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Two-phase seccomp and an x86_64 fast path

RFC In review Andy Lutomirski 5 participants 14 messages Jun 11, 2014 – Jun 13, 2014

Subsystems (7)
Arm (32-bit) x86 MIPS s390 +3 more subsystems
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Andy Lutomirski

author reviewer
#0 lore raw

cover Two-phase seccomp and an x86_64 fast path

On my VM, getpid takes about 70ns. Before this patchset, adding a single-instruction always-accept seccomp filter added about 134ns of overhead to getpid. With this patchset, the overhead is down to about 13ns.

I'd really appreciate careful review from all relevant arch maintainers for patch 1.

This is an RFC for now. I'll submit a non-RFC version after the merge window ends.

Andy Lutomirski (5):
seccomp,x86,arm,mips,s390: Remove nr parameter from secure_computing x86_64,entry: Treat regs->ax the same in fastpath and slowpath
syscalls
seccomp: Refactor the filter callback and the API
seccomp: Allow arch code to provide seccomp_data x86,seccomp: Add a seccomp fastpath

 arch/arm/kernel/ptrace.c       |   7 +-
 arch/mips/kernel/ptrace.c      |   2 +-
 arch/s390/kernel/ptrace.c      |   2 +-
 arch/x86/include/asm/calling.h |   6 +-
 arch/x86/kernel/entry_64.S     |  52 ++++++++-
 arch/x86/kernel/ptrace.c       |   2 +-
 arch/x86/kernel/vsyscall_64.c  |   2 +-
 include/linux/seccomp.h        |  25 +++--
 kernel/seccomp.c               | 244 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------------
 9 files changed, 241 insertions(+), 101 deletions(-)
Signature · 1 line
1.9.3
author reviewer
#1 lore raw

RFC 1/5 seccomp,x86,arm,mips,s390: Remove nr parameter from secure_computing

The secure_computing function took a syscall number parameter, but it only paid any attention to that parameter if seccomp mode 1 was enabled. Rather than coming up with a kludge to get the parameter to work in mode 2, just remove the parameter.

To avoid churn in arches that don't have seccomp filters (and may not even support syscall_get_nr right now), this leaves the parameter in secure_computing_strict, which is now a real function.

For ARM, this is a bit ugly due to the fact that ARM conditionally supports seccomp filters. Fixing that is probably only be a couple of lines of code, but it should be coordinated with the audit maintainers.

This will be a slight slowdown on some arches. The right fix is to pass in all of seccomp_data instead of trying to make just the syscall nr part be fast.

I'm working on a big seccomp speedup for x86, but I'd like to remove this wart first.

---
 arch/arm/kernel/ptrace.c      |  7 ++++-
 arch/mips/kernel/ptrace.c     |  2 +-
 arch/s390/kernel/ptrace.c     |  2 +-
 arch/x86/kernel/ptrace.c      |  2 +-
 arch/x86/kernel/vsyscall_64.c |  2 +-
 include/linux/seccomp.h       | 21 ++++++++-------
 kernel/seccomp.c              | 63 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------------
 7 files changed, 65 insertions(+), 34 deletions(-)
arch/arm/kernel/ptrace.c +6 -1
index 0dd3b79..f79c9cc 100644
@@ -934,8 +934,13 @@ asmlinkage int syscall_trace_enter(struct pt_regs *regs, int scno)
 	current_thread_info()->syscall = scno;
 
 	/* Do the secure computing check first; failures should be fast. */
-	if (secure_computing(scno) == -1)
+#ifdef CONFIG_HAVE_ARCH_SECCOMP_FILTER
+	if (secure_computing() == -1)
 		return -1;
+#else
+	/* XXX: remove this once OABI gets fixed */
+	secure_computing_strict(scno);
+#endif
 
 	if (test_thread_flag(TIF_SYSCALL_TRACE))
 		scno = tracehook_report_syscall(regs, PTRACE_SYSCALL_ENTER);
arch/mips/kernel/ptrace.c +1 -1
index f639ccd..808bafc 100644
@@ -639,7 +639,7 @@ asmlinkage long syscall_trace_enter(struct pt_regs *regs, long syscall)
 	long ret = 0;
 	user_exit();
 
-	if (secure_computing(syscall) == -1)
+	if (secure_computing() == -1)
 		return -1;
 
 	if (test_thread_flag(TIF_SYSCALL_TRACE) &&
arch/s390/kernel/ptrace.c +1 -1
index 1c82619..20f1998 100644
@@ -795,7 +795,7 @@ asmlinkage long do_syscall_trace_enter(struct pt_regs *regs)
 	long ret = 0;
 
