SELinux: Measure state and hash of policy using IMA
Subsystems (5)
PATCH 1/1 SELinux: Measure state and hash of policy using IMA
Critical data structures of security modules are currently not measured. Therefore an attestation service, for instance, would not be able to attest whether the security modules are always operating with the policies and configuration that the system administrator had setup. The policies and configuration for the security modules could be tampered with by rogue user mode agents or modified through some inadvertent actions on the system. Measuring such critical data would enable an attestation service to reliably assess the security configuration of the system.
SELinux configuration and policy are some of the critical data for this security module that needs to be measured. This measurement can be used by an attestation service, for instance, to verify if the configuration and policies have been setup correctly and that they haven't been tampered with at runtime.
Measure SELinux configuration, policy capabilities settings, and the hash of the loaded policy by calling the IMA hook ima_measure_critical_data(). Since the size of the loaded policy can be quite large, hash of the policy is measured instead of the entire policy to avoid bloating the IMA log.
Enable early boot measurement for SELinux in IMA since SELinux initializes its state and policy before custom IMA policy is loaded.
Sample measurement of SELinux state and hash of the policy:
10 e32e...5ac3 ima-buf sha256:86e8...4594 selinux-state-1595389364:287899386 696e697469616c697a65643d313b656e61626c65643d313b656e666f7263696e673d303b636865636b72657170726f743d313b6e6574776f726b5f706565725f636f6e74726f6c733d313b6f70656e5f7065726d733d313b657874656e6465645f736f636b65745f636c6173733d313b616c776179735f636865636b5f6e6574776f726b3d303b6367726f75705f7365636c6162656c3d313b6e6e705f6e6f737569645f7472616e736974696f6e3d313b67656e66735f7365636c6162656c5f73796d6c696e6b733d303 10 9e81...0857 ima-buf sha256:4941...68fc selinux-policy-hash-1597335667:462051628 8d1d...1834
To verify the measurement check the following:
Execute the following command to extract the measured data from the IMA log for SELinux configuration (selinux-state).
grep -m 1 "selinux-state" /sys/kernel/security/integrity/ima/ascii_runtime_measurements | cut -d' ' -f 6 | xxd -r -p
The output should be the list of key-value pairs. For example,
initialized=1;enabled=1;enforcing=0;checkreqprot=1;network_peer_controls=1;open_perms=1;extended_socket_class=1;always_check_network=0;cgroup_seclabel=1;nnp_nosuid_transition=1;genfs_seclabel_symlinks=0;
To verify the measured data with the current SELinux state:
=> enabled should be set to 1 if /sys/fs/selinux folder exists,
0 otherwise
For other entries, compare the integer value in the files
=> /sys/fs/selinux/enforce
=> /sys/fs/selinux/checkreqprot
And, each of the policy capabilities files under
=> /sys/fs/selinux/policy_capabilities
For selinux-policy-hash, the hash of SELinux policy is included in the IMA log entry.
To verify the measured data with the current SELinux policy run the following commands and verify the output hash values match.
