint32_t ipb)
@@ -1604,6 +1615,9 @@ static int handle_diag(S390CPU *cpu, struct kvm_run *run, uint32_t ipb)case DIAG_CERT_STORE :kvm_handle_diag_320 (cpu, run);break ; +case DIAG_SECURE_IPL : +kvm_handle_diag_508 (cpu, run); +break ;default :trace_kvm_insn_diag (func_code);kvm_s390_program_interrupt (cpu,PGM_SPECIFICATION );
target/s390x/s390x-internal.h +2 -0
@@ -390,6 +390,8 @@ void handle_diag_308(CPUS390XState *env, uint64_t r1, uint64_t r3, uintptr_t ra);void handle_diag_320 (CPUS390XState *env,uint64_t r1,uint64_t r3,uintptr_t ra); +void handle_diag_508 (CPUS390XState *env,uint64_t r1,uint64_t r3, +uintptr_t ra);/* translate.c */
target/s390x/tcg/misc_helper.c +7 -0
@@ -149,6 +149,13 @@ void HELPER(diag)(CPUS390XState *env, uint32_t r1, uint32_t r3, uint32_t num)bql_unlock (); r =0 ;break ; +case 0x508 : +/* secure ipl operations */ +bql_lock (); +handle_diag_508 (env, r1, r3,GETPC ()); +bql_unlock (); + r =0 ; +break ;default : r =-1 ;break ;
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
PATCH v10 11/30 crypto/x509-utils: Add helper functions for DIAG 508 subcode 1
In reply to Zhuoying CaiIntroduce helper functions to support signature verification required by DIAG 508 subcode 1:
qcrypto_pkcs7_convert_sig_pem() – converts a signature from DER to PEM format qcrypto_x509_verify_sig() – verifies the provided data against the given signature
These functions enable basic signature verification support.
--- crypto/x509-utils.c | 108 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ include/crypto/x509-utils.h | 41 ++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 149 insertions(+)
crypto/x509-utils.c +108 -0
@@ -16,6 +16,7 @@#include <gnutls/gnutls.h> #include <gnutls/crypto.h> #include <gnutls/x509.h> +#include <gnutls/pkcs7.h> static const int qcrypto_to_gnutls_hash_alg_map[QCRYPTO_HASH_ALGO__MAX ] = { [QCRYPTO_HASH_ALGO_MD5 ] =GNUTLS_DIG_MD5 ,
@@ -335,6 +336,96 @@ int qcrypto_x509_check_ecc_curve_p521(uint8_t *cert, size_t size, Error **errp)return curve_id ==GNUTLS_ECC_CURVE_SECP521R1 ; } +int qcrypto_pkcs7_convert_sig_pem (uint8_t *sig,size_t sig_size, +uint8_t **result,size_t *resultlen, +Error **errp) +{ +int ret =-1 ; +int rc; +gnutls_pkcs7_t signature; +gnutls_datum_t sig_datum_der = {.data = sig, .size = sig_size}; +gnutls_datum_t sig_datum_pem = {.data =NULL , .size =0 }; + + rc =gnutls_pkcs7_init (&signature); +if (rc <0 ) { +error_setg (errp,"Failed to initialize pkcs7 data: %s" ,gnutls_strerror (rc)); +return ret; + } + + rc =gnutls_pkcs7_import (signature, &sig_datum_der,GNUTLS_X509_FMT_DER ); +if (rc !=0 ) { +error_setg (errp,"Failed to import signature: %s" ,gnutls_strerror (rc)); + goto cleanup; + } + + rc =gnutls_pkcs7_export2 (signature,GNUTLS_X509_FMT_PEM , &sig_datum_pem); +if (rc !=0 ) { +error_setg (errp,"Failed to convert signature to PEM format: %s" , +gnutls_strerror (rc)); + goto cleanup; + } + + *resultlen = sig_datum_pem.size; + *result =g_memdup2 (sig_datum_pem.data, sig_datum_pem.size); + + ret =0 ; + +cleanup: +gnutls_pkcs7_deinit (signature); +gnutls_free (sig_datum_pem.data); +return ret; +} + +int qcrypto_x509_verify_sig (uint8_t *cert,size_t cert_size, +uint8_t *comp,size_t comp_size, +uint8_t *sig,size_t sig_size,Error **errp) +{ +int rc; +int ret =-1 ; +gnutls_x509_crt_t crt =NULL ; +gnutls_pkcs7_t signature =NULL ; +gnutls_datum_t cert_datum = {.data = cert, .size = cert_size}; +gnutls_datum_t data_datum = {.data = comp, .size = comp_size}; +gnutls_datum_t sig_datum = {.data = sig, .size = sig_size}; + + rc =gnutls_x509_crt_init (&crt); +if (rc <0 ) { +error_setg (errp,"Failed to initialize certificate: %s" ,gnutls_strerror (rc)); + goto cleanup; + } + + rc =gnutls_x509_crt_import (crt, &cert_datum,GNUTLS_X509_FMT_PEM ); +if (rc !=0 ) { +error_setg (errp,"Failed to import certificate: %s" ,gnutls_strerror (rc)); + goto cleanup; + } + + rc =gnutls_pkcs7_init (&signature); +if (rc <0 ) { +error_setg (errp,"Failed to initialize pkcs7 data: %s" ,gnutls_strerror (rc)); + goto cleanup; + } + + rc =gnutls_pkcs7_import (signature, &sig_datum ,GNUTLS_X509_FMT_PEM ); +if (rc !=0 ) { +error_setg (errp,"Failed to import signature: %s" ,gnutls_strerror (rc)); + goto cleanup; + } + + rc =gnutls_pkcs7_verify_direct (signature, crt,0 , &data_datum,0 ); +if (rc !=0 ) { +error_setg (errp,"Failed to verify signature: %s" ,gnutls_strerror (rc)); + goto cleanup; + } + + ret =0 ; + +cleanup: +gnutls_x509_crt_deinit (crt); +gnutls_pkcs7_deinit (signature); +return ret; +} +#else /* ! CONFIG_GNUTLS */ int qcrypto_get_x509_cert_fingerprint(uint8_t *cert, size_t size,
@@ -378,4 +469,21 @@ int qcrypto_x509_check_ecc_curve_p521(uint8_t *cert, size_t size, Error **errp) return -1; } +int qcrypto_pkcs7_convert_sig_pem (uint8_t *sig,size_t sig_size, +uint8_t **result, +size_t *resultlen, +Error **errp) +{ +error_setg (errp,"GNUTLS is required to export pkcs7 signature" ); +return -1 ; +} + +int qcrypto_x509_verify_sig (uint8_t *cert,size_t cert_size, +uint8_t *comp,size_t comp_size, +uint8_t *sig,size_t sig_size,Error **errp) +{ +error_setg (errp,"GNUTLS is required for signature-verification support" ); +return -1 ; +} +#endif /* ! CONFIG_GNUTLS */
include/crypto/x509-utils.h +41 -0
45 lines not on this page · raw message
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Re: [PATCH v10 11/30] crypto/x509-utils: Add helper functions for DIAG 508 subcode 1
Quoted 48 lines · Zhuoying Cai
Introduce helper functions to support signature verification required by DIAG 508 subcode 1:
qcrypto_pkcs7_convert_sig_pem()– converts a signature from DER to PEM formatqcrypto_x509_verify_sig()– verifies the provided data against the given signatureThese functions enable basic signature verification support.
Signed-off-by Zhuoying Cai <[email protected]>Reviewed-by Farhan Ali<[email protected]>Reviewed-by Thomas Huth <[email protected]>--- crypto/x509-utils.c | 108 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ include/crypto/x509-utils.h | 41 ++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 149 insertions(+)crypto/x509-utils.c +27
-0+int qcrypto_pkcs7_convert_sig_pem (uint8_t *sig,size_t sig_size, +uint8_t **result,size_t *resultlen, +Error **errp) +{ +int ret =-1 ; +int rc; +gnutls_pkcs7_t signature; +gnutls_datum_t sig_datum_der = {.data = sig, .size = sig_size}; +gnutls_datum_t sig_datum_pem = {.data =NULL , .size =0 }; + + rc =gnutls_pkcs7_init (&signature); +if (rc <0 ) { +error_setg (errp,"Failed to initialize pkcs7 data: %s" ,gnutls_strerror (rc)); +return ret; + } + + rc =gnutls_pkcs7_import (signature, &sig_datum_der,GNUTLS_X509_FMT_DER ); +if (rc !=0 ) { +error_setg (errp,"Failed to import signature: %s" ,gnutls_strerror (rc)); + goto cleanup; + } + + rc =gnutls_pkcs7_export2 (signature,GNUTLS_X509_FMT_PEM , &sig_datum_pem); +if (rc !=0 ) { +error_setg (errp,"Failed to convert signature to PEM format: %s" , +gnutls_strerror (rc)); + goto cleanup;
crypto/x509-utils.c int qcrypto_x509_check_ecc_curve_p521(uint8_t *cert, size_t size, Error **errp) · line 375
Quoted 10 lines
crypto/x509-utils.c +10
-0+ } + + *resultlen = sig_datum_pem.size; + *result =g_memdup2 (sig_datum_pem.data, sig_datum_pem.size); + + ret =0 ; + +cleanup: +gnutls_pkcs7_deinit (signature); +gnutls_free (sig_datum_pem.data);
Change to g_free plesae
crypto/x509-utils.c
Quoted 2 lines
crypto/x509-utils.c +2
-0+return ret; +}
With that fixed
With regards,
Daniel
Signature · 3 lines
|: https://berrange.com ~~ https://hachyderm.io/@berrange :| |: https://libvirt.org ~~ https://entangle-photo.org :| |: https://pixelfed.art/berrange ~~ https://fstop138.berrange.com :|
PATCH v10 12/30 s390x/diag: Implement DIAG 508 subcode 1 for signature verification
In reply to Zhuoying CaiFrom: Collin Walling <[email protected]>
DIAG 508 subcode 1 performs signature-verification on signed components. A signed component may be a Linux kernel image, or any other signed binary. **Verification of initrd is not supported.**
The instruction call expects two item-pairs: an address of a device component, an address of the analogous signature file (in PKCS#7 DER format), and their respective lengths. All of this data should be encapsulated within a Diag508SigVerifBlock.
The DIAG handler will read from the provided addresses to retrieve the necessary data, parse the signature file, then perform the signature-verification. Because there is no way to correlate a specific certificate to a component, each certificate in the store is tried until either verification succeeds, or all certs have been exhausted.
A return code of 1 indicates success, and the index and length of the corresponding certificate will be set in the Diag508SigVerifBlock. The following values indicate failure:
0x0102: no certificates are available in the store 0x0202: component data is invalid 0x0302: PKCS#7 format signature is invalid 0x0402: signature-verification failed 0x0502: length of Diag508SigVerifBlock is invalid
--- docs/specs/s390x-secure-ipl.rst | 17 +++++ include/hw/s390x/ipl/diag508.h | 30 +++++++++ target/s390x/diag.c | 111 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++- 3 files changed, 157 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
docs/specs/s390x-secure-ipl.rst +17 -0
@@ -80,3 +80,20 @@ that requires assistance from QEMU. Subcode 0 - query installed subcodes Returns a 64-bit mask indicating which subcodes are supported. + +Subcode 1 - perform signature verification + Perform signature-verification on a signed component, using certificates + from the certificate store and leveraging qcrypto libraries to perform + this operation. + + Note: verification of initrd is not supported. + + A return code of 1 indicates success, and the index and length of the + corresponding certificate will be set in the Diag508SigVerifBlock. + The following values indicate failure: + + * ``0x0102``: no certificates are available in the store + * ``0x0202``: component data is invalid + * ``0x0302``: PKCS#7 format signature is invalid + * ``0x0402``: signature-verification failed + * ``0x0502``: length of Diag508SigVerifBlock is invalid
include/hw/s390x/ipl/diag508.h +30 -0
@@ -11,5 +11,35 @@#define S390X_DIAG508_H #define DIAG_508_SUBC_QUERY_SUBC 0x0000 +#define DIAG_508_SUBC_SIG_VERIF 0x8000 + +#define DIAG_508_RC_OK 0x0001 +#define DIAG_508_RC_NO_CERTS 0x0102 +#define DIAG_508_RC_INVAL_COMP_DATA 0x0202 +#define DIAG_508_RC_INVAL_PKCS7_SIG 0x0302 +#define DIAG_508_RC_FAIL_VERIF 0x0402 +#define DIAG_508_RC_INVAL_LEN 0x0502 + +/* +* Maximum componenet and signature sizes for current secure boot implementation +* Not architecturally defined and may need to revisit if increased +*/ +#define DIAG_508_MAX_COMP_LEN 0x10000000 +#define DIAG_508_MAX_SIG_LEN 4096 + +struct Diag508SigVerifBlock { +uint32_t length; +uint8_t reserved0[3 ]; +uint8_t version; +uint32_t reserved[2 ]; +uint8_t cert_store_index; +uint8_t reserved1[7 ]; +uint64_t cert_len; +uint64_t comp_len; +uint64_t comp_addr; +uint64_t sig_len; +uint64_t sig_addr; +}; +typedef struct Diag508SigVerifBlock Diag508SigVerifBlock ;#endif
target/s390x/diag.c +110 -1
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Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
PATCH v10 13/30 s390x/ipl: Introduce IPL Information Report Block (IIRB)
In reply to Zhuoying CaiThe IPL information report block (IIRB) contains information used to locate IPL records and to report the results of signature verification of one or more secure components of the load device.
IIRB is stored immediately following the IPL Parameter Block. Results on component verification in any case (failure or success) are stored.
The IIRB data is reserved and protected by the guest kernel during early boot to prevent it from being overwritten before the certificate data is permanently saved.
--- docs/specs/s390x-secure-ipl.rst | 21 ++++++++++++ include/hw/s390x/ipl/qipl.h | 59 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 80 insertions(+)
docs/specs/s390x-secure-ipl.rst +21 -0
@@ -97,3 +97,24 @@ Subcode 1 - perform signature verification * ``0x0302``: PKCS#7 format signature is invalid * ``0x0402``: signature-verification failed * ``0x0502``: length of Diag508SigVerifBlock is invalid + +IPL Information Report Block +---------------------------- + +The IPL Parameter Block (IPLPB), utilized for IPL operation, is extended with an +IPL Information Report Block (IIRB), which contains the results from secure IPL +operations such as: + +* component data +* verification results +* certificate data + +During early boot, the guest kernel reserves the memory region +containing the IIRB. This preserves the data while the guest kernel is +operating and during re-IPL. + +The guest kernel uses the contents in the IIRB for: + +* Boot logging: reports which components were loaded and verified. +* kexec operations: builds the next kernel’s IPL report from the existing one. +* Keying: installs IPL certificates into the platform trusted keyring.
include/hw/s390x/ipl/qipl.h +59 -0
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Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
PATCH v10 14/30 pc-bios/s390-ccw: Define memory for IPLB and convert IPLB to pointers
In reply to Zhuoying CaiDefine a memory space for both IPL Parameter Block (IPLB) and IPL Information Report Block (IIRB) since IIRB is stored immediately following IPLB.
Convert IPLB to pointer and it points to the start of the defined memory space. IIRB points to the end of IPLB.
--- include/hw/s390x/ipl/qipl.h | 6 ++++++ pc-bios/s390-ccw/iplb.h | 5 +++-- pc-bios/s390-ccw/jump2ipl.c | 6 +++--- pc-bios/s390-ccw/main.c | 34 +++++++++++++++++++--------------- pc-bios/s390-ccw/netmain.c | 8 ++++---- 5 files changed, 35 insertions(+), 24 deletions(-)
include/hw/s390x/ipl/qipl.h +6 -0
@@ -205,4 +205,10 @@ struct IplInfoReportBlock { };typedef struct IplInfoReportBlock IplInfoReportBlock ; +struct IplBlocks { +IplParameterBlock iplb; +IplInfoReportBlock iirb; +}; +typedef struct IplBlocks IplBlocks ; +#endif
pc-bios/s390-ccw/iplb.h +3 -2
@@ -20,8 +20,9 @@#include <string.h> extern QemuIplParameters qipl; -extern IplParameterBlock iplb __attribute__((__aligned__(PAGE_SIZE))); +extern IplParameterBlock *iplb;extern bool have_iplb; +extern IplBlocks ipl_data;static inline bool manage_iplb (IplParameterBlock *iplb,bool store) {
@@ -61,7 +62,7 @@ static inline bool load_next_iplb(void) qipl.index++; next_iplb = (IplParameterBlock *) qipl.next_iplb; -memcpy (&iplb, next_iplb,sizeof (IplParameterBlock)); +memcpy (iplb, next_iplb,sizeof (IplParameterBlock)); qipl.chain_len--; qipl.next_iplb = qipl.next_iplb +sizeof (IplParameterBlock);
pc-bios/s390-ccw/jump2ipl.c +3 -3
@@ -43,11 +43,11 @@ int jump_to_IPL_code(uint64_t address)* The IPLB for QEMU SCSI type devices must be rebuilt during re-ipl. The * iplb.devno is set to the boot position of the target SCSI device. */ -if (iplb.pbt ==S390_IPL_TYPE_QEMU_SCSI ) { - iplb.devno = qipl.index; +if (iplb->pbt ==S390_IPL_TYPE_QEMU_SCSI ) { + iplb->devno = qipl.index; } -if (have_iplb && !set_iplb (&iplb)) { +if (have_iplb && !set_iplb (iplb)) {panic ("Failed to set IPLB" ); }
pc-bios/s390-ccw/main.c +19 -15
@@ -24,7 +24,9 @@static SubChannelId blk_schid = { .one =1 };static char loadparm_str[LOADPARM_LEN +1 ];QemuIplParameters qipl; -IplParameterBlock iplb __attribute__((__aligned__(PAGE_SIZE))); +/* Ensure that IPLB and IIRB are page aligned and sequential in memory */ +IplBlocks ipl_data __attribute__((__aligned__(PAGE_SIZE))); +IplParameterBlock *iplb;bool have_iplb;static uint16_t cutype;LowCore *lowcore;/* Yes, this *is* a pointer to address 0 */
@@ -53,7 +55,7 @@ void write_subsystem_identification(void)void write_iplb_location (void ) {if (cutype ==CU_TYPE_VIRTIO &&virtio_get_device_type () !=VIRTIO_ID_NET ) { - lowcore->ptr_iplb =ptr2u32 (&iplb); + lowcore->ptr_iplb =ptr2u32 (iplb); } }
@@ -213,14 +215,14 @@ static void boot_setup(void)char lpmsg[] ="LOADPARM=[________]\n" ;VDev *vdev =virtio_get_device (); -if (have_iplb &&memcmp (iplb.loadparm,NO_LOADPARM ,LOADPARM_LEN ) !=0 ) { -ebcdic_to_ascii ((char *) iplb.loadparm, loadparm_str,LOADPARM_LEN ); +if (have_iplb &&memcmp (iplb->loadparm,NO_LOADPARM ,LOADPARM_LEN ) !=0 ) { +ebcdic_to_ascii ((char *) iplb->loadparm, loadparm_str,LOADPARM_LEN ); }else {sclp_get_loadparm_ascii (loadparm_str); }if (have_iplb) { - vdev->ipl_type = iplb.pbt; + vdev->ipl_type = iplb->pbt;menu_setup (vdev); }else { vdev->ipl_type =QEMU_DEFAULT_IPL ;
@@ -244,21 +246,21 @@ static bool find_boot_device(void)switch (vdev->ipl_type) {case S390_IPL_TYPE_CCW : vdev->scsi_device_selected = false; -debug_print_int ("device no. " , iplb.ccw.devno); - blk_schid.ssid = iplb.ccw.ssid &0x3 ; +debug_print_int ("device no. " , iplb->ccw.devno); + blk_schid.ssid = iplb->ccw.ssid &0x3 ;debug_print_int ("ssid " , blk_schid.ssid); - found =find_subch (iplb.ccw.devno); + found =find_subch (iplb->ccw.devno);break ;case S390_IPL_TYPE_QEMU_SCSI : vdev->scsi_device_selected = true; - vdev->selected_scsi_device.channel = iplb.scsi.channel; - vdev->selected_scsi_device.target = iplb.scsi.target; - vdev->selected_scsi_device.lun = iplb.scsi.lun; - blk_schid.ssid = iplb.scsi.ssid &0x3 ; - found =find_subch (iplb.scsi.devno); + vdev->selected_scsi_device.channel = iplb->scsi.channel; + vdev->selected_scsi_device.target = iplb->scsi.target; + vdev->selected_scsi_device.lun = iplb->scsi.lun; + blk_schid.ssid = iplb->scsi.ssid &0x3 ; + found =find_subch (iplb->scsi.devno);break ;case S390_IPL_TYPE_PCI : - found =find_fid (iplb.pci.fid); + found =find_fid (iplb->pci.fid);break ;default :puts ("Unsupported IPLB" );
@@ -377,10 +379,12 @@ static void probe_boot_device(void)void main (void ) { + iplb = &ipl_data.iplb; +copy_qipl ();sclp_setup ();css_setup (); - have_iplb =store_iplb (&iplb); + have_iplb =store_iplb (iplb);if (!have_iplb) {boot_setup ();probe_boot_device ();
pc-bios/s390-ccw/netmain.c +4 -4
@@ -528,11 +528,11 @@ static bool virtio_setup(void)*/ enable_mss_facility (); -if (have_iplb ||store_iplb (&iplb)) { -IPL_assert (iplb.pbt ==S390_IPL_TYPE_CCW ,"IPL_TYPE_CCW expected" ); - dev_no = iplb.ccw.devno; +if (have_iplb ||store_iplb (iplb)) { +IPL_assert (iplb->pbt ==S390_IPL_TYPE_CCW ,"IPL_TYPE_CCW expected" ); + dev_no = iplb->ccw.devno;debug_print_int ("device no. " , dev_no); - net_schid.ssid = iplb.ccw.ssid &0x3 ; + net_schid.ssid = iplb->ccw.ssid &0x3 ;debug_print_int ("ssid " , net_schid.ssid); found =find_net_dev (&schib, dev_no); }else {
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Re: [PATCH v10 14/30] pc-bios/s390-ccw: Define memory for IPLB and convert IPLB to pointers
Quoted 9 lines · Zhuoying Cai
Define a memory space for both IPL Parameter Block (IPLB) and IPL Information Report Block (IIRB) since IIRB is stored immediately following IPLB.
Convert IPLB to pointer and it points to the start of the defined memory space. IIRB points to the end of IPLB.
Signed-off-by Zhuoying Cai<[email protected]>Reviewed-by Thomas Huth<[email protected]>
Quoted 7 lines
--- include/hw/s390x/ipl/qipl.h | 6 ++++++ pc-bios/s390-ccw/iplb.h | 5 +++-- pc-bios/s390-ccw/jump2ipl.c | 6 +++--- pc-bios/s390-ccw/main.c | 34 +++++++++++++++++++--------------- pc-bios/s390-ccw/netmain.c | 8 ++++---- 5 files changed, 35 insertions(+), 24 deletions(-)
PATCH v10 15/30 hw/s390x/ipl: Add IPIB flags to IPL Parameter Block
In reply to Zhuoying CaiAdd IPIB flags to IPL Parameter Block to determine if IPL needs to perform securely and if IPL Information Report Block (IIRB) exists.
Move DIAG308 flags to a separated header file and add flags for secure IPL.
Secure boot in audit mode will perform if certificate(s) exist in the key store. IIRB will exist and results of verification will be stored in IIRB.
To ensure proper alignment of the IIRB and prevent overlap, set iplb->len to the maximum length of the IPLB, allowing alignment constraints to be determined based on its size.
--- hw/s390x/ipl.c | 21 +++++++++++++++++++++ hw/s390x/ipl.h | 21 +++++---------------- include/hw/s390x/ipl/diag308.h | 34 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ include/hw/s390x/ipl/qipl.h | 5 ++++- 4 files changed, 64 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-) create mode 100644 include/hw/s390x/ipl/diag308.h
hw/s390x/ipl.c +21 -0
@@ -461,6 +461,13 @@ S390IPLCertificateStore *s390_ipl_get_certificate_store(void)return &ipl->cert_store; } +static bool s390_has_certificate (void ) +{ +S390IPLState *ipl =get_ipl_device (); + +return ipl->cert_store.count >0 ; +} +static bool s390_build_iplb (DeviceState *dev_st,IplParameterBlock *iplb) {CcwDevice *ccw_dev =NULL ;
@@ -517,6 +524,20 @@ static bool s390_build_iplb(DeviceState *dev_st, IplParameterBlock *iplb)s390_ipl_convert_loadparm ((char *)lp, iplb->loadparm); iplb->flags |=DIAG308_FLAGS_LP_VALID ; +/* +* Secure boot in audit mode will perform +* if certificate(s) exist in the key store. +* +* IPL Information Report Block (IIRB) will exist +* for secure boot in audit mode. +* +* Results of secure boot will be stored in IIRB. +*/ +if (s390_has_certificate ()) { + iplb->hdr_flags |=DIAG308_IPIB_FLAGS_IPLIR ; + iplb->len =cpu_to_be32 (S390_IPLB_MAX_LEN ); + } +return true; }
hw/s390x/ipl.h +5 -16
@@ -23,7 +23,6 @@#include "qom/object.h" #include "target/s390x/kvm/pv.h" -#define DIAG308_FLAGS_LP_VALID 0x80#define MAX_BOOT_DEVS 8/* Max number of devices that may have a bootindex */ void s390_ipl_convert_loadparm (char *ascii_lp,uint8_t *ebcdic_lp);
@@ -90,21 +89,10 @@ struct S390IPLState { };QEMU_BUILD_BUG_MSG (offsetof(S390IPLState , iplb) &3 ,"alignment of iplb wrong" ); -#define DIAG_308_RC_OK 0x0001 -#define DIAG_308_RC_NO_CONF 0x0102 -#define DIAG_308_RC_INVALID 0x0402 -#define DIAG_308_RC_NO_PV_CONF 0x0902 -#define DIAG_308_RC_INVAL_FOR_PV 0x0a02 - -#define DIAG308_RESET_MOD_CLR 0 -#define DIAG308_RESET_LOAD_NORM 1 -#define DIAG308_LOAD_CLEAR 3 -#define DIAG308_LOAD_NORMAL_DUMP 4 -#define DIAG308_SET 5 -#define DIAG308_STORE 6 -#define DIAG308_PV_SET 8 -#define DIAG308_PV_STORE 9 -#define DIAG308_PV_START 10 +#define S390_IPL_TYPE_FCP 0x00 +#define S390_IPL_TYPE_CCW 0x02 +#define S390_IPL_TYPE_PV 0x05 +#define S390_IPL_TYPE_QEMU_SCSI 0xff#define S390_IPLB_HEADER_LEN 8#define S390_IPLB_MIN_PV_LEN 148
@@ -112,6 +100,7 @@ QEMU_BUILD_BUG_MSG(offsetof(S390IPLState, iplb) & 3, "alignment of iplb wrong");#define S390_IPLB_MIN_FCP_LEN 384#define S390_IPLB_MIN_PCI_LEN 376#define S390_IPLB_MIN_QEMU_SCSI_LEN 200 +#define S390_IPLB_MAX_LEN 4096static inline bool iplb_valid_len (IplParameterBlock *iplb) {
include/hw/s390x/ipl/diag308.h new file +34 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,34 @@ +/* +* S/390 DIAGNOSE 308 definitions and structures +* +* Copyright 2025 IBM Corp. +* Author(s): Zhuoying Cai <[email protected]> +* +* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later +*/ + +#ifndef S390X_DIAG308_H +#define S390X_DIAG308_H + +#define DIAG_308_RC_OK 0x0001 +#define DIAG_308_RC_NO_CONF 0x0102 +#define DIAG_308_RC_INVALID 0x0402 +#define DIAG_308_RC_NO_PV_CONF 0x0902 +#define DIAG_308_RC_INVAL_FOR_PV 0x0a02 + +#define DIAG308_RESET_MOD_CLR 0 +#define DIAG308_RESET_LOAD_NORM 1 +#define DIAG308_LOAD_CLEAR 3 +#define DIAG308_LOAD_NORMAL_DUMP 4 +#define DIAG308_SET 5 +#define DIAG308_STORE 6 +#define DIAG308_PV_SET 8 +#define DIAG308_PV_STORE 9 +#define DIAG308_PV_START 10 + +#define DIAG308_FLAGS_LP_VALID 0x80 + +#define DIAG308_IPIB_FLAGS_SIPL 0x40 +#define DIAG308_IPIB_FLAGS_IPLIR 0x20 + +#endif
include/hw/s390x/ipl/qipl.h +4 -1
@@ -12,6 +12,8 @@#ifndef S390X_QIPL_H #define S390X_QIPL_H +#include "diag308.h" +/* Boot Menu flags */ #define QIPL_FLAG_BM_OPTS_CMD 0x80#define QIPL_FLAG_BM_OPTS_ZIPL 0x40
@@ -122,7 +124,8 @@ typedef struct IplBlockPci IplBlockPci;union IplParameterBlock {struct {uint32_t len; -uint8_t reserved0[3 ]; +uint8_t hdr_flags; +uint8_t reserved0[2 ];uint8_t version;uint32_t blk0_len;uint8_t pbt;
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Re: [PATCH v10 15/30] hw/s390x/ipl: Add IPIB flags to IPL Parameter Block
Quoted 87 lines · Zhuoying Cai
Add IPIB flags to IPL Parameter Block to determine if IPL needs to perform securely and if IPL Information Report Block (IIRB) exists.
Move DIAG308 flags to a separated header file and add flags for secure IPL.
Secure boot in audit mode will perform if certificate(s) exist in the key store. IIRB will exist and results of verification will be stored in IIRB.
To ensure proper alignment of the IIRB and prevent overlap, set
iplb->lento the maximum length of the IPLB, allowing alignment constraints to be determined based on its size.Signed-off-by Zhuoying Cai <[email protected]>Reviewed-by Thomas Huth <[email protected]>--- hw/s390x/ipl.c | 21 +++++++++++++++++++++ hw/s390x/ipl.h | 21 +++++---------------- include/hw/s390x/ipl/diag308.h | 34 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ include/hw/s390x/ipl/qipl.h | 5 ++++- 4 files changed, 64 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-) create mode 100644 include/hw/s390x/ipl/diag308.hhw/s390x/ipl.c +21
-0@@ -461,6 +461,13 @@ S390IPLCertificateStore *s390_ipl_get_certificate_store(void)return &ipl->cert_store; } +static bool s390_has_certificate (void ) +{ +S390IPLState *ipl =get_ipl_device (); + +return ipl->cert_store.count >0 ; +} +static bool s390_build_iplb (DeviceState *dev_st,IplParameterBlock *iplb) {CcwDevice *ccw_dev =NULL ;@@ -517,6 +524,20 @@ static bool s390_build_iplb(DeviceState *dev_st, IplParameterBlock *iplb)s390_ipl_convert_loadparm ((char *)lp, iplb->loadparm); iplb->flags |=DIAG308_FLAGS_LP_VALID ; +/* +* Secure boot in audit mode will perform +* if certificate(s) exist in the key store. +* +* IPL Information Report Block (IIRB) will exist +* for secure boot in audit mode. +* +* Results of secure boot will be stored in IIRB. +*/ +if (s390_has_certificate ()) { + iplb->hdr_flags |=DIAG308_IPIB_FLAGS_IPLIR ; + iplb->len =cpu_to_be32 (S390_IPLB_MAX_LEN ); + } +return true; }hw/s390x/ipl.h +0
-10@@ -23,7 +23,6 @@#include "qom/object.h" #include "target/s390x/kvm/pv.h" -#define DIAG308_FLAGS_LP_VALID 0x80#define MAX_BOOT_DEVS 8/* Max number of devices that may have a bootindex */ void s390_ipl_convert_loadparm (char *ascii_lp,uint8_t *ebcdic_lp);@@ -90,21 +89,10 @@ struct S390IPLState { };QEMU_BUILD_BUG_MSG (offsetof(S390IPLState , iplb) &3 ,"alignment of iplb wrong" ); -#define DIAG_308_RC_OK 0x0001 -#define DIAG_308_RC_NO_CONF 0x0102 -#define DIAG_308_RC_INVALID 0x0402 -#define DIAG_308_RC_NO_PV_CONF 0x0902 -#define DIAG_308_RC_INVAL_FOR_PV 0x0a02 - -#define DIAG308_RESET_MOD_CLR 0 -#define DIAG308_RESET_LOAD_NORM 1 -#define DIAG308_LOAD_CLEAR 3
hw/s390x/ipl.h struct S390IPLState { · line 95
Quoted 10 lines
hw/s390x/ipl.h +4
-6-#define DIAG308_LOAD_NORMAL_DUMP 4 -#define DIAG308_SET 5 -#define DIAG308_STORE 6 -#define DIAG308_PV_SET 8 -#define DIAG308_PV_STORE 9 -#define DIAG308_PV_START 10 +#define S390_IPL_TYPE_FCP 0x00 +#define S390_IPL_TYPE_CCW 0x02 +#define S390_IPL_TYPE_PV 0x05 +#define S390_IPL_TYPE_QEMU_SCSI 0xff
Aren't these S390_IPL_TYPE_*'s already defined ininclude/hw/s390x/ipl/qipl.h as an enumeration?
[...]
