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4.9.337-rc1 review

PATCH In review Greg Kroah-Hartman 6 participants 259 messages Jan 5, 2023 – Jan 7, 2023 Page 2 of 2

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author maintainer
#186 lore raw

PATCH 186/251 hfs: fix OOB Read in __hfs_brec_find

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: ZhangPeng <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 8d824e69d9f3fa3121b2dda25053bae71e2460d2 ]

Syzbot reported a OOB read bug:

==================================================================

BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in hfs_strcmp+0x117/0x190
fs/hfs/string.c:84
Read of size 1 at addr ffff88807eb62c4e by task kworker/u4:1/11
CPU: 1 PID: 11 Comm: kworker/u4:1 Not tainted
6.1.0-rc6-syzkaller-00308-g644e9524388a #0
Workqueue: writeback wb_workfn (flush-7:0)
Call Trace:
 <TASK>
 __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:88 [inline]
 dump_stack_lvl+0x1b1/0x28e lib/dump_stack.c:106
 print_address_description+0x74/0x340 mm/kasan/report.c:284
 print_report+0x107/0x1f0 mm/kasan/report.c:395
 kasan_report+0xcd/0x100 mm/kasan/report.c:495
 hfs_strcmp+0x117/0x190 fs/hfs/string.c:84
 __hfs_brec_find+0x213/0x5c0 fs/hfs/bfind.c:75
 hfs_brec_find+0x276/0x520 fs/hfs/bfind.c:138
 hfs_write_inode+0x34c/0xb40 fs/hfs/inode.c:462
 write_inode fs/fs-writeback.c:1440 [inline]

If the input inode of hfs_write_inode() is incorrect:
struct inode
struct hfs_inode_info
struct hfs_cat_key
struct hfs_name
u8 len # len is greater than HFS_NAMELEN(31) which is the
maximum length of an HFS filename

OOB read occurred:
hfs_write_inode()
hfs_brec_find()
__hfs_brec_find()
hfs_cat_keycmp()
hfs_strcmp() # OOB read occurred due to len is too large

Fix this by adding a Check on len in hfs_write_inode() before calling hfs_brec_find().

---
 fs/hfs/inode.c | 2 ++
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
fs/hfs/inode.c +2 -0
index de0d6d4c46b6..cd4eee5b8358 100644
@@ -452,6 +452,8 @@ int hfs_write_inode(struct inode *inode, struct writeback_control *wbc)
 		/* panic? */
 		return -EIO;
 
+	if (HFS_I(main_inode)->cat_key.CName.len > HFS_NAMELEN)
+		return -EIO;
 	fd.search_key->cat = HFS_I(main_inode)->cat_key;
 	if (hfs_brec_find(&fd))
 		/* panic? */
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
author maintainer
#187 lore raw

PATCH 187/251 wifi: ath9k: verify the expected usb_endpoints are present

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Fedor Pchelkin <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 16ef02bad239f11f322df8425d302be62f0443ce ]

The bug arises when a USB device claims to be an ATH9K but doesn't have the expected endpoints. (In this case there was an interrupt endpoint where the driver expected a bulk endpoint.) The kernel needs to be able to handle such devices without getting an internal error.

usb 1-1: BOGUS urb xfer, pipe 3 != type 1

WARNING: CPU: 3 PID: 500 at drivers/usb/core/urb.c:493 usb_submit_urb+0xce2/0x1430 drivers/usb/core/urb.c:493
Modules linked in:
CPU: 3 PID: 500 Comm: kworker/3:2 Not tainted 5.10.135-syzkaller #0
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.12.0-1 04/01/2014
Workqueue: events request_firmware_work_func
RIP: 0010:usb_submit_urb+0xce2/0x1430 drivers/usb/core/urb.c:493
Call Trace:
 ath9k_hif_usb_alloc_rx_urbs drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath9k/hif_usb.c:908 [inline]
 ath9k_hif_usb_alloc_urbs+0x75e/0x1010 drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath9k/hif_usb.c:1019
 ath9k_hif_usb_dev_init drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath9k/hif_usb.c:1109 [inline]
 ath9k_hif_usb_firmware_cb+0x142/0x530 drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath9k/hif_usb.c:1242
 request_firmware_work_func+0x12e/0x240 drivers/base/firmware_loader/main.c:1097
 process_one_work+0x9af/0x1600 kernel/workqueue.c:2279
 worker_thread+0x61d/0x12f0 kernel/workqueue.c:2425
 kthread+0x3b4/0x4a0 kernel/kthread.c:313
 ret_from_fork+0x22/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:299

Found by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org) with Syzkaller.

---
 drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath9k/hif_usb.c | 14 ++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+)
drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath9k/hif_usb.c +14 -0
index 719cb53d8b4d..438323182d07 100644
@@ -1325,10 +1325,24 @@ static int send_eject_command(struct usb_interface *interface)
 static int ath9k_hif_usb_probe(struct usb_interface *interface,
 			       const struct usb_device_id *id)
 {
+	struct usb_endpoint_descriptor *bulk_in, *bulk_out, *int_in, *int_out;
 	struct usb_device *udev = interface_to_usbdev(interface);
+	struct usb_host_interface *alt;
 	struct hif_device_usb *hif_dev;
 	int ret = 0;
 
+	/* Verify the expected endpoints are present */
+	alt = interface->cur_altsetting;
+	if (usb_find_common_endpoints(alt, &bulk_in, &bulk_out, &int_in, &int_out) < 0 ||
+	    usb_endpoint_num(bulk_in) != USB_WLAN_RX_PIPE ||
+	    usb_endpoint_num(bulk_out) != USB_WLAN_TX_PIPE ||
+	    usb_endpoint_num(int_in) != USB_REG_IN_PIPE ||
+	    usb_endpoint_num(int_out) != USB_REG_OUT_PIPE) {
+		dev_err(&udev->dev,
+			"ath9k_htc: Device endpoint numbers are not the expected ones\n");
+		return -ENODEV;
+	}
+
 	if (id->driver_info == STORAGE_DEVICE)
 		return send_eject_command(interface);
 
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
author maintainer
#188 lore raw

PATCH 188/251 wifi: ar5523: Fix use-after-free on ar5523_cmd() timed out

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Shigeru Yoshida <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit b6702a942a069c2a975478d719e98d83cdae1797 ]

syzkaller reported use-after-free with the stack trace like below [1]:

[   38.960489][    C3] ==================================================================
[   38.963216][    C3] BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in ar5523_cmd_tx_cb+0x220/0x240
[   38.964950][    C3] Read of size 8 at addr ffff888048e03450 by task swapper/3/0
[   38.966363][    C3]
[   38.967053][    C3] CPU: 3 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/3 Not tainted 6.0.0-09039-ga6afa4199d3d-dirty #18
[   38.968464][    C3] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.16.0-1.fc36 04/01/2014
[   38.969959][    C3] Call Trace:
[   38.970841][    C3]  <IRQ>
[   38.971663][    C3]  dump_stack_lvl+0xfc/0x174
[   38.972620][    C3]  print_report.cold+0x2c3/0x752
[   38.973626][    C3]  ? ar5523_cmd_tx_cb+0x220/0x240
[   38.974644][    C3]  kasan_report+0xb1/0x1d0
[   38.975720][    C3]  ? ar5523_cmd_tx_cb+0x220/0x240
[   38.976831][    C3]  ar5523_cmd_tx_cb+0x220/0x240
[   38.978412][    C3]  __usb_hcd_giveback_urb+0x353/0x5b0
[   38.979755][    C3]  usb_hcd_giveback_urb+0x385/0x430
[   38.981266][    C3]  dummy_timer+0x140c/0x34e0
[   38.982925][    C3]  ? notifier_call_chain+0xb5/0x1e0
[   38.984761][    C3]  ? rcu_read_lock_sched_held+0xb/0x60
[   38.986242][    C3]  ? lock_release+0x51c/0x790
[   38.987323][    C3]  ? _raw_read_unlock_irqrestore+0x37/0x70
[   38.988483][    C3]  ? __wake_up_common_lock+0xde/0x130
[   38.989621][    C3]  ? reacquire_held_locks+0x4a0/0x4a0
[   38.990777][    C3]  ? lock_acquire+0x472/0x550
[   38.991919][    C3]  ? rcu_read_lock_sched_held+0xb/0x60
[   38.993138][    C3]  ? lock_acquire+0x472/0x550
[   38.994890][    C3]  ? dummy_urb_enqueue+0x860/0x860
[   38.996266][    C3]  ? do_raw_spin_unlock+0x16f/0x230
[   38.997670][    C3]  ? dummy_urb_enqueue+0x860/0x860
[   38.999116][    C3]  call_timer_fn+0x1a0/0x6a0
[   39.000668][    C3]  ? add_timer_on+0x4a0/0x4a0
[   39.002137][    C3]  ? reacquire_held_locks+0x4a0/0x4a0
[   39.003809][    C3]  ? __next_timer_interrupt+0x226/0x2a0
[   39.005509][    C3]  __run_timers.part.0+0x69a/0xac0
[   39.007025][    C3]  ? dummy_urb_enqueue+0x860/0x860
[   39.008716][    C3]  ? call_timer_fn+0x6a0/0x6a0
[   39.010254][    C3]  ? cpuacct_percpu_seq_show+0x10/0x10
[   39.011795][    C3]  ? kvm_sched_clock_read+0x14/0x40
[   39.013277][    C3]  ? sched_clock_cpu+0x69/0x2b0
[   39.014724][    C3]  run_timer_softirq+0xb6/0x1d0
[   39.016196][    C3]  __do_softirq+0x1d2/0x9be
[   39.017616][    C3]  __irq_exit_rcu+0xeb/0x190
[   39.019004][    C3]  irq_exit_rcu+0x5/0x20
[   39.020361][    C3]  sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x8f/0xb0
[   39.021965][    C3]  </IRQ>
[   39.023237][    C3]  <TASK>

In ar5523_probe(), ar5523_host_available() calls ar5523_cmd() as below (there are other functions which finally call ar5523_cmd()):

ar5523_probe()
-> ar5523_host_available()
-> ar5523_cmd_read()

      -> ar5523_cmd()

If ar5523_cmd() timed out, then ar5523_host_available() failed and ar5523_probe() freed the device structure. So, ar5523_cmd_tx_cb() might touch the freed structure.

This patch fixes this issue by canceling in-flight tx cmd if submitted urb timed out.

---
 drivers/net/wireless/ath/ar5523/ar5523.c | 6 ++++++
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)
drivers/net/wireless/ath/ar5523/ar5523.c +6 -0
index 0c6b33c464cd..187061a43f7f 100644
@@ -241,6 +241,11 @@ static void ar5523_cmd_tx_cb(struct urb *urb)
 	}
 }
 
+static void ar5523_cancel_tx_cmd(struct ar5523 *ar)
+{
+	usb_kill_urb(ar->tx_cmd.urb_tx);
+}
+
 static int ar5523_cmd(struct ar5523 *ar, u32 code, const void *idata,
 		      int ilen, void *odata, int olen, int flags)
 {
@@ -280,6 +285,7 @@ static int ar5523_cmd(struct ar5523 *ar, u32 code, const void *idata,
 	}
 
 	if (!wait_for_completion_timeout(&cmd->done, 2 * HZ)) {
+		ar5523_cancel_tx_cmd(ar);
 		cmd->odata = NULL;
 		ar5523_err(ar, "timeout waiting for command %02x reply\n",
 			   code);
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
author maintainer
#189 lore raw

PATCH 189/251 ipmi: fix memleak when unload ipmi driver

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Zhang Yuchen <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 36992eb6b9b83f7f9cdc8e74fb5799d7b52e83e9 ]

After the IPMI disconnect problem, the memory kept rising and we tried to unload the driver to free the memory. However, only part of the free memory is recovered after the driver is uninstalled. Using ebpf to hook free functions, we find that neither ipmi_user nor ipmi_smi_msg is free, only ipmi_recv_msg is free.

We find that the deliver_smi_err_response call in clean_smi_msgs does the destroy processing on each message from the xmit_msg queue without checking the return value and free ipmi_smi_msg.

deliver_smi_err_response is called only at this location. Adding the free handling has no effect.

To verify, try using ebpf to trace the free function.

  $ bpftrace -e 'kretprobe:ipmi_alloc_recv_msg {printf("alloc rcv
      %p\n",retval);} kprobe:free_recv_msg {printf("free recv %p\n",
      arg0)} kretprobe:ipmi_alloc_smi_msg {printf("alloc smi %p\n",
        retval);} kprobe:free_smi_msg {printf("free smi  %p\n",arg0)}'

Message-Id: <[email protected]>

[Fixed the comment above handle_one_recv_msg().]
---
 drivers/char/ipmi/ipmi_msghandler.c | 8 ++++++--
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/char/ipmi/ipmi_msghandler.c +6 -2
index 74044b52d2c6..97d3c9d4ebc7 100644
@@ -2930,12 +2930,16 @@ static void deliver_smi_err_response(ipmi_smi_t intf,
 				     struct ipmi_smi_msg *msg,
 				     unsigned char err)
 {
+	int rv;
 	msg->rsp[0] = msg->data[0] | 4;
 	msg->rsp[1] = msg->data[1];
 	msg->rsp[2] = err;
 	msg->rsp_size = 3;
-	/* It's an error, so it will never requeue, no need to check return. */
-	handle_one_recv_msg(intf, msg);
+
+	/* This will never requeue, but it may ask us to free the message. */
+	rv = handle_one_recv_msg(intf, msg);
+	if (rv == 0)
+		ipmi_free_smi_msg(msg);
 }
 
 static void cleanup_smi_msgs(ipmi_smi_t intf)
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
author maintainer
#190 lore raw

PATCH 190/251 net: ethernet: ti: Fix return type of netcp_ndo_start_xmit()

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Nathan Chancellor <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 63fe6ff674a96cfcfc0fa8df1051a27aa31c70b4 ]

With clang's kernel control flow integrity (kCFI, CONFIG_CFI_CLANG), indirect call targets are validated against the expected function pointer prototype to make sure the call target is valid to help mitigate ROP attacks. If they are not identical, there is a failure at run time, which manifests as either a kernel panic or thread getting killed. A proposed warning in clang aims to catch these at compile time, which reveals:

drivers/net/ethernet/ti/netcp_core.c:1944:21: error: incompatible function pointer types initializing 'netdev_tx_t (*)(struct sk_buff *, struct net_device *)' (aka 'enum netdev_tx (*)(struct sk_buff *, struct net_device *)') with an expression of type 'int (struct sk_buff *, struct net_device *)' [-Werror,-Wincompatible-function-pointer-types-strict]
.ndo_start_xmit = netcp_ndo_start_xmit,
^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
1 error generated.

->ndo_start_xmit() in 'struct net_device_ops' expects a return type of 'netdev_tx_t', not 'int'. Adjust the return type of netcp_ndo_start_xmit() to match the prototype's to resolve the warning and CFI failure.

---
 drivers/net/ethernet/ti/netcp_core.c | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/net/ethernet/ti/netcp_core.c +1 -1
index c17967b23d3c..957701d48712 100644
@@ -1237,7 +1237,7 @@ static int netcp_tx_submit_skb(struct netcp_intf *netcp,
 }
 
 /* Submit the packet */
-static int netcp_ndo_start_xmit(struct sk_buff *skb, struct net_device *ndev)
+static netdev_tx_t netcp_ndo_start_xmit(struct sk_buff *skb, struct net_device *ndev)
 {
 	struct netcp_intf *netcp = netdev_priv(ndev);
 	int subqueue = skb_get_queue_mapping(skb);
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
author maintainer
#191 lore raw

PATCH 191/251 hamradio: baycom_epp: Fix return type of baycom_send_packet()

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Nathan Chancellor <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit c5733e5b15d91ab679646ec3149e192996a27d5d ]

With clang's kernel control flow integrity (kCFI, CONFIG_CFI_CLANG), indirect call targets are validated against the expected function pointer prototype to make sure the call target is valid to help mitigate ROP attacks. If they are not identical, there is a failure at run time, which manifests as either a kernel panic or thread getting killed. A proposed warning in clang aims to catch these at compile time, which reveals:

drivers/net/hamradio/baycom_epp.c:1119:25: error: incompatible function pointer types initializing 'netdev_tx_t (*)(struct sk_buff *, struct net_device *)' (aka 'enum netdev_tx (*)(struct sk_buff *, struct net_device *)') with an expression of type 'int (struct sk_buff *, struct net_device *)' [-Werror,-Wincompatible-function-pointer-types-strict]
.ndo_start_xmit = baycom_send_packet,
^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
1 error generated.

->ndo_start_xmit() in 'struct net_device_ops' expects a return type of 'netdev_tx_t', not 'int'. Adjust the return type of baycom_send_packet() to match the prototype's to resolve the warning and CFI failure.

---
 drivers/net/hamradio/baycom_epp.c | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/net/hamradio/baycom_epp.c +1 -1
index 78dbc44540f6..b7831d0fd084 100644
@@ -768,7 +768,7 @@ static void epp_bh(struct work_struct *work)
  * ===================== network driver interface =========================
  */
 
-static int baycom_send_packet(struct sk_buff *skb, struct net_device *dev)
+static netdev_tx_t baycom_send_packet(struct sk_buff *skb, struct net_device *dev)
 {
 	struct baycom_state *bc = netdev_priv(dev);
 
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
author maintainer
#192 lore raw

PATCH 192/251 wifi: brcmfmac: Fix potential shift-out-of-bounds in brcmf_fw_alloc_request()

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Minsuk Kang <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 81d17f6f3331f03c8eafdacea68ab773426c1e3c ]

This patch fixes a shift-out-of-bounds in brcmfmac that occurs in BIT(chiprev) when a 'chiprev' provided by the device is too large. It should also not be equal to or greater than BITS_PER_TYPE(u32) as we do bitwise AND with a u32 variable and BIT(chiprev). The patch adds a check that makes the function return NULL if that is the case. Note that the NULL case is later handled by the bus-specific caller, brcmf_usb_probe_cb() or brcmf_usb_reset_resume(), for example.

Found by a modified version of syzkaller.

UBSAN: shift-out-of-bounds in drivers/net/wireless/broadcom/brcm80211/brcmfmac/firmware.c
shift exponent 151055786 is too large for 64-bit type 'long unsigned int'
CPU: 0 PID: 1885 Comm: kworker/0:2 Tainted: G           O      5.14.0+ #132
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.12.1-0-ga5cab58e9a3f-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
Workqueue: usb_hub_wq hub_event
Call Trace:
 dump_stack_lvl+0x57/0x7d
 ubsan_epilogue+0x5/0x40
 __ubsan_handle_shift_out_of_bounds.cold+0x53/0xdb
 ? lock_chain_count+0x20/0x20
 brcmf_fw_alloc_request.cold+0x19/0x3ea
 ? brcmf_fw_get_firmwares+0x250/0x250
 ? brcmf_usb_ioctl_resp_wait+0x1a7/0x1f0
 brcmf_usb_get_fwname+0x114/0x1a0
 ? brcmf_usb_reset_resume+0x120/0x120
 ? number+0x6c4/0x9a0
 brcmf_c_process_clm_blob+0x168/0x590
 ? put_dec+0x90/0x90
 ? enable_ptr_key_workfn+0x20/0x20
 ? brcmf_common_pd_remove+0x50/0x50
 ? rcu_read_lock_sched_held+0xa1/0xd0
 brcmf_c_preinit_dcmds+0x673/0xc40
 ? brcmf_c_set_joinpref_default+0x100/0x100
 ? rcu_read_lock_sched_held+0xa1/0xd0
 ? rcu_read_lock_bh_held+0xb0/0xb0
 ? lock_acquire+0x19d/0x4e0
 ? find_held_lock+0x2d/0x110
 ? brcmf_usb_deq+0x1cc/0x260
 ? mark_held_locks+0x9f/0xe0
 ? lockdep_hardirqs_on_prepare+0x273/0x3e0
 ? _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x47/0x50
 ? trace_hardirqs_on+0x1c/0x120
 ? brcmf_usb_deq+0x1a7/0x260
 ? brcmf_usb_rx_fill_all+0x5a/0xf0
 brcmf_attach+0x246/0xd40
 ? wiphy_new_nm+0x1476/0x1d50
 ? kmemdup+0x30/0x40
 brcmf_usb_probe+0x12de/0x1690
 ? brcmf_usbdev_qinit.constprop.0+0x470/0x470
 usb_probe_interface+0x25f/0x710
 really_probe+0x1be/0xa90
 __driver_probe_device+0x2ab/0x460
 ? usb_match_id.part.0+0x88/0xc0
 driver_probe_device+0x49/0x120
 __device_attach_driver+0x18a/0x250
 ? driver_allows_async_probing+0x120/0x120
 bus_for_each_drv+0x123/0x1a0
 ? bus_rescan_devices+0x20/0x20
 ? lockdep_hardirqs_on_prepare+0x273/0x3e0
 ? trace_hardirqs_on+0x1c/0x120
 __device_attach+0x207/0x330
 ? device_bind_driver+0xb0/0xb0
 ? kobject_uevent_env+0x230/0x12c0
 bus_probe_device+0x1a2/0x260
 device_add+0xa61/0x1ce0
 ? __mutex_unlock_slowpath+0xe7/0x660
 ? __fw_devlink_link_to_suppliers+0x550/0x550
 usb_set_configuration+0x984/0x1770
 ? kernfs_create_link+0x175/0x230
 usb_generic_driver_probe+0x69/0x90
 usb_probe_device+0x9c/0x220
 really_probe+0x1be/0xa90
 __driver_probe_device+0x2ab/0x460
 driver_probe_device+0x49/0x120
 __device_attach_driver+0x18a/0x250
 ? driver_allows_async_probing+0x120/0x120
 bus_for_each_drv+0x123/0x1a0
 ? bus_rescan_devices+0x20/0x20
 ? lockdep_hardirqs_on_prepare+0x273/0x3e0
 ? trace_hardirqs_on+0x1c/0x120
 __device_attach+0x207/0x330
 ? device_bind_driver+0xb0/0xb0
 ? kobject_uevent_env+0x230/0x12c0
 bus_probe_device+0x1a2/0x260
 device_add+0xa61/0x1ce0
 ? __fw_devlink_link_to_suppliers+0x550/0x550
 usb_new_device.cold+0x463/0xf66
 ? hub_disconnect+0x400/0x400
 ? _raw_spin_unlock_irq+0x24/0x30
 hub_event+0x10d5/0x3330
 ? hub_port_debounce+0x280/0x280
 ? __lock_acquire+0x1671/0x5790
 ? wq_calc_node_cpumask+0x170/0x2a0
 ? lock_release+0x640/0x640
 ? rcu_read_lock_sched_held+0xa1/0xd0
 ? rcu_read_lock_bh_held+0xb0/0xb0
 ? lockdep_hardirqs_on_prepare+0x273/0x3e0
 process_one_work+0x873/0x13e0
 ? lock_release+0x640/0x640
 ? pwq_dec_nr_in_flight+0x320/0x320
 ? rwlock_bug.part.0+0x90/0x90
 worker_thread+0x8b/0xd10
 ? __kthread_parkme+0xd9/0x1d0
 ? process_one_work+0x13e0/0x13e0
 kthread+0x379/0x450
 ? _raw_spin_unlock_irq+0x24/0x30
 ? set_kthread_struct+0x100/0x100
 ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30
---
 drivers/net/wireless/broadcom/brcm80211/brcmfmac/firmware.c | 5 +++++
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)
drivers/net/wireless/broadcom/brcm80211/brcmfmac/firmware.c +5 -0
index 33a7378164b8..6675de16e3b9 100644
@@ -572,6 +572,11 @@ int brcmf_fw_map_chip_to_name(u32 chip, u32 chiprev,
 	u32 i;
 	char end;
 
+	if (chiprev >= BITS_PER_TYPE(u32)) {
+		brcmf_err("Invalid chip revision %u\n", chiprev);
+		return NULL;
+	}
+
 	for (i = 0; i < table_size; i++) {
 		if (mapping_table[i].chipid == chip &&
 		    mapping_table[i].revmask & BIT(chiprev))
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
author maintainer
#193 lore raw

PATCH 193/251 igb: Do not free q_vector unless new one was allocated

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Kees Cook <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 0668716506ca66f90d395f36ccdaebc3e0e84801 ]

Avoid potential use-after-free condition under memory pressure. If the kzalloc() fails, q_vector will be freed but left in the original adapter->q_vector[v_idx] array position.

