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pam module to set cifs credentials in key store

PATCH In review Orion Poplawski 3 participants 17 messages Nov 12, 2013 – Dec 10, 2013 13 messages not in the archive

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#0 lore raw

Has anyone started work on a pam module to set the cifs keys on login? Is this sensible?

- Orion

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#2 lore raw
Quoted 5 lines · On Tue, 12 Nov 2013 23:22:57 +0000 (UTC) Orion Poplawski…

Has anyone started work on a pam module to set the cifs keys on login? Is this sensible?

- Orion

Quite sensible. No one is working on it that I know of...

Signature · 1 line
Jeff Layton <[email protected]>

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#4 lore raw
Quoted 11 lines · Jeff Layton
Quoted 5 lines · On Tue, 12 Nov 2013 23:22:57 +0000 (UTC) Orion Poplawski…

Has anyone started work on a pam module to set the cifs keys on login? Is this sensible?

- Orion

Quite sensible. No one is working on it that I know of...

How does this seem?

- I pulled a couple shared routines out of cifscreds.c into cifskey.[hc].
- We build the pam_cifscreds.so directly from all of the source to get -fpic.

I've tested with:

/etc/pam.d/login
#%PAM-1.0
auth [user_unknown=ignore success=ok ignore=ignore default=bad] pam_securetty.so

auth       substack     system-auth
auth       optional     pam_cifscreds.so
auth       include      postlogin
account    required     pam_nologin.so
account    include      system-auth
password   include      system-auth
# pam_selinux.so close should be the first session rule
session    required     pam_selinux.so close
session    required     pam_loginuid.so
session    optional     pam_console.so
# pam_selinux.so open should only be followed by sessions to be executed in the user context
session    required     pam_selinux.so open
session    required     pam_namespace.so
session    optional     pam_keyinit.so force revoke
session    include      system-auth
session    optional     pam_cifscreds.so domain=CO-RA
session    include      postlogin
-session   optional     pam_ck_connector.so

and it seems to work.

I tried putting it into system-auth but no luck. Not sure what is up there.

Signature · 5 lines
Orion Poplawski
Technical Manager                     303-415-9701 x222
NWRA, Boulder/CoRA Office             FAX: 303-415-9702
3380 Mitchell Lane                       [email protected]
Boulder, CO 80301                   http://www.nwra.com
Quoted 1 line

From e2e6e73f05d912377656675292994858b99cabbb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001

From: Orion Poplawski <[email protected]>
Date: Wed, 13 Nov 2013 13:53:30 -0700
Subject: [PATCH] Create cifscreds PAM module to insert credentials at login

---
 Makefile.am     |  11 +-
 cifscreds.c     |  49 +------
 cifskey.c       |  52 +++++++
 cifskey.h       |  47 ++++++
 configure.ac    |   6 +
 pam_cifscreds.c | 436 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 6 files changed, 552 insertions(+), 49 deletions(-)
 create mode 100644 cifskey.c
 create mode 100644 cifskey.h
 create mode 100644 pam_cifscreds.c
Makefile.am +10 -1
index 6407520..6e86cd3 100644
@@ -34,7 +34,7 @@ endif
 
 if CONFIG_CIFSCREDS
 bin_PROGRAMS += cifscreds
-cifscreds_SOURCES = cifscreds.c resolve_host.c util.c
+cifscreds_SOURCES = cifscreds.c cifskey.c resolve_host.c util.c
 cifscreds_LDADD = -lkeyutils
 man_MANS += cifscreds.1
 endif
@@ -91,4 +91,13 @@ idmapwb.8: idmapwb.8.in
 
 endif
 
+if CONFIG_PAM
+pamdir = $(libdir)/security
+
+pam_PROGRAMS = pam_cifscreds.so
+
+pam_cifscreds.so: pam_cifscreds.c cifskey.c resolve_host.c util.c
+	$(CC) $(CFLAGS) $(AM_CFLAGS) $(LDFLAGS) -shared -fpic -o $@ $+ -lpam -lkeyutils
+endif
+
 SUBDIRS = contrib
cifscreds.c +1 -48

76 lines not on this page · raw message

cifskey.c new file +52 -0

52 lines not on this page · raw message

cifskey.h new file +47 -0

47 lines not on this page · raw message

configure.ac +6 -0
index c5b2244..423c14a 100644
@@ -40,6 +40,11 @@ AC_ARG_ENABLE(cifsacl,
 	enable_cifsacl=$enableval,
 	enable_cifsacl="maybe")
 
+AC_ARG_ENABLE(pam,
+	[AS_HELP_STRING([--enable-pam],[Create cifscreds PAM module @<:@default=yes@:>@])],
+	enable_pam=$enableval,
+	enable_pam="maybe")
+
 AC_ARG_ENABLE(systemd,
 	[AS_HELP_STRING([--enable-systemd],[Enable systemd specific behavior for mount.cifs @<:@default=yes@:>@])],
 	enable_systemd=$enableval,
@@ -231,6 +236,7 @@ AM_CONDITIONAL(CONFIG_CIFSUPCALL, [test "$enable_cifsupcall" != "no"])
 AM_CONDITIONAL(CONFIG_CIFSCREDS, [test "$enable_cifscreds" != "no"])
 AM_CONDITIONAL(CONFIG_CIFSIDMAP, [test "$enable_cifsidmap" != "no"])
 AM_CONDITIONAL(CONFIG_CIFSACL, [test "$enable_cifsacl" != "no"])
+AM_CONDITIONAL(CONFIG_PAM, [test "$enable_pam" != "no" -o "$enable_pam" != "no"])
 AM_CONDITIONAL(CONFIG_PLUGIN, [test "$enable_cifsidmap" != "no" -o "$enable_cifsacl" != "no"])
 
 LIBCAP_NG_PATH
pam_cifscreds.c new file +436 -0

436 lines not on this page · raw message

Signature · 1 line
1.8.3.1

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#6 lore raw
Quoted 43 lines · On Wed, 13 Nov 2013 13:59:33 -0700 Orion Poplawski…
Quoted 11 lines · Jeff Layton
Quoted 5 lines · On Tue, 12 Nov 2013 23:22:57 +0000 (UTC) Orion Poplawski…

Has anyone started work on a pam module to set the cifs keys on login? Is this sensible?

- Orion

Quite sensible. No one is working on it that I know of...

How does this seem?

- I pulled a couple shared routines out of cifscreds.c into cifskey.[hc].
- We build the pam_cifscreds.so directly from all of the source to get -fpic.

I've tested with:

/etc/pam.d/login
#%PAM-1.0
auth [user_unknown=ignore success=ok ignore=ignore default=bad] pam_securetty.so

auth       substack     system-auth
auth       optional     pam_cifscreds.so
auth       include      postlogin
account    required     pam_nologin.so
account    include      system-auth
password   include      system-auth
# pam_selinux.so close should be the first session rule
session    required     pam_selinux.so close
session    required     pam_loginuid.so
session    optional     pam_console.so
# pam_selinux.so open should only be followed by sessions to be executed in 
the user context
session    required     pam_selinux.so open
session    required     pam_namespace.so
session    optional     pam_keyinit.so force revoke
session    include      system-auth
session    optional     pam_cifscreds.so domain=CO-RA
session    include      postlogin
-session   optional     pam_ck_connector.so
Quoted 4 lines

and it seems to work.

I tried putting it into system-auth but no luck. Not sure what is up there.

Nice! Looks like a good start, but I'm no PAM expert. Maybe we can get someone else to help review it.

Signature · 1 line
Jeff Layton <[email protected]>
#7 lore raw
In reply to a message not in the archive
Quoted 43 lines · Orion Poplawski
Quoted 11 lines · Jeff Layton
Quoted 5 lines · On Tue, 12 Nov 2013 23:22:57 +0000 (UTC) Orion Poplawski…

Has anyone started work on a pam module to set the cifs keys on login? Is this sensible?

- Orion

Quite sensible. No one is working on it that I know of...

How does this seem?

- I pulled a couple shared routines out of cifscreds.c into cifskey.[hc].
- We build the pam_cifscreds.so directly from all of the source to get -fpic.

I've tested with:

/etc/pam.d/login
#%PAM-1.0
auth [user_unknown=ignore success=ok ignore=ignore default=bad] pam_securetty.so

auth       substack     system-auth
auth       optional     pam_cifscreds.so
auth       include      postlogin
account    required     pam_nologin.so
account    include      system-auth
password   include      system-auth
# pam_selinux.so close should be the first session rule
session    required     pam_selinux.so close
session    required     pam_loginuid.so
session    optional     pam_console.so
# pam_selinux.so open should only be followed by sessions to be executed in 
the user context
session    required     pam_selinux.so open
session    required     pam_namespace.so
session    optional     pam_keyinit.so force revoke
session    include      system-auth
session    optional     pam_cifscreds.so domain=CO-RA
session    include      postlogin
-session   optional     pam_ck_connector.so
Quoted 4 lines

and it seems to work.

I tried putting it into system-auth but no luck. Not sure what is up there.

Uhm doesn't this code store the user password in the clear in a key that is explicitly made readable to any process of the user in the same session ?

Simo.

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#9 lore raw
Quoted 7 lines · Simo

Uhm doesn't this code store the user password in the clear in a key that is explicitly made readable to any process of the user in the same session ?

Simo.

I tried to mimic exactly what the cifscreds program does, but I may have made a mistake. Or perhaps cifscreds is also doing a bad thing. The key permissions are set to:

#define CIFS_KEY_PERMS (KEY_POS_VIEW|KEY_POS_WRITE|KEY_POS_SEARCH| \
                        KEY_USR_VIEW|KEY_USR_WRITE|KEY_USR_SEARCH)
Signature · 5 lines
Orion Poplawski
Technical Manager                     303-415-9701 x222
NWRA, Boulder/CoRA Office             FAX: 303-415-9702
3380 Mitchell Lane                       [email protected]
Boulder, CO 80301                   http://www.nwra.com

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#11 lore raw
Quoted 9 lines · Orion Poplawski
Quoted 7 lines · Simo

Uhm doesn't this code store the user password in the clear in a key that is explicitly made readable to any process of the user in the same session ?

Simo.

Quoted 8 lines

I tried to mimic exactly what the cifscreds program does, but I may have made a mistake. Or perhaps cifscreds is also doing a bad thing. The key permissions are set to:

#define CIFS_KEY_PERMS (KEY_POS_VIEW|KEY_POS_WRITE|KEY_POS_SEARCH| \
KEY_USR_VIEW|KEY_USR_WRITE|KEY_USR_SEARCH)

We're not setting KEY_*_READ, so one cannot read the contents of the key, IIUIC.