 	/* Do the secure computing check first. */
-	if (secure_computing(regs->gprs[2])) {
+	if (secure_computing()) {
 		/* seccomp failures shouldn't expose any additional code. */
 		ret = -1;
 		goto out;
arch/x86/kernel/ptrace.c +1 -1
index 678c0ad..93c182a 100644
@@ -1471,7 +1471,7 @@ long syscall_trace_enter(struct pt_regs *regs)
 		regs->flags |= X86_EFLAGS_TF;
 
 	/* do the secure computing check first */
-	if (secure_computing(regs->orig_ax)) {
+	if (secure_computing()) {
 		/* seccomp failures shouldn't expose any additional code. */
 		ret = -1L;
 		goto out;
arch/x86/kernel/vsyscall_64.c +1 -1
index 8b3b3eb..47a4123 100644
@@ -216,7 +216,7 @@ bool emulate_vsyscall(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long address)
 	 */
 	regs->orig_ax = syscall_nr;
 	regs->ax = -ENOSYS;
-	tmp = secure_computing(syscall_nr);
+	tmp = secure_computing();
 	if ((!tmp && regs->orig_ax != syscall_nr) || regs->ip != address) {
 		warn_bad_vsyscall(KERN_DEBUG, regs,
 				  "seccomp tried to change syscall nr or ip");
include/linux/seccomp.h +11 -10
index 4054b09..6e655a6 100644
@@ -25,19 +25,17 @@ struct seccomp {
 	struct seccomp_filter *filter;
 };
 
-extern int __secure_computing(int);
-static inline int secure_computing(int this_syscall)
+#ifdef CONFIG_HAVE_ARCH_SECCOMP_FILTER
+extern int __secure_computing(void);
+static inline int secure_computing(void)
 {
 	if (unlikely(test_thread_flag(TIF_SECCOMP)))
-		return  __secure_computing(this_syscall);
+		return  __secure_computing();
 	return 0;
 }
-
-/* A wrapper for architectures supporting only SECCOMP_MODE_STRICT. */
-static inline void secure_computing_strict(int this_syscall)
-{
-	BUG_ON(secure_computing(this_syscall) != 0);
-}
+#else
+extern void secure_computing_strict(int this_syscall);
+#endif
 
 extern long prctl_get_seccomp(void);
 extern long prctl_set_seccomp(unsigned long, char __user *);
@@ -54,8 +52,11 @@ static inline int seccomp_mode(struct seccomp *s)
 struct seccomp { };
 struct seccomp_filter { };
 
-static inline int secure_computing(int this_syscall) { return 0; }
+#ifdef CONFIG_HAVE_ARCH_SECCOMP_FILTER
+static inline int secure_computing(void) { return 0; }
+#else
 static inline void secure_computing_strict(int this_syscall) { return; }
+#endif
 
 static inline long prctl_get_seccomp(void)
 {
kernel/seccomp.c +44 -19

100 lines not on this page · raw message

Signature · 1 line
1.9.3
author reviewer
#2 lore raw

RFC 2/5 x86_64,entry: Treat regs->ax the same in fastpath and slowpath syscalls

In reply to Andy Lutomirski

For slowpath syscalls, we initialize regs->ax to -ENOSYS and stick the syscall number into regs->orig_ax prior to any possible tracing and syscall execution. This is user-visible ABI used by ptrace syscall emulation and seccomp.

For fastpath syscalls, there's no good reason not to do the same thing. It's even slightly simpler than what we're currently doing. It probably has no measureable performance impact. It should have no user-visible effect.

The purpose of this patch is to prepare for seccomp-based syscall emulation in the fast path. This change is just subtle enough that I'm keeping it separate.

---
 arch/x86/include/asm/calling.h |  6 +++++-
 arch/x86/kernel/entry_64.S     | 11 +++--------
 2 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
arch/x86/include/asm/calling.h +5 -1
index cb4c73b..76659b6 100644
@@ -85,7 +85,7 @@ For 32-bit we have the following conventions - kernel is built with
 #define ARGOFFSET	R11
 #define SWFRAME		ORIG_RAX
 
-	.macro SAVE_ARGS addskip=0, save_rcx=1, save_r891011=1
+	.macro SAVE_ARGS addskip=0, save_rcx=1, save_r891011=1, rax_enosys=0
 	subq  $9*8+\addskip, %rsp
 	CFI_ADJUST_CFA_OFFSET	9*8+\addskip
 	movq_cfi rdi, 8*8
@@ -96,7 +96,11 @@ For 32-bit we have the following conventions - kernel is built with
 	movq_cfi rcx, 5*8
 	.endif
 
+	.if \rax_enosys
+	movq $-ENOSYS, 4*8(%rsp)
+	.else
 	movq_cfi rax, 4*8
+	.endif
 
