SELinux - convert to kzalloc
Subsystems (3)
PATCH 1/1 SELinux - convert to kzalloc
This patch converts SELinux code from kmalloc/memset to the new kazalloc function. On i386, this results in a text saving of over 1K.
Before:
text data bss dec hex filename
86319 4642 15236 106197 19ed5 security/selinux/built-in.o
After:
text data bss dec hex filename
85278 4642 15236 105156 19ac4 security/selinux/built-in.o
Please apply.
---
security/selinux/hooks.c | 24 +++++------------ security/selinux/netif.c | 3 -- security/selinux/selinuxfs.c | 30 +++++++--------------- security/selinux/ss/conditional.c | 12 ++------ security/selinux/ss/ebitmap.c | 9 ++---- security/selinux/ss/hashtab.c | 6 +--- security/selinux/ss/policydb.c | 51 ++++++++++++-------------------------- security/selinux/ss/services.c | 9 ++---- 8 files changed, 48 insertions(+), 96 deletions(-)
security/selinux/hooks.c +8 -16
@@ -122,11 +122,10 @@ static int task_alloc_security(struct ta {struct task_security_struct *tsec; - tsec =kmalloc (sizeof (struct task_security_struct ),GFP_KERNEL ); + tsec =kzalloc (sizeof (struct task_security_struct ),GFP_KERNEL );if (!tsec)return -ENOMEM ; -memset (tsec,0 ,sizeof (struct task_security_struct )); tsec->magic =SELINUX_MAGIC ; tsec->task = task; tsec->osid = tsec->sid = tsec->ptrace_sid =SECINITSID_UNLABELED ;
@@ -151,11 +150,10 @@ static int inode_alloc_security(struct istruct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security;struct inode_security_struct *isec; - isec =kmalloc (sizeof (struct inode_security_struct ),GFP_KERNEL ); + isec =kzalloc (sizeof (struct inode_security_struct ),GFP_KERNEL );if (!isec)return -ENOMEM ; -memset (isec,0 ,sizeof (struct inode_security_struct ));init_MUTEX (&isec->sem);INIT_LIST_HEAD (&isec->list); isec->magic =SELINUX_MAGIC ;
@@ -193,11 +191,10 @@ static int file_alloc_security(struct fistruct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security;struct file_security_struct *fsec; - fsec =kmalloc (sizeof (struct file_security_struct ),GFP_ATOMIC ); + fsec =kzalloc (sizeof (struct file_security_struct ),GFP_ATOMIC );if (!fsec)return -ENOMEM ; -memset (fsec,0 ,sizeof (struct file_security_struct )); fsec->magic =SELINUX_MAGIC ; fsec->file = file;if (tsec && tsec->magic ==SELINUX_MAGIC ) {
@@ -227,11 +224,10 @@ static int superblock_alloc_security(str {struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec; - sbsec =kmalloc (sizeof (struct superblock_security_struct ),GFP_KERNEL ); + sbsec =kzalloc (sizeof (struct superblock_security_struct ),GFP_KERNEL );if (!sbsec)return -ENOMEM ; -memset (sbsec,0 ,sizeof (struct superblock_security_struct ));init_MUTEX (&sbsec->sem);INIT_LIST_HEAD (&sbsec->list);INIT_LIST_HEAD (&sbsec->isec_head);
@@ -269,11 +265,10 @@ static int sk_alloc_security(struct sockif (family !=PF_UNIX )return 0 ; - ssec =kmalloc (sizeof (*ssec), priority); + ssec =kzalloc (sizeof (*ssec), priority);if (!ssec)return -ENOMEM ; -memset (ssec,0 ,sizeof (*ssec)); ssec->magic =SELINUX_MAGIC ; ssec->sk = sk; ssec->peer_sid =SECINITSID_UNLABELED ;
@@ -1467,11 +1462,10 @@ static int selinux_bprm_alloc_security(s {struct bprm_security_struct *bsec; - bsec =kmalloc (sizeof (struct bprm_security_struct ),GFP_KERNEL ); + bsec =kzalloc (sizeof (struct bprm_security_struct ),GFP_KERNEL );if (!bsec)return -ENOMEM ; -memset (bsec,0 ,sizeof *bsec); bsec->magic =SELINUX_MAGIC ; bsec->bprm = bprm; bsec->sid =SECINITSID_UNLABELED ;
@@ -3581,11 +3575,10 @@ static int ipc_alloc_security(struct tasstruct task_security_struct *tsec = task->security;struct ipc_security_struct *isec; - isec =kmalloc (sizeof (struct ipc_security_struct ),GFP_KERNEL ); + isec =kzalloc (sizeof (struct ipc_security_struct ),GFP_KERNEL );if (!isec)return -ENOMEM ; -memset (isec,0 ,sizeof (struct ipc_security_struct )); isec->magic =SELINUX_MAGIC ; isec->sclass = sclass; isec->ipc_perm = perm;