Signature · 5 lines
Orion Poplawski
Technical Manager                     303-415-9701 x222
NWRA, Boulder/CoRA Office             FAX: 303-415-9702
3380 Mitchell Lane                       [email protected]
Boulder, CO 80301                   http://www.nwra.com

A message that is not in the archive (sent off-list or not yet received): [email protected]

#13 lore raw
Quoted 14 lines · Orion Poplawski
Quoted 13 lines · Orion Poplawski
Quoted 7 lines · Simo

Uhm doesn't this code store the user password in the clear in a key that is explicitly made readable to any process of the user in the same session ?

Simo.

I tried to mimic exactly what the cifscreds program does, but I may have made a mistake. Or perhaps cifscreds is also doing a bad thing. The key permissions are set to:

Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 4 lines

#define CIFS_KEY_PERMS (KEY_POS_VIEW|KEY_POS_WRITE|KEY_POS_SEARCH| \
KEY_USR_VIEW|KEY_USR_WRITE|KEY_USR_SEARCH)

We're not setting KEY_*_READ, so one cannot read the contents of the key, IIUIC.

My bad, my eyes saw VIEW but read READ.

Simo.

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#15 lore raw
Quoted 20 lines · On Wed, 13 Nov 2013 18:32:19 -0500 Simo <[email protected]…
Quoted 19 lines · Orion Poplawski
Quoted 17 lines · Orion Poplawski
Quoted 7 lines · Simo

Uhm doesn't this code store the user password in the clear in a key that is explicitly made readable to any process of the user in the same session ?

Simo.

I tried to mimic exactly what the cifscreds program does, but I may have made a mistake. Or perhaps cifscreds is also doing a bad thing. The key permissions are set to:

#define CIFS_KEY_PERMS (KEY_POS_VIEW|KEY_POS_WRITE|KEY_POS_SEARCH| \
KEY_USR_VIEW|KEY_USR_WRITE|KEY_USR_SEARCH)

Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 1 line

We're not setting KEY_*_READ, so one cannot read the contents of the key, IIUIC.

My bad, my eyes saw VIEW but read READ.

Simo.

Yep, and furthermore...

These keys are saved as a "logon" keytype (see kernel commit 9f6ed2ca257). Those are basically just like the "user" keytype except that there is no mechanism to report the payload to userland. So even if the permissions we such that you could read them, there's no way for the kernel to do so.

About the only way to get the password out of the kernel would be to poke around in /dev/mem or the equivalent. Unfortunately, there's not much we can do about that...

Signature · 1 line
Jeff Layton <[email protected]>

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#17 lore raw
Quoted 38 lines · Jeff Layton
Quoted 20 lines · On Wed, 13 Nov 2013 18:32:19 -0500 Simo <[email protected]…
Quoted 19 lines · Orion Poplawski
Quoted 17 lines · Orion Poplawski
Quoted 7 lines · Simo

Uhm doesn't this code store the user password in the clear in a key that is explicitly made readable to any process of the user in the same session ?

Simo.

I tried to mimic exactly what the cifscreds program does, but I may have made a mistake. Or perhaps cifscreds is also doing a bad thing. The key permissions are set to:

#define CIFS_KEY_PERMS (KEY_POS_VIEW|KEY_POS_WRITE|KEY_POS_SEARCH| \
KEY_USR_VIEW|KEY_USR_WRITE|KEY_USR_SEARCH)

Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 1 line

We're not setting KEY_*_READ, so one cannot read the contents of the key, IIUIC.

My bad, my eyes saw VIEW but read READ.

Simo.

Yep, and furthermore...

These keys are saved as a "logon" keytype (see kernel commit 9f6ed2ca257). Those are basically just like the "user" keytype except that there is no mechanism to report the payload to userland. So even if the permissions we such that you could read them, there's no way for the kernel to do so.

Quoted 3 lines

About the only way to get the password out of the kernel would be to poke around in /dev/mem or the equivalent. Unfortunately, there's not much we can do about that...

We could (reversibly) encrypt them with a key held in a TPM chip :-)

Simo.

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#19 lore raw
Quoted 39 lines · On Thu, 14 Nov 2013 11:15:50 -0500 Simo <[email protected]…
Quoted 38 lines · Jeff Layton
Quoted 20 lines · On Wed, 13 Nov 2013 18:32:19 -0500 Simo <[email protected]…
Quoted 19 lines · Orion Poplawski
Quoted 17 lines · Orion Poplawski
Quoted 7 lines · Simo

Uhm doesn't this code store the user password in the clear in a key that is explicitly made readable to any process of the user in the same session ?

Simo.

I tried to mimic exactly what the cifscreds program does, but I may have made a mistake. Or perhaps cifscreds is also doing a bad thing. The key permissions are set to:

#define CIFS_KEY_PERMS (KEY_POS_VIEW|KEY_POS_WRITE|KEY_POS_SEARCH| \
KEY_USR_VIEW|KEY_USR_WRITE|KEY_USR_SEARCH)

Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 1 line

We're not setting KEY_*_READ, so one cannot read the contents of the key, IIUIC.

My bad, my eyes saw VIEW but read READ.

Simo.

Yep, and furthermore...

These keys are saved as a "logon" keytype (see kernel commit 9f6ed2ca257). Those are basically just like the "user" keytype except that there is no mechanism to report the payload to userland. So even if the permissions we such that you could read them, there's no way for the kernel to do so.

Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 3 lines

About the only way to get the password out of the kernel would be to poke around in /dev/mem or the equivalent. Unfortunately, there's not much we can do about that...

We could (reversibly) encrypt them with a key held in a TPM chip :-)

Sure, anything is possible. It's just a simple matter of coding that up... ;)

Signature · 1 line
Jeff Layton <[email protected]>
#20 lore raw
In reply to a message not in the archive
Quoted 5 lines · On Wed, 13 Nov 2013 13:59:33 -0700 Orion Poplawski…

From e2e6e73f05d912377656675292994858b99cabbb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Orion Poplawski <[email protected]>
Date: Wed, 13 Nov 2013 13:53:30 -0700
Subject: [PATCH] Create cifscreds PAM module to insert credentials at login

Sorry for taking so long to review this. This looks like a good start. FWIW, I'd like to see this merged for the next release, which should happen in the next month or two.

When you think this is ready for merge, please resend with a real '[PATCH]' tag in the subject, so I don't miss it...

Comments inline below:

Quoted 238 lines
---
 Makefile.am     |  11 +-
 cifscreds.c     |  49 +------
 cifskey.c       |  52 +++++++
 cifskey.h       |  47 ++++++
 configure.ac    |   6 +
 pam_cifscreds.c | 436 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 6 files changed, 552 insertions(+), 49 deletions(-)
 create mode 100644 cifskey.c
 create mode 100644 cifskey.h
 create mode 100644 pam_cifscreds.c
Makefile.am +10 -1
index 6407520..6e86cd3 100644
@@ -34,7 +34,7 @@ endif
 
 if CONFIG_CIFSCREDS
 bin_PROGRAMS += cifscreds
-cifscreds_SOURCES = cifscreds.c resolve_host.c util.c
+cifscreds_SOURCES = cifscreds.c cifskey.c resolve_host.c util.c
 cifscreds_LDADD = -lkeyutils
 man_MANS += cifscreds.1
 endif
@@ -91,4 +91,13 @@ idmapwb.8: idmapwb.8.in
 
 endif
 
+if CONFIG_PAM
+pamdir = $(libdir)/security
+
+pam_PROGRAMS = pam_cifscreds.so
+
+pam_cifscreds.so: pam_cifscreds.c cifskey.c resolve_host.c util.c
+	$(CC) $(CFLAGS) $(AM_CFLAGS) $(LDFLAGS) -shared -fpic -o $@ $+ -lpam -lkeyutils
+endif
+
 SUBDIRS = contrib
cifscreds.c +1 -48
index 60be4e5..fa05dc8 100644
@@ -29,35 +29,16 @@
 #include <keyutils.h>
 #include <getopt.h>
 #include <errno.h>
+#include "cifskey.h"
 #include "mount.h"
 #include "resolve_host.h"
 #include "util.h"
 
 #define THIS_PROGRAM_NAME "cifscreds"
-#define KEY_PREFIX	  "cifs"
 
 /* max length of appropriate command */
 #define MAX_COMMAND_SIZE 32
 
-/* max length of username, password and domain name */
-#define MAX_USERNAME_SIZE 32
-#define MOUNT_PASSWD_SIZE 128
-#define MAX_DOMAIN_SIZE 64
-
-/*
- * disallowed characters for user and domain names. See:
- * http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/bb726984.aspx
- * http://support.microsoft.com/kb/909264
- */
-#define USER_DISALLOWED_CHARS "\\/\"[]:|<>+=;,?*"
-#define DOMAIN_DISALLOWED_CHARS "\\/:*?\"<>|"
-
-/* destination keyring */
-#define DEST_KEYRING KEY_SPEC_SESSION_KEYRING
-#define CIFS_KEY_TYPE  "logon"
-#define CIFS_KEY_PERMS (KEY_POS_VIEW|KEY_POS_WRITE|KEY_POS_SEARCH| \
-			KEY_USR_VIEW|KEY_USR_WRITE|KEY_USR_SEARCH)
-
 struct cmdarg {
 	char		*host;
 	char		*user;
@@ -106,17 +87,6 @@ usage(void)
 	return EXIT_FAILURE;
 }
 
-/* search a specific key in keyring */
-static key_serial_t
-key_search(const char *addr, char keytype)
-{
-	char desc[INET6_ADDRSTRLEN + sizeof(KEY_PREFIX) + 4];
-
-	sprintf(desc, "%s:%c:%s", KEY_PREFIX, keytype, addr);
-
-	return keyctl_search(DEST_KEYRING, CIFS_KEY_TYPE, desc, 0);
-}
-
 /* search all program's keys in keyring */
 static key_serial_t key_search_all(void)
 {
@@ -170,23 +140,6 @@ key_search_all_out:
 	return ret;
 }
 
