audit: implement container identifier
Subsystems (10)
v3 cover audit: implement container identifier
Implement kernel audit container identifier.
This patchset is a third based on the proposal document (V3) posted:
https://www.redhat.com/archives/linux-audit/2018-January/msg00014.html
The first patch implements the proc fs write to set the audit container identifier of a process, emitting an AUDIT_CONTAINER_ID record to announce the registration of that audit container identifier on that process. This patch requires userspace support for record acceptance and proper type display.
The second implements the auxiliary record AUDIT_CONTAINER if an audit container identifier is identifiable with an event. This patch requires userspace support for proper type display.
The third adds signal and ptrace support.
The 4th creates a local audit context to be able to bind a standalone record with a locally created auxiliary record.
The 5th patch adds audit container identifier records to the tty standalone record.
The 6th adds audit container identifier filtering to the exit, exclude and user lists. This patch adds the AUDIT_CONTID field and requires auditctl userspace support for the --contid option.
The 7th adds network namespace audit container identifier labelling based on member tasks' audit container identifier labels.
The 8th adds audit container identifier support to standalone netfilter records that don't have a task context and lists each container to which that net namespace belongs.
The 9th implements reading the audit container identifier from the proc filesystem for debugging. This patch isn't planned for upstream inclusion.
The 10th fixes an rfkill spelling mistake in a comment that is otherwise the only match for "contid" in the kernel.
Example: Set an audit container identifier of 123456 to the "sleep" task:
sleep 2&
child=$!
echo 123456 > /proc/$child/audit_containerid; echo $? ausearch -ts recent -m container
echo child:$child contid:$( cat /proc/$child/audit_containerid)
This should produce a record such as:
type=CONTAINER_ID msg=audit(2018-06-06 12:39:29.636:26949) : op=set opid=2209 old-contid=18446744073709551615 contid=123456 pid=628 auid=root uid=root tty=ttyS0 ses=1 subj=unconfined_u:unconfined_r:unconfined_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 comm=bash exe=/usr/bin/bash res=yes
Example: Set a filter on an audit container identifier 123459 on /tmp/tmpcontainerid:
contid=123459
key=tmpcontainerid
auditctl -a exit,always -F dir=/tmp -F perm=wa -F contid=$contid -F key=$key perl -e "sleep 1; open(my \$tmpfile, '>', \"/tmp/$key\"); close(\$tmpfile);" & child=$!
echo $contid > /proc/$child/audit_containerid
sleep 2
ausearch -i -ts recent -k $key
auditctl -d exit,always -F dir=/tmp -F perm=wa -F contid=$contid -F key=$key rm -f /tmp/$key
This should produce an event such as:
type=CONTAINER msg=audit(2018-06-06 12:46:31.707:26953) : op=task contid=123459 type=PROCTITLE msg=audit(2018-06-06 12:46:31.707:26953) : proctitle=perl -e sleep 1; open(my $tmpfile, '>', "/tmp/tmpcontainerid"); close($tmpfile); type=PATH msg=audit(2018-06-06 12:46:31.707:26953) : item=1 name=/tmp/tmpcontainerid inode=25656 dev=00:26 mode=file,644 ouid=root ogid=root rdev=00:00 obj=unconfined_u:object_r:user_tmp_t:s0 nametype=CREATE cap_fp=none cap_fi=none cap_fe=0 cap_fver=0 type=PATH msg=audit(2018-06-06 12:46:31.707:26953) : item=0 name=/tmp/ inode=8985 dev=00:26 mode=dir,sticky,777 ouid=root ogid=root rdev=00:00 obj=system_u:object_r:tmp_t:s0 nametype=PARENT cap_fp=none cap_fi=none cap_fe=0 cap_fver=0 type=CWD msg=audit(2018-06-06 12:46:31.707:26953) : cwd=/root type=SYSCALL msg=audit(2018-06-06 12:46:31.707:26953) : arch=x86_64 syscall=openat success=yes exit=3 a0=0xffffffffffffff9c a1=0x5621f2b81900 a2=O_WRONLY|O_CREAT|O_TRUNC a3=0x1b6 items=2 ppid=628 pid=2232 auid=root uid=root gid=root euid=root suid=root fsuid=root egid=root sgid=root fsgid=root tty=ttyS0 ses=1 comm=perl exe=/usr/bin/perl subj=unconfined_u:unconfined_r:unconfined_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 key=tmpcontainerid
Requires: https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-kernel/issues/81
See: https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-kernel/issues/90
See: https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-userspace/issues/40
See: https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-testsuite/issues/64