Signature · 2 lines
Regards, Collin
Re: [PATCH v10 15/30] hw/s390x/ipl: Add IPIB flags to IPL Parameter Block
In reply to Zhuoying CaiQuoted 25 lines · Zhuoying Cai
<snip...>
hw/s390x/ipl.h +4
-15-#define DIAG_308_RC_OK 0x0001 -#define DIAG_308_RC_NO_CONF 0x0102 -#define DIAG_308_RC_INVALID 0x0402 -#define DIAG_308_RC_NO_PV_CONF 0x0902 -#define DIAG_308_RC_INVAL_FOR_PV 0x0a02 - -#define DIAG308_RESET_MOD_CLR 0 -#define DIAG308_RESET_LOAD_NORM 1 -#define DIAG308_LOAD_CLEAR 3 -#define DIAG308_LOAD_NORMAL_DUMP 4 -#define DIAG308_SET 5 -#define DIAG308_STORE 6 -#define DIAG308_PV_SET 8 -#define DIAG308_PV_STORE 9 -#define DIAG308_PV_START 10 +#define S390_IPL_TYPE_FCP 0x00 +#define S390_IPL_TYPE_CCW 0x02 +#define S390_IPL_TYPE_PV 0x05 +#define S390_IPL_TYPE_QEMU_SCSI 0xff#define S390_IPLB_HEADER_LEN 8#define S390_IPLB_MIN_PV_LEN 148
hw/s390x/ipl.h QEMU_BUILD_BUG_MSG(offsetof(S390IPLState, iplb) & 3, "alignment of iplb wrong"); · line 104
Quoted 6 lines
hw/s390x/ipl.h +1
-0@@ -112,6 +100,7 @@ QEMU_BUILD_BUG_MSG(offsetof(S390IPLState, iplb) & 3, "alignment of iplb wrong");#define S390_IPLB_MIN_FCP_LEN 384#define S390_IPLB_MIN_PCI_LEN 376#define S390_IPLB_MIN_QEMU_SCSI_LEN 200 +#define S390_IPLB_MAX_LEN 4096
Collin correctly pointed out that S390_IPL_TYPE* already exists as an enum in 'include/hw/s390x/ipl/qipl.h', so no need to define here.
I suggest we also move the various IPLB length definitions to qipl.h while we are cleaning this up, since they are architected values anyway.
Regards,
Jared Rossi
Re: [PATCH v10 15/30] hw/s390x/ipl: Add IPIB flags to IPL Parameter Block
Quoted 38 lines · Jared Rossi
Quoted 25 lines · Zhuoying Cai
<snip...>
hw/s390x/ipl.h +4
-15-#define DIAG_308_RC_OK 0x0001 -#define DIAG_308_RC_NO_CONF 0x0102 -#define DIAG_308_RC_INVALID 0x0402 -#define DIAG_308_RC_NO_PV_CONF 0x0902 -#define DIAG_308_RC_INVAL_FOR_PV 0x0a02 - -#define DIAG308_RESET_MOD_CLR 0 -#define DIAG308_RESET_LOAD_NORM 1 -#define DIAG308_LOAD_CLEAR 3 -#define DIAG308_LOAD_NORMAL_DUMP 4 -#define DIAG308_SET 5 -#define DIAG308_STORE 6 -#define DIAG308_PV_SET 8 -#define DIAG308_PV_STORE 9 -#define DIAG308_PV_START 10 +#define S390_IPL_TYPE_FCP 0x00 +#define S390_IPL_TYPE_CCW 0x02 +#define S390_IPL_TYPE_PV 0x05 +#define S390_IPL_TYPE_QEMU_SCSI 0xff#define S390_IPLB_HEADER_LEN 8#define S390_IPLB_MIN_PV_LEN 148hw/s390x/ipl.h QEMU_BUILD_BUG_MSG(offsetof(S390IPLState, iplb) & 3, "alignment of iplb wrong"); · line 104
Quoted 6 lines
hw/s390x/ipl.h +1
-0@@ -112,6 +100,7 @@ QEMU_BUILD_BUG_MSG(offsetof(S390IPLState, iplb) & 3, "alignment of iplb wrong");#define S390_IPLB_MIN_FCP_LEN 384#define S390_IPLB_MIN_PCI_LEN 376#define S390_IPLB_MIN_QEMU_SCSI_LEN 200 +#define S390_IPLB_MAX_LEN 4096Collin correctly pointed out that S390_IPL_TYPE* already exists as an enum in '
include/hw/s390x/ipl/qipl.h', so no need to define here.
Quoted 5 lines
I suggest we also move the various IPLB length definitions to
qipl.hwhile we are cleaning this up, since they are architected values anyway.Regards,
Jared Rossi
Thanks for pointing this out. I'll also move the other IPLB related definitions to qipl.h in the next version.
PATCH v10 16/30 s390x: Guest support for Secure-IPL Facility
In reply to Zhuoying CaiIntroduce Secure-IPL (SIPL) facility.
Use fac_ipl to represent bytes 136 and 137 for IPL device facilities of the SCLP Read Info block.
Availability of SIPL facility is determined by byte 136 bit 1 of the SCLP Read Info block. Byte 136's facilities cannot be represented without the availability of the extended-length-SCCB, so add it as a check for consistency.
Secure IPL is not available for guests under protected virtualization.
This feature is available starting with the gen16 CPU model.
--- hw/s390x/sclp.c | 2 ++ include/hw/s390x/sclp.h | 4 +++- target/s390x/cpu_features.c | 4 ++++ target/s390x/cpu_features.h | 1 + target/s390x/cpu_features_def.h.inc | 3 +++ target/s390x/cpu_models.c | 2 ++ target/s390x/gen-features.c | 2 ++ target/s390x/kvm/kvm.c | 3 +++ 8 files changed, 20 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
hw/s390x/sclp.c +2 -0
@@ -146,6 +146,8 @@ static void read_SCP_info(SCLPDevice *sclp, SCCB *sccb)if (s390_has_feat (S390_FEAT_EXTENDED_LENGTH_SCCB )) {s390_get_feat_block (S390_FEAT_TYPE_SCLP_FAC134 , &read_info->fac134); +s390_get_feat_block (S390_FEAT_TYPE_SCLP_FAC_IPL , + read_info->fac_ipl); } read_info->facilities = cpu_to_be64(SCLP_HAS_CPU_INFO |
include/hw/s390x/sclp.h +3 -1
@@ -136,7 +136,9 @@ typedef struct ReadInfo {uint32_t hmfai;uint8_t _reserved7[134 -128 ];/* 128-133 */ uint8_t fac134; -uint8_t _reserved8[144 -135 ];/* 135-143 */ +uint8_t _reserved8; +uint8_t fac_ipl[2 ];/* 136-137 */ +uint8_t _reserved9[144 -138 ];/* 138-143 */ struct CPUEntry entries[];/* * When the Extended-Length SCCB (ELS) feature is enabled the
target/s390x/cpu_features.c +4 -0
@@ -119,6 +119,7 @@ void s390_fill_feat_block(const S390FeatBitmap features, S390FeatType type,* Some facilities are not available for CPUs in protected mode: * - All SIE facilities because SIE is not available * - DIAG318 +* - Secure IPL Facility * * As VMs can move in and out of protected mode the CPU model * doesn't protect us from that problem because it is only
@@ -149,6 +150,9 @@ void s390_fill_feat_block(const S390FeatBitmap features, S390FeatType type,clear_be_bit (s390_feat_def (S390_FEAT_DIAG_318 )->bit, data);clear_be_bit (s390_feat_def (S390_FEAT_CERT_STORE )->bit, data);break ; +case S390_FEAT_TYPE_SCLP_FAC_IPL : +clear_be_bit (s390_feat_def (S390_FEAT_SIPL )->bit, data); +break ;default :return ; }
target/s390x/cpu_features.h +1 -0
@@ -24,6 +24,7 @@ typedef enum {S390_FEAT_TYPE_SCLP_CONF_CHAR ,S390_FEAT_TYPE_SCLP_CONF_CHAR_EXT ,S390_FEAT_TYPE_SCLP_FAC134 , +S390_FEAT_TYPE_SCLP_FAC_IPL ,S390_FEAT_TYPE_SCLP_CPU ,S390_FEAT_TYPE_MISC , S390_FEAT_TYPE_PLO,
target/s390x/cpu_features_def.h.inc +3 -0
@@ -140,6 +140,9 @@ DEF_FEAT(SIE_IBS, "ibs", SCLP_CONF_CHAR_EXT, 10, "SIE: Interlock-and-broadcast-s DEF_FEAT(DIAG_318, "diag318", SCLP_FAC134, 0, "Control program name and version codes") DEF_FEAT(CERT_STORE, "cstore", SCLP_FAC134, 5, "Certificate Store functions") +/* Features exposed via SCLP SCCB Facilities byte 136 - 137 (bit numbers relative to byte-136) */ +DEF_FEAT(SIPL, "sipl", SCLP_FAC_IPL, 1, "Secure-IPL facility") + /* Features exposed via SCLP CPU info. */ DEF_FEAT(SIE_F2, "sief2", SCLP_CPU, 4, "SIE: interception format 2 (Virtual SIE)") DEF_FEAT(SIE_SKEY, "skey", SCLP_CPU, 5, "SIE: Storage-key facility")
target/s390x/cpu_models.c +2 -0
@@ -263,6 +263,7 @@ bool s390_has_feat(S390Feat feat)case S390_FEAT_SIE_CMMA :case S390_FEAT_SIE_PFMFI :case S390_FEAT_SIE_IBS : +case S390_FEAT_SIPL :case S390_FEAT_CONFIGURATION_TOPOLOGY :return false;break ;
@@ -507,6 +508,7 @@ static void check_consistency(const S390CPUModel *model) { S390_FEAT_AP_QUEUE_INTERRUPT_CONTROL, S390_FEAT_AP }, { S390_FEAT_DIAG_318, S390_FEAT_EXTENDED_LENGTH_SCCB }, { S390_FEAT_CERT_STORE, S390_FEAT_EXTENDED_LENGTH_SCCB }, + { S390_FEAT_SIPL, S390_FEAT_EXTENDED_LENGTH_SCCB }, { S390_FEAT_NNPA, S390_FEAT_VECTOR }, { S390_FEAT_RDP, S390_FEAT_LOCAL_TLB_CLEARING }, { S390_FEAT_UV_FEAT_AP, S390_FEAT_AP },
target/s390x/gen-features.c +2 -0
@@ -721,6 +721,7 @@ static uint16_t full_GEN16_GA1[] = {S390_FEAT_UV_FEAT_AP ,S390_FEAT_UV_FEAT_AP_INTR ,S390_FEAT_CERT_STORE , + S390_FEAT_SIPL, }; static uint16_t full_GEN17_GA1[] = {
@@ -922,6 +923,7 @@ static uint16_t qemu_MAX[] = {S390_FEAT_PRNO_TRNG ,S390_FEAT_EXTENDED_LENGTH_SCCB ,S390_FEAT_CERT_STORE , + S390_FEAT_SIPL, };/****** END FEATURE DEFS ******/
target/s390x/kvm/kvm.c +3 -0
@@ -2518,6 +2518,9 @@ bool kvm_s390_get_host_cpu_model(S390CPUModel *model, Error **errp)set_bit (S390_FEAT_CERT_STORE , model->features); +/* Some Secure IPL facilities are emulated by QEMU */ +set_bit (S390_FEAT_SIPL , model->features); +/* Test for Ultravisor features that influence secure guest behavior */ query_uv_feat_guest (model->features);
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
PATCH v10 17/30 pc-bios/s390-ccw: Refactor zipl_run()
In reply to Zhuoying CaiRefactor to enhance readability before enabling secure IPL in later patches.
--- pc-bios/s390-ccw/bootmap.c | 51 ++++++++++++++++++++++++-------------- 1 file changed, 33 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-)
pc-bios/s390-ccw/bootmap.c +33 -18
@@ -674,12 +674,42 @@ static int zipl_load_segment(ComponentEntry *entry)return 0 ; } +static int zipl_run_normal (ComponentEntry **entry_ptr,uint8_t *tmp_sec) +{ +ComponentEntry *entry = *entry_ptr; + +while (entry->component_type ==ZIPL_COMP_ENTRY_LOAD || + entry->component_type ==ZIPL_COMP_ENTRY_SIGNATURE ) { + +/* Secure boot is off, so we skip signature entries */ +if (entry->component_type ==ZIPL_COMP_ENTRY_SIGNATURE ) { + entry++; +continue ; + } + +if (zipl_load_segment (entry)) { +return -1 ; + } + + entry++; + +if ((uint8_t *)&entry[1 ] > tmp_sec +MAX_SECTOR_SIZE ) { +puts ("Wrong entry value" ); +return -EINVAL ; + } + } + + *entry_ptr = entry; +return 0 ; +} +/* Run a zipl program */ static int zipl_run (ScsiBlockPtr *pte) {ComponentHeader *header;ComponentEntry *entry;uint8_t tmp_sec[MAX_SECTOR_SIZE ]; +int rc;if (virtio_read (pte->blockno, tmp_sec)) {puts ("Cannot read header" );
@@ -700,25 +730,10 @@ static int zipl_run(ScsiBlockPtr *pte)/* Load image(s) into RAM */ entry = (ComponentEntry *)(&header[1 ]); -while (entry->component_type ==ZIPL_COMP_ENTRY_LOAD || - entry->component_type ==ZIPL_COMP_ENTRY_SIGNATURE ) { - -/* We don't support secure boot yet, so we skip signature entries */ -if (entry->component_type ==ZIPL_COMP_ENTRY_SIGNATURE ) { - entry++; -continue ; - } - -if (zipl_load_segment (entry)) { -return -1 ; - } - entry++; - -if ((uint8_t *)(&entry[1 ]) > (tmp_sec +MAX_SECTOR_SIZE )) { -puts ("Wrong entry value" ); -return -EINVAL ; - } + rc =zipl_run_normal (&entry, tmp_sec); +if (rc) { +return rc; }if (entry->component_type !=ZIPL_COMP_ENTRY_EXEC ) {
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Re: [PATCH v10 17/30] pc-bios/s390-ccw: Refactor zipl_run()
Quoted 75 lines · Zhuoying Cai
Refactor to enhance readability before enabling secure IPL in later patches.
Signed-off-by Zhuoying Cai <[email protected]>Reviewed-by Thomas Huth <[email protected]>--- pc-bios/s390-ccw/bootmap.c | 51 ++++++++++++++++++++++++-------------- 1 file changed, 33 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-)pc-bios/s390-ccw/bootmap.c +30
-14@@ -674,12 +674,42 @@ static int zipl_load_segment(ComponentEntry *entry)return 0 ; } +static int zipl_run_normal (ComponentEntry **entry_ptr,uint8_t *tmp_sec) +{ +ComponentEntry *entry = *entry_ptr; + +while (entry->component_type ==ZIPL_COMP_ENTRY_LOAD || + entry->component_type ==ZIPL_COMP_ENTRY_SIGNATURE ) { + +/* Secure boot is off, so we skip signature entries */ +if (entry->component_type ==ZIPL_COMP_ENTRY_SIGNATURE ) { + entry++; +continue ; + } + +if (zipl_load_segment (entry)) { +return -1 ; + } + + entry++; + +if ((uint8_t *)&entry[1 ] > tmp_sec +MAX_SECTOR_SIZE ) { +puts ("Wrong entry value" ); +return -EINVAL ; + } + } + + *entry_ptr = entry; +return 0 ; +} +/* Run a zipl program */ static int zipl_run (ScsiBlockPtr *pte) {ComponentHeader *header;ComponentEntry *entry;uint8_t tmp_sec[MAX_SECTOR_SIZE ]; +int rc;if (virtio_read (pte->blockno, tmp_sec)) {puts ("Cannot read header" );@@ -700,25 +730,10 @@ static int zipl_run(ScsiBlockPtr *pte)/* Load image(s) into RAM */ entry = (ComponentEntry *)(&header[1 ]); -while (entry->component_type ==ZIPL_COMP_ENTRY_LOAD || - entry->component_type ==ZIPL_COMP_ENTRY_SIGNATURE ) { - -/* We don't support secure boot yet, so we skip signature entries */ -if (entry->component_type ==ZIPL_COMP_ENTRY_SIGNATURE ) { - entry++; -continue ; - } - -if (zipl_load_segment (entry)) { -return -1 ; - } - entry++; -
pc-bios/s390-ccw/bootmap.c static int zipl_run(ScsiBlockPtr *pte) · line 739
Quoted 10 lines
pc-bios/s390-ccw/bootmap.c +3
-4-if ((uint8_t *)(&entry[1 ]) > (tmp_sec +MAX_SECTOR_SIZE )) { -puts ("Wrong entry value" ); -return -EINVAL ; - } + rc =zipl_run_normal (&entry, tmp_sec); +if (rc) { +return rc; }if (entry->component_type !=ZIPL_COMP_ENTRY_EXEC ) {
Reviewed by: Jared Rossi <[email protected]>
PATCH v10 18/30 pc-bios/s390-ccw: Rework zipl_load_segment function
In reply to Zhuoying CaiMake the address variable a parameter of zipl_load_segment and return segment length.
Modify this function to allow the caller to specify a memory address where segment data should be loaded into.
seg_len variable is necessary to store the calculated segment length and is used during signature verification. Return the length on success, or a negative return code on failure.
--- pc-bios/s390-ccw/bootmap.c | 15 ++++++++++----- 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
pc-bios/s390-ccw/bootmap.c +10 -5
@@ -613,19 +613,22 @@ static int ipl_eckd(void)* IPL a SCSI disk */ -static int zipl_load_segment (ComponentEntry *entry) +/* +* Returns: length of the segment on success, +* negative value on error. +*/ +static int zipl_load_segment (ComponentEntry *entry,uint64_t address) {const int max_entries = (MAX_SECTOR_SIZE /sizeof (ScsiBlockPtr));ScsiBlockPtr *bprs = (void *)sec;const int bprs_size =sizeof (sec);block_number_t blockno; -uint64_t address;int i;char err_msg[] ="zIPL failed to read BPRS at 0xZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZ" ;char *blk_no = &err_msg[30 ];/* where to print blockno in (those ZZs) */ +int seg_len =0 ; blockno = entry->data.blockno; - address = entry->compdat.load_addr;debug_print_int ("loading segment at block" , blockno);debug_print_int ("addr" , address);
@@ -668,10 +671,12 @@ static int zipl_load_segment(ComponentEntry *entry)puts ("zIPL load segment failed" );return -EIO ; } + + seg_len += bprs->size * (bprs[i].blockct +1 ); } }while (blockno); -return 0 ; +return seg_len; }static int zipl_run_normal (ComponentEntry **entry_ptr,uint8_t *tmp_sec)
@@ -687,7 +692,7 @@ static int zipl_run_normal(ComponentEntry **entry_ptr, uint8_t *tmp_sec)continue ; } -if (zipl_load_segment (entry)) { +if (zipl_load_segment (entry, entry->compdat.load_addr) <0 ) {return -1 ; }
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Re: [PATCH v10 18/30] pc-bios/s390-ccw: Rework zipl_load_segment function
Quoted 21 lines · Zhuoying Cai
Make the address variable a parameter of
zipl_load_segmentand return segment length.Modify this function to allow the caller to specify a memory address where segment data should be loaded into.
seg_lenvariable is necessary to store the calculated segment length and is used during signature verification. Return the length on success, or a negative return code on failure.Signed-off-by Zhuoying Cai <[email protected]>Reviewed-by Thomas Huth <[email protected]>--- pc-bios/s390-ccw/bootmap.c | 15 ++++++++++----- 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)pc-bios/s390-ccw/bootmap.c +0
-0
pc-bios/s390-ccw/bootmap.c static int ipl_eckd(void) · line 621
Quoted 10 lines
pc-bios/s390-ccw/bootmap.c +5
-1@@ -613,19 +613,22 @@ static int ipl_eckd(void)* IPL a SCSI disk */ -static int zipl_load_segment (ComponentEntry *entry) +/* +* Returns: length of the segment on success, +* negative value on error. +*/ +static int zipl_load_segment (ComponentEntry *entry,uint64_t address) {
Passing both the entire ComponentEntry, which often contains the address already, as well as a separate address parameter seems redundant.
The only other ComponentEntry value needed is the block number, so let's instead convert the parameters to be block_number_t blockno and uint64_t address.
I think just those two parameters are sufficient without passing the entire ComponentEntry, unless I've missed something.
Quoted 30 lines
pc-bios/s390-ccw/bootmap.c +4
-3const int max_entries = (MAX_SECTOR_SIZE /sizeof (ScsiBlockPtr));ScsiBlockPtr *bprs = (void *)sec;const int bprs_size =sizeof (sec);block_number_t blockno; -uint64_t address;int i;char err_msg[] ="zIPL failed to read BPRS at 0xZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZ" ;char *blk_no = &err_msg[30 ];/* where to print blockno in (those ZZs) */ +int seg_len =0 ; blockno = entry->data.blockno; - address = entry->compdat.load_addr;debug_print_int ("loading segment at block" , blockno);debug_print_int ("addr" , address);@@ -668,10 +671,12 @@ static int zipl_load_segment(ComponentEntry *entry)puts ("zIPL load segment failed" );return -EIO ; } + + seg_len += bprs->size * (bprs[i].blockct +1 ); } }while (blockno); -return 0 ; +return seg_len; }static int zipl_run_normal (ComponentEntry **entry_ptr,uint8_t *tmp_sec)
pc-bios/s390-ccw/bootmap.c static int zipl_run_normal(ComponentEntry **entry_ptr, uint8_t *tmp_sec) · line 698
Quoted 8 lines
pc-bios/s390-ccw/bootmap.c +1
-1@@ -687,7 +692,7 @@ static int zipl_run_normal(ComponentEntry **entry_ptr, uint8_t *tmp_sec)continue ; } -if (zipl_load_segment (entry)) { +if (zipl_load_segment (entry, entry->compdat.load_addr) <0 ) {return -1 ; }
Regards,
Jared Rossi
PATCH v10 19/30 pc-bios/s390-ccw: Add signature verification for secure IPL in audit mode
In reply to Zhuoying CaiEnable secure IPL in audit mode, which performs signature verification, but any error does not terminate the boot process. Only warnings will be logged to the console instead.
Add a comp_len variable to store the length of a segment in zipl_load_segment. comp_len variable is necessary to store the calculated segment length and is used during signature verification. Return the length on success, or a negative return code on failure.
Secure IPL in audit mode requires at least one certificate provided in the key store along with necessary facilities (Secure IPL Facility, Certificate Store Facility and secure IPL extension support).
Note: Secure IPL in audit mode is implemented for the SCSI scheme of virtio-blk/virtio-scsi devices.
--- docs/system/s390x/secure-ipl.rst | 35 +++ pc-bios/s390-ccw/Makefile | 2 +- pc-bios/s390-ccw/bootmap.c | 36 +++- pc-bios/s390-ccw/bootmap.h | 11 + pc-bios/s390-ccw/main.c | 6 + pc-bios/s390-ccw/s390-ccw.h | 27 +++ pc-bios/s390-ccw/sclp.c | 37 ++++ pc-bios/s390-ccw/sclp.h | 6 + pc-bios/s390-ccw/secure-ipl.c | 359 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ pc-bios/s390-ccw/secure-ipl.h | 110 ++++++++++ 10 files changed, 626 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) create mode 100644 pc-bios/s390-ccw/secure-ipl.c create mode 100644 pc-bios/s390-ccw/secure-ipl.h
docs/system/s390x/secure-ipl.rst +35 -0
@@ -18,3 +18,38 @@ Note: certificate files must have a .pem extension. .. code-block:: shell qemu-system-s390x -machine s390-ccw-virtio,boot-certs.0.path=/.../qemu/certs,boot-certs.1.path=/another/path/cert.pem ... + + +IPL Modes +========= +Multiple IPL modes are available to differentiate between the various IPL +configurations. These modes are mutually exclusive and enabled based on the +``boot-certs`` option on the QEMU command line. + +Normal Mode +----------- + +The absence of certificates will attempt to IPL a guest without secure IPL +operations. No checks are performed, and no warnings/errors are reported. +This is the default mode. + +Configuration: + +.. code-block:: shell + + qemu-system-s390x -machine s390-ccw-virtio ... + +Audit Mode +---------- + +When the certificate store is populated with at least one certificate +and no additional secure IPL parameters are provided on the command +line, then secure IPL will proceed in "audit mode". All secure IPL +operations will be performed with signature verification errors reported +as non-disruptive warnings. + +Configuration: + +.. code-block:: shell + + qemu-system-s390x -machine s390-ccw-virtio,boot-certs.0.path=/.../qemu/certs,boot-certs.1.path=/another/path/cert.pem ...
pc-bios/s390-ccw/Makefile +1 -1
@@ -35,7 +35,7 @@ QEMU_DGFLAGS = -MMD -MP -MT $@ -MF $(@D)/$(*F).d OBJECTS = start.o main.o bootmap.o jump2ipl.o sclp.o menu.o netmain.o \ virtio.o virtio-net.o virtio-scsi.o virtio-blkdev.o cio.o dasd-ipl.o \ - virtio-ccw.o clp.o pci.o virtio-pci.o + virtio-ccw.o clp.o pci.o virtio-pci.o secure-ipl.o SLOF_DIR := $(SRC_PATH)/../../roms/SLOF
pc-bios/s390-ccw/bootmap.c +34 -2
@@ -15,6 +15,7 @@#include "bootmap.h" #include "virtio.h" #include "bswap.h" +#include "secure-ipl.h" #ifdef DEBUG /* #define DEBUG_FALLBACK */
@@ -617,7 +618,7 @@ static int ipl_eckd(void)* Returns: length of the segment on success, * negative value on error. */ -static int zipl_load_segment (ComponentEntry *entry,uint64_t address) +int zipl_load_segment (ComponentEntry *entry,uint64_t address) {const int max_entries = (MAX_SECTOR_SIZE /sizeof (ScsiBlockPtr));ScsiBlockPtr *bprs = (void *)sec;
@@ -736,7 +737,19 @@ static int zipl_run(ScsiBlockPtr *pte)/* Load image(s) into RAM */ entry = (ComponentEntry *)(&header[1 ]); - rc =zipl_run_normal (&entry, tmp_sec); +switch (boot_mode) { +case ZIPL_BOOT_MODE_SECURE_AUDIT : + rc =zipl_run_secure (&entry, tmp_sec); +break ; +case ZIPL_BOOT_MODE_NORMAL : + rc =zipl_run_normal (&entry, tmp_sec); +break ; +default : +puts ("Unknown boot mode" ); + rc =-1 ; +break ; + } +if (rc) {return rc; }
@@ -1103,17 +1116,33 @@ static int zipl_load_vscsi(void)* IPL starts here */ +ZiplBootMode get_boot_mode (uint8_t hdr_flags) +{ +bool sipl_set = hdr_flags &DIAG308_IPIB_FLAGS_SIPL ; +bool iplir_set = hdr_flags &DIAG308_IPIB_FLAGS_IPLIR ; + +if (!sipl_set && iplir_set) { +return ZIPL_BOOT_MODE_SECURE_AUDIT ; + } + +return ZIPL_BOOT_MODE_NORMAL ; +} +void zipl_load (void ) {VDev *vdev =virtio_get_device ();if (vdev->is_cdrom) { +IPL_assert ((boot_mode ==ZIPL_BOOT_MODE_NORMAL ), +"Secure boot from ISO image is not supported!" );ipl_iso_el_torito ();puts ("Failed to IPL this ISO image!" );return ; }if (virtio_get_device_type () ==VIRTIO_ID_NET ) { +IPL_assert ((boot_mode ==ZIPL_BOOT_MODE_NORMAL ), +"Virtio net boot device does not support secure boot!" );netmain ();puts ("Failed to IPL from this network!" );return ;
@@ -1124,6 +1153,9 @@ void zipl_load(void)return ; } +IPL_assert ((boot_mode ==ZIPL_BOOT_MODE_NORMAL ), +"Secure boot with the ECKD scheme is not supported!" ); +switch (virtio_get_device_type ()) {case VIRTIO_ID_BLOCK :zipl_load_vblk ();
pc-bios/s390-ccw/bootmap.h +11 -0
@@ -88,9 +88,18 @@ typedef struct BootMapTable {BootMapPointer entry[]; } __attribute__ ((packed)) BootMapTable; +#define DER_SIGNATURE_FORMAT 1 + +typedef struct SignatureInformation { +uint8_t format; +uint8_t reserved[3 ]; +uint32_t sig_len; +}SignatureInformation ; +typedef union ComponentEntryData {uint64_t load_psw;uint64_t load_addr; +SignatureInformation sig_info; }ComponentEntryData ; typedef struct ComponentEntry {
@@ -113,6 +122,8 @@ typedef struct ScsiMbr {ScsiBlockPtr pt;/* block pointer to program table */ } __attribute__ ((packed)) ScsiMbr; +int zipl_load_segment (ComponentEntry *entry,uint64_t address); +#define ZIPL_MAGIC "zIPL"#define ZIPL_MAGIC_EBCDIC "\xa9\xc9\xd7\xd3"#define IPL1_MAGIC "\xc9\xd7\xd3\xf1"/* == "IPL1" in EBCDIC */
pc-bios/s390-ccw/main.c +6 -0
@@ -30,6 +30,7 @@ IplParameterBlock *iplb;bool have_iplb;static uint16_t cutype;LowCore *lowcore;/* Yes, this *is* a pointer to address 0 */ +ZiplBootMode boot_mode;#define LOADPARM_PROMPT "PROMPT "#define LOADPARM_EMPTY " "
@@ -303,6 +304,9 @@ static void ipl_ccw_device(void)switch (cutype) {case CU_TYPE_DASD_3990 :case CU_TYPE_DASD_2107 : +IPL_assert ((boot_mode ==ZIPL_BOOT_MODE_NORMAL ), +"Passthrough (vfio) CCW device does not support secure boot!" ); +dasd_ipl (blk_schid, cutype);break ;case CU_TYPE_VIRTIO :
@@ -390,6 +394,8 @@ void main(void)probe_boot_device (); } + boot_mode =get_boot_mode (iplb->hdr_flags); +while (have_iplb) {boot_setup ();if (have_iplb &&find_boot_device ()) {
pc-bios/s390-ccw/s390-ccw.h +27 -0
@@ -40,6 +40,22 @@ typedef unsigned long long u64; ((b) == 0 ? (a) : (MIN(a, b))))#endif +/* +* Round number down to multiple. Requires that d be a power of 2. +* Works even if d is a smaller type than n. +*/ +#ifndef ROUND_DOWN +#define ROUND_DOWN (n, d) ((n) & -(0 ? (n) : (d))) +#endif + +/* +* Round number up to multiple. Requires that d be a power of 2. +* Works even if d is a smaller type than n. +*/ +#ifndef ROUND_UP +#define ROUND_UP (n, d) ROUND_DOWN((n) + (d) - 1, (d)) +#endif +#define ARRAY_SIZE (a) (sizeof(a) / sizeof((a)[0]))#include "cio.h"
@@ -64,11 +80,22 @@ void sclp_print(const char *string);void sclp_set_write_mask (uint32_t receive_mask,uint32_t send_mask);void sclp_setup (void );void sclp_get_loadparm_ascii (char *loadparm); +bool sclp_is_diag320_on (void ); +bool sclp_is_sipl_on (void );int sclp_read (char *str,size_t count);/* bootmap.c */ void zipl_load (void ); +typedef enum ZiplBootMode { +ZIPL_BOOT_MODE_NORMAL =0 , +ZIPL_BOOT_MODE_SECURE_AUDIT =1 , +}ZiplBootMode ; + +extern ZiplBootMode boot_mode; + +ZiplBootMode get_boot_mode (uint8_t hdr_flags); +/* jump2ipl.c */ void write_reset_psw (uint64_t psw);int jump_to_IPL_code (uint64_t address);
pc-bios/s390-ccw/sclp.c +37 -0
@@ -113,6 +113,43 @@ void sclp_get_loadparm_ascii(char *loadparm) } } +bool sclp_is_diag320_on (void ) +{ +ReadInfo *sccb = (void *)_sccb; +uint8_t fac134 =0 ; + +memset ((char *)_sccb,0 ,sizeof (ReadInfo)); + sccb->h.length =SCCB_SIZE ; +if (!sclp_service_call (SCLP_CMDW_READ_SCP_INFO , sccb)) { + fac134 = sccb->fac134; + } + +return fac134 &SCCB_FAC134_DIAG320_BIT ; +} + +/* +* Get fac_ipl (byte 136 and byte 137 of the SCLP Read Info block) +* for IPL device facilities. +*/ +static void sclp_get_fac_ipl (uint16_t *fac_ipl) +{ +ReadInfo *sccb = (void *)_sccb; + +memset ((char *)_sccb,0 ,sizeof (ReadInfo)); + sccb->h.length =SCCB_SIZE ; +if (!sclp_service_call (SCLP_CMDW_READ_SCP_INFO , sccb)) { + *fac_ipl = sccb->fac_ipl; + } +} + +bool sclp_is_sipl_on (void ) +{ +uint16_t fac_ipl =0 ; + +sclp_get_fac_ipl (&fac_ipl); +return fac_ipl &SCCB_FAC_IPL_SIPL_BIT ; +} +int sclp_read (char *str,size_t count) {ReadEventData *sccb = (void *)_sccb;
pc-bios/s390-ccw/sclp.h +6 -0
@@ -50,6 +50,8 @@ typedef struct SCCBHeader { } __attribute__((packed)) SCCBHeader;#define SCCB_DATA_LEN (SCCB_SIZE - sizeof(SCCBHeader)) +#define SCCB_FAC134_DIAG320_BIT 0x4 +#define SCCB_FAC_IPL_SIPL_BIT 0x4000 typedef struct ReadInfo { SCCBHeader h;
@@ -57,6 +59,10 @@ typedef struct ReadInfo {uint8_t rnsize;uint8_t reserved[13 ];uint8_t loadparm[LOADPARM_LEN ]; +uint8_t reserved1[102 ]; +uint8_t fac134; +uint8_t reserved2; +uint16_t fac_ipl; } __attribute__((packed)) ReadInfo; typedef struct SCCB {
pc-bios/s390-ccw/secure-ipl.c new file +359 -0
359 lines not on this page · raw message
pc-bios/s390-ccw/secure-ipl.h new file +110 -0
110 lines not on this page · raw message
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Re: [PATCH v10 19/30] pc-bios/s390-ccw: Add signature verification for secure IPL in audit mode
Quoted 51 lines · Zhuoying Cai
Enable secure IPL in audit mode, which performs signature verification, but any error does not terminate the boot process. Only warnings will be logged to the console instead.
Add a
comp_lenvariable to store the length of a segment inzipl_load_segment.comp_lenvariable is necessary to store the calculated segment length and is used during signature verification. Return the length on success, or a negative return code on failure.Secure IPL in audit mode requires at least one certificate provided in the key store along with necessary facilities (Secure IPL Facility, Certificate Store Facility and secure IPL extension support).