@@ -3613,11 +3606,10 @@ static int msg_msg_alloc_security(struct {struct msg_security_struct *msec; - msec =kmalloc (sizeof (struct msg_security_struct ),GFP_KERNEL ); + msec =kzalloc (sizeof (struct msg_security_struct ),GFP_KERNEL );if (!msec)return -ENOMEM ; -memset (msec,0 ,sizeof (struct msg_security_struct )); msec->magic =SELINUX_MAGIC ; msec->msg = msg; msec->sid =SECINITSID_UNLABELED ;
security/selinux/netif.c +1 -2
@@ -114,13 +114,12 @@ static struct sel_netif *sel_netif_lookuif (likely (netif !=NULL )) goto out; - new =kmalloc (sizeof (*new),GFP_ATOMIC ); + new =kzalloc (sizeof (*new),GFP_ATOMIC );if (!new) { netif =ERR_PTR (-ENOMEM ); goto out; } -memset (new,0 ,sizeof (*new)); nsec = &new->nsec; ret =security_netif_sid (dev->name, &nsec->if_sid, &nsec->msg_sid);
security/selinux/selinuxfs.c +10 -20
@@ -424,15 +424,13 @@ static ssize_t sel_write_access(struct freturn length; length = -ENOMEM ; - scon =kmalloc (size+1 ,GFP_KERNEL ); + scon =kzalloc (size+1 ,GFP_KERNEL );if (!scon)return length; -memset (scon,0 , size+1 ); - tcon =kmalloc (size+1 ,GFP_KERNEL ); + tcon =kzalloc (size+1 ,GFP_KERNEL );if (!tcon) goto out; -memset (tcon,0 , size+1 ); length = -EINVAL ;if (sscanf (buf,"%s %s %hu %x" , scon, tcon, &tclass, &req) !=4 )
@@ -475,15 +473,13 @@ static ssize_t sel_write_create(struct freturn length; length = -ENOMEM ; - scon =kmalloc (size+1 ,GFP_KERNEL ); + scon =kzalloc (size+1 ,GFP_KERNEL );if (!scon)return length; -memset (scon,0 , size+1 ); - tcon =kmalloc (size+1 ,GFP_KERNEL ); + tcon =kzalloc (size+1 ,GFP_KERNEL );if (!tcon) goto out; -memset (tcon,0 , size+1 ); length = -EINVAL ;if (sscanf (buf,"%s %s %hu" , scon, tcon, &tclass) !=3 )
@@ -536,15 +532,13 @@ static ssize_t sel_write_relabel(structreturn length; length = -ENOMEM ; - scon =kmalloc (size+1 ,GFP_KERNEL ); + scon =kzalloc (size+1 ,GFP_KERNEL );if (!scon)return length; -memset (scon,0 , size+1 ); - tcon =kmalloc (size+1 ,GFP_KERNEL ); + tcon =kzalloc (size+1 ,GFP_KERNEL );if (!tcon) goto out; -memset (tcon,0 , size+1 ); length = -EINVAL ;if (sscanf (buf,"%s %s %hu" , scon, tcon, &tclass) !=3 )
@@ -595,15 +589,13 @@ static ssize_t sel_write_user(struct filreturn length; length = -ENOMEM ; - con =kmalloc (size+1 ,GFP_KERNEL ); + con =kzalloc (size+1 ,GFP_KERNEL );if (!con)return length; -memset (con,0 , size+1 ); - user =kmalloc (size+1 ,GFP_KERNEL ); + user =kzalloc (size+1 ,GFP_KERNEL );if (!user) goto out; -memset (user,0 , size+1 ); length = -EINVAL ;if (sscanf (buf,"%s %s" , con, user) !=2 )
@@ -658,15 +650,13 @@ static ssize_t sel_write_member(struct freturn length; length = -ENOMEM ; - scon =kmalloc (size+1 ,GFP_KERNEL ); + scon =kzalloc (size+1 ,GFP_KERNEL );if (!scon)return length; -memset (scon,0 , size+1 ); - tcon =kmalloc (size+1 ,GFP_KERNEL ); + tcon =kzalloc (size+1 ,GFP_KERNEL );if (!tcon) goto out; -memset (tcon,0 , size+1 ); length = -EINVAL ;if (sscanf (buf,"%s %s %hu" , scon, tcon, &tclass) !=3 )
security/selinux/ss/conditional.c +4 -8
@@ -220,10 +220,9 @@ int cond_read_bool(struct policydb *p, su32 len;int rc; - booldatum =kmalloc (sizeof (struct cond_bool_datum ),GFP_KERNEL ); + booldatum =kzalloc (sizeof (struct cond_bool_datum ),GFP_KERNEL );if (!booldatum)return -1 ; -memset (booldatum,0 ,sizeof (struct cond_bool_datum )); rc =next_entry (buf, fp,sizeof buf);if (rc <0 )
@@ -321,10 +320,9 @@ static int cond_insertf(struct avtab *a, goto err; } - list =kmalloc (sizeof (struct cond_av_list ),GFP_KERNEL ); + list =kzalloc (sizeof (struct cond_av_list ),GFP_KERNEL );if (!list) goto err; -memset (list,0 ,sizeof (*list)); list->node = node_ptr;if (!data->head)
@@ -414,11 +412,10 @@ static int cond_read_node(struct policydif (rc <0 ) goto err; - expr =kmalloc (sizeof (struct cond_expr ),GFP_KERNEL ); + expr =kzalloc (sizeof (struct cond_expr ),GFP_KERNEL );if (!expr) { goto err; } -memset (expr,0 ,sizeof (struct cond_expr )); expr->expr_type =le32_to_cpu (buf[0 ]); expr->bool =le32_to_cpu (buf[1 ]);