See: https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-kernel/wiki/RFE-Audit-Container-ID
Changelog:
v3
- switched from containerid in task_struct to audit_task_info (depends on ghak81)
- drop INVALID_CID in favour of only AUDIT_CID_UNSET
- check for !audit_task_info, throw -ENOPROTOOPT on set
- changed -EPERM to -EEXIST for parent check
- return AUDIT_CID_UNSET if !audit_enabled
- squash child/thread check patch into AUDIT_CONTAINER_ID patch
- changed -EPERM to -EBUSY for child check
- separate child and thread checks, use -EALREADY for latter
- move addition of op= from ptrace/signal patch to AUDIT_CONTAINER patch
- fix && to || bashism in ptrace/signal patch
- uninline and export function for audit_free_context()
- drop CONFIG_CHANGE, FEATURE_CHANGE, ANOM_ABEND, ANOM_SECCOMP patches
- move audit_enabled check (xt_AUDIT)
- switched from containerid list in struct net to net_generic's struct audit_net
- move containerid list iteration into audit (xt_AUDIT)
- create function to move namespace switch into audit
- switched /proc/PID/ entry from containerid to audit_containerid
- call kzalloc with GFP_ATOMIC on in_atomic() in audit_alloc_context()
- call kzalloc with GFP_ATOMIC on in_atomic() in audit_log_container_info()
- use xt_net(par) instead of sock_net(skb->sk) to get net
- switched record and field names: initial CONTAINER_ID, aux CONTAINER, field CONTID
- allow to set own contid
- open code audit_set_containerid
- add contid inherited flag
- ccontainerid and pcontainerid eliminated due to inherited flag
- change name of container list funcitons
- rename containerid to contid
- convert initial container record to syscall aux
- fix spelling mistake of contidion in net/rfkill/core.c to avoid contid name collision
v2
- add check for children and threads
- add network namespace container identifier list
- add NETFILTER_PKT audit container identifier logging
- patch description and documentation clean-up and example
- reap unused ppid
Richard Guy Briggs (10):
audit: add container id
audit: log container info of syscalls
audit: add containerid support for ptrace and signals
audit: add support for non-syscall auxiliary records
audit: add containerid support for tty_audit
audit: add containerid filtering
audit: add support for containerid to network namespaces
audit: NETFILTER_PKT: record each container ID associated with a netNS debug audit: read container ID of a process
rfkill: fix spelling mistake contidion to condition
drivers/tty/tty_audit.c | 5 +- fs/proc/base.c | 53 +++++++++++++++++++ include/linux/audit.h | 68 ++++++++++++++++++++++++ include/uapi/linux/audit.h | 8 ++- kernel/audit.c | 114 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ kernel/audit.h | 3 ++ kernel/auditfilter.c | 47 +++++++++++++++++ kernel/auditsc.c | 128 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--- kernel/nsproxy.c | 4 ++ net/netfilter/xt_AUDIT.c | 12 ++++- net/rfkill/core.c | 2 +- 11 files changed, 433 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
Signature · 1 line
1.8.3.1
RFC PATCH v3 1/10 audit: add container id
Implement the proc fs write to set the audit container identifier of a process, emitting an AUDIT_CONTAINER_ID record to document the event.
This is a write from the container orchestrator task to a proc entry of the form /proc/PID/audit_containerid where PID is the process ID of the newly created task that is to become the first task in a container, or an additional task added to a container.
The write expects up to a u64 value (unset: 18446744073709551615).
The writer must have capability CAP_AUDIT_CONTROL.
This will produce a record such as this:
type=CONTAINER_ID msg=audit(2018-06-06 12:39:29.636:26949) : op=set opid=2209 old-contid=18446744073709551615 contid=123456 pid=628 auid=root uid=root tty=ttyS0 ses=1 subj=unconfined_u:unconfined_r:unconfined_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 comm=bash exe=/usr/bin/bash res=yes
The "op" field indicates an initial set. The "pid" to "ses" fields are the orchestrator while the "opid" field is the object's PID, the process being "contained". Old and new audit container identifier values are given in the "contid" fields, while res indicates its success.
It is not permitted to unset or re-set the audit container identifier. A child inherits its parent's audit container identifier, but then can be set only once after.