Note: Secure IPL in audit mode is implemented for the SCSI scheme of virtio-blk/virtio-scsi devices.
Signed-off-by Zhuoying Cai <[email protected]>--- docs/system/s390x/secure-ipl.rst | 35 +++ pc-bios/s390-ccw/Makefile | 2 +- pc-bios/s390-ccw/bootmap.c | 36 +++- pc-bios/s390-ccw/bootmap.h | 11 + pc-bios/s390-ccw/main.c | 6 + pc-bios/s390-ccw/s390-ccw.h | 27 +++ pc-bios/s390-ccw/sclp.c | 37 ++++ pc-bios/s390-ccw/sclp.h | 6 + pc-bios/s390-ccw/secure-ipl.c | 359 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ pc-bios/s390-ccw/secure-ipl.h | 110 ++++++++++ 10 files changed, 626 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) create mode 100644 pc-bios/s390-ccw/secure-ipl.c create mode 100644 pc-bios/s390-ccw/secure-ipl.hdocs/system/s390x/secure-ipl.rst +11
-0@@ -18,3 +18,38 @@ Note: certificate files must have a .pem extension. .. code-block:: shell qemu-system-s390x -machine s390-ccw-virtio,boot-certs.0.path=/.../qemu/certs,boot-certs.1.path=/another/path/cert.pem ... + + +IPL Modes +========= +Multiple IPL modes are available to differentiate between the various IPL +configurations. These modes are mutually exclusive and enabled based on the +``boot-certs`` option on the QEMU command line. + +Normal Mode +----------- +
docs/system/s390x/secure-ipl.rst Note: certificate files must have a .pem extension. · line 41
Quoted 10 lines
docs/system/s390x/secure-ipl.rst +10
-0+The absence of certificates will attempt to IPL a guest without secure IPL +operations. No checks are performed, and no warnings/errors are reported. +This is the default mode. + +Configuration: + +.. code-block:: shell + + qemu-system-s390x -machine s390-ccw-virtio ... +
Since this patch needs some rework anyway, it might help to reduce LOC for this patch and make things more readable by inserting a new patch before this one that introduces Normal Mode and does the IPL_checks. In that way, this patch would contain the context only for secure IPL related operations.
The commit message should give a brief introduction to what the boot modes are intended for.
Quoted 137 lines
docs/system/s390x/secure-ipl.rst +14
-0+Audit Mode +---------- + +When the certificate store is populated with at least one certificate +and no additional secure IPL parameters are provided on the command +line, then secure IPL will proceed in "audit mode". All secure IPL +operations will be performed with signature verification errors reported +as non-disruptive warnings. + +Configuration: + +.. code-block:: shell + + qemu-system-s390x -machine s390-ccw-virtio,boot-certs.0.path=/.../qemu/certs,boot-certs.1.path=/another/path/cert.pem ...pc-bios/s390-ccw/Makefile +1
-1@@ -35,7 +35,7 @@ QEMU_DGFLAGS = -MMD -MP -MT $@ -MF $(@D)/$(*F).d OBJECTS = start.o main.o bootmap.o jump2ipl.o sclp.o menu.o netmain.o \ virtio.o virtio-net.o virtio-scsi.o virtio-blkdev.o cio.o dasd-ipl.o \ - virtio-ccw.o clp.o pci.o virtio-pci.o + virtio-ccw.o clp.o pci.o virtio-pci.o secure-ipl.o SLOF_DIR := $(SRC_PATH)/../../roms/SLOFpc-bios/s390-ccw/bootmap.c +34
-2@@ -15,6 +15,7 @@#include "bootmap.h" #include "virtio.h" #include "bswap.h" +#include "secure-ipl.h" #ifdef DEBUG /* #define DEBUG_FALLBACK */ @@ -617,7 +618,7 @@ static int ipl_eckd(void)* Returns: length of the segment on success, * negative value on error. */ -static int zipl_load_segment (ComponentEntry *entry,uint64_t address) +int zipl_load_segment (ComponentEntry *entry,uint64_t address) {const int max_entries = (MAX_SECTOR_SIZE /sizeof (ScsiBlockPtr));ScsiBlockPtr *bprs = (void *)sec;@@ -736,7 +737,19 @@ static int zipl_run(ScsiBlockPtr *pte)/* Load image(s) into RAM */ entry = (ComponentEntry *)(&header[1 ]); - rc =zipl_run_normal (&entry, tmp_sec); +switch (boot_mode) { +case ZIPL_BOOT_MODE_SECURE_AUDIT : + rc =zipl_run_secure (&entry, tmp_sec); +break ; +case ZIPL_BOOT_MODE_NORMAL : + rc =zipl_run_normal (&entry, tmp_sec); +break ; +default : +puts ("Unknown boot mode" ); + rc =-1 ; +break ; + } +if (rc) {return rc; }@@ -1103,17 +1116,33 @@ static int zipl_load_vscsi(void)* IPL starts here */ +ZiplBootMode get_boot_mode (uint8_t hdr_flags) +{ +bool sipl_set = hdr_flags &DIAG308_IPIB_FLAGS_SIPL ; +bool iplir_set = hdr_flags &DIAG308_IPIB_FLAGS_IPLIR ; + +if (!sipl_set && iplir_set) { +return ZIPL_BOOT_MODE_SECURE_AUDIT ; + } + +return ZIPL_BOOT_MODE_NORMAL ; +} +void zipl_load (void ) {VDev *vdev =virtio_get_device ();if (vdev->is_cdrom) { +IPL_assert ((boot_mode ==ZIPL_BOOT_MODE_NORMAL ), +"Secure boot from ISO image is not supported!" );ipl_iso_el_torito ();puts ("Failed to IPL this ISO image!" );return ; }if (virtio_get_device_type () ==VIRTIO_ID_NET ) { +IPL_assert ((boot_mode ==ZIPL_BOOT_MODE_NORMAL ), +"Virtio net boot device does not support secure boot!" );netmain ();puts ("Failed to IPL from this network!" );return ;@@ -1124,6 +1153,9 @@ void zipl_load(void)return ; } +IPL_assert ((boot_mode ==ZIPL_BOOT_MODE_NORMAL ), +"Secure boot with the ECKD scheme is not supported!" ); +switch (virtio_get_device_type ()) {case VIRTIO_ID_BLOCK :zipl_load_vblk ();pc-bios/s390-ccw/bootmap.h +9
-0@@ -88,9 +88,18 @@ typedef struct BootMapTable {BootMapPointer entry[]; } __attribute__ ((packed)) BootMapTable; +#define DER_SIGNATURE_FORMAT 1 + +typedef struct SignatureInformation { +uint8_t format; +uint8_t reserved[3 ]; +uint32_t sig_len; +}SignatureInformation ; +typedef union ComponentEntryData {uint64_t load_psw;uint64_t load_addr; +SignatureInformation sig_info; }ComponentEntryData ; typedef struct ComponentEntry {
pc-bios/s390-ccw/bootmap.h typedef struct ScsiMbr { · line 126
Quoted 5 lines
pc-bios/s390-ccw/bootmap.h +2
-0@@ -113,6 +122,8 @@ typedef struct ScsiMbr {ScsiBlockPtr pt;/* block pointer to program table */ } __attribute__ ((packed)) ScsiMbr; +int zipl_load_segment (ComponentEntry *entry,uint64_t address); +
Please move this update to patch "[PATCH v10 18/30] pc-bios/s390-ccw:
Rework zipl_load_segment function" and make sure to mention it in the commit message.
Quoted 266 lines
pc-bios/s390-ccw/bootmap.h +0
-0#define ZIPL_MAGIC "zIPL"#define ZIPL_MAGIC_EBCDIC "\xa9\xc9\xd7\xd3"#define IPL1_MAGIC "\xc9\xd7\xd3\xf1"/* == "IPL1" in EBCDIC */ pc-bios/s390-ccw/main.c +6
-0@@ -30,6 +30,7 @@ IplParameterBlock *iplb;bool have_iplb;static uint16_t cutype;LowCore *lowcore;/* Yes, this *is* a pointer to address 0 */ +ZiplBootMode boot_mode;#define LOADPARM_PROMPT "PROMPT "#define LOADPARM_EMPTY " "@@ -303,6 +304,9 @@ static void ipl_ccw_device(void)switch (cutype) {case CU_TYPE_DASD_3990 :case CU_TYPE_DASD_2107 : +IPL_assert ((boot_mode ==ZIPL_BOOT_MODE_NORMAL ), +"Passthrough (vfio) CCW device does not support secure boot!" ); +dasd_ipl (blk_schid, cutype);break ;case CU_TYPE_VIRTIO :@@ -390,6 +394,8 @@ void main(void)probe_boot_device (); } + boot_mode =get_boot_mode (iplb->hdr_flags); +while (have_iplb) {boot_setup ();if (have_iplb &&find_boot_device ()) {pc-bios/s390-ccw/s390-ccw.h +27
-0@@ -40,6 +40,22 @@ typedef unsigned long long u64; ((b) == 0 ? (a) : (MIN(a, b))))#endif +/* +* Round number down to multiple. Requires that d be a power of 2. +* Works even if d is a smaller type than n. +*/ +#ifndef ROUND_DOWN +#define ROUND_DOWN (n, d) ((n) & -(0 ? (n) : (d))) +#endif + +/* +* Round number up to multiple. Requires that d be a power of 2. +* Works even if d is a smaller type than n. +*/ +#ifndef ROUND_UP +#define ROUND_UP (n, d) ROUND_DOWN((n) + (d) - 1, (d)) +#endif +#define ARRAY_SIZE (a) (sizeof(a) / sizeof((a)[0]))#include "cio.h" @@ -64,11 +80,22 @@ void sclp_print(const char *string);void sclp_set_write_mask (uint32_t receive_mask,uint32_t send_mask);void sclp_setup (void );void sclp_get_loadparm_ascii (char *loadparm); +bool sclp_is_diag320_on (void ); +bool sclp_is_sipl_on (void );int sclp_read (char *str,size_t count);/* bootmap.c */ void zipl_load (void ); +typedef enum ZiplBootMode { +ZIPL_BOOT_MODE_NORMAL =0 , +ZIPL_BOOT_MODE_SECURE_AUDIT =1 , +}ZiplBootMode ; + +extern ZiplBootMode boot_mode; + +ZiplBootMode get_boot_mode (uint8_t hdr_flags); +/* jump2ipl.c */ void write_reset_psw (uint64_t psw);int jump_to_IPL_code (uint64_t address);pc-bios/s390-ccw/sclp.c +37
-0@@ -113,6 +113,43 @@ void sclp_get_loadparm_ascii(char *loadparm) } } +bool sclp_is_diag320_on (void ) +{ +ReadInfo *sccb = (void *)_sccb; +uint8_t fac134 =0 ; + +memset ((char *)_sccb,0 ,sizeof (ReadInfo)); + sccb->h.length =SCCB_SIZE ; +if (!sclp_service_call (SCLP_CMDW_READ_SCP_INFO , sccb)) { + fac134 = sccb->fac134; + } + +return fac134 &SCCB_FAC134_DIAG320_BIT ; +} + +/* +* Get fac_ipl (byte 136 and byte 137 of the SCLP Read Info block) +* for IPL device facilities. +*/ +static void sclp_get_fac_ipl (uint16_t *fac_ipl) +{ +ReadInfo *sccb = (void *)_sccb; + +memset ((char *)_sccb,0 ,sizeof (ReadInfo)); + sccb->h.length =SCCB_SIZE ; +if (!sclp_service_call (SCLP_CMDW_READ_SCP_INFO , sccb)) { + *fac_ipl = sccb->fac_ipl; + } +} + +bool sclp_is_sipl_on (void ) +{ +uint16_t fac_ipl =0 ; + +sclp_get_fac_ipl (&fac_ipl); +return fac_ipl &SCCB_FAC_IPL_SIPL_BIT ; +} +int sclp_read (char *str,size_t count) {ReadEventData *sccb = (void *)_sccb;pc-bios/s390-ccw/sclp.h +6
-0@@ -50,6 +50,8 @@ typedef struct SCCBHeader { } __attribute__((packed)) SCCBHeader;#define SCCB_DATA_LEN (SCCB_SIZE - sizeof(SCCBHeader)) +#define SCCB_FAC134_DIAG320_BIT 0x4 +#define SCCB_FAC_IPL_SIPL_BIT 0x4000 typedef struct ReadInfo { SCCBHeader h;@@ -57,6 +59,10 @@ typedef struct ReadInfo {uint8_t rnsize;uint8_t reserved[13 ];uint8_t loadparm[LOADPARM_LEN ]; +uint8_t reserved1[102 ]; +uint8_t fac134; +uint8_t reserved2; +uint16_t fac_ipl; } __attribute__((packed)) ReadInfo; typedef struct SCCB {pc-bios/s390-ccw/secure-ipl.c new file +104
-0@@ -0,0 +1,359 @@ +/* +* S/390 Secure IPL +* +* Functions to support IPL in secure boot mode (DIAG 320, DIAG 508, +* signature verification, and certificate handling). +* +* For secure IPL overview: docs/system/s390x/secure-ipl.rst +* For secure IPL technical: docs/specs/s390x-secure-ipl.rst +* +* Copyright 2025 IBM Corp. +* Author(s): Zhuoying Cai <[email protected]> +* +* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later +*/ + +#include <stdlib.h> +#include <string.h> +#include <stdio.h> +#include "bootmap.h" +#include "s390-ccw.h" +#include "secure-ipl.h" + +static uint8_t vcb_data[MAX_SECTOR_SIZE * 4] __attribute__((__aligned__(PAGE_SIZE))); +static uint8_t vcssb_data[VCSSB_MIN_LEN] __attribute__((__aligned__(8))); + +VCStorageSizeBlock *zipl_secure_get_vcssb (void ) +{ +VCStorageSizeBlock *vcssb; + + vcssb = (VCStorageSizeBlock *)vcssb_data; +/* avoid retrieving vcssb multiple times */ +if (vcssb->length >=VCSSB_MIN_LEN ) { +return vcssb; + } + +if (!is_cert_store_facility_supported ()) { +puts ("Certificate Store Facility is not supported by the hypervisor!" ); +return NULL ; + } + + vcssb->length =VCSSB_MIN_LEN ; +if (diag320 (vcssb,DIAG_320_SUBC_QUERY_VCSI ) !=DIAG_320_RC_OK ) { + vcssb->length =0 ; +return NULL ; + } + +return vcssb; +} + +static uint32_t get_total_certs_length (void ) +{ +VCStorageSizeBlock *vcssb; + + vcssb =zipl_secure_get_vcssb (); +if (vcssb ==NULL ) { +return 0 ; + } + +return vcssb->total_vcb_len -VCB_HEADER_LEN - vcssb->total_vc_ct *VCE_HEADER_LEN ; +} + +static uint32_t request_certificate (uint8_t *cert_addr,uint8_t index) +{ +VCStorageSizeBlock *vcssb; +VCBlock *vcb; +VCEntry *vce; +uint32_t cert_len =0 ; + +/* Get Verification Certificate Storage Size block with DIAG320 subcode 1 */ + vcssb =zipl_secure_get_vcssb (); +if (vcssb ==NULL ) { +return 0 ; + } + +/* +* Request single entry +* Fill input fields of single-entry VCB +*/ + vcb = (VCBlock *)vcb_data; + vcb->in_len =ROUND_UP (vcssb->max_single_vcb_len,PAGE_SIZE ); + vcb->first_vc_index = index; + vcb->last_vc_index = index; + +if (diag320 (vcb,DIAG_320_SUBC_STORE_VC ) !=DIAG_320_RC_OK ) { + goto out; + } + +if (vcb->out_len ==VCB_HEADER_LEN ) { +puts ("No certificate entry" ); + goto out; + } + +if (vcb->remain_ct !=0 ) { +puts ("Not enough memory to store all requested certificates" ); + goto out; + } + + vce = (VCEntry *)vcb->vce_buf; +if (!(vce->flags &DIAG_320_VCE_FLAGS_VALID )) { +puts ("Invalid certificate" ); + goto out; + } + + cert_len = vce->cert_len;
pc-bios/s390-ccw/secure-ipl.c line 114
Quoted 10 lines
pc-bios/s390-ccw/secure-ipl.c new file +10
-0+memcpy (cert_addr, (uint8_t *)vce + vce->cert_offset, vce->cert_len); + +out: +memset (vcb_data,0 ,sizeof (vcb_data)); +return cert_len; +} + +static void cert_list_add (IplSignatureCertificateList *cert_list,int cert_entry_idx, +uint8_t *cert_addr,uint64_t cert_len) +{
There's a way to get rid of the index param in both list_add functions.
We have the following:
- Total length of the list (comp_list->ipl_info_header.len)
- Each entry is a static size (IplSignatureCertificateEntry)
- Each new entry is to be added to the end of the list
So you could do something like:
``` int idx = (comp_list->ipl_info_header.len - sizeof(IplInfoBlockHeader)) / sizeof(IplSignatureCertificateEntry); ```
Which should calculate to the index to add the new entry to. You no longer need to account for an index++ outside this function call.
Same idea for comp_list_add().
pc-bios/s390-ccw/secure-ipl.c line 123
Quoted 9 lines
pc-bios/s390-ccw/secure-ipl.c new file +9
-0+if (cert_entry_idx >MAX_CERTIFICATES -1 ) { +printf ("Warning: Ignoring cert entry #%d because only %d entries are supported\n" , + cert_entry_idx +1 ,MAX_CERTIFICATES ); +return ; + } + + cert_list->cert_entries[cert_entry_idx].addr = (uint64_t )cert_addr; + cert_list->cert_entries[cert_entry_idx].len = cert_len; + cert_list->ipl_info_header.len +=sizeof (cert_list->cert_entries[cert_entry_idx]);
Simplify the size by sizeof(IplSignatureCertificateEntry).
Quoted 4 lines
pc-bios/s390-ccw/secure-ipl.c new file +4
-0+}> + +static void comp_list_add(IplDeviceComponentList *comp_list, int comp_entry_idx, +SecureIplCompEntryInfo comp_entry_info) +{
pc-bios/s390-ccw/secure-ipl.c line 138
Quoted 10 lines
pc-bios/s390-ccw/secure-ipl.c new file +10
-0+if (comp_entry_idx >MAX_CERTIFICATES -1 ) { +printf ("Warning: Ignoring comp entry #%d because only %d entries are supported\n" , + comp_entry_idx +1 ,MAX_CERTIFICATES ); +return ; + } + + comp_list->device_entries[comp_entry_idx].addr = comp_entry_info.addr; + comp_list->device_entries[comp_entry_idx].len = comp_entry_info.len; + comp_list->device_entries[comp_entry_idx].flags = comp_entry_info.flags; +/* cert index field is meaningful only when S390_IPL_DEV_COMP_FLAG_SC is set */
So basically the EXEC component won't have the SC flag set? Would it make sense to only set the cert_index when:
if (flags & S390_IPL_DEV_COMP_FLAG_SC)
?
Quoted 66 lines
pc-bios/s390-ccw/secure-ipl.c new file +66
-0+ comp_list->device_entries[comp_entry_idx].cert_index = comp_entry_info.cert_index; + comp_list->ipl_info_header.len +=sizeof (comp_list->device_entries[comp_entry_idx]); +} + +static void update_iirb (IplDeviceComponentList *comp_list, +IplSignatureCertificateList *cert_list) +{ +IplInfoReportBlock *iirb; +IplDeviceComponentList *iirb_comps; +IplSignatureCertificateList *iirb_certs; +uint32_t iirb_hdr_len; +uint32_t comps_len; +uint32_t certs_len; + +if (iplb->len %8 !=0 ) { +panic ("IPL parameter block length field value is not multiple of 8 bytes" ); + } + + iirb_hdr_len =sizeof (IplInfoReportBlockHeader); + comps_len = comp_list->ipl_info_header.len; + certs_len = cert_list->ipl_info_header.len; +if ((comps_len + certs_len + iirb_hdr_len) >sizeof (IplInfoReportBlock)) { +panic ("Not enough space to hold all components and certificates in IIRB" ); + } + +/* IIRB immediately follows IPLB */ + iirb = &ipl_data.iirb; + iirb->hdr.len = iirb_hdr_len; + +/* Copy IPL device component list after IIRB Header */ + iirb_comps = (IplDeviceComponentList *) iirb->info_blks; +memcpy (iirb_comps, comp_list, comps_len); + +/* Update IIRB length */ + iirb->hdr.len += comps_len; + +/* Copy IPL sig cert list after IPL device component list */ + iirb_certs = (IplSignatureCertificateList *) (iirb->info_blks + + iirb_comps->ipl_info_header.len); +memcpy (iirb_certs, cert_list, certs_len); + +/* Update IIRB length */ + iirb->hdr.len += certs_len; +} + +static bool secure_ipl_supported (void ) +{ +if (!sclp_is_sipl_on ()) { +puts ("Secure IPL Facility is not supported by the hypervisor!" ); +return false; + } + +if (!is_signature_verif_supported ()) { +puts ("Secure IPL extensions are not supported by the hypervisor!" ); +return false; + } + +if (!is_cert_store_facility_supported ()) { +puts ("Certificate Store Facility is not supported by the hypervisor!" ); +return false; + } + +return true; +} + +static void init_lists(IplDeviceComponentList *comp_list,
pc-bios/s390-ccw/secure-ipl.c line 214
Quoted 10 lines
pc-bios/s390-ccw/secure-ipl.c new file +10
-0+ IplSignatureCertificateList *cert_list) +{ + comp_list->ipl_info_header.type =IPL_INFO_BLOCK_TYPE_COMPONENTS ; + comp_list->ipl_info_header.len =sizeof (comp_list->ipl_info_header); + + cert_list->ipl_info_header.type =IPL_INFO_BLOCK_TYPE_CERTIFICATES ; + cert_list->ipl_info_header.len =sizeof (cert_list->ipl_info_header); +} + +static int zipl_load_signature (ComponentEntry *entry,uint64_t sig_sec)
The _sec suffix doesn't make sense here. It's mainly used for global variables.
pc-bios/s390-ccw/secure-ipl.c line 223
Quoted 9 lines
pc-bios/s390-ccw/secure-ipl.c new file +9
-0+{ +if (zipl_load_segment (entry, sig_sec) <0 ) { +return -1 ; + } + +if (entry->compdat.sig_info.format !=DER_SIGNATURE_FORMAT ) { +puts ("Signature is not in DER format" ); +return -1 ; + }
Swap the order of the if statements since the format is known before loading the segment from the disk. That way we don't bother doing any uneccessary I/O if the signature is invalid.
pc-bios/s390-ccw/secure-ipl.c line 225
Quoted 2 lines
pc-bios/s390-ccw/secure-ipl.c new file +2
-0+ +return entry->compdat.sig_info.sig_len;
Question: are sig_len and the successful rc of zipl_load_segment equivalent? If so, and with the suggestion above, you could just return zipl_load_segment(...). In that way, on error the proper -rc is returned.
Quoted 28 lines
pc-bios/s390-ccw/secure-ipl.c new file +28
-0+} + +int zipl_run_secure (ComponentEntry **entry_ptr,uint8_t *tmp_sec) +{ +IplDeviceComponentList comp_list = {0 }; +IplSignatureCertificateList cert_list = {0 }; +SecureIplCompEntryInfo comp_entry_info; +ComponentEntry *entry = *entry_ptr; +uint8_t *cert_addr =NULL ; +uint64_t *sig =NULL ; +int cert_entry_idx =0 ; +int comp_entry_idx =0 ; +int sig_len =0 ; +int comp_len; +uint64_t comp_addr; +uint64_t cert_len; +uint8_t cert_table_idx; +bool verified; +/* +* Keep track of which certificate store indices correspond to the +* certificate data entries within the IplSignatureCertificateList to +* prevent allocating space for the same certificate multiple times. +* +* The array index corresponds to the certificate's cert-store index. +* +* The array value corresponds to the certificate's entry within the +* IplSignatureCertificateList (with a value of -1 denoting no entry +* exists for the certificate).
pc-bios/s390-ccw/secure-ipl.c line 263
Quoted 10 lines
pc-bios/s390-ccw/secure-ipl.c new file +10
-0+*/ +int cert_list_table[MAX_CERTIFICATES ] = { [0 ...MAX_CERTIFICATES -1 ] =-1 }; +int signed_count =0 ; + +if (!secure_ipl_supported ()) { +panic ("Unable to boot in secure/audit mode" ); + } + +init_lists (&comp_list, &cert_list); + cert_addr =malloc (get_total_certs_length ());
This makes more sense as cert_buf since it's storing the actual certificate data and not holding an address.
Quoted 4 lines
pc-bios/s390-ccw/secure-ipl.c new file +4
-0+ sig =malloc (MAX_SECTOR_SIZE ); + +while (entry->component_type !=ZIPL_COMP_ENTRY_EXEC ) { +switch (entry->component_type) {
pc-bios/s390-ccw/secure-ipl.c line 277
Quoted 10 lines
pc-bios/s390-ccw/secure-ipl.c new file +10
-0+case ZIPL_COMP_ENTRY_SIGNATURE : +if (sig_len) { + goto out; + } + + sig_len =zipl_load_signature (entry, (uint64_t )sig); +if (sig_len <0 ) { + goto out; + } +break ;
What about using another SecureIplCompEntryInfo for the signature info? You could use it as a pointer and change some checks to if (sig). During the ENTRY_LOAD case, do free(sig) at the end or something like that.
Whether making it a pointer makes sense or not, I think using the struct would still simplify things.
pc-bios/s390-ccw/secure-ipl.c line 280
Quoted 3 lines
pc-bios/s390-ccw/secure-ipl.c new file +3
-0+case ZIPL_COMP_ENTRY_LOAD : + comp_addr = entry->compdat.load_addr; + comp_len =zipl_load_segment (entry, comp_addr);
Why not set the comp_entry_info fields here directly? Then comp_addr and comp_len go away.
Quoted 5 lines
pc-bios/s390-ccw/secure-ipl.c new file +5
-0+if (comp_len <0 ) { + goto out; + } + +if (!sig_len) {
pc-bios/s390-ccw/secure-ipl.c line 295
Quoted 10 lines
pc-bios/s390-ccw/secure-ipl.c new file +10
-0+break ; + } + + comp_entry_info = (SecureIplCompEntryInfo ){0 }; + comp_entry_info.addr = comp_addr; + comp_entry_info.len = (uint64_t )comp_len; + + verified =verify_signature (comp_entry_info, + sig_len, (uint64_t )sig, + &cert_len, &cert_table_idx);
If the signature uses a SecureIplCompEntryInfo, you can further reduce the param list to this function.
pc-bios/s390-ccw/secure-ipl.c line 298
Quoted 3 lines
pc-bios/s390-ccw/secure-ipl.c new file +3
-0+ +/* default flags for unverified component */ + comp_entry_info.flags |=S390_IPL_DEV_COMP_FLAG_SC ;
Move setting this flag to near where the comp addr and len are set. Just do a regular = assign instead of |= since it's the first flag to be set for the variable.
Quoted 10 lines
pc-bios/s390-ccw/secure-ipl.c new file +10
-0+ +if (verified) { +if (cert_list_table[cert_table_idx] ==-1 ) { +if (!request_certificate (cert_addr, cert_table_idx)) { +puts ("Could not get certificate" ); + goto out; + } + + cert_list_table[cert_table_idx] = cert_entry_idx; +cert_list_add (&cert_list, cert_entry_idx, cert_addr, cert_len);
pc-bios/s390-ccw/secure-ipl.c line 318
Quoted 10 lines
pc-bios/s390-ccw/secure-ipl.c new file +10
-0+ +/* increment for the next certificate */ + cert_entry_idx++; + cert_addr += cert_len; + } + +puts ("Verified component" ); + comp_entry_info.cert_index = cert_list_table[cert_table_idx]; + comp_entry_info.flags |=S390_IPL_DEV_COMP_FLAG_CSV ; + }
Add an else here and move the zipl_secure_handle() from below.
Quoted 25 lines
pc-bios/s390-ccw/secure-ipl.c new file +25
-0+ +comp_list_add (&comp_list, comp_entry_idx, comp_entry_info); + +if (!verified) { +zipl_secure_handle ("Could not verify component" ); + } + + comp_entry_idx++; + signed_count +=1 ; +/* After a signature is used another new one can be accepted */ + sig_len =0 ; +break ; +default : +puts ("Unknown component entry type" ); +return -1 ; + } + + entry++; + +if ((uint8_t *)(&entry[1 ]) > tmp_sec +MAX_SECTOR_SIZE ) { +puts ("Wrong entry value" ); +return -EINVAL ; + } + } +
pc-bios/s390-ccw/secure-ipl.c line 354
Quoted 10 lines
pc-bios/s390-ccw/secure-ipl.c new file +10
-0+if (signed_count ==0 ) { +zipl_secure_handle ("Secure boot is on, but components are not signed" ); + } + +update_iirb (&comp_list, &cert_list); + + *entry_ptr = entry; + free(sig);> + + return 0; +out:
"goto out" should be used to jump to a label for a regular return case. However, this is the error case. Change the label to error.
Quoted 39 lines
pc-bios/s390-ccw/secure-ipl.c new file +5
-0+free (cert_addr); +free (sig); + +return -1 ; +}pc-bios/s390-ccw/secure-ipl.h new file +28
-0@@ -0,0 +1,110 @@ +/* +* S/390 Secure IPL +* +* Copyright 2025 IBM Corp. +* Author(s): Zhuoying Cai <[email protected]> +* +* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later +*/ + +#ifndef _PC_BIOS_S390_CCW_SECURE_IPL_H +#define _PC_BIOS_S390_CCW_SECURE_IPL_H + +#include <diag320.h> +#include <diag508.h> + +VCStorageSizeBlock *zipl_secure_get_vcssb (void ); +int zipl_run_secure (ComponentEntry **entry_ptr,uint8_t *tmp_sec); + +/* Custom struct for secure IPL component entry information */ +typedef struct SecureIplCompEntryInfo { +uint64_t addr; +uint64_t len; +uint16_t cert_index; +uint8_t flags; +}SecureIplCompEntryInfo ; + +static inline void zipl_secure_handle (const char *message) +{
pc-bios/s390-ccw/secure-ipl.h line 38
Quoted 10 lines
pc-bios/s390-ccw/secure-ipl.h new file +10
-0+switch (boot_mode) { +case ZIPL_BOOT_MODE_SECURE_AUDIT : +IPL_check (false, message); +break ; +default : +break ; + } +} + +static inline uint64_t diag320 (void *data,unsigned long subcode)
For consistency, the name of this function should be _diag320.
Quoted 10 lines
pc-bios/s390-ccw/secure-ipl.h new file +10
-0+{ + register unsigned long addr asm("0") = (unsigned long)data; + register unsigned long rc asm("1") = 0; + + asmvolatile ("diag %0,%2,0x320\n" + :"+d" (addr),"+d" (rc) + :"d" (subcode) + :"memory" ,"cc" ); +return rc; +}
pc-bios/s390-ccw/secure-ipl.h line 58
Quoted 10 lines
pc-bios/s390-ccw/secure-ipl.h new file +10
-0+ +static inline bool is_cert_store_facility_supported (void ) +{ +uint32_t d320_ism; + +if (!sclp_is_diag320_on ()) { +return false; + } + +diag320 (&d320_ism,DIAG_320_SUBC_QUERY_ISM );
Should probably check the rc here for DIAG_320_RC_OK.
Quoted 52 lines
pc-bios/s390-ccw/secure-ipl.h new file +52
-0+return d320_ism & (DIAG_320_ISM_QUERY_VCSI |DIAG_320_ISM_STORE_VC ); +} + +static inline uint64_t _diag508 (void *data,unsigned long subcode) +{ + register unsigned long addr asm("0") = (unsigned long)data; + register unsigned long rc asm("1") = 0; + + asmvolatile ("diag %0,%2,0x508\n" + :"+d" (addr),"+d" (rc) + :"d" (subcode) + :"memory" ,"cc" ); +return rc; +} + +static inline bool is_signature_verif_supported (void ) +{ +uint64_t d508_subcodes; + + d508_subcodes =_diag508 (NULL ,DIAG_508_SUBC_QUERY_SUBC ); +return d508_subcodes &DIAG_508_SUBC_SIG_VERIF ; +} + +static inline bool verify_signature (SecureIplCompEntryInfo comp_entry_info, +uint64_t sig_len,uint64_t sig_addr, +uint64_t *cert_len,uint8_t *cert_idx) +{ +Diag508SigVerifBlock svb; + + svb.length =sizeof (Diag508SigVerifBlock); + svb.version =0 ; + svb.comp_len = comp_entry_info.len; + svb.comp_addr = comp_entry_info.addr; + svb.sig_len = sig_len; + svb.sig_addr = sig_addr; + +if (_diag508 (&svb,DIAG_508_SUBC_SIG_VERIF ) ==DIAG_508_RC_OK ) { + *cert_len = svb.cert_len; +/* +* DIAG 508 utilizes an index origin of 0 when indexing the cert store. +* The cert_idx will be used for DIAG 320 data structures, which expects +* an index origin of 1. Account for the offset here so it's easier to +* manage later. +*/ + *cert_idx = svb.cert_store_index +1 ; +return true; + } + +return false; +} + +#endif /* _PC_BIOS_S390_CCW_SECURE_IPL_H */
Signature · 2 lines
Regards, Collin
Re: [PATCH v10 19/30] pc-bios/s390-ccw: Add signature verification for secure IPL in audit mode
Thanks for the review!
Quoted 99 lines · Collin Walling
Quoted 51 lines · Zhuoying Cai
Enable secure IPL in audit mode, which performs signature verification, but any error does not terminate the boot process. Only warnings will be logged to the console instead.
Add a
comp_lenvariable to store the length of a segment inzipl_load_segment.comp_lenvariable is necessary to store the calculated segment length and is used during signature verification. Return the length on success, or a negative return code on failure.Secure IPL in audit mode requires at least one certificate provided in the key store along with necessary facilities (Secure IPL Facility, Certificate Store Facility and secure IPL extension support).