@@ -460,10 +457,9 @@ int cond_read_list(struct policydb *p, v len =le32_to_cpu (buf[0 ]);for (i =0 ; i < len; i++) { - node =kmalloc (sizeof (struct cond_node ),GFP_KERNEL ); + node =kzalloc (sizeof (struct cond_node ),GFP_KERNEL );if (!node) goto err; -memset (node,0 ,sizeof (struct cond_node ));if (cond_read_node (p, node, fp) !=0 ) goto err;
security/selinux/ss/ebitmap.c +3 -6
@@ -39,12 +39,11 @@ int ebitmap_cpy(struct ebitmap *dst, str n = src->node; prev =NULL ;while (n) { - new =kmalloc (sizeof (*new),GFP_ATOMIC ); + new =kzalloc (sizeof (*new),GFP_ATOMIC );if (!new) {ebitmap_destroy (dst);return -ENOMEM ; } -memset (new,0 ,sizeof (*new)); new->startbit = n->startbit; new->map = n->map; new->next =NULL ;
@@ -150,10 +149,9 @@ int ebitmap_set_bit(struct ebitmap *e, uif (!value)return 0 ; - new =kmalloc (sizeof (*new),GFP_ATOMIC ); + new =kzalloc (sizeof (*new),GFP_ATOMIC );if (!new)return -ENOMEM ; -memset (new,0 ,sizeof (*new)); new->startbit = bit & ~(MAPSIZE -1 ); new->map = (MAPBIT << (bit - new->startbit));
@@ -232,13 +230,12 @@ int ebitmap_read(struct ebitmap *e, voidprintk (KERN_ERR "security: ebitmap: truncated map\n" ); goto bad; } - n =kmalloc (sizeof (*n),GFP_KERNEL ); + n =kzalloc (sizeof (*n),GFP_KERNEL );if (!n) {printk (KERN_ERR "security: ebitmap: out of memory\n" ); rc = -ENOMEM ; goto bad; } -memset (n,0 ,sizeof (*n)); n->startbit =le32_to_cpu (buf[0 ]);
security/selinux/ss/hashtab.c +2 -4
@@ -15,11 +15,10 @@ struct hashtab *hashtab_create(u32 (*hasstruct hashtab *p;u32 i; - p =kmalloc (sizeof (*p),GFP_KERNEL ); + p =kzalloc (sizeof (*p),GFP_KERNEL );if (p ==NULL )return p; -memset (p,0 ,sizeof (*p)); p->size = size; p->nel =0 ; p->hash_value = hash_value;
@@ -55,10 +54,9 @@ int hashtab_insert(struct hashtab *h, voif (cur && (h->keycmp (h, key, cur->key) ==0 ))return -EEXIST ; - newnode =kmalloc (sizeof (*newnode),GFP_KERNEL ); + newnode =kzalloc (sizeof (*newnode),GFP_KERNEL );if (newnode ==NULL )return -ENOMEM ; -memset (newnode,0 ,sizeof (*newnode)); newnode->key = key; newnode->datum = datum;if (prev) {
security/selinux/ss/policydb.c +17 -34
217 lines not on this page · raw message
security/selinux/ss/services.c +3 -6
@@ -1531,12 +1531,11 @@ int security_get_user_sids(u32 fromsid, } usercon.user = user->value; - mysids =kmalloc (maxnel*sizeof (*mysids),GFP_ATOMIC ); + mysids =kzalloc (maxnel*sizeof (*mysids),GFP_ATOMIC );if (!mysids) { rc = -ENOMEM ; goto out_unlock; } -memset (mysids,0 , maxnel*sizeof (*mysids));ebitmap_for_each_bit (&user->roles, rnode, i) {if (!ebitmap_node_get_bit (rnode, i))
@@ -1566,13 +1565,12 @@ int security_get_user_sids(u32 fromsid, mysids[mynel++] = sid; }else { maxnel +=SIDS_NEL ; - mysids2 =kmalloc (maxnel*sizeof (*mysids2),GFP_ATOMIC ); + mysids2 =kzalloc (maxnel*sizeof (*mysids2),GFP_ATOMIC );if (!mysids2) { rc = -ENOMEM ;kfree (mysids); goto out_unlock; } -memset (mysids2,0 , maxnel*sizeof (*mysids2));memcpy (mysids2, mysids, mynel *sizeof (*mysids2));kfree (mysids); mysids = mysids2;
@@ -1714,10 +1712,9 @@ int security_get_bools(int *len, char ** goto out; } - *names = (char **)kmalloc (sizeof (char *) * *len,GFP_ATOMIC ); + *names = (char **)kzalloc (sizeof (char *) * *len,GFP_ATOMIC );if (!*names) goto err; -memset (*names,0 ,sizeof (char *) * *len); *values = (int *)kmalloc (sizeof (int ) * *len,GFP_ATOMIC );if (!*values)
Quoted 4 lines · James Morris
This patch converts SELinux code from kmalloc/memset to the new kazalloc function. On i386, this results in a text saving of over 1K.
Quoted 8 lines
Before:
text data bss dec hex filename
86319 4642 15236 106197 19ed5security/selinux/built-in.oAfter:
text data bss dec hex filename
85278 4642 15236 105156 19ac4security/selinux/built-in.o
That's a nice size reduction. If we had kzalloc_gfp_kernel(size_t) we could drop an argument and save even more, but I suspect Linus would come after me with a cattle prod.
