Fix misspelling
PATCH 1/1 Fix misspelling
From: Elia Pinto <[email protected]>
Fix misspelling using http://github.com/lyda/misspell-check
Signed-off-by Elia Pinto <[email protected]>
--- policy/modules/kernel/files.te | 2 +- policy/modules/kernel/storage.if | 14 +++++++------- policy/modules/system/miscfiles.if | 2 +- policy/modules/system/udev.te | 2 +- policy/modules/system/userdomain.if | 4 ++-- 5 files changed, 12 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
policy/modules/kernel/files.te +1 -1
@@ -71,7 +71,7 @@ typealias etc_t alias snmpd_etc_t; # type etc_runtime_t; files_type(etc_runtime_t) -#Temporarily in policy until FC5 dissappears +#Temporarily in policy until FC5 disappears typealias etc_runtime_t alias firstboot_rw_t; #
policy/modules/kernel/storage.if +7 -7
@@ -82,7 +82,7 @@ interface(`storage_dontaudit_setattr_fixed_disk_dev',` ######################################## ## <summary> ## Allow the caller to directly read from a fixed disk. -## This is extremly dangerous as it can bypass the +## This is extremely dangerous as it can bypass the ## SELinux protections for filesystem objects, and ## should only be used by trusted domains. ## </summary>
@@ -128,7 +128,7 @@ interface(`storage_dontaudit_read_fixed_disk',` ######################################## ## <summary> ## Allow the caller to directly write to a fixed disk. -## This is extremly dangerous as it can bypass the +## This is extremely dangerous as it can bypass the ## SELinux protections for filesystem objects, and ## should only be used by trusted domains. ## </summary>
@@ -173,7 +173,7 @@ interface(`storage_dontaudit_write_fixed_disk',` ######################################## ## <summary> ## Allow the caller to directly read and write to a fixed disk. -## This is extremly dangerous as it can bypass the +## This is extremely dangerous as it can bypass the ## SELinux protections for filesystem objects, and ## should only be used by trusted domains. ## </summary>
@@ -432,7 +432,7 @@ interface(`storage_setattr_scsi_generic_dev',` ## <summary> ## Allow the caller to directly read, in a ## generic fashion, from any SCSI device. -## This is extremly dangerous as it can bypass the +## This is extremely dangerous as it can bypass the ## SELinux protections for filesystem objects, and ## should only be used by trusted domains. ## </summary>
@@ -457,7 +457,7 @@ interface(`storage_read_scsi_generic',` ## <summary> ## Allow the caller to directly write, in a ## generic fashion, from any SCSI device. -## This is extremly dangerous as it can bypass the +## This is extremely dangerous as it can bypass the ## SELinux protections for filesystem objects, and ## should only be used by trusted domains. ## </summary>
@@ -638,7 +638,7 @@ interface(`storage_dontaudit_setattr_removable_dev',` ## <summary> ## Allow the caller to directly read from ## a removable device. -## This is extremly dangerous as it can bypass the +## This is extremely dangerous as it can bypass the ## SELinux protections for filesystem objects, and ## should only be used by trusted domains. ## </summary>
@@ -679,7 +679,7 @@ interface(`storage_dontaudit_raw_read_removable_device',` ## <summary> ## Allow the caller to directly write to ## a removable device. -## This is extremly dangerous as it can bypass the +## This is extremely dangerous as it can bypass the ## SELinux protections for filesystem objects, and ## should only be used by trusted domains. ## </summary>
policy/modules/system/miscfiles.if +1 -1
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -## <summary>Miscelaneous files.</summary> +## <summary>Miscellaneous files.</summary> ######################################## ## <summary>
policy/modules/system/udev.te +1 -1
@@ -193,7 +193,7 @@ ifdef(`distro_debian',` ifdef(`distro_gentoo',` # during boot, init scripts use /dev/.rcsysinit - # existance to determine if we are in early booting + # existence to determine if we are in early booting init_getattr_script_status_files(udev_t) ')
policy/modules/system/userdomain.if +2 -2
@@ -1521,7 +1521,7 @@ interface(`userdom_search_user_home_dirs',` ## <desc> ## <p> ## Do not audit attempts to search user home directories. -## This will supress SELinux denial messages when the specified +## This will suppress SELinux denial messages when the specified ## domain is denied the permission to search these directories. ## </p> ## </desc>
@@ -3200,7 +3200,7 @@ interface(`userdom_use_unpriv_users_fds',` ## <desc> ## <p> ## Do not audit attempts to inherit the file descriptors -## from unprivileged user domains. This will supress +## from unprivileged user domains. This will suppress ## SELinux denial messages when the specified domain is denied ## the permission to inherit these file descriptors. ## </p>
Signature · 1 line
1.7.10.4
PATCH 1/1 Fix misspelling
Quoted 18 lines · Elia Pinto
From: Elia Pinto <[email protected]>
Fix misspelling using http://github.com/lyda/misspell-check
Signed-off-by Elia Pinto <[email protected]>--- policy/modules/kernel/files.te | 2 +- policy/modules/kernel/storage.if | 14 +++++++------- policy/modules/system/miscfiles.if | 2 +- policy/modules/system/udev.te | 2 +- policy/modules/system/userdomain.if | 4 ++-- 5 files changed, 12 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)policy/modules/kernel/files.te +0
-0
policy/modules/kernel/files.te typealias etc_t alias snmpd_etc_t; · line 75
Quoted 6 lines
policy/modules/kernel/files.te +1
-1@@ -71,7 +71,7 @@ typealias etc_t alias snmpd_etc_t; # type etc_runtime_t; files_type(etc_runtime_t) -#Temporarily in policy until FC5 dissappears +#Temporarily in policy until FC5 disappears typealias etc_runtime_t alias firstboot_rw_t;
Merged, though I ended up removing this alias.