Note: Secure IPL in audit mode is implemented for the SCSI scheme of virtio-blk/virtio-scsi devices.
Signed-off-by Zhuoying Cai <[email protected]>--- docs/system/s390x/secure-ipl.rst | 35 +++ pc-bios/s390-ccw/Makefile | 2 +- pc-bios/s390-ccw/bootmap.c | 36 +++- pc-bios/s390-ccw/bootmap.h | 11 + pc-bios/s390-ccw/main.c | 6 + pc-bios/s390-ccw/s390-ccw.h | 27 +++ pc-bios/s390-ccw/sclp.c | 37 ++++ pc-bios/s390-ccw/sclp.h | 6 + pc-bios/s390-ccw/secure-ipl.c | 359 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ pc-bios/s390-ccw/secure-ipl.h | 110 ++++++++++ 10 files changed, 626 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) create mode 100644 pc-bios/s390-ccw/secure-ipl.c create mode 100644 pc-bios/s390-ccw/secure-ipl.hdocs/system/s390x/secure-ipl.rst +11
-0@@ -18,3 +18,38 @@ Note: certificate files must have a .pem extension. .. code-block:: shell qemu-system-s390x -machine s390-ccw-virtio,boot-certs.0.path=/.../qemu/certs,boot-certs.1.path=/another/path/cert.pem ... + + +IPL Modes +========= +Multiple IPL modes are available to differentiate between the various IPL +configurations. These modes are mutually exclusive and enabled based on the +``boot-certs`` option on the QEMU command line. + +Normal Mode +----------- +docs/system/s390x/secure-ipl.rst Note: certificate files must have a .pem extension. · line 41
Quoted 10 lines
docs/system/s390x/secure-ipl.rst +10
-0+The absence of certificates will attempt to IPL a guest without secure IPL +operations. No checks are performed, and no warnings/errors are reported. +This is the default mode. + +Configuration: + +.. code-block:: shell + + qemu-system-s390x -machine s390-ccw-virtio ... +Since this patch needs some rework anyway, it might help to reduce LOC for this patch and make things more readable by inserting a new patch before this one that introduces Normal Mode and does the
IPL_checks. In that way, this patch would contain the context only for secure IPL related operations.The commit message should give a brief introduction to what the boot modes are intended for.
Quoted 27 lines
docs/system/s390x/secure-ipl.rst +14
-0+Audit Mode +---------- + +When the certificate store is populated with at least one certificate +and no additional secure IPL parameters are provided on the command +line, then secure IPL will proceed in "audit mode". All secure IPL +operations will be performed with signature verification errors reported +as non-disruptive warnings. + +Configuration: + +.. code-block:: shell + + qemu-system-s390x -machine s390-ccw-virtio,boot-certs.0.path=/.../qemu/certs,boot-certs.1.path=/another/path/cert.pem ...pc-bios/s390-ccw/Makefile +1
-1@@ -35,7 +35,7 @@ QEMU_DGFLAGS = -MMD -MP -MT $@ -MF $(@D)/$(*F).d OBJECTS = start.o main.o bootmap.o jump2ipl.o sclp.o menu.o netmain.o \ virtio.o virtio-net.o virtio-scsi.o virtio-blkdev.o cio.o dasd-ipl.o \ - virtio-ccw.o clp.o pci.o virtio-pci.o + virtio-ccw.o clp.o pci.o virtio-pci.o secure-ipl.o SLOF_DIR := $(SRC_PATH)/../../roms/SLOF
[...]
Quoted 20 lines
pc-bios/s390-ccw/Makefile
Quoted 2 lines
pc-bios/s390-ccw/Makefile +2
-0+ +static int zipl_load_signature(ComponentEntry *entry, uint64_t sig_sec)The
_secsuffix doesn't make sense here. It's mainly used for global variables.pc-bios/s390-ccw/Makefile
Quoted 9 lines
pc-bios/s390-ccw/Makefile +9
-0+{ + if (zipl_load_segment(entry, sig_sec) < 0) { + return -1; + } + + if (entry->compdat.sig_info.format != DER_SIGNATURE_FORMAT) { + puts("Signature is not in DER format"); + return -1; + }Swap the order of the if statements since the format is known before loading the segment from the disk. That way we don't bother doing any uneccessary I/O if the signature is invalid.
Quoted 8 lines
pc-bios/s390-ccw/Makefile
Quoted 2 lines
pc-bios/s390-ccw/Makefile +2
-0+ + return entry->compdat.sig_info.sig_len;Question: are
sig_lenand the successful rc ofzipl_load_segmentequivalent? If so, and with the suggestion above, you could justreturn zipl_load_segment(...). In that way, on error the proper -rc is returned.
No, they are not the same. zipl_load_segment() returns the length of the loaded segment, and sig_len is the exact signature size.
Debug output:sig_len returns: 525 bytes (actual signature size) zipl_load_segment() returns: 1024 bytes (actual data loaded from disk, two 512-byte sectors)
Quoted 65 lines
Quoted 28 lines
pc-bios/s390-ccw/Makefile +28
-0+} + +int zipl_run_secure(ComponentEntry **entry_ptr, uint8_t *tmp_sec) +{ + IplDeviceComponentList comp_list = { 0 }; + IplSignatureCertificateList cert_list = { 0 }; + SecureIplCompEntryInfo comp_entry_info; + ComponentEntry *entry = *entry_ptr; + uint8_t *cert_addr = NULL; + uint64_t *sig = NULL; + int cert_entry_idx = 0; + int comp_entry_idx = 0; + int sig_len = 0; + int comp_len; + uint64_t comp_addr; + uint64_t cert_len; + uint8_t cert_table_idx; + bool verified; + /* + * Keep track of which certificate store indices correspond to the + * certificate data entries within the IplSignatureCertificateList to + * prevent allocating space for the same certificate multiple times. + * + * The array index corresponds to the certificate's cert-store index. + * + * The array value corresponds to the certificate's entry within the + * IplSignatureCertificateList (with a value of -1 denoting no entry + * exists for the certificate).pc-bios/s390-ccw/Makefile
Quoted 10 lines
pc-bios/s390-ccw/Makefile +10
-0+ */ + int cert_list_table[MAX_CERTIFICATES] = { [0 ... MAX_CERTIFICATES - 1] = -1 }; + int signed_count = 0; + + if (!secure_ipl_supported()) { + panic("Unable to boot in secure/audit mode"); + } + + init_lists(&comp_list, &cert_list); + cert_addr = malloc(get_total_certs_length());This makes more sense as
cert_bufsince it's storing the actual certificate data and not holding an address.Quoted 4 lines
pc-bios/s390-ccw/Makefile +4
-0+ sig = malloc(MAX_SECTOR_SIZE); + + while (entry->component_type != ZIPL_COMP_ENTRY_EXEC) { + switch (entry->component_type) {pc-bios/s390-ccw/Makefile
Quoted 10 lines
pc-bios/s390-ccw/Makefile +10
-0+ case ZIPL_COMP_ENTRY_SIGNATURE: + if (sig_len) { + goto out; + } + + sig_len = zipl_load_signature(entry, (uint64_t)sig); + if (sig_len < 0) { + goto out; + } + break;What about using another SecureIplCompEntryInfo for the signature info? You could use it as a pointer and change some checks to
if (sig). During theENTRY_LOADcase, dofree(sig)at the end or something like that.Whether making it a pointer makes sense or not, I think using the struct would still simplify things.
Quoted 7 lines
pc-bios/s390-ccw/Makefile
Quoted 3 lines
pc-bios/s390-ccw/Makefile +3
-0+ case ZIPL_COMP_ENTRY_LOAD: + comp_addr = entry->compdat.load_addr; + comp_len = zipl_load_segment(entry, comp_addr);Why not set the
comp_entry_infofields here directly? Thencomp_addrandcomp_lengo away.
comp_addr can be set directly here; however, comp_len must be handled separately because zipl_load_segment() may return a negative value. Assigning it directly to a uint32_t field could result in incorrect behavior due to implicit type conversion.
I also think deferring these assignments improves readability and ensures the structure is only initialized when it is actually needed for verification.
Quoted 94 lines
Quoted 5 lines
pc-bios/s390-ccw/Makefile +5
-0+ if (comp_len < 0) { + goto out; + } + + if (!sig_len) {pc-bios/s390-ccw/Makefile
Quoted 10 lines
pc-bios/s390-ccw/Makefile +10
-0+ break; + } + + comp_entry_info = (SecureIplCompEntryInfo){ 0 }; + comp_entry_info.addr = comp_addr; + comp_entry_info.len = (uint64_t)comp_len; + + verified = verify_signature(comp_entry_info, + sig_len, (uint64_t)sig, + &cert_len, &cert_table_idx);If the signature uses a SecureIplCompEntryInfo, you can further reduce the param list to this function.
pc-bios/s390-ccw/Makefile
Quoted 3 lines
pc-bios/s390-ccw/Makefile +3
-0+ + /* default flags for unverified component */ + comp_entry_info.flags |= S390_IPL_DEV_COMP_FLAG_SC;Move setting this flag to near where the comp addr and len are set. Just do a regular = assign instead of |= since it's the first flag to be set for the variable.
Quoted 10 lines
pc-bios/s390-ccw/Makefile +10
-0+ + if (verified) { + if (cert_list_table[cert_table_idx] == -1) { + if (!request_certificate(cert_addr, cert_table_idx)) { + puts("Could not get certificate"); + goto out; + } + + cert_list_table[cert_table_idx] = cert_entry_idx; + cert_list_add(&cert_list, cert_entry_idx, cert_addr, cert_len);pc-bios/s390-ccw/Makefile
Quoted 10 lines
pc-bios/s390-ccw/Makefile +10
-0+ + /* increment for the next certificate */ + cert_entry_idx++; + cert_addr += cert_len; + } + + puts("Verified component"); + comp_entry_info.cert_index = cert_list_table[cert_table_idx]; + comp_entry_info.flags |= S390_IPL_DEV_COMP_FLAG_CSV; + }Add an
elsehere and move thezipl_secure_handle()from below.Quoted 25 lines
pc-bios/s390-ccw/Makefile +25
-0+ + comp_list_add(&comp_list, comp_entry_idx, comp_entry_info); + + if (!verified) { + zipl_secure_handle("Could not verify component"); + } + + comp_entry_idx++; + signed_count += 1; + /* After a signature is used another new one can be accepted */ + sig_len = 0; + break; + default: + puts("Unknown component entry type"); + return -1; + } + + entry++; + + if ((uint8_t *)(&entry[1]) > tmp_sec + MAX_SECTOR_SIZE) { + puts("Wrong entry value"); + return -EINVAL; + } + } +pc-bios/s390-ccw/Makefile
Quoted 10 lines
pc-bios/s390-ccw/Makefile +10
-0+ if (signed_count == 0) { + zipl_secure_handle("Secure boot is on, but components are not signed"); + } + + update_iirb(&comp_list, &cert_list); + + *entry_ptr = entry; + free(sig);> + + return 0; +out:"goto out" should be used to jump to a label for a regular return case. However, this is the error case. Change the label to
error.Quoted 5 lines
pc-bios/s390-ccw/Makefile +5
-0+ free(cert_addr); + free(sig); + + return -1; +}
[...]
Re: [PATCH v10 19/30] pc-bios/s390-ccw: Add signature verification for secure IPL in audit mode
In reply to Zhuoying CaiQuoted 114 lines · Zhuoying Cai
Enable secure IPL in audit mode, which performs signature verification, but any error does not terminate the boot process. Only warnings will be logged to the console instead.
Add a
comp_lenvariable to store the length of a segment inzipl_load_segment.comp_lenvariable is necessary to store the calculated segment length and is used during signature verification. Return the length on success, or a negative return code on failure.Secure IPL in audit mode requires at least one certificate provided in the key store along with necessary facilities (Secure IPL Facility, Certificate Store Facility and secure IPL extension support).
Note: Secure IPL in audit mode is implemented for the SCSI scheme of virtio-blk/virtio-scsi devices.
Signed-off-by Zhuoying Cai <[email protected]>--- docs/system/s390x/secure-ipl.rst | 35 +++ pc-bios/s390-ccw/Makefile | 2 +- pc-bios/s390-ccw/bootmap.c | 36 +++- pc-bios/s390-ccw/bootmap.h | 11 + pc-bios/s390-ccw/main.c | 6 + pc-bios/s390-ccw/s390-ccw.h | 27 +++ pc-bios/s390-ccw/sclp.c | 37 ++++ pc-bios/s390-ccw/sclp.h | 6 + pc-bios/s390-ccw/secure-ipl.c | 359 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ pc-bios/s390-ccw/secure-ipl.h | 110 ++++++++++ 10 files changed, 626 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)create mode 100644
pc-bios/s390-ccw/secure-ipl.ccreate mode 100644pc-bios/s390-ccw/secure-ipl.hdocs/system/s390x/secure-ipl.rst +35
-0@@ -18,3 +18,38 @@ Note: certificate files must have a .pem extension. .. code-block:: shell qemu-system-s390x -machine s390-ccw-virtio,boot-certs.0.path=/.../qemu/certs,boot-certs.1.path=/another/path/cert.pem ... + + +IPL Modes +========= +Multiple IPL modes are available to differentiate between the various IPL +configurations. These modes are mutually exclusive and enabled based on the +``boot-certs`` option on the QEMU command line. + +Normal Mode +----------- + +The absence of certificates will attempt to IPL a guest without secure IPL +operations. No checks are performed, and no warnings/errors are reported. +This is the default mode. + +Configuration: + +.. code-block:: shell + + qemu-system-s390x -machine s390-ccw-virtio ... + +Audit Mode +---------- + +When the certificate store is populated with at least one certificate +and no additional secure IPL parameters are provided on the command +line, then secure IPL will proceed in "audit mode". All secure IPL +operations will be performed with signature verification errors reported +as non-disruptive warnings. + +Configuration: + +.. code-block:: shell + + qemu-system-s390x -machine s390-ccw-virtio,boot-certs.0.path=/.../qemu/certs,boot-certs.1.path=/another/path/cert.pem ...pc-bios/s390-ccw/Makefile +1
-1@@ -35,7 +35,7 @@ QEMU_DGFLAGS = -MMD -MP -MT $@ -MF $(@D)/$(*F).d OBJECTS = start.o main.o bootmap.o jump2ipl.o sclp.o menu.o netmain.o \ virtio.o virtio-net.o virtio-scsi.o virtio-blkdev.o cio.o dasd-ipl.o \ - virtio-ccw.o clp.o pci.o virtio-pci.o + virtio-ccw.o clp.o pci.o virtio-pci.o secure-ipl.o SLOF_DIR := $(SRC_PATH)/../../roms/SLOFpc-bios/s390-ccw/bootmap.c +2
-2@@ -15,6 +15,7 @@#include "bootmap.h" #include "virtio.h" #include "bswap.h" +#include "secure-ipl.h" #ifdef DEBUG /* #define DEBUG_FALLBACK */ @@ -617,7 +618,7 @@ static int ipl_eckd(void)* Returns: length of the segment on success, * negative value on error. */ -static int zipl_load_segment (ComponentEntry *entry,uint64_t address) +int zipl_load_segment (ComponentEntry *entry,uint64_t address) {const int max_entries = (MAX_SECTOR_SIZE /sizeof (ScsiBlockPtr));ScsiBlockPtr *bprs = (void *)sec;@@ -736,7 +737,19 @@ static int zipl_run(ScsiBlockPtr *pte)/* Load image(s) into RAM */ entry = (ComponentEntry *)(&header[1 ]); - rc =zipl_run_normal (&entry, tmp_sec);
pc-bios/s390-ccw/bootmap.c static int zipl_run(ScsiBlockPtr *pte) · line 749
Quoted 10 lines
pc-bios/s390-ccw/bootmap.c +10
-0+switch (boot_mode) { +case ZIPL_BOOT_MODE_SECURE_AUDIT : + rc =zipl_run_secure (&entry, tmp_sec); +break ; +case ZIPL_BOOT_MODE_NORMAL : + rc =zipl_run_normal (&entry, tmp_sec); +break ; +default : +puts ("Unknown boot mode" ); + rc =-1 ;
This should be a full panic in my opinion.
Quoted 265 lines
pc-bios/s390-ccw/bootmap.c +22
-0+break ; + } +if (rc) {return rc; }@@ -1103,17 +1116,33 @@ static int zipl_load_vscsi(void)* IPL starts here */ +ZiplBootMode get_boot_mode (uint8_t hdr_flags) +{ +bool sipl_set = hdr_flags &DIAG308_IPIB_FLAGS_SIPL ; +bool iplir_set = hdr_flags &DIAG308_IPIB_FLAGS_IPLIR ; + +if (!sipl_set && iplir_set) { +return ZIPL_BOOT_MODE_SECURE_AUDIT ; + } + +return ZIPL_BOOT_MODE_NORMAL ; +} +void zipl_load (void ) {VDev *vdev =virtio_get_device ();if (vdev->is_cdrom) { +IPL_assert ((boot_mode ==ZIPL_BOOT_MODE_NORMAL ), +"Secure boot from ISO image is not supported!" );ipl_iso_el_torito ();puts ("Failed to IPL this ISO image!" );return ; }if (virtio_get_device_type () ==VIRTIO_ID_NET ) { +IPL_assert ((boot_mode ==ZIPL_BOOT_MODE_NORMAL ), +"Virtio net boot device does not support secure boot!" );netmain ();puts ("Failed to IPL from this network!" );return ;@@ -1124,6 +1153,9 @@ void zipl_load(void)return ; } +IPL_assert ((boot_mode ==ZIPL_BOOT_MODE_NORMAL ), +"Secure boot with the ECKD scheme is not supported!" ); +switch (virtio_get_device_type ()) {case VIRTIO_ID_BLOCK :zipl_load_vblk ();pc-bios/s390-ccw/bootmap.h +11
-0@@ -88,9 +88,18 @@ typedef struct BootMapTable {BootMapPointer entry[]; } __attribute__ ((packed)) BootMapTable; +#define DER_SIGNATURE_FORMAT 1 + +typedef struct SignatureInformation { +uint8_t format; +uint8_t reserved[3 ]; +uint32_t sig_len; +}SignatureInformation ; +typedef union ComponentEntryData {uint64_t load_psw;uint64_t load_addr; +SignatureInformation sig_info; }ComponentEntryData ; typedef struct ComponentEntry {@@ -113,6 +122,8 @@ typedef struct ScsiMbr {ScsiBlockPtr pt;/* block pointer to program table */ } __attribute__ ((packed)) ScsiMbr; +int zipl_load_segment (ComponentEntry *entry,uint64_t address); +#define ZIPL_MAGIC "zIPL"#define ZIPL_MAGIC_EBCDIC "\xa9\xc9\xd7\xd3"#define IPL1_MAGIC "\xc9\xd7\xd3\xf1"/* == "IPL1" in EBCDIC */ pc-bios/s390-ccw/main.c +6
-0@@ -30,6 +30,7 @@ IplParameterBlock *iplb;bool have_iplb;static uint16_t cutype;LowCore *lowcore;/* Yes, this *is* a pointer to address 0 */ +ZiplBootMode boot_mode;#define LOADPARM_PROMPT "PROMPT "#define LOADPARM_EMPTY " "@@ -303,6 +304,9 @@ static void ipl_ccw_device(void)switch (cutype) {case CU_TYPE_DASD_3990 :case CU_TYPE_DASD_2107 : +IPL_assert ((boot_mode ==ZIPL_BOOT_MODE_NORMAL ), +"Passthrough (vfio) CCW device does not support secure boot!" ); +dasd_ipl (blk_schid, cutype);break ;case CU_TYPE_VIRTIO :@@ -390,6 +394,8 @@ void main(void)probe_boot_device (); } + boot_mode =get_boot_mode (iplb->hdr_flags); +while (have_iplb) {boot_setup ();if (have_iplb &&find_boot_device ()) {pc-bios/s390-ccw/s390-ccw.h +27
-0@@ -40,6 +40,22 @@ typedef unsigned long long u64; ((b) == 0 ? (a) : (MIN(a, b))))#endif +/* +* Round number down to multiple. Requires that d be a power of 2. +* Works even if d is a smaller type than n. +*/ +#ifndef ROUND_DOWN +#define ROUND_DOWN (n, d) ((n) & -(0 ? (n) : (d))) +#endif + +/* +* Round number up to multiple. Requires that d be a power of 2. +* Works even if d is a smaller type than n. +*/ +#ifndef ROUND_UP +#define ROUND_UP (n, d) ROUND_DOWN((n) + (d) - 1, (d)) +#endif +#define ARRAY_SIZE (a) (sizeof(a) / sizeof((a)[0]))#include "cio.h" @@ -64,11 +80,22 @@ void sclp_print(const char *string);void sclp_set_write_mask (uint32_t receive_mask,uint32_t send_mask);void sclp_setup (void );void sclp_get_loadparm_ascii (char *loadparm); +bool sclp_is_diag320_on (void ); +bool sclp_is_sipl_on (void );int sclp_read (char *str,size_t count);/* bootmap.c */ void zipl_load (void ); +typedef enum ZiplBootMode { +ZIPL_BOOT_MODE_NORMAL =0 , +ZIPL_BOOT_MODE_SECURE_AUDIT =1 , +}ZiplBootMode ; + +extern ZiplBootMode boot_mode; + +ZiplBootMode get_boot_mode (uint8_t hdr_flags); +/* jump2ipl.c */ void write_reset_psw (uint64_t psw);int jump_to_IPL_code (uint64_t address);pc-bios/s390-ccw/sclp.c +37
-0@@ -113,6 +113,43 @@ void sclp_get_loadparm_ascii(char *loadparm) } } +bool sclp_is_diag320_on (void ) +{ +ReadInfo *sccb = (void *)_sccb; +uint8_t fac134 =0 ; + +memset ((char *)_sccb,0 ,sizeof (ReadInfo)); + sccb->h.length =SCCB_SIZE ; +if (!sclp_service_call (SCLP_CMDW_READ_SCP_INFO , sccb)) { + fac134 = sccb->fac134; + } + +return fac134 &SCCB_FAC134_DIAG320_BIT ; +} + +/* +* Get fac_ipl (byte 136 and byte 137 of the SCLP Read Info block) +* for IPL device facilities. +*/ +static void sclp_get_fac_ipl (uint16_t *fac_ipl) +{ +ReadInfo *sccb = (void *)_sccb; + +memset ((char *)_sccb,0 ,sizeof (ReadInfo)); + sccb->h.length =SCCB_SIZE ; +if (!sclp_service_call (SCLP_CMDW_READ_SCP_INFO , sccb)) { + *fac_ipl = sccb->fac_ipl; + } +} + +bool sclp_is_sipl_on (void ) +{ +uint16_t fac_ipl =0 ; + +sclp_get_fac_ipl (&fac_ipl); +return fac_ipl &SCCB_FAC_IPL_SIPL_BIT ; +} +int sclp_read (char *str,size_t count) {ReadEventData *sccb = (void *)_sccb;pc-bios/s390-ccw/sclp.h +6
-0@@ -50,6 +50,8 @@ typedef struct SCCBHeader { } __attribute__((packed)) SCCBHeader;#define SCCB_DATA_LEN (SCCB_SIZE - sizeof(SCCBHeader)) +#define SCCB_FAC134_DIAG320_BIT 0x4 +#define SCCB_FAC_IPL_SIPL_BIT 0x4000 typedef struct ReadInfo { SCCBHeader h;@@ -57,6 +59,10 @@ typedef struct ReadInfo {uint8_t rnsize;uint8_t reserved[13 ];uint8_t loadparm[LOADPARM_LEN ]; +uint8_t reserved1[102 ]; +uint8_t fac134; +uint8_t reserved2; +uint16_t fac_ipl; } __attribute__((packed)) ReadInfo; typedef struct SCCB {pc-bios/s390-ccw/secure-ipl.c new file +24
-0@@ -0,0 +1,359 @@ +/* +* S/390 Secure IPL +* +* Functions to support IPL in secure boot mode (DIAG 320, DIAG 508, +* signature verification, and certificate handling). +* +* For secure IPL overview: docs/system/s390x/secure-ipl.rst +* For secure IPL technical: docs/specs/s390x-secure-ipl.rst +* +* Copyright 2025 IBM Corp. +* Author(s): Zhuoying Cai <[email protected]> +* +* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later +*/ + +#include <stdlib.h> +#include <string.h> +#include <stdio.h> +#include "bootmap.h" +#include "s390-ccw.h" +#include "secure-ipl.h" + +static uint8_t vcb_data[MAX_SECTOR_SIZE * 4] __attribute__((__aligned__(PAGE_SIZE))); +static uint8_t vcssb_data[VCSSB_MIN_LEN] __attribute__((__aligned__(8)));
pc-bios/s390-ccw/secure-ipl.c line 34
Quoted 10 lines
pc-bios/s390-ccw/secure-ipl.c new file +10
-0+ +VCStorageSizeBlock *zipl_secure_get_vcssb (void ) +{ +VCStorageSizeBlock *vcssb; + + vcssb = (VCStorageSizeBlock *)vcssb_data; +/* avoid retrieving vcssb multiple times */ +if (vcssb->length >=VCSSB_MIN_LEN ) { +return vcssb; + }
vcssb_data is VCSSB_MIN_LEN bytes so if vcssb->length were greater than VCSSB_MIN_LEN, wouldn't that indicate buffer overflow?
pc-bios/s390-ccw/secure-ipl.c line 39
Quoted 5 lines
pc-bios/s390-ccw/secure-ipl.c new file +5
-0+ +if (!is_cert_store_facility_supported ()) { +puts ("Certificate Store Facility is not supported by the hypervisor!" ); +return NULL ; + }
This looks like it should be a higher level check done earlier and only once. If it is not supported we can abort before we even try requesting a certificate.
pc-bios/s390-ccw/secure-ipl.c line 48
Quoted 9 lines
pc-bios/s390-ccw/secure-ipl.c new file +9
-0+ + vcssb->length =VCSSB_MIN_LEN ; +if (diag320 (vcssb,DIAG_320_SUBC_QUERY_VCSI ) !=DIAG_320_RC_OK ) { + vcssb->length =0 ; +return NULL ; + } + +return vcssb; +}
I don't understand why the vcssb_data buffer is needed. Why not just pass the vcssb pointer as a parameter?
Quoted 15 lines
pc-bios/s390-ccw/secure-ipl.c new file +15
-0+ +static uint32_t get_total_certs_length (void ) +{ +VCStorageSizeBlock *vcssb; + + vcssb =zipl_secure_get_vcssb (); +if (vcssb ==NULL ) { +return 0 ; + } + +return vcssb->total_vcb_len -VCB_HEADER_LEN - vcssb->total_vc_ct *VCE_HEADER_LEN ; +} + +static uint32_t request_certificate (uint8_t *cert_addr,uint8_t index) +{
pc-bios/s390-ccw/secure-ipl.c line 73
Quoted 10 lines
pc-bios/s390-ccw/secure-ipl.c new file +10
-0+VCStorageSizeBlock *vcssb; +VCBlock *vcb; +VCEntry *vce; +uint32_t cert_len =0 ; + +/* Get Verification Certificate Storage Size block with DIAG320 subcode 1 */ + vcssb =zipl_secure_get_vcssb (); +if (vcssb ==NULL ) { +return 0 ; + }
Could getting the vcssb be simplified to something like
if (vcssb == NULL && diag320(&vcssb, DIAG_320_SUBC_QUERY_VCSI) != DIAG_320_RC_OK) { return 0;
}
That would eliminate zipl_secure_get_vcssb() entirely if the facility is also checked earlier.
Can you explain the purpose of casting a byte array instead just using VCStorageSizeBlock?
Quoted 19 lines
pc-bios/s390-ccw/secure-ipl.c new file +19
-0+ +/* +* Request single entry +* Fill input fields of single-entry VCB +*/ + vcb = (VCBlock *)vcb_data; + vcb->in_len =ROUND_UP (vcssb->max_single_vcb_len,PAGE_SIZE ); + vcb->first_vc_index = index; + vcb->last_vc_index = index; + +if (diag320 (vcb,DIAG_320_SUBC_STORE_VC ) !=DIAG_320_RC_OK ) { + goto out; + } + +if (vcb->out_len ==VCB_HEADER_LEN ) { +puts ("No certificate entry" ); + goto out; + } +
pc-bios/s390-ccw/secure-ipl.c line 102
Quoted 10 lines
pc-bios/s390-ccw/secure-ipl.c new file +10
-0+if (vcb->remain_ct !=0 ) { +puts ("Not enough memory to store all requested certificates" ); + goto out; + } + + vce = (VCEntry *)vcb->vce_buf; +if (!(vce->flags &DIAG_320_VCE_FLAGS_VALID )) { +puts ("Invalid certificate" ); + goto out; + }
As I understand it vcb_data is basically to hold a VCEntry array that is actually part of the VCBlock. Would it be possible to allocate this space as part of the VCBlock itself to eliminate the vcb_data buffer?
Quoted 29 lines
pc-bios/s390-ccw/secure-ipl.c new file +29
-0+ + cert_len = vce->cert_len; +memcpy (cert_addr, (uint8_t *)vce + vce->cert_offset, vce->cert_len); + +out: +memset (vcb_data,0 ,sizeof (vcb_data)); +return cert_len; +} + +static void cert_list_add (IplSignatureCertificateList *cert_list,int cert_entry_idx, +uint8_t *cert_addr,uint64_t cert_len) +{ +if (cert_entry_idx >MAX_CERTIFICATES -1 ) { +printf ("Warning: Ignoring cert entry #%d because only %d entries are supported\n" , + cert_entry_idx +1 ,MAX_CERTIFICATES ); +return ; + } + + cert_list->cert_entries[cert_entry_idx].addr = (uint64_t )cert_addr; + cert_list->cert_entries[cert_entry_idx].len = cert_len; + cert_list->ipl_info_header.len +=sizeof (cert_list->cert_entries[cert_entry_idx]); +} + +static void comp_list_add (IplDeviceComponentList *comp_list,int comp_entry_idx, +SecureIplCompEntryInfo comp_entry_info) +{ +if (comp_entry_idx >MAX_CERTIFICATES -1 ) { +printf ("Warning: Ignoring comp entry #%d because only %d entries are supported\n" , + comp_entry_idx +1 ,MAX_CERTIFICATES );
pc-bios/s390-ccw/secure-ipl.c line 141
Quoted 10 lines
pc-bios/s390-ccw/secure-ipl.c new file +10
-0+return ; + } + + comp_list->device_entries[comp_entry_idx].addr = comp_entry_info.addr; + comp_list->device_entries[comp_entry_idx].len = comp_entry_info.len; + comp_list->device_entries[comp_entry_idx].flags = comp_entry_info.flags; +/* cert index field is meaningful only when S390_IPL_DEV_COMP_FLAG_SC is set */ + comp_list->device_entries[comp_entry_idx].cert_index = comp_entry_info.cert_index; + comp_list->ipl_info_header.len +=sizeof (comp_list->device_entries[comp_entry_idx]); +}
These functions should return true/false to indicate when something is skipped. Then after the max is reached it can break and stop calling these functions.
Otherwise this would flood the console with a message for each skipped entry.
Quoted 61 lines
pc-bios/s390-ccw/secure-ipl.c new file +61
-0+ +static void update_iirb (IplDeviceComponentList *comp_list, +IplSignatureCertificateList *cert_list) +{ +IplInfoReportBlock *iirb; +IplDeviceComponentList *iirb_comps; +IplSignatureCertificateList *iirb_certs; +uint32_t iirb_hdr_len; +uint32_t comps_len; +uint32_t certs_len; + +if (iplb->len %8 !=0 ) { +panic ("IPL parameter block length field value is not multiple of 8 bytes" ); + } + + iirb_hdr_len =sizeof (IplInfoReportBlockHeader); + comps_len = comp_list->ipl_info_header.len; + certs_len = cert_list->ipl_info_header.len; +if ((comps_len + certs_len + iirb_hdr_len) >sizeof (IplInfoReportBlock)) { +panic ("Not enough space to hold all components and certificates in IIRB" ); + } + +/* IIRB immediately follows IPLB */ + iirb = &ipl_data.iirb; + iirb->hdr.len = iirb_hdr_len; + +/* Copy IPL device component list after IIRB Header */ + iirb_comps = (IplDeviceComponentList *) iirb->info_blks; +memcpy (iirb_comps, comp_list, comps_len); + +/* Update IIRB length */ + iirb->hdr.len += comps_len; + +/* Copy IPL sig cert list after IPL device component list */ + iirb_certs = (IplSignatureCertificateList *) (iirb->info_blks + + iirb_comps->ipl_info_header.len); +memcpy (iirb_certs, cert_list, certs_len); + +/* Update IIRB length */ + iirb->hdr.len += certs_len; +} + +static bool secure_ipl_supported (void ) +{ +if (!sclp_is_sipl_on ()) { +puts ("Secure IPL Facility is not supported by the hypervisor!" ); +return false; + } + +if (!is_signature_verif_supported ()) { +puts ("Secure IPL extensions are not supported by the hypervisor!" ); +return false; + } + +if (!is_cert_store_facility_supported ()) { +puts ("Certificate Store Facility is not supported by the hypervisor!" ); +return false; + } + +return true; +}
pc-bios/s390-ccw/secure-ipl.c line 212
Quoted 10 lines
pc-bios/s390-ccw/secure-ipl.c new file +10
-0+ +static void init_lists (IplDeviceComponentList *comp_list, +IplSignatureCertificateList *cert_list) +{ + comp_list->ipl_info_header.type =IPL_INFO_BLOCK_TYPE_COMPONENTS ; + comp_list->ipl_info_header.len =sizeof (comp_list->ipl_info_header); + + cert_list->ipl_info_header.type =IPL_INFO_BLOCK_TYPE_CERTIFICATES ; + cert_list->ipl_info_header.len =sizeof (cert_list->ipl_info_header); +}
Why not sizeof(IplInfoBlockHeader)?