-/* add or update a specific key to keyring */
-static key_serial_t
-key_add(const char *addr, const char *user, const char *pass, char keytype)
-{
-	int len;
-	char desc[INET6_ADDRSTRLEN + sizeof(KEY_PREFIX) + 4];
-	char val[MOUNT_PASSWD_SIZE +  MAX_USERNAME_SIZE + 2];
-
-	/* set key description */
-	sprintf(desc, "%s:%c:%s", KEY_PREFIX, keytype, addr);
-
-	/* set payload contents */
-	len = sprintf(val, "%s:%s", user, pass);
-
-	return add_key(CIFS_KEY_TYPE, desc, val, len + 1, DEST_KEYRING);
-}
-
 /* add command handler */
 static int cifscreds_add(struct cmdarg *arg)
 {
cifskey.c new file +52 -0
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..7716c42
@@ -0,0 +1,52 @@
+/*
+ * Credentials stashing routines for Linux CIFS VFS (virtual filesystem)
+ * Copyright (C) 2010 Jeff Layton ([email protected])
+ * Copyright (C) 2010 Igor Druzhinin ([email protected])
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+ * the Free Software Foundation; either version 3 of the License, or
+ * (at your option) any later version.
+ *
+ * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
+ * GNU General Public License for more details.
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
+ * along with this program.  If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
+ */
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <keyutils.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include "cifskey.h"
+#include "resolve_host.h"
+
+/* search a specific key in keyring */
+key_serial_t
+key_search(const char *addr, char keytype)
+{
+	char desc[INET6_ADDRSTRLEN + sizeof(KEY_PREFIX) + 4];
+
+	sprintf(desc, "%s:%c:%s", KEY_PREFIX, keytype, addr);
+
+	return keyctl_search(DEST_KEYRING, CIFS_KEY_TYPE, desc, 0);
+}
+
+/* add or update a specific key to keyring */
+key_serial_t
+key_add(const char *addr, const char *user, const char *pass, char keytype)
+{
+	int len;
+	char desc[INET6_ADDRSTRLEN + sizeof(KEY_PREFIX) + 4];
+	char val[MOUNT_PASSWD_SIZE +  MAX_USERNAME_SIZE + 2];
+
+	/* set key description */
+	sprintf(desc, "%s:%c:%s", KEY_PREFIX, keytype, addr);
+
+	/* set payload contents */
+	len = sprintf(val, "%s:%s", user, pass);
+
+	return add_key(CIFS_KEY_TYPE, desc, val, len + 1, DEST_KEYRING);
+}
cifskey.h new file +47 -0
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..ed0c469
@@ -0,0 +1,47 @@
+/*
+ * Credentials stashing utility for Linux CIFS VFS (virtual filesystem) definitions
+ * Copyright (C) 2010 Jeff Layton ([email protected])
+ * Copyright (C) 2010 Igor Druzhinin ([email protected])
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+ * the Free Software Foundation; either version 3 of the License, or
+ * (at your option) any later version.
+ *
+ * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
+ * GNU General Public License for more details.
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
+ * along with this program.  If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
+ */
+
+#ifndef _CIFSKEY_H
+#define _CIFSKEY_H
+
+#define KEY_PREFIX	  "cifs"
+
+/* max length of username, password and domain name */
+#define MAX_USERNAME_SIZE 32
+#define MOUNT_PASSWD_SIZE 128
+#define MAX_DOMAIN_SIZE 64
+
+/*
+ * disallowed characters for user and domain names. See:
+ * http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/bb726984.aspx
+ * http://support.microsoft.com/kb/909264
+ */
+#define USER_DISALLOWED_CHARS "\\/\"[]:|<>+=;,?*"
+#define DOMAIN_DISALLOWED_CHARS "\\/:*?\"<>|"
+
+/* destination keyring */
+#define DEST_KEYRING KEY_SPEC_SESSION_KEYRING
+#define CIFS_KEY_TYPE  "logon"
+#define CIFS_KEY_PERMS (KEY_POS_VIEW|KEY_POS_WRITE|KEY_POS_SEARCH| \
+			KEY_USR_VIEW|KEY_USR_WRITE|KEY_USR_SEARCH)
+
+key_serial_t key_search(const char *addr, char keytype);
+key_serial_t key_add(const char *addr, const char *user, const char *pass, char keytype);
+
+#endif /* _CIFSKEY_H */
configure.ac +0 -0
index c5b2244..423c14a 100644

configure.ac AC_ARG_ENABLE(cifsacl, · line 47

Quoted 8 lines
configure.ac +5 -0
@@ -40,6 +40,11 @@ AC_ARG_ENABLE(cifsacl,
 	enable_cifsacl=$enableval,
 	enable_cifsacl="maybe")
 
+AC_ARG_ENABLE(pam,
+	[AS_HELP_STRING([--enable-pam],[Create cifscreds PAM module @<:@default=yes@:>@])],
+	enable_pam=$enableval,
+	enable_pam="maybe")
+

Ok, so you're enabling this by default.

configure.ac AM_CONDITIONAL(CONFIG_CIFSUPCALL, [test "$enable_cifsupcall" != "no"]) · line 239

Quoted 8 lines
configure.ac +1 -0
 AC_ARG_ENABLE(systemd,
 	[AS_HELP_STRING([--enable-systemd],[Enable systemd specific behavior for mount.cifs @<:@default=yes@:>@])],
 	enable_systemd=$enableval,
@@ -231,6 +236,7 @@ AM_CONDITIONAL(CONFIG_CIFSUPCALL, [test "$enable_cifsupcall" != "no"])
 AM_CONDITIONAL(CONFIG_CIFSCREDS, [test "$enable_cifscreds" != "no"])
 AM_CONDITIONAL(CONFIG_CIFSIDMAP, [test "$enable_cifsidmap" != "no"])
 AM_CONDITIONAL(CONFIG_CIFSACL, [test "$enable_cifsacl" != "no"])
+AM_CONDITIONAL(CONFIG_PAM, [test "$enable_pam" != "no" -o "$enable_pam" != "no"])

Erm...you're testing the same thing twice here?

configure.ac AM_CONDITIONAL(CONFIG_CIFSUPCALL, [test "$enable_cifsupcall" != "no"]) · line 242

Quoted 3 lines
configure.ac +0 -0
 AM_CONDITIONAL(CONFIG_PLUGIN, [test "$enable_cifsidmap" != "no" -o "$enable_cifsacl" != "no"])
 
 LIBCAP_NG_PATH

I think the autoconf stuff needs some work.

If the box doesn't have what's needed to build it, the build is going to fail unless someone explicitly disables CONFIG_PAM.

Ideally, we'd build this by default and have autoconf test for what's required to build the PAM module. If the build requires aren't present, then the building of the PAM module should be disabled with a warning message that states that.

There are some other examples of that sort of behavior in configure.ac. It's a little more complicated, but it makes life easier for people building the package.

Quoted 135 lines
pam_cifscreds.c new file +129 -0
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..e99c912
@@ -0,0 +1,436 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2013 Orion Poplawski <[email protected]>
+ *
+ * based on gkr-pam-module.c, Copyright (C) 2007 Stef Walter
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+ * the Free Software Foundation; either version 3 of the License, or
+ * (at your option) any later version.
+ *
+ * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
+ * GNU General Public License for more details.
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
+ * along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
+ */
+
+#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H
+#include "config.h"
+#endif /* HAVE_CONFIG_H */
+
+#include <assert.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <pwd.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <syslog.h>
+#include <sys/types.h>
+/*
+#include <signal.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <sys/wait.h>
+*/
+
+#include <keyutils.h>
+
+#include <security/pam_appl.h>
+#include <security/pam_modules.h>
+#include <security/pam_ext.h>
+
+#include "cifskey.h"
+#include "mount.h"
+#include "resolve_host.h"
+#include "util.h"
+
+/**
+ * Flags that can be passed to the PAM module
+ */
+enum {
+	ARG_DOMAIN	   = 1 << 0,	/** Set domain password */
+	ARG_DEBUG	   = 1 << 1	/** Print debug messages */
+};
+
+/**
+ * Parse the arguments passed to the PAM module.
+ *
+ * @param ph PAM handle
+ * @param argc number of arguments
+ * @param argv array of arguments
+ * @param kwalletopener kwalletopener argument, path to the kwalletopener binary
+ * @return ORed flags that have been parsed
+ */
+static uint parse_args (pam_handle_t *ph, int argc, const char **argv, const char **hostdomain)
+{
+	uint args = 0;
+	const void *svc;
+	int i;
+	const char *host = NULL;
+	const char *domain = NULL;
+
+	svc = NULL;
+	if (pam_get_item (ph, PAM_SERVICE, &svc) != PAM_SUCCESS) {
+		svc = NULL;
+	}
+
+	size_t host_len = strlen("host=");
+	size_t domain_len = strlen("domain=");
+
+	/* Parse the arguments */
+	for (i = 0; i < argc; i++) {
+		if (strncmp(argv[i], "host=", host_len) == 0) {
+			host = (argv[i]) + host_len;
+			if (*host == '\0') {
+				host = NULL;
+				pam_syslog(ph, LOG_ERR, ""
+					   "host= specification missing argument");
+			} else {
+				*hostdomain = host;
+			}
+		} else if (strncmp(argv[i], "domain=", domain_len) == 0) {
+			domain = (argv[i]) + domain_len;
+			if (*domain == '\0') {
+				domain = NULL;
+				pam_syslog(ph, LOG_ERR, ""
+					   "domain= specification missing argument");
+			} else {
+				*hostdomain = domain;
+				args |= ARG_DOMAIN;
+			}
+		} else if (strcmp(argv[i], "debug") == 0) {
+			args |= ARG_DEBUG;
+		} else {
+			pam_syslog(ph, LOG_ERR, "invalid option %s",
+				   argv[i]);
+		}
+	}
+
+	if (host && domain) {
+		pam_syslog(ph, LOG_ERR, "cannot specify both host= and "
+			   "domain= arguments");
+	}
+
+	return args;
+}
+
+static void
+free_password (char *password)
+{
+	volatile char *vp;
+	size_t len;
+
+	if (!password) {
+		return;
+	}
+
+	/* Defeats some optimizations */

pam_cifscreds.c line 139

Quoted 10 lines
pam_cifscreds.c new file +10 -0
+	len = strlen (password);
+	memset (password, 0xAA, len);
+	memset (password, 0xBB, len);
+
+	/* Defeats others */
+	vp = (volatile char*)password;
+	while (*vp) {
+		*(vp++) = 0xAA;
+	}
+

I'm all for scrubbing the pw memory but that seems a bit like overkill. Got any references to cite about why you need to write over it 3 times?

If that's really necessary, then we should move the password handling in cifscreds and mount.cifs binary to use something like this too. Maybe consider putting this in an a.out lib and linking it into all 3?