sha256sum /sys/fs/selinux/policy | cut -d' ' -f 1
grep -m 1 "selinux-policy-hash" /sys/kernel/security/integrity/ima/ascii_runtime_measurements | cut -d' ' -f 6
This patch is dependent on the following patch series:
https://patchwork.kernel.org/patch/11709527/ https://patchwork.kernel.org/patch/11730193/ https://patchwork.kernel.org/patch/11730757/
--- security/integrity/ima/Kconfig | 3 +- security/selinux/Makefile | 2 + security/selinux/hooks.c | 1 + security/selinux/include/security.h | 15 +++ security/selinux/measure.c | 149 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ security/selinux/selinuxfs.c | 3 + security/selinux/ss/services.c | 71 +++++++++++-- 7 files changed, 233 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-) create mode 100644 security/selinux/measure.c
security/integrity/ima/Kconfig +1 -2
@@ -324,8 +324,7 @@ config IMA_MEASURE_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS config IMA_QUEUE_EARLY_BOOT_DATA bool - depends on IMA_MEASURE_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS - depends on SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYRING + depends on SECURITY_SELINUX || (IMA_MEASURE_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS && SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYRING) default y config IMA_SECURE_AND_OR_TRUSTED_BOOT
security/selinux/Makefile +2 -0
@@ -16,6 +16,8 @@ selinux-$(CONFIG_NETLABEL) += netlabel.o selinux-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_INFINIBAND) += ibpkey.o +selinux-$(CONFIG_IMA) += measure.o + ccflags-y := -I$(srctree)/security/selinux -I$(srctree)/security/selinux/include $(addprefix $(obj)/,$(selinux-y)): $(obj)/flask.h
security/selinux/hooks.c +1 -0
@@ -7394,6 +7394,7 @@ int selinux_disable(struct selinux_state *state) }selinux_mark_disabled (state); +selinux_measure_state (state);pr_info ("SELinux: Disabled at runtime.\n" );
security/selinux/include/security.h +15 -0
@@ -222,16 +222,31 @@ static inline bool selinux_policycap_genfs_seclabel_symlinks(void)return state->policycap[POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_GENFS_SECLABEL_SYMLINKS ]; } +static inline bool selinux_checkreqprot (const struct selinux_state *state) +{ +return READ_ONCE (state->checkreqprot); +} +int security_mls_enabled (struct selinux_state *state);int security_load_policy (struct selinux_state *state,void *data,size_t len);int security_read_policy (struct selinux_state *state,void **data,size_t *len); +int security_read_policy_kernel (struct selinux_state *state, +void **data,size_t *len);size_t security_policydb_len (struct selinux_state *state);int security_policycap_supported (struct selinux_state *state,unsigned int req_cap); +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA +extern void selinux_measure_state (struct selinux_state *selinux_state); +#else +static inline void selinux_measure_state (struct selinux_state *selinux_state) +{ +} +#endif +#define SEL_VEC_MAX 32struct av_decision {u32 allowed;
security/selinux/measure.c new file +149 -0
149 lines not on this page · raw message
security/selinux/selinuxfs.c +3 -0
@@ -173,6 +173,7 @@ static ssize_t sel_write_enforce(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,from_kuid (&init_user_ns,audit_get_loginuid (current)), audit_get_sessionid(current));enforcing_set (state, new_value); +selinux_measure_state (state);if (new_value)avc_ss_reset (state->avc,0 );selnl_notify_setenforce (new_value);
@@ -678,6 +679,8 @@ static ssize_t sel_write_checkreqprot(struct file *file, const char __user *buf, fsi->state->checkreqprot = new_value ?1 :0 ; length = count; + +selinux_measure_state (fsi->state); out:kfree (page);return length;
security/selinux/ss/services.c +62 -9
111 lines not on this page · raw message
Signature · 1 line
2.28.0
Stephen Smalley
maintainerQuoted 77 lines · Lakshmi Ramasubramanian
Critical data structures of security modules are currently not measured. Therefore an attestation service, for instance, would not be able to attest whether the security modules are always operating with the policies and configuration that the system administrator had setup. The policies and configuration for the security modules could be tampered with by rogue user mode agents or modified through some inadvertent actions on the system. Measuring such critical data would enable an attestation service to reliably assess the security configuration of the system.
SELinux configuration and policy are some of the critical data for this security module that needs to be measured. This measurement can be used by an attestation service, for instance, to verify if the configuration and policies have been setup correctly and that they haven't been tampered with at runtime.
Measure SELinux configuration, policy capabilities settings, and the hash of the loaded policy by calling the IMA hook
ima_measure_critical_data(). Since the size of the loaded policy can be quite large, hash of the policy is measured instead of the entire policy to avoid bloating the IMA log.Enable early boot measurement for SELinux in IMA since SELinux initializes its state and policy before custom IMA policy is loaded.