 	.if \save_r891011
 	movq_cfi r8,  3*8
arch/x86/kernel/entry_64.S +3 -8
index 1e96c36..f9e713a 100644
@@ -611,8 +611,8 @@ GLOBAL(system_call_after_swapgs)
 	 * and short:
 	 */
 	ENABLE_INTERRUPTS(CLBR_NONE)
-	SAVE_ARGS 8,0
-	movq  %rax,ORIG_RAX-ARGOFFSET(%rsp)
+	SAVE_ARGS 8, 0, rax_enosys=1
+	movq_cfi rax,(ORIG_RAX-ARGOFFSET)
 	movq  %rcx,RIP-ARGOFFSET(%rsp)
 	CFI_REL_OFFSET rip,RIP-ARGOFFSET
 	testl $_TIF_WORK_SYSCALL_ENTRY,TI_flags+THREAD_INFO(%rsp,RIP-ARGOFFSET)
@@ -624,7 +624,7 @@ system_call_fastpath:
 	andl $__SYSCALL_MASK,%eax
 	cmpl $__NR_syscall_max,%eax
 #endif
-	ja badsys
+	ja ret_from_sys_call  /* and return regs->ax */
 	movq %r10,%rcx
 	call *sys_call_table(,%rax,8)  # XXX:	 rip relative
 	movq %rax,RAX-ARGOFFSET(%rsp)
@@ -683,10 +683,6 @@ sysret_signal:
 	FIXUP_TOP_OF_STACK %r11, -ARGOFFSET
 	jmp int_check_syscall_exit_work
 
-badsys:
-	movq $-ENOSYS,RAX-ARGOFFSET(%rsp)
-	jmp ret_from_sys_call
-
 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL
 	/*
 	 * Fast path for syscall audit without full syscall trace.
@@ -726,7 +722,6 @@ tracesys:
 	jz auditsys
 #endif
 	SAVE_REST
-	movq $-ENOSYS,RAX(%rsp) /* ptrace can change this for a bad syscall */
 	FIXUP_TOP_OF_STACK %rdi
 	movq %rsp,%rdi
 	call syscall_trace_enter
Signature · 1 line
1.9.3
author reviewer
#3 lore raw

RFC 3/5 seccomp: Refactor the filter callback and the API

In reply to Andy Lutomirski

The reason I did this is to add a seccomp API that will be usable for an x86 fast path. The x86 entry code needs to use a rather expensive slow path for a syscall that might be visible to things like ptrace. By splitting seccomp into two phases, we can check whether we need the slow path and then use the fast path in if the filter allows the syscall or just returns some errno.

As a side effect, I think the new code is much easier to understand than the old code.

This has one user-visible effect: the audit record written for SECCOMP_RET_TRACE is now a simple indication that SECCOMP_RET_TRACE happened. It used to depend in a complicated way on what the tracer did. I couldn't make much sense of it.

---
 include/linux/seccomp.h |   6 ++
 kernel/seccomp.c        | 179 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----------------
 2 files changed, 122 insertions(+), 63 deletions(-)
include/linux/seccomp.h +6 -0
index 6e655a6..8345fdc 100644
@@ -33,6 +33,12 @@ static inline int secure_computing(void)
 		return  __secure_computing();
 	return 0;
 }
+
+#define SECCOMP_PHASE1_OK	0
+#define SECCOMP_PHASE1_SKIP	1
+
+extern u32 seccomp_phase1(void);
+int seccomp_phase2(u32 phase1_result);
 #else
 extern void secure_computing_strict(int this_syscall);
 #endif
kernel/seccomp.c +116 -63

203 lines not on this page · raw message

Signature · 1 line
1.9.3
author reviewer
#4 lore raw

RFC 4/5 seccomp: Allow arch code to provide seccomp_data

In reply to Andy Lutomirski
---
 include/linux/seccomp.h |  2 +-
 kernel/seccomp.c        | 32 +++++++++++++++++++-------------
 2 files changed, 20 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)
include/linux/seccomp.h +1 -1
index 8345fdc..4fc7a84 100644
@@ -37,7 +37,7 @@ static inline int secure_computing(void)
 #define SECCOMP_PHASE1_OK	0
 #define SECCOMP_PHASE1_SKIP	1
 
-extern u32 seccomp_phase1(void);
+extern u32 seccomp_phase1(struct seccomp_data *sd);
 int seccomp_phase2(u32 phase1_result);
 #else
 extern void secure_computing_strict(int this_syscall);
kernel/seccomp.c +19 -13
index dfdb38a..6848912 100644
@@ -173,24 +173,27 @@ static int seccomp_check_filter(struct sock_filter *filter, unsigned int flen)
  *
  * Returns valid seccomp BPF response codes.
  */
-static u32 seccomp_run_filters(void)
+static u32 seccomp_run_filters(struct seccomp_data *sd)
 {
 	struct seccomp_filter *f;
-	struct seccomp_data sd;
+	struct seccomp_data sd_local;
 	u32 ret = SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW;
 