---
 drivers/net/ethernet/intel/igb/igb_main.c | 8 ++++++--
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/net/ethernet/intel/igb/igb_main.c +6 -2
index 2e713e5f75cd..bbca786f0427 100644
@@ -1219,8 +1219,12 @@ static int igb_alloc_q_vector(struct igb_adapter *adapter,
 	if (!q_vector) {
 		q_vector = kzalloc(size, GFP_KERNEL);
 	} else if (size > ksize(q_vector)) {
-		kfree_rcu(q_vector, rcu);
-		q_vector = kzalloc(size, GFP_KERNEL);
+		struct igb_q_vector *new_q_vector;
+
+		new_q_vector = kzalloc(size, GFP_KERNEL);
+		if (new_q_vector)
+			kfree_rcu(q_vector, rcu);
+		q_vector = new_q_vector;
 	} else {
 		memset(q_vector, 0, size);
 	}
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
author maintainer
#194 lore raw

PATCH 194/251 s390/ctcm: Fix return type of ctc{mp,}m_tx()

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Nathan Chancellor <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit aa5bf80c3c067b82b4362cd6e8e2194623bcaca6 ]

With clang's kernel control flow integrity (kCFI, CONFIG_CFI_CLANG), indirect call targets are validated against the expected function pointer prototype to make sure the call target is valid to help mitigate ROP attacks. If they are not identical, there is a failure at run time, which manifests as either a kernel panic or thread getting killed. A proposed warning in clang aims to catch these at compile time, which reveals:

drivers/s390/net/ctcm_main.c:1064:21: error: incompatible function pointer types initializing 'netdev_tx_t (*)(struct sk_buff *, struct net_device *)' (aka 'enum netdev_tx (*)(struct sk_buff *, struct net_device *)') with an expression of type 'int (struct sk_buff *, struct net_device *)' [-Werror,-Wincompatible-function-pointer-types-strict]
.ndo_start_xmit = ctcm_tx,
^~~~~~~
drivers/s390/net/ctcm_main.c:1072:21: error: incompatible function pointer types initializing 'netdev_tx_t (*)(struct sk_buff *, struct net_device *)' (aka 'enum netdev_tx (*)(struct sk_buff *, struct net_device *)') with an expression of type 'int (struct sk_buff *, struct net_device *)' [-Werror,-Wincompatible-function-pointer-types-strict]
.ndo_start_xmit = ctcmpc_tx,
^~~~~~~~~

->ndo_start_xmit() in 'struct net_device_ops' expects a return type of 'netdev_tx_t', not 'int'. Adjust the return type of ctc{mp,}m_tx() to match the prototype's to resolve the warning and potential CFI failure, should s390 select ARCH_SUPPORTS_CFI_CLANG in the future.

Additionally, while in the area, remove a comment block that is no longer relevant.

---
 drivers/s390/net/ctcm_main.c | 11 ++---------
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
drivers/s390/net/ctcm_main.c +2 -9
index e22b9ac3e564..ab48eef72d4f 100644
@@ -866,16 +866,9 @@ static int ctcmpc_transmit_skb(struct channel *ch, struct sk_buff *skb)
 /**
  * Start transmission of a packet.
  * Called from generic network device layer.
- *
- *  skb		Pointer to buffer containing the packet.
- *  dev		Pointer to interface struct.
- *
- * returns 0 if packet consumed, !0 if packet rejected.
- *         Note: If we return !0, then the packet is free'd by
- *               the generic network layer.
  */
 /* first merge version - leaving both functions separated */
-static int ctcm_tx(struct sk_buff *skb, struct net_device *dev)
+static netdev_tx_t ctcm_tx(struct sk_buff *skb, struct net_device *dev)
 {
 	struct ctcm_priv *priv = dev->ml_priv;
 
@@ -918,7 +911,7 @@ static int ctcm_tx(struct sk_buff *skb, struct net_device *dev)
 }
 
 /* unmerged MPC variant of ctcm_tx */
-static int ctcmpc_tx(struct sk_buff *skb, struct net_device *dev)
+static netdev_tx_t ctcmpc_tx(struct sk_buff *skb, struct net_device *dev)
 {
 	int len = 0;
 	struct ctcm_priv *priv = dev->ml_priv;
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
author maintainer
#195 lore raw

PATCH 195/251 s390/netiucv: Fix return type of netiucv_tx()

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Nathan Chancellor <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 88d86d18d7cf7e9137c95f9d212bb9fff8a1b4be ]

With clang's kernel control flow integrity (kCFI, CONFIG_CFI_CLANG), indirect call targets are validated against the expected function pointer prototype to make sure the call target is valid to help mitigate ROP attacks. If they are not identical, there is a failure at run time, which manifests as either a kernel panic or thread getting killed. A proposed warning in clang aims to catch these at compile time, which reveals:

drivers/s390/net/netiucv.c:1854:21: error: incompatible function pointer types initializing 'netdev_tx_t (*)(struct sk_buff *, struct net_device *)' (aka 'enum netdev_tx (*)(struct sk_buff *, struct net_device *)') with an expression of type 'int (struct sk_buff *, struct net_device *)' [-Werror,-Wincompatible-function-pointer-types-strict]
.ndo_start_xmit = netiucv_tx,
^~~~~~~~~~

->ndo_start_xmit() in 'struct net_device_ops' expects a return type of 'netdev_tx_t', not 'int'. Adjust the return type of netiucv_tx() to match the prototype's to resolve the warning and potential CFI failure, should s390 select ARCH_SUPPORTS_CFI_CLANG in the future.

Additionally, while in the area, remove a comment block that is no longer relevant.

---
 drivers/s390/net/netiucv.c | 9 +--------
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 8 deletions(-)
drivers/s390/net/netiucv.c +1 -8
index b0e8ffdf864b..3465ea3d667b 100644
@@ -1361,15 +1361,8 @@ static int netiucv_pm_restore_thaw(struct device *dev)
 /**
  * Start transmission of a packet.
  * Called from generic network device layer.
- *
- * @param skb Pointer to buffer containing the packet.
- * @param dev Pointer to interface struct.
- *
- * @return 0 if packet consumed, !0 if packet rejected.
- *         Note: If we return !0, then the packet is free'd by
- *               the generic network layer.
  */
-static int netiucv_tx(struct sk_buff *skb, struct net_device *dev)
+static netdev_tx_t netiucv_tx(struct sk_buff *skb, struct net_device *dev)
 {
 	struct netiucv_priv *privptr = netdev_priv(dev);
 	int rc;
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
author maintainer
#196 lore raw

PATCH 196/251 s390/lcs: Fix return type of lcs_start_xmit()

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Nathan Chancellor <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit bb16db8393658e0978c3f0d30ae069e878264fa3 ]

With clang's kernel control flow integrity (kCFI, CONFIG_CFI_CLANG), indirect call targets are validated against the expected function pointer prototype to make sure the call target is valid to help mitigate ROP attacks. If they are not identical, there is a failure at run time, which manifests as either a kernel panic or thread getting killed. A proposed warning in clang aims to catch these at compile time, which reveals:

drivers/s390/net/lcs.c:2090:21: error: incompatible function pointer types initializing 'netdev_tx_t (*)(struct sk_buff *, struct net_device *)' (aka 'enum netdev_tx (*)(struct sk_buff *, struct net_device *)') with an expression of type 'int (struct sk_buff *, struct net_device *)' [-Werror,-Wincompatible-function-pointer-types-strict]
.ndo_start_xmit = lcs_start_xmit,
^~~~~~~~~~~~~~
drivers/s390/net/lcs.c:2097:21: error: incompatible function pointer types initializing 'netdev_tx_t (*)(struct sk_buff *, struct net_device *)' (aka 'enum netdev_tx (*)(struct sk_buff *, struct net_device *)') with an expression of type 'int (struct sk_buff *, struct net_device *)' [-Werror,-Wincompatible-function-pointer-types-strict]
.ndo_start_xmit = lcs_start_xmit,
^~~~~~~~~~~~~~

->ndo_start_xmit() in 'struct net_device_ops' expects a return type of 'netdev_tx_t', not 'int'. Adjust the return type of lcs_start_xmit() to match the prototype's to resolve the warning and potential CFI failure, should s390 select ARCH_SUPPORTS_CFI_CLANG in the future.

---
 drivers/s390/net/lcs.c | 8 +++-----
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
drivers/s390/net/lcs.c +3 -5
index 4d3caad7e981..3bd2241c13e8 100644
@@ -1544,9 +1544,8 @@ lcs_txbuffer_cb(struct lcs_channel *channel, struct lcs_buffer *buffer)
 /**
  * Packet transmit function called by network stack
  */
-static int
-__lcs_start_xmit(struct lcs_card *card, struct sk_buff *skb,
-		 struct net_device *dev)
+static netdev_tx_t __lcs_start_xmit(struct lcs_card *card, struct sk_buff *skb,
+				    struct net_device *dev)
 {
 	struct lcs_header *header;
 	int rc = NETDEV_TX_OK;
@@ -1607,8 +1606,7 @@ __lcs_start_xmit(struct lcs_card *card, struct sk_buff *skb,
 	return rc;
 }
 
-static int
-lcs_start_xmit(struct sk_buff *skb, struct net_device *dev)
+static netdev_tx_t lcs_start_xmit(struct sk_buff *skb, struct net_device *dev)
 {
 	struct lcs_card *card;
 	int rc;
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
author maintainer
#197 lore raw

PATCH 197/251 drm/sti: Use drm_mode_copy()

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Ville Syrjälä <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 442cf8e22ba25a77cb9092d78733fdbac9844e50 ]

struct drm_display_mode embeds a list head, so overwriting the full struct with another one will corrupt the list (if the destination mode is on a list). Use drm_mode_copy() instead which explicitly preserves the list head of the destination mode.

Even if we know the destination mode is not on any list using drm_mode_copy() seems decent as it sets a good example. Bad examples of not using it might eventually get copied into code where preserving the list head actually matters.

Obviously one case not covered here is when the mode itself is embedded in a larger structure and the whole structure is copied. But if we are careful when copying into modes embedded in structures I think we can be a little more reassured that bogus list heads haven't been propagated in.

@is_mode_copy@
@@
drm_mode_copy(...)
{
...
}

@depends on !is_mode_copy@
struct drm_display_mode *mode;
expression E, S;
@@
(
- *mode = E
+ drm_mode_copy(mode, &E)
|
- memcpy(mode, E, S)
+ drm_mode_copy(mode, E)
)

@depends on !is_mode_copy@
struct drm_display_mode mode;
expression E;
@@
(
- mode = E
+ drm_mode_copy(&mode, &E)
|
- memcpy(&mode, E, S)
+ drm_mode_copy(&mode, E)
)

@@
struct drm_display_mode *mode;
@@
- &*mode
+ mode

---
 drivers/gpu/drm/sti/sti_dvo.c  | 2 +-
 drivers/gpu/drm/sti/sti_hda.c  | 2 +-
 drivers/gpu/drm/sti/sti_hdmi.c | 2 +-
 3 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
drivers/gpu/drm/sti/sti_dvo.c +1 -1
index e8c1ed08a9f7..4be5b5670599 100644
@@ -296,7 +296,7 @@ static void sti_dvo_set_mode(struct drm_bridge *bridge,
 
 	DRM_DEBUG_DRIVER("\n");
 
-	memcpy(&dvo->mode, mode, sizeof(struct drm_display_mode));
+	drm_mode_copy(&dvo->mode, mode);
 
 	/* According to the path used (main or aux), the dvo clocks should
 	 * have a different parent clock. */
drivers/gpu/drm/sti/sti_hda.c +1 -1
index 08808e3701de..cbceea7d4f87 100644
@@ -528,7 +528,7 @@ static void sti_hda_set_mode(struct drm_bridge *bridge,
 
 	DRM_DEBUG_DRIVER("\n");
 
-	memcpy(&hda->mode, mode, sizeof(struct drm_display_mode));
+	drm_mode_copy(&hda->mode, mode);
 
 	if (!hda_get_mode_idx(hda->mode, &mode_idx)) {
 		DRM_ERROR("Undefined mode\n");
drivers/gpu/drm/sti/sti_hdmi.c +1 -1
index a5412a6fbeca..c450668883b5 100644
@@ -848,7 +848,7 @@ static void sti_hdmi_set_mode(struct drm_bridge *bridge,
 	DRM_DEBUG_DRIVER("\n");
 
 	/* Copy the drm display mode in the connector local structure */
-	memcpy(&hdmi->mode, mode, sizeof(struct drm_display_mode));
+	drm_mode_copy(&hdmi->mode, mode);
 
 	/* Update clock framerate according to the selected mode */
 	ret = clk_set_rate(hdmi->clk_pix, mode->clock * 1000);
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
author maintainer
#198 lore raw

PATCH 198/251 md/raid1: stop mdx_raid1 thread when raid1 array run failed

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Jiang Li <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit b611ad14006e5be2170d9e8e611bf49dff288911 ]

fail run raid1 array when we assemble array with the inactive disk only, but the mdx_raid1 thread were not stop, Even if the associated resources have been released. it will caused a NULL dereference when we do poweroff.

This causes the following Oops:

    [  287.587787] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000070
    [  287.594762] #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode
    [  287.599912] #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page
    [  287.605061] PGD 0 P4D 0
    [  287.607612] Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI
    [  287.611287] CPU: 3 PID: 5265 Comm: md0_raid1 Tainted: G     U            5.10.146 #0
    [  287.619029] Hardware name: xxxxxxx/To be filled by O.E.M, BIOS 5.19 06/16/2022
    [  287.626775] RIP: 0010:md_check_recovery+0x57/0x500 [md_mod]
    [  287.632357] Code: fe 01 00 00 48 83 bb 10 03 00 00 00 74 08 48 89 ......
    [  287.651118] RSP: 0018:ffffc90000433d78 EFLAGS: 00010202
    [  287.656347] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff888105986800 RCX: 0000000000000000
    [  287.663491] RDX: ffffc90000433bb0 RSI: 00000000ffffefff RDI: ffff888105986800
    [  287.670634] RBP: ffffc90000433da0 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: c0000000ffffefff
    [  287.677771] R10: 0000000000000001 R11: ffffc90000433ba8 R12: ffff888105986800
    [  287.684907] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: fffffffffffffe00 R15: ffff888100b6b500
    [  287.692052] FS:  0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff888277f80000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
    [  287.700149] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
    [  287.705897] CR2: 0000000000000070 CR3: 000000000320a000 CR4: 0000000000350ee0
    [  287.713033] Call Trace:
    [  287.715498]  raid1d+0x6c/0xbbb [raid1]
    [  287.719256]  ? __schedule+0x1ff/0x760
    [  287.722930]  ? schedule+0x3b/0xb0
    [  287.726260]  ? schedule_timeout+0x1ed/0x290
    [  287.730456]  ? __switch_to+0x11f/0x400
    [  287.734219]  md_thread+0xe9/0x140 [md_mod]
    [  287.738328]  ? md_thread+0xe9/0x140 [md_mod]
    [  287.742601]  ? wait_woken+0x80/0x80
    [  287.746097]  ? md_register_thread+0xe0/0xe0 [md_mod]
    [  287.751064]  kthread+0x11a/0x140
    [  287.754300]  ? kthread_park+0x90/0x90
    [  287.757974]  ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30

In fact, when raid1 array run fail, we need to do
md_unregister_thread() before raid1_free().

---
 drivers/md/raid1.c | 1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
drivers/md/raid1.c +1 -0
index 8a50da4f148f..26ae749184da 100644
@@ -2964,6 +2964,7 @@ static int raid1_run(struct mddev *mddev)
 	 * RAID1 needs at least one disk in active
 	 */
 	if (conf->raid_disks - mddev->degraded < 1) {
+		md_unregister_thread(&conf->thread);
 		ret = -EINVAL;
 		goto abort;
 	}
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
author maintainer
#199 lore raw

PATCH 199/251 mrp: introduce active flags to prevent UAF when applicant uninit

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Schspa Shi <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit ab0377803dafc58f1e22296708c1c28e309414d6 ]

The caller of del_timer_sync must prevent restarting of the timer, If we have no this synchronization, there is a small probability that the cancellation will not be successful.

And syzbot report the fellowing crash:
==================================================================

BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in hlist_add_head include/linux/list.h:929 [inline]
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in enqueue_timer+0x18/0xa4 kernel/time/timer.c:605

Write at addr f9ff000024df6058 by task syz-fuzzer/2256 Pointer tag: [f9], memory tag: [fe]

CPU: 1 PID: 2256 Comm: syz-fuzzer Not tainted 6.1.0-rc5-syzkaller-00008-
ge01d50cbd6ee #0
Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT)
Call trace:
 dump_backtrace.part.0+0xe0/0xf0 arch/arm64/kernel/stacktrace.c:156
 dump_backtrace arch/arm64/kernel/stacktrace.c:162 [inline]
 show_stack+0x18/0x40 arch/arm64/kernel/stacktrace.c:163
 __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:88 [inline]
 dump_stack_lvl+0x68/0x84 lib/dump_stack.c:106
 print_address_description mm/kasan/report.c:284 [inline]
 print_report+0x1a8/0x4a0 mm/kasan/report.c:395
 kasan_report+0x94/0xb4 mm/kasan/report.c:495
 __do_kernel_fault+0x164/0x1e0 arch/arm64/mm/fault.c:320
 do_bad_area arch/arm64/mm/fault.c:473 [inline]
 do_tag_check_fault+0x78/0x8c arch/arm64/mm/fault.c:749
 do_mem_abort+0x44/0x94 arch/arm64/mm/fault.c:825
 el1_abort+0x40/0x60 arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:367
 el1h_64_sync_handler+0xd8/0xe4 arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:427
 el1h_64_sync+0x64/0x68 arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S:576
 hlist_add_head include/linux/list.h:929 [inline]
 enqueue_timer+0x18/0xa4 kernel/time/timer.c:605
 mod_timer+0x14/0x20 kernel/time/timer.c:1161
 mrp_periodic_timer_arm net/802/mrp.c:614 [inline]
 mrp_periodic_timer+0xa0/0xc0 net/802/mrp.c:627
 call_timer_fn.constprop.0+0x24/0x80 kernel/time/timer.c:1474
 expire_timers+0x98/0xc4 kernel/time/timer.c:1519

To fix it, we can introduce a new active flags to make sure the timer will not restart.

Reported-by [email protected]
---
 include/net/mrp.h |  1 +
 net/802/mrp.c     | 18 +++++++++++++-----
 2 files changed, 14 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
include/net/mrp.h +1 -0
index 31912c3be772..9338d6305159 100644
@@ -119,6 +119,7 @@ struct mrp_applicant {
 	struct sk_buff		*pdu;
 	struct rb_root		mad;
 	struct rcu_head		rcu;
+	bool			active;
 };
 
 struct mrp_port {
net/802/mrp.c +13 -5
index 4ee3af3d400b..ac6b6374a1fc 100644
@@ -610,7 +610,10 @@ static void mrp_join_timer(unsigned long data)
 	spin_unlock(&app->lock);
 
 	mrp_queue_xmit(app);
-	mrp_join_timer_arm(app);
+	spin_lock(&app->lock);
+	if (likely(app->active))
+		mrp_join_timer_arm(app);
+	spin_unlock(&app->lock);
 }
 
 static void mrp_periodic_timer_arm(struct mrp_applicant *app)
@@ -624,11 +627,12 @@ static void mrp_periodic_timer(unsigned long data)
 	struct mrp_applicant *app = (struct mrp_applicant *)data;
 
 	spin_lock(&app->lock);
-	mrp_mad_event(app, MRP_EVENT_PERIODIC);
-	mrp_pdu_queue(app);
+	if (likely(app->active)) {
+		mrp_mad_event(app, MRP_EVENT_PERIODIC);
+		mrp_pdu_queue(app);
+		mrp_periodic_timer_arm(app);
+	}
 	spin_unlock(&app->lock);
-
-	mrp_periodic_timer_arm(app);
 }
 
 static int mrp_pdu_parse_end_mark(struct sk_buff *skb, int *offset)
@@ -876,6 +880,7 @@ int mrp_init_applicant(struct net_device *dev, struct mrp_application *appl)
 	app->dev = dev;
 	app->app = appl;
 	app->mad = RB_ROOT;
+	app->active = true;
 	spin_lock_init(&app->lock);
 	skb_queue_head_init(&app->queue);
 	rcu_assign_pointer(dev->mrp_port->applicants[appl->type], app);
@@ -905,6 +910,9 @@ void mrp_uninit_applicant(struct net_device *dev, struct mrp_application *appl)
 
 	RCU_INIT_POINTER(port->applicants[appl->type], NULL);
 
+	spin_lock_bh(&app->lock);
+	app->active = false;
+	spin_unlock_bh(&app->lock);
 	/* Delete timer and generate a final TX event to flush out
 	 * all pending messages before the applicant is gone.
 	 */
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
author maintainer
#200 lore raw

PATCH 200/251 ppp: associate skb with a device at tx

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Stanislav Fomichev <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 9f225444467b98579cf28d94f4ad053460dfdb84 ]

Syzkaller triggered flow dissector warning with the following:

r0 = openat$ppp(0xffffffffffffff9c, &(0x7f0000000000), 0xc0802, 0x0)
ioctl$PPPIOCNEWUNIT(r0, 0xc004743e, &(0x7f00000000c0))
ioctl$PPPIOCSACTIVE(r0, 0x40107446, &(0x7f0000000240)={0x2, &(0x7f0000000180)=[{0x20, 0x0, 0x0, 0xfffff034}, {0x6}]}) pwritev(r0, &(0x7f0000000040)=[{&(0x7f0000000140)='\x00!', 0x2}], 0x1, 0x0, 0x0)

[    9.485814] WARNING: CPU: 3 PID: 329 at net/core/flow_dissector.c:1016 __skb_flow_dissect+0x1ee0/0x1fa0
[    9.485929]  skb_get_poff+0x53/0xa0
[    9.485937]  bpf_skb_get_pay_offset+0xe/0x20
[    9.485944]  ? ppp_send_frame+0xc2/0x5b0
[    9.485949]  ? _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x40/0x60
[    9.485958]  ? __ppp_xmit_process+0x7a/0xe0
[    9.485968]  ? ppp_xmit_process+0x5b/0xb0
[    9.485974]  ? ppp_write+0x12a/0x190
[    9.485981]  ? do_iter_write+0x18e/0x2d0
[    9.485987]  ? __import_iovec+0x30/0x130
[    9.485997]  ? do_pwritev+0x1b6/0x240
[    9.486016]  ? trace_hardirqs_on+0x47/0x50
[    9.486023]  ? __x64_sys_pwritev+0x24/0x30
[    9.486026]  ? do_syscall_64+0x3d/0x80
[    9.486031]  ? entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd

Flow dissector tries to find skb net namespace either via device or via socket. Neigher is set in ppp_send_frame, so let's manually use ppp->dev.

---
 drivers/net/ppp/ppp_generic.c | 2 ++
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
drivers/net/ppp/ppp_generic.c +2 -0
index 6287d2ad77c6..f6cf25cba16e 100644
@@ -1541,6 +1541,8 @@ ppp_send_frame(struct ppp *ppp, struct sk_buff *skb)
 	int len;
 	unsigned char *cp;
 
+	skb->dev = ppp->dev;
+
 	if (proto < 0x8000) {
 #ifdef CONFIG_PPP_FILTER
 		/* check if we should pass this packet */
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
author maintainer
#201 lore raw

PATCH 201/251 media: dvb-frontends: fix leak of memory fw

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Yan Lei <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit a15fe8d9f1bf460a804bcf18a890bfd2cf0d5caa ]

---
 drivers/media/dvb-frontends/bcm3510.c | 1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
drivers/media/dvb-frontends/bcm3510.c +1 -0
index bb698839e477..fc1dbdfb0cba 100644
@@ -648,6 +648,7 @@ static int bcm3510_download_firmware(struct dvb_frontend* fe)
 		deb_info("firmware chunk, addr: 0x%04x, len: 0x%04x, total length: 0x%04zx\n",addr,len,fw->size);
 		if ((ret = bcm3510_write_ram(st,addr,&b[i+4],len)) < 0) {
 			err("firmware download failed: %d\n",ret);
+			release_firmware(fw);
 			return ret;
 		}
 		i += 4 + len;
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
author maintainer
#202 lore raw

PATCH 202/251 media: dvb-usb: fix memory leak in dvb_usb_adapter_init()

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Mazin Al Haddad <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 94d90fb06b94a90c176270d38861bcba34ce377d ]

Syzbot reports a memory leak in "dvb_usb_adapter_init()". The leak is due to not accounting for and freeing current iteration's adapter->priv in case of an error. Currently if an error occurs, it will exit before incrementing "num_adapters_initalized", which is used as a reference counter to free all adap->priv in "dvb_usb_adapter_exit()". There are multiple error paths that can exit from before incrementing the counter. Including the error handling paths for "dvb_usb_adapter_stream_init()", "dvb_usb_adapter_dvb_init()" and "dvb_usb_adapter_frontend_init()" within "dvb_usb_adapter_init()".