Sample measurement of SELinux state and hash of the policy:
10 e32e...5ac3 ima-buf sha256:86e8...4594 selinux-state-1595389364:287899386 696e697469616c697a65643d313b656e61626c65643d313b656e666f7263696e673d303b636865636b72657170726f743d313b6e6574776f726b5f706565725f636f6e74726f6c733d313b6f70656e5f7065726d733d313b657874656e6465645f736f636b65745f636c6173733d313b616c776179735f636865636b5f6e6574776f726b3d303b6367726f75705f7365636c6162656c3d313b6e6e705f6e6f737569645f7472616e736974696f6e3d313b67656e66735f7365636c6162656c5f73796d6c696e6b733d303 10 9e81...0857 ima-buf sha256:4941...68fc selinux-policy-hash-1597335667:462051628 8d1d...1834
To verify the measurement check the following:
Execute the following command to extract the measured data from the IMA log for SELinux configuration (selinux-state).
grep -m 1 "selinux-state"
/sys/kernel/security/integrity/ima/ascii_runtime_measurements| cut -d' ' -f 6 | xxd -r -pThe output should be the list of key-value pairs. For example,
initialized=1;enabled=1;enforcing=0;checkreqprot=1;network_peer_controls=1;open_perms=1;extended_socket_class=1;always_check_network=0;cgroup_seclabel=1;nnp_nosuid_transition=1;genfs_seclabel_symlinks=0;To verify the measured data with the current SELinux state:
=> enabled should be set to 1 if
/sys/fs/selinuxfolder exists,
0 otherwiseFor other entries, compare the integer value in the files
=>/sys/fs/selinux/enforce
=>/sys/fs/selinux/checkreqprot
And, each of the policy capabilities files under
=>/sys/fs/selinux/policy_capabilitiesFor selinux-policy-hash, the hash of SELinux policy is included in the IMA log entry.
To verify the measured data with the current SELinux policy run the following commands and verify the output hash values match.
sha256sum
/sys/fs/selinux/policy| cut -d' ' -f 1grep -m 1 "selinux-policy-hash"
/sys/kernel/security/integrity/ima/ascii_runtime_measurements| cut -d' ' -f 6This patch is dependent on the following patch series:
https://patchwork.kernel.org/patch/11709527/ https://patchwork.kernel.org/patch/11730193/ https://patchwork.kernel.org/patch/11730757/Signed-off-by Lakshmi Ramasubramanian <[email protected]>Suggested-by Stephen Smalley <[email protected]>---
security/selinux/ss/services.c +5
-0+int security_read_policy_kernel (struct selinux_state *state, +void **data,size_t *len) +{ +int rc; +
security/selinux/ss/services.c int security_read_policy(struct selinux_state *state, · line 3811
Quoted 10 lines
security/selinux/ss/services.c +8
-0+ rc =security_read_policy_len (state, len); +if (rc) +return rc; + + *data =vmalloc (*len); +if (!*data) +return -ENOMEM ; +return security_read_selinux_policy (state, data, len); }
See the discussion here:
https://lore.kernel.org/selinux/[email protected]/T/#t
In order for this to be safe, you need to ensure that all callers of security_read_policy_kernel() have taken fsi->mutex in selinuxfs and any use of security_read_policy_len() occurs while holding the mutex. Otherwise, the length can change between security_read_policy_len() and security_read_selinux_policy() if policy is reloaded.
Quoted 22 lines · Stephen Smalley
On Fri, Aug 21, 2020 at 9:00 PM Lakshmi Ramasubramanian
Quoted 5 lines
security/selinux/ss/services.c +5
-0+int security_read_policy_kernel (struct selinux_state *state, +void **data,size_t *len) +{ +int rc; +security/selinux/ss/services.c int security_read_policy(struct selinux_state *state, · line 3811
Quoted 10 lines
security/selinux/ss/services.c +8
-0+ rc =security_read_policy_len (state, len); +if (rc) +return rc; + + *data =vmalloc (*len); +if (!*data) +return -ENOMEM ; +return security_read_selinux_policy (state, data, len); }See the discussion here:
https://lore.kernel.org/selinux/[email protected]/T/#t
Quoted 6 lines
In order for this to be safe, you need to ensure that all callers of
security_read_policy_kernel()have takenfsi->mutexin selinuxfs and any use ofsecurity_read_policy_len()occurs while holding the mutex. Otherwise, the length can change betweensecurity_read_policy_len()andsecurity_read_selinux_policy()if policy is reloaded.
