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x86: skip check for spurious faults for non-present faults

PATCH In review David Vrabel 2 participants 3 messages May 16, 2014 – Jun 18, 2014

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PATCH v2 1/1 x86: skip check for spurious faults for non-present faults

If a fault on a kernel address is due to a non-present page, then it cannot be the result of stale TLB entry from a protection change (RO to RW or NX to X). Thus the pagetable walk in spurious_fault() can be skipped.

See the initial if in spurious_fault() and the tests in spurious_fault_check()) for the set of possible error codes checked for spurious faults. These are:

IRUWP
Before x00xx && ( 1xxxx || xxx1x )
After ( 10001 || 00011 ) && ( 1xxxx || xxx1x )

Thus the new condition is a subset of the previous one, excluding only non-present faults (I == 1 and W == 1 are mutually exclusive).

This avoids spurious_fault() oopsing in some cases if the pagetables it attempts to walk are not accessible. This obscures the location of the original fault.

This also fixes a crash with Xen PV guests when they access entries in the M2P corresponding to device MMIO regions. The M2P is mapped (read-only) by Xen into the kernel address space of the guest and this mapping may contains holes for non-RAM regions. Read faults will result in calls to spurious_fault(), but because the page tables for the M2P mappings are not accessible by the guest the pagetable walk would fault.

This was not normally a problem as MMIO mappings would not normally result in a M2P lookup because of the use of the _PAGE_IOMAP bit the PTE. However, removing the _PAGE_IOMAP bit requires M2P lookups for MMIO mappings as well.

---
x86 maintainers, this is a prerequisite for removing Xen's usage of _PAGE_IOMAP so I think this is best merged via the Xen tree.

v2:
- improve comments

---
 arch/x86/mm/fault.c |   22 ++++++++++++++++++++--
 1 file changed, 20 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
arch/x86/mm/fault.c +20 -2
index 8e57229..7f790e4 100644
@@ -924,8 +924,17 @@ static int spurious_fault_check(unsigned long error_code, pte_t *pte)
  * cross-processor TLB flush, even if no stale TLB entries exist
  * on other processors.
  *
+ * Spurious faults may only occur if the TLB contains an entry with
+ * fewer permission than the page table entry.  Non-present (P = 0)
+ * and reserved bit (R = 1) faults are never spurious.
+ *
  * There are no security implications to leaving a stale TLB when
  * increasing the permissions on a page.
+ *
+ * Returns non-zero if a spurious fault was handled, zero otherwise.
+ *
+ * See Intel Developer's Manual Vol 3 Section 4.10.4.3, bullet 3
+ * (Optional Invalidation).
  */
 static noinline __kprobes int
 spurious_fault(unsigned long error_code, unsigned long address)
@@ -936,8 +945,17 @@ spurious_fault(unsigned long error_code, unsigned long address)
 	pte_t *pte;
 	int ret;
 
-	/* Reserved-bit violation or user access to kernel space? */
-	if (error_code & (PF_USER | PF_RSVD))
+	/*
+	 * Only writes to RO or instruction fetches from NX may cause
+	 * spurious faults.
+	 *
+	 * These could be from user or supervisor accesses but the TLB
+	 * is only lazily flushed after a kernel mapping protection
+	 * change, so user accesses are not expected to cause spurious
+	 * faults.
+	 */
+	if (error_code != (PF_WRITE | PF_PROT)
+	    && error_code != (PF_INSTR | PF_PROT))
 		return 0;
 
 	pgd = init_mm.pgd + pgd_index(address);
Signature · 1 line
1.7.10.4
#2 lore raw
In reply to David Vrabel

Peter,

Someone else asking about what _PAGE_IOMAP was for reminded me that this was still outstanding. Could you review and ack if appropriate?

Thanks.

David

Quoted 90 lines · David Vrabel

If a fault on a kernel address is due to a non-present page, then it cannot be the result of stale TLB entry from a protection change (RO to RW or NX to X). Thus the pagetable walk in spurious_fault() can be skipped.

See the initial if in spurious_fault() and the tests in spurious_fault_check()) for the set of possible error codes checked for spurious faults. These are:

IRUWP
Before x00xx && ( 1xxxx || xxx1x )
After ( 10001 || 00011 ) && ( 1xxxx || xxx1x )

Thus the new condition is a subset of the previous one, excluding only non-present faults (I == 1 and W == 1 are mutually exclusive).

This avoids spurious_fault() oopsing in some cases if the pagetables it attempts to walk are not accessible. This obscures the location of the original fault.

This also fixes a crash with Xen PV guests when they access entries in the M2P corresponding to device MMIO regions. The M2P is mapped (read-only) by Xen into the kernel address space of the guest and this mapping may contains holes for non-RAM regions. Read faults will result in calls to spurious_fault(), but because the page tables for the M2P mappings are not accessible by the guest the pagetable walk would fault.

This was not normally a problem as MMIO mappings would not normally result in a M2P lookup because of the use of the _PAGE_IOMAP bit the PTE. However, removing the _PAGE_IOMAP bit requires M2P lookups for MMIO mappings as well.

---
x86 maintainers, this is a prerequisite for removing Xen's usage of _PAGE_IOMAP so I think this is best merged via the Xen tree.

v2:
- improve comments

---
 arch/x86/mm/fault.c |   22 ++++++++++++++++++++--
 1 file changed, 20 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
arch/x86/mm/fault.c +20 -2
index 8e57229..7f790e4 100644
@@ -924,8 +924,17 @@ static int spurious_fault_check(unsigned long error_code, pte_t *pte)
  * cross-processor TLB flush, even if no stale TLB entries exist
  * on other processors.
  *
+ * Spurious faults may only occur if the TLB contains an entry with
+ * fewer permission than the page table entry.  Non-present (P = 0)
+ * and reserved bit (R = 1) faults are never spurious.
+ *
  * There are no security implications to leaving a stale TLB when
  * increasing the permissions on a page.
+ *
+ * Returns non-zero if a spurious fault was handled, zero otherwise.
+ *
+ * See Intel Developer's Manual Vol 3 Section 4.10.4.3, bullet 3
+ * (Optional Invalidation).
  */
 static noinline __kprobes int
 spurious_fault(unsigned long error_code, unsigned long address)
@@ -936,8 +945,17 @@ spurious_fault(unsigned long error_code, unsigned long address)
 	pte_t *pte;
 	int ret;
 
-	/* Reserved-bit violation or user access to kernel space? */
-	if (error_code & (PF_USER | PF_RSVD))
+	/*
+	 * Only writes to RO or instruction fetches from NX may cause
+	 * spurious faults.
+	 *
+	 * These could be from user or supervisor accesses but the TLB
+	 * is only lazily flushed after a kernel mapping protection
+	 * change, so user accesses are not expected to cause spurious
+	 * faults.
+	 */
+	if (error_code != (PF_WRITE | PF_PROT)
+	    && error_code != (PF_INSTR | PF_PROT))
 		return 0;
 
 	pgd = init_mm.pgd + pgd_index(address);