This means that in case of an error in any of these functions the current iteration is not accounted for and the current iteration's adap->priv is not freed.

Fix this by freeing the current iteration's adap->priv in the "stream_init_err:" label in the error path. The rest of the (accounted for) adap->priv objects are freed in dvb_usb_adapter_exit() as expected using the num_adapters_initalized variable.

Syzbot report:

BUG: memory leak
unreferenced object 0xffff8881172f1a00 (size 512):
  comm "kworker/0:2", pid 139, jiffies 4294994873 (age 10.960s)
  hex dump (first 32 bytes):
    00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  ................
    00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  ................
backtrace:
    [<ffffffff844af012>] dvb_usb_adapter_init drivers/media/usb/dvb-usb/dvb-usb-init.c:75 [inline]
    [<ffffffff844af012>] dvb_usb_init drivers/media/usb/dvb-usb/dvb-usb-init.c:184 [inline]
    [<ffffffff844af012>] dvb_usb_device_init.cold+0x4e5/0x79e drivers/media/usb/dvb-usb/dvb-usb-init.c:308
    [<ffffffff830db21d>] dib0700_probe+0x8d/0x1b0 drivers/media/usb/dvb-usb/dib0700_core.c:883
    [<ffffffff82d3fdc7>] usb_probe_interface+0x177/0x370 drivers/usb/core/driver.c:396
    [<ffffffff8274ab37>] call_driver_probe drivers/base/dd.c:542 [inline]
    [<ffffffff8274ab37>] really_probe.part.0+0xe7/0x310 drivers/base/dd.c:621
    [<ffffffff8274ae6c>] really_probe drivers/base/dd.c:583 [inline]
    [<ffffffff8274ae6c>] __driver_probe_device+0x10c/0x1e0 drivers/base/dd.c:752
    [<ffffffff8274af6a>] driver_probe_device+0x2a/0x120 drivers/base/dd.c:782
    [<ffffffff8274b786>] __device_attach_driver+0xf6/0x140 drivers/base/dd.c:899
    [<ffffffff82747c87>] bus_for_each_drv+0xb7/0x100 drivers/base/bus.c:427
    [<ffffffff8274b352>] __device_attach+0x122/0x260 drivers/base/dd.c:970
    [<ffffffff827498f6>] bus_probe_device+0xc6/0xe0 drivers/base/bus.c:487
    [<ffffffff82745cdb>] device_add+0x5fb/0xdf0 drivers/base/core.c:3405
    [<ffffffff82d3d202>] usb_set_configuration+0x8f2/0xb80 drivers/usb/core/message.c:2170
    [<ffffffff82d4dbfc>] usb_generic_driver_probe+0x8c/0xc0 drivers/usb/core/generic.c:238
    [<ffffffff82d3f49c>] usb_probe_device+0x5c/0x140 drivers/usb/core/driver.c:293
    [<ffffffff8274ab37>] call_driver_probe drivers/base/dd.c:542 [inline]
    [<ffffffff8274ab37>] really_probe.part.0+0xe7/0x310 drivers/base/dd.c:621
    [<ffffffff8274ae6c>] really_probe drivers/base/dd.c:583 [inline]
    [<ffffffff8274ae6c>] __driver_probe_device+0x10c/0x1e0 drivers/base/dd.c:752
---
 drivers/media/usb/dvb-usb/dvb-usb-init.c | 4 +++-
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/media/usb/dvb-usb/dvb-usb-init.c +3 -1
index 690c1e06fbfa..28077f3c9edf 100644
@@ -84,7 +84,7 @@ static int dvb_usb_adapter_init(struct dvb_usb_device *d, short *adapter_nrs)
 
 		ret = dvb_usb_adapter_stream_init(adap);
 		if (ret)
-			return ret;
+			goto stream_init_err;
 
 		ret = dvb_usb_adapter_dvb_init(adap, adapter_nrs);
 		if (ret)
@@ -117,6 +117,8 @@ static int dvb_usb_adapter_init(struct dvb_usb_device *d, short *adapter_nrs)
 	dvb_usb_adapter_dvb_exit(adap);
 dvb_init_err:
 	dvb_usb_adapter_stream_exit(adap);
+stream_init_err:
+	kfree(adap->priv);
 	return ret;
 }
 
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
author maintainer
#203 lore raw

PATCH 203/251 blk-mq: fix possible memleak when register hctx failed

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Ye Bin <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 4b7a21c57b14fbcd0e1729150189e5933f5088e9 ]

There's issue as follows when do fault injection test:
unreferenced object 0xffff888132a9f400 (size 512):
comm "insmod", pid 308021, jiffies 4324277909 (age 509.733s) hex dump (first 32 bytes):

    00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 08 f4 a9 32 81 88 ff ff  ...........2....
    08 f4 a9 32 81 88 ff ff 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  ...2............
  backtrace:
    [<00000000e8952bb4>] kmalloc_node_trace+0x22/0xa0
    [<00000000f9980e0f>] blk_mq_alloc_and_init_hctx+0x3f1/0x7e0
    [<000000002e719efa>] blk_mq_realloc_hw_ctxs+0x1e6/0x230
    [<000000004f1fda40>] blk_mq_init_allocated_queue+0x27e/0x910
    [<00000000287123ec>] __blk_mq_alloc_disk+0x67/0xf0
    [<00000000a2a34657>] 0xffffffffa2ad310f
    [<00000000b173f718>] 0xffffffffa2af824a
    [<0000000095a1dabb>] do_one_initcall+0x87/0x2a0
    [<00000000f32fdf93>] do_init_module+0xdf/0x320
    [<00000000cbe8541e>] load_module+0x3006/0x3390
    [<0000000069ed1bdb>] __do_sys_finit_module+0x113/0x1b0
    [<00000000a1a29ae8>] do_syscall_64+0x35/0x80
    [<000000009cd878b0>] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x46/0xb0

Fault injection context as follows:
kobject_add
blk_mq_register_hctx
blk_mq_sysfs_register
blk_register_queue
device_add_disk
null_add_dev.part.0 [null_blk]

As 'blk_mq_register_hctx' may already add some objects when failed halfway, but there isn't do fallback, caller don't know which objects add failed. To solve above issue just do fallback when add objects failed halfway in 'blk_mq_register_hctx'.

---
 block/blk-mq-sysfs.c | 11 +++++++++--
 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
block/blk-mq-sysfs.c +9 -2
index 5b64d9d7d147..fc9362e0a118 100644
@@ -380,7 +380,7 @@ static int blk_mq_register_hctx(struct blk_mq_hw_ctx *hctx)
 {
 	struct request_queue *q = hctx->queue;
 	struct blk_mq_ctx *ctx;
-	int i, ret;
+	int i, j, ret;
 
 	if (!hctx->nr_ctx)
 		return 0;
@@ -392,9 +392,16 @@ static int blk_mq_register_hctx(struct blk_mq_hw_ctx *hctx)
 	hctx_for_each_ctx(hctx, ctx, i) {
 		ret = kobject_add(&ctx->kobj, &hctx->kobj, "cpu%u", ctx->cpu);
 		if (ret)
-			break;
+			goto out;
 	}
 
+	return 0;
+out:
+	hctx_for_each_ctx(hctx, ctx, j) {
+		if (j < i)
+			kobject_del(&ctx->kobj);
+	}
+	kobject_del(&hctx->kobj);
 	return ret;
 }
 
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
author maintainer
#204 lore raw

PATCH 204/251 mmc: f-sdh30: Add quirks for broken timeout clock capability

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Kunihiko Hayashi <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit aae9d3a440736691b3c1cb09ae2c32c4f1ee2e67 ]

There is a case where the timeout clock is not supplied to the capability. Add a quirk for that.

---
 drivers/mmc/host/sdhci_f_sdh30.c | 3 +++
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
drivers/mmc/host/sdhci_f_sdh30.c +3 -0
index 111b66f5439b..43e787954293 100644
@@ -180,6 +180,9 @@ static int sdhci_f_sdh30_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)
 	if (reg & SDHCI_CAN_DO_8BIT)
 		priv->vendor_hs200 = F_SDH30_EMMC_HS200;
 
+	if (!(reg & SDHCI_TIMEOUT_CLK_MASK))
+		host->quirks |= SDHCI_QUIRK_DATA_TIMEOUT_USES_SDCLK;
+
 	ret = sdhci_add_host(host);
 	if (ret)
 		goto err_add_host;
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
author maintainer
#205 lore raw

PATCH 205/251 media: si470x: Fix use-after-free in si470x_int_in_callback()

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Shigeru Yoshida <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 7d21e0b1b41b21d628bf2afce777727bd4479aa5 ]

syzbot reported use-after-free in si470x_int_in_callback() [1]. This indicates that urb->context, which contains struct si470x_device object, is freed when si470x_int_in_callback() is called.

The cause of this issue is that si470x_int_in_callback() is called for freed urb.

si470x_usb_driver_probe() calls si470x_start_usb(), which then calls usb_submit_urb() and si470x_start(). If si470x_start_usb() fails, si470x_usb_driver_probe() doesn't kill urb, but it just frees struct si470x_device object, as depicted below:

si470x_usb_driver_probe()
...
si470x_start_usb()

    ...
    usb_submit_urb()
    retval = si470x_start()
    return retval
  if (retval < 0)
    free struct si470x_device object, but don't kill urb

This patch fixes this issue by killing urb when si470x_start_usb() fails and urb is submitted. If si470x_start_usb() fails and urb is not submitted, i.e. submitting usb fails, it just frees struct si470x_device object.

---
 drivers/media/radio/si470x/radio-si470x-usb.c | 4 +++-
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/media/radio/si470x/radio-si470x-usb.c +3 -1
index a8a0ff9a1f83..6724c5287cc3 100644
@@ -741,8 +741,10 @@ static int si470x_usb_driver_probe(struct usb_interface *intf,
 
 	/* start radio */
 	retval = si470x_start_usb(radio);
-	if (retval < 0)
+	if (retval < 0 && !radio->int_in_running)
 		goto err_buf;
+	else if (retval < 0)	/* in case of radio->int_in_running == 1 */
+		goto err_all;
 
 	/* set initial frequency */
 	si470x_set_freq(radio, 87.5 * FREQ_MUL); /* available in all regions */
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
author maintainer
#206 lore raw

PATCH 206/251 clk: st: Fix memory leak in st_of_quadfs_setup()

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Xiu Jianfeng <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit cfd3ffb36f0d566846163118651d868e607300ba ]

If st_clk_register_quadfs_pll() fails, @lock should be freed before goto @err_exit, otherwise will cause meory leak issue, fix it.

---
 drivers/clk/st/clkgen-fsyn.c | 5 +++--
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/clk/st/clkgen-fsyn.c +3 -2
index 14819d919df1..715c5d3a5cde 100644
@@ -948,9 +948,10 @@ static void __init st_of_quadfs_setup(struct device_node *np,
 
 	clk = st_clk_register_quadfs_pll(pll_name, clk_parent_name, data,
 			reg, lock);
-	if (IS_ERR(clk))
+	if (IS_ERR(clk)) {
+		kfree(lock);
 		goto err_exit;
-	else
+	} else
 		pr_debug("%s: parent %s rate %u\n",
 			__clk_get_name(clk),
 			__clk_get_name(clk_get_parent(clk)),
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
author maintainer
#207 lore raw

PATCH 207/251 drm/fsl-dcu: Fix return type of fsl_dcu_drm_connector_mode_valid()

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Nathan Chancellor <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 96d845a67b7e406cfed7880a724c8ca6121e022e ]

With clang's kernel control flow integrity (kCFI, CONFIG_CFI_CLANG), indirect call targets are validated against the expected function pointer prototype to make sure the call target is valid to help mitigate ROP attacks. If they are not identical, there is a failure at run time, which manifests as either a kernel panic or thread getting killed. A proposed warning in clang aims to catch these at compile time, which reveals:

drivers/gpu/drm/fsl-dcu/fsl_dcu_drm_rgb.c:74:16: error: incompatible function pointer types initializing 'enum drm_mode_status (*)(struct drm_connector *, struct drm_display_mode *)' with an expression of type 'int (struct drm_connector *, struct drm_display_mode *)' [-Werror,-Wincompatible-function-pointer-types-strict]
.mode_valid = fsl_dcu_drm_connector_mode_valid,
^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
1 error generated.

->mode_valid() in 'struct drm_connector_helper_funcs' expects a return type of 'enum drm_mode_status', not 'int'. Adjust the return type of fsl_dcu_drm_connector_mode_valid() to match the prototype's to resolve the warning and CFI failure.

---
 drivers/gpu/drm/fsl-dcu/fsl_dcu_drm_rgb.c | 5 +++--
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/gpu/drm/fsl-dcu/fsl_dcu_drm_rgb.c +3 -2
index e1dd75b18118..5993d6ac85e6 100644
@@ -90,8 +90,9 @@ static int fsl_dcu_drm_connector_get_modes(struct drm_connector *connector)
 	return num_modes;
 }
 
-static int fsl_dcu_drm_connector_mode_valid(struct drm_connector *connector,
-					    struct drm_display_mode *mode)
+static enum drm_mode_status
+fsl_dcu_drm_connector_mode_valid(struct drm_connector *connector,
+				 struct drm_display_mode *mode)
 {
 	if (mode->hdisplay & 0xf)
 		return MODE_ERROR;
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
author maintainer
#208 lore raw

PATCH 208/251 drm/sti: Fix return type of sti_{dvo,hda,hdmi}_connector_mode_valid()

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Nathan Chancellor <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 0ad811cc08a937d875cbad0149c1bab17f84ba05 ]

With clang's kernel control flow integrity (kCFI, CONFIG_CFI_CLANG), indirect call targets are validated against the expected function pointer prototype to make sure the call target is valid to help mitigate ROP attacks. If they are not identical, there is a failure at run time, which manifests as either a kernel panic or thread getting killed. A proposed warning in clang aims to catch these at compile time, which reveals:

drivers/gpu/drm/sti/sti_hda.c:637:16: error: incompatible function pointer types initializing 'enum drm_mode_status (*)(struct drm_connector *, struct drm_display_mode *)' with an expression of type 'int (struct drm_connector *, struct drm_display_mode *)' [-Werror,-Wincompatible-function-pointer-types-strict]
.mode_valid = sti_hda_connector_mode_valid,
^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
drivers/gpu/drm/sti/sti_dvo.c:376:16: error: incompatible function pointer types initializing 'enum drm_mode_status (*)(struct drm_connector *, struct drm_display_mode *)' with an expression of type 'int (struct drm_connector *, struct drm_display_mode *)' [-Werror,-Wincompatible-function-pointer-types-strict]
.mode_valid = sti_dvo_connector_mode_valid,
^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
drivers/gpu/drm/sti/sti_hdmi.c:1035:16: error: incompatible function pointer types initializing 'enum drm_mode_status (*)(struct drm_connector *, struct drm_display_mode *)' with an expression of type 'int (struct drm_connector *, struct drm_display_mode *)' [-Werror,-Wincompatible-function-pointer-types-strict]
.mode_valid = sti_hdmi_connector_mode_valid,
^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

->mode_valid() in 'struct drm_connector_helper_funcs' expects a return type of 'enum drm_mode_status', not 'int'. Adjust the return type of sti_{dvo,hda,hdmi}_connector_mode_valid() to match the prototype's to resolve the warning and CFI failure.

---
 drivers/gpu/drm/sti/sti_dvo.c  | 5 +++--
 drivers/gpu/drm/sti/sti_hda.c  | 5 +++--
 drivers/gpu/drm/sti/sti_hdmi.c | 5 +++--
 3 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
drivers/gpu/drm/sti/sti_dvo.c +3 -2
index 4be5b5670599..10e33a89b74c 100644
@@ -354,8 +354,9 @@ static int sti_dvo_connector_get_modes(struct drm_connector *connector)
 
 #define CLK_TOLERANCE_HZ 50
 
-static int sti_dvo_connector_mode_valid(struct drm_connector *connector,
-					struct drm_display_mode *mode)
+static enum drm_mode_status
+sti_dvo_connector_mode_valid(struct drm_connector *connector,
+			     struct drm_display_mode *mode)
 {
 	int target = mode->clock * 1000;
 	int target_min = target - CLK_TOLERANCE_HZ;
drivers/gpu/drm/sti/sti_hda.c +3 -2
index cbceea7d4f87..1c36758660f5 100644
@@ -606,8 +606,9 @@ static int sti_hda_connector_get_modes(struct drm_connector *connector)
 
 #define CLK_TOLERANCE_HZ 50
 
-static int sti_hda_connector_mode_valid(struct drm_connector *connector,
-					struct drm_display_mode *mode)
+static enum drm_mode_status
+sti_hda_connector_mode_valid(struct drm_connector *connector,
+			     struct drm_display_mode *mode)
 {
 	int target = mode->clock * 1000;
 	int target_min = target - CLK_TOLERANCE_HZ;
drivers/gpu/drm/sti/sti_hdmi.c +3 -2
index c450668883b5..28186bcc8139 100644
@@ -906,8 +906,9 @@ static int sti_hdmi_connector_get_modes(struct drm_connector *connector)
 
 #define CLK_TOLERANCE_HZ 50
 
-static int sti_hdmi_connector_mode_valid(struct drm_connector *connector,
-					struct drm_display_mode *mode)
+static enum drm_mode_status
+sti_hdmi_connector_mode_valid(struct drm_connector *connector,
+			      struct drm_display_mode *mode)
 {
 	int target = mode->clock * 1000;
 	int target_min = target - CLK_TOLERANCE_HZ;
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
author maintainer
#209 lore raw

PATCH 209/251 orangefs: Fix kmemleak in orangefs_prepare_debugfs_help_string()

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Zhang Xiaoxu <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit d23417a5bf3a3afc55de5442eb46e1e60458b0a1 ]

When insert and remove the orangefs module, then debug_help_string will be leaked:

unreferenced object 0xffff8881652ba000 (size 4096):

    comm "insmod", pid 1701, jiffies 4294893639 (age 13218.530s)
    hex dump (first 32 bytes):
      43 6c 69 65 6e 74 20 44 65 62 75 67 20 4b 65 79  Client Debug Key
      77 6f 72 64 73 20 61 72 65 20 75 6e 6b 6e 6f 77  words are unknow
    backtrace:
      [<0000000004e6f8e3>] kmalloc_trace+0x27/0xa0
      [<0000000006f75d85>] orangefs_prepare_debugfs_help_string+0x5e/0x480 [orangefs]
      [<0000000091270a2a>] _sub_I_65535_1+0x57/0xf70 [crc_itu_t]
      [<000000004b1ee1a3>] do_one_initcall+0x87/0x2a0
      [<000000001d0614ae>] do_init_module+0xdf/0x320
      [<00000000efef068c>] load_module+0x2f98/0x3330
      [<000000006533b44d>] __do_sys_finit_module+0x113/0x1b0
      [<00000000a0da6f99>] do_syscall_64+0x35/0x80
      [<000000007790b19b>] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x46/0xb0

When remove the module, should always free debug_help_string. Should always free the allocated buffer when change the free_debug_help_string.

---
 fs/orangefs/orangefs-debugfs.c | 3 +++
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
fs/orangefs/orangefs-debugfs.c +3 -0
index 7d7df003f9d8..401d70944e49 100644
@@ -253,6 +253,8 @@ static int orangefs_kernel_debug_init(void)
 void orangefs_debugfs_cleanup(void)
 {
 	debugfs_remove_recursive(debug_dir);
+	kfree(debug_help_string);
+	debug_help_string = NULL;
 }
 
 /* open ORANGEFS_KMOD_DEBUG_HELP_FILE */
@@ -706,6 +708,7 @@ int orangefs_prepare_debugfs_help_string(int at_boot)
 		memset(debug_help_string, 0, DEBUG_HELP_STRING_SIZE);
 		strlcat(debug_help_string, new, string_size);
 		mutex_unlock(&orangefs_help_file_lock);
+		kfree(new);
 	}
 
 	rc = 0;
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
author maintainer
#210 lore raw

PATCH 210/251 ASoC: mediatek: mt8173-rt5650-rt5514: fix refcount leak in mt8173_rt5650_rt5514_dev_probe()

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Wang Yufen <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 3327d721114c109ba0575f86f8fda3b525404054 ]

The node returned by of_parse_phandle() with refcount incremented, of_node_put() needs be called when finish using it. So add it in the error path in mt8173_rt5650_rt5514_dev_probe().

Fixes 0d1d7a664288 ("ASoC: mediatek: Refine mt8173 driver and change config option")
---
 sound/soc/mediatek/mt8173/mt8173-rt5650-rt5514.c | 7 +++++--
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
sound/soc/mediatek/mt8173/mt8173-rt5650-rt5514.c +5 -2
index 52fdd766ee82..8fbc59199d58 100644
@@ -209,14 +209,16 @@ static int mt8173_rt5650_rt5514_dev_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)
 	if (!mt8173_rt5650_rt5514_codecs[0].of_node) {
 		dev_err(&pdev->dev,
 			"Property 'audio-codec' missing or invalid\n");
-		return -EINVAL;
+		ret = -EINVAL;
+		goto out;
 	}
 	mt8173_rt5650_rt5514_codecs[1].of_node =
 		of_parse_phandle(pdev->dev.of_node, "mediatek,audio-codec", 1);
 	if (!mt8173_rt5650_rt5514_codecs[1].of_node) {
 		dev_err(&pdev->dev,
 			"Property 'audio-codec' missing or invalid\n");
-		return -EINVAL;
+		ret = -EINVAL;
+		goto out;
 	}
 	mt8173_rt5650_rt5514_codec_conf[0].of_node =
 		mt8173_rt5650_rt5514_codecs[1].of_node;
@@ -229,6 +231,7 @@ static int mt8173_rt5650_rt5514_dev_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)
 		dev_err(&pdev->dev, "%s snd_soc_register_card fail %d\n",
 			__func__, ret);
 
+out:
 	of_node_put(platform_node);
 	return ret;
 }
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
author maintainer
#211 lore raw

PATCH 211/251 ASoC: wm8994: Fix potential deadlock

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Marek Szyprowski <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 9529dc167ffcdfd201b9f0eda71015f174095f7e ]

Fix this by dropping wm8994->accdet_lock while calling cancel_delayed_work_sync(&wm8994->mic_work) in wm1811_jackdet_irq().

Fixes c0cc3f166525 ("ASoC: wm8994: Allow a delay between jack insertion and microphone detect")
---
 sound/soc/codecs/wm8994.c | 5 +++++
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)
sound/soc/codecs/wm8994.c +5 -0
index f289762cd676..1feeeed4bfb2 100644
@@ -3704,7 +3704,12 @@ static irqreturn_t wm1811_jackdet_irq(int irq, void *data)
 	} else {
 		dev_dbg(codec->dev, "Jack not detected\n");
 
+		/* Release wm8994->accdet_lock to avoid deadlock:
+		 * cancel_delayed_work_sync() takes wm8994->mic_work internal
+		 * lock and wm1811_mic_work takes wm8994->accdet_lock */
+		mutex_unlock(&wm8994->accdet_lock);
 		cancel_delayed_work_sync(&wm8994->mic_work);
+		mutex_lock(&wm8994->accdet_lock);
 
 		snd_soc_update_bits(codec, WM8958_MICBIAS2,
 				    WM8958_MICB2_DISCH, WM8958_MICB2_DISCH);
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
author maintainer
#212 lore raw

PATCH 212/251 ASoC: rockchip: spdif: Add missing clk_disable_unprepare() in rk_spdif_runtime_resume()

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Wang Jingjin <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 6d94d0090527b1763872275a7ccd44df7219b31e ]

rk_spdif_runtime_resume() may have called clk_prepare_enable() before return from failed branches, add missing clk_disable_unprepare() in this case.

Fixes f874b80e1571 ("ASoC: rockchip: Add rockchip SPDIF transceiver driver")
---
 sound/soc/rockchip/rockchip_spdif.c | 1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
sound/soc/rockchip/rockchip_spdif.c +1 -0
index f387d7bae3d4..e4073c48faf6 100644
@@ -85,6 +85,7 @@ static int __maybe_unused rk_spdif_runtime_resume(struct device *dev)
 
 	ret = clk_prepare_enable(spdif->hclk);
 	if (ret) {
+		clk_disable_unprepare(spdif->mclk);
 		dev_err(spdif->dev, "hclk clock enable failed %d\n", ret);
 		return ret;
 	}
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
author maintainer
#213 lore raw

PATCH 213/251 ASoC: rt5670: Remove unbalanced pm_runtime_put()

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Hans de Goede <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 6c900dcc3f7331a67ed29739d74524e428d137fb ]

For some reason rt5670_i2c_probe() does a pm_runtime_put() at the end of a successful probe. But it has never done a pm_runtime_get() leading to the following error being logged into dmesg:

rt5670 i2c-10EC5640:00: Runtime PM usage count underflow!