Quoted 179 lines
pc-bios/s390-ccw/secure-ipl.c new file +147
-0+ +static int zipl_load_signature (ComponentEntry *entry,uint64_t sig_sec) +{ +if (zipl_load_segment (entry, sig_sec) <0 ) { +return -1 ; + } + +if (entry->compdat.sig_info.format !=DER_SIGNATURE_FORMAT ) { +puts ("Signature is not in DER format" ); +return -1 ; + } + +return entry->compdat.sig_info.sig_len; +} + +int zipl_run_secure (ComponentEntry **entry_ptr,uint8_t *tmp_sec) +{ +IplDeviceComponentList comp_list = {0 }; +IplSignatureCertificateList cert_list = {0 }; +SecureIplCompEntryInfo comp_entry_info; +ComponentEntry *entry = *entry_ptr; +uint8_t *cert_addr =NULL ; +uint64_t *sig =NULL ; +int cert_entry_idx =0 ; +int comp_entry_idx =0 ; +int sig_len =0 ; +int comp_len; +uint64_t comp_addr; +uint64_t cert_len; +uint8_t cert_table_idx; +bool verified; +/* +* Keep track of which certificate store indices correspond to the +* certificate data entries within the IplSignatureCertificateList to +* prevent allocating space for the same certificate multiple times. +* +* The array index corresponds to the certificate's cert-store index. +* +* The array value corresponds to the certificate's entry within the +* IplSignatureCertificateList (with a value of -1 denoting no entry +* exists for the certificate). +*/ +int cert_list_table[MAX_CERTIFICATES ] = { [0 ...MAX_CERTIFICATES -1 ] =-1 }; +int signed_count =0 ; + +if (!secure_ipl_supported ()) { +panic ("Unable to boot in secure/audit mode" ); + } + +init_lists (&comp_list, &cert_list); + cert_addr =malloc (get_total_certs_length ()); + sig =malloc (MAX_SECTOR_SIZE ); + +while (entry->component_type !=ZIPL_COMP_ENTRY_EXEC ) { +switch (entry->component_type) { +case ZIPL_COMP_ENTRY_SIGNATURE : +if (sig_len) { + goto out; + } + + sig_len =zipl_load_signature (entry, (uint64_t )sig); +if (sig_len <0 ) { + goto out; + } +break ; +case ZIPL_COMP_ENTRY_LOAD : + comp_addr = entry->compdat.load_addr; + comp_len =zipl_load_segment (entry, comp_addr); +if (comp_len <0 ) { + goto out; + } + +if (!sig_len) { +break ; + } + + comp_entry_info = (SecureIplCompEntryInfo ){0 }; + comp_entry_info.addr = comp_addr; + comp_entry_info.len = (uint64_t )comp_len; + + verified =verify_signature (comp_entry_info, + sig_len, (uint64_t )sig, + &cert_len, &cert_table_idx); + +/* default flags for unverified component */ + comp_entry_info.flags |=S390_IPL_DEV_COMP_FLAG_SC ; + +if (verified) { +if (cert_list_table[cert_table_idx] ==-1 ) { +if (!request_certificate (cert_addr, cert_table_idx)) { +puts ("Could not get certificate" ); + goto out; + } + + cert_list_table[cert_table_idx] = cert_entry_idx; +cert_list_add (&cert_list, cert_entry_idx, cert_addr, cert_len); + +/* increment for the next certificate */ + cert_entry_idx++; + cert_addr += cert_len; + } + +puts ("Verified component" ); + comp_entry_info.cert_index = cert_list_table[cert_table_idx]; + comp_entry_info.flags |=S390_IPL_DEV_COMP_FLAG_CSV ; + } + +comp_list_add (&comp_list, comp_entry_idx, comp_entry_info); + +if (!verified) { +zipl_secure_handle ("Could not verify component" ); + } + + comp_entry_idx++; + signed_count +=1 ; +/* After a signature is used another new one can be accepted */ + sig_len =0 ; +break ; +default : +puts ("Unknown component entry type" ); +return -1 ; + } + + entry++; + +if ((uint8_t *)(&entry[1 ]) > tmp_sec +MAX_SECTOR_SIZE ) { +puts ("Wrong entry value" ); +return -EINVAL ; + } + } + +if (signed_count ==0 ) { +zipl_secure_handle ("Secure boot is on, but components are not signed" ); + } + +update_iirb (&comp_list, &cert_list); + + *entry_ptr = entry; +free (sig); + +return 0 ; +out: +free (cert_addr); +free (sig); + +return -1 ; +}pc-bios/s390-ccw/secure-ipl.h new file +26
-0@@ -0,0 +1,110 @@ +/* +* S/390 Secure IPL +* +* Copyright 2025 IBM Corp. +* Author(s): Zhuoying Cai <[email protected]> +* +* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later +*/ + +#ifndef _PC_BIOS_S390_CCW_SECURE_IPL_H +#define _PC_BIOS_S390_CCW_SECURE_IPL_H + +#include <diag320.h> +#include <diag508.h> + +VCStorageSizeBlock *zipl_secure_get_vcssb (void ); +int zipl_run_secure (ComponentEntry **entry_ptr,uint8_t *tmp_sec); + +/* Custom struct for secure IPL component entry information */ +typedef struct SecureIplCompEntryInfo { +uint64_t addr; +uint64_t len; +uint16_t cert_index; +uint8_t flags; +}SecureIplCompEntryInfo ; +
pc-bios/s390-ccw/secure-ipl.h line 36
Quoted 10 lines
pc-bios/s390-ccw/secure-ipl.h new file +10
-0+static inline void zipl_secure_handle (const char *message) +{ +switch (boot_mode) { +case ZIPL_BOOT_MODE_SECURE_AUDIT : +IPL_check (false, message); +break ; +default : +break ; + } +}
I think calling this something like 'secure_ipl_print' would make more sense. Maybe skip IPL_check and use printf directly since it's always false.
Quoted 64 lines
pc-bios/s390-ccw/secure-ipl.h new file +64
-0+ +static inline uint64_t diag320 (void *data,unsigned long subcode) +{ + register unsigned long addr asm("0") = (unsigned long)data; + register unsigned long rc asm("1") = 0; + + asmvolatile ("diag %0,%2,0x320\n" + :"+d" (addr),"+d" (rc) + :"d" (subcode) + :"memory" ,"cc" ); +return rc; +} + +static inline bool is_cert_store_facility_supported (void ) +{ +uint32_t d320_ism; + +if (!sclp_is_diag320_on ()) { +return false; + } + +diag320 (&d320_ism,DIAG_320_SUBC_QUERY_ISM ); +return d320_ism & (DIAG_320_ISM_QUERY_VCSI |DIAG_320_ISM_STORE_VC ); +} + +static inline uint64_t _diag508 (void *data,unsigned long subcode) +{ + register unsigned long addr asm("0") = (unsigned long)data; + register unsigned long rc asm("1") = 0; + + asmvolatile ("diag %0,%2,0x508\n" + :"+d" (addr),"+d" (rc) + :"d" (subcode) + :"memory" ,"cc" ); +return rc; +} + +static inline bool is_signature_verif_supported (void ) +{ +uint64_t d508_subcodes; + + d508_subcodes =_diag508 (NULL ,DIAG_508_SUBC_QUERY_SUBC ); +return d508_subcodes &DIAG_508_SUBC_SIG_VERIF ; +} + +static inline bool verify_signature (SecureIplCompEntryInfo comp_entry_info, +uint64_t sig_len,uint64_t sig_addr, +uint64_t *cert_len,uint8_t *cert_idx) +{ +Diag508SigVerifBlock svb; + + svb.length =sizeof (Diag508SigVerifBlock); + svb.version =0 ; + svb.comp_len = comp_entry_info.len; + svb.comp_addr = comp_entry_info.addr; + svb.sig_len = sig_len; + svb.sig_addr = sig_addr; + +if (_diag508 (&svb,DIAG_508_SUBC_SIG_VERIF ) ==DIAG_508_RC_OK ) { + *cert_len = svb.cert_len; +/* +* DIAG 508 utilizes an index origin of 0 when indexing the cert store. +* The cert_idx will be used for DIAG 320 data structures, which expects +* an index origin of 1. Account for the offset here so it's easier to
pc-bios/s390-ccw/secure-ipl.h line 110
Quoted 10 lines
pc-bios/s390-ccw/secure-ipl.h new file +10
-0+* manage later. +*/ + *cert_idx = svb.cert_store_index +1 ; + return true; + } + +return false; +} + +#endif /* _PC_BIOS_S390_CCW_SECURE_IPL_H */
Regards,
Jared Rossi
Re: [PATCH v10 19/30] pc-bios/s390-ccw: Add signature verification for secure IPL in audit mode
Quoted 35 lines · Jared Rossi
Quoted 32 lines · Zhuoying Cai
Enable secure IPL in audit mode, which performs signature verification, but any error does not terminate the boot process. Only warnings will be logged to the console instead.
Add a
comp_lenvariable to store the length of a segment inzipl_load_segment.comp_lenvariable is necessary to store the calculated segment length and is used during signature verification. Return the length on success, or a negative return code on failure.Secure IPL in audit mode requires at least one certificate provided in the key store along with necessary facilities (Secure IPL Facility, Certificate Store Facility and secure IPL extension support).
Note: Secure IPL in audit mode is implemented for the SCSI scheme of virtio-blk/virtio-scsi devices.
Signed-off-by Zhuoying Cai <[email protected]>---
docs/system/s390x/secure-ipl.rst| 35 +++ pc-bios/s390-ccw/Makefile | 2 +- pc-bios/s390-ccw/bootmap.c | 36 +++- pc-bios/s390-ccw/bootmap.h | 11 + pc-bios/s390-ccw/main.c | 6 + pc-bios/s390-ccw/s390-ccw.h | 27 +++ pc-bios/s390-ccw/sclp.c | 37 ++++ pc-bios/s390-ccw/sclp.h | 6 + pc-bios/s390-ccw/secure-ipl.c | 359 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ pc-bios/s390-ccw/secure-ipl.h | 110 ++++++++++10 files changed, 626 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)create mode 100644
pc-bios/s390-ccw/secure-ipl.ccreate mode 100644pc-bios/s390-ccw/secure-ipl.h
...
Quoted 36 lines
Quoted 36 lines
pc-bios/s390-ccw/secure-ipl.h new file +30
-0@@ -0,0 +1,110 @@ +/* +* S/390 Secure IPL +* +* Copyright 2025 IBM Corp. +* Author(s): Zhuoying Cai <[email protected]> +* +* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later +*/ + +#ifndef _PC_BIOS_S390_CCW_SECURE_IPL_H +#define _PC_BIOS_S390_CCW_SECURE_IPL_H + +#include <diag320.h> +#include <diag508.h> + +VCStorageSizeBlock *zipl_secure_get_vcssb (void ); +int zipl_run_secure (ComponentEntry **entry_ptr,uint8_t *tmp_sec); + +/* Custom struct for secure IPL component entry information */ +typedef struct SecureIplCompEntryInfo { + uint64_t addr; + uint64_t len; + uint16_t cert_index; + uint8_t flags; +}SecureIplCompEntryInfo ; + +static inline void zipl_secure_handle (const char *message) +{ + switch (boot_mode) { + case ZIPL_BOOT_MODE_SECURE_AUDIT:
Quoted 9 lines
pc-bios/s390-ccw/secure-ipl.h line 36
Quoted 6 lines
pc-bios/s390-ccw/secure-ipl.h new file +6
-0+ IPL_check(false, message); + break; + default: + break; + } +}I think calling this something like '
secure_ipl_print' would make more sense. Maybe skipIPL_checkand use printf directly since it's always false.
When true secure IPL mode is introduced (patch 25), this function is updated such that it will panic in that mode. How about 'secure_ipl_error'?
Re: [PATCH v10 19/30] pc-bios/s390-ccw: Add signature verification for secure IPL in audit mode
In reply to Zhuoying CaiQuoted 38 lines · Zhuoying Cai
Enable secure IPL in audit mode, which performs signature verification, but any error does not terminate the boot process. Only warnings will be logged to the console instead.
Add a
comp_lenvariable to store the length of a segment inzipl_load_segment.comp_lenvariable is necessary to store the calculated segment length and is used during signature verification. Return the length on success, or a negative return code on failure.Secure IPL in audit mode requires at least one certificate provided in the key store along with necessary facilities (Secure IPL Facility, Certificate Store Facility and secure IPL extension support).
Note: Secure IPL in audit mode is implemented for the SCSI scheme of virtio-blk/virtio-scsi devices.
Signed-off-by Zhuoying Cai <[email protected]>--- docs/system/s390x/secure-ipl.rst | 35 +++ pc-bios/s390-ccw/Makefile | 2 +- pc-bios/s390-ccw/bootmap.c | 36 +++- pc-bios/s390-ccw/bootmap.h | 11 + pc-bios/s390-ccw/main.c | 6 + pc-bios/s390-ccw/s390-ccw.h | 27 +++ pc-bios/s390-ccw/sclp.c | 37 ++++ pc-bios/s390-ccw/sclp.h | 6 + pc-bios/s390-ccw/secure-ipl.c | 359 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ pc-bios/s390-ccw/secure-ipl.h | 110 ++++++++++ 10 files changed, 626 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)create mode 100644
pc-bios/s390-ccw/secure-ipl.ccreate mode 100644pc-bios/s390-ccw/secure-ipl.hdocs/system/s390x/secure-ipl.rst +0
-0@@ -18,3 +18,38 @@ Note: certificate files must have a .pem extension. .. code-block:: shell
docs/system/s390x/secure-ipl.rst Note: certificate files must have a .pem extension. · line 28
Quoted 10 lines
docs/system/s390x/secure-ipl.rst +8
-0qemu-system-s390x -machine s390-ccw-virtio,boot-certs.0.path=/.../qemu/certs,boot-certs.1.path=/another/path/cert.pem ... + + +IPL Modes +========= +Multiple IPL modes are available to differentiate between the various IPL +configurations. These modes are mutually exclusive and enabled based on the +``boot-certs`` option on the QEMU command line. +
Add a newline before this paragraph for consistency with the other sections. :)
Quoted 13 lines
docs/system/s390x/secure-ipl.rst +13
-0+Normal Mode +----------- + +The absence of certificates will attempt to IPL a guest without secure IPL +operations. No checks are performed, and no warnings/errors are reported. +This is the default mode. + +Configuration: + +.. code-block:: shell + + qemu-system-s390x -machine s390-ccw-virtio ... +
PATCH v10 20/30 pc-bios/s390-ccw: Add signed component address overlap checks
In reply to Zhuoying CaiAdd address range tracking and overlap checks to ensure that no component overlaps with a signed component during secure IPL.
--- pc-bios/s390-ccw/secure-ipl.c | 58 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--- pc-bios/s390-ccw/secure-ipl.h | 15 +++++++++ 2 files changed, 69 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
pc-bios/s390-ccw/secure-ipl.c +54 -4
@@ -211,6 +211,49 @@ static void init_lists(IplDeviceComponentList *comp_list, cert_list->ipl_info_header.len =sizeof (cert_list->ipl_info_header); } +static bool is_comp_overlap (SecureIplCompAddrRangeList *range_list, +SecureIplCompEntryInfo comp_entry_info) +{ +uint64_t start_addr; +uint64_t end_addr; + + start_addr = comp_entry_info.addr; + end_addr = comp_entry_info.addr + comp_entry_info.len; + +/* +* Check component's address range does not overlap with any +* signed component's address range. +*/ +for (int i =0 ; i < range_list->index; i++) { +if ((range_list->comp_addr_range[i].start_addr < end_addr && + start_addr < range_list->comp_addr_range[i].end_addr) && + range_list->comp_addr_range[i].is_signed) { +return true; + } + } +return false; +} + +static void comp_addr_range_add (SecureIplCompAddrRangeList *range_list, +SecureIplCompEntryInfo comp_entry_info, +bool is_signed) +{ +uint64_t start_addr; +uint64_t end_addr; + + start_addr = comp_entry_info.addr; + end_addr = comp_entry_info.addr + comp_entry_info.len; + +if (range_list->index >=MAX_CERTIFICATES ) { +zipl_secure_handle ("Component address range update failed due to out-of-range" +" index; Overlapping validation cannot be guaranteed" ); + } + + range_list->comp_addr_range[range_list->index].is_signed = is_signed; + range_list->comp_addr_range[range_list->index].start_addr = start_addr; + range_list->comp_addr_range[range_list->index].end_addr = end_addr; +} +static int zipl_load_signature (ComponentEntry *entry,uint64_t sig_sec) {if (zipl_load_segment (entry, sig_sec) <0 ) {
@@ -253,6 +296,7 @@ int zipl_run_secure(ComponentEntry **entry_ptr, uint8_t *tmp_sec)* exists for the certificate). */ int cert_list_table[MAX_CERTIFICATES ] = { [0 ...MAX_CERTIFICATES -1 ] =-1 }; +SecureIplCompAddrRangeList range_list = {0 };int signed_count =0 ;if (!secure_ipl_supported ()) {
@@ -282,14 +326,20 @@ int zipl_run_secure(ComponentEntry **entry_ptr, uint8_t *tmp_sec) goto out; } -if (!sig_len) { -break ; - } - comp_entry_info = (SecureIplCompEntryInfo ){0 }; comp_entry_info.addr = comp_addr; comp_entry_info.len = (uint64_t )comp_len; +if (is_comp_overlap (&range_list, comp_entry_info)) { +zipl_secure_handle ("Component addresses overlap" ); + } +comp_addr_range_add (&range_list, comp_entry_info, !!sig_len); + range_list.index +=1 ; + +if (!sig_len) { +break ; + } + verified =verify_signature (comp_entry_info, sig_len, (uint64_t )sig, &cert_len, &cert_table_idx);
pc-bios/s390-ccw/secure-ipl.h +15 -0
@@ -24,6 +24,21 @@ typedef struct SecureIplCompEntryInfo {uint8_t flags; } SecureIplCompEntryInfo; +typedef struct SecureIplCompAddrRange { +bool is_signed; +uint64_t start_addr; +uint64_t end_addr; +}SecureIplCompAddrRange ; + +/* +* Custom struct for managing a list of secure IPL component address ranges. +* Tracks up to MAX_CERTIFICATES address ranges with an index counter. +*/ +typedef struct SecureIplCompAddrRangeList { +SecureIplCompAddrRange comp_addr_range[MAX_CERTIFICATES ]; +int index; +}SecureIplCompAddrRangeList ; +static inline void zipl_secure_handle (const char *message) {switch (boot_mode) {
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Re: [PATCH v10 20/30] pc-bios/s390-ccw: Add signed component address overlap checks
Quoted 44 lines · Zhuoying Cai
Add address range tracking and overlap checks to ensure that no component overlaps with a signed component during secure IPL.
Signed-off-by Zhuoying Cai <[email protected]>--- pc-bios/s390-ccw/secure-ipl.c | 58 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--- pc-bios/s390-ccw/secure-ipl.h | 15 +++++++++ 2 files changed, 69 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)pc-bios/s390-ccw/secure-ipl.c +27
-0@@ -211,6 +211,49 @@ static void init_lists(IplDeviceComponentList *comp_list, cert_list->ipl_info_header.len =sizeof (cert_list->ipl_info_header); } +static bool is_comp_overlap (SecureIplCompAddrRangeList *range_list, +SecureIplCompEntryInfo comp_entry_info) +{ +uint64_t start_addr; +uint64_t end_addr; + + start_addr = comp_entry_info.addr; + end_addr = comp_entry_info.addr + comp_entry_info.len; + +/* +* Check component's address range does not overlap with any +* signed component's address range. +*/ +for (int i =0 ; i < range_list->index; i++) { +if ((range_list->comp_addr_range[i].start_addr < end_addr && + start_addr < range_list->comp_addr_range[i].end_addr) && + range_list->comp_addr_range[i].is_signed) { +return true; + } + } +return false; +} + +static void comp_addr_range_add (SecureIplCompAddrRangeList *range_list, +SecureIplCompEntryInfo comp_entry_info, +bool is_signed) +{
pc-bios/s390-ccw/secure-ipl.c static void init_lists(IplDeviceComponentList *comp_list, · line 250
Quoted 10 lines
pc-bios/s390-ccw/secure-ipl.c +10
-0+uint64_t start_addr; +uint64_t end_addr; + + start_addr = comp_entry_info.addr; + end_addr = comp_entry_info.addr + comp_entry_info.len; + +if (range_list->index >=MAX_CERTIFICATES ) { +zipl_secure_handle ("Component address range update failed due to out-of-range" +" index; Overlapping validation cannot be guaranteed" ); + }
On audit mode, you will still attempt to access outside the bounds of the array. If the intention is to simply ignore adding more entries to the list, then make sure to return early.
Quoted 22 lines
pc-bios/s390-ccw/secure-ipl.c +7
-1+ + range_list->comp_addr_range[range_list->index].is_signed = is_signed; + range_list->comp_addr_range[range_list->index].start_addr = start_addr; + range_list->comp_addr_range[range_list->index].end_addr = end_addr; +} +static int zipl_load_signature (ComponentEntry *entry,uint64_t sig_sec) {if (zipl_load_segment (entry, sig_sec) <0 ) {@@ -253,6 +296,7 @@ int zipl_run_secure(ComponentEntry **entry_ptr, uint8_t *tmp_sec)* exists for the certificate). */ int cert_list_table[MAX_CERTIFICATES ] = { [0 ...MAX_CERTIFICATES -1 ] =-1 }; +SecureIplCompAddrRangeList range_list = {0 };int signed_count =0 ;if (!secure_ipl_supported ()) {@@ -282,14 +326,20 @@ int zipl_run_secure(ComponentEntry **entry_ptr, uint8_t *tmp_sec) goto out; } -if (!sig_len) {
pc-bios/s390-ccw/secure-ipl.c int zipl_run_secure(ComponentEntry **entry_ptr, uint8_t *tmp_sec) · line 335
Quoted 10 lines
pc-bios/s390-ccw/secure-ipl.c +3
-3-break ; - } - comp_entry_info = (SecureIplCompEntryInfo ){0 }; comp_entry_info.addr = comp_addr; comp_entry_info.len = (uint64_t )comp_len; +if (is_comp_overlap (&range_list, comp_entry_info)) { +zipl_secure_handle ("Component addresses overlap" ); + }
Seems to be mixed styling here where is_comp_overlap is a bool and the error is handled outside the function, and comp_addr_range_add is void and the error is handled within.
For consistency, I think is_comp_overlap could be check_comp_overlap, void, and handle the error within.
pc-bios/s390-ccw/secure-ipl.c int zipl_run_secure(ComponentEntry **entry_ptr, uint8_t *tmp_sec) · line 337
Quoted 2 lines
pc-bios/s390-ccw/secure-ipl.c +2
-0+comp_addr_range_add (&range_list, comp_entry_info, !!sig_len); + range_list.index +=1 ;
Index should be incremented within the function.
pc-bios/s390-ccw/secure-ipl.c int zipl_run_secure(ComponentEntry **entry_ptr, uint8_t *tmp_sec) · line 342
Quoted 5 lines
pc-bios/s390-ccw/secure-ipl.c +5
-0+ +if (!sig_len) { +break ; + } +
What is the reason for this check moving here? If it's intentional for the check to be at this point in the function, I'd suggest putting in here in the original patch the code was introduced so it doesn't look anomalous.
Quoted 29 lines
pc-bios/s390-ccw/secure-ipl.c +0
-0verified =verify_signature (comp_entry_info, sig_len, (uint64_t )sig, &cert_len, &cert_table_idx);pc-bios/s390-ccw/secure-ipl.h +15
-0@@ -24,6 +24,21 @@ typedef struct SecureIplCompEntryInfo {uint8_t flags; } SecureIplCompEntryInfo; +typedef struct SecureIplCompAddrRange { +bool is_signed; +uint64_t start_addr; +uint64_t end_addr; +}SecureIplCompAddrRange ; + +/* +* Custom struct for managing a list of secure IPL component address ranges. +* Tracks up to MAX_CERTIFICATES address ranges with an index counter. +*/ +typedef struct SecureIplCompAddrRangeList { +SecureIplCompAddrRange comp_addr_range[MAX_CERTIFICATES ]; +int index; +}SecureIplCompAddrRangeList ; +static inline void zipl_secure_handle (const char *message) {switch (boot_mode) {
Signature · 2 lines
Regards, Collin
Re: [PATCH v10 20/30] pc-bios/s390-ccw: Add signed component address overlap checks
Quoted 14 lines · Collin Walling
Quoted 13 lines · Zhuoying Cai
Add address range tracking and overlap checks to ensure that no component overlaps with a signed component during secure IPL.
Signed-off-by Zhuoying Cai <[email protected]>--- pc-bios/s390-ccw/secure-ipl.c | 58 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--- pc-bios/s390-ccw/secure-ipl.h | 15 +++++++++ 2 files changed, 69 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)pc-bios/s390-ccw/secure-ipl.c +0
-0
[...]
Quoted 39 lines
Quoted 16 lines
static int
zipl_load_signature(ComponentEntry *entry, uint64_t sig_sec){ if (zipl_load_segment(entry, sig_sec) < 0) {pc-bios/s390-ccw/secure-ipl.c +1
-1@@ -253,6 +296,7 @@ int zipl_run_secure(ComponentEntry **entry_ptr, uint8_t *tmp_sec)* exists for the certificate). */ int cert_list_table[MAX_CERTIFICATES ] = { [0 ...MAX_CERTIFICATES -1 ] =-1 }; +SecureIplCompAddrRangeList range_list = {0 };int signed_count =0 ;if (!secure_ipl_supported ()) {@@ -282,14 +326,20 @@ int zipl_run_secure(ComponentEntry **entry_ptr, uint8_t *tmp_sec) goto out; } -if (!sig_len) {pc-bios/s390-ccw/secure-ipl.c int zipl_run_secure(ComponentEntry **entry_ptr, uint8_t *tmp_sec) · line 335
Quoted 10 lines
pc-bios/s390-ccw/secure-ipl.c +3
-3-break ; - } - comp_entry_info = (SecureIplCompEntryInfo ){0 }; comp_entry_info.addr = comp_addr; comp_entry_info.len = (uint64_t )comp_len; +if (is_comp_overlap (&range_list, comp_entry_info)) { +zipl_secure_handle ("Component addresses overlap" ); + }Seems to be mixed styling here where
is_comp_overlapis a bool and the error is handled outside the function, andcomp_addr_range_addis void and the error is handled within.For consistency, I think
is_comp_overlapcould becheck_comp_overlap, void, and handle the error within.pc-bios/s390-ccw/secure-ipl.c int zipl_run_secure(ComponentEntry **entry_ptr, uint8_t *tmp_sec) · line 337
Quoted 2 lines
pc-bios/s390-ccw/secure-ipl.c +2
-0+comp_addr_range_add (&range_list, comp_entry_info, !!sig_len); + range_list.index +=1 ;Index should be incremented within the function.
Quoted 11 lines
pc-bios/s390-ccw/secure-ipl.c int zipl_run_secure(ComponentEntry **entry_ptr, uint8_t *tmp_sec) · line 342
Quoted 5 lines
pc-bios/s390-ccw/secure-ipl.c +5
-0+ +if (!sig_len) { +break ; + } +What is the reason for this check moving here? If it's intentional for the check to be at this point in the function, I'd suggest putting in here in the original patch the code was introduced so it doesn't look anomalous.
Thanks for the suggestion.
This check was moved here because overlapping checks apply to all components, meaning every component, signed or unsigned, must ensure it does not overlap with signed components. The checks after this point apply only to signed components. I can put the check here in the original patch.
Quoted 31 lines
Quoted 29 lines
pc-bios/s390-ccw/secure-ipl.c +0
-0verified =verify_signature (comp_entry_info, sig_len, (uint64_t )sig, &cert_len, &cert_table_idx);pc-bios/s390-ccw/secure-ipl.h +15
-0@@ -24,6 +24,21 @@ typedef struct SecureIplCompEntryInfo {uint8_t flags; } SecureIplCompEntryInfo; +typedef struct SecureIplCompAddrRange { +bool is_signed; +uint64_t start_addr; +uint64_t end_addr; +}SecureIplCompAddrRange ; + +/* +* Custom struct for managing a list of secure IPL component address ranges. +* Tracks up to MAX_CERTIFICATES address ranges with an index counter. +*/ +typedef struct SecureIplCompAddrRangeList { +SecureIplCompAddrRange comp_addr_range[MAX_CERTIFICATES ]; +int index; +}SecureIplCompAddrRangeList ; +static inline void zipl_secure_handle (const char *message) {switch (boot_mode) {
Re: [PATCH v10 20/30] pc-bios/s390-ccw: Add signed component address overlap checks
In reply to Zhuoying CaiQuoted 24 lines · Zhuoying Cai
Add address range tracking and overlap checks to ensure that no component overlaps with a signed component during secure IPL.
Signed-off-by Zhuoying Cai <[email protected]>--- pc-bios/s390-ccw/secure-ipl.c | 58 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--- pc-bios/s390-ccw/secure-ipl.h | 15 +++++++++ 2 files changed, 69 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)pc-bios/s390-ccw/secure-ipl.c +7
-0@@ -211,6 +211,49 @@ static void init_lists(IplDeviceComponentList *comp_list, cert_list->ipl_info_header.len =sizeof (cert_list->ipl_info_header); } +static bool is_comp_overlap (SecureIplCompAddrRangeList *range_list, +SecureIplCompEntryInfo comp_entry_info) +{ +uint64_t start_addr; +uint64_t end_addr; + + start_addr = comp_entry_info.addr;
pc-bios/s390-ccw/secure-ipl.c static void init_lists(IplDeviceComponentList *comp_list, · line 230
Quoted 10 lines
pc-bios/s390-ccw/secure-ipl.c +10
-0+ end_addr = comp_entry_info.addr + comp_entry_info.len; + +/* +* Check component's address range does not overlap with any +* signed component's address range. +*/ +for (int i =0 ; i < range_list->index; i++) { +if ((range_list->comp_addr_range[i].start_addr < end_addr && + start_addr < range_list->comp_addr_range[i].end_addr) && + range_list->comp_addr_range[i].is_signed) {
Check 'is_signed' first so that we don't bother with unsigned components.
Quoted 10 lines
pc-bios/s390-ccw/secure-ipl.c +10
-0+return true; + } + } +return false; +} + +static void comp_addr_range_add (SecureIplCompAddrRangeList *range_list, +SecureIplCompEntryInfo comp_entry_info, +bool is_signed) +{
pc-bios/s390-ccw/secure-ipl.c static void init_lists(IplDeviceComponentList *comp_list, · line 250
Quoted 10 lines
pc-bios/s390-ccw/secure-ipl.c +10
-0+uint64_t start_addr; +uint64_t end_addr; + + start_addr = comp_entry_info.addr; + end_addr = comp_entry_info.addr + comp_entry_info.len; + +if (range_list->index >=MAX_CERTIFICATES ) { +zipl_secure_handle ("Component address range update failed due to out-of-range" +" index; Overlapping validation cannot be guaranteed" ); + }
This check can be done before calling. We should break early and stop calling this function once the max is reached.
Quoted 54 lines
pc-bios/s390-ccw/secure-ipl.c +17
-4+ + range_list->comp_addr_range[range_list->index].is_signed = is_signed; + range_list->comp_addr_range[range_list->index].start_addr = start_addr; + range_list->comp_addr_range[range_list->index].end_addr = end_addr; +} +static int zipl_load_signature (ComponentEntry *entry,uint64_t sig_sec) {if (zipl_load_segment (entry, sig_sec) <0 ) {@@ -253,6 +296,7 @@ int zipl_run_secure(ComponentEntry **entry_ptr, uint8_t *tmp_sec)* exists for the certificate). */ int cert_list_table[MAX_CERTIFICATES ] = { [0 ...MAX_CERTIFICATES -1 ] =-1 }; +SecureIplCompAddrRangeList range_list = {0 };int signed_count =0 ;if (!secure_ipl_supported ()) {@@ -282,14 +326,20 @@ int zipl_run_secure(ComponentEntry **entry_ptr, uint8_t *tmp_sec) goto out; } -if (!sig_len) { -break ; - } - comp_entry_info = (SecureIplCompEntryInfo ){0 }; comp_entry_info.addr = comp_addr; comp_entry_info.len = (uint64_t )comp_len; +if (is_comp_overlap (&range_list, comp_entry_info)) { +zipl_secure_handle ("Component addresses overlap" ); + } +comp_addr_range_add (&range_list, comp_entry_info, !!sig_len); + range_list.index +=1 ; + +if (!sig_len) { +break ; + } + verified =verify_signature (comp_entry_info, sig_len, (uint64_t )sig, &cert_len, &cert_table_idx);pc-bios/s390-ccw/secure-ipl.h +4
-0@@ -24,6 +24,21 @@ typedef struct SecureIplCompEntryInfo {uint8_t flags; } SecureIplCompEntryInfo; +typedef struct SecureIplCompAddrRange { + bool is_signed; + uint64_t start_addr; + uint64_t end_addr;
pc-bios/s390-ccw/secure-ipl.h typedef struct SecureIplCompEntryInfo { · line 40
Quoted 10 lines
pc-bios/s390-ccw/secure-ipl.h +10
-0+} SecureIplCompAddrRange; + +/* +* Custom struct for managing a list of secure IPL component address ranges. +* Tracks up to MAX_CERTIFICATES address ranges with an index counter. +*/ +typedef struct SecureIplCompAddrRangeList { +SecureIplCompAddrRange comp_addr_range[MAX_CERTIFICATES ]; +int index; +}SecureIplCompAddrRangeList ;
I don't think 'index' is the correct name for the variable. Something like 'num' would be better, since it is the total number of address ranges, right?
pc-bios/s390-ccw/secure-ipl.h typedef struct SecureIplCompEntryInfo { · line 44
Quoted 4 lines
pc-bios/s390-ccw/secure-ipl.h +1
-0+static inline void zipl_secure_handle (const char *message) {switch (boot_mode) {
Regards,
Jared Rossi
Re: [PATCH v10 20/30] pc-bios/s390-ccw: Add signed component address overlap checks
Quoted 16 lines · Jared Rossi
Quoted 13 lines · Zhuoying Cai
Add address range tracking and overlap checks to ensure that no component overlaps with a signed component during secure IPL.