Quoted 273 lines
pam_cifscreds.c new file +273 -0
+	free (password);
+}
+
+static void
+cleanup_free_password (pam_handle_t *ph, void *data, int pam_end_status)
+{
+	free_password (data);
+}
+
+/**
+ * Set the cifs credentials
+ *
+ * @param ph PAM handle
+ * @param user
+ * @param password
+ * @param args ORed flags for this module
+ * @param hostdomain hostname or domainname
+ */
+static int cifscreds_pam_add(pam_handle_t *ph, const char *user, const char *password,
+			     uint args, const char *hostdomain)
+{
+	int ret = PAM_SUCCESS;
+	char addrstr[MAX_ADDR_LIST_LEN];
+	char *currentaddress, *nextaddress;
+	char keytype = ((args & ARG_DOMAIN) == ARG_DOMAIN) ? 'd' : 'a';
+
+	assert(user);
+	assert(password);
+	assert(hostdomain);
+
+	if (keytype == 'd') {
+		if (strpbrk(hostdomain, DOMAIN_DISALLOWED_CHARS)) {
+			pam_syslog(ph, LOG_ERR, "Domain name contains invalid characters");
+			return PAM_SERVICE_ERR;
+		}
+		strlcpy(addrstr, hostdomain, MAX_ADDR_LIST_LEN);
+	} else {
+		ret = resolve_host(hostdomain, addrstr);
+	}
+
+	switch (ret) {
+	case EX_USAGE:
+		pam_syslog(ph, LOG_ERR, "Could not resolve address for %s", hostdomain);
+		return PAM_SERVICE_ERR;
+
+	case EX_SYSERR:
+		pam_syslog(ph, LOG_ERR, "Problem parsing address list");
+		return PAM_SERVICE_ERR;
+	}
+
+	if (strpbrk(user, USER_DISALLOWED_CHARS)) {
+		pam_syslog(ph, LOG_ERR, "Incorrect username");
+		return PAM_SERVICE_ERR;
+	}
+
+	/* search for same credentials stashed for current host */
+	currentaddress = addrstr;
+	nextaddress = strchr(currentaddress, ',');
+	if (nextaddress)
+		*nextaddress++ = '\0';
+
+	while (currentaddress) {
+		if (key_search(currentaddress, keytype) > 0) {
+			pam_syslog(ph, LOG_WARNING, "You already have stashed credentials "
+				"for %s (%s)", currentaddress, hostdomain);
+
+			return PAM_SERVICE_ERR;
+		}
+
+		currentaddress = nextaddress;
+		if (currentaddress) {
+			*(currentaddress - 1) = ',';
+			nextaddress = strchr(currentaddress, ',');
+			if (nextaddress)
+				*nextaddress++ = '\0';
+		}
+	}
+
+	/* Set the password */
+	currentaddress = addrstr;
+	nextaddress = strchr(currentaddress, ',');
+	if (nextaddress)
+		*nextaddress++ = '\0';
+
+	while (currentaddress) {
+		key_serial_t key = key_add(currentaddress, user, password, keytype);
+		if (key <= 0) {
+			pam_syslog(ph, LOG_ERR, "error: Add credential key for %s",
+				currentaddress);
+		} else {
+			if ((args & ARG_DEBUG) == ARG_DEBUG) {
+				pam_syslog(ph, LOG_DEBUG, "credential key for \\\\%s\\%s added",
+					   currentaddress, user);
+			}
+			if (keyctl(KEYCTL_SETPERM, key, CIFS_KEY_PERMS) < 0) {
+				pam_syslog(ph, LOG_ERR,"error: Setting permissons "
+					"on key, attempt to delete...");
+
+				if (keyctl(KEYCTL_UNLINK, key, DEST_KEYRING) < 0) {
+					pam_syslog(ph, LOG_ERR, "error: Deleting key from "
+						"keyring for %s (%s)",
+						currentaddress, hostdomain);
+				}
+			}
+		}
+
+		currentaddress = nextaddress;
+		if (currentaddress) {
+			nextaddress = strchr(currentaddress, ',');
+			if (nextaddress)
+				*nextaddress++ = '\0';
+		}
+	}
+
+	return PAM_SUCCESS;
+}
+
+/**
+ * PAM function called during authentication.
+ *
+ * This function first tries to get a password from PAM. Afterwards two
+ * scenarios are possible:
+ *
+ * - A session is already available which usually means that the user is already
+ *	logged on and PAM has been used inside the screensaver. In that case, no need to 
+ *	do anything(?).
+ *
+ * - A session is not yet available. Store the password inside PAM data so
+ *	it can be retrieved during pam_open_session to set the credentials.
+ *
+ * @param ph PAM handle
+ * @param unused unused
+ * @param argc number of arguments for this PAM module
+ * @param argv array of arguments for this PAM module
+ * @return any of the PAM return values
+ */
+PAM_EXTERN int pam_sm_authenticate(pam_handle_t *ph, int unused, int argc, const char **argv)
+{
+	struct passwd *pwd;
+	const char *hostdomain;
+	const char *user;
+	const char *password;
+	uint args;
+	int ret;
+
+	args = parse_args(ph, argc, argv, &hostdomain);
+	
+	/* Figure out and/or prompt for the user name */
+	ret = pam_get_user(ph, &user, NULL);
+	if (ret != PAM_SUCCESS || !user) {
+		pam_syslog(ph, LOG_ERR, "couldn't get the user name: %s",
+			   pam_strerror(ph, ret));
+		return PAM_SERVICE_ERR;
+	}
+
+	pwd = getpwnam(user);
+	if (!pwd) {
+		pam_syslog(ph, LOG_ERR, "error looking up user information for: %s", user);
+		return PAM_SERVICE_ERR;
+	}
+
+	/* Lookup the password */
+	ret = pam_get_item(ph, PAM_AUTHTOK, (const void**)&password);
+	if (ret != PAM_SUCCESS || password == NULL) {
+		if (ret == PAM_SUCCESS) {
+			pam_syslog(ph, LOG_WARNING, "no password is available for user");
+		} else {
+			pam_syslog(ph, LOG_WARNING, "no password is available for user: %s",
+				   pam_strerror(ph, ret));
+		}
+		return PAM_SUCCESS;
+	}
+
+	/* set password as pam data and launch during open_session. */
+	if (pam_set_data(ph, "cifscreds_password", strdup(password), cleanup_free_password) != PAM_SUCCESS) {
+		pam_syslog(ph, LOG_ERR, "error storing password");
+		return PAM_AUTHTOK_RECOVER_ERR;
+	}
+
+	if ((args & ARG_DEBUG) == ARG_DEBUG) {
+		pam_syslog(ph, LOG_DEBUG, "password stored");
+	}
+
+	return PAM_SUCCESS;
+}
+
+/**
+ * PAM function called during opening the session.
+ *
+ * Retrieves the password stored during authentication from PAM data, then uses
+ * it set the cifs key.
+ *
+ * @param ph PAM handle
+ * @param flags currently unused, TODO: check for silent flag
+ * @param argc number of arguments for this PAM module
+ * @param argv array of arguments for this PAM module
+ * @return any of the PAM return values
+ */
+PAM_EXTERN int pam_sm_open_session(pam_handle_t *ph, int flags, int argc, const char **argv)
+{
+	struct passwd *pwd;
+	const char *user = NULL;
+	const char *password = NULL;
+	const char *hostdomain = NULL;
+	uint args;
+	int retval;
+	key_serial_t	ses_key, uses_key;
+
+	args = parse_args(ph, argc, argv, &hostdomain);
+
+	/* Figure out the user name */
+	retval = pam_get_user(ph, &user, NULL);
+	if (retval != PAM_SUCCESS || !user) {
+		pam_syslog(ph, LOG_ERR, "couldn't get the user name: %s",
+			   pam_strerror(ph, retval));
+		return PAM_SERVICE_ERR;
+	}
+
+	pwd = getpwnam(user);
+	if (!pwd) {
+		pam_syslog(ph, LOG_ERR, "error looking up user information for: %s", user);
+		return PAM_SERVICE_ERR;
+	}
+
+	/* retrieve the stored password */
+	if (pam_get_data(ph, "cifscreds_password", (const void**)&password) != PAM_SUCCESS) {
+		/*
+		 * No password, no worries, maybe this (PAM using) application
+		 * didn't do authentication, or is hopeless and wants to call
+		 * different PAM callbacks from different processes.
+		 *
+		 *
+		 */
+		password = NULL;
+		if ((args & ARG_DEBUG) == ARG_DEBUG) {
+			pam_syslog(ph, LOG_DEBUG, "no stored password found");
+		}
+		return PAM_SUCCESS;
+	}
+
+	/* make sure we have a host or domain name */
+	if (!hostdomain) {
+		pam_syslog(ph, LOG_ERR, "one of host= or domain= must be specified");
+		return PAM_SERVICE_ERR;
+	}
+
+	/* make sure there is a session keyring */
+	ses_key = keyctl_get_keyring_ID(KEY_SPEC_SESSION_KEYRING, 0);
+	if (ses_key == -1) {
+		if (errno == ENOKEY)
+			pam_syslog(ph, LOG_ERR, "you have no session keyring. "
+					"Consider using pam_keyinit to "
+					"install one.");
+		else
+			pam_syslog(ph, LOG_ERR, "unable to query session "
+					"keyring: %s", strerror(errno));
+	}
+
+	/* A problem querying the user-session keyring isn't fatal. */
+	uses_key = keyctl_get_keyring_ID(KEY_SPEC_USER_SESSION_KEYRING, 0);
+	if ((uses_key >= 0) && (ses_key == uses_key))
+		pam_syslog(ph, LOG_ERR, "you have no persistent session "
+				"keyring. cifscreds keys will not persist.");
+
+	return cifscreds_pam_add(ph, user, password, args, hostdomain);
+}
+
+/**
+ * This is called when the PAM session is closed.
+ *
+ * Currently it does nothing.  The session closing should remove the passwords
+ *
+ * @param ph PAM handle

pam_cifscreds.c line 422

Quoted 10 lines
pam_cifscreds.c new file +10 -0
+ * @param flags currently unused, TODO: check for silent flag
+ * @param argc number of arguments for this PAM module
+ * @param argv array of arguments for this PAM module
+ * @return PAM_SUCCESS
+ */
+PAM_EXTERN int pam_sm_close_session(pam_handle_t *ph, int flags, int argc, const char **argv)
+{
+	return PAM_SUCCESS;
+}
+

Cleaning up after you're done seems like a good thing to do. The thing we need to be careful about here is that we might still need these creds to write out dirty data. This may require some consideration...

