Various gssd fixes including machine-credential issue.
Subsystems (2)
First I would like to wholeheartedly support Neil Brown's comment. We at the Vrije Universiteit in Amsterdam (NL) also have the situation where the Kerberos administrator does not hand out machine credentials. A lot of Linux users from the Faculty of Sciences depend on the functionality that lets them access the NFS file servers with only their user credentials.
Secondly I would like to make a remark on basing client id's on the system's kerberos principal's name. That same faculty, in the times it had its own IT department, used an identical keytab for all Linux workstations, using the principal names "[nfs|root|host]/[email protected]". I understand this would lead to severe problems when the client id (co_ownerid) is based solely in the systems root principal name.
It seems to me that the issues about the client id look like a bag of worms. I've seen that the newest standard `requires' integrity protection for client id exchanges. I doubt that that will help when the source code of the NFS client is known and
the client id is guessable. The wisest thing might be to offer different options and let the administrators pick the one they like best?
Regards,
Ed Keizer
IT department
Vrije Universiteit
Amsterdam
NL
Quoted 5 lines · E.G. Keizer
First I would like to wholeheartedly support Neil Brown's comment. We at the Vrije Universiteit in Amsterdam (NL) also have the situation where the Kerberos administrator does not hand out machine credentials. A lot of Linux users from the Faculty of Sciences depend on the functionality that lets them access the NFS file servers with only their user credentials.
They should still be able to do that, but in that case, the state management will have to default to AUTH_SYS to set up the lease, which means that someone else can spoof requests to cancel the lease or change the callback channel parameters.
Quoted 5 lines
Secondly I would like to make a remark on basing client id's on the system's kerberos principal's name. That same faculty, in the times it had its own IT department, used an identical keytab for all Linux workstations, using the principal names "[nfs|root|host]/[email protected]". I understand this would lead to severe problems when the client id (
co_ownerid) is based solely in the systems root principal name.
How so? The only problem should be that any one of those machines can go and cancel or change the lease of any other. That's a compromise that you decided upon when you decided to use one keytab for all of them.
Quoted 4 lines
It seems to me that the issues about the client id look like a bag of worms. I've seen that the newest standard `requires' integrity protection for client id exchanges. I doubt that that will help when the source code of the NFS client is known and
the client id is guessable.
What is the attack and how would it compromise security on the clients that you care about?
Quoted 2 lines
The wisest thing might be to offer different options
and let the administrators pick the one they like best?
We have two options available to you: auth_sys or RPCSEC_GSS w/krb5i.
Signature · 6 lines
Trond Myklebust Linux NFS client maintainer NetApp [email protected] www.netapp.com
Quoted 11 lines · Trond
Quoted 5 lines · E.G. Keizer
First I would like to wholeheartedly support Neil Brown's comment. We at the Vrije Universiteit in Amsterdam (NL) also have the situation where the Kerberos administrator does not hand out machine credentials. A lot of Linux users from the Faculty of Sciences depend on the functionality that lets them access the NFS file servers with only their user credentials.
They should still be able to do that, but in that case, the state management will have to default to
AUTH_SYSto set up the lease, which means that someone else can spoof requests to cancel the lease or change the callback channel parameters.
We would probably accept that. But can you enlighten me as to why AUTH_SYS is better then krb5 (no i, no p)?
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Secondly I would like to make a remark on basing client id's on the system's kerberos principal's name. That same faculty, in the times it had its own IT department, used an identical keytab for all Linux workstations, using the principal names "[nfs|root|host]/[email protected]". I understand this would lead to severe problems when the client id (
co_ownerid) is based solely in the systems root principal name.How so? The only problem should be that any one of those machines can go and cancel or change the lease of any other. That's a compromise that you decided upon when you decided to use one keytab for all of them.
Mmm, not at the time we made the decision. But I just mentioned that as an example of the problems one can meet when deciding on the implementation of client id. The same problem, but on a smaller scale, occurs when the client id is based on the system principal and two or more systems use the same user principal as system principal.
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It seems to me that the issues about the client id look like a bag of worms. I've seen that the newest standard `requires' integrity protection for client id exchanges. I doubt that that will help when the source code of the NFS client is known and
the client id is guessable.What is the attack and how would it compromise security on the clients that you care about?