Signed-off-by Zhuoying Cai <[email protected]>--- pc-bios/s390-ccw/secure-ipl.c | 58 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--- pc-bios/s390-ccw/secure-ipl.h | 15 +++++++++ 2 files changed, 69 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)pc-bios/s390-ccw/secure-ipl.c +0
-0
[...]
Quoted 17 lines
Quoted 17 lines
pc-bios/s390-ccw/secure-ipl.h +9
-0@@ -24,6 +24,21 @@ typedef struct SecureIplCompEntryInfo {uint8_t flags; } SecureIplCompEntryInfo; +typedef struct SecureIplCompAddrRange { +bool is_signed; +uint64_t start_addr; +uint64_t end_addr; +}SecureIplCompAddrRange ; + +/* +* Custom struct for managing a list of secure IPL component address ranges. +* Tracks up to MAX_CERTIFICATES address ranges with an index counter.
Quoted 9 lines
pc-bios/s390-ccw/secure-ipl.h typedef struct SecureIplCompEntryInfo { · line 40
Quoted 5 lines
pc-bios/s390-ccw/secure-ipl.h +5
-0+*/ +typedef struct SecureIplCompAddrRangeList { +SecureIplCompAddrRange comp_addr_range[MAX_CERTIFICATES ]; +int index; +}SecureIplCompAddrRangeList ;I don't think 'index' is the correct name for the variable. Something like 'num' would be better, since it is the total number of address ranges, right?
“index” refers to the index used to access comp_addr_range, but I agree that num could be a better name since it represents the total number of address ranges. I’m happy to rename it if preferred.
Quoted 7 lines
pc-bios/s390-ccw/secure-ipl.h typedef struct SecureIplCompEntryInfo { · line 44
Quoted 4 lines
pc-bios/s390-ccw/secure-ipl.h +1
-0+static inline void zipl_secure_handle (const char *message) {switch (boot_mode) {Regards,
Jared Rossi
Re: [PATCH v10 20/30] pc-bios/s390-ccw: Add signed component address overlap checks
Quoted 44 lines · Zhuoying Cai
Quoted 15 lines · Jared Rossi
Quoted 13 lines · Zhuoying Cai
Add address range tracking and overlap checks to ensure that no component overlaps with a signed component during secure IPL.
Signed-off-by Zhuoying Cai <[email protected]>--- pc-bios/s390-ccw/secure-ipl.c | 58 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--- pc-bios/s390-ccw/secure-ipl.h | 15 +++++++++ 2 files changed, 69 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)pc-bios/s390-ccw/secure-ipl.c +0
-0[...]
Quoted 17 lines
Quoted 17 lines
pc-bios/s390-ccw/secure-ipl.h +9
-0@@ -24,6 +24,21 @@ typedef struct SecureIplCompEntryInfo {uint8_t flags; } SecureIplCompEntryInfo; +typedef struct SecureIplCompAddrRange { +bool is_signed; +uint64_t start_addr; +uint64_t end_addr; +}SecureIplCompAddrRange ; + +/* +* Custom struct for managing a list of secure IPL component address ranges. +* Tracks up to MAX_CERTIFICATES address ranges with an index counter. Quoted 9 lines
pc-bios/s390-ccw/secure-ipl.h typedef struct SecureIplCompEntryInfo { · line 40
Quoted 5 lines
pc-bios/s390-ccw/secure-ipl.h +5
-0+*/ +typedef struct SecureIplCompAddrRangeList { +SecureIplCompAddrRange comp_addr_range[MAX_CERTIFICATES ]; +int index; +}SecureIplCompAddrRangeList ;I don't think 'index' is the correct name for the variable. Something like 'num' would be better, since it is the total number of address ranges, right?
Quoted 3 lines
“index” refers to the index used to access
comp_addr_range, but I agree that num could be a better name since it represents the total number of address ranges. I’m happy to rename it if preferred.
Yes, please do. I think calling it 'num' is more representative of how it is actually being used, e.g. the loop in is_comp_overlap() doesn't loop up until a specific index in the array, it iterates through all elements.
While I'm thinking of it, can you also please change is_comp_overlap() to check_comp_overlap()? Prefixing it with 'is_' sounds a bit weird to me.
Thanks,
Jared Rossi
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 7 lines
pc-bios/s390-ccw/secure-ipl.h typedef struct SecureIplCompEntryInfo { · line 44
Quoted 5 lines
pc-bios/s390-ccw/secure-ipl.h +1
-0+static inline void zipl_secure_handle (const char *message) {switch (boot_mode) {Regards,
Jared Rossi
PATCH v10 21/30 s390x: Guest support for Secure-IPL Code Loading Attributes Facility (SCLAF)
In reply to Zhuoying CaiThe secure-IPL-code-loading-attributes facility (SCLAF) provides additional security during secure IPL.
Availability of SCLAF is determined by byte 136 bit 3 of the SCLP Read Info block.
This feature is available starting with the gen16 CPU model.
--- docs/specs/s390x-secure-ipl.rst | 18 ++++++++++++++++++ target/s390x/cpu_features.c | 2 ++ target/s390x/cpu_features_def.h.inc | 1 + target/s390x/cpu_models.c | 3 +++ target/s390x/gen-features.c | 2 ++ target/s390x/kvm/kvm.c | 1 + 6 files changed, 27 insertions(+)
docs/specs/s390x-secure-ipl.rst +18 -0
@@ -118,3 +118,21 @@ The guest kernel uses the contents in the IIRB for: * Boot logging: reports which components were loaded and verified. * kexec operations: builds the next kernel’s IPL report from the existing one. * Keying: installs IPL certificates into the platform trusted keyring. + +Secure Code Loading Attributes Facility +--------------------------------------- + +The Secure Code Loading Attributes Facility (SCLAF) enhances system security +during the IPL by enforcing additional verification rules. + +When SCLAF is available, its behavior depends on the IPL mode. It introduces +verification of both signed and unsigned components to help ensure that only +authorized code is loaded during the IPL process. Any errors detected by SCLAF +are reported in the IIRB. + +Unsigned components are restricted to load addresses at or above absolute +storage address ``0x2000``. + +Signed components must include a Secure Code Loading Attribute Block (SCLAB), +which is appended at the very end of the component. The SCLAB defines security +attributes for handling the signed code.
target/s390x/cpu_features.c +2 -0
@@ -120,6 +120,7 @@ void s390_fill_feat_block(const S390FeatBitmap features, S390FeatType type,* - All SIE facilities because SIE is not available * - DIAG318 * - Secure IPL Facility +* - Secure IPL Code Loading Attributes Facility * * As VMs can move in and out of protected mode the CPU model * doesn't protect us from that problem because it is only
@@ -152,6 +153,7 @@ void s390_fill_feat_block(const S390FeatBitmap features, S390FeatType type,break ;case S390_FEAT_TYPE_SCLP_FAC_IPL :clear_be_bit (s390_feat_def (S390_FEAT_SIPL )->bit, data); +clear_be_bit (s390_feat_def (S390_FEAT_SCLAF )->bit, data);break ;default :return ;
target/s390x/cpu_features_def.h.inc +1 -0
@@ -142,6 +142,7 @@ DEF_FEAT(CERT_STORE, "cstore", SCLP_FAC134, 5, "Certificate Store functions") /* Features exposed via SCLP SCCB Facilities byte 136 - 137 (bit numbers relative to byte-136) */ DEF_FEAT(SIPL, "sipl", SCLP_FAC_IPL, 1, "Secure-IPL facility") +DEF_FEAT(SCLAF, "sclaf", SCLP_FAC_IPL, 3, "Secure-IPL-code-loading-attributes facility") /* Features exposed via SCLP CPU info. */ DEF_FEAT(SIE_F2, "sief2", SCLP_CPU, 4, "SIE: interception format 2 (Virtual SIE)")
target/s390x/cpu_models.c +3 -0
@@ -264,6 +264,7 @@ bool s390_has_feat(S390Feat feat)case S390_FEAT_SIE_PFMFI :case S390_FEAT_SIE_IBS :case S390_FEAT_SIPL : +case S390_FEAT_SCLAF :case S390_FEAT_CONFIGURATION_TOPOLOGY :return false;break ;
@@ -509,6 +510,8 @@ static void check_consistency(const S390CPUModel *model) { S390_FEAT_DIAG_318, S390_FEAT_EXTENDED_LENGTH_SCCB }, { S390_FEAT_CERT_STORE, S390_FEAT_EXTENDED_LENGTH_SCCB }, { S390_FEAT_SIPL, S390_FEAT_EXTENDED_LENGTH_SCCB }, + { S390_FEAT_SCLAF, S390_FEAT_EXTENDED_LENGTH_SCCB }, + { S390_FEAT_SCLAF, S390_FEAT_SIPL }, { S390_FEAT_NNPA, S390_FEAT_VECTOR }, { S390_FEAT_RDP, S390_FEAT_LOCAL_TLB_CLEARING }, { S390_FEAT_UV_FEAT_AP, S390_FEAT_AP },
target/s390x/gen-features.c +2 -0
@@ -722,6 +722,7 @@ static uint16_t full_GEN16_GA1[] = {S390_FEAT_UV_FEAT_AP_INTR ,S390_FEAT_CERT_STORE ,S390_FEAT_SIPL , + S390_FEAT_SCLAF, }; static uint16_t full_GEN17_GA1[] = {
@@ -924,6 +925,7 @@ static uint16_t qemu_MAX[] = {S390_FEAT_EXTENDED_LENGTH_SCCB ,S390_FEAT_CERT_STORE ,S390_FEAT_SIPL , + S390_FEAT_SCLAF, };/****** END FEATURE DEFS ******/
target/s390x/kvm/kvm.c +1 -0
@@ -2520,6 +2520,7 @@ bool kvm_s390_get_host_cpu_model(S390CPUModel *model, Error **errp)/* Some Secure IPL facilities are emulated by QEMU */ set_bit (S390_FEAT_SIPL , model->features); +set_bit (S390_FEAT_SCLAF , model->features);/* Test for Ultravisor features that influence secure guest behavior */ query_uv_feat_guest (model->features);
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
PATCH v10 22/30 pc-bios/s390-ccw: Add additional security checks for secure boot
In reply to Zhuoying CaiAdd additional checks to ensure that components do not overlap with signed components when loaded into memory.
Add additional checks to ensure the load addresses of unsigned components are greater than or equal to 0x2000.
When the secure IPL code loading attributes facility (SCLAF) is installed, all signed components must contain a secure code loading attributes block (SCLAB).
The SCLAB provides further validation of information on where to load the signed binary code from the load device, and where to start the execution of the loaded OS code.
When SCLAF is installed, its content must be evaluated during secure IPL. However, a missing SCLAB will not be reported in audit mode. The SCALB checking will be skipped in this case.
Add IPL Information Error Indicators (IIEI) and Component Error Indicators (CEI) for IPL Information Report Block (IIRB).
When SCLAF is installed, additional secure boot checks are performed during zipl and store results of verification into IIRB.
--- include/hw/s390x/ipl/qipl.h | 29 +++- pc-bios/s390-ccw/s390-ccw.h | 1 + pc-bios/s390-ccw/sclp.c | 8 + pc-bios/s390-ccw/sclp.h | 1 + pc-bios/s390-ccw/secure-ipl.c | 283 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++- pc-bios/s390-ccw/secure-ipl.h | 49 ++++++ 6 files changed, 365 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
include/hw/s390x/ipl/qipl.h +27 -2
@@ -156,10 +156,20 @@ struct IplInfoReportBlockHeader { };typedef struct IplInfoReportBlockHeader IplInfoReportBlockHeader ; +/* IPL Info Error Indicators */ +#define S390_IIEI_NO_SIGNED_COMP 0x8000/* bit 0 */ +#define S390_IIEI_NO_SCLAB 0x4000/* bit 1 */ +#define S390_IIEI_NO_GLOBAL_SCLAB 0x2000/* bit 2 */ +#define S390_IIEI_MORE_GLOBAL_SCLAB 0x1000/* bit 3 */ +#define S390_IIEI_FOUND_UNSIGNED_COMP 0x800/* bit 4 */ +#define S390_IIEI_MORE_SIGNED_COMP 0x400/* bit 5 */ +struct IplInfoBlockHeader {uint32_t len;uint8_t type; -uint8_t reserved1[11 ]; +uint8_t reserved1[3 ]; +uint16_t iiei; +uint8_t reserved2[6 ]; };typedef struct IplInfoBlockHeader IplInfoBlockHeader ;
@@ -183,13 +193,28 @@ typedef struct IplSignatureCertificateList IplSignatureCertificateList;#define S390_IPL_DEV_COMP_FLAG_SC 0x80#define S390_IPL_DEV_COMP_FLAG_CSV 0x40 +/* IPL Device Component Error Indicators */ +#define S390_CEI_INVALID_SCLAB 0x80000000/* bit 0 */ +#define S390_CEI_INVALID_SCLAB_LEN 0x40000000/* bit 1 */ +#define S390_CEI_INVALID_SCLAB_FORMAT 0x20000000/* bit 2 */ +#define S390_CEI_UNMATCHED_SCLAB_LOAD_ADDR 0x10000000/* bit 3 */ +#define S390_CEI_UNMATCHED_SCLAB_LOAD_PSW 0x8000000/* bit 4 */ +#define S390_CEI_INVALID_LOAD_PSW 0x4000000/* bit 5 */ +#define S390_CEI_NUC_NOT_IN_GLOBAL_SCLA 0x2000000/* bit 6 */ +#define S390_CEI_SCLAB_OLA_NOT_ONE 0x1000000/* bit 7 */ +#define S390_CEI_SC_NOT_IN_GLOBAL_SCLAB 0x800000/* bit 8 */ +#define S390_CEI_SCLAB_LOAD_ADDR_NOT_ZERO 0x400000/* bit 9 */ +#define S390_CEI_SCLAB_LOAD_PSW_NOT_ZERO 0x200000/* bit 10 */ +#define S390_CEI_INVALID_UNSIGNED_ADDR 0x100000/* bit 11 */ +struct IplDeviceComponentEntry {uint64_t addr;uint64_t len;uint8_t flags;uint8_t reserved1[5 ];uint16_t cert_index; -uint8_t reserved2[8 ]; +uint32_t cei; +uint8_t reserved2[4 ]; };typedef struct IplDeviceComponentEntry IplDeviceComponentEntry ;
pc-bios/s390-ccw/s390-ccw.h +1 -0
@@ -82,6 +82,7 @@ void sclp_setup(void);void sclp_get_loadparm_ascii (char *loadparm);bool sclp_is_diag320_on (void );bool sclp_is_sipl_on (void ); +bool sclp_is_sclaf_on (void );int sclp_read (char *str,size_t count);/* bootmap.c */
pc-bios/s390-ccw/sclp.c +8 -0
@@ -150,6 +150,14 @@ bool sclp_is_sipl_on(void)return fac_ipl &SCCB_FAC_IPL_SIPL_BIT ; } +bool sclp_is_sclaf_on (void ) +{ +uint16_t fac_ipl =0 ; + +sclp_get_fac_ipl (&fac_ipl); +return fac_ipl &SCCB_FAC_IPL_SCLAF_BIT ; +} +int sclp_read (char *str,size_t count) {ReadEventData *sccb = (void *)_sccb;
pc-bios/s390-ccw/sclp.h +1 -0
@@ -52,6 +52,7 @@ typedef struct SCCBHeader {#define SCCB_DATA_LEN (SCCB_SIZE - sizeof(SCCBHeader))#define SCCB_FAC134_DIAG320_BIT 0x4#define SCCB_FAC_IPL_SIPL_BIT 0x4000 +#define SCCB_FAC_IPL_SCLAF_BIT 0x1000 typedef struct ReadInfo { SCCBHeader h;
pc-bios/s390-ccw/secure-ipl.c +279 -4
330 lines not on this page · raw message
pc-bios/s390-ccw/secure-ipl.h +49 -0
65 lines not on this page · raw message
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Re: [PATCH v10 22/30] pc-bios/s390-ccw: Add additional security checks for secure boot
Quoted 531 lines · Zhuoying Cai
Add additional checks to ensure that components do not overlap with signed components when loaded into memory.
Add additional checks to ensure the load addresses of unsigned components are greater than or equal to
0x2000.When the secure IPL code loading attributes facility (SCLAF) is installed, all signed components must contain a secure code loading attributes block (SCLAB).
The SCLAB provides further validation of information on where to load the signed binary code from the load device, and where to start the execution of the loaded OS code.
When SCLAF is installed, its content must be evaluated during secure IPL. However, a missing SCLAB will not be reported in audit mode. The SCALB checking will be skipped in this case.
Add IPL Information Error Indicators (IIEI) and Component Error Indicators (CEI) for IPL Information Report Block (IIRB).
When SCLAF is installed, additional secure boot checks are performed during zipl and store results of verification into IIRB.
Signed-off-by Zhuoying Cai <[email protected]>--- include/hw/s390x/ipl/qipl.h | 29 +++- pc-bios/s390-ccw/s390-ccw.h | 1 + pc-bios/s390-ccw/sclp.c | 8 + pc-bios/s390-ccw/sclp.h | 1 + pc-bios/s390-ccw/secure-ipl.c | 283 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++- pc-bios/s390-ccw/secure-ipl.h | 49 ++++++ 6 files changed, 365 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)include/hw/s390x/ipl/qipl.h +27
-2@@ -156,10 +156,20 @@ struct IplInfoReportBlockHeader { };typedef struct IplInfoReportBlockHeader IplInfoReportBlockHeader ; +/* IPL Info Error Indicators */ +#define S390_IIEI_NO_SIGNED_COMP 0x8000/* bit 0 */ +#define S390_IIEI_NO_SCLAB 0x4000/* bit 1 */ +#define S390_IIEI_NO_GLOBAL_SCLAB 0x2000/* bit 2 */ +#define S390_IIEI_MORE_GLOBAL_SCLAB 0x1000/* bit 3 */ +#define S390_IIEI_FOUND_UNSIGNED_COMP 0x800/* bit 4 */ +#define S390_IIEI_MORE_SIGNED_COMP 0x400/* bit 5 */ +struct IplInfoBlockHeader {uint32_t len;uint8_t type; -uint8_t reserved1[11 ]; +uint8_t reserved1[3 ]; +uint16_t iiei; +uint8_t reserved2[6 ]; };typedef struct IplInfoBlockHeader IplInfoBlockHeader ;@@ -183,13 +193,28 @@ typedef struct IplSignatureCertificateList IplSignatureCertificateList;#define S390_IPL_DEV_COMP_FLAG_SC 0x80#define S390_IPL_DEV_COMP_FLAG_CSV 0x40 +/* IPL Device Component Error Indicators */ +#define S390_CEI_INVALID_SCLAB 0x80000000/* bit 0 */ +#define S390_CEI_INVALID_SCLAB_LEN 0x40000000/* bit 1 */ +#define S390_CEI_INVALID_SCLAB_FORMAT 0x20000000/* bit 2 */ +#define S390_CEI_UNMATCHED_SCLAB_LOAD_ADDR 0x10000000/* bit 3 */ +#define S390_CEI_UNMATCHED_SCLAB_LOAD_PSW 0x8000000/* bit 4 */ +#define S390_CEI_INVALID_LOAD_PSW 0x4000000/* bit 5 */ +#define S390_CEI_NUC_NOT_IN_GLOBAL_SCLA 0x2000000/* bit 6 */ +#define S390_CEI_SCLAB_OLA_NOT_ONE 0x1000000/* bit 7 */ +#define S390_CEI_SC_NOT_IN_GLOBAL_SCLAB 0x800000/* bit 8 */ +#define S390_CEI_SCLAB_LOAD_ADDR_NOT_ZERO 0x400000/* bit 9 */ +#define S390_CEI_SCLAB_LOAD_PSW_NOT_ZERO 0x200000/* bit 10 */ +#define S390_CEI_INVALID_UNSIGNED_ADDR 0x100000/* bit 11 */ +struct IplDeviceComponentEntry {uint64_t addr;uint64_t len;uint8_t flags;uint8_t reserved1[5 ];uint16_t cert_index; -uint8_t reserved2[8 ]; +uint32_t cei; +uint8_t reserved2[4 ]; };typedef struct IplDeviceComponentEntry IplDeviceComponentEntry ;pc-bios/s390-ccw/s390-ccw.h +1
-0@@ -82,6 +82,7 @@ void sclp_setup(void);void sclp_get_loadparm_ascii (char *loadparm);bool sclp_is_diag320_on (void );bool sclp_is_sipl_on (void ); +bool sclp_is_sclaf_on (void );int sclp_read (char *str,size_t count);/* bootmap.c */ pc-bios/s390-ccw/sclp.c +8
-0@@ -150,6 +150,14 @@ bool sclp_is_sipl_on(void)return fac_ipl &SCCB_FAC_IPL_SIPL_BIT ; } +bool sclp_is_sclaf_on (void ) +{ +uint16_t fac_ipl =0 ; + +sclp_get_fac_ipl (&fac_ipl); +return fac_ipl &SCCB_FAC_IPL_SCLAF_BIT ; +} +int sclp_read (char *str,size_t count) {ReadEventData *sccb = (void *)_sccb;pc-bios/s390-ccw/sclp.h +1
-0@@ -52,6 +52,7 @@ typedef struct SCCBHeader {#define SCCB_DATA_LEN (SCCB_SIZE - sizeof(SCCBHeader))#define SCCB_FAC134_DIAG320_BIT 0x4#define SCCB_FAC_IPL_SIPL_BIT 0x4000 +#define SCCB_FAC_IPL_SCLAF_BIT 0x1000 typedef struct ReadInfo { SCCBHeader h;pc-bios/s390-ccw/secure-ipl.c +279
-4@@ -134,6 +134,7 @@ static void comp_list_add(IplDeviceComponentList *comp_list, int comp_entry_idx, comp_list->device_entries[comp_entry_idx].addr = comp_entry_info.addr; comp_list->device_entries[comp_entry_idx].len = comp_entry_info.len; + comp_list->device_entries[comp_entry_idx].cei = comp_entry_info.cei; comp_list->device_entries[comp_entry_idx].flags = comp_entry_info.flags;/* cert index field is meaningful only when S390_IPL_DEV_COMP_FLAG_SC is set */ comp_list->device_entries[comp_entry_idx].cert_index = comp_entry_info.cert_index;@@ -198,6 +199,12 @@ static bool secure_ipl_supported(void)return false; } +if (!sclp_is_sclaf_on ()) { +puts ("Secure IPL Code Loading Attributes Facility is not supported by" +" the hypervisor!" ); +return false; + } +return true; }@@ -254,6 +261,259 @@ static void comp_addr_range_add(SecureIplCompAddrRangeList *range_list, range_list->comp_addr_range[range_list->index].end_addr = end_addr; } +static void check_unsigned_addr (SecureIplCompEntryInfo *comp_entry_info) +{ +/* unsigned load address must be greater than or equal to 0x2000 */ + comp_entry_info->cei |=validate_comp_condition ( + comp_entry_info->addr >=S390_SECURE_IPL_UNSIGNED_MIN_ADDR , +S390_CEI_INVALID_UNSIGNED_ADDR , +"Load address is less than 0x2000" ); +} + +static bool check_sclab_presence (uint8_t *sclab_magic,uint32_t *cei_flags) +{ +/* identifies the presence of SCLAB */ +if (magic_match (sclab_magic,ZIPL_MAGIC )) { +return true; + } + + *cei_flags |=S390_CEI_INVALID_SCLAB ; + +/* a missing SCLAB will not be reported in audit mode */ +return false; +} + +static void check_sclab_length (uint16_t sclab_len,uint32_t *cei_flags) +{ + *cei_flags |=validate_comp_condition (sclab_len >=S390_SECURE_IPL_SCLAB_MIN_LEN , +S390_CEI_INVALID_SCLAB_LEN | +S390_CEI_INVALID_SCLAB , +"Invalid SCLAB length" ); +} + +static void check_sclab_format (uint8_t sclab_format,uint32_t *cei_flags) +{ +/* SCLAB format must set to zero, indicating a format-0 SCLAB being used */ + *cei_flags |=validate_comp_condition (sclab_format ==0 , +S390_CEI_INVALID_SCLAB_FORMAT , +"Format-0 SCLAB is not being used" ); +} + +static void check_sclab_opsw (SecureCodeLoadingAttributesBlock *sclab, +SecureIplSclabInfo *sclab_info,uint32_t *cei_flags) +{ +const char *msg; + +if (!(sclab->flags &S390_SECURE_IPL_SCLAB_FLAG_OPSW )) { +/* OPSW = 0 - Load PSW field in SCLAB must contain zeros */ + msg ="Load PSW is not zero when Override PSW bit is zero" ; + *cei_flags |=validate_comp_condition (sclab->load_psw ==0 , +S390_CEI_SCLAB_LOAD_PSW_NOT_ZERO , + msg); + + }else { +/* OPSW = 1 indicating global SCLAB */ + sclab_info->global_count +=1 ; +if (sclab_info->global_count ==1 ) { + sclab_info->global_load_psw = sclab->load_psw; + sclab_info->global_flags = sclab->flags; + } + +/* OLA must set to one */ + msg ="Override Load Address bit is not set to one in the global SCLAB" ; + *cei_flags |=validate_comp_condition ( + sclab->flags &S390_SECURE_IPL_SCLAB_FLAG_OLA , +S390_CEI_SCLAB_OLA_NOT_ONE , msg); + } +} + +static void check_sclab_ola (SecureCodeLoadingAttributesBlock *sclab, +uint64_t load_addr,uint32_t *cei_flags) +{ +const char *msg; + +if (!(sclab->flags &S390_SECURE_IPL_SCLAB_FLAG_OLA )) { +/* OLA = 0 - Load address field in SCLAB must contain zeros */ + msg ="Load Address is not zero when Override Load Address bit is zero" ; + *cei_flags |=validate_comp_condition (sclab->load_addr ==0 , +S390_CEI_SCLAB_LOAD_ADDR_NOT_ZERO , + msg); + }else { +/* OLA = 1 - Load address field must match storage address of the component */ + msg ="Load Address does not match with component load address" ; + *cei_flags |=validate_comp_condition (sclab->load_addr == load_addr, +S390_CEI_UNMATCHED_SCLAB_LOAD_ADDR , + msg); + } +} + +static void check_sclab_nuc (uint16_t sclab_flags,uint32_t *cei_flags) +{ +const char *msg; +bool is_nuc_set; +bool is_global_sclab; + + is_nuc_set = sclab_flags &S390_SECURE_IPL_SCLAB_FLAG_NUC ; + is_global_sclab = sclab_flags &S390_SECURE_IPL_SCLAB_FLAG_OPSW ; + msg ="No Unsigned Components bit is set, but not in the global SCLAB" ; + *cei_flags |=validate_comp_condition (!is_nuc_set || is_global_sclab, +S390_CEI_NUC_NOT_IN_GLOBAL_SCLA , msg); +} + +static void check_sclab_sc (uint16_t sclab_flags,uint32_t *cei_flags) +{ +const char *msg; +bool is_sc_set; +bool is_global_sclab; + + is_sc_set = sclab_flags &S390_SECURE_IPL_SCLAB_FLAG_SC ; + is_global_sclab = sclab_flags &S390_SECURE_IPL_SCLAB_FLAG_OPSW ; + msg ="Single Component bit is set, but not in the global SCLAB" ; + *cei_flags |=validate_comp_condition (!is_sc_set || is_global_sclab, +S390_CEI_SC_NOT_IN_GLOBAL_SCLAB , msg); +} + +static bool is_psw_valid (uint64_t psw,SecureIplCompAddrRangeList *range_list) +{ +uint32_t addr = psw &0x7fffffff ; + +/* PSW points within a signed binary code component */ +for (int i =0 ; i < range_list->index; i++) { +if (range_list->comp_addr_range[i].is_signed && + addr >= range_list->comp_addr_range[i].start_addr && + addr <= range_list->comp_addr_range[i].end_addr -2 ) { +return true; + } + } +return false; +} + +static void check_load_psw (SecureIplCompAddrRangeList *range_list, +uint64_t sclab_load_psw, +SecureIplCompEntryInfo *comp_entry_info) +{ +bool valid; +uint64_t load_psw; + + load_psw = comp_entry_info->addr; + valid =is_psw_valid (sclab_load_psw, range_list) && +is_psw_valid (load_psw, range_list); + comp_entry_info->cei |=validate_comp_condition (valid, +S390_CEI_INVALID_LOAD_PSW , +"Invalid PSW" ); + +/* compare load PSW with the PSW specified in component */ + comp_entry_info->cei |=validate_comp_condition (sclab_load_psw == load_psw, +S390_CEI_UNMATCHED_SCLAB_LOAD_PSW , +"Load PSW does not match with PSW in component" ); +} + +static void check_no_unsigned_comp (SecureIplSclabInfo sclab_info, +IplDeviceComponentList *comp_list) +{ +bool is_nuc_set; + + is_nuc_set = sclab_info.global_flags &S390_SECURE_IPL_SCLAB_FLAG_NUC ; +if (is_nuc_set && sclab_info.unsigned_count >0 ) { + comp_list->ipl_info_header.iiei |=S390_IIEI_FOUND_UNSIGNED_COMP ; +zipl_secure_handle ("Unsigned components are not allowed" ); + } +} + +static void check_single_comp (SecureIplSclabInfo sclab_info, +IplDeviceComponentList *comp_list) +{ +bool is_sc_set; + + is_sc_set = sclab_info.global_flags &S390_SECURE_IPL_SCLAB_FLAG_SC ; +if (is_sc_set && + sclab_info.signed_count !=1 && + sclab_info.unsigned_count >=0 ) { + comp_list->ipl_info_header.iiei |=S390_IIEI_MORE_SIGNED_COMP ; +zipl_secure_handle ("Only one signed component is allowed" ); + } +} + +void check_global_sclab (SecureIplSclabInfo sclab_info, +IplDeviceComponentList *comp_list) +{ +if (sclab_info.count ==0 ) { +return ; + } + +if (sclab_info.global_count ==0 ) { + comp_list->ipl_info_header.iiei |=S390_IIEI_NO_GLOBAL_SCLAB ; +zipl_secure_handle ("Global SCLAB does not exists" ); +return ; + } + +if (sclab_info.global_count >1 ) { + comp_list->ipl_info_header.iiei |=S390_IIEI_MORE_GLOBAL_SCLAB ; +zipl_secure_handle ("More than one global SCLAB" ); +return ; + } + +if (sclab_info.global_flags) { +/* Unsigned components are not allowed if NUC flag is set in the global SCLAB */ +check_no_unsigned_comp (sclab_info, comp_list); + +/* Only one signed component is allowed is SC flag is set in the global SCLAB */ +check_single_comp (sclab_info, comp_list); + } +} + +static void check_has_signed_comp (int signed_count,IplDeviceComponentList *comp_list) +{ +const char *msg; + + msg ="Secure boot is on, but components are not signed" ; + comp_list->ipl_info_header.iiei |= +validate_comp_condition (signed_count >0 , +S390_IIEI_NO_SIGNED_COMP , msg); + +} + +static void check_sclab_count (int count,IplDeviceComponentList *comp_list) +{ + comp_list->ipl_info_header.iiei |= +validate_comp_condition (count >0 ,S390_IIEI_NO_SCLAB , +"No recognizable SCLAB" ); +} + +static void check_sclab (SecureIplCompEntryInfo *comp_entry_info, +SecureIplSclabInfo *sclab_info) +{ +SclabOriginLocator *sclab_locator; +SecureCodeLoadingAttributesBlock *sclab; + +/* sclab locator is located at the last 8 bytes of the signed comp */ + sclab_locator = (SclabOriginLocator *)(comp_entry_info->addr + + comp_entry_info->len -8 ); + +/* return early if sclab does not exist */ +if (!check_sclab_presence (sclab_locator->magic, &comp_entry_info->cei)) { +return ; + } + +check_sclab_length (sclab_locator->len, &comp_entry_info->cei); + +/* return early if sclab is invalid */ +if (comp_entry_info->cei &S390_CEI_INVALID_SCLAB ) { +return ; + } + + sclab_info->count +=1 ; + sclab = (SecureCodeLoadingAttributesBlock *)(comp_entry_info->addr + + comp_entry_info->len - + sclab_locator->len); + +check_sclab_format (sclab->format, &comp_entry_info->cei); +check_sclab_opsw (sclab, sclab_info, &comp_entry_info->cei); +check_sclab_ola (sclab, comp_entry_info->addr, &comp_entry_info->cei); +check_sclab_nuc (sclab->flags, &comp_entry_info->cei); +check_sclab_sc (sclab->flags, &comp_entry_info->cei); +} +static int zipl_load_signature (ComponentEntry *entry,uint64_t sig_sec) {if (zipl_load_segment (entry, sig_sec) <0 ) {@@ -297,7 +557,7 @@ int zipl_run_secure(ComponentEntry **entry_ptr, uint8_t *tmp_sec)*/ int cert_list_table[MAX_CERTIFICATES ] = { [0 ...MAX_CERTIFICATES -1 ] =-1 };SecureIplCompAddrRangeList range_list = {0 }; -int signed_count =0 ; +SecureIplSclabInfo sclab_info = {0 };if (!secure_ipl_supported ()) {panic ("Unable to boot in secure/audit mode" );@@ -337,9 +597,15 @@ int zipl_run_secure(ComponentEntry **entry_ptr, uint8_t *tmp_sec) range_list.index +=1 ;if (!sig_len) { +check_unsigned_addr (&comp_entry_info); +comp_list_add (&comp_list, comp_entry_idx, comp_entry_info); + + sclab_info.unsigned_count +=1 ; + comp_entry_idx++;break ; } +check_sclab (&comp_entry_info, &sclab_info); verified =verify_signature (comp_entry_info, sig_len, (uint64_t )sig, &cert_len, &cert_table_idx);@@ -374,7 +640,7 @@ int zipl_run_secure(ComponentEntry **entry_ptr, uint8_t *tmp_sec) } comp_entry_idx++; - signed_count +=1 ; + sclab_info.signed_count +=1 ;/* After a signature is used another new one can be accepted */ sig_len =0 ;break ;@@ -391,10 +657,19 @@ int zipl_run_secure(ComponentEntry **entry_ptr, uint8_t *tmp_sec) } } -if (signed_count ==0 ) { -zipl_secure_handle ("Secure boot is on, but components are not signed" ); +/* validate load PSW with PSW specified in the final entry */ +if (sclab_info.global_load_psw) { + comp_entry_info = (SecureIplCompEntryInfo ){0 }; + comp_entry_info.addr = entry->compdat.load_psw; + +check_load_psw (&range_list, sclab_info.global_load_psw, &comp_entry_info); +comp_list_add (&comp_list, comp_entry_idx, comp_entry_info); } +check_has_signed_comp (sclab_info.signed_count, &comp_list); +check_sclab_count (sclab_info.count, &comp_list); +check_global_sclab (sclab_info, &comp_list); +update_iirb (&comp_list, &cert_list); *entry_ptr = entry;pc-bios/s390-ccw/secure-ipl.h +38
-0@@ -16,10 +16,47 @@VCStorageSizeBlock *zipl_secure_get_vcssb (void );int zipl_run_secure (ComponentEntry **entry_ptr,uint8_t *tmp_sec); +#define S390_SECURE_IPL_SCLAB_FLAG_OPSW 0x8000 +#define S390_SECURE_IPL_SCLAB_FLAG_OLA 0x4000 +#define S390_SECURE_IPL_SCLAB_FLAG_NUC 0x2000 +#define S390_SECURE_IPL_SCLAB_FLAG_SC 0x1000 + +#define S390_SECURE_IPL_SCLAB_MIN_LEN 32 +#define S390_SECURE_IPL_UNSIGNED_MIN_ADDR 0x2000 + +struct SecureCodeLoadingAttributesBlock { +uint8_t format; +uint8_t reserved1; +uint16_t flags; +uint8_t reserved2[4 ]; +uint64_t load_psw; +uint64_t load_addr; +uint64_t reserved3[]; +} __attribute__ ((packed)); +typedef struct SecureCodeLoadingAttributesBlock SecureCodeLoadingAttributesBlock ; + +struct SclabOriginLocator { +uint8_t reserved[2 ]; +uint16_t len; +uint8_t magic[4 ]; +} __attribute__ ((packed)); +typedef struct SclabOriginLocator SclabOriginLocator ; + +/* Custom struct used to consolidate SCLAB overhead */ +typedef struct SecureIplSclabInfo { +int count; +int global_count; +int signed_count; +int unsigned_count; +uint64_t global_load_psw; +uint16_t global_flags; +}SecureIplSclabInfo ; +/* Custom struct for secure IPL component entry information */ typedef struct SecureIplCompEntryInfo {uint64_t addr;uint64_t len; +uint32_t cei;uint16_t cert_index;uint8_t flags; }SecureIplCompEntryInfo ;@@ -50,6 +87,18 @@ static inline void zipl_secure_handle(const char *message) } } +static inline uint32_t validate_comp_condition(bool condition, uint32_t flag,
pc-bios/s390-ccw/secure-ipl.h static inline void zipl_secure_handle(const char *message) · line 100
Quoted 10 lines
pc-bios/s390-ccw/secure-ipl.h +10
-0+ const char *message) + +{ +if (condition) { +return 0 ; + } + +zipl_secure_handle (message); +return flag; +}
This isn't what I had in mind. Let's look at the following functions:
check_sclab_countcheck_has_signed_compcheck_sclab_format
and a few others.
