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Fix misspelling

PATCH New Elia Pinto 2 participants 2 messages Jun 6, 2014 – Jun 9, 2014

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Elia Pinto

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PATCH 1/1 Fix misspelling

From: Elia Pinto <[email protected]>

Fix misspelling using http://github.com/lyda/misspell-check

---
 policy/modules/kernel/files.te      |    2 +-
 policy/modules/kernel/storage.if    |   14 +++++++-------
 policy/modules/system/miscfiles.if  |    2 +-
 policy/modules/system/udev.te       |    2 +-
 policy/modules/system/userdomain.if |    4 ++--
 5 files changed, 12 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
policy/modules/kernel/files.te +1 -1
index cdc1801..852bd46 100644
@@ -71,7 +71,7 @@ typealias etc_t alias snmpd_etc_t;
 #
 type etc_runtime_t;
 files_type(etc_runtime_t)
-#Temporarily in policy until FC5 dissappears
+#Temporarily in policy until FC5 disappears
 typealias etc_runtime_t alias firstboot_rw_t;
 
 #
policy/modules/kernel/storage.if +7 -7
index 64c4cd0..5c1be6b 100644
@@ -82,7 +82,7 @@ interface(`storage_dontaudit_setattr_fixed_disk_dev',`
 ########################################
 ## <summary>
 ##	Allow the caller to directly read from a fixed disk.
-##	This is extremly dangerous as it can bypass the
+##	This is extremely dangerous as it can bypass the
 ##	SELinux protections for filesystem objects, and
 ##	should only be used by trusted domains.
 ## </summary>
@@ -128,7 +128,7 @@ interface(`storage_dontaudit_read_fixed_disk',`
 ########################################
 ## <summary>
 ##	Allow the caller to directly write to a fixed disk.
-##	This is extremly dangerous as it can bypass the
+##	This is extremely dangerous as it can bypass the
 ##	SELinux protections for filesystem objects, and
 ##	should only be used by trusted domains.
 ## </summary>
@@ -173,7 +173,7 @@ interface(`storage_dontaudit_write_fixed_disk',`
 ########################################
 ## <summary>
 ##	Allow the caller to directly read and write to a fixed disk.
-##	This is extremly dangerous as it can bypass the
+##	This is extremely dangerous as it can bypass the
 ##	SELinux protections for filesystem objects, and
 ##	should only be used by trusted domains.
 ## </summary>
@@ -432,7 +432,7 @@ interface(`storage_setattr_scsi_generic_dev',`
 ## <summary>
 ##	Allow the caller to directly read, in a
 ##	generic fashion, from any SCSI device.
-##	This is extremly dangerous as it can bypass the
+##	This is extremely dangerous as it can bypass the
 ##	SELinux protections for filesystem objects, and
 ##	should only be used by trusted domains.
 ## </summary>
@@ -457,7 +457,7 @@ interface(`storage_read_scsi_generic',`
 ## <summary>
 ##	Allow the caller to directly write, in a
 ##	generic fashion, from any SCSI device.
-##	This is extremly dangerous as it can bypass the
+##	This is extremely dangerous as it can bypass the
 ##	SELinux protections for filesystem objects, and
 ##	should only be used by trusted domains.
 ## </summary>
@@ -638,7 +638,7 @@ interface(`storage_dontaudit_setattr_removable_dev',`
 ## <summary>
 ##	Allow the caller to directly read from
 ##	a removable device.
-##	This is extremly dangerous as it can bypass the
+##	This is extremely dangerous as it can bypass the
 ##	SELinux protections for filesystem objects, and
 ##	should only be used by trusted domains.
 ## </summary>
@@ -679,7 +679,7 @@ interface(`storage_dontaudit_raw_read_removable_device',`
 ## <summary>
 ##	Allow the caller to directly write to
 ##	a removable device.
-##	This is extremly dangerous as it can bypass the
+##	This is extremely dangerous as it can bypass the
 ##	SELinux protections for filesystem objects, and
 ##	should only be used by trusted domains.
 ## </summary>
policy/modules/system/miscfiles.if +1 -1
index fc28bc3..acb637d 100644
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-## <summary>Miscelaneous files.</summary>
+## <summary>Miscellaneous files.</summary>
 
 ########################################
 ## <summary>
policy/modules/system/udev.te +1 -1
index 35ea2c3..f4545f5 100644
@@ -193,7 +193,7 @@ ifdef(`distro_debian',`
 
 ifdef(`distro_gentoo',`
 	# during boot, init scripts use /dev/.rcsysinit
-	# existance to determine if we are in early booting
+	# existence to determine if we are in early booting
 	init_getattr_script_status_files(udev_t)
 ')
 
policy/modules/system/userdomain.if +2 -2
index f7c74c3..de7d96a 100644
@@ -1521,7 +1521,7 @@ interface(`userdom_search_user_home_dirs',`
 ## <desc>
 ##	<p>
 ##	Do not audit attempts to search user home directories.
-##	This will supress SELinux denial messages when the specified
+##	This will suppress SELinux denial messages when the specified
 ##	domain is denied the permission to search these directories.
 ##	</p>
 ## </desc>
@@ -3200,7 +3200,7 @@ interface(`userdom_use_unpriv_users_fds',`
 ## <desc>
 ##	<p>
 ##	Do not audit attempts to inherit the file descriptors
-##	from unprivileged user domains. This will supress
+##	from unprivileged user domains. This will suppress
 ##	SELinux denial messages when the specified domain is denied
 ##	the permission to inherit these file descriptors.
 ##	</p>
Signature · 1 line
1.7.10.4
#1 lore raw