Note that the use of kzalloc() will nullify kmalloc's compile-time optimisation where it determines which slab to use at compile time - kzalloc() won't know the size and will have to do the table search. But the performance benefit from text size reductions will balance that.
SELinux seems to do a lot of kzalloc(a * b, flags):
+ mysids = kzalloc(maxnel*sizeof(*mysids), GFP_ATOMIC);
+ *names = (char**)kzalloc(sizeof(char*) * *len, GFP_ATOMIC);
+ mysids2 = kzalloc(maxnel*sizeof(*mysids2), GFP_ATOMIC);
Consider using kcalloc() here.
Quoted 7 lines · Andrew Morton
SELinux seems to do a lot of
kzalloc(a * b, flags):+ mysids =
kzalloc(maxnel*sizeof(*mysids), GFP_ATOMIC);
+ *names = (char**)kzalloc(sizeof(char*) * *len,GFP_ATOMIC);
+ mysids2 =kzalloc(maxnel*sizeof(*mysids2), GFP_ATOMIC);Consider using
kcalloc()here.
Ok, updated patch below (found four of them).
---
security/selinux/hooks.c | 24 +++++------------ security/selinux/netif.c | 3 -- security/selinux/selinuxfs.c | 30 +++++++--------------- security/selinux/ss/conditional.c | 12 ++------ security/selinux/ss/ebitmap.c | 9 ++---- security/selinux/ss/hashtab.c | 6 +--- security/selinux/ss/policydb.c | 51 ++++++++++++-------------------------- security/selinux/ss/services.c | 11 ++------ 8 files changed, 49 insertions(+), 97 deletions(-)
security/selinux/hooks.c +8 -16
@@ -122,11 +122,10 @@ static int task_alloc_security(struct ta {struct task_security_struct *tsec; - tsec =kmalloc (sizeof (struct task_security_struct ),GFP_KERNEL ); + tsec =kzalloc (sizeof (struct task_security_struct ),GFP_KERNEL );if (!tsec)return -ENOMEM ; -memset (tsec,0 ,sizeof (struct task_security_struct )); tsec->magic =SELINUX_MAGIC ; tsec->task = task; tsec->osid = tsec->sid = tsec->ptrace_sid =SECINITSID_UNLABELED ;
@@ -151,11 +150,10 @@ static int inode_alloc_security(struct istruct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security;struct inode_security_struct *isec; - isec =kmalloc (sizeof (struct inode_security_struct ),GFP_KERNEL ); + isec =kzalloc (sizeof (struct inode_security_struct ),GFP_KERNEL );if (!isec)return -ENOMEM ; -memset (isec,0 ,sizeof (struct inode_security_struct ));init_MUTEX (&isec->sem);INIT_LIST_HEAD (&isec->list); isec->magic =SELINUX_MAGIC ;
@@ -193,11 +191,10 @@ static int file_alloc_security(struct fistruct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security;struct file_security_struct *fsec; - fsec =kmalloc (sizeof (struct file_security_struct ),GFP_ATOMIC ); + fsec =kzalloc (sizeof (struct file_security_struct ),GFP_ATOMIC );if (!fsec)return -ENOMEM ; -memset (fsec,0 ,sizeof (struct file_security_struct )); fsec->magic =SELINUX_MAGIC ; fsec->file = file;if (tsec && tsec->magic ==SELINUX_MAGIC ) {
@@ -227,11 +224,10 @@ static int superblock_alloc_security(str {struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec; - sbsec =kmalloc (sizeof (struct superblock_security_struct ),GFP_KERNEL ); + sbsec =kzalloc (sizeof (struct superblock_security_struct ),GFP_KERNEL );if (!sbsec)return -ENOMEM ; -memset (sbsec,0 ,sizeof (struct superblock_security_struct ));init_MUTEX (&sbsec->sem);INIT_LIST_HEAD (&sbsec->list);INIT_LIST_HEAD (&sbsec->isec_head);
@@ -269,11 +265,10 @@ static int sk_alloc_security(struct sockif (family !=PF_UNIX )return 0 ; - ssec =kmalloc (sizeof (*ssec), priority); + ssec =kzalloc (sizeof (*ssec), priority);if (!ssec)return -ENOMEM ; -memset (ssec,0 ,sizeof (*ssec)); ssec->magic =SELINUX_MAGIC ; ssec->sk = sk; ssec->peer_sid =SECINITSID_UNLABELED ;
@@ -1467,11 +1462,10 @@ static int selinux_bprm_alloc_security(s {struct bprm_security_struct *bsec; - bsec =kmalloc (sizeof (struct bprm_security_struct ),GFP_KERNEL ); + bsec =kzalloc (sizeof (struct bprm_security_struct ),GFP_KERNEL );if (!bsec)return -ENOMEM ; -memset (bsec,0 ,sizeof *bsec); bsec->magic =SELINUX_MAGIC ; bsec->bprm = bprm; bsec->sid =SECINITSID_UNLABELED ;
