Fix a panic in SPEC_CTRL_ENTRY_FROM_INTR_IST
PATCH 1/1 Fix a panic in SPEC_CTRL_ENTRY_FROM_INTR_IST
On on IBRS available env, bootup panic when bti=0 like below:
(XEN) Speculative mitigation facilities:
(XEN) Hardware features: SMEP IBRS/IBPB STIBP
(XEN) BTI mitigations: Thunk N/A, Others: IBRS- SMEP
(XEN) ----[ Xen-4.4.4OVM x86_64 debug=n Tainted: C ]----
(XEN) CPU: 0
(XEN) RIP: e008:[<ffff82d0802041bb>]
entry.o#handle_ist_exception+0xd1/0x176
(XEN) RFLAGS: 0000000000010046 CONTEXT: hypervisor
(XEN) rax: 0000000000000000 rbx: 0000000000000000 rcx: 0000000000000048 (XEN) rdx: 0000000000000001 rsi: 0000000000000000 rdi: 0000000000000000 (XEN) rbp: 0000000000000000 rsp: ffff82d080529f58 r8: 0000000000000000 (XEN) r9: 0000000000000000 r10: 0000000000000000 r11: 0000000000000000 (XEN) r12: 0000000000000000 r13: 0000000000000000 r14: ffff82d08052ffff (XEN) r15: 0000000000000000 cr0: 000000008005003b cr4: 00000000001506f0 (XEN) cr3: 0000000076fbe000 cr2: 0000000000000000 (XEN) ds: 0000 es: 0000 fs: 0000 gs: 0000 ss: 0000 cs: e008 (XEN) Xen stack trace from rsp=ffff82d080529f58: (XEN) 0000000000000018 00000000ffffffff 0000000000000002 ffff82d080528000 (XEN) 0000000000000000 ffff82d0802a50e0 ffff82d08052fd98 ffff82d08072fc00 (XEN) 0000000000000000 0000000000010000 0000000000000400 0000000000000830 (XEN) 0000000000000000 000000000000000a ffff82d0803f0fc0 0000000200000000 (XEN) ffff82d080298876 000000000000e008 0000000000000046 ffff82d08052fdf8 (XEN) 0000000000000000
(XEN) Xen call trace:
(XEN) [<ffff82d0802041bb>] entry.o#handle_ist_exception+0xd1/0x176
(XEN)
(XEN)
(XEN) ****************************************
(XEN) Panic on CPU 0:
(XEN) GENERAL PROTECTION FAULT
(XEN) [error_code=0000]
(XEN) ****************************************
It's due to %edx isn't cleared to zero before wrmsr.
DO_OVERWRITE_RSB clobbers %eax and happend to cover the bug in certain case so we didn't reproduce without bti=0. Change to use %edx.
--- xen/include/asm-x86/spec_ctrl_asm.h | 7 ++++--- 1 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
xen/include/asm-x86/spec_ctrl_asm.h +4 -3
@@ -269,16 +269,16 @@* This is logical merge of DO_OVERWRITE_RSB and DO_SPEC_CTRL_ENTRY * maybexen=1, but with conditionals rather than alternatives. */ - movzbl STACK_CPUINFO_FIELD(bti_ist_info)(%r14), %eax + movzbl STACK_CPUINFO_FIELD(bti_ist_info)(%r14), %edx - testb $BTI_IST_RSB, %al + testb $BTI_IST_RSB, %dl jz .L\@_skip_rsb DO_OVERWRITE_RSB .L\@_skip_rsb: - testb $BTI_IST_WRMSR, %al + testb $BTI_IST_WRMSR, %dl jz .L\@_skip_wrmsr xor %edx, %edx
@@ -291,6 +291,7 @@* Load Xen's intended value. SPEC_CTRL_IBRS vs 0 is encoded in the * bottom bit of bti_ist_info, via a deliberate alias with BTI_IST_IBRS. */ + xor %edx, %edx mov $MSR_SPEC_CTRL, %ecx and $BTI_IST_IBRS, %eax wrmsr
Signature · 6 lines
1.7.3 _______________________________________________ Xen-devel mailing list [email protected] https://lists.xenproject.org/mailman/listinfo/xen-devel
Quoted 36 lines
Quoted 1 line
Quoted 1 line · On 14.02.18 at 05:03, <[email protected]> wrote:
On on IBRS available env, bootup panic when bti=0 like below:
(XEN) Speculative mitigation facilities:
(XEN) Hardware features: SMEP IBRS/IBPB STIBP