See: https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-kernel/issues/90
See: https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-userspace/issues/51
See: https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-testsuite/issues/64
See: https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-kernel/wiki/RFE-Audit-Container-ID
--- fs/proc/base.c | 37 ++++++++++++++++++++++++ include/linux/audit.h | 25 ++++++++++++++++ include/uapi/linux/audit.h | 2 ++ kernel/auditsc.c | 71 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 4 files changed, 135 insertions(+)
fs/proc/base.c +37 -0
@@ -1302,6 +1302,41 @@ static ssize_t proc_sessionid_read(struct file * file, char __user * buf, .read = proc_sessionid_read, .llseek = generic_file_llseek, }; + +static ssize_t proc_contid_write (struct file *file,const char __user *buf, +size_t count,loff_t *ppos) +{ +struct inode *inode =file_inode (file); +u64 contid; +int rv; +struct task_struct *task =get_proc_task (inode); + +if (!task) +return -ESRCH ; +if (*ppos !=0 ) { +/* No partial writes. */ +put_task_struct (task); +return -EINVAL ; + } + + rv =kstrtou64_from_user (buf, count,10 , &contid); +if (rv <0 ) { +put_task_struct (task); +return rv; + } + + rv =audit_set_contid (task, contid); +put_task_struct (task); +if (rv <0 ) +return rv; +return count; +} + +static const struct file_operations proc_contid_operations = { + .write = proc_contid_write, + .llseek = generic_file_llseek, +}; +#endif #ifdef CONFIG_FAULT_INJECTION
@@ -2995,6 +3030,7 @@ static int proc_pid_patch_state(struct seq_file *m, struct pid_namespace *ns,#ifdef CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL REG ("loginuid" ,S_IWUSR |S_IRUGO , proc_loginuid_operations),REG ("sessionid" ,S_IRUGO , proc_sessionid_operations), +REG ("audit_containerid" ,S_IWUSR , proc_contid_operations), #endif #ifdef CONFIG_FAULT_INJECTION REG("make-it-fail", S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR, proc_fault_inject_operations),
@@ -3386,6 +3422,7 @@ static int proc_tid_comm_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask)#ifdef CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL REG ("loginuid" ,S_IWUSR |S_IRUGO , proc_loginuid_operations),REG ("sessionid" ,S_IRUGO , proc_sessionid_operations), +REG ("audit_containerid" ,S_IWUSR , proc_contid_operations), #endif #ifdef CONFIG_FAULT_INJECTION REG("make-it-fail", S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR, proc_fault_inject_operations),
include/linux/audit.h +25 -0
@@ -219,6 +219,8 @@ static inline void audit_log_task_info(struct audit_buffer *ab,struct audit_task_info {kuid_t loginuid;unsigned int sessionid; +u64 contid; +bool inherited;/* containerid inheritance */ struct audit_context *ctx; };extern struct audit_task_info init_struct_audit;
@@ -331,6 +333,7 @@ static inline void audit_ptrace(struct task_struct *t)extern int auditsc_get_stamp (struct audit_context *ctx,struct timespec64 *t,unsigned int *serial);extern int audit_set_loginuid (kuid_t loginuid); +extern int audit_set_contid (struct task_struct *tsk,u64 contid);static inline kuid_t audit_get_loginuid (struct task_struct *tsk) {
@@ -348,6 +351,14 @@ static inline unsigned int audit_get_sessionid(struct task_struct *tsk)return AUDIT_SID_UNSET ; } +static inline u64 audit_get_contid (struct task_struct *tsk) +{ +if (!tsk->audit) +return AUDIT_CID_UNSET ; +else +return tsk->audit->contid; +} +extern void __audit_ipc_obj (struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp);extern void __audit_ipc_set_perm (unsigned long qbytes,uid_t uid,gid_t gid,umode_t mode);extern void __audit_bprm (struct linux_binprm *bprm);
@@ -542,6 +553,10 @@ static inline unsigned int audit_get_sessionid(struct task_struct *tsk) {return AUDIT_SID_UNSET ; } +static inline kuid_t audit_get_contid (struct task_struct *tsk) +{ +return AUDIT_CID_UNSET ; +}static inline void audit_ipc_obj (struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp) { } static inline void audit_ipc_set_perm(unsigned long qbytes, uid_t uid,
@@ -606,6 +621,16 @@ static inline bool audit_loginuid_set(struct task_struct *tsk)return uid_valid (audit_get_loginuid (tsk)); } +static inline bool cid_valid (u64 contid) +{ +return contid !=AUDIT_CID_UNSET ; +} + +static inline bool audit_contid_set (struct task_struct *tsk) +{ +return cid_valid (audit_get_contid (tsk)); +} +static inline void audit_log_string (struct audit_buffer *ab,const char *buf) {audit_log_n_string (ab, buf,strlen (buf));
include/uapi/linux/audit.h +2 -0
@@ -71,6 +71,7 @@#define AUDIT_TTY_SET 1017/* Set TTY auditing status */ #define AUDIT_SET_FEATURE 1018/* Turn an audit feature on or off */ #define AUDIT_GET_FEATURE 1019/* Get which features are enabled */ +#define AUDIT_CONTAINER_ID 1020/* Define the container id and information */ #define AUDIT_FIRST_USER_MSG 1100/* Userspace messages mostly uninteresting to kernel */ #define AUDIT_USER_AVC 1107/* We filter this differently */
@@ -466,6 +467,7 @@ struct audit_tty_status {#define AUDIT_UID_UNSET (unsigned int)-1#define AUDIT_SID_UNSET ((unsigned int)-1) +#define AUDIT_CID_UNSET ((u64)-1)/* audit_rule_data supports filter rules with both integer and string * fields. It corresponds with AUDIT_ADD_RULE, AUDIT_DEL_RULE and
kernel/auditsc.c +71 -0
89 lines not on this page · raw message
Signature · 1 line
1.8.3.1
Re: [RFC PATCH ghak90 (was ghak32) V3 01/10] audit: add container id
Quoted 174 lines · EDT Richard Guy Briggs
Implement the proc fs write to set the audit container identifier of a process, emitting an
AUDIT_CONTAINER_IDrecord to document the event.This is a write from the container orchestrator task to a proc entry of the form
/proc/PID/audit_containeridwhere PID is the process ID of the newly created task that is to become the first task in a container, or an additional task added to a container.The write expects up to a u64 value (unset: 18446744073709551615).
