merge/pull: verify GPG signatures of commits being merged
PATCH 1/1 merge/pull: verify GPG signatures of commits being merged
git merge/pull:
When --verify-signatures is specified on the command-line of git-merge or git-pull, check whether the commits being merged have good gpg signatures and abort the merge in case they do not. This allows e.g. auto-deployment from untrusted repo hosts.
pretty printing:
Tell about an "untrusted good signature" in addition to the previous "good signature" and "bad signature". In case of a missing signature, expand the pretty format string "%G?" to "N" in since this eases the wirting of anything parsing git-log output.
---
I moved the commit signature verification code from pretty.c to commit.c because it is used from pretty.c and builtin/merge.c. I include that pretty printing change here because I needed to add the good/untrusted check for the merge --verify-signatures option to really make sense.
Those new %G? options are implicitly tested by t7612-merge-verify-signatures.sh because %G? is just replaced by the passed-through output of the commit verification function.
Documentation/merge-options.txt | 4 +++ Documentation/pretty-formats.txt | 2 +- builtin/merge.c | 33 +++++++++++++++++- commit.c | 55 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ commit.h | 9 +++++ git-pull.sh | 10 ++++-- gpg-interface.h | 6 ++++ pretty.c | 69 ++++--------------------------------- t/lib-gpg/pubring.gpg | Bin 1164 -> 2359 bytes t/lib-gpg/random_seed | Bin 600 -> 600 bytes t/lib-gpg/secring.gpg | Bin 1237 -> 3734 bytes t/lib-gpg/trustdb.gpg | Bin 1280 -> 1360 bytes t/t7612-merge-verify-signatures.sh | 61 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 13 files changed, 183 insertions(+), 66 deletions(-)
Documentation/merge-options.txt +4 -0
@@ -83,6 +83,10 @@ option can be used to override --squash. Pass merge strategy specific option through to the merge strategy. +--verify-signatures:: +--no-verify-signatures:: + Verify that the commits being merged have good trusted GPG signatures + --summary:: --no-summary:: Synonyms to --stat and --no-stat; these are deprecated and will be
Documentation/pretty-formats.txt +1 -1
@@ -131,7 +131,7 @@ The placeholders are: - '%B': raw body (unwrapped subject and body) - '%N': commit notes - '%GG': raw verification message from GPG for a signed commit -- '%G?': show either "G" for Good or "B" for Bad for a signed commit +- '%G?': show "G" for a Good signature, "B" for a Bad signature, "U" for a good, untrusted signature and "N" for no signature - '%GS': show the name of the signer for a signed commit - '%gD': reflog selector, e.g., `refs/stash@{1}` - '%gd': shortened reflog selector, e.g., `stash@{1}`
builtin/merge.c +32 -1
@@ -49,7 +49,7 @@ static const char * const builtin_merge_usage[] = {static int show_diffstat =1 , shortlog_len =-1 , squash;static int option_commit =1 , allow_fast_forward =1 ;static int fast_forward_only, option_edit =-1 ; -static int allow_trivial =1 , have_message; +static int allow_trivial =1 , have_message, verify_signatures =0 ;static int overwrite_ignore =1 ;static struct strbuf merge_msg =STRBUF_INIT ;static struct strategy **use_strategies;
@@ -199,6 +199,8 @@ static struct option builtin_merge_options[] = {OPT_BOOLEAN (0 ,"ff-only" , &fast_forward_only,N_ ("abort if fast-forward is not possible" )),OPT_RERERE_AUTOUPDATE (&allow_rerere_auto), +OPT_BOOLEAN (0 ,"verify-signatures" , &verify_signatures, +N_ ("Verify that the named commit has a valid GPG signature" )),OPT_CALLBACK ('s' ,"strategy" , &use_strategies,N_ ("strategy" ),N_ ("merge strategy to use" ), option_parse_strategy), OPT_CALLBACK('X', "strategy-option", &xopts, N_("option=value"),