Instead of defining a separate function for each check, I was thinking of using a single assert-style function in their place entirely, e.g.:
Instead of calling:
check_sclab_count(sclab_info.count, &comp_list);
You could change the function closer to what you had previously with v9's set_comp_cei_with_log:
``` validate_comp(sclab_info.count > 0, &comp_list->ipl_info_header.iiei, S390_IIEI_NO_SCLAB, "No recognizable SCLAB"); ```
Inside the function is just:
```
if (!condition) {
*flags |= flag;
zipl_secure_handle(msg);
}
```Use this function inplace of all checks that would conditionally set the cei/iiei flags and report an error message.
Again, the idea is to just simplify the code for a patch that implements a somewhat complex s390x concept. Aside from any checks that require more work than just a simple check, I'd suggest using this single function.
Quoted 4 lines
pc-bios/s390-ccw/secure-ipl.h +1
-0+static inline uint64_t diag320 (void *data,unsigned long subcode) { register unsigned long addr asm("0") = (unsigned long)data;
Signature · 2 lines
Regards, Collin
Re: [PATCH v10 22/30] pc-bios/s390-ccw: Add additional security checks for secure boot
Quoted 4 lines · Collin Walling
``` validate_comp(sclab_info.count > 0, &comp_list->ipl_info_header.iiei, S390_IIEI_NO_SCLAB, "No recognizable SCLAB"); ```
On second thought, calling this zipl_secure_validate or something might look better. It follows the naming scheme of zipl_secure_handle which conditionally resumes/aborts based on the boot mode.
Signature · 2 lines
Regards, Collin
Re: [PATCH v10 22/30] pc-bios/s390-ccw: Add additional security checks for secure boot
In reply to Zhuoying CaiQuoted 108 lines · Zhuoying Cai
Add additional checks to ensure that components do not overlap with signed components when loaded into memory.
Add additional checks to ensure the load addresses of unsigned components are greater than or equal to
0x2000.When the secure IPL code loading attributes facility (SCLAF) is installed, all signed components must contain a secure code loading attributes block (SCLAB).
The SCLAB provides further validation of information on where to load the signed binary code from the load device, and where to start the execution of the loaded OS code.
When SCLAF is installed, its content must be evaluated during secure IPL. However, a missing SCLAB will not be reported in audit mode. The SCALB checking will be skipped in this case.
Add IPL Information Error Indicators (IIEI) and Component Error Indicators (CEI) for IPL Information Report Block (IIRB).
When SCLAF is installed, additional secure boot checks are performed during zipl and store results of verification into IIRB.
Signed-off-by Zhuoying Cai <[email protected]>--- include/hw/s390x/ipl/qipl.h | 29 +++- pc-bios/s390-ccw/s390-ccw.h | 1 + pc-bios/s390-ccw/sclp.c | 8 + pc-bios/s390-ccw/sclp.h | 1 + pc-bios/s390-ccw/secure-ipl.c | 283 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++- pc-bios/s390-ccw/secure-ipl.h | 49 ++++++ 6 files changed, 365 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)include/hw/s390x/ipl/qipl.h +27
-2@@ -156,10 +156,20 @@ struct IplInfoReportBlockHeader { };typedef struct IplInfoReportBlockHeader IplInfoReportBlockHeader ; +/* IPL Info Error Indicators */ +#define S390_IIEI_NO_SIGNED_COMP 0x8000/* bit 0 */ +#define S390_IIEI_NO_SCLAB 0x4000/* bit 1 */ +#define S390_IIEI_NO_GLOBAL_SCLAB 0x2000/* bit 2 */ +#define S390_IIEI_MORE_GLOBAL_SCLAB 0x1000/* bit 3 */ +#define S390_IIEI_FOUND_UNSIGNED_COMP 0x800/* bit 4 */ +#define S390_IIEI_MORE_SIGNED_COMP 0x400/* bit 5 */ +struct IplInfoBlockHeader {uint32_t len;uint8_t type; -uint8_t reserved1[11 ]; +uint8_t reserved1[3 ]; +uint16_t iiei; +uint8_t reserved2[6 ]; };typedef struct IplInfoBlockHeader IplInfoBlockHeader ;@@ -183,13 +193,28 @@ typedef struct IplSignatureCertificateList IplSignatureCertificateList;#define S390_IPL_DEV_COMP_FLAG_SC 0x80#define S390_IPL_DEV_COMP_FLAG_CSV 0x40 +/* IPL Device Component Error Indicators */ +#define S390_CEI_INVALID_SCLAB 0x80000000/* bit 0 */ +#define S390_CEI_INVALID_SCLAB_LEN 0x40000000/* bit 1 */ +#define S390_CEI_INVALID_SCLAB_FORMAT 0x20000000/* bit 2 */ +#define S390_CEI_UNMATCHED_SCLAB_LOAD_ADDR 0x10000000/* bit 3 */ +#define S390_CEI_UNMATCHED_SCLAB_LOAD_PSW 0x8000000/* bit 4 */ +#define S390_CEI_INVALID_LOAD_PSW 0x4000000/* bit 5 */ +#define S390_CEI_NUC_NOT_IN_GLOBAL_SCLA 0x2000000/* bit 6 */ +#define S390_CEI_SCLAB_OLA_NOT_ONE 0x1000000/* bit 7 */ +#define S390_CEI_SC_NOT_IN_GLOBAL_SCLAB 0x800000/* bit 8 */ +#define S390_CEI_SCLAB_LOAD_ADDR_NOT_ZERO 0x400000/* bit 9 */ +#define S390_CEI_SCLAB_LOAD_PSW_NOT_ZERO 0x200000/* bit 10 */ +#define S390_CEI_INVALID_UNSIGNED_ADDR 0x100000/* bit 11 */ +struct IplDeviceComponentEntry {uint64_t addr;uint64_t len;uint8_t flags;uint8_t reserved1[5 ];uint16_t cert_index; -uint8_t reserved2[8 ]; +uint32_t cei; +uint8_t reserved2[4 ]; };typedef struct IplDeviceComponentEntry IplDeviceComponentEntry ;pc-bios/s390-ccw/s390-ccw.h +1
-0@@ -82,6 +82,7 @@ void sclp_setup(void);void sclp_get_loadparm_ascii (char *loadparm);bool sclp_is_diag320_on (void );bool sclp_is_sipl_on (void ); +bool sclp_is_sclaf_on (void );int sclp_read (char *str,size_t count);/* bootmap.c */ pc-bios/s390-ccw/sclp.c +0
-0@@ -150,6 +150,14 @@ bool sclp_is_sipl_on(void)return fac_ipl &SCCB_FAC_IPL_SIPL_BIT ;
pc-bios/s390-ccw/sclp.c bool sclp_is_sipl_on(void) · line 160
Quoted 10 lines
pc-bios/s390-ccw/sclp.c +8
-0} +bool sclp_is_sclaf_on (void ) +{ +uint16_t fac_ipl =0 ; + +sclp_get_fac_ipl (&fac_ipl); +return fac_ipl &SCCB_FAC_IPL_SCLAF_BIT ; +} +
Could sclp_get_fac_ipl() be reworked to instead take the FLAGS as a parameter and then return the result of sccb->fac_ipl & FLAGS? That way we wouldn't need a wrapper to check the bits.
Quoted 145 lines
pc-bios/s390-ccw/sclp.c +0
-0int sclp_read (char *str,size_t count) {ReadEventData *sccb = (void *)_sccb;pc-bios/s390-ccw/sclp.h +1
-0@@ -52,6 +52,7 @@ typedef struct SCCBHeader {#define SCCB_DATA_LEN (SCCB_SIZE - sizeof(SCCBHeader))#define SCCB_FAC134_DIAG320_BIT 0x4#define SCCB_FAC_IPL_SIPL_BIT 0x4000 +#define SCCB_FAC_IPL_SCLAF_BIT 0x1000 typedef struct ReadInfo { SCCBHeader h;pc-bios/s390-ccw/secure-ipl.c +108
-0@@ -134,6 +134,7 @@ static void comp_list_add(IplDeviceComponentList *comp_list, int comp_entry_idx, comp_list->device_entries[comp_entry_idx].addr = comp_entry_info.addr; comp_list->device_entries[comp_entry_idx].len = comp_entry_info.len; + comp_list->device_entries[comp_entry_idx].cei = comp_entry_info.cei; comp_list->device_entries[comp_entry_idx].flags = comp_entry_info.flags;/* cert index field is meaningful only when S390_IPL_DEV_COMP_FLAG_SC is set */ comp_list->device_entries[comp_entry_idx].cert_index = comp_entry_info.cert_index;@@ -198,6 +199,12 @@ static bool secure_ipl_supported(void)return false; } +if (!sclp_is_sclaf_on ()) { +puts ("Secure IPL Code Loading Attributes Facility is not supported by" +" the hypervisor!" ); +return false; + } +return true; }@@ -254,6 +261,259 @@ static void comp_addr_range_add(SecureIplCompAddrRangeList *range_list, range_list->comp_addr_range[range_list->index].end_addr = end_addr; } +static void check_unsigned_addr (SecureIplCompEntryInfo *comp_entry_info) +{ +/* unsigned load address must be greater than or equal to 0x2000 */ + comp_entry_info->cei |=validate_comp_condition ( + comp_entry_info->addr >=S390_SECURE_IPL_UNSIGNED_MIN_ADDR , +S390_CEI_INVALID_UNSIGNED_ADDR , +"Load address is less than 0x2000" ); +} + +static bool check_sclab_presence (uint8_t *sclab_magic,uint32_t *cei_flags) +{ +/* identifies the presence of SCLAB */ +if (magic_match (sclab_magic,ZIPL_MAGIC )) { +return true; + } + + *cei_flags |=S390_CEI_INVALID_SCLAB ; + +/* a missing SCLAB will not be reported in audit mode */ +return false; +} + +static void check_sclab_length (uint16_t sclab_len,uint32_t *cei_flags) +{ + *cei_flags |=validate_comp_condition (sclab_len >=S390_SECURE_IPL_SCLAB_MIN_LEN , +S390_CEI_INVALID_SCLAB_LEN | +S390_CEI_INVALID_SCLAB , +"Invalid SCLAB length" ); +} + +static void check_sclab_format (uint8_t sclab_format,uint32_t *cei_flags) +{ +/* SCLAB format must set to zero, indicating a format-0 SCLAB being used */ + *cei_flags |=validate_comp_condition (sclab_format ==0 , +S390_CEI_INVALID_SCLAB_FORMAT , +"Format-0 SCLAB is not being used" ); +} + +static void check_sclab_opsw (SecureCodeLoadingAttributesBlock *sclab, +SecureIplSclabInfo *sclab_info,uint32_t *cei_flags) +{ +const char *msg; + +if (!(sclab->flags &S390_SECURE_IPL_SCLAB_FLAG_OPSW )) { +/* OPSW = 0 - Load PSW field in SCLAB must contain zeros */ + msg ="Load PSW is not zero when Override PSW bit is zero" ; + *cei_flags |=validate_comp_condition (sclab->load_psw ==0 , +S390_CEI_SCLAB_LOAD_PSW_NOT_ZERO , + msg); + + }else { +/* OPSW = 1 indicating global SCLAB */ + sclab_info->global_count +=1 ; +if (sclab_info->global_count ==1 ) { + sclab_info->global_load_psw = sclab->load_psw; + sclab_info->global_flags = sclab->flags; + } + +/* OLA must set to one */ + msg ="Override Load Address bit is not set to one in the global SCLAB" ; + *cei_flags |=validate_comp_condition ( + sclab->flags &S390_SECURE_IPL_SCLAB_FLAG_OLA , +S390_CEI_SCLAB_OLA_NOT_ONE , msg); + } +} + +static void check_sclab_ola (SecureCodeLoadingAttributesBlock *sclab, +uint64_t load_addr,uint32_t *cei_flags) +{ +const char *msg; + +if (!(sclab->flags &S390_SECURE_IPL_SCLAB_FLAG_OLA )) { +/* OLA = 0 - Load address field in SCLAB must contain zeros */ + msg ="Load Address is not zero when Override Load Address bit is zero" ; + *cei_flags |=validate_comp_condition (sclab->load_addr ==0 , +S390_CEI_SCLAB_LOAD_ADDR_NOT_ZERO , + msg); + }else { +/* OLA = 1 - Load address field must match storage address of the component */ + msg ="Load Address does not match with component load address" ; + *cei_flags |=validate_comp_condition (sclab->load_addr == load_addr, +S390_CEI_UNMATCHED_SCLAB_LOAD_ADDR , + msg); + } +} + +static void check_sclab_nuc (uint16_t sclab_flags,uint32_t *cei_flags) +{ +const char *msg; +bool is_nuc_set; +bool is_global_sclab; + + is_nuc_set = sclab_flags &S390_SECURE_IPL_SCLAB_FLAG_NUC ; + is_global_sclab = sclab_flags &S390_SECURE_IPL_SCLAB_FLAG_OPSW ; + msg ="No Unsigned Components bit is set, but not in the global SCLAB" ; + *cei_flags |=validate_comp_condition (!is_nuc_set || is_global_sclab, +S390_CEI_NUC_NOT_IN_GLOBAL_SCLA , msg); +} + +static void check_sclab_sc (uint16_t sclab_flags,uint32_t *cei_flags) +{
pc-bios/s390-ccw/secure-ipl.c static void comp_addr_range_add(SecureIplCompAddrRangeList *range_list, · line 374
Quoted 10 lines
pc-bios/s390-ccw/secure-ipl.c +10
-0+const char *msg; +bool is_sc_set; +bool is_global_sclab; + + is_sc_set = sclab_flags &S390_SECURE_IPL_SCLAB_FLAG_SC ; + is_global_sclab = sclab_flags &S390_SECURE_IPL_SCLAB_FLAG_OPSW ; + msg ="Single Component bit is set, but not in the global SCLAB" ; + *cei_flags |=validate_comp_condition (!is_sc_set || is_global_sclab, +S390_CEI_SC_NOT_IN_GLOBAL_SCLAB , msg); +}
See comment below about how the flags are defined.
These checks seem unnecessarily complicated. I think the whole SCLAB validation process could be distilled into one function that does the checks inline.
e.g. (untested)
if (~sclab_flags & S390_SCLAB_SC || sclab_flags & S390_SCLAB_OPSW) { zipl_secure_handle("SC bit is set, but not in the global SCLAB"); cei_flags |= S390_CEI_SC_NOT_IN_GLOBAL_SCLAB;
}
etc...
It would be a fairly long series of if statements, but I don't see much benefit to wrapping them in layers of function calls.
Quoted 97 lines
pc-bios/s390-ccw/secure-ipl.c +97
-0+ +static bool is_psw_valid (uint64_t psw,SecureIplCompAddrRangeList *range_list) +{ +uint32_t addr = psw &0x7fffffff ; + +/* PSW points within a signed binary code component */ +for (int i =0 ; i < range_list->index; i++) { +if (range_list->comp_addr_range[i].is_signed && + addr >= range_list->comp_addr_range[i].start_addr && + addr <= range_list->comp_addr_range[i].end_addr -2 ) { +return true; + } + } +return false; +} + +static void check_load_psw (SecureIplCompAddrRangeList *range_list, +uint64_t sclab_load_psw, +SecureIplCompEntryInfo *comp_entry_info) +{ +bool valid; +uint64_t load_psw; + + load_psw = comp_entry_info->addr; + valid =is_psw_valid (sclab_load_psw, range_list) && +is_psw_valid (load_psw, range_list); + comp_entry_info->cei |=validate_comp_condition (valid, +S390_CEI_INVALID_LOAD_PSW , +"Invalid PSW" ); + +/* compare load PSW with the PSW specified in component */ + comp_entry_info->cei |=validate_comp_condition (sclab_load_psw == load_psw, +S390_CEI_UNMATCHED_SCLAB_LOAD_PSW , +"Load PSW does not match with PSW in component" ); +} + +static void check_no_unsigned_comp (SecureIplSclabInfo sclab_info, +IplDeviceComponentList *comp_list) +{ +bool is_nuc_set; + + is_nuc_set = sclab_info.global_flags &S390_SECURE_IPL_SCLAB_FLAG_NUC ; +if (is_nuc_set && sclab_info.unsigned_count >0 ) { + comp_list->ipl_info_header.iiei |=S390_IIEI_FOUND_UNSIGNED_COMP ; +zipl_secure_handle ("Unsigned components are not allowed" ); + } +} + +static void check_single_comp (SecureIplSclabInfo sclab_info, +IplDeviceComponentList *comp_list) +{ +bool is_sc_set; + + is_sc_set = sclab_info.global_flags &S390_SECURE_IPL_SCLAB_FLAG_SC ; +if (is_sc_set && + sclab_info.signed_count !=1 && + sclab_info.unsigned_count >=0 ) { + comp_list->ipl_info_header.iiei |=S390_IIEI_MORE_SIGNED_COMP ; +zipl_secure_handle ("Only one signed component is allowed" ); + } +} + +void check_global_sclab (SecureIplSclabInfo sclab_info, +IplDeviceComponentList *comp_list) +{ +if (sclab_info.count ==0 ) { +return ; + } + +if (sclab_info.global_count ==0 ) { + comp_list->ipl_info_header.iiei |=S390_IIEI_NO_GLOBAL_SCLAB ; +zipl_secure_handle ("Global SCLAB does not exists" ); +return ; + } + +if (sclab_info.global_count >1 ) { + comp_list->ipl_info_header.iiei |=S390_IIEI_MORE_GLOBAL_SCLAB ; +zipl_secure_handle ("More than one global SCLAB" ); +return ; + } + +if (sclab_info.global_flags) { +/* Unsigned components are not allowed if NUC flag is set in the global SCLAB */ +check_no_unsigned_comp (sclab_info, comp_list); + +/* Only one signed component is allowed is SC flag is set in the global SCLAB */ +check_single_comp (sclab_info, comp_list); + } +} + +static void check_has_signed_comp (int signed_count,IplDeviceComponentList *comp_list) +{ +const char *msg; + + msg ="Secure boot is on, but components are not signed" ; + comp_list->ipl_info_header.iiei |= + validate_comp_condition(signed_count > 0,
pc-bios/s390-ccw/secure-ipl.c static void comp_addr_range_add(SecureIplCompAddrRangeList *range_list, · line 481
Quoted 10 lines
pc-bios/s390-ccw/secure-ipl.c +10
-0+ S390_IIEI_NO_SIGNED_COMP, msg); + +} + +static void check_sclab_count (int count,IplDeviceComponentList *comp_list) +{ + comp_list->ipl_info_header.iiei |= +validate_comp_condition (count >0 ,S390_IIEI_NO_SCLAB , +"No recognizable SCLAB" ); +}
See above comments on the other check_sclab_* functions. These types of wrappers don't seem necessary to me.
Quoted 99 lines
pc-bios/s390-ccw/secure-ipl.c +54
-4+ +static void check_sclab (SecureIplCompEntryInfo *comp_entry_info, +SecureIplSclabInfo *sclab_info) +{ +SclabOriginLocator *sclab_locator; +SecureCodeLoadingAttributesBlock *sclab; + +/* sclab locator is located at the last 8 bytes of the signed comp */ + sclab_locator = (SclabOriginLocator *)(comp_entry_info->addr + + comp_entry_info->len -8 ); + +/* return early if sclab does not exist */ +if (!check_sclab_presence (sclab_locator->magic, &comp_entry_info->cei)) { +return ; + } + +check_sclab_length (sclab_locator->len, &comp_entry_info->cei); + +/* return early if sclab is invalid */ +if (comp_entry_info->cei &S390_CEI_INVALID_SCLAB ) { +return ; + } + + sclab_info->count +=1 ; + sclab = (SecureCodeLoadingAttributesBlock *)(comp_entry_info->addr + + comp_entry_info->len - + sclab_locator->len); + +check_sclab_format (sclab->format, &comp_entry_info->cei); +check_sclab_opsw (sclab, sclab_info, &comp_entry_info->cei); +check_sclab_ola (sclab, comp_entry_info->addr, &comp_entry_info->cei); +check_sclab_nuc (sclab->flags, &comp_entry_info->cei); +check_sclab_sc (sclab->flags, &comp_entry_info->cei); +} +static int zipl_load_signature (ComponentEntry *entry,uint64_t sig_sec) {if (zipl_load_segment (entry, sig_sec) <0 ) {@@ -297,7 +557,7 @@ int zipl_run_secure(ComponentEntry **entry_ptr, uint8_t *tmp_sec)*/ int cert_list_table[MAX_CERTIFICATES ] = { [0 ...MAX_CERTIFICATES -1 ] =-1 };SecureIplCompAddrRangeList range_list = {0 }; -int signed_count =0 ; +SecureIplSclabInfo sclab_info = {0 };if (!secure_ipl_supported ()) {panic ("Unable to boot in secure/audit mode" );@@ -337,9 +597,15 @@ int zipl_run_secure(ComponentEntry **entry_ptr, uint8_t *tmp_sec) range_list.index +=1 ;if (!sig_len) { +check_unsigned_addr (&comp_entry_info); +comp_list_add (&comp_list, comp_entry_idx, comp_entry_info); + + sclab_info.unsigned_count +=1 ; + comp_entry_idx++;break ; } +check_sclab (&comp_entry_info, &sclab_info); verified =verify_signature (comp_entry_info, sig_len, (uint64_t )sig, &cert_len, &cert_table_idx);@@ -374,7 +640,7 @@ int zipl_run_secure(ComponentEntry **entry_ptr, uint8_t *tmp_sec) } comp_entry_idx++; - signed_count +=1 ; + sclab_info.signed_count +=1 ;/* After a signature is used another new one can be accepted */ sig_len =0 ;break ;@@ -391,10 +657,19 @@ int zipl_run_secure(ComponentEntry **entry_ptr, uint8_t *tmp_sec) } } -if (signed_count ==0 ) { -zipl_secure_handle ("Secure boot is on, but components are not signed" ); +/* validate load PSW with PSW specified in the final entry */ +if (sclab_info.global_load_psw) { + comp_entry_info = (SecureIplCompEntryInfo ){0 }; + comp_entry_info.addr = entry->compdat.load_psw; + +check_load_psw (&range_list, sclab_info.global_load_psw, &comp_entry_info); +comp_list_add (&comp_list, comp_entry_idx, comp_entry_info); } +check_has_signed_comp (sclab_info.signed_count, &comp_list); +check_sclab_count (sclab_info.count, &comp_list); +check_global_sclab (sclab_info, &comp_list); +update_iirb (&comp_list, &cert_list); *entry_ptr = entry;pc-bios/s390-ccw/secure-ipl.h +0
-0
pc-bios/s390-ccw/secure-ipl.h line 22
Quoted 7 lines
pc-bios/s390-ccw/secure-ipl.h +4
-0@@ -16,10 +16,47 @@VCStorageSizeBlock *zipl_secure_get_vcssb (void );int zipl_run_secure (ComponentEntry **entry_ptr,uint8_t *tmp_sec); +#define S390_SECURE_IPL_SCLAB_FLAG_OPSW 0x8000 +#define S390_SECURE_IPL_SCLAB_FLAG_OLA 0x4000 +#define S390_SECURE_IPL_SCLAB_FLAG_NUC 0x2000 +#define S390_SECURE_IPL_SCLAB_FLAG_SC 0x1000
In my opinion these should be shortened to, e.g.
S390_SCLAB_SC 0x1000 /* single component flag */
This would make using them for bitwise operations much more manageable.
Add a comment for what each flag/acronym stands for.
Quoted 4 lines
pc-bios/s390-ccw/secure-ipl.h +4
-0+ +#define S390_SECURE_IPL_SCLAB_MIN_LEN 32 +#define S390_SECURE_IPL_UNSIGNED_MIN_ADDR 0x2000 +
pc-bios/s390-ccw/secure-ipl.h line 36
Quoted 10 lines
pc-bios/s390-ccw/secure-ipl.h +10
-0+struct SecureCodeLoadingAttributesBlock { +uint8_t format; +uint8_t reserved1; +uint16_t flags; +uint8_t reserved2[4 ]; +uint64_t load_psw; +uint64_t load_addr; +uint64_t reserved3[]; +} __attribute__ ((packed)); +typedef struct SecureCodeLoadingAttributesBlock SecureCodeLoadingAttributesBlock ;
This is kind of ugly. Maybe SclaBlock? SCLoadAttrBlock? Just include a comment with the full name.
Quoted 35 lines
pc-bios/s390-ccw/secure-ipl.h +24
-0+ +struct SclabOriginLocator { +uint8_t reserved[2 ]; +uint16_t len; +uint8_t magic[4 ]; +} __attribute__ ((packed)); +typedef struct SclabOriginLocator SclabOriginLocator ; + +/* Custom struct used to consolidate SCLAB overhead */ +typedef struct SecureIplSclabInfo { +int count; +int global_count; +int signed_count; +int unsigned_count; +uint64_t global_load_psw; +uint16_t global_flags; +}SecureIplSclabInfo ; +/* Custom struct for secure IPL component entry information */ typedef struct SecureIplCompEntryInfo {uint64_t addr;uint64_t len; +uint32_t cei;uint16_t cert_index;uint8_t flags; }SecureIplCompEntryInfo ;@@ -50,6 +87,18 @@ static inline void zipl_secure_handle(const char *message) } } +static inline uint32_t validate_comp_condition (bool condition,uint32_t flag, +const char *message) + +{ +if (condition) {
pc-bios/s390-ccw/secure-ipl.h static inline void zipl_secure_handle(const char *message) · line 104
Quoted 10 lines
pc-bios/s390-ccw/secure-ipl.h +7
-0+return 0 ; + } + +zipl_secure_handle (message); +return flag; +} +static inline uint64_t diag320 (void *data,unsigned long subcode) { register unsigned long addr asm("0") = (unsigned long)data;
Regards,
Jared Rossi
PATCH v10 23/30 Add secure-boot to s390-ccw-virtio machine type option
In reply to Zhuoying CaiAdd secure-boot as a parameter of s390-ccw-virtio machine type option.
The secure-boot=on|off parameter is implemented to enable secure IPL.
By default, secure-boot is set to false if not specified in the command line.
--- docs/system/s390x/secure-ipl.rst | 22 +++++++++++++++++----- hw/s390x/s390-virtio-ccw.c | 22 ++++++++++++++++++++++ include/hw/s390x/s390-virtio-ccw.h | 1 + qemu-options.hx | 6 +++++- 4 files changed, 45 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
docs/system/s390x/secure-ipl.rst +17 -5
@@ -19,19 +19,31 @@ Note: certificate files must have a .pem extension. qemu-system-s390x -machine s390-ccw-virtio,boot-certs.0.path=/.../qemu/certs,boot-certs.1.path=/another/path/cert.pem ... +Enabling Secure IPL +------------------- + +Secure IPL is enabled by explicitly setting ``secure-boot=on``; if not +specified, secure boot is considered off. + +.. code-block:: shell + + qemu-system-s390x -machine s390-ccw-virtio,secure-boot=on|off + IPL Modes ========= Multiple IPL modes are available to differentiate between the various IPL -configurations. These modes are mutually exclusive and enabled based on the -``boot-certs`` option on the QEMU command line. +configurations. These modes are mutually exclusive and enabled based on specific +combinations of the ``secure-boot`` and ``boot-certs`` options on the QEMU +command line. Normal Mode ----------- -The absence of certificates will attempt to IPL a guest without secure IPL -operations. No checks are performed, and no warnings/errors are reported. -This is the default mode. +The absence of both certificates and the ``secure-boot`` option will attempt to +IPL a guest without secure IPL operations. No checks are performed, and no +warnings/errors are reported. This is the default mode, and can be explicitly +enabled with ``secure-boot=off``. Configuration:
hw/s390x/s390-virtio-ccw.c +22 -0
@@ -813,6 +813,21 @@ static void machine_set_boot_certs(Object *obj, Visitor *v, const char *name, ms->boot_certs = cert_list; } +static inline bool machine_get_secure_boot (Object *obj,Error **errp) +{ +S390CcwMachineState *ms =S390_CCW_MACHINE (obj); + +return ms->secure_boot; +} + +static inline void machine_set_secure_boot (Object *obj,bool value, +Error **errp) +{ +S390CcwMachineState *ms =S390_CCW_MACHINE (obj); + + ms->secure_boot = value; +} +static void ccw_machine_class_init (ObjectClass *oc,const void *data) {MachineClass *mc =MACHINE_CLASS (oc);
@@ -871,6 +886,13 @@ static void ccw_machine_class_init(ObjectClass *oc, const void *data) machine_get_boot_certs, machine_set_boot_certs, NULL, NULL);object_class_property_set_description (oc,"boot-certs" ,"provide paths to a directory and/or a certificate file for secure boot" ); + +object_class_property_add_bool (oc,"secure-boot" , + machine_get_secure_boot, + machine_set_secure_boot); +object_class_property_set_description (oc,"secure-boot" , +"enable/disable secure boot" ); + }static inline void s390_machine_initfn (Object *obj)
include/hw/s390x/s390-virtio-ccw.h +1 -0
@@ -29,6 +29,7 @@ struct S390CcwMachineState {bool aes_key_wrap;bool dea_key_wrap;bool pv; +bool secure_boot;uint8_t loadparm[8 ];uint64_t memory_limit;uint64_t max_pagesize;
qemu-options.hx +5 -1
@@ -46,7 +46,8 @@ DEF("machine", HAS_ARG, QEMU_OPTION_machine, \ " cxl-fmw.0.targets.0=firsttarget,cxl-fmw.0.targets.1=secondtarget,cxl-fmw.0.size=size[,cxl-fmw.0.interleave-granularity=granularity]\n" " sgx-epc.0.memdev=memid,sgx-epc.0.node=numaid\n" " smp-cache.0.cache=cachename,smp-cache.0.topology=topologylevel\n" - " boot-certs.0.path=/path/directory,boot-certs.1.path=/path/file provides paths to a directory and/or a certificate file\n", + " boot-certs.0.path=/path/directory,boot-certs.1.path=/path/file provides paths to a directory and/or a certificate file\n" + " secure-boot=on|off enable/disable secure boot (default=off) \n", QEMU_ARCH_ALL) SRST ``-machine [type=]name[,prop=value[,...]]``
@@ -213,6 +214,9 @@ SRST ``boot-certs.0.path=/path/directory,boot-certs.1.path=/path/file`` Provide paths to a directory and/or a certificate file on the host [s390x only]. + + ``secure-boot=on|off`` + Enables or disables secure boot on s390-ccw guest. The default is off. ERST DEF("M", HAS_ARG, QEMU_OPTION_M,
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
PATCH v10 24/30 hw/s390x/ipl: Set IPIB flags for secure IPL
In reply to Zhuoying CaiIf -M secure-boot=on is specified on the command line option, indicating true secure IPL enabled, set Secure-IPL bit and IPL-Information-Report bit on in IPIB Flags field, and trigger true secure IPL in the S390 BIOS.