The writer must have capability
CAP_AUDIT_CONTROL.This will produce a record such as this:
type=CONTAINER_ID msg=audit(2018-06-06 12:39:29.636:26949) : op=set
opid=2209 old-contid=18446744073709551615 contid=123456 pid=628 auid=root uid=root tty=ttyS0 ses=1 subj=unconfined_u:unconfined_r:unconfined_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 comm=bash exe=/usr/bin/bash res=yesThe "op" field indicates an initial set. The "pid" to "ses" fields are the orchestrator while the "opid" field is the object's PID, the process being "contained". Old and new audit container identifier values are given in the "contid" fields, while res indicates its success.
It is not permitted to unset or re-set the audit container identifier. A child inherits its parent's audit container identifier, but then can be set only once after.
See: https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-kernel/issues/90
See: https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-userspace/issues/51
See: https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-testsuite/issues/64
See:
https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-kernel/wiki/RFE-Audit-Container-IDSigned-off-by Richard Guy Briggs <[email protected]>--- fs/proc/base.c | 37 ++++++++++++++++++++++++ include/linux/audit.h | 25 ++++++++++++++++ include/uapi/linux/audit.h | 2 ++ kernel/auditsc.c | 71++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 4 files changed, 135 insertions(+)
fs/proc/base.c +34
-0@@ -1302,6 +1302,41 @@ static ssize_t proc_sessionid_read(struct file * file, char __user * buf, .read = proc_sessionid_read, .llseek = generic_file_llseek, }; + +static ssize_t proc_contid_write (struct file *file,const char __user *buf, + size_t count, loff_t *ppos) +{ +struct inode *inode =file_inode (file); +u64 contid; +int rv; +struct task_struct *task =get_proc_task (inode); + +if (!task) +return -ESRCH ; +if (*ppos !=0 ) { +/* No partial writes. */ +put_task_struct (task); +return -EINVAL ; + } + + rv =kstrtou64_from_user (buf, count,10 , &contid); +if (rv <0 ) { +put_task_struct (task); +return rv; + } + + rv =audit_set_contid (task, contid); +put_task_struct (task); +if (rv <0 ) +return rv; +return count; +} + +static const struct file_operations proc_contid_operations = { + .write = proc_contid_write, + .llseek = generic_file_llseek, +}; +#endif #ifdef CONFIG_FAULT_INJECTION @@ -2995,6 +3030,7 @@ static int proc_pid_patch_state(struct seq_file *m,struct
pid_namespace*ns, #ifdefCONFIG_AUDITSYSCALLfs/proc/base.c +2
-0REG ("loginuid" ,S_IWUSR |S_IRUGO , proc_loginuid_operations),REG ("sessionid" ,S_IRUGO , proc_sessionid_operations), +REG ("audit_containerid" ,S_IWUSR , proc_contid_operations), #endif #ifdef CONFIG_FAULT_INJECTION REG("make-it-fail", S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR, proc_fault_inject_operations),@@ -3386,6 +3422,7 @@ static int proc_tid_comm_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask) #ifdef CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALLREG ("loginuid" ,S_IWUSR |S_IRUGO , proc_loginuid_operations),REG ("sessionid" ,S_IRUGO , proc_sessionid_operations), +REG ("audit_containerid" ,S_IWUSR , proc_contid_operations), #endif #ifdef CONFIG_FAULT_INJECTION REG("make-it-fail", S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR, proc_fault_inject_operations),include/linux/audit.h +25
-0@@ -219,6 +219,8 @@ static inline void audit_log_task_info(struct audit_buffer *ab, struct audit_task_info {kuid_t loginuid;unsigned int sessionid; +u64 contid; +bool inherited;/* containerid inheritance */ struct audit_context *ctx; };extern struct audit_task_info init_struct_audit;@@ -331,6 +333,7 @@ static inline void audit_ptrace(struct task_struct *t)extern int auditsc_get_stamp (struct audit_context *ctx,struct timespec64 *t,unsigned int *serial);extern int audit_set_loginuid (kuid_t loginuid); +extern int audit_set_contid (struct task_struct *tsk,u64 contid);static inline kuid_t audit_get_loginuid (struct task_struct *tsk) {@@ -348,6 +351,14 @@ static inline unsigned int audit_get_sessionid(struct task_struct *tsk) return AUDIT_SID_UNSET; } +static inline u64 audit_get_contid (struct task_struct *tsk) +{ +if (!tsk->audit) +return AUDIT_CID_UNSET ; +else +return tsk->audit->contid; +} +extern void __audit_ipc_obj (struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp);extern void __audit_ipc_set_perm (unsigned long qbytes,uid_t uid,gid_t gid,umode_t mode);extern void __audit_bprm (struct linux_binprm *bprm);@@ -542,6 +553,10 @@ static inline unsigned int audit_get_sessionid(struct task_struct *tsk) {return AUDIT_SID_UNSET ; } +static inline kuid_t audit_get_contid (struct task_struct *tsk) +{ +return AUDIT_CID_UNSET ; +}static inline void audit_ipc_obj (struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp) { } static inline void audit_ipc_set_perm(unsigned long qbytes, uid_t uid,@@ -606,6 +621,16 @@ static inline bool audit_loginuid_set(struct task_struct *tsk) return uid_valid(audit_get_loginuid(tsk)); } +static inline bool cid_valid (u64 contid) +{ +return contid !