Fix this by removing the unnecessary pm_runtime_put().

Fixes 64e89e5f5548 ("ASoC: rt5670: Add runtime PM support")
---
 sound/soc/codecs/rt5670.c |    2 --
 1 file changed, 2 deletions(-)
sound/soc/codecs/rt5670.c +0 -2
@@ -3028,8 +3028,6 @@ static int rt5670_i2c_probe(struct i2c_c
 	if (ret < 0)
 		goto err;
 
-	pm_runtime_put(&i2c->dev);
-
 	return 0;
 err:
 	pm_runtime_disable(&i2c->dev);
author maintainer
#214 lore raw

PATCH 214/251 HID: wacom: Ensure bootloader PID is usable in hidraw mode

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Jason Gerecke <[email protected]>

commit 1db1f392591aff13fd643f0ec7c1d5e27391d700 upstream.

Some Wacom devices have a special "bootloader" mode that is used for firmware flashing. When operating in this mode, the device cannot be used for input, and the HID descriptor is not able to be processed by the driver. The driver generates an "Unknown device_type" warning and then returns an error code from wacom_probe(). This is a problem because userspace still needs to be able to interact with the device via hidraw to perform the firmware flash.

This commit adds a non-generic device definition for 056a:0094 which is used when devices are in "bootloader" mode. It marks the devices with a special BOOTLOADER type that is recognized by wacom_probe() and wacom_raw_event(). When we see this type we ensure a hidraw device is created and otherwise keep our hands off so that userspace is in full control.

---
 drivers/hid/wacom_sys.c |    8 ++++++++
 drivers/hid/wacom_wac.c |    4 ++++
 drivers/hid/wacom_wac.h |    1 +
 3 files changed, 13 insertions(+)
drivers/hid/wacom_sys.c +8 -0
@@ -69,6 +69,9 @@ static int wacom_raw_event(struct hid_de
 {
 	struct wacom *wacom = hid_get_drvdata(hdev);
 
+	if (wacom->wacom_wac.features.type == BOOTLOADER)
+		return 0;
+
 	if (size > WACOM_PKGLEN_MAX)
 		return 1;
 
@@ -2409,6 +2412,11 @@ static int wacom_probe(struct hid_device
 		goto fail;
 	}
 
+	if (features->type == BOOTLOADER) {
+		hid_warn(hdev, "Using device in hidraw-only mode");
+		return hid_hw_start(hdev, HID_CONNECT_HIDRAW);
+	}
+
 	error = wacom_parse_and_register(wacom, false);
 	if (error)
 		goto fail;
drivers/hid/wacom_wac.c +4 -0
@@ -3550,6 +3550,9 @@ static const struct wacom_features wacom
 static const struct wacom_features wacom_features_HID_ANY_ID =
 	{ "Wacom HID", .type = HID_GENERIC, .oVid = HID_ANY_ID, .oPid = HID_ANY_ID };
 
+static const struct wacom_features wacom_features_0x94 =
+	{ "Wacom Bootloader", .type = BOOTLOADER };
+
 #define USB_DEVICE_WACOM(prod)						\
 	HID_DEVICE(BUS_USB, HID_GROUP_WACOM, USB_VENDOR_ID_WACOM, prod),\
 	.driver_data = (kernel_ulong_t)&wacom_features_##prod
@@ -3623,6 +3626,7 @@ const struct hid_device_id wacom_ids[] =
 	{ USB_DEVICE_WACOM(0x84) },
 	{ USB_DEVICE_WACOM(0x90) },
 	{ USB_DEVICE_WACOM(0x93) },
+	{ USB_DEVICE_WACOM(0x94) },
 	{ USB_DEVICE_WACOM(0x97) },
 	{ USB_DEVICE_WACOM(0x9A) },
 	{ USB_DEVICE_WACOM(0x9F) },
drivers/hid/wacom_wac.h +1 -0
@@ -154,6 +154,7 @@ enum {
 	MTTPC,
 	MTTPC_B,
 	HID_GENERIC,
+	BOOTLOADER,
 	MAX_TYPE
 };
 
author maintainer
#215 lore raw

PATCH 215/251 reiserfs: Add missing calls to reiserfs_security_free()

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Roberto Sassu <[email protected]>

commit 572302af1258459e124437b8f3369357447afac7 upstream.

Commit 57fe60df6241 ("reiserfs: add atomic addition of selinux attributes during inode creation") defined reiserfs_security_free() to free the name and value of a security xattr allocated by the active LSM through security_old_inode_init_security(). However, this function is not called in the reiserfs code.

Thus, add a call to reiserfs_security_free() whenever reiserfs_security_init() is called, and initialize value to NULL, to avoid to call kfree() on an uninitialized pointer.

Finally, remove the kfree() for the xattr name, as it is not allocated anymore.

Fixes 57fe60df6241 ("reiserfs: add atomic addition of selinux attributes during inode creation")
Cc Jeff Mahoney <[email protected]>
Cc Tetsuo Handa <[email protected]>
---
 fs/reiserfs/namei.c          |    4 ++++
 fs/reiserfs/xattr_security.c |    2 +-
 2 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
fs/reiserfs/namei.c +4 -0
@@ -695,6 +695,7 @@ static int reiserfs_create(struct inode
 
 out_failed:
 	reiserfs_write_unlock(dir->i_sb);
+	reiserfs_security_free(&security);
 	return retval;
 }
 
@@ -778,6 +779,7 @@ static int reiserfs_mknod(struct inode *
 
 out_failed:
 	reiserfs_write_unlock(dir->i_sb);
+	reiserfs_security_free(&security);
 	return retval;
 }
 
@@ -876,6 +878,7 @@ static int reiserfs_mkdir(struct inode *
 	retval = journal_end(&th);
 out_failed:
 	reiserfs_write_unlock(dir->i_sb);
+	reiserfs_security_free(&security);
 	return retval;
 }
 
@@ -1191,6 +1194,7 @@ static int reiserfs_symlink(struct inode
 	retval = journal_end(&th);
 out_failed:
 	reiserfs_write_unlock(parent_dir->i_sb);
+	reiserfs_security_free(&security);
 	return retval;
 }
 
fs/reiserfs/xattr_security.c +1 -1
@@ -48,6 +48,7 @@ int reiserfs_security_init(struct inode
 	int error;
 
 	sec->name = NULL;
+	sec->value = NULL;
 
 	/* Don't add selinux attributes on xattrs - they'll never get used */
 	if (IS_PRIVATE(dir))
@@ -93,7 +94,6 @@ int reiserfs_security_write(struct reise
 
 void reiserfs_security_free(struct reiserfs_security_handle *sec)
 {
-	kfree(sec->name);
 	kfree(sec->value);
 	sec->name = NULL;
 	sec->value = NULL;
author maintainer
#216 lore raw

PATCH 216/251 iio: adc: ad_sigma_delta: do not use internal iio_dev lock

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Nuno Sá <[email protected]>

commit 20228a1d5a55e7db0c6720840f2c7d2b48c55f69 upstream.

Drop 'mlock' usage by making use of iio_device_claim_direct_mode(). This change actually makes sure we cannot do a single conversion while buffering is enable. Note there was a potential race in the previous code since we were only acquiring the lock after checking if the bus is enabled.

Fixes af3008485ea0 ("iio:adc: Add common code for ADI Sigma Delta devices")
Cc <[email protected]> #No rush as race is very old.
---
 drivers/iio/adc/ad_sigma_delta.c |    8 ++++----
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
drivers/iio/adc/ad_sigma_delta.c +4 -4
@@ -282,10 +282,10 @@ int ad_sigma_delta_single_conversion(str
 	unsigned int sample, raw_sample;
 	int ret = 0;
 
-	if (iio_buffer_enabled(indio_dev))
-		return -EBUSY;
+	ret = iio_device_claim_direct_mode(indio_dev);
+	if (ret)
+		return ret;
 
-	mutex_lock(&indio_dev->mlock);
 	ad_sigma_delta_set_channel(sigma_delta, chan->address);
 
 	spi_bus_lock(sigma_delta->spi->master);
@@ -319,7 +319,7 @@ out:
 	ad_sigma_delta_set_mode(sigma_delta, AD_SD_MODE_IDLE);
 	sigma_delta->bus_locked = false;
 	spi_bus_unlock(sigma_delta->spi->master);
-	mutex_unlock(&indio_dev->mlock);
+	iio_device_release_direct_mode(indio_dev);
 
 	if (ret)
 		return ret;
author maintainer
#217 lore raw

PATCH 217/251 gcov: add support for checksum field

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Rickard x Andersson <[email protected]>

commit e96b95c2b7a63a454b6498e2df67aac14d046d13 upstream.

In GCC version 12.1 a checksum field was added.

This patch fixes a kernel crash occurring during boot when using gcov-kernel with GCC version 12.2. The crash occurred on a system running on i.MX6SX.

---
 kernel/gcov/gcc_4_7.c |    5 +++++
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)
kernel/gcov/gcc_4_7.c +5 -0
@@ -84,6 +84,7 @@ struct gcov_fn_info {
  * @version: gcov version magic indicating the gcc version used for compilation
  * @next: list head for a singly-linked list
  * @stamp: uniquifying time stamp
+ * @checksum: unique object checksum
  * @filename: name of the associated gcov data file
  * @merge: merge functions (null for unused counter type)
  * @n_functions: number of instrumented functions
@@ -96,6 +97,10 @@ struct gcov_info {
 	unsigned int version;
 	struct gcov_info *next;
 	unsigned int stamp;
+ /* Since GCC 12.1 a checksum field is added. */
+#if (__GNUC__ >= 12)
+	unsigned int checksum;
+#endif
 	const char *filename;
 	void (*merge[GCOV_COUNTERS])(gcov_type *, unsigned int);
 	unsigned int n_functions;
author maintainer
#218 lore raw

PATCH 218/251 powerpc/rtas: avoid scheduling in rtas_os_term()

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Nathan Lynch <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 6c606e57eecc37d6b36d732b1ff7e55b7dc32dd4 ]

It's unsafe to use rtas_busy_delay() to handle a busy status from the ibm,os-term RTAS function in rtas_os_term():

Kernel panic - not syncing: Attempted to kill init! exitcode=0x0000000b
BUG: sleeping function called from invalid context at arch/powerpc/kernel/rtas.c:618
in_atomic(): 1, irqs_disabled(): 1, non_block: 0, pid: 1, name: swapper/0
preempt_count: 2, expected: 0
CPU: 7 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Tainted: G      D            6.0.0-rc5-02182-gf8553a572277-dirty #9
Call Trace:
[c000000007b8f000] [c000000001337110] dump_stack_lvl+0xb4/0x110 (unreliable)
[c000000007b8f040] [c0000000002440e4] __might_resched+0x394/0x3c0
[c000000007b8f0e0] [c00000000004f680] rtas_busy_delay+0x120/0x1b0
[c000000007b8f100] [c000000000052d04] rtas_os_term+0xb8/0xf4
[c000000007b8f180] [c0000000001150fc] pseries_panic+0x50/0x68
[c000000007b8f1f0] [c000000000036354] ppc_panic_platform_handler+0x34/0x50
[c000000007b8f210] [c0000000002303c4] notifier_call_chain+0xd4/0x1c0
[c000000007b8f2b0] [c0000000002306cc] atomic_notifier_call_chain+0xac/0x1c0
[c000000007b8f2f0] [c0000000001d62b8] panic+0x228/0x4d0
[c000000007b8f390] [c0000000001e573c] do_exit+0x140c/0x1420
[c000000007b8f480] [c0000000001e586c] make_task_dead+0xdc/0x200

Use rtas_busy_delay_time() instead, which signals without side effects whether to attempt the ibm,os-term RTAS call again.

---
 arch/powerpc/kernel/rtas.c | 7 ++++++-
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
arch/powerpc/kernel/rtas.c +6 -1
index 641f3e4c3380..9a77778bd24a 100644
@@ -733,10 +733,15 @@ void rtas_os_term(char *str)
 
 	snprintf(rtas_os_term_buf, 2048, "OS panic: %s", str);
 
+	/*
+	 * Keep calling as long as RTAS returns a "try again" status,
+	 * but don't use rtas_busy_delay(), which potentially
+	 * schedules.
+	 */
 	do {
 		status = rtas_call(rtas_token("ibm,os-term"), 1, 1, NULL,
 				   __pa(rtas_os_term_buf));
-	} while (rtas_busy_delay(status));
+	} while (rtas_busy_delay_time(status));
 
 	if (status != 0)
 		printk(KERN_EMERG "ibm,os-term call failed %d\n", status);
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
author maintainer
#219 lore raw

PATCH 219/251 HID: plantronics: Additional PIDs for double volume key presses quirk

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Terry Junge <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 3d57f36c89d8ba32b2c312f397a37fd1a2dc7cfc ]

I no longer work for Plantronics (aka Poly, aka HP) and do not have access to the headsets in order to test. However, as noted by Maxim, the other 32xx models that share the same base code set as the 3220 would need the same quirk. This patch adds the PIDs for the rest of the Blackwire 32XX product family that require the quirk.

Plantronics Blackwire 3210 Series (047f:c055)
Plantronics Blackwire 3215 Series (047f:c057)
Plantronics Blackwire 3225 Series (047f:c058)

Quote from previous patch by Maxim Mikityanskiy Plantronics Blackwire 3220 Series (047f:c056) sends HID reports twice for each volume key press. This patch adds a quirk to hid-plantronics for this product ID, which will ignore the second volume key press if it happens within 5 ms from the last one that was handled.

The patch was tested on the mentioned model only, it shouldn't affect other models, however, this quirk might be needed for them too. Auto-repeat (when a key is held pressed) is not affected, because the rate is about 3 times per second, which is far less frequent than once in 5 ms.
End quote

---
 drivers/hid/hid-ids.h         | 3 +++
 drivers/hid/hid-plantronics.c | 9 +++++++++
 2 files changed, 12 insertions(+)
drivers/hid/hid-ids.h +3 -0
index 1f641870d860..4d69551dbc52 100644
@@ -816,7 +816,10 @@
 #define USB_DEVICE_ID_ORTEK_WKB2000	0x2000
 
 #define USB_VENDOR_ID_PLANTRONICS	0x047f
+#define USB_DEVICE_ID_PLANTRONICS_BLACKWIRE_3210_SERIES	0xc055
 #define USB_DEVICE_ID_PLANTRONICS_BLACKWIRE_3220_SERIES	0xc056
+#define USB_DEVICE_ID_PLANTRONICS_BLACKWIRE_3215_SERIES	0xc057
+#define USB_DEVICE_ID_PLANTRONICS_BLACKWIRE_3225_SERIES	0xc058
 
 #define USB_VENDOR_ID_PANASONIC		0x04da
 #define USB_DEVICE_ID_PANABOARD_UBT780	0x1044
drivers/hid/hid-plantronics.c +9 -0
index 460711c1124a..3b75cadd543f 100644
@@ -201,9 +201,18 @@ static int plantronics_probe(struct hid_device *hdev,
 }
 
 static const struct hid_device_id plantronics_devices[] = {
+	{ HID_USB_DEVICE(USB_VENDOR_ID_PLANTRONICS,
+					 USB_DEVICE_ID_PLANTRONICS_BLACKWIRE_3210_SERIES),
+		.driver_data = PLT_QUIRK_DOUBLE_VOLUME_KEYS },
 	{ HID_USB_DEVICE(USB_VENDOR_ID_PLANTRONICS,
 					 USB_DEVICE_ID_PLANTRONICS_BLACKWIRE_3220_SERIES),
 		.driver_data = PLT_QUIRK_DOUBLE_VOLUME_KEYS },
+	{ HID_USB_DEVICE(USB_VENDOR_ID_PLANTRONICS,
+					 USB_DEVICE_ID_PLANTRONICS_BLACKWIRE_3215_SERIES),
+		.driver_data = PLT_QUIRK_DOUBLE_VOLUME_KEYS },
+	{ HID_USB_DEVICE(USB_VENDOR_ID_PLANTRONICS,
+					 USB_DEVICE_ID_PLANTRONICS_BLACKWIRE_3225_SERIES),
+		.driver_data = PLT_QUIRK_DOUBLE_VOLUME_KEYS },
 	{ HID_USB_DEVICE(USB_VENDOR_ID_PLANTRONICS, HID_ANY_ID) },
 	{ }
 };
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
author maintainer
#220 lore raw

PATCH 220/251 hfsplus: fix bug causing custom uid and gid being unable to be assigned with mount

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Aditya Garg <[email protected]>

commit 9f2b5debc07073e6dfdd774e3594d0224b991927 upstream.

Despite specifying UID and GID in mount command, the specified UID and GID were not being assigned. This patch fixes this issue.

---
 fs/hfsplus/hfsplus_fs.h |    2 ++
 fs/hfsplus/inode.c      |    4 ++--
 fs/hfsplus/options.c    |    4 ++++
 3 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
fs/hfsplus/hfsplus_fs.h +2 -0
@@ -198,6 +198,8 @@ struct hfsplus_sb_info {
 #define HFSPLUS_SB_HFSX		3
 #define HFSPLUS_SB_CASEFOLD	4
 #define HFSPLUS_SB_NOBARRIER	5
+#define HFSPLUS_SB_UID		6
+#define HFSPLUS_SB_GID		7
 
 static inline struct hfsplus_sb_info *HFSPLUS_SB(struct super_block *sb)
 {
fs/hfsplus/inode.c +2 -2
@@ -186,11 +186,11 @@ static void hfsplus_get_perms(struct ino
 	mode = be16_to_cpu(perms->mode);
 
 	i_uid_write(inode, be32_to_cpu(perms->owner));
-	if (!i_uid_read(inode) && !mode)
+	if ((test_bit(HFSPLUS_SB_UID, &sbi->flags)) || (!i_uid_read(inode) && !mode))
 		inode->i_uid = sbi->uid;
 
 	i_gid_write(inode, be32_to_cpu(perms->group));
-	if (!i_gid_read(inode) && !mode)
+	if ((test_bit(HFSPLUS_SB_GID, &sbi->flags)) || (!i_gid_read(inode) && !mode))
 		inode->i_gid = sbi->gid;
 
 	if (dir) {
fs/hfsplus/options.c +4 -0
@@ -139,6 +139,8 @@ int hfsplus_parse_options(char *input, s
 			if (!uid_valid(sbi->uid)) {
 				pr_err("invalid uid specified\n");
 				return 0;
+			} else {
+				set_bit(HFSPLUS_SB_UID, &sbi->flags);
 			}
 			break;
 		case opt_gid:
@@ -150,6 +152,8 @@ int hfsplus_parse_options(char *input, s
 			if (!gid_valid(sbi->gid)) {
 				pr_err("invalid gid specified\n");
 				return 0;
+			} else {
+				set_bit(HFSPLUS_SB_GID, &sbi->flags);
 			}
 			break;
 		case opt_part:
author maintainer
#221 lore raw

PATCH 221/251 ALSA: line6: correct midi status byte when receiving data from podxt

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Artem Egorkine <[email protected]>

commit 8508fa2e7472f673edbeedf1b1d2b7a6bb898ecc upstream.

A PODxt device sends 0xb2, 0xc2 or 0xf2 as a status byte for MIDI messages over USB that should otherwise have a 0xb0, 0xc0 or 0xf0 status byte. This is usually corrected by the driver on other OSes.

This fixes MIDI sysex messages sent by PODxt.

[ tiwai: fixed white spaces ]

---
 sound/usb/line6/driver.c  |    3 ++-
 sound/usb/line6/midi.c    |    3 ++-
 sound/usb/line6/midibuf.c |   25 +++++++++++++++++--------
 sound/usb/line6/midibuf.h |    5 ++++-
 sound/usb/line6/pod.c     |    3 ++-
 5 files changed, 27 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
sound/usb/line6/driver.c +2 -1
@@ -304,7 +304,8 @@ static void line6_data_received(struct u
 		for (;;) {
 			done =
 				line6_midibuf_read(mb, line6->buffer_message,
-						LINE6_MIDI_MESSAGE_MAXLEN);
+						   LINE6_MIDI_MESSAGE_MAXLEN,
+						   LINE6_MIDIBUF_READ_RX);
 
 			if (done <= 0)
 				break;
sound/usb/line6/midi.c +2 -1
@@ -60,7 +60,8 @@ static void line6_midi_transmit(struct s
 
 	for (;;) {
 		done = line6_midibuf_read(mb, chunk,
-					  LINE6_FALLBACK_MAXPACKETSIZE);
+					  LINE6_FALLBACK_MAXPACKETSIZE,
+					  LINE6_MIDIBUF_READ_TX);
 
 		if (done == 0)
 			break;
sound/usb/line6/midibuf.c +17 -8
@@ -13,6 +13,7 @@
 
 #include "midibuf.h"
 
+
 static int midibuf_message_length(unsigned char code)
 {
 	int message_length;
@@ -24,12 +25,7 @@ static int midibuf_message_length(unsign
 
 		message_length = length[(code >> 4) - 8];
 	} else {
-		/*
-		   Note that according to the MIDI specification 0xf2 is
-		   the "Song Position Pointer", but this is used by Line 6
-		   to send sysex messages to the host.
-		 */
-		static const int length[] = { -1, 2, -1, 2, -1, -1, 1, 1, 1, 1,
+		static const int length[] = { -1, 2, 2, 2, -1, -1, 1, 1, 1, -1,
 			1, 1, 1, -1, 1, 1
 		};
 		message_length = length[code & 0x0f];
@@ -129,7 +125,7 @@ int line6_midibuf_write(struct midi_buff
 }
 
 int line6_midibuf_read(struct midi_buffer *this, unsigned char *data,
-		       int length)
+		       int length, int read_type)
 {
 	int bytes_used;
 	int length1, length2;
@@ -152,9 +148,22 @@ int line6_midibuf_read(struct midi_buffe
 
 	length1 = this->size - this->pos_read;
 
-	/* check MIDI command length */
 	command = this->buf[this->pos_read];
+	/*
+	   PODxt always has status byte lower nibble set to 0010,
+	   when it means to send 0000, so we correct if here so
+	   that control/program changes come on channel 1 and
+	   sysex message status byte is correct
+	 */
+	if (read_type == LINE6_MIDIBUF_READ_RX) {
+		if (command == 0xb2 || command == 0xc2 || command == 0xf2) {
+			unsigned char fixed = command & 0xf0;
+			this->buf[this->pos_read] = fixed;
+			command = fixed;
+		}
+	}
 
+	/* check MIDI command length */
 	if (command & 0x80) {
 		midi_length = midibuf_message_length(command);
 		this->command_prev = command;
sound/usb/line6/midibuf.h +4 -1
@@ -12,6 +12,9 @@
 #ifndef MIDIBUF_H
 #define MIDIBUF_H
 
+#define LINE6_MIDIBUF_READ_TX 0
+#define LINE6_MIDIBUF_READ_RX 1
+
 struct midi_buffer {
 	unsigned char *buf;
 	int size;
@@ -27,7 +30,7 @@ extern void line6_midibuf_destroy(struct
 extern int line6_midibuf_ignore(struct midi_buffer *mb, int length);
 extern int line6_midibuf_init(struct midi_buffer *mb, int size, int split);
 extern int line6_midibuf_read(struct midi_buffer *mb, unsigned char *data,
-			      int length);
+			      int length, int read_type);
 extern void line6_midibuf_reset(struct midi_buffer *mb);
 extern int line6_midibuf_write(struct midi_buffer *mb, unsigned char *data,
 			       int length);
sound/usb/line6/pod.c +2 -1
@@ -169,8 +169,9 @@ static struct line6_pcm_properties pod_p
 	.bytes_per_channel = 3 /* SNDRV_PCM_FMTBIT_S24_3LE */
 };
 
+
 static const char pod_version_header[] = {
-	0xf2, 0x7e, 0x7f, 0x06, 0x02
+	0xf0, 0x7e, 0x7f, 0x06, 0x02
 };
 
 /* forward declarations: */
author maintainer
#222 lore raw

PATCH 222/251 ALSA: line6: fix stack overflow in line6_midi_transmit

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Artem Egorkine <[email protected]>

commit b8800d324abb50160560c636bfafe2c81001b66c upstream.

Correctly calculate available space including the size of the chunk buffer. This fixes a buffer overflow when multiple MIDI sysex messages are sent to a PODxt device.