 	/* Ensure unexpected behavior doesn't result in failing open. */
 	if (WARN_ON(current->seccomp.filter == NULL))
 		return SECCOMP_RET_KILL;
 
-	populate_seccomp_data(&sd);
+	if (!sd) {
+		populate_seccomp_data(&sd_local);
+		sd = &sd_local;
+	}
 
 	/*
 	 * All filters in the list are evaluated and the lowest BPF return
 	 * value always takes priority (ignoring the DATA).
 	 */
 	for (f = current->seccomp.filter; f; f = f->prev) {
-		u32 cur_ret = sk_run_filter_int_seccomp(&sd, f->insnsi);
+		u32 cur_ret = sk_run_filter_int_seccomp(sd, f->insnsi);
 		if ((cur_ret & SECCOMP_RET_ACTION) < (ret & SECCOMP_RET_ACTION))
 			ret = cur_ret;
 	}
@@ -406,7 +409,7 @@ void secure_computing_strict(int this_syscall)
 #else
 int __secure_computing(void)
 {
-	u32 phase1_result = seccomp_phase1();
+	u32 phase1_result = seccomp_phase1(NULL);
 	if (likely(phase1_result == SECCOMP_PHASE1_OK))
 		return 0;
 	else if (likely(phase1_result == SECCOMP_PHASE1_SKIP))
@@ -416,22 +419,22 @@ int __secure_computing(void)
 }
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_SECCOMP_FILTER
-static u32 __seccomp_phase1_filter(int this_syscall, struct pt_regs *regs)
+static u32 __seccomp_phase1_filter(int this_syscall, struct seccomp_data *sd)
 {
-	u32 filter_ret = seccomp_run_filters();
+	u32 filter_ret = seccomp_run_filters(sd);
 	int data = filter_ret & SECCOMP_RET_DATA;
 	u32 action = filter_ret & SECCOMP_RET_ACTION;
 
 	switch (action) {
 	case SECCOMP_RET_ERRNO:
 		/* Set the low-order 16-bits as a errno. */
-		syscall_set_return_value(current, regs,
+		syscall_set_return_value(current, task_pt_regs(current),
 					 -data, 0);
 		goto skip;
 
 	case SECCOMP_RET_TRAP:
 		/* Show the handler the original registers. */
-		syscall_rollback(current, regs);
+		syscall_rollback(current, task_pt_regs(current));
 		/* Let the filter pass back 16 bits of data. */
 		seccomp_send_sigsys(this_syscall, data);
 		goto skip;
@@ -458,11 +461,14 @@ skip:
 
 /**
  * seccomp_phase1() - run fast path seccomp checks on the current syscall
+ * @arg sd: The seccomp_data or NULL
  *
  * This only reads pt_regs via the syscall_xyz helpers.  The only change
  * it will make to pt_regs is via syscall_set_return_value, and it will
  * only do that if it returns SECCOMP_PHASE1_SKIP.
  *
+ * If sd is provided, it will not read pt_regs@all.
+ *
  * It may also call do_exit or force a signal; these actions must be
  * safe.
  *
@@ -476,11 +482,11 @@ skip:
  * If it returns anything else, then the return value should be passed
  * to seccomp_phase2 from a context in which ptrace hooks are safe.
  */
-u32 seccomp_phase1(void)
+u32 seccomp_phase1(struct seccomp_data *sd)
 {
 	int mode = current->seccomp.mode;
-	struct pt_regs *regs = task_pt_regs(current);
-	int this_syscall = syscall_get_nr(current, regs);
+	int this_syscall = sd ? sd->nr :
+		syscall_get_nr(current, task_pt_regs(current));
 
 	switch (mode) {
 	case SECCOMP_MODE_STRICT:
@@ -488,7 +494,7 @@ u32 seccomp_phase1(void)
 		return SECCOMP_PHASE1_OK;
 #ifdef CONFIG_SECCOMP_FILTER
 	case SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER:
-		return __seccomp_phase1_filter(this_syscall, regs);
+		return __seccomp_phase1_filter(this_syscall, sd);
 #endif
 	default:
 		BUG();
Signature · 1 line
1.9.3
author reviewer
#5 lore raw

RFC 5/5 x86,seccomp: Add a seccomp fastpath

In reply to Andy Lutomirski

On my VM, getpid takes about 70ns. Before this patch, adding a single-instruction always-accept seccomp filter added about 134ns of overhead to getpid. With this patch, the overhead is down to about 13ns.