Quoted 4 lines
pam_cifscreds.c new file +4 -0
+/**
+ * This is called when PAM is invoked to change the user's authentication token.
+ * TODO - update the credetials
+ *

pam_cifscreds.c line 436

Quoted 10 lines
pam_cifscreds.c new file +10 -0
+ * @param ph PAM handle
+ * @param flags currently unused, TODO: check for silent flag
+ * @param argc number of arguments for this PAM module
+ * @param argv array of arguments for this PAM module
+ * @return PAM_SUCCESS
+ */
+ PAM_EXTERN int pam_sm_setcred(pam_handle_t *ph, int flags, int argc, const char **argv)
+{
+	return PAM_SUCCESS;
+}

The rest looks reasonably straightforward, but I don't PAM that well, so it's hard for me to comment.

Signature · 1 line
Jeff Layton <[email protected]>

A message that is not in the archive (sent off-list or not yet received): 20131130053237.5ba7359d-9yPaYZwiELC+kQycOl6kW4xkIHaj4LzF@public.gmane.org

#22 lore raw

PATCH 1/1 cifs-utils: pam module to set cifs credentials in key store

Quoted 9 lines · Jeff Layton
Quoted 5 lines · On Wed, 13 Nov 2013 13:59:33 -0700 Orion Poplawski…

From e2e6e73f05d912377656675292994858b99cabbb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Orion Poplawski <[email protected]>
Date: Wed, 13 Nov 2013 13:53:30 -0700
Subject: [PATCH] Create cifscreds PAM module to insert credentials at login

Quoted 4 lines

Sorry for taking so long to review this. This looks like a good start. FWIW, I'd like to see this merged for the next release, which should happen in the next month or two.

No problem, thanks for the review.

Quoted 2 lines

When you think this is ready for merge, please resend with a real '[PATCH]' tag in the subject, so I don't miss it...

Hopefully this is okay.

Quoted 7 lines

Review AM_CONDITIONAL(CONFIG_CIFSUPCALL, [test "$enable_cifsupcall" != "no"]) · line 239

Quoted 5 lines
(quoted diff) +1 -0
@@ -231,6 +236,7 @@ AM_CONDITIONAL(CONFIG_CIFSUPCALL, [test "$enable_cifsupcall" != "no"])
  AM_CONDITIONAL(CONFIG_CIFSCREDS, [test "$enable_cifscreds" != "no"])
  AM_CONDITIONAL(CONFIG_CIFSIDMAP, [test "$enable_cifsidmap" != "no"])
  AM_CONDITIONAL(CONFIG_CIFSACL, [test "$enable_cifsacl" != "no"])
+AM_CONDITIONAL(CONFIG_PAM, [test "$enable_pam" != "no" -o "$enable_pam" != "no"])

Erm...you're testing the same thing twice here?

Oops, copy/paste error.

Quoted 6 lines

I think the autoconf stuff needs some work.

If the box doesn't have what's needed to build it, the build is going to fail unless someone explicitly disables CONFIG_PAM.

Quoted 8 lines

Ideally, we'd build this by default and have autoconf test for what's required to build the PAM module. If the build requires aren't present, then the building of the PAM module should be disabled with a warning message that states that.

There are some other examples of that sort of behavior in configure.ac. It's a little more complicated, but it makes life easier for people building the package.

Okay, I've added a section for checking for security/pam_appl.h. Should we also check for the other headers/libraries as well?

I've also added to the keyutils.h section so as to disable the pam module there too.

Quoted 25 lines
Quoted 11 lines
(quoted diff) +11 -0
+static void
+free_password (char *password)
+{
+	volatile char *vp;
+	size_t len;
+
+	if (!password) {
+		return;
+	}
+
+	/* Defeats some optimizations */

Review AM_CONDITIONAL(CONFIG_CIFSUPCALL, [test "$enable_cifsupcall" != "no"])

Quoted 10 lines
(quoted diff) +10 -0
+	len = strlen (password);
+	memset (password, 0xAA, len);
+	memset (password, 0xBB, len);
+
+	/* Defeats others */
+	vp = (volatile char*)password;
+	while (*vp) {
+		*(vp++) = 0xAA;
+	}
+

I'm all for scrubbing the pw memory but that seems a bit like overkill. Got any references to cite about why you need to write over it 3 times?

Quoted 3 lines

If that's really necessary, then we should move the password handling in cifscreds and mount.cifs binary to use something like this too. Maybe consider putting this in an a.out lib and linking it into all 3?

This is copied directly from the gnome-keyring pam module. I don't have any references for why it is done. My guess is because it is part of a PAM chain, so perhaps to prevent later modules from accessing it? Or perhaps just to scrub memory? I suspect that the multiple times is to defeat compiler optimization making it a no-op?

Quoted 13 lines
Quoted 13 lines
(quoted diff) +13 -0
+
+/**
+ * This is called when the PAM session is closed.
+ *
+ * Currently it does nothing.  The session closing should remove the passwords
+ *
+ * @param ph PAM handle
+ * @param flags currently unused, TODO: check for silent flag
+ * @param argc number of arguments for this PAM module
+ * @param argv array of arguments for this PAM module
+ * @return PAM_SUCCESS
+ */
+PAM_EXTERN int pam_sm_close_session(pam_handle_t *ph, int flags, int argc, const char **argv)
Quoted 8 lines

Review

Quoted 4 lines
(quoted diff) +4 -0
+{
+	return PAM_SUCCESS;
+}
+

Cleaning up after you're done seems like a good thing to do. The thing we need to be careful about here is that we might still need these creds to write out dirty data. This may require some consideration...

Yeah, I'm not sure what there is to do here really. Anything would be more than what is done currently running cifscreds directly.

Quoted 9 lines
Quoted 9 lines

+/**
+ * This is called when PAM is invoked to change the user's authentication token.
+ * TODO - update the credetials
+ *
+ * @param ph PAM handle
+ * @param flags currently unused, TODO: check for silent flag
+ * @param argc number of arguments for this PAM module
+ * @param argv array of arguments for this PAM module
+ * @return PAM_SUCCESS

Quoted 9 lines

Review

Quoted 5 lines

+ */
+ PAM_EXTERN int pam_sm_setcred(pam_handle_t *ph, int flags, int argc, const char **argv)

(quoted diff) +3 -0
+{
+	return PAM_SUCCESS;
+}

The rest looks reasonably straightforward, but I don't PAM that well, so it's hard for me to comment.

Actually, I'm not sure what should be done here. gnome-keyring doesn't do anything. http://pubs.opengroup.org/onlinepubs/008329799/pam_sm_setcred.htm describes the call.

Looks like the pam_sm_chauthtok function is used to update the passwords. I've made attempts to implement that.

Signature · 5 lines
Orion Poplawski
Technical Manager                     303-415-9701 x222
NWRA, Boulder/CoRA Office             FAX: 303-415-9702
3380 Mitchell Lane                       [email protected]
Boulder, CO 80301                   http://www.nwra.com
Quoted 1 line

From 4a6c651bef574697bfaf8d1be24ca48cc46418e5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001

From: Orion Poplawski <[email protected]>
Date: Wed, 13 Nov 2013 13:53:30 -0700
Subject: [PATCH] Create cifscreds PAM module to insert credentials at login

---
 Makefile.am     |  11 +-
 cifscreds.c     |  49 +----
 cifskey.c       |  52 ++++++
 cifskey.h       |  47 +++++
 configure.ac    |  24 ++-
 pam_cifscreds.c | 550 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 6 files changed, 681 insertions(+), 52 deletions(-)
 create mode 100644 cifskey.c
 create mode 100644 cifskey.h
 create mode 100644 pam_cifscreds.c
Makefile.am +10 -1
index 6407520..6e86cd3 100644
@@ -34,7 +34,7 @@ endif
 
 if CONFIG_CIFSCREDS
 bin_PROGRAMS += cifscreds
-cifscreds_SOURCES = cifscreds.c resolve_host.c util.c
+cifscreds_SOURCES = cifscreds.c cifskey.c resolve_host.c util.c
 cifscreds_LDADD = -lkeyutils
 man_MANS += cifscreds.1
 endif
@@ -91,4 +91,13 @@ idmapwb.8: idmapwb.8.in
 
 endif
 
+if CONFIG_PAM
+pamdir = $(libdir)/security
+
+pam_PROGRAMS = pam_cifscreds.so
+
+pam_cifscreds.so: pam_cifscreds.c cifskey.c resolve_host.c util.c
+	$(CC) $(CFLAGS) $(AM_CFLAGS) $(LDFLAGS) -shared -fpic -o $@ $+ -lpam -lkeyutils
+endif
+
 SUBDIRS = contrib
cifscreds.c +1 -48

76 lines not on this page · raw message

cifskey.c new file +52 -0

52 lines not on this page · raw message

cifskey.h new file +47 -0

47 lines not on this page · raw message

configure.ac +21 -3
index c5b2244..4a9cb6d 100644
@@ -40,6 +40,11 @@ AC_ARG_ENABLE(cifsacl,
 	enable_cifsacl=$enableval,
 	enable_cifsacl="maybe")
 
+AC_ARG_ENABLE(pam,
+	[AS_HELP_STRING([--enable-pam],[Create cifscreds PAM module @<:@default=yes@:>@])],
+	enable_pam=$enableval,
+	enable_pam="maybe")
+
 AC_ARG_ENABLE(systemd,
 	[AS_HELP_STRING([--enable-systemd],[Enable systemd specific behavior for mount.cifs @<:@default=yes@:>@])],
 	enable_systemd=$enableval,
@@ -190,18 +195,30 @@ AC_TEST_WBCHL
 # test for presence of WBC_ID_TYPE_BOTH enum value
 AC_TEST_WBC_IDMAP_BOTH
 
-if test $enable_cifscreds != "no"; then
+if test $enable_cifscreds != "no" -o $enable_pam != "no"; then
 	AC_CHECK_HEADERS([keyutils.h], , [
 
-				if test $enable_cifscreds = "yes"; then
+				if test $enable_cifscreds = "yes" -o $enable_pam = "yes"; then
 					AC_MSG_ERROR([keyutils.h not found, consider installing keyutils-libs-devel.])
 				else
-					AC_MSG_WARN([keyutils.h not found, consider installing keyutils-libs-devel. Disabling cifscreds.])
+					AC_MSG_WARN([keyutils.h not found, consider installing keyutils-libs-devel. Disabling cifscreds and cifscreds PAM module.])
 					enable_cifscreds="no"
+					enable_pam="no"
 				fi
 			])
 fi
 