Thanks. I'll make this change.
-lakshmi
Quoted 19 lines · Stephen Smalley
Quoted 5 lines
security/selinux/ss/services.c +5
-0+int security_read_policy_kernel (struct selinux_state *state, +void **data,size_t *len) +{ +int rc; +security/selinux/ss/services.c int security_read_policy(struct selinux_state *state, · line 3811
Quoted 10 lines
security/selinux/ss/services.c +8
-0+ rc =security_read_policy_len (state, len); +if (rc) +return rc; + + *data =vmalloc (*len); +if (!*data) +return -ENOMEM ; +return security_read_selinux_policy (state, data, len); }See the discussion here:
https://lore.kernel.org/selinux/[email protected]/T/#t
Quoted 6 lines
In order for this to be safe, you need to ensure that all callers of
security_read_policy_kernel()have takenfsi->mutexin selinuxfs and any use ofsecurity_read_policy_len()occurs while holding the mutex. Otherwise, the length can change betweensecurity_read_policy_len()andsecurity_read_selinux_policy()if policy is reloaded.
"struct selinux_fs_info" is available when calling security_read_policy_kernel() - currently in measure.c. Only "struct selinux_state" is.
Is Ondrej's re-try approach I need to use to workaround policy reload issue?
thanks,
-lakshmi
Stephen Smalley
maintainerQuoted 29 lines · Lakshmi Ramasubramanian
Quoted 19 lines · Stephen Smalley
Quoted 5 lines
security/selinux/ss/services.c +5
-0+int security_read_policy_kernel (struct selinux_state *state, +void **data,size_t *len) +{ +int rc; +security/selinux/ss/services.c int security_read_policy(struct selinux_state *state, · line 3811
Quoted 10 lines
security/selinux/ss/services.c +8
-0+ rc =security_read_policy_len (state, len); +if (rc) +return rc; + + *data =vmalloc (*len); +if (!*data) +return -ENOMEM ; +return security_read_selinux_policy (state, data, len); }See the discussion here:
https://lore.kernel.org/selinux/[email protected]/T/#tQuoted 6 lines
In order for this to be safe, you need to ensure that all callers of
security_read_policy_kernel()have takenfsi->mutexin selinuxfs and any use ofsecurity_read_policy_len()occurs while holding the mutex. Otherwise, the length can change betweensecurity_read_policy_len()andsecurity_read_selinux_policy()if policy is reloaded.
Quoted 5 lines
"struct
selinux_fs_info" is available when callingsecurity_read_policy_kernel()- currently inmeasure.c. Only "structselinux_state" is.Is Ondrej's re-try approach I need to use to workaround policy reload issue?
No, I think perhaps we should move the mutex to selinux_state instead of selinux_fs_info. selinux_fs_info has a pointer to selinux_state so it can then use it indirectly. Note that your patches are going to conflict with other ongoing work in the selinux next branch that is refactoring policy load and converting the policy rwlock to RCU.