=AUDIT_CID_UNSET ; +} + +static inline bool audit_contid_set (struct task_struct *tsk) +{ +return cid_valid (audit_get_contid (tsk)); +} +static inline void audit_log_string (struct audit_buffer *ab,const char *buf) {audit_log_n_string (ab, buf,strlen (buf));include/uapi/linux/audit.h +0
-0
include/uapi/linux/audit.h line 74
Quoted 4 lines
include/uapi/linux/audit.h +1
-0@@ -71,6 +71,7 @@#define AUDIT_TTY_SET 1017/* Set TTY auditing status */ #define AUDIT_SET_FEATURE 1018/* Turn an audit feature on or off */ #define AUDIT_GET_FEATURE 1019/* Get which features are enabled */ +#define AUDIT_CONTAINER_ID 1020/* Define the container id and
information
Quoted 81 lines
include/uapi/linux/audit.h +0
-0*/ #define AUDIT_FIRST_USER_MSG 1100/* Userspace messages mostly uninteresting to kernel */ #define
AUDIT_USER_AVC1107 /* We filter this
differently */include/uapi/linux/audit.h +1
-0@@ -466,6 +467,7 @@ struct audit_tty_status {#define AUDIT_UID_UNSET (unsigned int)-1#define AUDIT_SID_UNSET ((unsigned int)-1) +#define AUDIT_CID_UNSET ((u64)-1)/* audit_rule_data supports filter rules with both integer and string * fields. It corresponds with AUDIT_ADD_RULE, AUDIT_DEL_RULE and kernel/auditsc.c +46
-0@@ -956,6 +956,8 @@ int audit_alloc(struct task_struct *tsk)return -ENOMEM ; info->loginuid =audit_get_loginuid (current); info->sessionid =audit_get_sessionid (current); + info->contid =audit_get_contid (current); + info->inherited = true; tsk->audit = info;if (likely (!audit_ever_enabled))@@ -985,6 +987,8 @@ int audit_alloc(struct task_struct *tsk)struct audit_task_info init_struct_audit = { .loginuid =INVALID_UID , .sessionid =AUDIT_SID_UNSET , + .contid =AUDIT_CID_UNSET , + .inherited = true, .ctx =NULL , };@@ -2112,6 +2116,73 @@ int audit_set_loginuid(kuid_t loginuid) }/** +* audit_set_contid - set current task's audit_context contid +* @contid: contid value +* +* Returns 0 on success, -EPERM on permission failure. +* +* Called (set) from fs/proc/base.c::proc_contid_write(). +*/ +int audit_set_contid (struct task_struct *task,u64 contid) +{ +u64 oldcontid; +int rc =0 ; +struct audit_buffer *ab; +uid_t uid; +struct tty_struct *tty; +char comm[sizeof (current->comm)]; + +/* Can't set if audit disabled */ +if (!task->audit) +return -ENOPROTOOPT ; + oldcontid =audit_get_contid (task); +/* Don't allow the audit containerid to be unset */ +if (!cid_valid (contid)) + rc = -EINVAL ; +/* if we don't have caps, reject */ +else if (!capable (CAP_AUDIT_CONTROL )) + rc = -EPERM ; +/* if task has children or is not single-threaded, deny */ +else if (!list_empty (&task->children)) + rc = -EBUSY ; +else if (!(thread_group_leader (task) &&thread_group_empty (task))) + rc = -EALREADY ; +/* it is already set, and not inherited from the parent, reject */ +else if (cid_valid (oldcontid) && !task->audit->inherited) + rc = -EEXIST ; +if (!rc) { +task_lock (task); + task->audit->contid = contid; + task->audit->inherited = false; +task_unlock (task); + } + +if (!audit_enabled)
kernel/auditsc.c int audit_set_loginuid(kuid_t loginuid) · line 2170
Quoted 10 lines
kernel/auditsc.c +9
-0+return rc; + + ab =audit_log_start (audit_context (),GFP_KERNEL ,AUDIT_CONTAINER_ID ); +if (!ab) +return rc; + + uid =from_kuid (&init_user_ns,task_uid (current)); + tty =audit_get_tty (current); + audit_log_format(ab, "op=set opid=%d old-contid=%llu contid=%llu pid=%d uid=%u auid=%u tty=%s ses=%u", + task_tgid_nr(task), oldcontid,
contid,
kernel/auditsc.c int audit_set_loginuid(kuid_t loginuid) · line 2174
Quoted 4 lines
kernel/auditsc.c +4
-0+ task_tgid_nr(current), uid +from_kuid (&init_user_ns,audit_get_loginuid (current)), + tty ?tty_name (tty) :"(none)" , + audit_get_sessionid(current));
The event code doesn't match the example event at the top. (uid and auid are transposed.) But the code looks right.
Ack for the event format.