(XEN) BTI mitigations: Thunk N/A, Others: IBRS- SMEP
(XEN) ----[ Xen-4.4.4OVMx86_64debug=n Tainted: C ]----
(XEN) CPU: 0
(XEN) RIP: e008:[<ffff82d0802041bb>]
entry.o#handle_ist_exception+0xd1/0x176
(XEN) RFLAGS: 0000000000010046 CONTEXT: hypervisor(XEN) rax: 0000000000000000 rbx: 0000000000000000 rcx: 0000000000000048 (XEN) rdx: 0000000000000001 rsi: 0000000000000000 rdi: 0000000000000000 (XEN) rbp: 0000000000000000 rsp: ffff82d080529f58 r8: 0000000000000000 (XEN) r9: 0000000000000000 r10: 0000000000000000 r11: 0000000000000000 (XEN) r12: 0000000000000000 r13: 0000000000000000 r14: ffff82d08052ffff (XEN) r15: 0000000000000000 cr0: 000000008005003b cr4: 00000000001506f0 (XEN) cr3: 0000000076fbe000 cr2: 0000000000000000 (XEN) ds: 0000 es: 0000 fs: 0000 gs: 0000 ss: 0000 cs: e008 (XEN) Xen stack trace from rsp=ffff82d080529f58: (XEN) 0000000000000018 00000000ffffffff 0000000000000002 ffff82d080528000 (XEN) 0000000000000000 ffff82d0802a50e0 ffff82d08052fd98 ffff82d08072fc00 (XEN) 0000000000000000 0000000000010000 0000000000000400 0000000000000830 (XEN) 0000000000000000 000000000000000a ffff82d0803f0fc0 0000000200000000 (XEN) ffff82d080298876 000000000000e008 0000000000000046 ffff82d08052fdf8 (XEN) 0000000000000000(XEN) Xen call trace:
(XEN) [<ffff82d0802041bb>] entry.o#handle_ist_exception+0xd1/0x176
(XEN)
(XEN)
(XEN) ****************************************
(XEN) Panic on CPU 0:
(XEN) GENERAL PROTECTION FAULT
(XEN) [error_code=0000]
(XEN) ****************************************
Quoted 8 lines
It's due to %edx isn't cleared to zero before wrmsr.
DO_OVERWRITE_RSBclobbers %eax and happend to cover the bug in certain case so we didn't reproduce without bti=0. Change to use %edx.Reviewed-by Boris Ostrovsky <[email protected]>Tested-by Boris Ostrovsky <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Zhenzhong Duan <[email protected]>
Two formal things: Please put tags in sequential (in time) order:
reporter, author(s), reviewers/testers. And please follow patch submission rules - send them _to_ the list, with maintainers (and other interested parties) on _cc_.
Quoted 23 lines
xen/include/asm-x86/spec_ctrl_asm.h +3
-3@@ -269,16 +269,16 @@* This is logical merge of DO_OVERWRITE_RSB and DO_SPEC_CTRL_ENTRY * maybexen=1, but with conditionals rather than alternatives. */ - movzbl STACK_CPUINFO_FIELD(bti_ist_info)(%r14), %eax + movzbl STACK_CPUINFO_FIELD(bti_ist_info)(%r14), %edx - testb $BTI_IST_RSB, %al + testb $BTI_IST_RSB, %dl jz .L\@_skip_rsb DO_OVERWRITE_RSB .L\@_skip_rsb: - testb $BTI_IST_WRMSR, %al + testb $BTI_IST_WRMSR, %dl jz .L\@_skip_wrmsr xor %edx, %edx
xen/include/asm-x86/spec_ctrl_asm.h line 297
Quoted 7 lines
xen/include/asm-x86/spec_ctrl_asm.h +1
-0@@ -291,6 +291,7 @@* Load Xen's intended value. SPEC_CTRL_IBRS vs 0 is encoded in the * bottom bit of bti_ist_info, via a deliberate alias with BTI_IST_IBRS. */ + xor %edx, %edx mov $MSR_SPEC_CTRL, %ecx and $BTI_IST_IBRS, %eax wrmsr
This is wrong now, and the comment very clearly states why. I think rather than switching %eax to %edx it would be better to preserve %eax (e.g. by saving into %edx) around DO_OVERWRITE_RSB. I'll send an updated patch in a few minutes.