@@ -3581,11 +3575,10 @@ static int ipc_alloc_security(struct tasstruct task_security_struct *tsec = task->security;struct ipc_security_struct *isec; - isec =kmalloc (sizeof (struct ipc_security_struct ),GFP_KERNEL ); + isec =kzalloc (sizeof (struct ipc_security_struct ),GFP_KERNEL );if (!isec)return -ENOMEM ; -memset (isec,0 ,sizeof (struct ipc_security_struct )); isec->magic =SELINUX_MAGIC ; isec->sclass = sclass; isec->ipc_perm = perm;
@@ -3613,11 +3606,10 @@ static int msg_msg_alloc_security(struct {struct msg_security_struct *msec; - msec =kmalloc (sizeof (struct msg_security_struct ),GFP_KERNEL ); + msec =kzalloc (sizeof (struct msg_security_struct ),GFP_KERNEL );if (!msec)return -ENOMEM ; -memset (msec,0 ,sizeof (struct msg_security_struct )); msec->magic =SELINUX_MAGIC ; msec->msg = msg; msec->sid =SECINITSID_UNLABELED ;
security/selinux/netif.c +1 -2
@@ -114,13 +114,12 @@ static struct sel_netif *sel_netif_lookuif (likely (netif !=NULL )) goto out; - new =kmalloc (sizeof (*new),GFP_ATOMIC ); + new =kzalloc (sizeof (*new),GFP_ATOMIC );if (!new) { netif =ERR_PTR (-ENOMEM ); goto out; } -memset (new,0 ,sizeof (*new)); nsec = &new->nsec; ret =security_netif_sid (dev->name, &nsec->if_sid, &nsec->msg_sid);
security/selinux/selinuxfs.c +10 -20
@@ -424,15 +424,13 @@ static ssize_t sel_write_access(struct freturn length; length = -ENOMEM ; - scon =kmalloc (size+1 ,GFP_KERNEL ); + scon =kzalloc (size+1 ,GFP_KERNEL );if (!scon)return length; -memset (scon,0 , size+1 ); - tcon =kmalloc (size+1 ,GFP_KERNEL ); + tcon =kzalloc (size+1 ,GFP_KERNEL );if (!tcon) goto out; -memset (tcon,0 , size+1 ); length = -EINVAL ;if (sscanf (buf,"%s %s %hu %x" , scon, tcon, &tclass, &req) !=4 )
@@ -475,15 +473,13 @@ static ssize_t sel_write_create(struct freturn length; length = -ENOMEM ; - scon =kmalloc (size+1 ,GFP_KERNEL ); + scon =kzalloc (size+1 ,GFP_KERNEL );if (!scon)return length; -memset (scon,0 , size+1 ); - tcon =kmalloc (size+1 ,GFP_KERNEL ); + tcon =kzalloc (size+1 ,GFP_KERNEL );if (!tcon) goto out; -memset (tcon,0 , size+1 ); length = -EINVAL ;if (sscanf (buf,"%s %s %hu" , scon, tcon, &tclass) !=3 )
@@ -536,15 +532,13 @@ static ssize_t sel_write_relabel(structreturn length; length = -ENOMEM ; - scon =kmalloc (size+1 ,GFP_KERNEL ); + scon =kzalloc (size+1 ,GFP_KERNEL );if (!scon)return length; -memset (scon,0 , size+1 ); - tcon =kmalloc (size+1 ,GFP_KERNEL ); + tcon =kzalloc (size+1 ,GFP_KERNEL );if (!tcon) goto out; -memset (tcon,0 , size+1 ); length = -EINVAL ;if (sscanf (buf,"%s %s %hu" , scon, tcon, &tclass) !=3 )
@@ -595,15 +589,13 @@ static ssize_t sel_write_user(struct filreturn length; length = -ENOMEM ; - con =kmalloc (size+1 ,GFP_KERNEL ); + con =kzalloc (size+1 ,GFP_KERNEL );if (!con)return length; -memset (con,0 , size+1 ); - user =kmalloc (size+1 ,GFP_KERNEL ); + user =kzalloc (size+1 ,GFP_KERNEL );if (!user) goto out; -memset (user,0 , size+1 ); length = -EINVAL ;if (sscanf (buf,"%s %s" , con, user) !=2 )
@@ -658,15 +650,13 @@ static ssize_t sel_write_member(struct freturn length; length = -ENOMEM ; - scon =kmalloc (size+1 ,GFP_KERNEL ); + scon =kzalloc (size+1 ,GFP_KERNEL );if (!scon)return length; -memset (scon,0 , size+1 ); - tcon =kmalloc (size+1 ,GFP_KERNEL ); + tcon =kzalloc (size+1 ,GFP_KERNEL );if (!tcon) goto out; -memset (tcon,0 , size+1 ); length = -EINVAL ;if (sscanf (buf,"%s %s %hu" , scon, tcon, &tclass) !=3 )
security/selinux/ss/conditional.c +4 -8
@@ -220,10 +220,9 @@ int cond_read_bool(struct policydb *p, su32 len;int rc; - booldatum =kmalloc (sizeof (struct cond_bool_datum ),GFP_KERNEL ); + booldatum =kzalloc (sizeof (struct cond_bool_datum ),GFP_KERNEL );if (!booldatum)return -1 ; -memset (booldatum,0 ,sizeof (struct cond_bool_datum )); rc =next_entry (buf, fp,sizeof buf);if (rc <0 )
@@ -321,10 +320,9 @@ static int cond_insertf(struct avtab *a, goto err; } - list =kmalloc (sizeof (struct cond_av_list ),GFP_KERNEL ); + list =kzalloc (sizeof (struct cond_av_list ),GFP_KERNEL );if (!list) goto err; -memset (list,0 ,sizeof (*list)); list->node = node_ptr;if (!data->head)