Quoted 35 lines · Stephen Smalley
Quoted 33 lines · Lakshmi Ramasubramanian
Quoted 19 lines · Stephen Smalley
Quoted 5 lines
security/selinux/ss/services.c +5
-0+int security_read_policy_kernel (struct selinux_state *state, +void **data,size_t *len) +{ +int rc; +security/selinux/ss/services.c int security_read_policy(struct selinux_state *state, · line 3811
Quoted 10 lines
security/selinux/ss/services.c +8
-0+ rc =security_read_policy_len (state, len); +if (rc) +return rc; + + *data =vmalloc (*len); +if (!*data) +return -ENOMEM ; +return security_read_selinux_policy (state, data, len); }See the discussion here:
https://lore.kernel.org/selinux/[email protected]/T/#tQuoted 6 lines
In order for this to be safe, you need to ensure that all callers of
security_read_policy_kernel()have takenfsi->mutexin selinuxfs and any use ofsecurity_read_policy_len()occurs while holding the mutex. Otherwise, the length can change betweensecurity_read_policy_len()andsecurity_read_selinux_policy()if policy is reloaded."struct
selinux_fs_info" is available when callingsecurity_read_policy_kernel()- currently inmeasure.c. Only "structselinux_state" is.
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 1 line
Is Ondrej's re-try approach I need to use to workaround policy reload issue?
No, I think perhaps we should move the mutex to
selinux_stateinstead ofselinux_fs_info.selinux_fs_infohas a pointer toselinux_stateso it can then use it indirectly. Note that your patches are going to conflict with other ongoing work in the selinux next branch that is refactoring policy load and converting the policy rwlock to RCU.
Yeah, and I'm experimenting with a patch on top of Stephen's RCU work that would allow you to do this in a straightforward way without even messing with the fsi->mutex. My patch may or may not be eventually committed, but either way I'd recommend holding off on this for a while until the dust settles around the RCU conversion.
Signature · 3 lines
Ondrej Mosnacek Software Engineer, Platform Security - SELinux kernel Red Hat, Inc.
Quoted 45 lines · Ondrej Mosnacek
Quoted 35 lines · Stephen Smalley
Quoted 33 lines · Lakshmi Ramasubramanian
Quoted 19 lines · Stephen Smalley
Quoted 5 lines
security/selinux/ss/services.c +5
-0+int security_read_policy_kernel (struct selinux_state *state, +void **data,size_t *len) +{ +int rc; +security/selinux/ss/services.c int security_read_policy(struct selinux_state *state, · line 3811
Quoted 10 lines
security/selinux/ss/services.c +8
-0+ rc =security_read_policy_len (state, len); +if (rc) +return rc; + + *data =vmalloc (*len); +if (!*data) +return -ENOMEM ; +return security_read_selinux_policy (state, data, len); }See the discussion here:
https://lore.kernel.org/selinux/[email protected]/T/#tQuoted 6 lines
In order for this to be safe, you need to ensure that all callers of
security_read_policy_kernel()have takenfsi->mutexin selinuxfs and any use ofsecurity_read_policy_len()occurs while holding the mutex. Otherwise, the length can change betweensecurity_read_policy_len()andsecurity_read_selinux_policy()if policy is reloaded."struct
selinux_fs_info" is available when callingsecurity_read_policy_kernel()- currently inmeasure.c. Only "structselinux_state" is.Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 1 line
Is Ondrej's re-try approach I need to use to workaround policy reload issue?
No, I think perhaps we should move the mutex to
selinux_stateinstead ofselinux_fs_info.selinux_fs_infohas a pointer toselinux_stateso it can then use it indirectly. Note that your patches are going to conflict with other ongoing work in the selinux next branch that is refactoring policy load and converting the policy rwlock to RCU.
Quoted 6 lines
Yeah, and I'm experimenting with a patch on top of Stephen's RCU work that would allow you to do this in a straightforward way without even messing with the
fsi->mutex. My patch may or may not be eventually committed, but either way I'd recommend holding off on this for a while until the dust settles around the RCU conversion.
I can make the SELinux\IMA changes in "selinux next branch" taking dependencies on Stephen's patches + relevant IMA patches.
Could you please let me know the URL to the "selinux next branch"?
thanks,
-lakshmi
Paul Moore
maintainerQuoted 6 lines · Lakshmi Ramasubramanian
Quoted 5 lines · Ondrej Mosnacek
Quoted 3 lines · Stephen Smalley
Quoted 1 line · Lakshmi Ramasubramanian
On 8/24/20 7:00 AM, Stephen Smalley wrote:
...