-Steve
Quoted 14 lines
kernel/auditsc.c +11
-0+audit_put_tty (tty); +audit_log_task_context (ab); +audit_log_format (ab," comm=" ); +audit_log_untrustedstring (ab,get_task_comm (comm, current)); +audit_log_d_path_exe (ab, current->mm); +audit_log_format (ab," res=%d" , !rc); +audit_log_end (ab); +return rc; +} + +/** * __audit_mq_open - record audit data for a POSIX MQ open * @oflag: open flag * @mode: mode bits
Re: [RFC PATCH ghak90 (was ghak32) V3 01/10] audit: add container id
Quoted 272 lines · Steve Grubb
Quoted 174 lines · EDT Richard Guy Briggs
Implement the proc fs write to set the audit container identifier of a process, emitting an
AUDIT_CONTAINER_IDrecord to document the event.This is a write from the container orchestrator task to a proc entry of the form
/proc/PID/audit_containeridwhere PID is the process ID of the newly created task that is to become the first task in a container, or an additional task added to a container.The write expects up to a u64 value (unset: 18446744073709551615).
The writer must have capability
CAP_AUDIT_CONTROL.This will produce a record such as this:
type=CONTAINER_ID msg=audit(2018-06-06 12:39:29.636:26949) : op=set
opid=2209 old-contid=18446744073709551615 contid=123456 pid=628 auid=root uid=root tty=ttyS0 ses=1 subj=unconfined_u:unconfined_r:unconfined_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 comm=bash exe=/usr/bin/bash res=yesThe "op" field indicates an initial set. The "pid" to "ses" fields are the orchestrator while the "opid" field is the object's PID, the process being "contained". Old and new audit container identifier values are given in the "contid" fields, while res indicates its success.
It is not permitted to unset or re-set the audit container identifier. A child inherits its parent's audit container identifier, but then can be set only once after.
See: https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-kernel/issues/90
See: https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-userspace/issues/51
See: https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-testsuite/issues/64
See:
https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-kernel/wiki/RFE-Audit-Container-IDSigned-off-by Richard Guy Briggs <[email protected]>--- fs/proc/base.c | 37 ++++++++++++++++++++++++ include/linux/audit.h | 25 ++++++++++++++++ include/uapi/linux/audit.h | 2 ++ kernel/auditsc.c | 71++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 4 files changed, 135 insertions(+)
fs/proc/base.c +34
-0@@ -1302,6 +1302,41 @@ static ssize_t proc_sessionid_read(struct file * file, char __user * buf, .read = proc_sessionid_read, .llseek = generic_file_llseek, }; + +static ssize_t proc_contid_write (struct file *file,const char __user *buf, + size_t count, loff_t *ppos) +{ +struct inode *inode =file_inode (file); +u64 contid; +int rv; +struct task_struct *task =get_proc_task (inode); + +if (!task) +return -ESRCH ; +if (*ppos !=0 ) { +/* No partial writes. */ +put_task_struct (task); +return -EINVAL ; + } + + rv =kstrtou64_from_user (buf, count,10 , &contid); +if (rv <0 ) { +put_task_struct (task); +return rv; + } + + rv =audit_set_contid (task, contid); +put_task_struct (task); +if (rv <0 ) +return rv; +return count; +} + +static const struct file_operations proc_contid_operations = { + .write = proc_contid_write, + .llseek = generic_file_llseek, +}; +#endif #ifdef CONFIG_FAULT_INJECTION @@ -2995,6 +3030,7 @@ static int proc_pid_patch_state(struct seq_file *m,struct
pid_namespace*ns, #ifdefCONFIG_AUDITSYSCALLfs/proc/base.c +2
-0REG ("loginuid" ,S_IWUSR |S_IRUGO , proc_loginuid_operations),REG ("sessionid" ,S_IRUGO , proc_sessionid_operations), +REG ("audit_containerid" ,S_IWUSR , proc_contid_operations), #endif #ifdef CONFIG_FAULT_INJECTION REG("make-it-fail", S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR, proc_fault_inject_operations),@@ -3386,6 +3422,7 @@ static int proc_tid_comm_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask) #ifdef CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALLREG ("loginuid" ,S_IWUSR |S_IRUGO , proc_loginuid_operations),REG ("sessionid" ,S_IRUGO , proc_sessionid_operations), +REG ("audit_containerid" ,S_IWUSR , proc_contid_operations), #endif #ifdef CONFIG_FAULT_INJECTION REG("make-it-fail", S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR, proc_fault_inject_operations),include/linux/audit.h +25