I'm not really thrilled by this patch. It has two main issues:

1. Calling into code in kernel/seccomp.c from assembly feels ugly.

2. The x86 64-bit syscall entry now has four separate code paths:
fast, seccomp only, audit only, and slow. This kind of sucks. Would it be worth trying to rewrite the whole thing in C with a two-phase slow path approach like I'm using here for seccomp?

---
 arch/x86/kernel/entry_64.S | 45 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 include/linux/seccomp.h    |  4 ++--
 2 files changed, 47 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
arch/x86/kernel/entry_64.S +45 -0
index f9e713a..feb32b2 100644
@@ -683,6 +683,45 @@ sysret_signal:
 	FIXUP_TOP_OF_STACK %r11, -ARGOFFSET
 	jmp int_check_syscall_exit_work
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECCOMP
+	/*
+	 * Fast path for seccomp without any other slow path triggers.
+	 */
+seccomp_fastpath:
+	/* Build seccomp_data */
+	pushq %r9				/* args[5] */
+	pushq %r8				/* args[4] */
+	pushq %r10				/* args[3] */
+	pushq %rdx				/* args[2] */
+	pushq %rsi				/* args[1] */
+	pushq %rdi				/* args[0] */
+	pushq RIP-ARGOFFSET+6*8(%rsp)		/* rip */
+	pushq %rax 				/* nr and junk */
+	movl $AUDIT_ARCH_X86_64, 4(%rsp)	/* arch */
+	movq %rsp, %rdi
+	call seccomp_phase1
+	addq $8*8, %rsp
+	cmpq $1, %rax
+	ja seccomp_invoke_phase2
+	LOAD_ARGS 0  /* restore clobbered regs */
+	jb system_call_fastpath
+	jmp ret_from_sys_call
+
+seccomp_invoke_phase2:
+	SAVE_REST
+	FIXUP_TOP_OF_STACK %rdi
+	movq %rax,%rdi
+	call seccomp_phase2
+
+	/* if seccomp says to skip, then set orig_ax to -1 and skip */
+	test %eax,%eax
+	jz 1f
+	movq $-1, ORIG_RAX(%rsp)
+1:
+	mov ORIG_RAX(%rsp), %rax		/* reload rax */
+	jmp system_call_post_trace		/* and maybe do the syscall */
+#endif
+
 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL
 	/*
 	 * Fast path for syscall audit without full syscall trace.
@@ -717,6 +756,10 @@ sysret_audit:
 
 	/* Do syscall tracing */
 tracesys:
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECCOMP
+	testl $(_TIF_WORK_SYSCALL_ENTRY & ~_TIF_SECCOMP),TI_flags+THREAD_INFO(%rsp,RIP-ARGOFFSET)
+	jz seccomp_fastpath
+#endif
 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL
 	testl $(_TIF_WORK_SYSCALL_ENTRY & ~_TIF_SYSCALL_AUDIT),TI_flags+THREAD_INFO(%rsp,RIP-ARGOFFSET)
 	jz auditsys
@@ -725,6 +768,8 @@ tracesys:
 	FIXUP_TOP_OF_STACK %rdi
 	movq %rsp,%rdi
 	call syscall_trace_enter
+
+system_call_post_trace:
 	/*
 	 * Reload arg registers from stack in case ptrace changed them.
 	 * We don't reload %rax because syscall_trace_enter() returned
include/linux/seccomp.h +2 -2
index 4fc7a84..d3d4c52 100644
@@ -37,8 +37,8 @@ static inline int secure_computing(void)
 #define SECCOMP_PHASE1_OK	0
 #define SECCOMP_PHASE1_SKIP	1
 
-extern u32 seccomp_phase1(struct seccomp_data *sd);
-int seccomp_phase2(u32 phase1_result);
+asmlinkage __visible extern u32 seccomp_phase1(struct seccomp_data *sd);
+asmlinkage __visible int seccomp_phase2(u32 phase1_result);
 #else
 extern void secure_computing_strict(int this_syscall);
 #endif
Signature · 1 line
1.9.3
#6 lore raw

Re: [RFC 5/5] x86,seccomp: Add a seccomp fastpath

Quoted 4 lines · Andy Lutomirski

On my VM, getpid takes about 70ns. Before this patch, adding a single-instruction always-accept seccomp filter added about 134ns of overhead to getpid. With this patch, the overhead is down to about 13ns.

interesting.
Is this the gain from patch 4 into patch 5 or from patch 0 to patch 5? 13ns is still with seccomp enabled, but without filters?

Quoted 30 lines

I'm not really thrilled by this patch. It has two main issues:

1. Calling into code in kernel/seccomp.c from assembly feels ugly.

2. The x86 64-bit syscall entry now has four separate code paths:
fast, seccomp only, audit only, and slow. This kind of sucks. Would it be worth trying to rewrite the whole thing in C with a two-phase slow path approach like I'm using here for seccomp?