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Is Ondrej's re-try approach I need to use to workaround policy reload issue?
No, I think perhaps we should move the mutex to
selinux_stateinstead ofselinux_fs_info.selinux_fs_infohas a pointer toselinux_stateso it can then use it indirectly. Note that your patches are going to conflict with other ongoing work in the selinux next branch that is refactoring policy load and converting the policy rwlock to RCU.
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 5 lines
Yeah, and I'm experimenting with a patch on top of Stephen's RCU work that would allow you to do this in a straightforward way without even messing with the
fsi->mutex. My patch may or may not be eventually committed, but either way I'd recommend holding off on this for a while until the dust settles around the RCU conversion.I can make the SELinux\IMA changes in "selinux next branch" taking dependencies on Stephen's patches + relevant IMA patches.
I know it can be frustrating to hear what I'm about to say, but the best option is probably just to wait a little to let things settle in the SELinux -next branch. There is a lot of stuff going on right now with patches flooding in (at least "flooding" from a SELinux kernel development perspective) and we/I've haven't gotten through all of them yet.
Quoted 1 line
Could you please let me know the URL to the "selinux next branch"?
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux.git next
Signature · 2 lines
paul moore www.paul-moore.com
On 8/24/20 3:18 PM, Paul Moore wrote:
Hi Paul,
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Is Ondrej's re-try approach I need to use to workaround policy reload issue?
No, I think perhaps we should move the mutex to
selinux_stateinstead ofselinux_fs_info.selinux_fs_infohas a pointer toselinux_stateso it can then use it indirectly. Note that your patches are going to conflict with other ongoing work in the selinux next branch that is refactoring policy load and converting the policy rwlock to RCU.Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 5 lines
Yeah, and I'm experimenting with a patch on top of Stephen's RCU work that would allow you to do this in a straightforward way without even messing with the
fsi->mutex. My patch may or may not be eventually committed, but either way I'd recommend holding off on this for a while until the dust settles around the RCU conversion.I can make the SELinux\IMA changes in "selinux next branch" taking dependencies on Stephen's patches + relevant IMA patches.
Quoted 7 lines
I know it can be frustrating to hear what I'm about to say, but the best option is probably just to wait a little to let things settle in the SELinux -next branch. There is a lot of stuff going on right now with patches flooding in (at least "flooding" from a SELinux kernel development perspective) and we/I've haven't gotten through all of them yet.
Could you please let me know when the current set of changes in SELinux next branch would be completed and be ready to take new changes?
I mean, roughly - would it be a month from now or you expect that to take longer?
thanks,
-lakshmi
Stephen Smalley
maintainerQuoted 30 lines · Lakshmi Ramasubramanian
On 8/24/20 3:18 PM, Paul Moore wrote:
Hi Paul,
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Is Ondrej's re-try approach I need to use to workaround policy reload issue?
No, I think perhaps we should move the mutex to
selinux_stateinstead ofselinux_fs_info.selinux_fs_infohas a pointer toselinux_stateso it can then use it indirectly. Note that your patches are going to conflict with other ongoing work in the selinux next branch that is refactoring policy load and converting the policy rwlock to RCU.Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 5 lines
Yeah, and I'm experimenting with a patch on top of Stephen's RCU work that would allow you to do this in a straightforward way without even messing with the
fsi->mutex. My patch may or may not be eventually committed, but either way I'd recommend holding off on this for a while until the dust settles around the RCU conversion.I can make the SELinux\IMA changes in "selinux next branch" taking dependencies on Stephen's patches + relevant IMA patches.
Quoted 7 lines
I know it can be frustrating to hear what I'm about to say, but the best option is probably just to wait a little to let things settle in the SELinux -next branch. There is a lot of stuff going on right now with patches flooding in (at least "flooding" from a SELinux kernel development perspective) and we/I've haven't gotten through all of them yet.