@@ -1233,6 +1235,35 @@ int cmd_merge(int argc, const char **argv, const char *prefix)usage_with_options (builtin_merge_usage, builtin_merge_options); +if (verify_signatures) { +//Verify the commit signatures +for (p = remoteheads; p; p = p->next) { +struct commit *commit = p->item; +struct signature signature; + signature.check_result =0 ; + +check_commit_signature (commit, &signature); + +char hex[41 ]; +strcpy (hex,find_unique_abbrev (commit->object.sha1,DEFAULT_ABBREV )); +switch (signature.check_result){ +case 'G' : +if (verbosity >=0 ) +printf (_ ("Commit %s has a good GPG signature by %s\n" ), hex, signature.signer); +break ; +case 'U' : +die (_ ("Commmit %s has a good GPG signature allegedly by %s, albeit from an untrusted key." ), hex, signature.signer); +case 'B' : +die (_ ("Commmit %s has a bad GPG signature allegedly by %s." ), hex, signature.signer); +default ://'N' +die (_ ("Commmit %s does not have a good GPG signature. In fact, commit %s does not have a GPG signature at all." ), hex, hex); + } + +free (signature.gpg_output); +free (signature.signer); + } + } +strbuf_addstr (&buf,"merge" );for (p = remoteheads; p; p = p->next)strbuf_addf (&buf," %s" ,merge_remote_util (p->item)->name);
commit.c +55 -0
61 lines not on this page · raw message
commit.h +9 -0
@@ -5,6 +5,7 @@#include "tree.h" #include "strbuf.h" #include "decorate.h" +#include "gpg-interface.h" struct commit_list {struct commit *item;
@@ -230,4 +231,12 @@ extern void print_commit_list(struct commit_list *list,const char *format_cur, const char *format_last); +/* +* Check the signature of the given commit. The result of the check is stored in +* sig->check_result, 'G' for a good signature, 'U' for a good signature from an +* untrusted signer, 'B' for a bad signature and 'N' for no signature at all. +* This may allocate memory for sig->gpg_output and sig->signer. +*/ +extern void check_commit_signature (const struct commit * commit,struct signature *sig); +#endif /* COMMIT_H */
git-pull.sh +8 -2
@@ -39,7 +39,7 @@ test -z "$(git ls-files -u)" || die_conflict test -f "$GIT_DIR/MERGE_HEAD" && die_merge strategy_args= diffstat= no_commit= squash= no_ff= ff_only= -log_arg= verbosity= progress= recurse_submodules= +log_arg= verbosity= progress= recurse_submodules= verify_signatures= merge_args= edit= curr_branch=$(git symbolic-ref -q HEAD) curr_branch_short="${curr_branch#refs/heads/}"
@@ -125,6 +125,12 @@ do --no-recurse-submodules) recurse_submodules=--no-recurse-submodules ;; + --verify-signatures) + verify_signatures=--verify-signatures + ;; + --no-verify-signatures) + verify_signatures=--no-verify-signatures + ;; --d|--dr|--dry|--dry-|--dry-r|--dry-ru|--dry-run) dry_run=--dry-run ;;
@@ -283,7 +289,7 @@ true) eval="$eval --onto $merge_head ${oldremoteref:-$merge_head}" ;; *) - eval="git-merge $diffstat $no_commit $edit $squash $no_ff $ff_only" + eval="git-merge $diffstat $no_commit $verify_signatures $edit $squash $no_ff $ff_only" eval="$eval $log_arg $strategy_args $merge_args $verbosity $progress" eval="$eval \"\$merge_name\" HEAD $merge_head" ;;
gpg-interface.h +6 -0
@@ -1,6 +1,12 @@#ifndef GPG_INTERFACE_H #define GPG_INTERFACE_H +struct signature { +char *gpg_output; +char check_result;// 0 (not checked), N (checked but no further result), U (untrusted, good), G (good) or B (bad) +char *signer; +}; +extern int sign_buffer (struct strbuf *buffer,struct strbuf *signature,const char *signing_key);extern int verify_signed_buffer (const char *payload,size_t payload_size,const char *signature,size_t signature_size,struct strbuf *gpg_output);extern int git_gpg_config (const char *,const char *,void *);
pretty.c +7 -62
95 lines not on this page · raw message
t/lib-gpg/pubring.gpg binary +0 -0
t/lib-gpg/random_seed binary +0 -0
t/lib-gpg/secring.gpg binary +0 -0
t/lib-gpg/trustdb.gpg binary +0 -0
t/t7612-merge-verify-signatures.sh new file +61 -0
61 lines not on this page · raw message
Signature · 1 line
1.8.1.5
Hi,
Quoted 5 lines · Sebastian Götte
git merge/pull:
When --verify-signatures is specified on the command-line of git-merge or git-pull, check whether the commits being merged have good gpg signatures and abort the merge in case they do not. This allows e.g. auto-deployment from untrusted repo hosts.
This leaves me pretty nervous. Is there an argument to pass in to specify a keyring with public keys to trust? Without that, it is presumably using ~/.gnupg/trustdb.gpg, which is about trust of identity rather than trust to provide code to run on my machine. :(
If there's a good way to avoid that, this looks like a good thing to do, though.