-0@@ -219,6 +219,8 @@ static inline void audit_log_task_info(struct audit_buffer *ab, struct audit_task_info {kuid_t loginuid;unsigned int sessionid; +u64 contid; +bool inherited;/* containerid inheritance */ struct audit_context *ctx; };extern struct audit_task_info init_struct_audit;@@ -331,6 +333,7 @@ static inline void audit_ptrace(struct task_struct *t)extern int auditsc_get_stamp (struct audit_context *ctx,struct timespec64 *t,unsigned int *serial);extern int audit_set_loginuid (kuid_t loginuid); +extern int audit_set_contid (struct task_struct *tsk,u64 contid);static inline kuid_t audit_get_loginuid (struct task_struct *tsk) {@@ -348,6 +351,14 @@ static inline unsigned int audit_get_sessionid(struct task_struct *tsk) return AUDIT_SID_UNSET; } +static inline u64 audit_get_contid (struct task_struct *tsk) +{ +if (!tsk->audit) +return AUDIT_CID_UNSET ; +else +return tsk->audit->contid; +} +extern void __audit_ipc_obj (struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp);extern void __audit_ipc_set_perm (unsigned long qbytes,uid_t uid,gid_t gid,umode_t mode);extern void __audit_bprm (struct linux_binprm *bprm);@@ -542,6 +553,10 @@ static inline unsigned int audit_get_sessionid(struct task_struct *tsk) {return AUDIT_SID_UNSET ; } +static inline kuid_t audit_get_contid (struct task_struct *tsk) +{ +return AUDIT_CID_UNSET ; +}static inline void audit_ipc_obj (struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp) { } static inline void audit_ipc_set_perm(unsigned long qbytes, uid_t uid,@@ -606,6 +621,16 @@ static inline bool audit_loginuid_set(struct task_struct *tsk) return uid_valid(audit_get_loginuid(tsk)); } +static inline bool cid_valid (u64 contid) +{ +return contid !=AUDIT_CID_UNSET ; +} + +static inline bool audit_contid_set (struct task_struct *tsk) +{ +return cid_valid (audit_get_contid (tsk)); +} +static inline void audit_log_string (struct audit_buffer *ab,const char *buf) {audit_log_n_string (ab, buf,strlen (buf));include/uapi/linux/audit.h +0
-0include/uapi/linux/audit.h line 74
Quoted 4 lines
include/uapi/linux/audit.h +1
-0@@ -71,6 +71,7 @@#define AUDIT_TTY_SET 1017/* Set TTY auditing status */ #define AUDIT_SET_FEATURE 1018/* Turn an audit feature on or off */ #define AUDIT_GET_FEATURE 1019/* Get which features are enabled */ +#define AUDIT_CONTAINER_ID 1020/* Define the container id and information
Quoted 81 lines
include/uapi/linux/audit.h +0
-0*/ #define AUDIT_FIRST_USER_MSG 1100/* Userspace messages mostly uninteresting to kernel */ #define
AUDIT_USER_AVC1107 /* We filter this
differently */include/uapi/linux/audit.h +1
-0@@ -466,6 +467,7 @@ struct audit_tty_status {#define AUDIT_UID_UNSET (unsigned int)-1#define AUDIT_SID_UNSET ((unsigned int)-1) +#define AUDIT_CID_UNSET ((u64)-1)/* audit_rule_data supports filter rules with both integer and string * fields. It corresponds with AUDIT_ADD_RULE, AUDIT_DEL_RULE and kernel/auditsc.c +46
-0@@ -956,6 +956,8 @@ int audit_alloc(struct task_struct *tsk)return -ENOMEM ; info->loginuid =audit_get_loginuid (current); info->sessionid =audit_get_sessionid (current); + info->contid =audit_get_contid (current); + info->inherited = true; tsk->audit = info;if (likely (!audit_ever_enabled))@@ -985,6 +987,8 @@ int audit_alloc(struct task_struct *tsk)struct audit_task_info init_struct_audit = { .loginuid =INVALID_UID , .sessionid =AUDIT_SID_UNSET , + .contid =AUDIT_CID_UNSET , + .inherited = true, .ctx =NULL , };@@ -2112,6 +2116,73 @@ int audit_set_loginuid(kuid_t loginuid) }/** +* audit_set_contid - set current task's audit_context contid +* @contid: contid value +* +* Returns 0 on success, -EPERM on permission failure. +* +* Called (set) from fs/proc/base.c::proc_contid_write(). +*/ +int audit_set_contid (struct task_struct *task,u64 contid) +{ +u64 oldcontid; +int rc =0 ; +struct audit_buffer *ab; +uid_t uid; +struct tty_struct *tty; +char comm[sizeof (current->comm)]; + +/* Can't set if audit disabled */ +if (!task->audit) +return -ENOPROTOOPT ; + oldcontid =audit_get_contid (task); +/* Don't allow the audit containerid to be unset */ +if (!cid_valid (contid)) + rc = -EINVAL ; +/* if we don't have caps, reject */ +else if (!capable (CAP_AUDIT_CONTROL )) + rc = -EPERM ; +/* if task has children or is not single-threaded, deny */ +else if (!list_empty (&task->children)) + rc = -EBUSY ; +else if (!(thread_group_leader (task) &&thread_group_empty (task))) + rc = -EALREADY ; +/* it is already set, and not inherited from the parent, reject */ +else if (cid_valid (oldcontid) && !task->audit->inherited) + rc = -EEXIST ; +if (!rc) { +task_lock (task); + task->audit->contid = contid; + task->audit->inherited = false; +task_unlock (task); + } + +if (!audit_enabled)kernel/auditsc.c int audit_set_loginuid(kuid_t loginuid) · line 2170
Quoted 10 lines
kernel/auditsc.c +9
-0+return rc; + + ab =audit_log_start (audit_context (),GFP_KERNEL ,AUDIT_CONTAINER_ID ); +if (!ab) +return rc; + + uid =from_kuid (&init_user_ns,task_uid (current)); + tty =audit_get_tty (current); + audit_log_format(ab, "op=set opid=%d old-contid=%llu contid=%llu pid=%d uid=%u auid=%u tty=%s ses=%u", + task_tgid_nr(task), oldcontid,contid,
Quoted 7 lines
kernel/auditsc.c int audit_set_loginuid(kuid_t loginuid) · line 2174
Quoted 4 lines
kernel/auditsc.c +4
-0+ task_tgid_nr(current), uid +from_kuid (&init_user_ns,audit_get_loginuid (current)), + tty ?tty_name (tty) :"(none)" , + audit_get_sessionid(current));The event code doesn't match the example event at the top. (uid and auid are transposed.) But the code looks right.