I am personally not that worried about this issue on our environment. But others seem to be in their environment. Otherwise the integrity requirement would not have ended up in the NFSv4 RFC. As fas as I understand the danger with a man-in-the-middle attack is that the attacker can see my client id and thus cancel my lease. When the man-in-the-middle can guess my client id he can still invalidate my lease even when i'am using krb5i.
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The wisest thing might be to offer different options
and let the administrators pick the one they like best?We have two options available to you:
auth_sysorRPCSEC_GSSw/krb5i.
I meant different options for choosing the client id.
Regards,
Ed Keizer
Quoted 9 lines · E.G. Keizer
Quoted 7 lines · Trond
Quoted 5 lines · E.G. Keizer
First I would like to wholeheartedly support Neil Brown's comment. We at the Vrije Universiteit in Amsterdam (NL) also have the situation where the Kerberos administrator does not hand out machine credentials. A lot of Linux users from the Faculty of Sciences depend on the functionality that lets them access the NFS file servers with only their user credentials.
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They should still be able to do that, but in that case, the state management will have to default to
AUTH_SYSto set up the lease, which means that someone else can spoof requests to cancel the lease or change the callback channel parameters.We would probably accept that. But can you enlighten me as to why
AUTH_SYSis better then krb5 (no i, no p)?
I don't understand. If you are not handing out machine creds, then how can RPCSEC_GSS/krb work where RPCSEC_GSS/krb5i did not?
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Secondly I would like to make a remark on basing client id's on the system's kerberos principal's name. That same faculty, in the times it had its own IT department, used an identical keytab for all Linux workstations, using the principal names "[nfs|root|host]/[email protected]". I understand this would lead to severe problems when the client id (
co_ownerid) is based solely in the systems root principal name.
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How so? The only problem should be that any one of those machines can go and cancel or change the lease of any other. That's a compromise that you decided upon when you decided to use one keytab for all of them.
Mmm, not at the time we made the decision. But I just mentioned that as an example of the problems one can meet when deciding on the implementation of client id. The same problem, but on a smaller scale, occurs when the client id is based on the system principal and two or more systems use the same user principal as system principal.
The only thing that has changed is that if you use the 'migration' mount option, then the clientid uses the hostname as part of the long form client id. Otherwise, it uses the ip-address as it did before.
The long form client id is not, and has never been 'based' on a system principal. It is _authenticated_ by a system principal. All that has changed is that we've divorced the authentication mechanism from the mountpoint authentication. We did so in order to avoid the problems that otherwise arise when mounting several volumes with different authentication mechanisms from the same server.
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It seems to me that the issues about the client id look like a bag of worms. I've seen that the newest standard `requires' integrity protection for client id exchanges. I doubt that that will help when the source code of the NFS client is known and
the client id is guessable.
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 2 lines
What is the attack and how would it compromise security on the clients that you care about?
I am personally not that worried about this issue on our environment. But others seem to be in their environment. Otherwise the integrity requirement would not have ended up in the NFSv4 RFC. As fas as I understand the danger with a man-in-the-middle attack is that the attacker can see my client id and thus cancel my lease. When the man-in-the-middle can guess my client id he can still invalidate my lease even when i'am using krb5i.
According to the NFSv4 spec, your lease will be authenticated by the principal + security mechanism. The attacker cannot cancel or modify that lease without authenticating using the same principal and same krb5i security mechanism.
I agree that adding krb5p as an option might be a good idea in order to protect the results of the SETCLIENTID operation; particularly so when all the other NFS related operations to the server are using krb5p. The problem is that I know of several servers that currently support krb5i but not krb5p, and so we'd have to do this too with care until those servers are spec-compliant.
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The wisest thing might be to offer different options
and let the administrators pick the one they like best?We have two options available to you:
auth_sysorRPCSEC_GSSw/krb5i.I meant different options for choosing the client id.
Regards,
Ed Keizer
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Signature · 6 lines
Trond Myklebust Linux NFS client maintainer NetApp [email protected] www.netapp.com
Quoted 10 lines · E.G. Keizer
Quoted 7 lines · Trond
Quoted 5 lines · E.G. Keizer
First I would like to wholeheartedly support Neil Brown's comment. We at the Vrije Universiteit in Amsterdam (NL) also have the situation where the Kerberos administrator does not hand out machine credentials. A lot of Linux users from the Faculty of Sciences depend on the functionality that lets them access the NFS file servers with only their user credentials.
Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 4 lines
They should still be able to do that, but in that case, the state management will have to default to
AUTH_SYSto set up the lease, which means that someone else can spoof requests to cancel the lease or change the callback channel parameters.We would probably accept that. But can you enlighten me as to why
AUTH_SYSis better then krb5 (no i, no p)?
It isn't "better." But if no GSS credential is available on the client, then AUTH_SYS is about the only choice for a client to use.
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Secondly I would like to make a remark on basing client id's on the system's kerberos principal's name. That same faculty, in the times it had its own IT department, used an identical keytab for all Linux workstations, using the principal names "[nfs|root|host]/[email protected]". I understand this would lead to severe problems when the client id (
co_ownerid) is based solely in the systems root principal name.How so? The only problem should be that any one of those machines can go and cancel or change the lease of any other. That's a compromise that you decided upon when you decided to use one keytab for all of them.
Mmm, not at the time we made the decision. But I just mentioned that as an example of the problems one can meet when deciding on the implementation of client id. The same problem, but on a smaller scale, occurs when the client id is based on the system principal and two or more systems use the same user principal as system principal.
Quoted 6 lines
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It seems to me that the issues about the client id look like a bag of worms. I've seen that the newest standard `requires' integrity protection for client id exchanges. I doubt that that will help when the source code of the NFS client is known and
the client id is guessable.
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 2 lines
What is the attack and how would it compromise security on the clients that you care about?
I am personally not that worried about this issue on our environment. But others seem to be in their environment. Otherwise the integrity requirement would not have ended up in the NFSv4 RFC. As fas as I understand the danger with a man-in-the-middle attack is that the attacker can see my client id and thus cancel my lease. When the man-in-the-middle can guess my client id he can still invalidate my lease even when i'am using krb5i.
No, SETCLIENTID would have to be authenticated with a Kerberos principal. That's what protects the lease.
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The wisest thing might be to offer different options and let the administrators pick the one they like best?
We have two options available to you:
auth_sysorRPCSEC_GSSw/krb5i.I meant different options for choosing the client id.
Have you seen the nfs4_unique_id boot parameter? (cf. Documentation/filesystems/nfs.txt) Pick a different UUID for each of your clients, and specify that UUID via the kernel command line.
You probably need to use the "migration" mount option as well.
Signature · 2 lines
Chuck Lever chuck[dot]lever[at]oracle[dot]com
Quoted 54 lines · Chuck Lever
Quoted 10 lines · E.G. Keizer
Quoted 7 lines · Trond
Quoted 5 lines · E.G. Keizer
First I would like to wholeheartedly support Neil Brown's comment. We at the Vrije Universiteit in Amsterdam (NL) also have the situation where the Kerberos administrator does not hand out machine credentials. A lot of Linux users from the Faculty of Sciences depend on the functionality that lets them access the NFS file servers with only their user credentials.
Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 4 lines
They should still be able to do that, but in that case, the state management will have to default to
AUTH_SYSto set up the lease, which means that someone else can spoof requests to cancel the lease or change the callback channel parameters.We would probably accept that. But can you enlighten me as to why
AUTH_SYSis better then krb5 (no i, no p)?It isn't "better." But if no GSS credential is available on the client, then
AUTH_SYSis about the only choice for a client to use.Quoted 22 lines
Quoted 11 lines
Quoted 7 lines
Secondly I would like to make a remark on basing client id's on the system's kerberos principal's name. That same faculty, in the times it had its own IT department, used an identical keytab for all Linux workstations, using the principal names "[nfs|root|host]/[email protected]". I understand this would lead to severe problems when the client id (
co_ownerid) is based solely in the systems root principal name.How so? The only problem should be that any one of those machines can go and cancel or change the lease of any other. That's a compromise that you decided upon when you decided to use one keytab for all of them.
Mmm, not at the time we made the decision. But I just mentioned that as an example of the problems one can meet when deciding on the implementation of client id. The same problem, but on a smaller scale, occurs when the client id is based on the system principal and two or more systems use the same user principal as system principal.
Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 5 lines
It seems to me that the issues about the client id look like a bag of worms. I've seen that the newest standard `requires' integrity protection for client id exchanges. I doubt that that will help when the source code of the NFS client is known and
the client id is guessable.Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 2 lines
What is the attack and how would it compromise security on the clients that you care about?