@@ -414,11 +412,10 @@ static int cond_read_node(struct policydif (rc <0 ) goto err; - expr =kmalloc (sizeof (struct cond_expr ),GFP_KERNEL ); + expr =kzalloc (sizeof (struct cond_expr ),GFP_KERNEL );if (!expr) { goto err; } -memset (expr,0 ,sizeof (struct cond_expr )); expr->expr_type =le32_to_cpu (buf[0 ]); expr->bool =le32_to_cpu (buf[1 ]);
@@ -460,10 +457,9 @@ int cond_read_list(struct policydb *p, v len =le32_to_cpu (buf[0 ]);for (i =0 ; i < len; i++) { - node =kmalloc (sizeof (struct cond_node ),GFP_KERNEL ); + node =kzalloc (sizeof (struct cond_node ),GFP_KERNEL );if (!node) goto err; -memset (node,0 ,sizeof (struct cond_node ));if (cond_read_node (p, node, fp) !=0 ) goto err;
security/selinux/ss/ebitmap.c +3 -6
@@ -39,12 +39,11 @@ int ebitmap_cpy(struct ebitmap *dst, str n = src->node; prev =NULL ;while (n) { - new =kmalloc (sizeof (*new),GFP_ATOMIC ); + new =kzalloc (sizeof (*new),GFP_ATOMIC );if (!new) {ebitmap_destroy (dst);return -ENOMEM ; } -memset (new,0 ,sizeof (*new)); new->startbit = n->startbit; new->map = n->map; new->next =NULL ;
@@ -150,10 +149,9 @@ int ebitmap_set_bit(struct ebitmap *e, uif (!value)return 0 ; - new =kmalloc (sizeof (*new),GFP_ATOMIC ); + new =kzalloc (sizeof (*new),GFP_ATOMIC );if (!new)return -ENOMEM ; -memset (new,0 ,sizeof (*new)); new->startbit = bit & ~(MAPSIZE -1 ); new->map = (MAPBIT << (bit - new->startbit));
@@ -232,13 +230,12 @@ int ebitmap_read(struct ebitmap *e, voidprintk (KERN_ERR "security: ebitmap: truncated map\n" ); goto bad; } - n =kmalloc (sizeof (*n),GFP_KERNEL ); + n =kzalloc (sizeof (*n),GFP_KERNEL );if (!n) {printk (KERN_ERR "security: ebitmap: out of memory\n" ); rc = -ENOMEM ; goto bad; } -memset (n,0 ,sizeof (*n)); n->startbit =le32_to_cpu (buf[0 ]);
security/selinux/ss/hashtab.c +2 -4
@@ -15,11 +15,10 @@ struct hashtab *hashtab_create(u32 (*hasstruct hashtab *p;u32 i; - p =kmalloc (sizeof (*p),GFP_KERNEL ); + p =kzalloc (sizeof (*p),GFP_KERNEL );if (p ==NULL )return p; -memset (p,0 ,sizeof (*p)); p->size = size; p->nel =0 ; p->hash_value = hash_value;
@@ -55,10 +54,9 @@ int hashtab_insert(struct hashtab *h, voif (cur && (h->keycmp (h, key, cur->key) ==0 ))return -EEXIST ; - newnode =kmalloc (sizeof (*newnode),GFP_KERNEL ); + newnode =kzalloc (sizeof (*newnode),GFP_KERNEL );if (newnode ==NULL )return -ENOMEM ; -memset (newnode,0 ,sizeof (*newnode)); newnode->key = key; newnode->datum = datum;if (prev) {
security/selinux/ss/policydb.c +17 -34
217 lines not on this page · raw message
security/selinux/ss/services.c +4 -7
@@ -1531,12 +1531,11 @@ int security_get_user_sids(u32 fromsid, } usercon.user = user->value; - mysids =kmalloc (maxnel*sizeof (*mysids),GFP_ATOMIC ); + mysids =kcalloc (maxnel,sizeof (*mysids),GFP_ATOMIC );if (!mysids) { rc = -ENOMEM ; goto out_unlock; } -memset (mysids,0 , maxnel*sizeof (*mysids));ebitmap_for_each_bit (&user->roles, rnode, i) {if (!ebitmap_node_get_bit (rnode, i))
@@ -1566,13 +1565,12 @@ int security_get_user_sids(u32 fromsid, mysids[mynel++] = sid; }else { maxnel +=SIDS_NEL ; - mysids2 =kmalloc (maxnel*sizeof (*mysids2),GFP_ATOMIC ); + mysids2 =kcalloc (maxnel,sizeof (*mysids2),GFP_ATOMIC );if (!mysids2) { rc = -ENOMEM ;kfree (mysids); goto out_unlock; } -memset (mysids2,0 , maxnel*sizeof (*mysids2));memcpy (mysids2, mysids, mynel *sizeof (*mysids2));kfree (mysids); mysids = mysids2;
@@ -1714,12 +1712,11 @@ int security_get_bools(int *len, char ** goto out; } - *names = (char **)kmalloc (sizeof (char *) * *len,GFP_ATOMIC ); + *names = (char **)kcalloc (*len,sizeof (char *),GFP_ATOMIC );if (!*names) goto err; -memset (*names,0 ,sizeof (char *) * *len); - *values = (int *)kmalloc (sizeof (int ) * *len,GFP_ATOMIC ); + *values = (int *)kcalloc (*len,sizeof (int ),GFP_ATOMIC );if (!*values) goto err;
Andrew> That's a nice size reduction. If we had Andrew> kzalloc_gfp_kernel(size_t) we could drop an argument and Andrew> save even more, but I suspect Linus would come after me Andrew> with a cattle prod.