Quoted 5 lines
Could you please let me know when the current set of changes in SELinux next branch would be completed and be ready to take new changes?
I mean, roughly - would it be a month from now or you expect that to take longer?
I can't speak for Paul but I would expect it to be sooner rather than later. Ondrej has some follow ups on top of my policy rcu conversion but then it should be good to go.
Stephen Smalley
maintainerQuoted 36 lines · Stephen Smalley
Quoted 33 lines · Lakshmi Ramasubramanian
On 8/24/20 3:18 PM, Paul Moore wrote:
Hi Paul,
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Is Ondrej's re-try approach I need to use to workaround policy reload issue?
No, I think perhaps we should move the mutex to
selinux_stateinstead ofselinux_fs_info.selinux_fs_infohas a pointer toselinux_stateso it can then use it indirectly. Note that your patches are going to conflict with other ongoing work in the selinux next branch that is refactoring policy load and converting the policy rwlock to RCU.Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 5 lines
Yeah, and I'm experimenting with a patch on top of Stephen's RCU work that would allow you to do this in a straightforward way without even messing with the
fsi->mutex. My patch may or may not be eventually committed, but either way I'd recommend holding off on this for a while until the dust settles around the RCU conversion.I can make the SELinux\IMA changes in "selinux next branch" taking dependencies on Stephen's patches + relevant IMA patches.
Quoted 7 lines
I know it can be frustrating to hear what I'm about to say, but the best option is probably just to wait a little to let things settle in the SELinux -next branch. There is a lot of stuff going on right now with patches flooding in (at least "flooding" from a SELinux kernel development perspective) and we/I've haven't gotten through all of them yet.
Could you please let me know when the current set of changes in SELinux next branch would be completed and be ready to take new changes?
Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 2 lines
I mean, roughly - would it be a month from now or you expect that to take longer?
I can't speak for Paul but I would expect it to be sooner rather than later. Ondrej has some follow ups on top of my policy rcu conversion but then it should be good to go.
I think the major changes are now merged although there are still a couple of changes coming from Ondrej that could affect your code. For your purposes, the important things to note are:
1) The mutex has moved from selinux_fs_info to selinux_state and is now named policy_mutex. You will need to take it around your call to security_read_policy_kernel().
2) security_policydb_len() was removed and security_read_policy() just directly reads the policydb len. You can do the same from your security_read_policy_kernel() variant.
3) Ondrej has a pending change to move the policycap[] array from selinux_state to selinux_policy so that it can be atomically updated with the policy.
4) Ondrej has a pending change to eliminate the separate initialized boolean from selinux_state and just test whether selinux_state.policy is non-NULL but as long as you are using selinux_initialized() to test, your code should be unaffected.
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Could you please let me know when the current set of changes in SELinux next branch would be completed and be ready to take new changes?
I mean, roughly - would it be a month from now or you expect that to take longer?
I can't speak for Paul but I would expect it to be sooner rather than later. Ondrej has some follow ups on top of my policy rcu conversion but then it should be good to go.
I think the major changes are now merged although there are still a couple of changes coming from Ondrej that could affect your code. For your purposes, the important things to note are:
1) The mutex has moved from
selinux_fs_infotoselinux_stateand is now namedpolicy_mutex. You will need to take it around your call tosecurity_read_policy_kernel().2)
security_policydb_len()was removed andsecurity_read_policy()just directly reads the policydb len. You can do the same from yoursecurity_read_policy_kernel()variant.
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3) Ondrej has a pending change to move the policycap[] array from
selinux_statetoselinux_policyso that it can be atomically updated with the policy.4) Ondrej has a pending change to eliminate the separate initialized boolean from
selinux_stateand just test whether selinux_state.policy is non-NULL but as long as you are usingselinux_initialized()to test, your code should be unaffected.
Thanks a lot for the update Stephen.
I will start updating the IMA measurement changes in selinux next branch. Will post the patches this week.
-lakshmi