+if test $enable_pam != "no"; then
+	AC_CHECK_HEADERS([security/pam_appl.h], , [
+
+				if test $enable_pam = "yes"; then
+					AC_MSG_ERROR([security/pam_appl.h not found, consider installing keyutils-libs-devel.])
+				else
+					AC_MSG_WARN([security/pam_appl.h not found, consider installing pam-devel. Disabling cifscreds PAM module.])
+					enable_pam="no"
+				fi
+			])
+fi
 
 # ugly, but I'm not sure how to check for functions in a library that's not in $LIBS
 cu_saved_libs=$LIBS
@@ -231,6 +248,7 @@ AM_CONDITIONAL(CONFIG_CIFSUPCALL, [test "$enable_cifsupcall" != "no"])
 AM_CONDITIONAL(CONFIG_CIFSCREDS, [test "$enable_cifscreds" != "no"])
 AM_CONDITIONAL(CONFIG_CIFSIDMAP, [test "$enable_cifsidmap" != "no"])
 AM_CONDITIONAL(CONFIG_CIFSACL, [test "$enable_cifsacl" != "no"])
+AM_CONDITIONAL(CONFIG_PAM, [test "$enable_pam" != "no"])
 AM_CONDITIONAL(CONFIG_PLUGIN, [test "$enable_cifsidmap" != "no" -o "$enable_cifsacl" != "no"])
 
 LIBCAP_NG_PATH
pam_cifscreds.c new file +550 -0

550 lines not on this page · raw message

Signature · 1 line
1.8.3.1

A message that is not in the archive (sent off-list or not yet received): [email protected]

#24 lore raw

Re: [PATCH] cifs-utils: pam module to set cifs credentials in key store

Quoted 133 lines · On Mon, 02 Dec 2013 12:36:38 -0700 Orion Poplawski…
Quoted 9 lines · Jeff Layton
Quoted 5 lines · On Wed, 13 Nov 2013 13:59:33 -0700 Orion Poplawski…

From e2e6e73f05d912377656675292994858b99cabbb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Orion Poplawski <[email protected]>
Date: Wed, 13 Nov 2013 13:53:30 -0700
Subject: [PATCH] Create cifscreds PAM module to insert credentials at login

Quoted 4 lines

Sorry for taking so long to review this. This looks like a good start. FWIW, I'd like to see this merged for the next release, which should happen in the next month or two.

No problem, thanks for the review.

Quoted 2 lines

When you think this is ready for merge, please resend with a real '[PATCH]' tag in the subject, so I don't miss it...

Hopefully this is okay.

Quoted 7 lines

configure.ac AM_CONDITIONAL(CONFIG_CIFSUPCALL, [test "$enable_cifsupcall" != "no"]) · line 239

Quoted 5 lines
configure.ac +1 -0
@@ -231,6 +236,7 @@ AM_CONDITIONAL(CONFIG_CIFSUPCALL, [test "$enable_cifsupcall" != "no"])
  AM_CONDITIONAL(CONFIG_CIFSCREDS, [test "$enable_cifscreds" != "no"])
  AM_CONDITIONAL(CONFIG_CIFSIDMAP, [test "$enable_cifsidmap" != "no"])
  AM_CONDITIONAL(CONFIG_CIFSACL, [test "$enable_cifsacl" != "no"])
+AM_CONDITIONAL(CONFIG_PAM, [test "$enable_pam" != "no" -o "$enable_pam" != "no"])

Erm...you're testing the same thing twice here?

Oops, copy/paste error.

Quoted 6 lines

I think the autoconf stuff needs some work.

If the box doesn't have what's needed to build it, the build is going to fail unless someone explicitly disables CONFIG_PAM.

Quoted 8 lines

Ideally, we'd build this by default and have autoconf test for what's required to build the PAM module. If the build requires aren't present, then the building of the PAM module should be disabled with a warning message that states that.

There are some other examples of that sort of behavior in configure.ac. It's a little more complicated, but it makes life easier for people building the package.

Okay, I've added a section for checking for security/pam_appl.h. Should we also check for the other headers/libraries as well?

I've also added to the keyutils.h section so as to disable the pam module there too.

Quoted 25 lines
Quoted 11 lines
pam_cifscreds.c new file +11 -0
+static void
+free_password (char *password)
+{
+	volatile char *vp;
+	size_t len;
+
+	if (!password) {
+		return;
+	}
+
+	/* Defeats some optimizations */

pam_cifscreds.c line 138

Quoted 10 lines
pam_cifscreds.c new file +10 -0
+	len = strlen (password);
+	memset (password, 0xAA, len);
+	memset (password, 0xBB, len);
+
+	/* Defeats others */
+	vp = (volatile char*)password;
+	while (*vp) {
+		*(vp++) = 0xAA;
+	}
+

I'm all for scrubbing the pw memory but that seems a bit like overkill. Got any references to cite about why you need to write over it 3 times?

Quoted 3 lines

If that's really necessary, then we should move the password handling in cifscreds and mount.cifs binary to use something like this too. Maybe consider putting this in an a.out lib and linking it into all 3?

This is copied directly from the gnome-keyring pam module. I don't have any references for why it is done. My guess is because it is part of a PAM chain, so perhaps to prevent later modules from accessing it? Or perhaps just to scrub memory? I suspect that the multiple times is to defeat compiler optimization making it a no-op?

Quoted 13 lines
Quoted 13 lines
pam_cifscreds.c new file +13 -0
+
+/**
+ * This is called when the PAM session is closed.
+ *
+ * Currently it does nothing.  The session closing should remove the passwords
+ *
+ * @param ph PAM handle
+ * @param flags currently unused, TODO: check for silent flag
+ * @param argc number of arguments for this PAM module
+ * @param argv array of arguments for this PAM module
+ * @return PAM_SUCCESS
+ */
+PAM_EXTERN int pam_sm_close_session(pam_handle_t *ph, int flags, int argc, const char **argv)
Quoted 8 lines

pam_cifscreds.c line 388

Quoted 4 lines
pam_cifscreds.c new file +4 -0
+{
+	return PAM_SUCCESS;
+}
+

Cleaning up after you're done seems like a good thing to do. The thing we need to be careful about here is that we might still need these creds to write out dirty data. This may require some consideration...

Yeah, I'm not sure what there is to do here really. Anything would be more than what is done currently running cifscreds directly.

Quoted 9 lines
Quoted 9 lines

+/**
+ * This is called when PAM is invoked to change the user's authentication token.
+ * TODO - update the credetials
+ *
+ * @param ph PAM handle
+ * @param flags currently unused, TODO: check for silent flag
+ * @param argc number of arguments for this PAM module
+ * @param argv array of arguments for this PAM module
+ * @return PAM_SUCCESS

Quoted 9 lines

pam_cifscreds.c line 387

Quoted 5 lines

+ */
+ PAM_EXTERN int pam_sm_setcred(pam_handle_t *ph, int flags, int argc, const char **argv)

pam_cifscreds.c new file +3 -0
+{
+	return PAM_SUCCESS;
+}

The rest looks reasonably straightforward, but I don't PAM that well, so it's hard for me to comment.

Quoted 7 lines

Actually, I'm not sure what should be done here. gnome-keyring doesn't do anything. http://pubs.opengroup.org/onlinepubs/008329799/pam_sm_setcred.htm
describes the call.

Looks like the pam_sm_chauthtok function is used to update the passwords. I've made attempts to implement that.

Ok, I've got it merged into my staging repo, and will plan to do some testing with it in the next few days. At this point, I think the main thing the patch is missing is a manpage. Do you mind writing one up for it?

Signature · 1 line
Jeff Layton <[email protected]>

A message that is not in the archive (sent off-list or not yet received): 20131207090643.127cd0fe-9yPaYZwiELC+kQycOl6kW4xkIHaj4LzF@public.gmane.org

#26 lore raw

Re: [PATCH] cifs-utils: pam module to set cifs credentials in key store

Quoted 6 lines · Jeff Layton

Ok, I've got it merged into my staging repo, and will plan to do some testing with it in the next few days. At this point, I think the main thing the patch is missing is a manpage. Do you mind writing one up for it?

Sure, sent in a separate email.

Signature · 5 lines
Orion Poplawski
Technical Manager                     303-415-9701 x222
NWRA, Boulder/CoRA Office             FAX: 303-415-9702
3380 Mitchell Lane                       [email protected]
Boulder, CO 80301                   http://www.nwra.com
#27 lore raw

Re: [PATCH] cifs-utils: pam module to set cifs credentials in key store

In reply to a message not in the archive
Quoted 133 lines · On Mon, 02 Dec 2013 12:36:38 -0700 Orion Poplawski…
Quoted 9 lines · Jeff Layton
Quoted 5 lines · On Wed, 13 Nov 2013 13:59:33 -0700 Orion Poplawski…

From e2e6e73f05d912377656675292994858b99cabbb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Orion Poplawski <[email protected]>
Date: Wed, 13 Nov 2013 13:53:30 -0700
Subject: [PATCH] Create cifscreds PAM module to insert credentials at login

Quoted 4 lines

Sorry for taking so long to review this. This looks like a good start. FWIW, I'd like to see this merged for the next release, which should happen in the next month or two.

No problem, thanks for the review.

Quoted 2 lines

When you think this is ready for merge, please resend with a real '[PATCH]' tag in the subject, so I don't miss it...

Hopefully this is okay.

Quoted 7 lines

configure.ac AM_CONDITIONAL(CONFIG_CIFSUPCALL, [test "$enable_cifsupcall" != "no"]) · line 239

Quoted 5 lines
configure.ac +1 -0
@@ -231,6 +236,7 @@ AM_CONDITIONAL(CONFIG_CIFSUPCALL, [test "$enable_cifsupcall" != "no"])
  AM_CONDITIONAL(CONFIG_CIFSCREDS, [test "$enable_cifscreds" != "no"])
  AM_CONDITIONAL(CONFIG_CIFSIDMAP, [test "$enable_cifsidmap" != "no"])
  AM_CONDITIONAL(CONFIG_CIFSACL, [test "$enable_cifsacl" != "no"])
+AM_CONDITIONAL(CONFIG_PAM, [test "$enable_pam" != "no" -o "$enable_pam" != "no"])

Erm...you're testing the same thing twice here?

Oops, copy/paste error.