---
 sound/usb/line6/midi.c |    3 ++-
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
sound/usb/line6/midi.c +2 -1
@@ -48,7 +48,8 @@ static void line6_midi_transmit(struct s
 	int req, done;
 
 	for (;;) {
-		req = min(line6_midibuf_bytes_free(mb), line6->max_packet_size);
+		req = min3(line6_midibuf_bytes_free(mb), line6->max_packet_size,
+			   LINE6_FALLBACK_MAXPACKETSIZE);
 		done = snd_rawmidi_transmit_peek(substream, chunk, req);
 
 		if (done == 0)
author maintainer
#223 lore raw

PATCH 223/251 pnode: terminate at peers of source

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Christian Brauner <[email protected]>

commit 11933cf1d91d57da9e5c53822a540bbdc2656c16 upstream.

The propagate_mnt() function handles mount propagation when creating mounts and propagates the source mount tree @source_mnt to all applicable nodes of the destination propagation mount tree headed by @dest_mnt.

Unfortunately it contains a bug where it fails to terminate at peers of @source_mnt when looking up copies of the source mount that become masters for copies of the source mount tree mounted on top of slaves in the destination propagation tree causing a NULL dereference.

Once the mechanics of the bug are understood it's easy to trigger. Because of unprivileged user namespaces it is available to unprivileged users.

While fixing this bug we've gotten confused multiple times due to unclear terminology or missing concepts. So let's start this with some clarifications:

* The terms "master" or "peer" denote a shared mount. A shared mount belongs to a peer group.

* A peer group is a set of shared mounts that propagate to each other. They are identified by a peer group id. The peer group id is available in @shared_mnt->mnt_group_id.
Shared mounts within the same peer group have the same peer group id. The peers in a peer group can be reached via @shared_mnt->mnt_share.

* The terms "slave mount" or "dependent mount" denote a mount that receives propagation from a peer in a peer group. IOW, shared mounts may have slave mounts and slave mounts have shared mounts as their master. Slave mounts of a given peer in a peer group are listed on that peers slave list available at @shared_mnt->mnt_slave_list.

* The term "master mount" denotes a mount in a peer group. IOW, it denotes a shared mount or a peer mount in a peer group. The term "master mount" - or "master" for short - is mostly used when talking in the context of slave mounts that receive propagation from a master mount. A master mount of a slave identifies the closest peer group a slave mount receives propagation from. The master mount of a slave can be identified via @slave_mount->mnt_master. Different slaves may point to different masters in the same peer group.

* Multiple peers in a peer group can have non-empty ->mnt_slave_lists. Non-empty ->mnt_slave_lists of peers don't intersect. Consequently, to ensure all slave mounts of a peer group are visited the ->mnt_slave_lists of all peers in a peer group have to be walked.

* Slave mounts point to a peer in the closest peer group they receive propagation from via @slave_mnt->mnt_master (see above). Together with these peers they form a propagation group (see below). The closest peer group can thus be identified through the peer group id @slave_mnt->mnt_master->mnt_group_id of the peer/master that a slave mount receives propagation from.

* A shared-slave mount is a slave mount to a peer group pg1 while also a peer in another peer group pg2. IOW, a peer group may receive propagation from another peer group.

If a peer group pg1 is a slave to another peer group pg2 then all peers in peer group pg1 point to the same peer in peer group pg2 via ->mnt_master. IOW, all peers in peer group pg1 appear on the same ->mnt_slave_list. IOW, they cannot be slaves to different peer groups.

* A pure slave mount is a slave mount that is a slave to a peer group but is not a peer in another peer group.

* A propagation group denotes the set of mounts consisting of a single peer group pg1 and all slave mounts and shared-slave mounts that point to a peer in that peer group via ->mnt_master. IOW, all slave mounts such that @slave_mnt->mnt_master->mnt_group_id is equal to @shared_mnt->mnt_group_id.

The concept of a propagation group makes it easier to talk about a single propagation level in a propagation tree.

For example, in propagate_mnt() the immediate peers of @dest_mnt and all slaves of @dest_mnt's peer group form a propagation group propg1. So a shared-slave mount that is a slave in propg1 and that is a peer in another peer group pg2 forms another propagation group propg2 together with all slaves that point to that shared-slave mount in their ->mnt_master.

* A propagation tree refers to all mounts that receive propagation starting from a specific shared mount.

For example, for propagate_mnt() @dest_mnt is the start of a propagation tree. The propagation tree ecompasses all mounts that receive propagation from @dest_mnt's peer group down to the leafs.

With that out of the way let's get to the actual algorithm.

We know that @dest_mnt is guaranteed to be a pure shared mount or a shared-slave mount. This is guaranteed by a check in attach_recursive_mnt(). So propagate_mnt() will first propagate the source mount tree to all peers in @dest_mnt's peer group:

for (n = next_peer(dest_mnt); n != dest_mnt; n = next_peer(n)) {
        ret = propagate_one(n);
        if (ret)
               goto out;
}

Notice, that the peer propagation loop of propagate_mnt() doesn't propagate @dest_mnt itself. @dest_mnt is mounted directly in attach_recursive_mnt() after we propagated to the destination propagation tree.

The mount that will be mounted on top of @dest_mnt is @source_mnt. This copy was created earlier even before we entered attach_recursive_mnt() and doesn't concern us a lot here.

It's just important to notice that when propagate_mnt() is called @source_mnt will not yet have been mounted on top of @dest_mnt. Thus, @source_mnt->mnt_parent will either still point to @source_mnt or - in the case @source_mnt is moved and thus already attached - still to its former parent.

For each peer @m in @dest_mnt's peer group propagate_one() will create a new copy of the source mount tree and mount that copy @child on @m such that @child->mnt_parent points to @m after propagate_one() returns.

propagate_one() will stash the last destination propagation node @m in @last_dest and the last copy it created for the source mount tree in @last_source.

Hence, if we call into propagate_one() again for the next destination propagation node @m, @last_dest will point to the previous destination propagation node and @last_source will point to the previous copy of the source mount tree and mounted on @last_dest.

Each new copy of the source mount tree is created from the previous copy of the source mount tree. This will become important later.

The peer loop in propagate_mnt() is straightforward. We iterate through the peers copying and updating @last_source and @last_dest as we go through them and mount each copy of the source mount tree @child on a peer @m in @dest_mnt's peer group.

After propagate_mnt() handled the peers in @dest_mnt's peer group propagate_mnt() will propagate the source mount tree down the propagation tree that @dest_mnt's peer group propagates to:

for (m = next_group(dest_mnt, dest_mnt); m;
                m = next_group(m, dest_mnt)) {
        /* everything in that slave group */
        n = m;
        do {
                ret = propagate_one(n);
                if (ret)
                        goto out;
                n = next_peer(n);
        } while (n != m);
}

The next_group() helper will recursively walk the destination propagation tree, descending into each propagation group of the propagation tree.

The important part is that it takes care to propagate the source mount tree to all peers in the peer group of a propagation group before it propagates to the slaves to those peers in the propagation group. IOW, it creates and mounts copies of the source mount tree that become masters before it creates and mounts copies of the source mount tree that become slaves to these masters.

It is important to remember that propagating the source mount tree to each mount @m in the destination propagation tree simply means that we create and mount new copies @child of the source mount tree on @m such that @child->mnt_parent points to @m.

Since we know that each node @m in the destination propagation tree headed by @dest_mnt's peer group will be overmounted with a copy of the source mount tree and since we know that the propagation properties of each copy of the source mount tree we create and mount at @m will mostly mirror the propagation properties of @m. We can use that information to create and mount the copies of the source mount tree that become masters before their slaves.

The easy case is always when @m and @last_dest are peers in a peer group of a given propagation group. In that case we know that we can simply copy @last_source without having to figure out what the master for the new copy @child of the source mount tree needs to be as we've done that in a previous call to propagate_one().

The hard case is when we're dealing with a slave mount or a shared-slave mount @m in a destination propagation group that we need to create and mount a copy of the source mount tree on.

For each propagation group in the destination propagation tree we propagate the source mount tree to we want to make sure that the copies @child of the source mount tree we create and mount on slaves @m pick an ealier copy of the source mount tree that we mounted on a master @m of the destination propagation group as their master. This is a mouthful but as far as we can tell that's the core of it all.

But, if we keep track of the masters in the destination propagation tree @m we can use the information to find the correct master for each copy of the source mount tree we create and mount at the slaves in the destination propagation tree @m.

Let's walk through the base case as that's still fairly easy to grasp.

If we're dealing with the first slave in the propagation group that @dest_mnt is in then we don't yet have marked any masters in the destination propagation tree.

We know the master for the first slave to @dest_mnt's peer group is simple @dest_mnt. So we expect this algorithm to yield a copy of the source mount tree that was mounted on a peer in @dest_mnt's peer group as the master for the copy of the source mount tree we want to mount at the first slave @m:

for (n = m; ; n = p) {
        p = n->mnt_master;
        if (p == dest_master || IS_MNT_MARKED(p))
                break;
}

For the first slave we walk the destination propagation tree all the way up to a peer in @dest_mnt's peer group. IOW, the propagation hierarchy can be walked by walking up the @mnt->mnt_master hierarchy of the destination propagation tree @m. We will ultimately find a peer in @dest_mnt's peer group and thus ultimately @dest_mnt->mnt_master.

Btw, here the assumption we listed at the beginning becomes important. Namely, that peers in a peer group pg1 that are slaves in another peer group pg2 appear on the same ->mnt_slave_list. IOW, all slaves who are peers in peer group pg1 point to the same peer in peer group pg2 via their ->mnt_master. Otherwise the termination condition in the code above would be wrong and next_group() would be broken too.

So the first iteration sets:

n = m;
p = n->mnt_master;

such that @p now points to a peer or @dest_mnt itself. We walk up one more level since we don't have any marked mounts. So we end up with:

n = dest_mnt;
p = dest_mnt->mnt_master;

If @dest_mnt's peer group is not slave to another peer group then @p is now NULL. If @dest_mnt's peer group is a slave to another peer group then @p now points to @dest_mnt->mnt_master points which is a master outside the propagation tree we're dealing with.

Now we need to figure out the master for the copy of the source mount tree we're about to create and mount on the first slave of @dest_mnt's peer group:

do {
        struct mount *parent = last_source->mnt_parent;
        if (last_source == first_source)
                break;
        done = parent->mnt_master == p;
        if (done && peers(n, parent))
                break;
        last_source = last_source->mnt_master;
} while (!done);

We know that @last_source->mnt_parent points to @last_dest and @last_dest is the last peer in @dest_mnt's peer group we propagated to in the peer loop in propagate_mnt().

Consequently, @last_source is the last copy we created and mount on that last peer in @dest_mnt's peer group. So @last_source is the master we want to pick.

We know that @last_source->mnt_parent->mnt_master points to @last_dest->mnt_master. We also know that @last_dest->mnt_master is either NULL or points to a master outside of the destination propagation tree and so does @p. Hence:

done = parent->mnt_master == p;

is trivially true in the base condition.

We also know that for the first slave mount of @dest_mnt's peer group that @last_dest either points @dest_mnt itself because it was initialized to:

last_dest = dest_mnt;

at the beginning of propagate_mnt() or it will point to a peer of @dest_mnt in its peer group. In both cases it is guaranteed that on the first iteration @n and @parent are peers (Please note the check for peers here as that's important.):

if (done && peers(n, parent))

        break;

So, as we expected, we select @last_source, which referes to the last copy of the source mount tree we mounted on the last peer in @dest_mnt's peer group, as the master of the first slave in @dest_mnt's peer group. The rest is taken care of by clone_mnt(last_source, ...). We'll skip over that part otherwise this becomes a blogpost.

At the end of propagate_mnt() we now mark @m->mnt_master as the first master in the destination propagation tree that is distinct from @dest_mnt->mnt_master. IOW, we mark @dest_mnt itself as a master.

By marking @dest_mnt or one of it's peers we are able to easily find it again when we later lookup masters for other copies of the source mount tree we mount copies of the source mount tree on slaves @m to @dest_mnt's peer group. This, in turn allows us to find the master we selected for the copies of the source mount tree we mounted on master in the destination propagation tree again.

The important part is to realize that the code makes use of the fact that the last copy of the source mount tree stashed in @last_source was mounted on top of the previous destination propagation node @last_dest. What this means is that @last_source allows us to walk the destination propagation hierarchy the same way each destination propagation node @m does.

If we take @last_source, which is the copy of @source_mnt we have mounted on @last_dest in the previous iteration of propagate_one(), then we know @last_source->mnt_parent points to @last_dest but we also know that as we walk through the destination propagation tree that @last_source->mnt_master will point to an earlier copy of the source mount tree we mounted one an earlier destination propagation node @m.

IOW, @last_source->mnt_parent will be our hook into the destination propagation tree and each consecutive @last_source->mnt_master will lead us to an earlier propagation node @m via @last_source->mnt_master->mnt_parent.

Hence, by walking up @last_source->mnt_master, each of which is mounted on a node that is a master @m in the destination propagation tree we can also walk up the destination propagation hierarchy.

So, for each new destination propagation node @m we use the previous copy of @last_source and the fact it's mounted on the previous propagation node @last_dest via @last_source->mnt_master->mnt_parent to determine what the master of the new copy of @last_source needs to be.

The goal is to find the _closest_ master that the new copy of the source mount tree we are about to create and mount on a slave @m in the destination propagation tree needs to pick. IOW, we want to find a suitable master in the propagation group.

As the propagation structure of the source mount propagation tree we create mirrors the propagation structure of the destination propagation tree we can find @m's closest master - i.e., a marked master - which is a peer in the closest peer group that @m receives propagation from. We store that closest master of @m in @p as before and record the slave to that master in @n

We then search for this master @p via @last_source by walking up the master hierarchy starting from the last copy of the source mount tree stored in @last_source that we created and mounted on the previous destination propagation node @m.

We will try to find the master by walking @last_source->mnt_master and by comparing @last_source->mnt_master->mnt_parent->mnt_master to @p. If we find @p then we can figure out what earlier copy of the source mount tree needs to be the master for the new copy of the source mount tree we're about to create and mount at the current destination propagation node @m.

If @last_source->mnt_master->mnt_parent and @n are peers then we know that the closest master they receive propagation from is @last_source->mnt_master->mnt_parent->mnt_master. If not then the closest immediate peer group that they receive propagation from must be one level higher up.

This builds on the earlier clarification at the beginning that all peers in a peer group which are slaves of other peer groups all point to the same ->mnt_master, i.e., appear on the same ->mnt_slave_list, of the closest peer group that they receive propagation from.

However, terminating the walk has corner cases.

If the closest marked master for a given destination node @m cannot be found by walking up the master hierarchy via @last_source->mnt_master then we need to terminate the walk when we encounter @source_mnt again.

This isn't an arbitrary termination. It simply means that the new copy of the source mount tree we're about to create has a copy of the source mount tree we created and mounted on a peer in @dest_mnt's peer group as its master. IOW, @source_mnt is the peer in the closest peer group that the new copy of the source mount tree receives propagation from.

We absolutely have to stop @source_mnt because @last_source->mnt_master either points outside the propagation hierarchy we're dealing with or it is NULL because @source_mnt isn't a shared-slave.

So continuing the walk past @source_mnt would cause a NULL dereference via @last_source->mnt_master->mnt_parent. And so we have to stop the walk when we encounter @source_mnt again.

One scenario where this can happen is when we first handled a series of slaves of @dest_mnt's peer group and then encounter peers in a new peer group that is a slave to @dest_mnt's peer group. We handle them and then we encounter another slave mount to @dest_mnt that is a pure slave to @dest_mnt's peer group. That pure slave will have a peer in @dest_mnt's peer group as its master. Consequently, the new copy of the source mount tree will need to have @source_mnt as it's master. So we walk the propagation hierarchy all the way up to @source_mnt based on @last_source->mnt_master.

So terminate on @source_mnt, easy peasy. Except, that the check misses something that the rest of the algorithm already handles.

If @dest_mnt has peers in it's peer group the peer loop in propagate_mnt():

for (n = next_peer(dest_mnt); n != dest_mnt; n = next_peer(n)) {
        ret = propagate_one(n);
        if (ret)
                goto out;
}

will consecutively update @last_source with each previous copy of the source mount tree we created and mounted at the previous peer in @dest_mnt's peer group. So after that loop terminates @last_source will point to whatever copy of the source mount tree was created and mounted on the last peer in @dest_mnt's peer group.

Furthermore, if there is even a single additional peer in @dest_mnt's peer group then @last_source will __not__ point to @source_mnt anymore. Because, as we mentioned above, @dest_mnt isn't even handled in this loop but directly in attach_recursive_mnt(). So it can't even accidently come last in that peer loop.

So the first time we handle a slave mount @m of @dest_mnt's peer group the copy of the source mount tree we create will make the __last copy of the source mount tree we created and mounted on the last peer in @dest_mnt's peer group the master of the new copy of the source mount tree we create and mount on the first slave of @dest_mnt's peer group__.

But this means that the termination condition that checks for @source_mnt is wrong. The @source_mnt cannot be found anymore by propagate_one(). Instead it will find the last copy of the source mount tree we created and mounted for the last peer of @dest_mnt's peer group again. And that is a peer of @source_mnt not @source_mnt itself.

IOW, we fail to terminate the loop correctly and ultimately dereference @last_source->mnt_master->mnt_parent. When @source_mnt's peer group isn't slave to another peer group then @last_source->mnt_master is NULL causing the splat below.

For example, assume @dest_mnt is a pure shared mount and has three peers in its peer group:

===================================================================================
mount-id mount-parent-id peer-group-id
===================================================================================
(@dest_mnt) mnt_master[216] 309 297 shared:216

    \
     (@source_mnt) mnt_master[218]:      609        609               shared:218

(1) mnt_master[216]: 607 605 shared:216

    \
     (P1) mnt_master[218]:               624        607               shared:218

(2) mnt_master[216]: 576 574 shared:216

    \
     (P2) mnt_master[218]:               625        576               shared:218

(3) mnt_master[216]: 545 543 shared:216

    \
     (P3) mnt_master[218]:               626        545               shared:218

After this sequence has been processed @last_source will point to (P3), the copy generated for the third peer in @dest_mnt's peer group we handled. So the copy of the source mount tree (P4) we create and mount on the first slave of @dest_mnt's peer group:

===================================================================================
mount-id mount-parent-id peer-group-id
===================================================================================
mnt_master[216] 309 297 shared:216
/
/
(S0) mnt_slave 483 481 master:216
\
\ (P3) mnt_master[218] 626 545 shared:218

    \  /
     \/
    (P4) mnt_slave                       627        483               master:218

will pick the last copy of the source mount tree (P3) as master, not (S0).

When walking the propagation hierarchy via @last_source's master hierarchy we encounter (P3) but not (S0), i.e., @source_mnt.

We can fix this in multiple ways:

(1) By setting @last_source to @source_mnt after we processed the peers in @dest_mnt's peer group right after the peer loop in propagate_mnt().

(2) By changing the termination condition that relies on finding exactly @source_mnt to finding a peer of @source_mnt.

(3) By only moving @last_source when we actually venture into a new peer group or some clever variant thereof.

The first two options are minimally invasive and what we want as a fix. The third option is more intrusive but something we'd like to explore in the near future.

This passes all LTP tests and specifically the mount propagation testsuite part of it. It also holds up against all known reproducers of this issues.

Final words.
First, this is a clever but __worringly__ underdocumented algorithm. There isn't a single detailed comment to be found in next_group(), propagate_one() or anywhere else in that file for that matter. This has been a giant pain to understand and work through and a bug like this is insanely difficult to fix without a detailed understanding of what's happening. Let's not talk about the amount of time that was sunk into fixing this.

Second, all the cool kids with access to
unshare --mount --user --map-root --propagation=unchanged are going to have a lot of fun. IOW, triggerable by unprivileged users while namespace_lock() lock is held.

[  115.848393] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000010
[  115.848967] #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode
[  115.849386] #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page
[  115.849803] PGD 0 P4D 0
[  115.850012] Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP PTI
[  115.850354] CPU: 0 PID: 15591 Comm: mount Not tainted 6.1.0-rc7 #3
[  115.850851] Hardware name: innotek GmbH VirtualBox/VirtualBox, BIOS
VirtualBox 12/01/2006
[  115.851510] RIP: 0010:propagate_one.part.0+0x7f/0x1a0
[  115.851924] Code: 75 eb 4c 8b 05 c2 25 37 02 4c 89 ca 48 8b 4a 10
49 39 d0 74 1e 48 3b 81 e0 00 00 00 74 26 48 8b 92 e0 00 00 00 be 01
00 00 00 <48> 8b 4a 10 49 39 d0 75 e2 40 84 f6 74 38 4c 89 05 84 25 37
02 4d
[  115.853441] RSP: 0018:ffffb8d5443d7d50 EFLAGS: 00010282
[  115.853865] RAX: ffff8e4d87c41c80 RBX: ffff8e4d88ded780 RCX: ffff8e4da4333a00
[  115.854458] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000001 RDI: ffff8e4d88ded780
[  115.855044] RBP: ffff8e4d88ded780 R08: ffff8e4da4338000 R09: ffff8e4da43388c0
[  115.855693] R10: 0000000000000002 R11: ffffb8d540158000 R12: ffffb8d5443d7da8
[  115.856304] R13: ffff8e4d88ded780 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000
[  115.856859] FS:  00007f92c90c9800(0000) GS:ffff8e4dfdc00000(0000)
knlGS:0000000000000000
[  115.857531] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[  115.858006] CR2: 0000000000000010 CR3: 0000000022f4c002 CR4: 00000000000706f0
[  115.858598] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
[  115.859393] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
[  115.860099] Call Trace:
[  115.860358]  <TASK>
[  115.860535]  propagate_mnt+0x14d/0x190
[  115.860848]  attach_recursive_mnt+0x274/0x3e0
[  115.861212]  path_mount+0x8c8/0xa60
[  115.861503]  __x64_sys_mount+0xf6/0x140
[  115.861819]  do_syscall_64+0x5b/0x80
[  115.862117]  ? do_faccessat+0x123/0x250
[  115.862435]  ? syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x17/0x40
[  115.862826]  ? do_syscall_64+0x67/0x80
[  115.863133]  ? syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x17/0x40
[  115.863527]  ? do_syscall_64+0x67/0x80
[  115.863835]  ? do_syscall_64+0x67/0x80
[  115.864144]  ? do_syscall_64+0x67/0x80
[  115.864452]  ? exc_page_fault+0x70/0x170
[  115.864775]  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd
[  115.865187] RIP: 0033:0x7f92c92b0ebe
[  115.865480] Code: 48 8b 0d 75 4f 0c 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48 83 c8 ff
c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 90 f3 0f 1e fa 49 89 ca b8 a5 00 00
00 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d 42 4f 0c 00 f7 d8 64 89
01 48
[  115.866984] RSP: 002b:00007fff000aa728 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX:
00000000000000a5
[  115.867607] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 000055a77888d6b0 RCX: 00007f92c92b0ebe
[  115.868240] RDX: 000055a77888d8e0 RSI: 000055a77888e6e0 RDI: 000055a77888e620
[  115.868823] RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000001
[  115.869403] R10: 0000000000001000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 000055a77888e620
[  115.869994] R13: 000055a77888d8e0 R14: 00000000ffffffff R15: 00007f92c93e4076
[  115.870581]  </TASK>
[  115.870763] Modules linked in: nft_fib_inet nft_fib_ipv4

nft_fib_ipv6 nft_fib nft_reject_inet nf_reject_ipv4 nf_reject_ipv6 nft_reject nft_ct nft_chain_nat nf_nat nf_conntrack nf_defrag_ipv6 nf_defrag_ipv4 ip_set rfkill nf_tables nfnetlink qrtr snd_intel8x0 sunrpc snd_ac97_codec ac97_bus snd_pcm snd_timer intel_rapl_msr intel_rapl_common snd vboxguest intel_powerclamp video rapl joydev soundcore i2c_piix4 wmi fuse zram xfs vmwgfx crct10dif_pclmul crc32_pclmul crc32c_intel polyval_clmulni polyval_generic drm_ttm_helper ttm e1000 ghash_clmulni_intel serio_raw ata_generic pata_acpi scsi_dh_rdac scsi_dh_emc scsi_dh_alua dm_multipath

[  115.875288] CR2: 0000000000000010
[  115.875641] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
[  115.876135] RIP: 0010:propagate_one.part.0+0x7f/0x1a0
[  115.876551] Code: 75 eb 4c 8b 05 c2 25 37 02 4c 89 ca 48 8b 4a 10
49 39 d0 74 1e 48 3b 81 e0 00 00 00 74 26 48 8b 92 e0 00 00 00 be 01
00 00 00 <48> 8b 4a 10 49 39 d0 75 e2 40 84 f6 74 38 4c 89 05 84 25 37
02 4d
[  115.878086] RSP: 0018:ffffb8d5443d7d50 EFLAGS: 00010282
[  115.878511] RAX: ffff8e4d87c41c80 RBX: ffff8e4d88ded780 RCX: ffff8e4da4333a00
[  115.879128] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000001 RDI: ffff8e4d88ded780
[  115.879715] RBP: ffff8e4d88ded780 R08: ffff8e4da4338000 R09: ffff8e4da43388c0
[  115.880359] R10: 0000000000000002 R11: ffffb8d540158000 R12: ffffb8d5443d7da8
[  115.880962] R13: ffff8e4d88ded780 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000
[  115.881548] FS:  00007f92c90c9800(0000) GS:ffff8e4dfdc00000(0000)
knlGS:0000000000000000
[  115.882234] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[  115.882713] CR2: 0000000000000010 CR3: 0000000022f4c002 CR4: 00000000000706f0
[  115.883314] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
[  115.883966] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Fixes f2ebb3a921c1 ("smarter propagate_mnt()")
Fixes 5ec0811d3037 ("propogate_mnt: Handle the first propogated copy being a slave")

---
If there are no big objections I'll get this to Linus rather sooner than later.