Any error that occurs during true secure IPL will cause the IPL to terminate.
--- hw/s390x/ipl.c | 19 ++++++++++++++++++- 1 file changed, 18 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
hw/s390x/ipl.c +18 -1
@@ -468,6 +468,11 @@ static bool s390_has_certificate(void)return ipl->cert_store.count >0 ; } +static bool s390_secure_boot_enabled (void ) +{ +return S390_CCW_MACHINE (qdev_get_machine ())->secure_boot; +} +static bool s390_build_iplb (DeviceState *dev_st,IplParameterBlock *iplb) {CcwDevice *ccw_dev =NULL ;
@@ -524,6 +529,18 @@ static bool s390_build_iplb(DeviceState *dev_st, IplParameterBlock *iplb)s390_ipl_convert_loadparm ((char *)lp, iplb->loadparm); iplb->flags |=DIAG308_FLAGS_LP_VALID ; +/* +* If secure-boot is enabled, then toggle the secure IPL flags to +* trigger secure boot in the s390 BIOS. +* +* Boot process will terminate if any error occurs during secure boot. +* +* If SIPL is on, IPLIR must also be on. +*/ +if (s390_secure_boot_enabled ()) { + iplb->hdr_flags |= (DIAG308_IPIB_FLAGS_SIPL |DIAG308_IPIB_FLAGS_IPLIR ); + iplb->len =cpu_to_be32 (S390_IPLB_MAX_LEN ); + }/* * Secure boot in audit mode will perform * if certificate(s) exist in the key store.
@@ -533,7 +550,7 @@ static bool s390_build_iplb(DeviceState *dev_st, IplParameterBlock *iplb)* * Results of secure boot will be stored in IIRB. */ -if (s390_has_certificate ()) { + else if (s390_has_certificate()) { iplb->hdr_flags |=DIAG308_IPIB_FLAGS_IPLIR ; iplb->len =cpu_to_be32 (S390_IPLB_MAX_LEN ); }
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Re: [PATCH v10 24/30] hw/s390x/ipl: Set IPIB flags for secure IPL
Quoted 49 lines · Zhuoying Cai
If
-M secure-boot=onis specified on the command line option, indicating true secure IPL enabled, set Secure-IPL bit and IPL-Information-Report bit on in IPIB Flags field, and trigger true secure IPL in the S390 BIOS.Any error that occurs during true secure IPL will cause the IPL to terminate.
Signed-off-by Zhuoying Cai <[email protected]>Reviewed-by Thomas Huth <[email protected]>--- hw/s390x/ipl.c | 19 ++++++++++++++++++- 1 file changed, 18 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)hw/s390x/ipl.c +17
-0@@ -468,6 +468,11 @@ static bool s390_has_certificate(void)return ipl->cert_store.count >0 ; } +static bool s390_secure_boot_enabled (void ) +{ +return S390_CCW_MACHINE (qdev_get_machine ())->secure_boot; +} +static bool s390_build_iplb (DeviceState *dev_st,IplParameterBlock *iplb) {CcwDevice *ccw_dev =NULL ;@@ -524,6 +529,18 @@ static bool s390_build_iplb(DeviceState *dev_st, IplParameterBlock *iplb)s390_ipl_convert_loadparm ((char *)lp, iplb->loadparm); iplb->flags |=DIAG308_FLAGS_LP_VALID ; +/* +* If secure-boot is enabled, then toggle the secure IPL flags to +* trigger secure boot in the s390 BIOS. +* +* Boot process will terminate if any error occurs during secure boot. +* +* If SIPL is on, IPLIR must also be on. +*/ +if (s390_secure_boot_enabled ()) { + iplb->hdr_flags |= (DIAG308_IPIB_FLAGS_SIPL |DIAG308_IPIB_FLAGS_IPLIR ); + iplb->len =cpu_to_be32 (S390_IPLB_MAX_LEN ); + }/* * Secure boot in audit mode will perform * if certificate(s) exist in the key store.
hw/s390x/ipl.c static bool s390_build_iplb(DeviceState *dev_st, IplParameterBlock *iplb) · line 556
Quoted 8 lines
hw/s390x/ipl.c +1
-1@@ -533,7 +550,7 @@ static bool s390_build_iplb(DeviceState *dev_st, IplParameterBlock *iplb)* * Results of secure boot will be stored in IIRB. */ -if (s390_has_certificate ()) { + else if (s390_has_certificate()) { iplb->hdr_flags |=DIAG308_IPIB_FLAGS_IPLIR ; iplb->len =cpu_to_be32 (S390_IPLB_MAX_LEN ); }
Signature · 2 lines
Regards, Collin
PATCH v10 25/30 pc-bios/s390-ccw: Handle true secure IPL mode
In reply to Zhuoying CaiWhen secure boot is enabled (-secure-boot on) and certificate(s) are provided, the boot operates in True Secure IPL mode.
Any verification error during True Secure IPL mode will cause the entire boot process to terminate.
Secure IPL in audit mode requires at least one certificate provided in the key store along with necessary facilities. If secure boot is enabled but no certificate is provided, the boot process will also terminate, as this is not a valid secure boot configuration.
Note: True Secure IPL mode is implemented for the SCSI scheme of virtio-blk/virtio-scsi devices.
--- docs/system/s390x/secure-ipl.rst | 13 +++++++++++++ pc-bios/s390-ccw/bootmap.c | 8 ++++++++ pc-bios/s390-ccw/s390-ccw.h | 1 + pc-bios/s390-ccw/secure-ipl.c | 4 ++++ pc-bios/s390-ccw/secure-ipl.h | 3 +++ 5 files changed, 29 insertions(+)
docs/system/s390x/secure-ipl.rst +13 -0
@@ -65,3 +65,16 @@ Configuration: .. code-block:: shell qemu-system-s390x -machine s390-ccw-virtio,boot-certs.0.path=/.../qemu/certs,boot-certs.1.path=/another/path/cert.pem ... + +Secure Mode +----------- + +When the ``secure-boot=on`` option is set and certificates are provided, +a secure boot is performed with error reporting enabled. The boot process aborts +if any error occurs. + +Configuration: + +.. code-block:: shell + + qemu-system-s390x -machine s390-ccw-virtio,secure-boot=on,boot-certs.0.path=/.../qemu/certs,boot-certs.1.path=/another/path/cert.pem ...
pc-bios/s390-ccw/bootmap.c +8 -0
@@ -738,6 +738,7 @@ static int zipl_run(ScsiBlockPtr *pte) entry = (ComponentEntry *)(&header[1 ]);switch (boot_mode) { +case ZIPL_BOOT_MODE_SECURE :case ZIPL_BOOT_MODE_SECURE_AUDIT : rc =zipl_run_secure (&entry, tmp_sec);break ;
@@ -1120,9 +1121,16 @@ ZiplBootMode get_boot_mode(uint8_t hdr_flags) {bool sipl_set = hdr_flags &DIAG308_IPIB_FLAGS_SIPL ;bool iplir_set = hdr_flags &DIAG308_IPIB_FLAGS_IPLIR ; +VCStorageSizeBlock *vcssb;if (!sipl_set && iplir_set) {return ZIPL_BOOT_MODE_SECURE_AUDIT ; + }else if (sipl_set && iplir_set) { + vcssb =zipl_secure_get_vcssb (); +if (vcssb ==NULL || vcssb->length ==VCSSB_NO_VC ) { +panic ("Need at least one certificate for secure boot!" ); + } +return ZIPL_BOOT_MODE_SECURE ; }return ZIPL_BOOT_MODE_NORMAL ;
pc-bios/s390-ccw/s390-ccw.h +1 -0
@@ -91,6 +91,7 @@ void zipl_load(void);typedef enum ZiplBootMode {ZIPL_BOOT_MODE_NORMAL =0 ,ZIPL_BOOT_MODE_SECURE_AUDIT =1 , +ZIPL_BOOT_MODE_SECURE =2 , }ZiplBootMode ;extern ZiplBootMode boot_mode;
pc-bios/s390-ccw/secure-ipl.c +4 -0
@@ -280,6 +280,10 @@ static bool check_sclab_presence(uint8_t *sclab_magic, uint32_t *cei_flags) *cei_flags |=S390_CEI_INVALID_SCLAB ;/* a missing SCLAB will not be reported in audit mode */ +if (boot_mode ==ZIPL_BOOT_MODE_SECURE ) { +zipl_secure_handle ("Magic does not match. SCLAB does not exist" ); + } +return false; }
pc-bios/s390-ccw/secure-ipl.h +3 -0
@@ -82,6 +82,9 @@ static inline void zipl_secure_handle(const char *message)case ZIPL_BOOT_MODE_SECURE_AUDIT :IPL_check (false, message);break ; +case ZIPL_BOOT_MODE_SECURE : +panic (message); +break ;default :break ; }
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Re: [PATCH v10 25/30] pc-bios/s390-ccw: Handle true secure IPL mode
Quoted 91 lines · Zhuoying Cai
When secure boot is enabled (-secure-boot on) and certificate(s) are provided, the boot operates in True Secure IPL mode.
Any verification error during True Secure IPL mode will cause the entire boot process to terminate.
Secure IPL in audit mode requires at least one certificate provided in the key store along with necessary facilities. If secure boot is enabled but no certificate is provided, the boot process will also terminate, as this is not a valid secure boot configuration.
Note: True Secure IPL mode is implemented for the SCSI scheme of virtio-blk/virtio-scsi devices.
Signed-off-by Zhuoying Cai <[email protected]>Reviewed-by Collin Walling <[email protected]>--- docs/system/s390x/secure-ipl.rst | 13 +++++++++++++ pc-bios/s390-ccw/bootmap.c | 8 ++++++++ pc-bios/s390-ccw/s390-ccw.h | 1 + pc-bios/s390-ccw/secure-ipl.c | 4 ++++ pc-bios/s390-ccw/secure-ipl.h | 3 +++ 5 files changed, 29 insertions(+)docs/system/s390x/secure-ipl.rst +13
-0@@ -65,3 +65,16 @@ Configuration: .. code-block:: shell qemu-system-s390x -machine s390-ccw-virtio,boot-certs.0.path=/.../qemu/certs,boot-certs.1.path=/another/path/cert.pem ... + +Secure Mode +----------- + +When the ``secure-boot=on`` option is set and certificates are provided, +a secure boot is performed with error reporting enabled. The boot process aborts +if any error occurs. + +Configuration: + +.. code-block:: shell + + qemu-system-s390x -machine s390-ccw-virtio,secure-boot=on,boot-certs.0.path=/.../qemu/certs,boot-certs.1.path=/another/path/cert.pem ...pc-bios/s390-ccw/bootmap.c +8
-0@@ -738,6 +738,7 @@ static int zipl_run(ScsiBlockPtr *pte) entry = (ComponentEntry *)(&header[1 ]);switch (boot_mode) { +case ZIPL_BOOT_MODE_SECURE :case ZIPL_BOOT_MODE_SECURE_AUDIT : rc =zipl_run_secure (&entry, tmp_sec);break ;@@ -1120,9 +1121,16 @@ ZiplBootMode get_boot_mode(uint8_t hdr_flags) {bool sipl_set = hdr_flags &DIAG308_IPIB_FLAGS_SIPL ;bool iplir_set = hdr_flags &DIAG308_IPIB_FLAGS_IPLIR ; +VCStorageSizeBlock *vcssb;if (!sipl_set && iplir_set) {return ZIPL_BOOT_MODE_SECURE_AUDIT ; + }else if (sipl_set && iplir_set) { + vcssb =zipl_secure_get_vcssb (); +if (vcssb ==NULL || vcssb->length ==VCSSB_NO_VC ) { +panic ("Need at least one certificate for secure boot!" ); + } +return ZIPL_BOOT_MODE_SECURE ; }return ZIPL_BOOT_MODE_NORMAL ;pc-bios/s390-ccw/s390-ccw.h +1
-0@@ -91,6 +91,7 @@ void zipl_load(void);typedef enum ZiplBootMode {ZIPL_BOOT_MODE_NORMAL =0 ,ZIPL_BOOT_MODE_SECURE_AUDIT =1 , +ZIPL_BOOT_MODE_SECURE =2 , }ZiplBootMode ;extern ZiplBootMode boot_mode;pc-bios/s390-ccw/secure-ipl.c +0
-0
pc-bios/s390-ccw/secure-ipl.c static bool check_sclab_presence(uint8_t *sclab_magic, uint32_t *cei_flags) · line 286
Quoted 7 lines
pc-bios/s390-ccw/secure-ipl.c +4
-0@@ -280,6 +280,10 @@ static bool check_sclab_presence(uint8_t *sclab_magic, uint32_t *cei_flags) *cei_flags |=S390_CEI_INVALID_SCLAB ;/* a missing SCLAB will not be reported in audit mode */ +if (boot_mode ==ZIPL_BOOT_MODE_SECURE ) { +zipl_secure_handle ("Magic does not match. SCLAB does not exist" ); + } +
Hmm I know I already gave my r-b, but I don't recall the boot_mode check here. Is there anything inherently wrong with reporting a missing SCLAB, even if it's not present for audit mode? The whole point of audit is to just do everything secure IPL does, but report warnings instead of terminating.
Quoted 17 lines
pc-bios/s390-ccw/secure-ipl.c +0
-0return false; }pc-bios/s390-ccw/secure-ipl.h +3
-0@@ -82,6 +82,9 @@ static inline void zipl_secure_handle(const char *message)case ZIPL_BOOT_MODE_SECURE_AUDIT :IPL_check (false, message);break ; +case ZIPL_BOOT_MODE_SECURE : +panic (message); +break ;default :break ; }
Signature · 2 lines
Regards, Collin
Re: [PATCH v10 25/30] pc-bios/s390-ccw: Handle true secure IPL mode
Quoted 25 lines · Collin Walling
Quoted 24 lines · Zhuoying Cai
When secure boot is enabled (-secure-boot on) and certificate(s) are provided, the boot operates in True Secure IPL mode.
Any verification error during True Secure IPL mode will cause the entire boot process to terminate.
Secure IPL in audit mode requires at least one certificate provided in the key store along with necessary facilities. If secure boot is enabled but no certificate is provided, the boot process will also terminate, as this is not a valid secure boot configuration.
Note: True Secure IPL mode is implemented for the SCSI scheme of virtio-blk/virtio-scsi devices.
Signed-off-by Zhuoying Cai <[email protected]>Reviewed-by Collin Walling <[email protected]>--- docs/system/s390x/secure-ipl.rst | 13 +++++++++++++ pc-bios/s390-ccw/bootmap.c | 8 ++++++++ pc-bios/s390-ccw/s390-ccw.h | 1 + pc-bios/s390-ccw/secure-ipl.c | 4 ++++ pc-bios/s390-ccw/secure-ipl.h | 3 +++ 5 files changed, 29 insertions(+)
[...]
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 7 lines
pc-bios/s390-ccw/secure-ipl.c +0
-0@@ -280,6 +280,10 @@ static bool check_sclab_presence(uint8_t *sclab_magic, uint32_t *cei_flags) *cei_flags |=S390_CEI_INVALID_SCLAB ;
Quoted 12 lines
pc-bios/s390-ccw/secure-ipl.c static bool check_sclab_presence(uint8_t *sclab_magic, uint32_t *cei_flags) · line 286
Quoted 5 lines
pc-bios/s390-ccw/secure-ipl.c +4
-0/* a missing SCLAB will not be reported in audit mode */ +if (boot_mode ==ZIPL_BOOT_MODE_SECURE ) { +zipl_secure_handle ("Magic does not match. SCLAB does not exist" ); + } +Hmm I know I already gave my r-b, but I don't recall the
boot_modecheck here. Is there anything inherently wrong with reporting a missing SCLAB, even if it's not present for audit mode? The whole point of audit is to just do everything secure IPL does, but report warnings instead of terminating.
Thanks for pointing this out. The boot_mode check was already present in the previous versions. During the early design phase of this line item, it was suggested that missing SCLAB would not be reported in audit mode.
Quoted 19 lines
Quoted 17 lines
pc-bios/s390-ccw/secure-ipl.c +0
-0return false; }pc-bios/s390-ccw/secure-ipl.h +3
-0@@ -82,6 +82,9 @@ static inline void zipl_secure_handle(const char *message)case ZIPL_BOOT_MODE_SECURE_AUDIT :IPL_check (false, message);break ; +case ZIPL_BOOT_MODE_SECURE : +panic (message); +break ;default :break ; }
PATCH v10 26/30 hw/s390x/ipl: Handle secure boot with multiple boot devices
In reply to Zhuoying CaiThe current approach to enable secure boot relies on providing secure-boot and boot-certs parameters of s390-ccw-virtio machine type option, which apply to all boot devices.
With the possibility of multiple boot devices, secure boot expects all provided devices to be supported and eligible (e.g., virtio-blk/virtio-scsi using the SCSI scheme).
If multiple boot devices are provided and include an unsupported (e.g., ECKD, VFIO) or a non-eligible (e.g., Net) device, the boot process will terminate with an error logged to the console.
--- hw/s390x/ipl.c | 79 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------------- pc-bios/s390-ccw/main.c | 3 -- 2 files changed, 54 insertions(+), 28 deletions(-)
hw/s390x/ipl.c +54 -25
@@ -473,6 +473,58 @@ static bool s390_secure_boot_enabled(void)return S390_CCW_MACHINE (qdev_get_machine ())->secure_boot; } +static bool s390_validate_secure_boot_device (int devtype,Error **errp) +{ +switch (devtype) { +case CCW_DEVTYPE_VFIO : +error_setg (errp,"Passthrough (vfio) CCW device does not support secure boot!" ); +return false; +case CCW_DEVTYPE_VIRTIO_NET : +error_setg (errp,"Virtio net boot device does not support secure boot!" ); +return false; +default : +return true; + } +} + +static void s390_apply_secure_boot (IplParameterBlock *iplb,int devtype, +bool secure_boot,bool audit_mode) +{ +Error *local_error =NULL ; + +if (!secure_boot && !audit_mode) { +return ; + } + +if (!s390_validate_secure_boot_device (devtype, &local_error)) { +error_report_err (local_error); +exit (1 ); + } + +/* +* If secure-boot is enabled, then toggle the secure IPL flags (SIPL) to +* trigger secure boot in the s390 BIOS. +* +* Boot process will terminate if any error occurs during secure boot. +*/ +if (secure_boot) { + iplb->hdr_flags |=DIAG308_IPIB_FLAGS_SIPL ; + } + +/* +* For both secure boot and audit mode, enable the IPL Information +* Report (IPLIR) flag so that the firmware generates an IPL +* Information Report Block (IIRB). +* +* Results of secure boot will be stored in IIRB. +* +* Extend the IPL parameter block to its maximum length to ensure +* sufficient space for the BIOS to populate the IIRB. +*/ + iplb->hdr_flags |=DIAG308_IPIB_FLAGS_IPLIR ; + iplb->len =cpu_to_be32 (S390_IPLB_MAX_LEN ); +} +static bool s390_build_iplb (DeviceState *dev_st,IplParameterBlock *iplb) {CcwDevice *ccw_dev =NULL ;
@@ -529,31 +581,8 @@ static bool s390_build_iplb(DeviceState *dev_st, IplParameterBlock *iplb)s390_ipl_convert_loadparm ((char *)lp, iplb->loadparm); iplb->flags |=DIAG308_FLAGS_LP_VALID ; -/* -* If secure-boot is enabled, then toggle the secure IPL flags to -* trigger secure boot in the s390 BIOS. -* -* Boot process will terminate if any error occurs during secure boot. -* -* If SIPL is on, IPLIR must also be on. -*/ -if (s390_secure_boot_enabled ()) { - iplb->hdr_flags |= (DIAG308_IPIB_FLAGS_SIPL |DIAG308_IPIB_FLAGS_IPLIR ); - iplb->len =cpu_to_be32 (S390_IPLB_MAX_LEN ); - } -/* -* Secure boot in audit mode will perform -* if certificate(s) exist in the key store. -* -* IPL Information Report Block (IIRB) will exist -* for secure boot in audit mode. -* -* Results of secure boot will be stored in IIRB. -*/ -else if (s390_has_certificate ()) { - iplb->hdr_flags |=DIAG308_IPIB_FLAGS_IPLIR ; - iplb->len =cpu_to_be32 (S390_IPLB_MAX_LEN ); - } +s390_apply_secure_boot (iplb, devtype,s390_secure_boot_enabled (), +s390_has_certificate ());return true; }
pc-bios/s390-ccw/main.c +0 -3
@@ -304,9 +304,6 @@ static void ipl_ccw_device(void)switch (cutype) {case CU_TYPE_DASD_3990 :case CU_TYPE_DASD_2107 : -IPL_assert ((boot_mode ==ZIPL_BOOT_MODE_NORMAL ), -"Passthrough (vfio) CCW device does not support secure boot!" ); -dasd_ipl (blk_schid, cutype);break ;case CU_TYPE_VIRTIO :
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
PATCH v10 27/30 hw/s390x/ipl: Handle secure boot without specifying a boot device
In reply to Zhuoying CaiIf secure boot in audit mode or True Secure IPL mode is enabled without specifying a boot device, the boot process will terminate with an error.
--- hw/s390x/ipl.c | 10 ++++++++++ 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+)
hw/s390x/ipl.c +10 -0
@@ -852,6 +852,16 @@ void s390_ipl_prepare_cpu(S390CPU *cpu) cpu->env.psw.addr = ipl->bios_start_addr;if (!ipl->iplb_valid) { ipl->iplb_valid =s390_init_all_iplbs (ipl); + +/* +* Secure IPL without specifying a boot device. +* IPLB is not generated if no boot device is defined. +*/ +if ((s390_has_certificate () ||s390_secure_boot_enabled ()) && + !ipl->iplb_valid) { +error_report ("No boot device defined for Secure IPL" ); +exit (1 ); + } }else { ipl->qipl.chain_len =0 ; }
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
PATCH v10 28/30 tests/functional/s390x: Add secure IPL functional test
In reply to Zhuoying CaiAdd functional test for secure IPL.
--- tests/functional/s390x/meson.build | 2 + tests/functional/s390x/test_secure_ipl.py | 148 ++++++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 150 insertions(+) create mode 100755 tests/functional/s390x/test_secure_ipl.py
tests/functional/s390x/meson.build +2 -0
@@ -2,6 +2,7 @@ test_s390x_timeouts = { 'ccw_virtio' : 420, + 'secure_ipl' : 280, } tests_s390x_system_quick = [
@@ -13,6 +14,7 @@ tests_s390x_system_thorough = [ 'ccw_virtio', 'pxelinux', 'replay', + 'secure_ipl', 'topology', 'tuxrun', ]
tests/functional/s390x/test_secure_ipl.py new file +148 -0
148 lines not on this page · raw message
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
PATCH v10 29/30 docs/specs: Add secure IPL documentation
In reply to Zhuoying CaiAdd documentation for secure IPL
--- docs/specs/s390x-secure-ipl.rst | 55 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 55 insertions(+)
docs/specs/s390x-secure-ipl.rst +55 -0
@@ -1,5 +1,60 @@ .. SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later +s390 Secure IPL +=============== + +Secure IPL (a.k.a. secure boot) enables s390-ccw virtual machines to +leverage qcrypto libraries and z/Architecture emulations to verify the +integrity of signed kernels. The qcrypto libraries are used to perform +certificate validation and signature-verification, whereas the +z/Architecture emulations are used to ensure secure IPL data has not +been tampered with, convey data between QEMU and guest code, and set up +the relevant secure IPL data structures with verification results. + +To find out more about using this feature, see +``docs/system/s390x/secure-ipl.rst``. + +Note that "guest code" will refer to the s390-ccw BIOS unless stated +otherwise. + +Both QEMU and guest code work in cooperation to perform secure IPL. The Secure +Loading Attributes Facility (SCLAF) is used to check the Secure Code +Loading Attribute Block (SCLAB) and ensure that secure IPL data has not +been tampered with. DIAGNOSE 'X'320' is invoked by guest code to query +the certificate store info and retrieve specific certificates from QEMU. +DIAGNOSE 'X'508' is used by guest code to leverage qcrypto libraries to +perform signature-verification in QEMU. Lastly, guest code generates and +appends an IPL Information Report Block (IIRB) at the end of the IPL +Parameter Block, which is used by the kernel to store signed and +verified entries. + +The logical steps are as follows: + +- guest code reads data payload from disk (e.g. stage3 boot loader, kernel) +- guest code checks the validity of the SCLAB +- guest code invokes DIAG 508 subcode 1 and provides it the payload +- QEMU handles DIAG 508 request by reading the payload and retrieving the + certificate store +- QEMU DIAG 508 utilizes qcrypto libraries to perform signature-verification on + the payload, attempting with each cert in the store (until success or + exhausted) +- QEMU DIAG 508 returns: + + - success: index of cert used to verify payload + - failure: error code + +- guest code responds to this operation: + + - success: retrieves cert from store via DIAG 320 using returned index + - failure: reports with warning (audit mode), aborts with error (secure mode) + +- guest code appends IIRB at the end of the IPLB +- guest code kicks off IPL + +More information regarding the respective DIAGNOSE commands and IPL data +structures are outlined within this document. + + s390 Certificate Store and Functions ====================================
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Re: [PATCH v10 29/30] docs/specs: Add secure IPL documentation
Quoted 17 lines · Zhuoying Cai
Add documentation for secure IPL
Signed-off-by Collin Walling <[email protected]>--- docs/specs/s390x-secure-ipl.rst | 55 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 55 insertions(+)docs/specs/s390x-secure-ipl.rst +3
-0@@ -1,5 +1,60 @@ .. SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later +s390 Secure IPL +=============== +
docs/specs/s390x-secure-ipl.rst line 15
Quoted 10 lines
docs/specs/s390x-secure-ipl.rst +10
-0+Secure IPL (a.k.a. secure boot) enables s390-ccw virtual machines to +leverage qcrypto libraries and z/Architecture emulations to verify the +integrity of signed kernels. The qcrypto libraries are used to perform +certificate validation and signature-verification, whereas the +z/Architecture emulations are used to ensure secure IPL data has not +been tampered with, convey data between QEMU and guest code, and set up +the relevant secure IPL data structures with verification results. + +To find out more about using this feature, see +``docs/system/s390x/secure-ipl.rst``.
This path is useful for developers reading this page in the repo, but it may be confusing for readers of the built documentation.
You can create a link instead/in addition. Consider something like:
To find out more about using this feature, see the :doc:documentation </system/s390x/secure-ipl>.
---
Regarding this document overall:
In the sphinx build, the left-side navigation menu and the bullets in specs/index do not render sensibly. Use:
Level 1 (title only)
====================
Level 2 subtitle
----------------
Level 3 subtitle
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
e.g.
Current:
= s390 Secure IPL
= s390 Certificate Store and Functions
- s390 Certificate Store
- ...
= Secure IPL Data Structures, Facilities, and Functions
- ...
New:
= s390 Secure IPL
- s390 Certificate Store and Functions
^ s390 Certificate Store
^ ...
- Secure IPL Data Structures, Facilities, and Functions ^ ...
PATCH v10 30/30 docs/system/s390x: Add secure IPL documentation
In reply to Zhuoying CaiAdd documentation for secure IPL
--- docs/system/s390x/secure-ipl.rst | 97 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 97 insertions(+)
docs/system/s390x/secure-ipl.rst +97 -0
@@ -1,5 +1,21 @@ .. SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later +s390 Secure IPL +=============== + +Secure IPL, also known as secure boot, enables s390-ccw virtual machines to +verify the integrity of guest kernels. + +For technical details of this feature, see ``docs/specs/s390x-secure-ipl.rst``. + +This document explains how to use secure IPL with s390x in QEMU. It covers +the command line options for providing certificates and enabling secure IPL, +the different IPL modes (Normal, Audit, and Secure), and system requirements. + +A quickstart guide is provided to demonstrate how to generate certificates, +sign images, and start a guest in Secure Mode. + + Secure IPL Command Line Options ===============================
@@ -78,3 +94,84 @@ Configuration: .. code-block:: shell qemu-system-s390x -machine s390-ccw-virtio,secure-boot=on,boot-certs.0.path=/.../qemu/certs,boot-certs.1.path=/another/path/cert.pem ... + + +Constraints +=========== + +The following constraints apply when attempting to boot an s390x guest in secure +mode: + +- z16 or "qemu" CPU model +- certificates must be in X.509 PEM format +- only support for SCSI scheme of virtio-blk/virtio-scsi devices +- a boot device must be specified +- any unsupported devices (e.g., ECKD and VFIO) or non-eligible devices (e.g., + network) will cause the entire boot process terminating early with an error + logged to the console. + + +Secure IPL Quickstart +===================== + +Build QEMU with gnutls enabled +------------------------------- + +.. code-block:: shell + + ./configure … --enable-gnutls + +Generate certificate (e.g. via certtool) +---------------------------------------- + +A private key is required before generating a certificate. This key must be kept +secure and confidential. + +Use an RSA private key for signing. + +.. code-block:: shell + + certtool --generate-privkey > key.pem + +A self-signed certificate requires the organization name. Use the ``cert.info`` +template to pre-fill values and avoid interactive prompts from certtool. + +.. code-block:: shell + + cat > cert.info <<EOF + cn = "My Name" + expiration_days = 36500 + cert_signing_key + EOF + + certtool --generate-self-signed \ + --load-privkey key.pem \ + --template cert.info \ + --hash=SHA256 \ + --outfile cert.pem + +Sign Images (e.g. via sign-file) +-------------------------------- + +- signing must be performed on a guest filesystem +- sign-file script used in the example below is located within the kernel source + repo + +.. code-block:: shell + + ./sign-file sha256 key.pem cert.pem /boot/vmlinuz-… + ./sign-file sha256 key.pem cert.pem /usr/lib/s390-tools/stage3.bin + +Run zipl with secure boot enabled +--------------------------------- + +.. code-block:: shell + + zipl --secure 1 -V + +Command line options for starting the guest +------------------------------------------- + +.. code-block:: shell + + qemu-system-s390x -machine s390-ccw-virtio,secure-boot=on,boot-certs.0.path=cert.pem ...
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Re: [PATCH v10 30/30] docs/system/s390x: Add secure IPL documentation
Quoted 13 lines · Zhuoying Cai
Add documentation for secure IPL
Signed-off-by Collin Walling <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Zhuoying Cai <[email protected]>--- docs/system/s390x/secure-ipl.rst | 97 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 97 insertions(+)docs/system/s390x/secure-ipl.rst +0
-0
docs/system/s390x/secure-ipl.rst line 9
Quoted 9 lines
docs/system/s390x/secure-ipl.rst +7
-0@@ -1,5 +1,21 @@ .. SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later +s390 Secure IPL +=============== + +Secure IPL, also known as secure boot, enables s390-ccw virtual machines to +verify the integrity of guest kernels. + +For technical details of this feature, see ``docs/specs/s390x-secure-ipl.rst``.
See my comment on the previous patch.
"For technical details of this feature, see the :doc:specs document </specs/s390x-secure-ipl>."
Quoted 81 lines
docs/system/s390x/secure-ipl.rst +74
-0+ +This document explains how to use secure IPL with s390x in QEMU. It covers +the command line options for providing certificates and enabling secure IPL, +the different IPL modes (Normal, Audit, and Secure), and system requirements. + +A quickstart guide is provided to demonstrate how to generate certificates, +sign images, and start a guest in Secure Mode. + + Secure IPL Command Line Options ===============================@@ -78,3 +94,84 @@ Configuration: .. code-block:: shell qemu-system-s390x -machine s390-ccw-virtio,secure-boot=on,boot-certs.0.path=/.../qemu/certs,boot-certs.1.path=/another/path/cert.pem ... + + +Constraints +=========== + +The following constraints apply when attempting to boot an s390x guest in secure +mode: + +- z16 or "qemu" CPU model +- certificates must be in X.509 PEM format +- only support for SCSI scheme of virtio-blk/virtio-scsi devices +- a boot device must be specified +- any unsupported devices (e.g., ECKD and VFIO) or non-eligible devices (e.g., + network) will cause the entire boot process terminating early with an error + logged to the console. + + +Secure IPL Quickstart +===================== + +Build QEMU with gnutls enabled +------------------------------- + +.. code-block:: shell + + ./configure … --enable-gnutls + +Generate certificate (e.g. via certtool) +---------------------------------------- + +A private key is required before generating a certificate. This key must be kept +secure and confidential. + +Use an RSA private key for signing. + +.. code-block:: shell + + certtool --generate-privkey > key.pem + +A self-signed certificate requires the organization name. Use the ``cert.info`` +template to pre-fill values and avoid interactive prompts from certtool. + +.. code-block:: shell + + cat > cert.info <<EOF + cn = "My Name" + expiration_days = 36500 + cert_signing_key + EOF + + certtool --generate-self-signed \ + --load-privkey key.pem \ + --template cert.info \ + --hash=SHA256 \ + --outfile cert.pem + +Sign Images (e.g. via sign-file) +-------------------------------- + +- signing must be performed on a guest filesystem +- sign-file script used in the example below is located within the kernel source + repo + +.. code-block:: shell +
docs/system/s390x/secure-ipl.rst Configuration: · line 171
Quoted 10 lines
docs/system/s390x/secure-ipl.rst +10
-0+ ./sign-file sha256 key.pem cert.pem /boot/vmlinuz-… + ./sign-file sha256 key.pem cert.pem /usr/lib/s390-tools/stage3.bin + +Run zipl with secure boot enabled +--------------------------------- + +.. code-block:: shell + + zipl --secure 1 -V +
Please consider clarifying that zipl must be run on the guest filesystem.
docs/system/s390x/secure-ipl.rst Configuration: · line 177
Quoted 6 lines
docs/system/s390x/secure-ipl.rst +6
-0+Command line options for starting the guest +------------------------------------------- + +.. code-block:: shell + + qemu-system-s390x -machine s390-ccw-virtio,secure-boot=on,boot-certs.0.path=cert.pem ...
Regarding this document overall: The bullets in docs/system/target-s390x
do not render sensibly in the sphinx build. See my similar comment on the previous patch.