---
 arch/x86/kernel/entry_64.S | 45 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 include/linux/seccomp.h    |  4 ++--
 2 files changed, 47 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
arch/x86/kernel/entry_64.S +7 -0
index f9e713a..feb32b2 100644
@@ -683,6 +683,45 @@ sysret_signal:
        FIXUP_TOP_OF_STACK %r11, -ARGOFFSET
        jmp int_check_syscall_exit_work
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECCOMP
+       /*
+        * Fast path for seccomp without any other slow path triggers.
+        */
+seccomp_fastpath:
+       /* Build seccomp_data */
+       pushq %r9                               /* args[5] */

arch/x86/kernel/entry_64.S sysret_signal: · line 702

Quoted 10 lines
arch/x86/kernel/entry_64.S +10 -0
+       pushq %r8                               /* args[4] */
+       pushq %r10                              /* args[3] */
+       pushq %rdx                              /* args[2] */
+       pushq %rsi                              /* args[1] */
+       pushq %rdi                              /* args[0] */
+       pushq RIP-ARGOFFSET+6*8(%rsp)           /* rip */
+       pushq %rax                              /* nr and junk */
+       movl $AUDIT_ARCH_X86_64, 4(%rsp)        /* arch */
+       movq %rsp, %rdi
+       call seccomp_phase1

the assembler code is pretty much repeating what C does in populate_seccomp_data(). Assuming the whole gain came from patch 5 why asm version is so much faster than C?
it skips SAVE/RESTORE_REST... what else?
If the most of the gain is from all patches combined (mainly from 2 phase approach) then why bother with asm?

Somehow it feels that the gain is due to better branch prediction in asm version. If you change few 'unlikely' in C to 'likely', it may get to the same performance...

btw patches #1-3 look good to me. especially #1 is nice.

Quoted 68 lines
arch/x86/kernel/entry_64.S +28 -0
+       addq $8*8, %rsp
+       cmpq $1, %rax
+       ja seccomp_invoke_phase2
+       LOAD_ARGS 0  /* restore clobbered regs */
+       jb system_call_fastpath
+       jmp ret_from_sys_call
+
+seccomp_invoke_phase2:
+       SAVE_REST
+       FIXUP_TOP_OF_STACK %rdi
+       movq %rax,%rdi
+       call seccomp_phase2
+
+       /* if seccomp says to skip, then set orig_ax to -1 and skip */
+       test %eax,%eax
+       jz 1f
+       movq $-1, ORIG_RAX(%rsp)
+1:
+       mov ORIG_RAX(%rsp), %rax                /* reload rax */
+       jmp system_call_post_trace              /* and maybe do the syscall */
+#endif
+
 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL
        /*
         * Fast path for syscall audit without full syscall trace.
@@ -717,6 +756,10 @@ sysret_audit:
 
        /* Do syscall tracing */
 tracesys:
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECCOMP
+       testl $(_TIF_WORK_SYSCALL_ENTRY & ~_TIF_SECCOMP),TI_flags+THREAD_INFO(%rsp,RIP-ARGOFFSET)
+       jz seccomp_fastpath
+#endif
 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL
        testl $(_TIF_WORK_SYSCALL_ENTRY & ~_TIF_SYSCALL_AUDIT),TI_flags+THREAD_INFO(%rsp,RIP-ARGOFFSET)
        jz auditsys
@@ -725,6 +768,8 @@ tracesys:
        FIXUP_TOP_OF_STACK %rdi
        movq %rsp,%rdi
        call syscall_trace_enter
+
+system_call_post_trace:
        /*
         * Reload arg registers from stack in case ptrace changed them.
         * We don't reload %rax because syscall_trace_enter() returned
include/linux/seccomp.h +2 -3
index 4fc7a84..d3d4c52 100644
@@ -37,8 +37,8 @@ static inline int secure_computing(void)
 #define SECCOMP_PHASE1_OK      0
 #define SECCOMP_PHASE1_SKIP    1
 
-extern u32 seccomp_phase1(struct seccomp_data *sd);
-int seccomp_phase2(u32 phase1_result);
+asmlinkage __visible extern u32 seccomp_phase1(struct seccomp_data *sd);
+asmlinkage __visible int seccomp_phase2(u32 phase1_result);
 #else
 extern void secure_computing_strict(int this_syscall);
 #endif
--

1.9.3

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author reviewer
#7 lore raw

Re: [RFC 5/5] x86,seccomp: Add a seccomp fastpath

Quoted 9 lines · Alexei Starovoitov
Quoted 4 lines · Andy Lutomirski

On my VM, getpid takes about 70ns. Before this patch, adding a single-instruction always-accept seccomp filter added about 134ns of overhead to getpid. With this patch, the overhead is down to about 13ns.

interesting.
Is this the gain from patch 4 into patch 5 or from patch 0 to patch 5? 13ns is still with seccomp enabled, but without filters?