---
 fs/pnode.c |    2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
fs/pnode.c +1 -1
@@ -247,7 +247,7 @@ static int propagate_one(struct mount *m
 		}
 		do {
 			struct mount *parent = last_source->mnt_parent;
-			if (last_source == first_source)
+			if (peers(last_source, first_source))
 				break;
 			done = parent->mnt_master == p;
 			if (done && peers(n, parent))
author maintainer
#224 lore raw

PATCH 224/251 md: fix a crash in mempool_free

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Mikulas Patocka <[email protected]>

commit 341097ee53573e06ab9fc675d96a052385b851fa upstream.

There's a crash in mempool_free when running the lvm test shell/lvchange-rebuild-raid.sh.

The reason for the crash is this:
* super_written calls atomic_dec_and_test(&mddev->pending_writes) and wake_up(&mddev->sb_wait). Then it calls rdev_dec_pending(rdev, mddev) and bio_put(bio).
* so, the process that waited on sb_wait and that is woken up is racing with bio_put(bio).
* if the process wins the race, it calls bioset_exit before bio_put(bio) is executed.
* bio_put(bio) attempts to free a bio into a destroyed bio set - causing a crash in mempool_free.

We fix this bug by moving bio_put before atomic_dec_and_test.

We also move rdev_dec_pending before atomic_dec_and_test as suggested by Neil Brown.

The function md_end_flush has a similar bug - we must call bio_put before we decrement the number of in-progress bios.

 BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000000
 #PF: supervisor write access in kernel mode
 #PF: error_code(0x0002) - not-present page
 PGD 11557f0067 P4D 11557f0067 PUD 0
 Oops: 0002 [#1] PREEMPT SMP
 CPU: 0 PID: 73 Comm: kworker/0:1 Not tainted 6.1.0-rc3 #5
 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.14.0-2 04/01/2014
 Workqueue: kdelayd flush_expired_bios [dm_delay]
 RIP: 0010:mempool_free+0x47/0x80
 Code: 48 89 ef 5b 5d ff e0 f3 c3 48 89 f7 e8 32 45 3f 00 48 63 53 08 48 89 c6 3b 53 04 7d 2d 48 8b 43 10 8d 4a 01 48 89 df 89 4b 08 <48> 89 2c d0 e8 b0 45 3f 00 48 8d 7b 30 5b 5d 31 c9 ba 01 00 00 00
 RSP: 0018:ffff88910036bda8 EFLAGS: 00010093
 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff8891037b65d8 RCX: 0000000000000001
 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000202 RDI: ffff8891037b65d8
 RBP: ffff8891447ba240 R08: 0000000000012908 R09: 00000000003d0900
 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000173544 R12: ffff889101a14000
 R13: ffff8891562ac300 R14: ffff889102b41440 R15: ffffe8ffffa00d05
 FS:  0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88942fa00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
 CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
 CR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 0000001102e99000 CR4: 00000000000006b0
 Call Trace:
  <TASK>
  clone_endio+0xf4/0x1c0 [dm_mod]
  clone_endio+0xf4/0x1c0 [dm_mod]
  __submit_bio+0x76/0x120
  submit_bio_noacct_nocheck+0xb6/0x2a0
  flush_expired_bios+0x28/0x2f [dm_delay]
  process_one_work+0x1b4/0x300
  worker_thread+0x45/0x3e0
  ? rescuer_thread+0x380/0x380
  kthread+0xc2/0x100
  ? kthread_complete_and_exit+0x20/0x20
  ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30
  </TASK>
 Modules linked in: brd dm_delay dm_raid dm_mod af_packet uvesafb cfbfillrect cfbimgblt cn cfbcopyarea fb font fbdev tun autofs4 binfmt_misc configfs ipv6 virtio_rng virtio_balloon rng_core virtio_net pcspkr net_failover failover qemu_fw_cfg button mousedev raid10 raid456 libcrc32c async_raid6_recov async_memcpy async_pq raid6_pq async_xor xor async_tx raid1 raid0 md_mod sd_mod t10_pi crc64_rocksoft crc64 virtio_scsi scsi_mod evdev psmouse bsg scsi_common [last unloaded: brd]
 CR2: 0000000000000000
 ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
---
 drivers/md/md.c |    9 ++++++---
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
drivers/md/md.c +6 -3
@@ -360,13 +360,14 @@ static void md_end_flush(struct bio *bio
 	struct md_rdev *rdev = bio->bi_private;
 	struct mddev *mddev = rdev->mddev;
 
+	bio_put(bio);
+
 	rdev_dec_pending(rdev, mddev);
 
 	if (atomic_dec_and_test(&mddev->flush_pending)) {
 		/* The pre-request flush has finished */
 		queue_work(md_wq, &mddev->flush_work);
 	}
-	bio_put(bio);
 }
 
 static void md_submit_flush_data(struct work_struct *ws);
@@ -725,10 +726,12 @@ static void super_written(struct bio *bi
 		md_error(mddev, rdev);
 	}
 
+	bio_put(bio);
+
+	rdev_dec_pending(rdev, mddev);
+
 	if (atomic_dec_and_test(&mddev->pending_writes))
 		wake_up(&mddev->sb_wait);
-	rdev_dec_pending(rdev, mddev);
-	bio_put(bio);
 }
 
 void md_super_write(struct mddev *mddev, struct md_rdev *rdev,
author maintainer
#225 lore raw

PATCH 225/251 mmc: vub300: fix warning - do not call blocking ops when !TASK_RUNNING

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Deren Wu <[email protected]>

commit 4a44cd249604e29e7b90ae796d7692f5773dd348 upstream.

vub300_enable_sdio_irq() works with mutex and need TASK_RUNNING here. Ensure that we mark current as TASK_RUNNING for sleepable context.

[   77.554641] do not call blocking ops when !TASK_RUNNING; state=1 set at [<ffffffff92a72c1d>] sdio_irq_thread+0x17d/0x5b0
[   77.554652] WARNING: CPU: 2 PID: 1983 at kernel/sched/core.c:9813 __might_sleep+0x116/0x160
[   77.554905] CPU: 2 PID: 1983 Comm: ksdioirqd/mmc1 Tainted: G           OE      6.1.0-rc5 #1
[   77.554910] Hardware name: Intel(R) Client Systems NUC8i7BEH/NUC8BEB, BIOS BECFL357.86A.0081.2020.0504.1834 05/04/2020
[   77.554912] RIP: 0010:__might_sleep+0x116/0x160
[   77.554920] RSP: 0018:ffff888107b7fdb8 EFLAGS: 00010282
[   77.554923] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff888118c1b740 RCX: 0000000000000000
[   77.554926] RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 0000000000000004 RDI: ffffed1020f6ffa9
[   77.554928] RBP: ffff888107b7fde0 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: ffffed1043ea60ba
[   77.554930] R10: ffff88821f5305cb R11: ffffed1043ea60b9 R12: ffffffff93aa3a60
[   77.554932] R13: 000000000000011b R14: 7fffffffffffffff R15: ffffffffc0558660
[   77.554934] FS:  0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88821f500000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[   77.554937] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[   77.554939] CR2: 00007f8a44010d68 CR3: 000000024421a003 CR4: 00000000003706e0
[   77.554942] Call Trace:
[   77.554944]  <TASK>
[   77.554952]  mutex_lock+0x78/0xf0
[   77.554973]  vub300_enable_sdio_irq+0x103/0x3c0 [vub300]
[   77.554981]  sdio_irq_thread+0x25c/0x5b0
[   77.555006]  kthread+0x2b8/0x370
[   77.555017]  ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30
[   77.555023]  </TASK>
[   77.555025] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
---
 drivers/mmc/host/vub300.c |    2 ++
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
drivers/mmc/host/vub300.c +2 -0
@@ -2056,6 +2056,7 @@ static void vub300_enable_sdio_irq(struc
 		return;
 	kref_get(&vub300->kref);
 	if (enable) {
+		set_current_state(TASK_RUNNING);
 		mutex_lock(&vub300->irq_mutex);
 		if (vub300->irqs_queued) {
 			vub300->irqs_queued -= 1;
@@ -2071,6 +2072,7 @@ static void vub300_enable_sdio_irq(struc
 			vub300_queue_poll_work(vub300, 0);
 		}
 		mutex_unlock(&vub300->irq_mutex);
+		set_current_state(TASK_INTERRUPTIBLE);
 	} else {
 		vub300->irq_enabled = 0;
 	}
author maintainer
#226 lore raw

PATCH 226/251 media: stv0288: use explicitly signed char

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Jason A. Donenfeld <[email protected]>

commit 7392134428c92a4cb541bd5c8f4f5c8d2e88364d upstream.

With char becoming unsigned by default, and with char alone being ambiguous and based on architecture, signed chars need to be marked explicitly as such. Use s8 and u8 types here, since that's what surrounding code does. This fixes:

drivers/media/dvb-frontends/stv0288.c:471 stv0288_set_frontend() warn: assigning (-9) to unsigned variable 'tm' drivers/media/dvb-frontends/stv0288.c:471 stv0288_set_frontend() warn: we never enter this loop

---
 drivers/media/dvb-frontends/stv0288.c |    5 ++---
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
drivers/media/dvb-frontends/stv0288.c +2 -3
@@ -452,9 +452,8 @@ static int stv0288_set_frontend(struct d
 	struct stv0288_state *state = fe->demodulator_priv;
 	struct dtv_frontend_properties *c = &fe->dtv_property_cache;
 
-	char tm;
-	unsigned char tda[3];
-	u8 reg, time_out = 0;
+	u8 tda[3], reg, time_out = 0;
+	s8 tm;
 
 	dprintk("%s : FE_SET_FRONTEND\n", __func__);
 
author maintainer
#227 lore raw

PATCH 227/251 ktest.pl minconfig: Unset configs instead of just removing them

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Steven Rostedt <[email protected]>

commit ef784eebb56425eed6e9b16e7d47e5c00dcf9c38 upstream.

After a full run of a make_min_config test, I noticed there were a lot of CONFIGs still enabled that really should not be. Looking at them, I noticed they were all defined as "default y". The issue is that the test simple removes the config and re-runs make oldconfig, which enables it again because it is set to default 'y'. Instead, explicitly disable the config with writing "# CONFIG_FOO is not set" to the file to keep it from being set again.

With this change, one of my box's minconfigs went from 768 configs set, down to 521 configs set.

Fixes 0a05c769a9de5 ("ktest: Added config_bisect test type")
---
 tools/testing/ktest/ktest.pl |    3 ++-
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
tools/testing/ktest/ktest.pl +2 -1
@@ -3751,9 +3751,10 @@ sub test_this_config {
     # .config to make sure it is missing the config that
     # we had before
     my %configs = %min_configs;
-    delete $configs{$config};
+    $configs{$config} = "# $config is not set";
     make_new_config ((values %configs), (values %keep_configs));
     make_oldconfig;
+    delete $configs{$config};
     undef %configs;
     assign_configs \%configs, $output_config;
 
author maintainer
#228 lore raw

PATCH 228/251 ARM: ux500: do not directly dereference __iomem

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Jason A. Donenfeld <[email protected]>

commit 65b0e307a1a9193571db12910f382f84195a3d29 upstream.

Sparse reports that calling add_device_randomness() on uid is a violation of address spaces. And indeed the next usage uses readl() properly, but that was left out when passing it toadd_device_ randomness(). So instead copy the whole thing to the stack first.

---
 drivers/soc/ux500/ux500-soc-id.c |   10 ++++------
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
drivers/soc/ux500/ux500-soc-id.c +4 -6
@@ -159,20 +159,18 @@ static ssize_t ux500_get_process(struct
 static const char *db8500_read_soc_id(struct device_node *backupram)
 {
 	void __iomem *base;
-	void __iomem *uid;
 	const char *retstr;
+	u32 uid[5];
 
 	base = of_iomap(backupram, 0);
 	if (!base)
 		return NULL;
-	uid = base + 0x1fc0;
+	memcpy_fromio(uid, base + 0x1fc0, sizeof(uid));
 
 	/* Throw these device-specific numbers into the entropy pool */
-	add_device_randomness(uid, 0x14);
+	add_device_randomness(uid, sizeof(uid));
 	retstr = kasprintf(GFP_KERNEL, "%08x%08x%08x%08x%08x",
-			 readl((u32 *)uid+0),
-			 readl((u32 *)uid+1), readl((u32 *)uid+2),
-			 readl((u32 *)uid+3), readl((u32 *)uid+4));
+			   uid[0], uid[1], uid[2], uid[3], uid[4]);
 	iounmap(base);
 	return retstr;
 }
author maintainer
#229 lore raw

PATCH 229/251 dm cache: Fix ABBA deadlock between shrink_slab and dm_cache_metadata_abort

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Mike Snitzer <[email protected]>

commit 352b837a5541690d4f843819028cf2b8be83d424 upstream.

Same ABBA deadlock pattern fixed in commit 4b60f452ec51 ("dm thin: Fix ABBA deadlock between shrink_slab and dm_pool_abort_metadata") to DM-cache's metadata.

Fixes 028ae9f76f29 ("dm cache: add fail io mode and needs_check flag")
---
 drivers/md/dm-cache-metadata.c |   55 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------
 1 file changed, 48 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
drivers/md/dm-cache-metadata.c +48 -7
@@ -522,11 +522,13 @@ static int __create_persistent_data_obje
 	return r;
 }
 
-static void __destroy_persistent_data_objects(struct dm_cache_metadata *cmd)
+static void __destroy_persistent_data_objects(struct dm_cache_metadata *cmd,
+					      bool destroy_bm)
 {
 	dm_sm_destroy(cmd->metadata_sm);
 	dm_tm_destroy(cmd->tm);
-	dm_block_manager_destroy(cmd->bm);
+	if (destroy_bm)
+		dm_block_manager_destroy(cmd->bm);
 }
 
 typedef unsigned long (*flags_mutator)(unsigned long);
@@ -780,7 +782,7 @@ static struct dm_cache_metadata *lookup_
 		cmd2 = lookup(bdev);
 		if (cmd2) {
 			mutex_unlock(&table_lock);
-			__destroy_persistent_data_objects(cmd);
+			__destroy_persistent_data_objects(cmd, true);
 			kfree(cmd);
 			return cmd2;
 		}
@@ -827,7 +829,7 @@ void dm_cache_metadata_close(struct dm_c
 		mutex_unlock(&table_lock);
 
 		if (!cmd->fail_io)
-			__destroy_persistent_data_objects(cmd);
+			__destroy_persistent_data_objects(cmd, true);
 		kfree(cmd);
 	}
 }
@@ -1551,14 +1553,53 @@ int dm_cache_metadata_needs_check(struct
 
 int dm_cache_metadata_abort(struct dm_cache_metadata *cmd)
 {
-	int r;
+	int r = -EINVAL;
+	struct dm_block_manager *old_bm = NULL, *new_bm = NULL;
+
+	/* fail_io is double-checked with cmd->root_lock held below */
+	if (unlikely(cmd->fail_io))
+		return r;
+
+	/*
+	 * Replacement block manager (new_bm) is created and old_bm destroyed outside of
+	 * cmd root_lock to avoid ABBA deadlock that would result (due to life-cycle of
+	 * shrinker associated with the block manager's bufio client vs cmd root_lock).
+	 * - must take shrinker_rwsem without holding cmd->root_lock
+	 */
+	new_bm = dm_block_manager_create(cmd->bdev, DM_CACHE_METADATA_BLOCK_SIZE << SECTOR_SHIFT,
+					 CACHE_METADATA_CACHE_SIZE,
+					 CACHE_MAX_CONCURRENT_LOCKS);
 
 	WRITE_LOCK(cmd);
-	__destroy_persistent_data_objects(cmd);
-	r = __create_persistent_data_objects(cmd, false);
+	if (cmd->fail_io) {
+		WRITE_UNLOCK(cmd);
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	__destroy_persistent_data_objects(cmd, false);
+	old_bm = cmd->bm;
+	if (IS_ERR(new_bm)) {
+		DMERR("could not create block manager during abort");
+		cmd->bm = NULL;
+		r = PTR_ERR(new_bm);
+		goto out_unlock;
+	}
+
+	cmd->bm = new_bm;
+	r = __open_or_format_metadata(cmd, false);
+	if (r) {
+		cmd->bm = NULL;
+		goto out_unlock;
+	}
+	new_bm = NULL;
+out_unlock:
 	if (r)
 		cmd->fail_io = true;
 	WRITE_UNLOCK(cmd);
+	dm_block_manager_destroy(old_bm);
+out:
+	if (new_bm && !IS_ERR(new_bm))
+		dm_block_manager_destroy(new_bm);
 
 	return r;
 }
author maintainer
#230 lore raw

PATCH 230/251 dm thin: Use last transactions pmd->root when commit failed

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Zhihao Cheng <[email protected]>

commit 7991dbff6849f67e823b7cc0c15e5a90b0549b9f upstream.

Recently we found a softlock up problem in dm thin pool btree lookup code due to corrupted metadata:

 Kernel panic - not syncing: softlockup: hung tasks
 CPU: 7 PID: 2669225 Comm: kworker/u16:3
 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996)
 Workqueue: dm-thin do_worker [dm_thin_pool]
 Call Trace:
   <IRQ>
   dump_stack+0x9c/0xd3
   panic+0x35d/0x6b9
   watchdog_timer_fn.cold+0x16/0x25
   __run_hrtimer+0xa2/0x2d0
   </IRQ>
   RIP: 0010:__relink_lru+0x102/0x220 [dm_bufio]
   __bufio_new+0x11f/0x4f0 [dm_bufio]
   new_read+0xa3/0x1e0 [dm_bufio]
   dm_bm_read_lock+0x33/0xd0 [dm_persistent_data]
   ro_step+0x63/0x100 [dm_persistent_data]
   btree_lookup_raw.constprop.0+0x44/0x220 [dm_persistent_data]
   dm_btree_lookup+0x16f/0x210 [dm_persistent_data]
   dm_thin_find_block+0x12c/0x210 [dm_thin_pool]
   __process_bio_read_only+0xc5/0x400 [dm_thin_pool]
   process_thin_deferred_bios+0x1a4/0x4a0 [dm_thin_pool]
   process_one_work+0x3c5/0x730

Following process may generate a broken btree mixed with fresh and stale btree nodes, which could get dm thin trapped in an infinite loop while looking up data block:
Transaction 1: pmd->root = A, A->B->C // One path in btree

                pmd->root = X, X->Y->Z   // Copy-up
 Transaction 2: X,Z is updated on disk, Y write failed.
                // Commit failed, dm thin becomes read-only.
                process_bio_read_only
		 dm_thin_find_block
		  __find_block
		   dm_btree_lookup(pmd->root)

The pmd->root points to a broken btree, Y may contain stale node pointing to any block, for example X, which gets dm thin trapped into a dead loop while looking up Z.

Fix this by setting pmd->root in __open_metadata(), so that dm thin will use the last transaction's pmd->root if commit failed.

Fetch a reproducer in [Link].

Linke: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=216790

Fixes 991d9fa02da0 ("dm: add thin provisioning target")
---
 drivers/md/dm-thin-metadata.c |    9 +++++++++
 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+)
drivers/md/dm-thin-metadata.c +9 -0
@@ -661,6 +661,15 @@ static int __open_metadata(struct dm_poo
 		goto bad_cleanup_data_sm;
 	}
 
+	/*
+	 * For pool metadata opening process, root setting is redundant
+	 * because it will be set again in __begin_transaction(). But dm
+	 * pool aborting process really needs to get last transaction's
+	 * root to avoid accessing broken btree.
+	 */
+	pmd->root = le64_to_cpu(disk_super->data_mapping_root);
+	pmd->details_root = le64_to_cpu(disk_super->device_details_root);
+
 	__setup_btree_details(pmd);
 	dm_bm_unlock(sblock);
 
author maintainer
#231 lore raw

PATCH 231/251 dm thin: Fix UAF in run_timer_softirq()

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Luo Meng <[email protected]>

commit 88430ebcbc0ec637b710b947738839848c20feff upstream.

When dm_resume() and dm_destroy() are concurrent, it will lead to UAF, as follows:

 BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in __run_timers+0x173/0x710
 Write of size 8 at addr ffff88816d9490f0 by task swapper/0/0
<snip>
 Call Trace:
  <IRQ>
  dump_stack_lvl+0x73/0x9f
  print_report.cold+0x132/0xaa2
  _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0xcd/0x160
  __run_timers+0x173/0x710
  kasan_report+0xad/0x110
  __run_timers+0x173/0x710
  __asan_store8+0x9c/0x140
  __run_timers+0x173/0x710
  call_timer_fn+0x310/0x310
  pvclock_clocksource_read+0xfa/0x250
  kvm_clock_read+0x2c/0x70
  kvm_clock_get_cycles+0xd/0x20
  ktime_get+0x5c/0x110
  lapic_next_event+0x38/0x50
  clockevents_program_event+0xf1/0x1e0
  run_timer_softirq+0x49/0x90
  __do_softirq+0x16e/0x62c
  __irq_exit_rcu+0x1fa/0x270
  irq_exit_rcu+0x12/0x20
  sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x8e/0xc0

One of the concurrency UAF can be shown as below:

use free

do_resume                           |
  __find_device_hash_cell           |
    dm_get                          |
      atomic_inc(&md->holders)      |
                                    | dm_destroy
                                    |   __dm_destroy
                                    |     if (!dm_suspended_md(md))
                                    |     atomic_read(&md->holders)
                                    |     msleep(1)
  dm_resume                         |
    __dm_resume                     |
      dm_table_resume_targets       |
        pool_resume                 |
          do_waker  #add delay work |
  dm_put                            |
    atomic_dec(&md->holders)        |
                                    |     dm_table_destroy
                                    |       pool_dtr
                                    |         __pool_dec
                                    |           __pool_destroy
                                    |             destroy_workqueue
                                    |             kfree(pool) # free pool

time out
__do_softirq
run_timer_softirq # pool has already been freed

This can be easily reproduced using:
1. create thin-pool
2. dmsetup suspend pool
3. dmsetup resume pool
4. dmsetup remove_all # Concurrent with 3

The root cause of this UAF bug is that dm_resume() adds timer after dm_destroy() skips cancelling the timer because of suspend status. After timeout, it will call run_timer_softirq(), however pool has already been freed. The concurrency UAF bug will happen.

Therefore, cancelling timer again in __pool_destroy().

Fixes 991d9fa02da0d ("dm: add thin provisioning target")
---
 drivers/md/dm-thin.c |    2 ++
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
drivers/md/dm-thin.c +2 -0
@@ -2935,6 +2935,8 @@ static void __pool_destroy(struct pool *
 	dm_bio_prison_destroy(pool->prison);
 	dm_kcopyd_client_destroy(pool->copier);
 
+	cancel_delayed_work_sync(&pool->waker);
+	cancel_delayed_work_sync(&pool->no_space_timeout);
 	if (pool->wq)
 		destroy_workqueue(pool->wq);
 
author maintainer
#232 lore raw

PATCH 232/251 dm cache: Fix UAF in destroy()

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Luo Meng <[email protected]>

commit 6a459d8edbdbe7b24db42a5a9f21e6aa9e00c2aa upstream.

Dm_cache also has the same UAF problem when dm_resume() and dm_destroy() are concurrent.

Therefore, cancelling timer again in destroy().