Hope that helps,
Jonathan
Quoted 10 lines · Jonathan Nieder
Quoted 5 lines
git merge/pull:
When --verify-signatures is specified on the command-line of git-merge or git-pull, check whether the commits being merged have good gpg signatures and abort the merge in case they do not. This allows e.g. auto-deployment from untrusted repo hosts.This leaves me pretty nervous. Is there an argument to pass in to specify a keyring with public keys to trust? Without that, it is presumably using ~/.gnupg/trustdb.gpg, which is about trust of identity rather than trust to provide code to run on my machine. :(
I think people who create a real merge via "git pull" and use that as "auto-deployment" mechanism is insane, but presumably that "auto" tells us some other things, like it will be done by non-human account, its $HOME/.gnupg would contain only the keyring that is for the auto deployer, or the cronscript that runs "git pull" can set GNUPGHOME and export it before doing so.
So, I wouldn't be worried about it too much.
Quoted 19 lines · Sebastian Götte
git merge/pull:
When --verify-signatures is specified on the command-line of git-merge or git-pull, check whether the commits being merged have good gpg signatures and abort the merge in case they do not. This allows e.g. auto-deployment from untrusted repo hosts.pretty printing:
Tell about an "untrusted good signature" in addition to the previous "good signature" and "bad signature". In case of a missing signature, expand the pretty format string "%G?" to "N" in since this eases the wirting of anything parsing git-log output.Signed-off-by Sebastian Götte <[email protected]>---
I moved the commit signature verification code frompretty.ctocommit.cbecause it is used frompretty.candbuiltin/merge.c. I include that pretty printing change here because I needed to add the good/untrusted check for the merge --verify-signatures option to really make sense.
Quoted 3 lines
Those new %G? options are implicitly tested by
t7612-merge-verify-signatures.shbecause %G? is just replaced by the passed-through output of the commit verification function.
While I think the new --verify-signature option may be a good addition, I wonder if you can split this patch down a bit for easier review and validation.
Perhaps this needs to be done in at least three steps:
(1) first move the code without changing anything (most importantly, do not add 'U' or 'N' at this step); then
(2) teach 'merge' and 'pull' to understand the new option, and finally;
(3) introduce 'U' and 'N'.
The existing users of '%G?' placeholders are not expecting to see 'N' but turning it into an empty string, so if the third step turns out to be problematic to these users, we can discard the third step and still benefit from the first two, for example.
Documentation/pretty-formats.txt The placeholders are: · line 134
Quoted 10 lines
Documentation/pretty-formats.txt +1
-1@@ -131,7 +131,7 @@ The placeholders are: - '%B': raw body (unwrapped subject and body) - '%N': commit notes - '%GG': raw verification message from GPG for a signed commit -- '%G?': show either "G" for Good or "B" for Bad for a signed commit +- '%G?': show "G" for a Good signature, "B" for a Bad signature, "U" for a good, untrusted signature and "N" for no signature
Even though this is a source that is turned into html and manpages, people do read these in the original text format (that is the whole point of using AsciiDoc as the source format), so please see if you can avoid this overly long line.
builtin/merge.c static const char * const builtin_merge_usage[] = { · line 52
Quoted 10 lines
builtin/merge.c +1
-1@@ -49,7 +49,7 @@ static const char * const builtin_merge_usage[] = {static int show_diffstat =1 , shortlog_len =-1 , squash;static int option_commit =1 , allow_fast_forward =1 ;static int fast_forward_only, option_edit =-1 ; -static int allow_trivial =1 , have_message; +static int allow_trivial =1 , have_message, verify_signatures =0 ;
Avoid initializing static variables to 0, and instead let BSS take care of them.
Quoted 10 lines
builtin/merge.c +2
-0@@ -199,6 +199,8 @@ static struct option builtin_merge_options[] = {OPT_BOOLEAN (0 ,"ff-only" , &fast_forward_only,N_ ("abort if fast-forward is not possible" )),OPT_RERERE_AUTOUPDATE (&allow_rerere_auto), +OPT_BOOLEAN (0 ,"verify-signatures" , &verify_signatures, +N_ ("Verify that the named commit has a valid GPG signature" )),OPT_CALLBACK ('s' ,"strategy" , &use_strategies,N_ ("strategy" ),N_ ("merge strategy to use" ), option_parse_strategy), OPT_CALLBACK('X', "strategy-option", &xopts, N_("option=value"),
builtin/merge.c int cmd_merge(int argc, const char **argv, const char *prefix) · line 1239
Quoted 5 lines
builtin/merge.c +2
-0@@ -1233,6 +1235,35 @@ int cmd_merge(int argc, const char **argv, const char *prefix)usage_with_options (builtin_merge_usage, builtin_merge_options); +if (verify_signatures) { +//Verify the commit signatures
No // C99/C++ comments.
The rest of the patch not reviewed; expecting a split reroll.
Thanks.