Quoted 6 lines

I think the autoconf stuff needs some work.

If the box doesn't have what's needed to build it, the build is going to fail unless someone explicitly disables CONFIG_PAM.

Quoted 8 lines

Ideally, we'd build this by default and have autoconf test for what's required to build the PAM module. If the build requires aren't present, then the building of the PAM module should be disabled with a warning message that states that.

There are some other examples of that sort of behavior in configure.ac. It's a little more complicated, but it makes life easier for people building the package.

Okay, I've added a section for checking for security/pam_appl.h. Should we also check for the other headers/libraries as well?

I've also added to the keyutils.h section so as to disable the pam module there too.

Quoted 25 lines
Quoted 11 lines
pam_cifscreds.c new file +11 -0
+static void
+free_password (char *password)
+{
+	volatile char *vp;
+	size_t len;
+
+	if (!password) {
+		return;
+	}
+
+	/* Defeats some optimizations */

pam_cifscreds.c line 138

Quoted 10 lines
pam_cifscreds.c new file +10 -0
+	len = strlen (password);
+	memset (password, 0xAA, len);
+	memset (password, 0xBB, len);
+
+	/* Defeats others */
+	vp = (volatile char*)password;
+	while (*vp) {
+		*(vp++) = 0xAA;
+	}
+

I'm all for scrubbing the pw memory but that seems a bit like overkill. Got any references to cite about why you need to write over it 3 times?

Quoted 3 lines

If that's really necessary, then we should move the password handling in cifscreds and mount.cifs binary to use something like this too. Maybe consider putting this in an a.out lib and linking it into all 3?

This is copied directly from the gnome-keyring pam module. I don't have any references for why it is done. My guess is because it is part of a PAM chain, so perhaps to prevent later modules from accessing it? Or perhaps just to scrub memory? I suspect that the multiple times is to defeat compiler optimization making it a no-op?

Quoted 13 lines
Quoted 13 lines
pam_cifscreds.c new file +13 -0
+
+/**
+ * This is called when the PAM session is closed.
+ *
+ * Currently it does nothing.  The session closing should remove the passwords
+ *
+ * @param ph PAM handle
+ * @param flags currently unused, TODO: check for silent flag
+ * @param argc number of arguments for this PAM module
+ * @param argv array of arguments for this PAM module
+ * @return PAM_SUCCESS
+ */
+PAM_EXTERN int pam_sm_close_session(pam_handle_t *ph, int flags, int argc, const char **argv)
Quoted 8 lines

pam_cifscreds.c line 388

Quoted 4 lines
pam_cifscreds.c new file +4 -0
+{
+	return PAM_SUCCESS;
+}
+

Cleaning up after you're done seems like a good thing to do. The thing we need to be careful about here is that we might still need these creds to write out dirty data. This may require some consideration...

Yeah, I'm not sure what there is to do here really. Anything would be more than what is done currently running cifscreds directly.

Quoted 9 lines
Quoted 9 lines

+/**
+ * This is called when PAM is invoked to change the user's authentication token.
+ * TODO - update the credetials
+ *
+ * @param ph PAM handle
+ * @param flags currently unused, TODO: check for silent flag
+ * @param argc number of arguments for this PAM module
+ * @param argv array of arguments for this PAM module
+ * @return PAM_SUCCESS

Quoted 9 lines

pam_cifscreds.c line 387

Quoted 5 lines

+ */
+ PAM_EXTERN int pam_sm_setcred(pam_handle_t *ph, int flags, int argc, const char **argv)

pam_cifscreds.c new file +3 -0
+{
+	return PAM_SUCCESS;
+}

The rest looks reasonably straightforward, but I don't PAM that well, so it's hard for me to comment.

Quoted 7 lines

Actually, I'm not sure what should be done here. gnome-keyring doesn't do anything. http://pubs.opengroup.org/onlinepubs/008329799/pam_sm_setcred.htm
describes the call.

Looks like the pam_sm_chauthtok function is used to update the passwords. I've made attempts to implement that.

Oh, and one other thing...

Can you resend the above patch with a Signed-off-by line?

Thanks,

Signature · 1 line
Jeff Layton <[email protected]>

A message that is not in the archive (sent off-list or not yet received): 20131207092341.16e0fe0c-9yPaYZwiELC+kQycOl6kW4xkIHaj4LzF@public.gmane.org

#29 lore raw

Re: [PATCH] cifs-utils: pam module to set cifs credentials in key store

Quoted 140 lines · On Sat, 7 Dec 2013 09:23:41 -0500 Jeff Layton…
Quoted 137 lines · On Mon, 02 Dec 2013 12:36:38 -0700 Orion Poplawski…
Quoted 9 lines · Jeff Layton
Quoted 5 lines · On Wed, 13 Nov 2013 13:59:33 -0700 Orion Poplawski…

From e2e6e73f05d912377656675292994858b99cabbb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Orion Poplawski <[email protected]>
Date: Wed, 13 Nov 2013 13:53:30 -0700
Subject: [PATCH] Create cifscreds PAM module to insert credentials at login

Quoted 4 lines

Sorry for taking so long to review this. This looks like a good start. FWIW, I'd like to see this merged for the next release, which should happen in the next month or two.

No problem, thanks for the review.

Quoted 2 lines

When you think this is ready for merge, please resend with a real '[PATCH]' tag in the subject, so I don't miss it...

Hopefully this is okay.

Quoted 7 lines

Review AM_CONDITIONAL(CONFIG_CIFSUPCALL, [test "$enable_cifsupcall" != "no"]) · line 239

Quoted 5 lines
(quoted diff) +1 -0
@@ -231,6 +236,7 @@ AM_CONDITIONAL(CONFIG_CIFSUPCALL, [test "$enable_cifsupcall" != "no"])
  AM_CONDITIONAL(CONFIG_CIFSCREDS, [test "$enable_cifscreds" != "no"])
  AM_CONDITIONAL(CONFIG_CIFSIDMAP, [test "$enable_cifsidmap" != "no"])
  AM_CONDITIONAL(CONFIG_CIFSACL, [test "$enable_cifsacl" != "no"])
+AM_CONDITIONAL(CONFIG_PAM, [test "$enable_pam" != "no" -o "$enable_pam" != "no"])

Erm...you're testing the same thing twice here?

Oops, copy/paste error.

Quoted 6 lines

I think the autoconf stuff needs some work.

If the box doesn't have what's needed to build it, the build is going to fail unless someone explicitly disables CONFIG_PAM.

Quoted 8 lines

Ideally, we'd build this by default and have autoconf test for what's required to build the PAM module. If the build requires aren't present, then the building of the PAM module should be disabled with a warning message that states that.

There are some other examples of that sort of behavior in configure.ac. It's a little more complicated, but it makes life easier for people building the package.

Okay, I've added a section for checking for security/pam_appl.h. Should we also check for the other headers/libraries as well?

I've also added to the keyutils.h section so as to disable the pam module there too.

Quoted 25 lines
Quoted 11 lines
(quoted diff) +11 -0
+static void
+free_password (char *password)
+{
+	volatile char *vp;
+	size_t len;
+
+	if (!password) {
+		return;
+	}
+
+	/* Defeats some optimizations */

Review AM_CONDITIONAL(CONFIG_CIFSUPCALL, [test "$enable_cifsupcall" != "no"])

Quoted 10 lines
(quoted diff) +10 -0
+	len = strlen (password);
+	memset (password, 0xAA, len);
+	memset (password, 0xBB, len);
+
+	/* Defeats others */
+	vp = (volatile char*)password;
+	while (*vp) {
+		*(vp++) = 0xAA;
+	}
+

I'm all for scrubbing the pw memory but that seems a bit like overkill. Got any references to cite about why you need to write over it 3 times?

Quoted 3 lines

If that's really necessary, then we should move the password handling in cifscreds and mount.cifs binary to use something like this too. Maybe consider putting this in an a.out lib and linking it into all 3?

This is copied directly from the gnome-keyring pam module. I don't have any references for why it is done. My guess is because it is part of a PAM chain, so perhaps to prevent later modules from accessing it? Or perhaps just to scrub memory? I suspect that the multiple times is to defeat compiler optimization making it a no-op?

Quoted 13 lines
Quoted 13 lines
(quoted diff) +13 -0
+
+/**
+ * This is called when the PAM session is closed.
+ *
+ * Currently it does nothing.  The session closing should remove the passwords
+ *
+ * @param ph PAM handle
+ * @param flags currently unused, TODO: check for silent flag
+ * @param argc number of arguments for this PAM module
+ * @param argv array of arguments for this PAM module
+ * @return PAM_SUCCESS
+ */
+PAM_EXTERN int pam_sm_close_session(pam_handle_t *ph, int flags, int argc, const char **argv)
Quoted 8 lines

Review

Quoted 4 lines
(quoted diff) +4 -0
+{
+	return PAM_SUCCESS;
+}
+

Cleaning up after you're done seems like a good thing to do. The thing we need to be careful about here is that we might still need these creds to write out dirty data. This may require some consideration...

Yeah, I'm not sure what there is to do here really. Anything would be more than what is done currently running cifscreds directly.

Quoted 9 lines
Quoted 9 lines

+/**
+ * This is called when PAM is invoked to change the user's authentication token.
+ * TODO - update the credetials
+ *
+ * @param ph PAM handle
+ * @param flags currently unused, TODO: check for silent flag
+ * @param argc number of arguments for this PAM module
+ * @param argv array of arguments for this PAM module
+ * @return PAM_SUCCESS

Quoted 9 lines

Review

Quoted 5 lines

+ */
+ PAM_EXTERN int pam_sm_setcred(pam_handle_t *ph, int flags, int argc, const char **argv)

(quoted diff) +3 -0
+{
+	return PAM_SUCCESS;
+}

The rest looks reasonably straightforward, but I don't PAM that well, so it's hard for me to comment.

Actually, I'm not sure what should be done here. gnome-keyring doesn't do anything. http://pubs.opengroup.org/onlinepubs/008329799/pam_sm_setcred.htm
describes the call.

Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 3 lines

Looks like the pam_sm_chauthtok function is used to update the passwords. I've made attempts to implement that.

Oh, and one other thing...

Can you resend the above patch with a Signed-off-by line?

Ok, I tested the pam_module this morning and it seems to work as expected. At this point, I think we can go ahead and merge it once we have a manpage.

I also intend to add this patch on top, which just does a little cleanup and fixes some build warnings.

