audit: fix potential integer overflow in audit_log_n_hex()
PATCH v2 1/1 audit: fix potential integer overflow in audit_log_n_hex()
The function calculates new_len as len << 1 for hex encoding. This has two overflow risks: the shift itself can overflow when len is large, and the result can be truncated when assigned to new_len (declared as int) from the size_t calculation.
Fix by using check_shl_overflow() to catch shift overflow and changing new_len and loop counter i to size_t to prevent truncation.
---
Changes in v2:
- Use check_shl_overflow() instead of manual overflow check.
kernel/audit.c | 10 ++++++++-- 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
kernel/audit.c +8 -2
@@ -62,6 +62,7 @@#include <net/ip.h> #include <net/ipv6.h> #include <linux/sctp.h> +#include <linux/overflow.h> #include "audit.h"
@@ -2076,7 +2077,8 @@ void audit_log_format(struct audit_buffer *ab, const char *fmt, ...)void audit_log_n_hex (struct audit_buffer *ab,const unsigned char *buf,size_t len) { -int i, avail, new_len; +int avail; +size_t i, new_len;unsigned char *ptr;struct sk_buff *skb;
@@ -2084,9 +2086,13 @@ void audit_log_n_hex(struct audit_buffer *ab, const unsigned char *buf,return ;BUG_ON (!ab->skb); + skb = ab->skb; avail =skb_tailroom (skb); - new_len = len<<1 ; + +if (check_shl_overflow (len,1 , &new_len)) +return ; +if (new_len >= avail) {/* Round the buffer request up to the next multiple */ new_len =AUDIT_BUFSIZ *(((new_len-avail)/AUDIT_BUFSIZ ) +1 );
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Quoted 10 lines · Ricardo Robaina
The function calculates
new_lenas len << 1 for hex encoding. This has two overflow risks: the shift itself can overflow when len is large, and the result can be truncated when assigned tonew_len(declared as int) from thesize_tcalculation.Fix by using
check_shl_overflow()to catch shift overflow and changingnew_lenand loop counter i tosize_tto prevent truncation.Fixes 168b7173959f ("AUDIT: Clean up logging of untrusted strings")Signed-off-by Ricardo Robaina <[email protected]>
Quoted 48 lines
---
Changes in v2:
- Usecheck_shl_overflow()instead of manual overflow check.kernel/audit.c | 10 ++++++++-- 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)kernel/audit.c +8
-2@@ -62,6 +62,7 @@#include <net/ip.h> #include <net/ipv6.h> #include <linux/sctp.h> +#include <linux/overflow.h> #include "audit.h" @@ -2076,7 +2077,8 @@ void audit_log_format(struct audit_buffer *ab, const char *fmt, ...)void audit_log_n_hex (struct audit_buffer *ab,const unsigned char *buf,size_t len) { -int i, avail, new_len; +int avail; +size_t i, new_len;unsigned char *ptr;struct sk_buff *skb;@@ -2084,9 +2086,13 @@ void audit_log_n_hex(struct audit_buffer *ab, const unsigned char *buf,return ;BUG_ON (!ab->skb); + skb = ab->skb; avail =skb_tailroom (skb); - new_len = len<<1 ; + +if (check_shl_overflow (len,1 , &new_len)) +return ; +if (new_len >= avail) {/* Round the buffer request up to the next multiple */ new_len =AUDIT_BUFSIZ *(((new_len-avail)/AUDIT_BUFSIZ ) +1 );Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
- RGB
--
Richard Guy Briggs <[email protected]>
Sr. S/W Engineer, Kernel Security, Base Operating Systems Remote, Ottawa, Red Hat Canada
Upstream IRC: SunRaycer
Voice: +1.613.860 2354 SMS: +1.613.518.6570
Paul Moore
maintainerQuoted 42 lines · On Jun 1, 2026 Ricardo Robaina <[email protected]> wrote:
The function calculates
new_lenas len << 1 for hex encoding. This has two overflow risks: the shift itself can overflow when len is large, and the result can be truncated when assigned tonew_len(declared as int) from thesize_tcalculation.Fix by using