Fixes c6b4fcbad044e ("dm: add cache target")
---
 drivers/md/dm-cache-target.c |    1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
drivers/md/dm-cache-target.c +1 -0
@@ -2321,6 +2321,7 @@ static void destroy(struct cache *cache)
 	if (cache->prison)
 		dm_bio_prison_destroy(cache->prison);
 
+	cancel_delayed_work_sync(&cache->waker);
 	if (cache->wq)
 		destroy_workqueue(cache->wq);
 
author maintainer
#233 lore raw

PATCH 233/251 dm cache: set needs_check flag after aborting metadata

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Mike Snitzer <[email protected]>

commit 6b9973861cb2e96dcd0bb0f1baddc5c034207c5c upstream.

Otherwise the commit that will be aborted will be associated with the metadata objects that will be torn down. Must write needs_check flag to metadata with a reset block manager.

Found through code-inspection (and compared against dm-thin.c).

Fixes 028ae9f76f29 ("dm cache: add fail io mode and needs_check flag")
---
 drivers/md/dm-cache-target.c |   10 +++++-----
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
drivers/md/dm-cache-target.c +5 -5
@@ -1030,16 +1030,16 @@ static void abort_transaction(struct cac
 	if (get_cache_mode(cache) >= CM_READ_ONLY)
 		return;
 
-	if (dm_cache_metadata_set_needs_check(cache->cmd)) {
-		DMERR("%s: failed to set 'needs_check' flag in metadata", dev_name);
-		set_cache_mode(cache, CM_FAIL);
-	}
-
 	DMERR_LIMIT("%s: aborting current metadata transaction", dev_name);
 	if (dm_cache_metadata_abort(cache->cmd)) {
 		DMERR("%s: failed to abort metadata transaction", dev_name);
 		set_cache_mode(cache, CM_FAIL);
 	}
+
+	if (dm_cache_metadata_set_needs_check(cache->cmd)) {
+		DMERR("%s: failed to set 'needs_check' flag in metadata", dev_name);
+		set_cache_mode(cache, CM_FAIL);
+	}
 }
 
 static void metadata_operation_failed(struct cache *cache, const char *op, int r)
author maintainer
#234 lore raw

PATCH 234/251 tracing: Fix infinite loop in tracing_read_pipe on overflowed print_trace_line

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Yang Jihong <[email protected]>

commit c1ac03af6ed45d05786c219d102f37eb44880f28 upstream.

print_trace_line may overflow seq_file buffer. If the event is not consumed, the while loop keeps peeking this event, causing a infinite loop.

Cc Masami Hiramatsu <[email protected]>
Fixes 088b1e427dbba ("ftrace: pipe fixes")
---
 kernel/trace/trace.c |   15 ++++++++++++++-
 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
kernel/trace/trace.c +14 -1
@@ -5226,7 +5226,20 @@ waitagain:
 
 		ret = print_trace_line(iter);
 		if (ret == TRACE_TYPE_PARTIAL_LINE) {
-			/* don't print partial lines */
+			/*
+			 * If one print_trace_line() fills entire trace_seq in one shot,
+			 * trace_seq_to_user() will returns -EBUSY because save_len == 0,
+			 * In this case, we need to consume it, otherwise, loop will peek
+			 * this event next time, resulting in an infinite loop.
+			 */
+			if (save_len == 0) {
+				iter->seq.full = 0;
+				trace_seq_puts(&iter->seq, "[LINE TOO BIG]\n");
+				trace_consume(iter);
+				break;
+			}
+
+			/* In other cases, don't print partial lines */
 			iter->seq.seq.len = save_len;
 			break;
 		}
author maintainer
#235 lore raw

PATCH 235/251 ARM: 9256/1: NWFPE: avoid compiler-generated __aeabi_uldivmod

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Nick Desaulniers <[email protected]>

commit 3220022038b9a3845eea762af85f1c5694b9f861 upstream.

clang-15's ability to elide loops completely became more aggressive when it can deduce how a variable is being updated in a loop. Counting down one variable by an increment of another can be replaced by a modulo operation.

For 64b variables on 32b ARM EABI targets, this can result in the compiler generating calls to __aeabi_uldivmod, which it does for a do while loop in float64_rem().

For the kernel, we'd generally prefer that developers not open code 64b division via binary / operators and instead use the more explicit helpers from div64.h. On arm-linux-gnuabi targets, failure to do so can result in linkage failures due to undefined references to __aeabi_uldivmod().

While developers can avoid open coding divisions on 64b variables, the compiler doesn't know that the Linux kernel has a partial implementation of a compiler runtime (--rtlib) to enforce this convention.

It's also undecidable for the compiler whether the code in question would be faster to execute the loop vs elide it and do the 64b division.

While I actively avoid using the internal -mllvm command line flags, I think we get better code than using barrier() here, which will force reloads+spills in the loop for all toolchains.

---
 arch/arm/nwfpe/Makefile |    6 ++++++
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)
arch/arm/nwfpe/Makefile +6 -0
@@ -10,3 +10,9 @@ nwfpe-y				+= fpa11.o fpa11_cpdo.o fpa11
 				   entry.o
 
 nwfpe-$(CONFIG_FPE_NWFPE_XP)	+= extended_cpdo.o
+
+# Try really hard to avoid generating calls to __aeabi_uldivmod() from
+# float64_rem() due to loop elision.
+ifdef CONFIG_CC_IS_CLANG
+CFLAGS_softfloat.o	+= -mllvm -replexitval=never
+endif
author maintainer
#236 lore raw

PATCH 236/251 media: dvb-core: Fix double free in dvb_register_device()

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Keita Suzuki <[email protected]>

commit 6b0d0477fce747d4137aa65856318b55fba72198 upstream.

In function dvb_register_device() -> dvb_register_media_device() -> dvb_create_media_entity(), dvb->entity is allocated and initialized. If the initialization fails, it frees the dvb->entity, and return an error code. The caller takes the error code and handles the error by calling dvb_media_device_free(), which unregisters the entity and frees the field again if it is not NULL. As dvb->entity may not NULLed in dvb_create_media_entity() when the allocation of dvbdev->pad fails, a double free may occur. This may also cause an Use After free in media_device_unregister_entity().

Fix this by storing NULL to dvb->entity when it is freed.

---
 drivers/media/dvb-core/dvbdev.c |    1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
drivers/media/dvb-core/dvbdev.c +1 -0
@@ -317,6 +317,7 @@ static int dvb_create_media_entity(struc
 				       GFP_KERNEL);
 		if (!dvbdev->pads) {
 			kfree(dvbdev->entity);
+			dvbdev->entity = NULL;
 			return -ENOMEM;
 		}
 	}
author maintainer
#237 lore raw

PATCH 237/251 cifs: fix confusing debug message

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Paulo Alcantara <[email protected]>

commit a85ceafd41927e41a4103d228a993df7edd8823b upstream.

Since rc was initialised to -ENOMEM in cifs_get_smb_ses(), when an existing smb session was found, free_xid() would be called and then print

CIFS: fs/cifs/connect.c: Existing tcp session with server found
CIFS: fs/cifs/connect.c: VFS: in cifs_get_smb_ses as Xid: 44 with uid: 0
CIFS: fs/cifs/connect.c: Existing smb sess found (status=1)
CIFS: fs/cifs/connect.c: VFS: leaving cifs_get_smb_ses (xid = 44) rc = -12

Fix this by initialising rc to 0 and then let free_xid() print this instead

CIFS: fs/cifs/connect.c: Existing tcp session with server found
CIFS: fs/cifs/connect.c: VFS: in cifs_get_smb_ses as Xid: 14 with uid: 0
CIFS: fs/cifs/connect.c: Existing smb sess found (status=1)
CIFS: fs/cifs/connect.c: VFS: leaving cifs_get_smb_ses (xid = 14) rc = 0

---
 fs/cifs/connect.c |    4 +++-
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
fs/cifs/connect.c +3 -1
@@ -2599,7 +2599,7 @@ cifs_set_cifscreds(struct smb_vol *vol _
 static struct cifs_ses *
 cifs_get_smb_ses(struct TCP_Server_Info *server, struct smb_vol *volume_info)
 {
-	int rc = -ENOMEM;
+	int rc = 0;
 	unsigned int xid;
 	struct cifs_ses *ses;
 	struct sockaddr_in *addr = (struct sockaddr_in *)&server->dstaddr;
@@ -2641,6 +2641,8 @@ cifs_get_smb_ses(struct TCP_Server_Info
 		return ses;
 	}
 
+	rc = -ENOMEM;
+
 	cifs_dbg(FYI, "Existing smb sess not found\n");
 	ses = sesInfoAlloc();
 	if (ses == NULL)
author maintainer
#238 lore raw

PATCH 238/251 PCI/sysfs: Fix double free in error path

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Sascha Hauer <[email protected]>

commit aa382ffa705bea9931ec92b6f3c70e1fdb372195 upstream.

When pci_create_attr() fails, pci_remove_resource_files() is called which will iterate over the res_attr[_wc] arrays and frees every non NULL entry. To avoid a double free here set the array entry only after it's clear we successfully initialized it.

Fixes b562ec8f74e4 ("PCI: Don't leak memory if sysfs_create_bin_file() fails")
---
 drivers/pci/pci-sysfs.c |   13 +++++++++----
 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
drivers/pci/pci-sysfs.c +9 -4
@@ -1167,11 +1167,9 @@ static int pci_create_attr(struct pci_de
 
 	sysfs_bin_attr_init(res_attr);
 	if (write_combine) {
-		pdev->res_attr_wc[num] = res_attr;
 		sprintf(res_attr_name, "resource%d_wc", num);
 		res_attr->mmap = pci_mmap_resource_wc;
 	} else {
-		pdev->res_attr[num] = res_attr;
 		sprintf(res_attr_name, "resource%d", num);
 		res_attr->mmap = pci_mmap_resource_uc;
 	}
@@ -1184,10 +1182,17 @@ static int pci_create_attr(struct pci_de
 	res_attr->size = pci_resource_len(pdev, num);
 	res_attr->private = &pdev->resource[num];
 	retval = sysfs_create_bin_file(&pdev->dev.kobj, res_attr);
-	if (retval)
+	if (retval) {
 		kfree(res_attr);
+		return retval;
+	}
+
+	if (write_combine)
+		pdev->res_attr_wc[num] = res_attr;
+	else
+		pdev->res_attr[num] = res_attr;
 
-	return retval;
+	return 0;
 }
 
 /**
author maintainer
#239 lore raw

PATCH 239/251 crypto: n2 - add missing hash statesize

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Corentin Labbe <[email protected]>

commit 76a4e874593543a2dff91d249c95bac728df2774 upstream.

Add missing statesize to hash templates.
This is mandatory otherwise no algorithms can be registered as the core requires statesize to be set.

Fixes 0a625fd2abaa ("crypto: n2 - Add Niagara2 crypto driver")
---
 drivers/crypto/n2_core.c |    6 ++++++
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)
drivers/crypto/n2_core.c +6 -0
@@ -1271,6 +1271,7 @@ struct n2_hash_tmpl {
 	const u32	*hash_init;
 	u8		hw_op_hashsz;
 	u8		digest_size;
+	u8		statesize;
 	u8		block_size;
 	u8		auth_type;
 	u8		hmac_type;
@@ -1302,6 +1303,7 @@ static const struct n2_hash_tmpl hash_tm
 	  .hmac_type	= AUTH_TYPE_HMAC_MD5,
 	  .hw_op_hashsz	= MD5_DIGEST_SIZE,
 	  .digest_size	= MD5_DIGEST_SIZE,
+	  .statesize	= sizeof(struct md5_state),
 	  .block_size	= MD5_HMAC_BLOCK_SIZE },
 	{ .name		= "sha1",
 	  .hash_zero	= sha1_zero_message_hash,
@@ -1310,6 +1312,7 @@ static const struct n2_hash_tmpl hash_tm
 	  .hmac_type	= AUTH_TYPE_HMAC_SHA1,
 	  .hw_op_hashsz	= SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE,
 	  .digest_size	= SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE,
+	  .statesize	= sizeof(struct sha1_state),
 	  .block_size	= SHA1_BLOCK_SIZE },
 	{ .name		= "sha256",
 	  .hash_zero	= sha256_zero_message_hash,
@@ -1318,6 +1321,7 @@ static const struct n2_hash_tmpl hash_tm
 	  .hmac_type	= AUTH_TYPE_HMAC_SHA256,
 	  .hw_op_hashsz	= SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE,
 	  .digest_size	= SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE,
+	  .statesize	= sizeof(struct sha256_state),
 	  .block_size	= SHA256_BLOCK_SIZE },
 	{ .name		= "sha224",
 	  .hash_zero	= sha224_zero_message_hash,
@@ -1326,6 +1330,7 @@ static const struct n2_hash_tmpl hash_tm
 	  .hmac_type	= AUTH_TYPE_RESERVED,
 	  .hw_op_hashsz	= SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE,
 	  .digest_size	= SHA224_DIGEST_SIZE,
+	  .statesize	= sizeof(struct sha256_state),
 	  .block_size	= SHA224_BLOCK_SIZE },
 };
 #define NUM_HASH_TMPLS ARRAY_SIZE(hash_tmpls)
@@ -1465,6 +1470,7 @@ static int __n2_register_one_ahash(const
 
 	halg = &ahash->halg;
 	halg->digestsize = tmpl->digest_size;
+	halg->statesize = tmpl->statesize;
 
 	base = &halg->base;
 	snprintf(base->cra_name, CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME, "%s", tmpl->name);
author maintainer
#240 lore raw

PATCH 240/251 iommu/amd: Fix ivrs_acpihid cmdline parsing code

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Kim Phillips <[email protected]>

commit 5f18e9f8868c6d4eae71678e7ebd4977b7d8c8cf upstream.

The second (UID) strcmp in acpi_dev_hid_uid_match considers "0" and "00" different, which can prevent device registration.

Have the AMD IOMMU driver's ivrs_acpihid parsing code remove any leading zeroes to make the UID strcmp succeed. Now users can safely specify "AMDxxxxx:00" or "AMDxxxxx:0" and expect the same behaviour.

Fixes ca3bf5d47cec ("iommu/amd: Introduces ivrs_acpihid kernel parameter")
Cc Suravee Suthikulpanit <[email protected]>
Cc Joerg Roedel <[email protected]>
---
 drivers/iommu/amd_iommu_init.c |    7 +++++++
 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+)
drivers/iommu/amd_iommu_init.c +7 -0
@@ -2684,6 +2684,13 @@ static int __init parse_ivrs_acpihid(cha
 		return 1;
 	}
 
+	/*
+	 * Ignore leading zeroes after ':', so e.g., AMDI0095:00
+	 * will match AMDI0095:0 in the second strcmp in acpi_dev_hid_uid_match
+	 */
+	while (*uid == '0' && *(uid + 1))
+		uid++;
+
 	i = early_acpihid_map_size++;
 	memcpy(early_acpihid_map[i].hid, hid, strlen(hid));
 	memcpy(early_acpihid_map[i].uid, uid, strlen(uid));
author maintainer
#241 lore raw

PATCH 241/251 parisc: led: Fix potential null-ptr-deref in start_task()

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Shang XiaoJing <[email protected]>

commit 41f563ab3c33698bdfc3403c7c2e6c94e73681e4 upstream.

start_task() calls create_singlethread_workqueue() and not checked the ret value, which may return NULL. And a null-ptr-deref may happen:

start_task()
create_singlethread_workqueue() # failed, led_wq is NULL queue_delayed_work()
queue_delayed_work_on()
__queue_delayed_work() # warning here, but continue
__queue_work() # access wq->flags, null-ptr-deref

Check the ret value and return -ENOMEM if it is NULL.

Fixes 3499495205a6 ("[PARISC] Use work queue in LED/LCD driver instead of tasklet.")
---
 drivers/parisc/led.c |    3 +++
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
drivers/parisc/led.c +3 -0
@@ -141,6 +141,9 @@ static int start_task(void)
 
 	/* Create the work queue and queue the LED task */
 	led_wq = create_singlethread_workqueue("led_wq");	
+	if (!led_wq)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
 	queue_delayed_work(led_wq, &led_task, 0);
 
 	return 0;
author maintainer
#242 lore raw

PATCH 242/251 device_cgroup: Roll back to original exceptions after copy failure

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Wang Weiyang <[email protected]>

commit e68bfbd3b3c3a0ec3cf8c230996ad8cabe90322f upstream.

When add the 'a *:* rwm' entry to devcgroup A's whitelist, at first A's exceptions will be cleaned and A's behavior is changed to DEVCG_DEFAULT_ALLOW. Then parent's exceptions will be copyed to A's whitelist. If copy failure occurs, just return leaving A to grant permissions to all devices. And A may grant more permissions than parent.

Backup A's whitelist and recover original exceptions after copy failure.

Fixes 4cef7299b478 ("device_cgroup: add proper checking when changing default behavior")
---
 security/device_cgroup.c |   33 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----
 1 file changed, 29 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
security/device_cgroup.c +29 -4
@@ -87,6 +87,17 @@ free_and_exit:
 	return -ENOMEM;
 }
 
+static void dev_exceptions_move(struct list_head *dest, struct list_head *orig)
+{
+	struct dev_exception_item *ex, *tmp;
+
+	lockdep_assert_held(&devcgroup_mutex);
+
+	list_for_each_entry_safe(ex, tmp, orig, list) {
+		list_move_tail(&ex->list, dest);
+	}
+}
+
 /*
  * called under devcgroup_mutex
  */
@@ -608,11 +619,13 @@ static int devcgroup_update_access(struc
 	int count, rc = 0;
 	struct dev_exception_item ex;
 	struct dev_cgroup *parent = css_to_devcgroup(devcgroup->css.parent);
+	struct dev_cgroup tmp_devcgrp;
 
 	if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
 		return -EPERM;
 
 	memset(&ex, 0, sizeof(ex));
+	memset(&tmp_devcgrp, 0, sizeof(tmp_devcgrp));
 	b = buffer;
 
 	switch (*b) {
@@ -624,15 +637,27 @@ static int devcgroup_update_access(struc
 
 			if (!may_allow_all(parent))
 				return -EPERM;
-			dev_exception_clean(devcgroup);
-			devcgroup->behavior = DEVCG_DEFAULT_ALLOW;
-			if (!parent)
+			if (!parent) {
+				devcgroup->behavior = DEVCG_DEFAULT_ALLOW;
+				dev_exception_clean(devcgroup);
 				break;
+			}
 
+			INIT_LIST_HEAD(&tmp_devcgrp.exceptions);
+			rc = dev_exceptions_copy(&tmp_devcgrp.exceptions,
+						 &devcgroup->exceptions);
+			if (rc)
+				return rc;
+			dev_exception_clean(devcgroup);
 			rc = dev_exceptions_copy(&devcgroup->exceptions,
 						 &parent->exceptions);
-			if (rc)
+			if (rc) {
+				dev_exceptions_move(&devcgroup->exceptions,
+						    &tmp_devcgrp.exceptions);
 				return rc;
+			}
+			devcgroup->behavior = DEVCG_DEFAULT_ALLOW;
+			dev_exception_clean(&tmp_devcgrp);
 			break;
 		case DEVCG_DENY:
 			if (css_has_online_children(&devcgroup->css))
author maintainer
#243 lore raw

PATCH 243/251 drm/connector: send hotplug uevent on connector cleanup

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Simon Ser <[email protected]>

commit 6fdc2d490ea1369d17afd7e6eb66fecc5b7209bc upstream.

A typical DP-MST unplug removes a KMS connector. However care must be taken to properly synchronize with user-space. The expected sequence of events is the following:

1. The kernel notices that the DP-MST port is gone.
2. The kernel marks the connector as disconnected, then sends a uevent to make user-space re-scan the connector list.
3. User-space notices the connector goes from connected to disconnected, disables it.
4. Kernel handles the IOCTL disabling the connector. On success, the very last reference to the struct drm_connector is dropped and drm_connector_cleanup() is called.
5. The connector is removed from the list, and a uevent is sent to tell user-space that the connector disappeared.

The very last step was missing. As a result, user-space thought the connector still existed and could try to disable it again. Since the kernel no longer knows about the connector, that would end up with EINVAL and confused user-space.

Fix this by sending a hotplug uevent from drm_connector_cleanup().

---
 drivers/gpu/drm/drm_connector.c |    3 +++
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
drivers/gpu/drm/drm_connector.c +3 -0
@@ -363,6 +363,9 @@ void drm_connector_cleanup(struct drm_co
 	mutex_destroy(&connector->mutex);
 
 	memset(connector, 0, sizeof(*connector));
+
+	if (dev->registered)
+		drm_sysfs_hotplug_event(dev);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(drm_connector_cleanup);
 
author maintainer
#244 lore raw

PATCH 244/251 drm/vmwgfx: Validate the box size for the snooped cursor

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Zack Rusin <[email protected]>

commit 4cf949c7fafe21e085a4ee386bb2dade9067316e upstream.

Invalid userspace dma surface copies could potentially overflow the memcpy from the surface to the snooped image leading to crashes. To fix it the dimensions of the copybox have to be validated against the expected size of the snooped cursor.

---
 drivers/gpu/drm/vmwgfx/vmwgfx_kms.c |    3 ++-
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/gpu/drm/vmwgfx/vmwgfx_kms.c +2 -1
@@ -301,7 +301,8 @@ void vmw_kms_cursor_snoop(struct vmw_sur
 	if (cmd->dma.guest.ptr.offset % PAGE_SIZE ||
 	    box->x != 0    || box->y != 0    || box->z != 0    ||
 	    box->srcx != 0 || box->srcy != 0 || box->srcz != 0 ||
-	    box->d != 1    || box_count != 1) {
+	    box->d != 1    || box_count != 1 ||
+	    box->w > 64 || box->h > 64) {
 		/* TODO handle none page aligned offsets */
 		/* TODO handle more dst & src != 0 */
 		/* TODO handle more then one copy */
author maintainer
#245 lore raw

PATCH 245/251 ext4: add inode table check in __ext4_get_inode_loc to aovid possible infinite loop

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Baokun Li <[email protected]>

commit eee22187b53611e173161e38f61de1c7ecbeb876 upstream.

In do_writepages, if the value returned by ext4_writepages is "-ENOMEM" and "wbc->sync_mode == WB_SYNC_ALL", retry until the condition is not met.

In __ext4_get_inode_loc, if the bh returned by sb_getblk is NULL, the function returns -ENOMEM.

In __getblk_slow, if the return value of grow_buffers is less than 0, the function returns NULL.

When the three processes are connected in series like the following stack, an infinite loop may occur:

do_writepages <--- keep retrying
ext4_writepages
mpage_map_and_submit_extent
mpage_map_one_extent

    ext4_map_blocks
     ext4_ext_map_blocks
      ext4_ext_handle_unwritten_extents
       ext4_ext_convert_to_initialized
        ext4_split_extent
         ext4_split_extent_at
          __ext4_ext_dirty
           __ext4_mark_inode_dirty
            ext4_reserve_inode_write
             ext4_get_inode_loc
              __ext4_get_inode_loc		<--- return -ENOMEM
               sb_getblk
                __getblk_gfp
                 __getblk_slow			<--- return NULL
                  grow_buffers
                   grow_dev_page		<--- return -ENXIO
                    ret = (block < end_block) ? 1 : -ENXIO;

In this issue, bg_inode_table_hi is overwritten as an incorrect value. As a result, block < end_block cannot be met in grow_dev_page. Therefore, __ext4_get_inode_loc always returns '-ENOMEM' and do_writepages keeps retrying. As a result, the writeback process is in the D state due to an infinite loop.

Add a check on inode table block in the __ext4_get_inode_loc function by referring to ext4_read_inode_bitmap to avoid this infinite loop.

---
 fs/ext4/inode.c |   10 +++++++++-
 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
fs/ext4/inode.c +9 -1
@@ -4321,9 +4321,17 @@ static int __ext4_get_inode_loc(struct i
 	inodes_per_block = EXT4_SB(sb)->s_inodes_per_block;
 	inode_offset = ((inode->i_ino - 1) %
 			EXT4_INODES_PER_GROUP(sb));
-	block = ext4_inode_table(sb, gdp) + (inode_offset / inodes_per_block);
 	iloc->offset = (inode_offset % inodes_per_block) * EXT4_INODE_SIZE(sb);
 
+	block = ext4_inode_table(sb, gdp);
+	if ((block <= le32_to_cpu(EXT4_SB(sb)->s_es->s_first_data_block)) ||
+	    (block >= ext4_blocks_count(EXT4_SB(sb)->s_es))) {
+		ext4_error(sb, "Invalid inode table block %llu in "
+			   "block_group %u", block, iloc->block_group);
+		return -EFSCORRUPTED;
+	}
+	block += (inode_offset / inodes_per_block);
+
 	bh = sb_getblk(sb, block);
 	if (unlikely(!bh))
 		return -ENOMEM;
author maintainer
#246 lore raw

PATCH 246/251 ext4: fix undefined behavior in bit shift for ext4_check_flag_values

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Gaosheng Cui <[email protected]>

commit 3bf678a0f9c017c9ba7c581541dbc8453452a7ae upstream.