Signature · 1 line
Jeff Layton <[email protected]>

From d12443fdd268e547412683d43dc03f266260f7c8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Jeff Layton <[email protected]>
Date: Sat, 7 Dec 2013 06:52:26 -0500
Subject: [cifs-utils PATCH] cifscreds: fix up some whitespace, typos and build
warnings in pam_cifscreds.c
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit

gcc -g -O2 -Wall -Wextra -D_FORTIFY_SOURCE=2 -fpie -pie -Wl,-z,relro,-z,now -shared -fpic -o pam_cifscreds.so pam_cifscreds.c cifskey.c resolve_host.c util.c -lpam -lkeyutils pam_cifscreds.c: In function ‘cleanup_free_password’:
pam_cifscreds.c:143:38: warning: unused parameter ‘ph’ [-Wunused-parameter]
cleanup_free_password (pam_handle_t *ph, void *data, int pam_end_status)

                                      ^
pam_cifscreds.c:143:58: warning: unused parameter ‘pam_end_status’ [-Wunused-parameter]
 cleanup_free_password (pam_handle_t *ph, void *data, int pam_end_status)
                                                          ^
pam_cifscreds.c: In function ‘cifscreds_pam_update’:
pam_cifscreds.c:271:8: warning: variable ‘addrs’ set but not used [-Wunused-but-set-variable]
  char *addrs[16];
        ^
pam_cifscreds.c: In function ‘pam_sm_authenticate’:
pam_cifscreds.c:359:58: warning: unused parameter ‘unused’ [-Wunused-parameter]
 PAM_EXTERN int pam_sm_authenticate(pam_handle_t *ph, int unused, int argc, const char **argv)
                                                          ^
pam_cifscreds.c: In function ‘pam_sm_open_session’:
pam_cifscreds.c:414:58: warning: unused parameter ‘flags’ [-Wunused-parameter]
 PAM_EXTERN int pam_sm_open_session(pam_handle_t *ph, int flags, int argc, const char **argv)
                                                          ^
pam_cifscreds.c: In function ‘pam_sm_close_session’:
pam_cifscreds.c:487:51: warning: unused parameter ‘ph’ [-Wunused-parameter]
 PAM_EXTERN int pam_sm_close_session(pam_handle_t *ph, int flags, int argc, const char **argv)
                                                   ^
pam_cifscreds.c:487:59: warning: unused parameter ‘flags’ [-Wunused-parameter]
 PAM_EXTERN int pam_sm_close_session(pam_handle_t *ph, int flags, int argc, const char **argv)
                                                           ^
pam_cifscreds.c:487:70: warning: unused parameter ‘argc’ [-Wunused-parameter]
 PAM_EXTERN int pam_sm_close_session(pam_handle_t *ph, int flags, int argc, const char **argv)
                                                                      ^
pam_cifscreds.c:487:89: warning: unused parameter ‘argv’ [-Wunused-parameter]
 PAM_EXTERN int pam_sm_close_session(pam_handle_t *ph, int flags, int argc, const char **argv)
                                                                                         ^
pam_cifscreds.c: In function ‘pam_sm_setcred’:
pam_cifscreds.c:501:45: warning: unused parameter ‘ph’ [-Wunused-parameter]
 PAM_EXTERN int pam_sm_setcred(pam_handle_t *ph, int flags, int argc, const char **argv)
                                             ^
pam_cifscreds.c:501:53: warning: unused parameter ‘flags’ [-Wunused-parameter]
 PAM_EXTERN int pam_sm_setcred(pam_handle_t *ph, int flags, int argc, const char **argv)
                                                     ^
pam_cifscreds.c:501:64: warning: unused parameter ‘argc’ [-Wunused-parameter]
 PAM_EXTERN int pam_sm_setcred(pam_handle_t *ph, int flags, int argc, const char **argv)
                                                                ^
pam_cifscreds.c:501:83: warning: unused parameter ‘argv’ [-Wunused-parameter]
 PAM_EXTERN int pam_sm_setcred(pam_handle_t *ph, int flags, int argc, const char **argv)
                                                                                   ^
---
 pam_cifscreds.c | 34 +++++++++++++++-------------------
 1 file changed, 15 insertions(+), 19 deletions(-)
pam_cifscreds.c +15 -19
index 1385146..e0d8a55 100644
@@ -140,7 +140,8 @@ free_password (char *password)
 }
 
 static void
-cleanup_free_password (pam_handle_t *ph, void *data, int pam_end_status)
+cleanup_free_password (pam_handle_t *ph __attribute__((unused)), void *data,
+			int pam_end_status __attribute__((unused)))
 {
 	free_password (data);
 }
@@ -268,7 +269,6 @@ static int cifscreds_pam_update(pam_handle_t *ph, const char *user, const char *
 	int ret = PAM_SUCCESS;
 	char addrstr[MAX_ADDR_LIST_LEN];
 	char *currentaddress, *nextaddress;
-	char *addrs[16];
 	int id, count = 0;
 	char keytype = ((args & ARG_DOMAIN) == ARG_DOMAIN) ? 'd' : 'a';
 
@@ -308,10 +308,8 @@ static int cifscreds_pam_update(pam_handle_t *ph, const char *user, const char *
 		*nextaddress++ = '\0';
 
 	while (currentaddress) {
-		if (key_search(currentaddress, keytype) > 0) {
-			addrs[count] = currentaddress;
+		if (key_search(currentaddress, keytype) > 0)
 			count++;
-		}
 
 		currentaddress = nextaddress;
 		if (currentaddress) {
@@ -322,7 +320,7 @@ static int cifscreds_pam_update(pam_handle_t *ph, const char *user, const char *
 	}
 
 	if (!count) {
-		pam_syslog(ph, LOG_ERR, "You have no same stached credentials for %s", hostdomain);
+		pam_syslog(ph, LOG_ERR, "You have no same stashed credentials for %s", hostdomain);
 		return PAM_SERVICE_ERR;
 	}
 
@@ -344,7 +342,7 @@ static int cifscreds_pam_update(pam_handle_t *ph, const char *user, const char *
  * scenarios are possible:
  *
  * - A session is already available which usually means that the user is already
- *	logged on and PAM has been used inside the screensaver. In that case, no need to 
+ *	logged on and PAM has been used inside the screensaver. In that case, no need to
  *	do anything(?).
  *
  * - A session is not yet available. Store the password inside PAM data so
@@ -356,7 +354,7 @@ static int cifscreds_pam_update(pam_handle_t *ph, const char *user, const char *
  * @param argv array of arguments for this PAM module
  * @return any of the PAM return values
  */
-PAM_EXTERN int pam_sm_authenticate(pam_handle_t *ph, int unused, int argc, const char **argv)
+PAM_EXTERN int pam_sm_authenticate(pam_handle_t *ph, int unused __attribute__((unused)), int argc, const char **argv)
 {
 	const char *hostdomain;
 	const char *user;
@@ -365,7 +363,7 @@ PAM_EXTERN int pam_sm_authenticate(pam_handle_t *ph, int unused, int argc, const
 	int ret;
 
 	args = parse_args(ph, argc, argv, &hostdomain);
-	
+
 	/* Figure out and/or prompt for the user name */
 	ret = pam_get_user(ph, &user, NULL);
 	if (ret != PAM_SUCCESS || !user) {
@@ -411,7 +409,7 @@ PAM_EXTERN int pam_sm_authenticate(pam_handle_t *ph, int unused, int argc, const
  * @param argv array of arguments for this PAM module
  * @return any of the PAM return values
  */
-PAM_EXTERN int pam_sm_open_session(pam_handle_t *ph, int flags, int argc, const char **argv)
+PAM_EXTERN int pam_sm_open_session(pam_handle_t *ph, int flags __attribute__((unused)), int argc, const char **argv)
 {
 	const char *user = NULL;
 	const char *password = NULL;
@@ -484,7 +482,7 @@ PAM_EXTERN int pam_sm_open_session(pam_handle_t *ph, int flags, int argc, const
  * @param argv array of arguments for this PAM module
  * @return PAM_SUCCESS
  */
-PAM_EXTERN int pam_sm_close_session(pam_handle_t *ph, int flags, int argc, const char **argv)
+PAM_EXTERN int pam_sm_close_session(pam_handle_t *ph __attribute__((unused)), int flags __attribute__((unused)), int argc __attribute__((unused)), const char **argv __attribute__((unused)))
 {
 	return PAM_SUCCESS;
 }
@@ -498,7 +496,7 @@ PAM_EXTERN int pam_sm_close_session(pam_handle_t *ph, int flags, int argc, const
  * @param argv array of arguments for this PAM module
  * @return PAM_SUCCESS
  */
-PAM_EXTERN int pam_sm_setcred(pam_handle_t *ph, int flags, int argc, const char **argv)
+PAM_EXTERN int pam_sm_setcred(pam_handle_t *ph __attribute__((unused)), int flags __attribute__((unused)), int argc __attribute__((unused)), const char **argv __attribute__((unused)))
 {
 	return PAM_SUCCESS;
 }
@@ -520,15 +518,14 @@ pam_sm_chauthtok (pam_handle_t *ph, int flags, int argc, const char **argv)
 	const char *password = NULL;
 	uint args;
 	int ret;
-	
+
 	args = parse_args(ph, argc, argv, &hostdomain);
 
 	if (flags & PAM_UPDATE_AUTHTOK) {
 		/* Figure out the user name */
 		ret = pam_get_user(ph, &user, NULL);
 		if (ret != PAM_SUCCESS) {
-			pam_syslog(ph, LOG_ERR, "couldn't get the user name: %s", 
-				pam_strerror (ph, ret));
+			pam_syslog(ph, LOG_ERR, "couldn't get the user name: %s", pam_strerror (ph, ret));
 			return PAM_SERVICE_ERR;
 		}
 
@@ -537,14 +534,13 @@ pam_sm_chauthtok (pam_handle_t *ph, int flags, int argc, const char **argv)
 			if (ret == PAM_SUCCESS) {
 				pam_syslog(ph, LOG_WARNING, "no password is available for user");
 			} else {
-				pam_syslog(ph, LOG_WARNING, "no password is available for user: %s",
-					pam_strerror(ph, ret));
+				pam_syslog(ph, LOG_WARNING, "no password is available for user: %s", pam_strerror(ph, ret));
 			}
 			return PAM_AUTHTOK_RECOVER_ERR;
 		}
-	
+
 		return cifscreds_pam_update(ph, user, password, args, hostdomain);
 	}
-	else 
+	else
 		return PAM_IGNORE;
 }
Signature · 1 line
1.8.4.2