Could one make kzalloc() an inline and do some __builtin_constant_p() trickery on the flags parameter to get the same effect?
I'll give it a try and see what happens.
- R.
PATCH 1/1 Create __kzalloc_gfp_kernel()
Andrew, it turns out that your idea of kzalloc_gfp_kernel() does save a bit. Here's a patch that shouldn't even make Linus look for a cattle prod.
[BTW, it's rather amusing watching ld use a gig of memory and several minutes of CPU time as it strains to link an allyesconfig kernel]
- R.
Here's a patch to get the effect of having kzalloc_gfp_kernel() without affecting any callers. It makes kzalloc() an inline that just calls __kzalloc_gfp_kernel() if the flags parameter is a compile-time constant and is GFP_KERNEL, and calls __kzalloc() otherwise.
On an x86_64 allyesconfig kernel, I see the following size:
text data bss dec hex filename
24202272 7609162 1998512 33809946 203e61a ../kbuild-before/vmlinux
24201601 7609266 1998512 33809379 203e3e3 ../kbuild-after/vmlinuxfor a net savings of 671 bytes of text (at a cost of 104 bytes of data for some reason). As use of kzalloc() becomes more widespread, this should get even better.
include/linux/slab.h +10 -1
@@ -99,7 +99,16 @@ found:return __kmalloc (size, flags); } -extern void *kzalloc (size_t ,unsigned int __nocast ); +extern void *__kzalloc (size_t ,unsigned int __nocast ); +extern void *__kzalloc_gfp_kernel (size_t ); + +static inline void *kzalloc (size_t size,unsigned int __nocast flags) +{ +if (__builtin_constant_p (flags) && flags ==GFP_KERNEL ) +return __kzalloc_gfp_kernel (size); +else +return __kzalloc (size, flags); +}/** * kcalloc - allocate memory for an array. The memory is set to zero.
mm/slab.c +8 -2
@@ -2985,14 +2985,20 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(kmem_cache_free);* @size: how many bytes of memory are required. * @flags: the type of memory to allocate. */ -void *kzalloc (size_t size,unsigned int __nocast flags) +void *__kzalloc (size_t size,unsigned int __nocast flags) {void *ret =kmalloc (size, flags);if (ret)memset (ret,0 , size);return ret; } -EXPORT_SYMBOL (kzalloc); +EXPORT_SYMBOL (__kzalloc); + +void *__kzalloc_gfp_kernel (size_t size) +{ +return __kzalloc (size,GFP_KERNEL ); +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL (__kzalloc_gfp_kernel);/** * kfree - free previously allocated memory
Re: [PATCH] Create __kzalloc_gfp_kernel()
Quoted 7 lines · Roland Dreier
On an
x86_64allyesconfig kernel, I see the following size:text data bss dec hex filename 24202272 7609162 1998512 33809946 203e61a ../kbuild-before/vmlinux 24201601 7609266 1998512 33809379 203e3e3 ../kbuild-after/vmlinux
It hardly seems worth it, really. Better savings would come from doing the same trick to kmem_cache_alloc() then tweaking kmalloc().
There are probably any number of frequently-called functions which we could hack around with..
PATCH 1/1 Move GFP_KERNEL use out of line to shrink text
Andrew> It hardly seems worth it, really. Better savings would Andrew> come from doing the same trick to kmem_cache_alloc() then Andrew> tweaking kmalloc().
Yep, right as usual; here's an updated patch. Do with it as you will -- I won't be hurt if you dump it, since I had fun trying this out.
Reduce kernel text by moving many uses of GFP_KERNEL out of line, by creating __kmem_cache_alloc_gfp_kernel(), __kmalloc_gfp_kernel() and __kzalloc_gfp_kernel() wrapper functions. Then kmem_cache_alloc(), kmalloc() and kzalloc() can be inline functions that just call their _gfp_kernel version if their flags parameter is a compile-time constant and is GFP_KERNEL, and call their ordinary version otherwise.
On an x86_64 allyesconfig kernel, I see the following sizes:
text data bss dec hex filename
24202272 7609162 1998512 33809946 203e61a vmlinux-before
24197561 7609474 1998512 33805547 203d4eb vmlinux-afterfor a net savings of 4711 bytes of text (at a cost of 312 bytes of data for some reason). With my usual config, the patched kernel boots and runs fine.