Jan
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Quoted 41 lines · Jan Beulich
Quoted 41 lines
Quoted 1 line
Quoted 1 line · On 14.02.18 at 05:03, <[email protected]> wrote:
On on IBRS available env, bootup panic when bti=0 like below:
(XEN) Speculative mitigation facilities:
(XEN) Hardware features: SMEP IBRS/IBPB STIBP
(XEN) BTI mitigations: Thunk N/A, Others: IBRS- SMEP
(XEN) ----[ Xen-4.4.4OVMx86_64debug=n Tainted: C ]----
(XEN) CPU: 0
(XEN) RIP: e008:[<ffff82d0802041bb>]
entry.o#handle_ist_exception+0xd1/0x176
(XEN) RFLAGS: 0000000000010046 CONTEXT: hypervisor(XEN) rax: 0000000000000000 rbx: 0000000000000000 rcx: 0000000000000048 (XEN) rdx: 0000000000000001 rsi: 0000000000000000 rdi: 0000000000000000 (XEN) rbp: 0000000000000000 rsp: ffff82d080529f58 r8: 0000000000000000 (XEN) r9: 0000000000000000 r10: 0000000000000000 r11: 0000000000000000 (XEN) r12: 0000000000000000 r13: 0000000000000000 r14: ffff82d08052ffff (XEN) r15: 0000000000000000 cr0: 000000008005003b cr4: 00000000001506f0 (XEN) cr3: 0000000076fbe000 cr2: 0000000000000000 (XEN) ds: 0000 es: 0000 fs: 0000 gs: 0000 ss: 0000 cs: e008 (XEN) Xen stack trace from rsp=ffff82d080529f58: (XEN) 0000000000000018 00000000ffffffff 0000000000000002 ffff82d080528000 (XEN) 0000000000000000 ffff82d0802a50e0 ffff82d08052fd98 ffff82d08072fc00 (XEN) 0000000000000000 0000000000010000 0000000000000400 0000000000000830 (XEN) 0000000000000000 000000000000000a ffff82d0803f0fc0 0000000200000000 (XEN) ffff82d080298876 000000000000e008 0000000000000046 ffff82d08052fdf8 (XEN) 0000000000000000(XEN) Xen call trace:
(XEN) [<ffff82d0802041bb>] entry.o#handle_ist_exception+0xd1/0x176
(XEN)
(XEN)
(XEN) ****************************************
(XEN) Panic on CPU 0:
(XEN) GENERAL PROTECTION FAULT
(XEN) [error_code=0000]
(XEN) ****************************************It's due to %edx isn't cleared to zero before wrmsr.
DO_OVERWRITE_RSBclobbers %eax and happend to cover the bug in certain case so we didn't reproduce without bti=0. Change to use %edx.
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 3 lines
Reviewed-by Boris Ostrovsky <[email protected]>Tested-by Boris Ostrovsky <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Zhenzhong Duan <[email protected]>Two formal things: Please put tags in sequential (in time) order:
reporter, author(s), reviewers/testers. And please follow patch submission rules - send them _to_ the list, with maintainers (and other interested parties) on _cc_.
Got it.
Quoted 22 lines
Quoted 22 lines
xen/include/asm-x86/spec_ctrl_asm.h +3
-3@@ -269,16 +269,16 @@* This is logical merge of DO_OVERWRITE_RSB and DO_SPEC_CTRL_ENTRY * maybexen=1, but with conditionals rather than alternatives. */ - movzbl STACK_CPUINFO_FIELD(bti_ist_info)(%r14), %eax + movzbl STACK_CPUINFO_FIELD(bti_ist_info)(%r14), %edx - testb $BTI_IST_RSB, %al + testb $BTI_IST_RSB, %dl jz .L\@_skip_rsb DO_OVERWRITE_RSB .L\@_skip_rsb: - testb $BTI_IST_WRMSR, %al + testb $BTI_IST_WRMSR, %dl jz .L\@_skip_wrmsr
Quoted 13 lines
xen/include/asm-x86/spec_ctrl_asm.h line 297
Quoted 9 lines
xen/include/asm-x86/spec_ctrl_asm.h +1
-0xor %edx, %edx@@ -291,6 +291,7 @@* Load Xen's intended value. SPEC_CTRL_IBRS vs 0 is encoded in the * bottom bit of bti_ist_info, via a deliberate alias with BTI_IST_IBRS. */ + xor %edx, %edx mov $MSR_SPEC_CTRL, %ecx and $BTI_IST_IBRS, %eax wrmsrThis is wrong now, and the comment very clearly states why. I think rather than switching %eax to %edx it would be better to preserve %eax (e.g. by saving into %edx) around
DO_OVERWRITE_RSB. I'll send an updated patch in a few minutes.
Right, I missed this part, thanks for point.
Your v2 patch looks good for me.
Signature · 8 lines
thanks zduan _______________________________________________ Xen-devel mailing list [email protected] https://lists.xenproject.org/mailman/listinfo/xen-devel