Skip to contentSkip to conversation

nfsd: make calculate reserved space correctly

PATCH In review Kinglong Mee 2 participants 3 messages Dec 9, 2013 – Dec 13, 2013

Subsystems (2)
lore
Share & tools
lore
#0 lore raw

PATCH 1/1 nfsd: make calculate reserved space correctly

rpcsec_gss_oid is defined as below, So, must using XDR_LEN to calculate reserved space. When len is not the multiples of 4, client will get bad data.

struct rpcsec_gss_oid {
        unsigned int    len;
        u8              data[GSS_OID_MAX_LEN];
};
---
 fs/nfsd/nfs4xdr.c | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
fs/nfsd/nfs4xdr.c +1 -1
index b0b886e..a57e67d 100644
@@ -3233,7 +3233,7 @@ nfsd4_do_encode_secinfo(struct nfsd4_compoundres *resp,
 
 		if (rpcauth_get_gssinfo(pf, &info) == 0) {
 			supported++;
-			RESERVE_SPACE(4 + 4 + info.oid.len + 4 + 4);
+			RESERVE_SPACE(4 + 4 + XDR_LEN(info.oid.len) + 4 + 4);
 			WRITE32(RPC_AUTH_GSS);
 			WRITE32(info.oid.len);
 			WRITEMEM(info.oid.data, info.oid.len);
Signature · 1 line
1.8.4.2
#1 lore raw
Quoted 2 lines · Kinglong Mee

rpcsec_gss_oid is defined as below, So, must using XDR_LEN to calculate reserved space. When len is not the multiples of 4, client will get bad data.

Looking at the definition of RESERVE_SPACE: first, it doesn't actually advance any pointers, all it does is an overflow check, so there shouldn't be data corruption unless we're at the end of a page (which shouldn't happen here). Second, RESERVE_SPACE actually rounds up for is, so we wouldn't hit that problem anyway.

Nevertheless, agreed that it's probably good practice to round up here as well.

--b.

Quoted 26 lines
struct rpcsec_gss_oid {
        unsigned int    len;
        u8              data[GSS_OID_MAX_LEN];
};
---
 fs/nfsd/nfs4xdr.c | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
fs/nfsd/nfs4xdr.c +1 -1
index b0b886e..a57e67d 100644
@@ -3233,7 +3233,7 @@ nfsd4_do_encode_secinfo(struct nfsd4_compoundres *resp,
 
 		if (rpcauth_get_gssinfo(pf, &info) == 0) {
 			supported++;
-			RESERVE_SPACE(4 + 4 + info.oid.len + 4 + 4);
+			RESERVE_SPACE(4 + 4 + XDR_LEN(info.oid.len) + 4 + 4);
 			WRITE32(RPC_AUTH_GSS);
 			WRITE32(info.oid.len);
 			WRITEMEM(info.oid.data, info.oid.len);
Signature · 1 line
1.8.4.2
#2 lore raw
Quoted 9 lines · J. Bruce Fields
Quoted 2 lines · Kinglong Mee

rpcsec_gss_oid is defined as below, So, must using XDR_LEN to calculate reserved space. When len is not the multiples of 4, client will get bad data.

Looking at the definition of RESERVE_SPACE: first, it doesn't actually advance any pointers, all it does is an overflow check, so there shouldn't be data corruption unless we're at the end of a page (which shouldn't happen here). Second, RESERVE_SPACE actually rounds up for is, so we wouldn't hit that problem anyway.

Yes.

Quoted 3 lines

Nevertheless, agreed that it's probably good practice to round up here as well.

Thank you.

thanks,
Kinglong Mee

Quoted 30 lines

--b.

Quoted 26 lines
struct rpcsec_gss_oid {
        unsigned int    len;
        u8              data[GSS_OID_MAX_LEN];
};
---
 fs/nfsd/nfs4xdr.c | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
fs/nfsd/nfs4xdr.c +1 -1
index b0b886e..a57e67d 100644
@@ -3233,7 +3233,7 @@ nfsd4_do_encode_secinfo(struct nfsd4_compoundres *resp,
 
 		if (rpcauth_get_gssinfo(pf, &info) == 0) {
 			supported++;
-			RESERVE_SPACE(4 + 4 + info.oid.len + 4 + 4);
+			RESERVE_SPACE(4 + 4 + XDR_LEN(info.oid.len) + 4 + 4);
 			WRITE32(RPC_AUTH_GSS);
 			WRITE32(info.oid.len);
 			WRITEMEM(info.oid.data, info.oid.len);
Signature · 1 line
1.8.4.2