check_shl_overflow()to catch shift overflow and changingnew_lenand loop counter i tosize_tto prevent truncation.Fixes 168b7173959f ("AUDIT: Clean up logging of untrusted strings")Signed-off-by Ricardo Robaina <[email protected]>Reviewed-by Richard Guy Briggs <[email protected]>---
Changes in v2:
- Usecheck_shl_overflow()instead of manual overflow check.kernel/audit.c | 10 ++++++++-- 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)kernel/audit.c +3
-1@@ -62,6 +62,7 @@#include <net/ip.h> #include <net/ipv6.h> #include <linux/sctp.h> +#include <linux/overflow.h> #include "audit.h" @@ -2076,7 +2077,8 @@ void audit_log_format(struct audit_buffer *ab, const char *fmt, ...)void audit_log_n_hex (struct audit_buffer *ab,const unsigned char *buf,size_t len) { -int i, avail, new_len; +int avail; +size_t i, new_len;unsigned char *ptr;struct sk_buff *skb;
kernel/audit.c void audit_log_n_hex(struct audit_buffer *ab, const unsigned char *buf, · line 2094
Quoted 10 lines
kernel/audit.c +4
-1@@ -2084,9 +2086,13 @@ void audit_log_n_hex(struct audit_buffer *ab, const unsigned char *buf,return ;BUG_ON (!ab->skb); + skb = ab->skb; avail =skb_tailroom (skb); - new_len = len<<1 ; + +if (check_shl_overflow (len,1 , &new_len)) +return ;
By returning without logging a value I worry we could end up with an oddly formatted audit record, e.g. "... A=foo B= C=bar ...". Instead of simply returning, should we log a '?' for the value and then return?
Quoted 5 lines
kernel/audit.c +0
-0if (new_len >= avail) {/* Round the buffer request up to the next multiple */ new_len =AUDIT_BUFSIZ *(((new_len-avail)/AUDIT_BUFSIZ ) +1 );Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
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paul-moore.com
Quoted 46 lines · Paul Moore
Quoted 44 lines · On Jun 1, 2026 Ricardo Robaina <[email protected]> wrote:
The function calculates
new_lenas len << 1 for hex encoding. This has two overflow risks: the shift itself can overflow when len is large, and the result can be truncated when assigned tonew_len(declared as int) from thesize_tcalculation.Fix by using
check_shl_overflow()to catch shift overflow and changingnew_lenand loop counter i tosize_tto prevent truncation.Fixes 168b7173959f ("AUDIT: Clean up logging of untrusted strings")Signed-off-by Ricardo Robaina <[email protected]>Reviewed-by Richard Guy Briggs <[email protected]>---
Changes in v2:
- Usecheck_shl_overflow()instead of manual overflow check.kernel/audit.c | 10 ++++++++-- 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)kernel/audit.c +3
-1@@ -62,6 +62,7 @@#include <net/ip.h> #include <net/ipv6.h> #include <linux/sctp.h> +#include <linux/overflow.h> #include "audit.h" @@ -2076,7 +2077,8 @@ void audit_log_format(struct audit_buffer *ab, const char *fmt, ...)void audit_log_n_hex (struct audit_buffer *ab,const unsigned char *buf,size_t len) { -int i, avail, new_len; +int avail; +size_t i, new_len;unsigned char *ptr;struct sk_buff *skb;@@ -2084,9 +2086,13 @@ void audit_log_n_hex(struct audit_buffer *ab, const unsigned char *buf,return ;
Quoted 13 lines
kernel/audit.c void audit_log_n_hex(struct audit_buffer *ab, const unsigned char *buf, · line 2094
Quoted 8 lines
kernel/audit.c +4
-1BUG_ON (!ab->skb); + skb = ab->skb; avail =skb_tailroom (skb); - new_len = len<<1 ; + +if (check_shl_overflow (len,1 , &new_len)) +return ;By returning without logging a value I worry we could end up with an oddly formatted audit record, e.g. "... A=foo B= C=bar ...". Instead of simply returning, should we log a '?' for the value and then return?
It makes sense, Paul. I'll send a new version shortly.
Quoted 9 lines
Quoted 5 lines
kernel/audit.c +0
-1if (new_len >= avail) {/* Round the buffer request up to the next multiple */ new_len =AUDIT_BUFSIZ *(((new_len-avail)/AUDIT_BUFSIZ ) +1 ); --2.53.0
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paul-moore.com