PATCH 1/1 Fix misspelling

Quoted 18 lines · Elia Pinto

From: Elia Pinto <[email protected]>

Fix misspelling using http://github.com/lyda/misspell-check

---
 policy/modules/kernel/files.te      |    2 +-
 policy/modules/kernel/storage.if    |   14 +++++++-------
 policy/modules/system/miscfiles.if  |    2 +-
 policy/modules/system/udev.te       |    2 +-
 policy/modules/system/userdomain.if |    4 ++--
 5 files changed, 12 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
policy/modules/kernel/files.te +0 -0
index cdc1801..852bd46 100644

policy/modules/kernel/files.te typealias etc_t alias snmpd_etc_t; · line 75

Quoted 6 lines
policy/modules/kernel/files.te +1 -1
@@ -71,7 +71,7 @@ typealias etc_t alias snmpd_etc_t;
 #
 type etc_runtime_t;
 files_type(etc_runtime_t)
-#Temporarily in policy until FC5 dissappears
+#Temporarily in policy until FC5 disappears
 typealias etc_runtime_t alias firstboot_rw_t;

Merged, though I ended up removing this alias.

Quoted 113 lines
policy/modules/kernel/storage.if +7 -7
index 64c4cd0..5c1be6b 100644
@@ -82,7 +82,7 @@ interface(`storage_dontaudit_setattr_fixed_disk_dev',`
 ########################################
 ## <summary>
 ##	Allow the caller to directly read from a fixed disk.
-##	This is extremly dangerous as it can bypass the
+##	This is extremely dangerous as it can bypass the
 ##	SELinux protections for filesystem objects, and
 ##	should only be used by trusted domains.
 ## </summary>
@@ -128,7 +128,7 @@ interface(`storage_dontaudit_read_fixed_disk',`
 ########################################
 ## <summary>
 ##	Allow the caller to directly write to a fixed disk.
-##	This is extremly dangerous as it can bypass the
+##	This is extremely dangerous as it can bypass the
 ##	SELinux protections for filesystem objects, and
 ##	should only be used by trusted domains.
 ## </summary>
@@ -173,7 +173,7 @@ interface(`storage_dontaudit_write_fixed_disk',`
 ########################################
 ## <summary>
 ##	Allow the caller to directly read and write to a fixed disk.
-##	This is extremly dangerous as it can bypass the
+##	This is extremely dangerous as it can bypass the
 ##	SELinux protections for filesystem objects, and
 ##	should only be used by trusted domains.
 ## </summary>
@@ -432,7 +432,7 @@ interface(`storage_setattr_scsi_generic_dev',`
 ## <summary>
 ##	Allow the caller to directly read, in a
 ##	generic fashion, from any SCSI device.
-##	This is extremly dangerous as it can bypass the
+##	This is extremely dangerous as it can bypass the
 ##	SELinux protections for filesystem objects, and
 ##	should only be used by trusted domains.
 ## </summary>
@@ -457,7 +457,7 @@ interface(`storage_read_scsi_generic',`
 ## <summary>
 ##	Allow the caller to directly write, in a
 ##	generic fashion, from any SCSI device.
-##	This is extremly dangerous as it can bypass the
+##	This is extremely dangerous as it can bypass the
 ##	SELinux protections for filesystem objects, and
 ##	should only be used by trusted domains.
 ## </summary>
@@ -638,7 +638,7 @@ interface(`storage_dontaudit_setattr_removable_dev',`
 ## <summary>
 ##	Allow the caller to directly read from
 ##	a removable device.
-##	This is extremly dangerous as it can bypass the
+##	This is extremely dangerous as it can bypass the
 ##	SELinux protections for filesystem objects, and
 ##	should only be used by trusted domains.
 ## </summary>
@@ -679,7 +679,7 @@ interface(`storage_dontaudit_raw_read_removable_device',`
 ## <summary>
 ##	Allow the caller to directly write to
 ##	a removable device.
-##	This is extremly dangerous as it can bypass the
+##	This is extremely dangerous as it can bypass the
 ##	SELinux protections for filesystem objects, and
 ##	should only be used by trusted domains.
 ## </summary>
policy/modules/system/miscfiles.if +1 -1
index fc28bc3..acb637d 100644
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-## <summary>Miscelaneous files.</summary>
+## <summary>Miscellaneous files.</summary>
 
 ########################################
 ## <summary>
policy/modules/system/udev.te +1 -1
index 35ea2c3..f4545f5 100644
@@ -193,7 +193,7 @@ ifdef(`distro_debian',`
 
 ifdef(`distro_gentoo',`
 	# during boot, init scripts use /dev/.rcsysinit
-	# existance to determine if we are in early booting
+	# existence to determine if we are in early booting
 	init_getattr_script_status_files(udev_t)
 ')
 
policy/modules/system/userdomain.if +2 -2
index f7c74c3..de7d96a 100644
@@ -1521,7 +1521,7 @@ interface(`userdom_search_user_home_dirs',`
 ## <desc>
 ##	<p>
 ##	Do not audit attempts to search user home directories.
-##	This will supress SELinux denial messages when the specified
+##	This will suppress SELinux denial messages when the specified
 ##	domain is denied the permission to search these directories.
 ##	</p>
 ## </desc>
@@ -3200,7 +3200,7 @@ interface(`userdom_use_unpriv_users_fds',`
 ## <desc>
 ##	<p>
 ##	Do not audit attempts to inherit the file descriptors
-##	from unprivileged user domains. This will supress
+##	from unprivileged user domains. This will suppress
 ##	SELinux denial messages when the specified domain is denied
 ##	the permission to inherit these file descriptors.
 ##	</p>
Signature · 3 lines
Chris PeBenito
Tresys Technology, LLC
www.tresys.com | oss.tresys.com