Shifting signed 32-bit value by 31 bits is undefined, so changing significant bit to unsigned. The UBSAN warning calltrace like below:

UBSAN: shift-out-of-bounds in fs/ext4/ext4.h:591:2
left shift of 1 by 31 places cannot be represented in type 'int'
Call Trace:
 <TASK>
 dump_stack_lvl+0x7d/0xa5
 dump_stack+0x15/0x1b
 ubsan_epilogue+0xe/0x4e
 __ubsan_handle_shift_out_of_bounds+0x1e7/0x20c
 ext4_init_fs+0x5a/0x277
 do_one_initcall+0x76/0x430
 kernel_init_freeable+0x3b3/0x422
 kernel_init+0x24/0x1e0
 ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30
 </TASK>
Fixes 9a4c80194713 ("ext4: ensure Inode flags consistency are checked at build time")
---
 fs/ext4/ext4.h |    2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
fs/ext4/ext4.h +1 -1
@@ -476,7 +476,7 @@ enum {
  *
  * It's not paranoia if the Murphy's Law really *is* out to get you.  :-)
  */
-#define TEST_FLAG_VALUE(FLAG) (EXT4_##FLAG##_FL == (1 << EXT4_INODE_##FLAG))
+#define TEST_FLAG_VALUE(FLAG) (EXT4_##FLAG##_FL == (1U << EXT4_INODE_##FLAG))
 #define CHECK_FLAG_VALUE(FLAG) BUILD_BUG_ON(!TEST_FLAG_VALUE(FLAG))
 
 static inline void ext4_check_flag_values(void)
author maintainer
#247 lore raw

PATCH 247/251 ext4: fix bug_on in __es_tree_search caused by bad boot loader inode

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Baokun Li <[email protected]>

commit 991ed014de0840c5dc405b679168924afb2952ac upstream.

We got a issue as fllows:
==================================================================
kernel BUG at fs/ext4/extents_status.c:203!
invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP

 CPU: 1 PID: 945 Comm: cat Not tainted 6.0.0-next-20221007-dirty #349
 RIP: 0010:ext4_es_end.isra.0+0x34/0x42
 RSP: 0018:ffffc9000143b768 EFLAGS: 00010203
 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff8881769cd0b8 RCX: 0000000000000000
 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffffffff8fc27cf7 RDI: 00000000ffffffff
 RBP: ffff8881769cd0bc R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffffc9000143b5f8
 R10: 0000000000000001 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: ffff8881769cd0a0
 R13: ffff8881768e5668 R14: 00000000768e52f0 R15: 0000000000000000
 FS: 00007f359f7f05c0(0000)GS:ffff88842fd00000(0000)knlGS:0000000000000000
 CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
 CR2: 00007f359f5a2000 CR3: 000000017130c000 CR4: 00000000000006e0
 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
 Call Trace:
  <TASK>
  __es_tree_search.isra.0+0x6d/0xf5
  ext4_es_cache_extent+0xfa/0x230
  ext4_cache_extents+0xd2/0x110
  ext4_find_extent+0x5d5/0x8c0
  ext4_ext_map_blocks+0x9c/0x1d30
  ext4_map_blocks+0x431/0xa50
  ext4_mpage_readpages+0x48e/0xe40
  ext4_readahead+0x47/0x50
  read_pages+0x82/0x530
  page_cache_ra_unbounded+0x199/0x2a0
  do_page_cache_ra+0x47/0x70
  page_cache_ra_order+0x242/0x400
  ondemand_readahead+0x1e8/0x4b0
  page_cache_sync_ra+0xf4/0x110
  filemap_get_pages+0x131/0xb20
  filemap_read+0xda/0x4b0
  generic_file_read_iter+0x13a/0x250
  ext4_file_read_iter+0x59/0x1d0
  vfs_read+0x28f/0x460
  ksys_read+0x73/0x160
  __x64_sys_read+0x1e/0x30
  do_syscall_64+0x35/0x80
  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd
  </TASK>
==================================================================

In the above issue, ioctl invokes the swap_inode_boot_loader function to swap inode<5> and inode<12>. However, inode<5> contain incorrect imode and disordered extents, and i_nlink is set to 1. The extents check for inode in the ext4_iget function can be bypassed bacause 5 is EXT4_BOOT_LOADER_INO. While links_count is set to 1, the extents are not initialized in swap_inode_boot_loader. After the ioctl command is executed successfully, the extents are swapped to inode<12>, in this case, run the cat command to view inode<12>. And Bug_ON is triggered due to the incorrect extents.

When the boot loader inode is not initialized, its imode can be one of the following:
1) the imode is a bad type, which is marked as bad_inode in ext4_iget and set to S_IFREG.
2) the imode is good type but not S_IFREG.
3) the imode is S_IFREG.

The BUG_ON may be triggered by bypassing the check in cases 1 and 2. Therefore, when the boot loader inode is bad_inode or its imode is not S_IFREG, initialize the inode to avoid triggering the BUG.

---
 fs/ext4/ioctl.c |    2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
fs/ext4/ioctl.c +1 -1
@@ -134,7 +134,7 @@ static long swap_inode_boot_loader(struc
 	/* Protect extent tree against block allocations via delalloc */
 	ext4_double_down_write_data_sem(inode, inode_bl);
 
-	if (inode_bl->i_nlink == 0) {
+	if (is_bad_inode(inode_bl) || !S_ISREG(inode_bl->i_mode)) {
 		/* this inode has never been used as a BOOT_LOADER */
 		set_nlink(inode_bl, 1);
 		i_uid_write(inode_bl, 0);
author maintainer
#248 lore raw

PATCH 248/251 ext4: init quota for old.inode in ext4_rename

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Ye Bin <[email protected]>

commit fae381a3d79bb94aa2eb752170d47458d778b797 upstream.

Syzbot found the following issue:
ext4_parse_param: s_want_extra_isize=128
ext4_inode_info_init: s_want_extra_isize=32
ext4_rename: old.inode=ffff88823869a2c8 old.dir=ffff888238699828 new.inode=ffff88823869d7e8 new.dir=ffff888238699828 __ext4_mark_inode_dirty: inode=ffff888238699828 ea_isize=32 want_ea_size=128 __ext4_mark_inode_dirty: inode=ffff88823869a2c8 ea_isize=32 want_ea_size=128
ext4_xattr_block_set: inode=ffff88823869a2c8

------------[ cut here ]------------
WARNING: CPU: 13 PID: 2234 at fs/ext4/xattr.c:2070 ext4_xattr_block_set.cold+0x22/0x980
Modules linked in:
RIP: 0010:ext4_xattr_block_set.cold+0x22/0x980
RSP: 0018:ffff888227d3f3b0 EFLAGS: 00010202
RAX: 0000000000000001 RBX: ffff88823007a000 RCX: 0000000000000000
RDX: 0000000000000a03 RSI: 0000000000000040 RDI: ffff888230078178
RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 000000000000002c R09: ffffed1075c7df8e
R10: ffff8883ae3efc6b R11: ffffed1075c7df8d R12: 0000000000000000
R13: ffff88823869a2c8 R14: ffff8881012e0460 R15: dffffc0000000000
FS:  00007f350ac1f740(0000) GS:ffff8883ae200000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007f350a6ed6a0 CR3: 0000000237456000 CR4: 00000000000006e0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Call Trace:
 <TASK>
 ? ext4_xattr_set_entry+0x3b7/0x2320
 ? ext4_xattr_block_set+0x0/0x2020
 ? ext4_xattr_set_entry+0x0/0x2320
 ? ext4_xattr_check_entries+0x77/0x310
 ? ext4_xattr_ibody_set+0x23b/0x340
 ext4_xattr_move_to_block+0x594/0x720
 ext4_expand_extra_isize_ea+0x59a/0x10f0
 __ext4_expand_extra_isize+0x278/0x3f0
 __ext4_mark_inode_dirty.cold+0x347/0x410
 ext4_rename+0xed3/0x174f
 vfs_rename+0x13a7/0x2510
 do_renameat2+0x55d/0x920
 __x64_sys_rename+0x7d/0xb0
 do_syscall_64+0x3b/0xa0
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x72/0xdc

As 'ext4_rename' will modify 'old.inode' ctime and mark inode dirty, which may trigger expand 'extra_isize' and allocate block. If inode didn't init quota will lead to warning. To solve above issue, init 'old.inode' firstly in 'ext4_rename'.

---
 fs/ext4/namei.c |    3 +++
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
fs/ext4/namei.c +3 -0
@@ -3864,6 +3864,9 @@ static int ext4_cross_rename(struct inod
 	retval = dquot_initialize(old.dir);
 	if (retval)
 		return retval;
+	retval = dquot_initialize(old.inode);
+	if (retval)
+		return retval;
 	retval = dquot_initialize(new.dir);
 	if (retval)
 		return retval;
author maintainer
#249 lore raw

PATCH 249/251 ext4: fix error code return to user-space in ext4_get_branch()

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Luís Henriques <[email protected]>

commit 26d75a16af285a70863ba6a81f85d81e7e65da50 upstream.

If a block is out of range in ext4_get_branch(), -ENOMEM will be returned to user-space. Obviously, this error code isn't really useful. This patch fixes it by making sure the right error code (-EFSCORRUPTED) is propagated to user-space. EUCLEAN is more informative than ENOMEM.

---
 fs/ext4/indirect.c |    9 ++++++++-
 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
fs/ext4/indirect.c +8 -1
@@ -147,6 +147,7 @@ static Indirect *ext4_get_branch(struct
 	struct super_block *sb = inode->i_sb;
 	Indirect *p = chain;
 	struct buffer_head *bh;
+	unsigned int key;
 	int ret = -EIO;
 
 	*err = 0;
@@ -155,7 +156,13 @@ static Indirect *ext4_get_branch(struct
 	if (!p->key)
 		goto no_block;
 	while (--depth) {
-		bh = sb_getblk(sb, le32_to_cpu(p->key));
+		key = le32_to_cpu(p->key);
+		if (key > ext4_blocks_count(EXT4_SB(sb)->s_es)) {
+			/* the block was out of range */
+			ret = -EFSCORRUPTED;
+			goto failure;
+		}
+		bh = sb_getblk(sb, key);
 		if (unlikely(!bh)) {
 			ret = -ENOMEM;
 			goto failure;
author maintainer
#250 lore raw

PATCH 250/251 ext4: avoid BUG_ON when creating xattrs

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Jan Kara <[email protected]>

commit b40ebaf63851b3a401b0dc9263843538f64f5ce6 upstream.

Commit fb0a387dcdcd ("ext4: limit block allocations for indirect-block files to < 2^32") added code to try to allocate xattr block with 32-bit block number for indirect block based files on the grounds that these files cannot use larger block numbers. It also added BUG_ON when allocated block could not fit into 32 bits. This is however bogus reasoning because xattr block is stored in inode->i_file_acl and inode->i_file_acl_hi and as such even indirect block based files can happily use full 48 bits for xattr block number. The proper handling seems to be there basically since 64-bit block number support was added. So remove the bogus limitation and BUG_ON.

Cc Eric Sandeen <[email protected]>
Fixes fb0a387dcdcd ("ext4: limit block allocations for indirect-block files to < 2^32")
---
 fs/ext4/xattr.c |    8 --------
 1 file changed, 8 deletions(-)
fs/ext4/xattr.c +0 -8
@@ -974,19 +974,11 @@ inserted:
 
 			goal = ext4_group_first_block_no(sb,
 						EXT4_I(inode)->i_block_group);
-
-			/* non-extent files can't have physical blocks past 2^32 */
-			if (!(ext4_test_inode_flag(inode, EXT4_INODE_EXTENTS)))
-				goal = goal & EXT4_MAX_BLOCK_FILE_PHYS;
-
 			block = ext4_new_meta_blocks(handle, inode, goal, 0,
 						     NULL, &error);
 			if (error)
 				goto cleanup;
 
-			if (!(ext4_test_inode_flag(inode, EXT4_INODE_EXTENTS)))
-				BUG_ON(block > EXT4_MAX_BLOCK_FILE_PHYS);
-
 			ea_idebug(inode, "creating block %llu",
 				  (unsigned long long)block);
 
author maintainer
#251 lore raw

PATCH 251/251 ext4: initialize quota before expanding inode in setproject ioctl

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Jan Kara <[email protected]>

commit 1485f726c6dec1a1f85438f2962feaa3d585526f upstream.

Make sure we initialize quotas before possibly expanding inode space (and thus maybe needing to allocate external xattr block) in ext4_ioctl_setproject(). This prevents not accounting the necessary block allocation.

---
 fs/ext4/ioctl.c |    8 ++++----
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
fs/ext4/ioctl.c +4 -4
@@ -333,6 +333,10 @@ static int ext4_ioctl_setproject(struct
 	if (IS_NOQUOTA(inode))
 		goto out_unlock;
 
+	err = dquot_initialize(inode);
+	if (err)
+		return err;
+
 	err = ext4_get_inode_loc(inode, &iloc);
 	if (err)
 		goto out_unlock;
@@ -345,10 +349,6 @@ static int ext4_ioctl_setproject(struct
 	}
 	brelse(iloc.bh);
 
-	err = dquot_initialize(inode);
-	if (err)
-		return err;
-
 	handle = ext4_journal_start(inode, EXT4_HT_QUOTA,
 		EXT4_QUOTA_INIT_BLOCKS(sb) +
 		EXT4_QUOTA_DEL_BLOCKS(sb) + 3);
Tested-by on the v1 series
#252 lore raw
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman
Quoted 20 lines · Greg Kroah-Hartman

-------------------------------------------
NOTE:

This is going to be the LAST 4.9.y release to be made by the stable/LTS kernel maintainers. After this release, it will be end-of-life and you should not use it at all. You should have moved to a newer kernel branch by now (as seen on the https://kernel.org/category/releases.html
page), but if NOT, and this is going to be a real hardship, please contact me directly.
-------------------------------------------

This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 4.9.337 release. There are 251 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please let me know.

Responses should be made by Sat, 07 Jan 2023 12:52:55 +0000. Anything received after that time might be too late.

The whole patch series can be found in one patch at:

Quoted 9 lines
	https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v4.x/stable-review/patch-4.9.337-rc1.gz

or in the git tree and branch at:
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.git linux-4.9.y
and the diffstat can be found below.

thanks,

greg k-h

Compiled and booted on my test system. No dmesg regressions.

thanks,
-- Shuah

Tested-by on the v1 series
#253 lore raw
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman
Quoted 11 lines · Greg Kroah-Hartman

-------------------------------------------
NOTE:

This is going to be the LAST 4.9.y release to be made by the stable/LTS kernel maintainers. After this release, it will be end-of-life and you should not use it at all. You should have moved to a newer kernel branch by now (as seen on the https://kernel.org/category/releases.html
page), but if NOT, and this is going to be a real hardship, please contact me directly.
-------------------------------------------

Quoted 8 lines

This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 4.9.337 release. There are 251 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please let me know.

Responses should be made by Sat, 07 Jan 2023 12:52:55 +0000. Anything received after that time might be too late.

Build results:

	total: 162 pass: 162 fail: 0
Qemu test results:
	total: 395 pass: 395 fail: 0

Guenter

Tested-by on the v1 series
#254 lore raw
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

Hi!

Quoted 10 lines

-------------------------------------------
NOTE:

This is going to be the LAST 4.9.y release to be made by the stable/LTS kernel maintainers. After this release, it will be end-of-life and you should not use it at all. You should have moved to a newer kernel branch by now (as seen on the https://kernel.org/category/releases.html
page), but if NOT, and this is going to be a real hardship, please contact me directly.
-------------------------------------------

CIP project is still maintaining 4.4-st, 4.4-cip and -rt releases, and is commited to do so for few more years. 4.9.y makes that job easier than it would be without them. If there's a way to keep 4.9 maintained a while longer, we might be interested.

Quoted 4 lines

This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 4.9.337 release. There are 251 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please let me know.

CIP testing did not find any problems here:

https://gitlab.com/cip-project/cip-testing/linux-stable-rc-ci/-/tree/linux-4.9.y

Best regards,
Pavel

Signature · 2 lines
DENX Software Engineering GmbH,      Managing Director: Wolfgang Denk
HRB 165235 Munich, Office: Kirchenstr.5, D-82194 Groebenzell, Germany
Tested-by on the v1 series
#255 lore raw
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman
Quoted 20 lines · Greg Kroah-Hartman

-------------------------------------------
NOTE:

This is going to be the LAST 4.9.y release to be made by the stable/LTS kernel maintainers. After this release, it will be end-of-life and you should not use it at all. You should have moved to a newer kernel branch by now (as seen on the https://kernel.org/category/releases.html
page), but if NOT, and this is going to be a real hardship, please contact me directly.
-------------------------------------------

This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 4.9.337 release. There are 251 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please let me know.

Responses should be made by Sat, 07 Jan 2023 12:52:55 +0000. Anything received after that time might be too late.

The whole patch series can be found in one patch at:

Quoted 8 lines
	https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v4.x/stable-review/patch-4.9.337-rc1.gz

or in the git tree and branch at:
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.git linux-4.9.y
and the diffstat can be found below.

thanks,

greg k-h

On ARCH_BRCMSTB using 32-bit and 64-bit ARM kernels, build tested on BMIPS_GENERIC:

Signature · 1 line
Florian
#256 lore raw
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

Hi!

Quoted 4 lines

This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 4.9.337 release. There are 251 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please let me know.

These are kCFI fixes, we don't really need them in 4.9:

Quoted 8 lines

Nathan Chancellor <[email protected]>
net: ethernet: ti: Fix return type of netcp_ndo_start_xmit()
Nathan Chancellor <[email protected]>
hamradio: baycom_epp: Fix return type of baycom_send_packet()
Nathan Chancellor <[email protected]>
drm/fsl-dcu: Fix return type of fsl_dcu_drm_connector_mode_valid()
Nathan Chancellor <[email protected]>
drm/sti: Fix return type of sti_{dvo,hda,hdmi}_connector_mode_valid()

This is marked as not-for-stable, and does not fix anything really bad, just smatch warning:

Quoted 2 lines

Marcus Folkesson <[email protected]>
HID: hid-sensor-custom: set fixed size for custom attributes

This is quite wrong. Real bug is registering the interrupt before the device is set up -- it should be fixed by reordering the init code, not by checking for NULL.

Quoted 2 lines

Gaosheng Cui <[email protected]>
ALSA: mts64: fix possible null-ptr-defer in snd_mts64_interrupt

This may turn working config into non-working for someone, as people now need to enable PWM manually to get fully working driver. I don't think we want it in stable.

Quoted 2 lines

Andy Shevchenko <[email protected]>
fbdev: ssd1307fb: Drop optional dependency

This claims to fix a deadlock, but in turn it calls cancel_delayed_work_sync from interrupt handler. I don't think that is good idea.

Quoted 2 lines

Marek Szyprowski <[email protected]>
ASoC: wm8994: Fix potential deadlock

This one is okay in mainline, but contains wrong error handling in the 4.9 backport. 4.19 seems okay. It needs to "goto out_unlock", not return directly.

Quoted 2 lines

Jan Kara <[email protected]>
ext4: initialize quota before expanding inode in setproject ioctl

Best regards,
Pavel

Signature · 2 lines
DENX Software Engineering GmbH,      Managing Director: Wolfgang Denk
HRB 165235 Munich, Office: Kirchenstr.5, D-82194 Groebenzell, Germany
author maintainer
#257 lore raw
Quoted 6 lines · Pavel Machek

This one is okay in mainline, but contains wrong error handling in the 4.9 backport. 4.19 seems okay. It needs to "goto out_unlock", not return directly.

Quoted 2 lines

Jan Kara <[email protected]>
ext4: initialize quota before expanding inode in setproject ioctl

I've fixed this up, good catch. The rest I've left as they seem reasonable to be in the tree as-is.

thanks,

greg k-h

Tested-by Linux Kernel Functional Testing on the v1 series
#258 lore raw
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman
Quoted 21 lines · Greg Kroah-Hartman

-------------------------------------------
NOTE:

This is going to be the LAST 4.9.y release to be made by the stable/LTS kernel maintainers. After this release, it will be end-of-life and you should not use it at all. You should have moved to a newer kernel branch by now (as seen on the https://kernel.org/category/releases.html
page), but if NOT, and this is going to be a real hardship, please contact me directly.
-------------------------------------------

This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 4.9.337 release. There are 251 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please let me know.

Responses should be made by Sat, 07 Jan 2023 12:52:55 +0000. Anything received after that time might be too late.

The whole patch series can be found in one patch at:

Quoted 8 lines
        https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v4.x/stable-review/patch-4.9.337-rc1.gz

or in the git tree and branch at:
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.git linux-4.9.y
and the diffstat can be found below.

thanks,

greg k-h

Results from Linaro’s test farm.
No regressions on arm64, arm, x86_64, and i386.

## Build
* kernel: 4.9.337-rc1
* git: https://gitlab.com/Linaro/lkft/mirrors/stable/linux-stable-rc
* git branch: linux-4.9.y
* git commit: e5be668a53e8317a07f6b4a6b3e0b17b232cb6a1
* git describe: v4.9.336-252-ge5be668a53e8
* test details:
https://qa-reports.linaro.org/lkft/linux-stable-rc-linux-4.9.y/build/v4.9.336-252-ge5be668a53e8

## Test Regressions (compared to v4.9.336)

## Metric Regressions (compared to v4.9.336)

## Test Fixes (compared to v4.9.336)

## Metric Fixes (compared to v4.9.336)

## Test result summary
total: 77532, pass: 66466, fail: 2409, skip: 8290, xfail: 367

## Build Summary
* arc: 10 total, 10 passed, 0 failed
* arm: 284 total, 278 passed, 6 failed
* arm64: 55 total, 48 passed, 7 failed
* i386: 31 total, 30 passed, 1 failed
* mips: 43 total, 40 passed, 3 failed
* parisc: 2 total, 0 passed, 2 failed
* powerpc: 27 total, 21 passed, 6 failed
* s390: 17 total, 12 passed, 5 failed
* sh: 26 total, 24 passed, 2 failed
* sparc: 14 total, 14 passed, 0 failed
* x86_64: 52 total, 49 passed, 3 failed

## Test suites summary
* boot
* fwts
* igt-gpu-tools
* kselftest-android
* kselftest-arm64
* kselftest-breakpoints
* kselftest-capabilities
* kselftest-cgroup
* kselftest-clone3
* kselftest-core
* kselftest-cpu-hotplug
* kselftest-cpufreq
* kselftest-drivers-dma-buf
* kselftest-efivarfs
* kselftest-filesystems
* kselftest-filesystems-binderfs
* kselftest-firmware
* kselftest-fpu
* kselftest-futex
* kselftest-gpio
* kselftest-intel_pstate
* kselftest-ipc
* kselftest-ir
* kselftest-kcmp
* kselftest-kexec
* kselftest-kvm
* kselftest-lib
* kselftest-livepatch
* kselftest-membarrier
* kselftest-net-forwarding
* kselftest-net-mptcp
* kselftest-netfilter
* kselftest-nsfs
* kselftest-openat2
* kselftest-pid_namespace
* kselftest-pidfd
* kselftest-proc
* kselftest-pstore
* kselftest-ptrace
* kselftest-seccomp
* kselftest-sigaltstack
* kselftest-size
* kselftest-splice
* kselftest-static_keys
* kselftest-sync
* kselftest-sysctl
* kselftest-tc-testing
* kselftest-timens
* kselftest-timers
* kselftest-tmpfs
* kselftest-tpm2
* kselftest-user
* kselftest-vm
* kselftest-x86
* kselftest-zram
* kunit
* kvm-unit-tests
* libhugetlbfs
* log-parser-boot
* log-parser-test
* ltp-cap_bounds
* ltp-commands
* ltp-containers
* ltp-controllers
* ltp-cpuhotplug
* ltp-crypto
* ltp-cve
* ltp-dio
* ltp-fcntl-locktests
* ltp-filecaps
* ltp-fs
* ltp-fs_bind
* ltp-fs_perms_simple
* ltp-fsx
* ltp-hugetlb
* ltp-io
* ltp-ipc
* ltp-math
* ltp-mm
* ltp-nptl
* ltp-open-posix-tests
* ltp-pty
* ltp-sched
* ltp-securebits
* ltp-smoke
* ltp-syscalls
* ltp-tracing
* network-basic-tests
* packetdrill
* rcutorture
* v4l2-compliance
* vdso

--
Linaro LKFT
https://lkft.linaro.org