I am personally not that worried about this issue on our environment. But others seem to be in their environment. Otherwise the integrity requirement would not have ended up in the NFSv4 RFC. As fas as I understand the danger with a man-in-the-middle attack is that the attacker can see my client id and thus cancel my lease. When the man-in-the-middle can guess my client id he can still invalidate my lease even when i'am using krb5i.
No, SETCLIENTID would have to be authenticated with a Kerberos principal. That's what protects the lease.
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The wisest thing might be to offer different options and let the administrators pick the one they like best?
We have two options available to you:
auth_sysorRPCSEC_GSSw/krb5i.I meant different options for choosing the client id.
Have you seen the
nfs4_unique_idboot parameter? (cf.Documentation/filesystems/nfs.txt) Pick a different UUID for each of your clients, and specify that UUID via the kernel command line.
Yes, sorry. I misremembered the code... If you specify 'migration' then the uuid is used. Otherwise we use the ip address.
Signature · 6 lines
Trond Myklebust Linux NFS client maintainer NetApp [email protected] www.netapp.com
Quoted 58 lines · Trond
Quoted 57 lines · Chuck Lever
Quoted 10 lines · E.G. Keizer
Quoted 7 lines · Trond
Quoted 5 lines · E.G. Keizer
First I would like to wholeheartedly support Neil Brown's comment. We at the Vrije Universiteit in Amsterdam (NL) also have the situation where the Kerberos administrator does not hand out machine credentials. A lot of Linux users from the Faculty of Sciences depend on the functionality that lets them access the NFS file servers with only their user credentials.
Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 4 lines
They should still be able to do that, but in that case, the state management will have to default to
AUTH_SYSto set up the lease, which means that someone else can spoof requests to cancel the lease or change the callback channel parameters.We would probably accept that. But can you enlighten me as to why
AUTH_SYSis better then krb5 (no i, no p)?It isn't "better." But if no GSS credential is available on the client, then
AUTH_SYSis about the only choice for a client to use.Quoted 22 lines
Quoted 11 lines
Quoted 7 lines
Secondly I would like to make a remark on basing client id's on the system's kerberos principal's name. That same faculty, in the times it had its own IT department, used an identical keytab for all Linux workstations, using the principal names "[nfs|root|host]/[email protected]". I understand this would lead to severe problems when the client id (
co_ownerid) is based solely in the systems root principal name.How so? The only problem should be that any one of those machines can go and cancel or change the lease of any other. That's a compromise that you decided upon when you decided to use one keytab for all of them.
Mmm, not at the time we made the decision. But I just mentioned that as an example of the problems one can meet when deciding on the implementation of client id. The same problem, but on a smaller scale, occurs when the client id is based on the system principal and two or more systems use the same user principal as system principal.
Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 5 lines
It seems to me that the issues about the client id look like a bag of worms. I've seen that the newest standard `requires' integrity protection for client id exchanges. I doubt that that will help when the source code of the NFS client is known and
the client id is guessable.Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 2 lines
What is the attack and how would it compromise security on the clients that you care about?
I am personally not that worried about this issue on our environment. But others seem to be in their environment. Otherwise the integrity requirement would not have ended up in the NFSv4 RFC. As fas as I understand the danger with a man-in-the-middle attack is that the attacker can see my client id and thus cancel my lease. When the man-in-the-middle can guess my client id he can still invalidate my lease even when i'am using krb5i.
No, SETCLIENTID would have to be authenticated with a Kerberos principal. That's what protects the lease.
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The wisest thing might be to offer different options and let the administrators pick the one they like best?
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We have two options available to you:
auth_sysorRPCSEC_GSSw/krb5i.I meant different options for choosing the client id.
Have you seen the
nfs4_unique_idboot parameter? (cf.Documentation/filesystems/nfs.txt) Pick a different UUID for each of your clients, and specify that UUID via the kernel command line.Yes, sorry. I misremembered the code... If you specify 'migration' then the uuid is used. Otherwise we use the ip address.
Nope, you were right the first time: the client's hostname is used if "nfs4_unique_id" is not specified.
Signature · 2 lines
Chuck Lever chuck[dot]lever[at]oracle[dot]com