Quoted 113 lines
policy/modules/kernel/storage.if +7
-7@@ -82,7 +82,7 @@ interface(`storage_dontaudit_setattr_fixed_disk_dev',` ######################################## ## <summary> ## Allow the caller to directly read from a fixed disk. -## This is extremly dangerous as it can bypass the +## This is extremely dangerous as it can bypass the ## SELinux protections for filesystem objects, and ## should only be used by trusted domains. ## </summary>@@ -128,7 +128,7 @@ interface(`storage_dontaudit_read_fixed_disk',` ######################################## ## <summary> ## Allow the caller to directly write to a fixed disk. -## This is extremly dangerous as it can bypass the +## This is extremely dangerous as it can bypass the ## SELinux protections for filesystem objects, and ## should only be used by trusted domains. ## </summary>@@ -173,7 +173,7 @@ interface(`storage_dontaudit_write_fixed_disk',` ######################################## ## <summary> ## Allow the caller to directly read and write to a fixed disk. -## This is extremly dangerous as it can bypass the +## This is extremely dangerous as it can bypass the ## SELinux protections for filesystem objects, and ## should only be used by trusted domains. ## </summary>@@ -432,7 +432,7 @@ interface(`storage_setattr_scsi_generic_dev',` ## <summary> ## Allow the caller to directly read, in a ## generic fashion, from any SCSI device. -## This is extremly dangerous as it can bypass the +## This is extremely dangerous as it can bypass the ## SELinux protections for filesystem objects, and ## should only be used by trusted domains. ## </summary>@@ -457,7 +457,7 @@ interface(`storage_read_scsi_generic',` ## <summary> ## Allow the caller to directly write, in a ## generic fashion, from any SCSI device. -## This is extremly dangerous as it can bypass the +## This is extremely dangerous as it can bypass the ## SELinux protections for filesystem objects, and ## should only be used by trusted domains. ## </summary>@@ -638,7 +638,7 @@ interface(`storage_dontaudit_setattr_removable_dev',` ## <summary> ## Allow the caller to directly read from ## a removable device. -## This is extremly dangerous as it can bypass the +## This is extremely dangerous as it can bypass the ## SELinux protections for filesystem objects, and ## should only be used by trusted domains. ## </summary>@@ -679,7 +679,7 @@ interface(`storage_dontaudit_raw_read_removable_device',` ## <summary> ## Allow the caller to directly write to ## a removable device. -## This is extremly dangerous as it can bypass the +## This is extremely dangerous as it can bypass the ## SELinux protections for filesystem objects, and ## should only be used by trusted domains. ## </summary>policy/modules/system/miscfiles.if +1
-1@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -## <summary>Miscelaneous files.</summary> +## <summary>Miscellaneous files.</summary> ######################################## ## <summary>policy/modules/system/udev.te +1
-1@@ -193,7 +193,7 @@ ifdef(`distro_debian',` ifdef(`distro_gentoo',` # during boot, init scripts use /dev/.rcsysinit - # existance to determine if we are in early booting + # existence to determine if we are in early booting init_getattr_script_status_files(udev_t) ')policy/modules/system/userdomain.if +2
-2@@ -1521,7 +1521,7 @@ interface(`userdom_search_user_home_dirs',` ## <desc> ## <p> ## Do not audit attempts to search user home directories. -## This will supress SELinux denial messages when the specified +## This will suppress SELinux denial messages when the specified ## domain is denied the permission to search these directories. ## </p> ## </desc>@@ -3200,7 +3200,7 @@ interface(`userdom_use_unpriv_users_fds',` ## <desc> ## <p> ## Do not audit attempts to inherit the file descriptors -## from unprivileged user domains. This will supress +## from unprivileged user domains. This will suppress ## SELinux denial messages when the specified domain is denied ## the permission to inherit these file descriptors. ## </p>
Signature · 3 lines
Chris PeBenito Tresys Technology, LLC www.tresys.com | oss.tresys.com