include/linux/slab.h +24 -2
@@ -61,7 +61,8 @@ extern kmem_cache_t *kmem_cache_create(c void (*)(void *, kmem_cache_t *, unsigned long));extern int kmem_cache_destroy (kmem_cache_t *);extern int kmem_cache_shrink (kmem_cache_t *); -extern void *kmem_cache_alloc (kmem_cache_t *,unsigned int __nocast ); +extern void *__kmem_cache_alloc (kmem_cache_t *,unsigned int __nocast ); +extern void *__kmem_cache_alloc_gfp_kernel (kmem_cache_t *);extern void kmem_cache_free (kmem_cache_t *,void *);extern unsigned int kmem_cache_size (kmem_cache_t *);extern const char *kmem_cache_name (kmem_cache_t *);
@@ -75,6 +76,15 @@ struct cache_sizes { };extern struct cache_sizes malloc_sizes[];extern void *__kmalloc (size_t ,unsigned int __nocast ); +extern void *__kmalloc_gfp_kernel (size_t ); + +static inline void *kmem_cache_alloc (kmem_cache_t *cache,unsigned int __nocast flags) +{ +if (__builtin_constant_p (flags) && flags ==GFP_KERNEL ) +return __kmem_cache_alloc_gfp_kernel (cache); + +return __kmem_cache_alloc (cache, flags); +}static inline void *kmalloc (size_t size,unsigned int __nocast flags) {
@@ -96,10 +106,22 @@ found: malloc_sizes[i].cs_dmacachep : malloc_sizes[i].cs_cachep, flags); } + +if (__builtin_constant_p (flags) && flags ==GFP_KERNEL ) +return __kmalloc_gfp_kernel (size);return __kmalloc (size, flags); } -extern void *kzalloc (size_t ,unsigned int __nocast ); +extern void *__kzalloc (size_t ,unsigned int __nocast ); +extern void *__kzalloc_gfp_kernel (size_t ); + +static inline void *kzalloc (size_t size,unsigned int __nocast flags) +{ +if (__builtin_constant_p (flags) && flags ==GFP_KERNEL ) +return __kzalloc_gfp_kernel (size); + +return __kzalloc (size, flags); +}/** * kcalloc - allocate memory for an array. The memory is set to zero.
mm/slab.c +22 -4
@@ -2778,11 +2778,17 @@ static inline void __cache_free(kmem_cac* Allocate an object from this cache. The flags are only relevant * if the cache has no available objects. */ -void *kmem_cache_alloc (kmem_cache_t *cachep,unsigned int __nocast flags) +void *__kmem_cache_alloc (kmem_cache_t *cachep,unsigned int __nocast flags) {return __cache_alloc (cachep, flags); } -EXPORT_SYMBOL (kmem_cache_alloc); +EXPORT_SYMBOL (__kmem_cache_alloc); + +void *__kmem_cache_alloc_gfp_kernel (kmem_cache_t *cachep) +{ +return __cache_alloc (cachep,GFP_KERNEL ); +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL (__kmem_cache_alloc_gfp_kernel);/** * kmem_ptr_validate - check if an untrusted pointer might
@@ -2912,6 +2918,12 @@ void *__kmalloc(size_t size, unsigned in }EXPORT_SYMBOL (__kmalloc); +void *__kmalloc_gfp_kernel (size_t size) +{ +return __kmalloc (size,GFP_KERNEL ); +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL (__kmalloc_gfp_kernel); +#ifdef CONFIG_SMP /** * __alloc_percpu - allocate one copy of the object for every present
@@ -2985,14 +2997,20 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(kmem_cache_free);* @size: how many bytes of memory are required. * @flags: the type of memory to allocate. */ -void *kzalloc (size_t size,unsigned int __nocast flags) +void *__kzalloc (size_t size,unsigned int __nocast flags) {void *ret =kmalloc (size, flags);if (ret)memset (ret,0 , size);return ret; } -EXPORT_SYMBOL (kzalloc); +EXPORT_SYMBOL (__kzalloc); + +void *__kzalloc_gfp_kernel (size_t size) +{ +return __kzalloc (size,GFP_KERNEL ); +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL (__kzalloc_gfp_kernel);/** * kfree - free previously allocated memory
Re: [PATCH] Move GFP_KERNEL use out of line to shrink text
Quoted 7 lines · Roland Dreier
text data bss dec hex filename 24202272 7609162 1998512 33809946 203e61a vmlinux-before 24197561 7609474 1998512 33805547 203d4eb vmlinux-afterfor a net savings of 4711 bytes of text (at a cost of 312 bytes of data for some reason). With my usual config, the patched kernel boots and runs fine.
FYI: "some reason" == KALLSYMS
--
vda
Re: [PATCH] Move GFP_KERNEL use out of line to shrink text
Quoted 11 lines · Denis Vlasenko
Quoted 7 lines · Roland Dreier
text data bss dec hex filename
24202272 7609162 1998512 33809946 203e61a vmlinux-before 24197561 7609474 1998512 33805547 203d4eb vmlinux-afterfor a net savings of 4711 bytes of text (at a cost of 312 bytes of data for some reason). With my usual config, the patched kernel boots and runs fine.
FYI: "some reason" == KALLSYMS
312 bytes for a couple more symbols is too much to be justified from kallsyms alone.
In a 64 bit machine each new symbol should take about 8 bytes for the address + ~ half the size of the symbol name, which in this case would give at most about ~50 bytes.
I guess the rest should come from the extra EXPORT_SYMBOL's...
Signature · 5 lines
Paulo Marques - www.grupopie.com The rule is perfect: in all matters of opinion our adversaries are insane. Mark Twain
Quoted 2 lines · James Morris
- *names = (char**)kmalloc(sizeof(char*) * *len,
GFP_ATOMIC); + *names = (char**)kzalloc(sizeof(char*) * *len,GFP_ATOMIC);
Extra cast
--
vda