13ns is with the simplest nonempty filter. I hope that empty filters don't work.

Quoted 38 lines
Quoted 37 lines

I'm not really thrilled by this patch. It has two main issues:

1. Calling into code in kernel/seccomp.c from assembly feels ugly.

2. The x86 64-bit syscall entry now has four separate code paths:
fast, seccomp only, audit only, and slow. This kind of sucks. Would it be worth trying to rewrite the whole thing in C with a two-phase slow path approach like I'm using here for seccomp?

---
 arch/x86/kernel/entry_64.S | 45 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 include/linux/seccomp.h    |  4 ++--
 2 files changed, 47 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
arch/x86/kernel/entry_64.S +13 -0
index f9e713a..feb32b2 100644
@@ -683,6 +683,45 @@ sysret_signal:
        FIXUP_TOP_OF_STACK %r11, -ARGOFFSET
        jmp int_check_syscall_exit_work
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECCOMP
+       /*
+        * Fast path for seccomp without any other slow path triggers.
+        */
+seccomp_fastpath:
+       /* Build seccomp_data */
+       pushq %r9                               /* args[5] */
+       pushq %r8                               /* args[4] */
+       pushq %r10                              /* args[3] */
+       pushq %rdx                              /* args[2] */
+       pushq %rsi                              /* args[1] */
+       pushq %rdi                              /* args[0] */
+       pushq RIP-ARGOFFSET+6*8(%rsp)           /* rip */
Quoted 2 lines

arch/x86/kernel/entry_64.S sysret_signal: · line 700

Quoted 2 lines
arch/x86/kernel/entry_64.S +2 -0
+       pushq %rax                              /* nr and junk */
+       movl $AUDIT_ARCH_X86_64, 4(%rsp)        /* arch */

It wouldn't shock me if this pair of instructions were microarchitecturally bad. Maybe I can save a few more cycles by using bitwise arithmetic or a pair of movls and explicit rsp manipulation here. I haven't tried.

Quoted 10 lines

arch/x86/kernel/entry_64.S sysret_signal: · line 702

Quoted 2 lines
arch/x86/kernel/entry_64.S +2 -0
+       movq %rsp, %rdi
+       call seccomp_phase1

the assembler code is pretty much repeating what C does in populate_seccomp_data(). Assuming the whole gain came from patch 5 why asm version is so much faster than C?

it skips SAVE/RESTORE_REST... what else?
If the most of the gain is from all patches combined (mainly from 2 phase approach) then why bother with asm?

The whole gain should be patch 5, but there are three things going on here.

The biggest win is skipping int_ret_from_sys_call. IRET sucks. There's some extra win from skipping SAVE/RESTORE_REST, but I haven't benchmarked that. I would guess it's on the order of 5ns. In theory a one-pass implementation could skip int_ret_from_sys_call, but that will be awkward to implement correctly.

The other benefit is generating seccomp_data in assembly. It saves about 7ns. This is likely due to avoiding all the indirection in syscall_xyz and to avoiding prodding at flags to figure out the arch token.

Fiddling with branch prediction made no difference that I could measure.

Quoted 6 lines

Somehow it feels that the gain is due to better branch prediction in asm version. If you change few 'unlikely' in C to 'likely', it may get to the same performance...

btw patches #1-3 look good to me. especially #1 is nice.

Thanks :)

--Andy

#8 lore raw

Re: [RFC 5/5] x86,seccomp: Add a seccomp fastpath

Quoted 4 lines · Andy Lutomirski

13ns is with the simplest nonempty filter. I hope that empty filters don't work.

Why wouldn't they?

-hpa

author reviewer
#9 lore raw

Re: [RFC 5/5] x86,seccomp: Add a seccomp fastpath

Quoted 7 lines · H. Peter Anvin
Quoted 4 lines · Andy Lutomirski

13ns is with the simplest nonempty filter. I hope that empty filters don't work.

Why wouldn't they?

Is it permissible to fall off the end of a BPF program? I'm getting EINVAL trying to install an actual empty filter. The filter I tested with was:

#include <unistd.h>
#include <linux/filter.h>
#include <linux/seccomp.h>
#include <sys/syscall.h>
#include <err.h>
#include <sys/prctl.h>
#include <stddef.h>
#include <stdio.h>

int main(int argc, char **argv)

{
    int rc;

    struct sock_filter filter[] = {
        BPF_STMT(BPF_RET+BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW),
    };

    struct sock_fprog prog = {
        .len = (unsigned short)(sizeof(filter)/sizeof(filter[0])),
        .filter = filter,
    };

    if (argc < 2) {
        printf("Usage: null_seccomp PATH ARGS...\n");
        return 1;
    }

    if (prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 1, 0, 0, 0))
        err(1, "PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS");
    if (prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER, &prog))
        err(1, "PR_SET_SECCOMP");

    execv(argv[1], argv + 1);
    err(1, argv[1]);
}

--Andy

#10 lore raw

Re: [RFC 5/5] x86,seccomp: Add a seccomp fastpath

Quoted 7 lines · Andy Lutomirski
Quoted 6 lines · H. Peter Anvin
Quoted 4 lines · Andy Lutomirski

13ns is with the simplest nonempty filter. I hope that empty filters don't work.

Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 1 line

Why wouldn't they?

Is it permissible to fall off the end of a BPF program? I'm getting EINVAL trying to install an actual empty filter. The filter I tested with was:

What I meant was that there has to be a well-defined behavior for the program falling off the end anyway, and that that should be preserved.

I guess it is possible to require that all code paths must provably reach a termination point.

-hpa

author reviewer
#11 lore raw

Re: [RFC 5/5] x86,seccomp: Add a seccomp fastpath

Quoted 15 lines · H. Peter Anvin
Quoted 7 lines · Andy Lutomirski
Quoted 6 lines · H. Peter Anvin
Quoted 4 lines · Andy Lutomirski

13ns is with the simplest nonempty filter. I hope that empty filters don't work.

Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 1 line

Why wouldn't they?

Is it permissible to fall off the end of a BPF program? I'm getting EINVAL trying to install an actual empty filter. The filter I tested with was:

Quoted 6 lines

What I meant was that there has to be a well-defined behavior for the program falling off the end anyway, and that that should be preserved.

I guess it is possible to require that all code paths must provably reach a termination point.

Dunno. I haven't ever touched any of the actual BPF code. This whole patchset only changes the code that invokes the BPF evaluator.

--Andy

#12 lore raw

Re: [RFC 5/5] x86,seccomp: Add a seccomp fastpath

Quoted 19 lines · Andy Lutomirski
Quoted 18 lines · H. Peter Anvin
Quoted 7 lines · Andy Lutomirski
Quoted 6 lines · H. Peter Anvin
Quoted 4 lines · Andy Lutomirski

13ns is with the simplest nonempty filter. I hope that empty filters don't work.

Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 1 line

Why wouldn't they?

Is it permissible to fall off the end of a BPF program? I'm getting EINVAL trying to install an actual empty filter. The filter I tested with was:

What I meant was that there has to be a well-defined behavior for the program falling off the end anyway, and that that should be preserved.

Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 3 lines

I guess it is possible to require that all code paths must provably reach a termination point.

Dunno. I haven't ever touched any of the actual BPF code. This whole patchset only changes the code that invokes the BPF evaluator.

Yes, this is how BPF works: runs to the end or exit early. With seccomp BPF specifically, the return value defaults to kill the process. If a filter was missing (NULL), or empty, or didn't explicitly return with a new value, the default (kill) should be taken.

-Kees

Signature · 2 lines
Kees Cook
Chrome OS Security
reviewer
#13 lore raw

Re: [RFC 5/5] x86,seccomp: Add a seccomp fastpath

Quoted 24 lines · Kees Cook
Quoted 23 lines · Andy Lutomirski
Quoted 21 lines · H. Peter Anvin
Quoted 7 lines · Andy Lutomirski
Quoted 6 lines · H. Peter Anvin
Quoted 4 lines · Andy Lutomirski

13ns is with the simplest nonempty filter. I hope that empty filters don't work.

Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 1 line

Why wouldn't they?

Is it permissible to fall off the end of a BPF program? I'm getting EINVAL trying to install an actual empty filter. The filter I tested with was:

What I meant was that there has to be a well-defined behavior for the program falling off the end anyway, and that that should be preserved.

I guess it is possible to require that all code paths must provably reach a termination point.

Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 2 lines

Dunno. I haven't ever touched any of the actual BPF code. This whole patchset only changes the code that invokes the BPF evaluator.

Yes, this is how BPF works: runs to the end or exit early. With seccomp BPF specifically, the return value defaults to kill the process. If a filter was missing (NULL), or empty, or didn't explicitly return with a new value, the default (kill) should be taken.

Yup - this is just a property of BPF (and a nice one :)

On seccomp_attach_filter this check fires:
if (fprog->len == 0 || fprog->len > BPF_MAXINSNS)

    return -EINVAL;

As well as in sk_chk_filter:
if (flen == 0 || flen > BPF_MAXINSNS)

    return -EINVAL;

And:
/* last instruction must be a RET code */

  switch (filter[flen - 1].code) {
    case BPF_S_RET_K:
    case BPF_S_RET_A:
      return check_load_and_stores(filter, flen);

}

cheers!
will