Hmmm, I thought I checked that explicitly... That event sample must have come from the previous compile before I fixed that.
Quoted 1 line
Ack for the event format.
Thanks!
Quoted 16 lines
-Steve
Quoted 4 lines
kernel/auditsc.c +4
-0+audit_put_tty (tty); +audit_log_task_context (ab); +audit_log_format (ab," comm=" ); +audit_log_untrustedstring (ab,get_task_comm (comm, current));kernel/auditsc.c int audit_set_loginuid(kuid_t loginuid) · line 2188
Quoted 10 lines
kernel/auditsc.c +7
-0+audit_log_d_path_exe (ab, current->mm); +audit_log_format (ab," res=%d" , !rc); +audit_log_end (ab); +return rc; +} + +/** * __audit_mq_open - record audit data for a POSIX MQ open * @oflag: open flag * @mode: mode bits
- RGB
--
Richard Guy Briggs <[email protected]>
Sr. S/W Engineer, Kernel Security, Base Operating Systems Remote, Ottawa, Red Hat Canada
IRC: rgb, SunRaycer
Voice: +1.647.777.2635, Internal: (81) 32635
Paul Moore
maintainerRe: [RFC PATCH ghak90 (was ghak32) V3 01/10] audit: add container id
In reply to Richard Guy BriggsQuoted 36 lines · Richard Guy Briggs
Implement the proc fs write to set the audit container identifier of a process, emitting an
AUDIT_CONTAINER_IDrecord to document the event.This is a write from the container orchestrator task to a proc entry of the form
/proc/PID/audit_containeridwhere PID is the process ID of the newly created task that is to become the first task in a container, or an additional task added to a container.The write expects up to a u64 value (unset: 18446744073709551615).
The writer must have capability
CAP_AUDIT_CONTROL.This will produce a record such as this:
type=CONTAINER_ID msg=audit(2018-06-06 12:39:29.636:26949) : op=set opid=2209 old-contid=18446744073709551615 contid=123456 pid=628 auid=root uid=root tty=ttyS0 ses=1 subj=unconfined_u:unconfined_r:unconfined_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 comm=bash exe=/usr/bin/bash res=yesThe "op" field indicates an initial set. The "pid" to "ses" fields are the orchestrator while the "opid" field is the object's PID, the process being "contained". Old and new audit container identifier values are given in the "contid" fields, while res indicates its success.
It is not permitted to unset or re-set the audit container identifier. A child inherits its parent's audit container identifier, but then can be set only once after.
See: https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-kernel/issues/90
See: https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-userspace/issues/51
See: https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-testsuite/issues/64
See: https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-kernel/wiki/RFE-Audit-Container-IDSigned-off-by Richard Guy Briggs <[email protected]>--- fs/proc/base.c | 37 ++++++++++++++++++++++++ include/linux/audit.h | 25 ++++++++++++++++ include/uapi/linux/audit.h | 2 ++ kernel/auditsc.c | 71 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 4 files changed, 135 insertions(+)
...
Quoted 5 lines
include/linux/audit.h +0
-0@@ -606,6 +621,16 @@ static inline bool audit_loginuid_set(struct task_struct *tsk)return uid_valid (audit_get_loginuid (tsk)); }
include/linux/audit.h static inline bool audit_loginuid_set(struct task_struct *tsk) · line 632
Quoted 10 lines
include/linux/audit.h +9
-0+static inline bool cid_valid (u64 contid) +{ +return contid !=AUDIT_CID_UNSET ; +} + +static inline bool audit_contid_set (struct task_struct *tsk) +{ +return cid_valid (audit_get_contid (tsk)); +}
For the sake of consistency I think we should rename cid_valid() to audit_contid_valid().
kernel/auditsc.c int audit_alloc(struct task_struct *tsk) · line 960
Quoted 10 lines
kernel/auditsc.c +2
-0@@ -956,6 +956,8 @@ int audit_alloc(struct task_struct *tsk)return -ENOMEM ; info->loginuid =audit_get_loginuid (current); info->sessionid =audit_get_sessionid (current); + info->contid =audit_get_contid (current); + info->inherited = true;
First see my others comments in this patch about inheritence, but if we decide that flagging inherited values is important we should probably rename the "inherited" field to indicate that it applies to just the "contid" field.
Quoted 35 lines
kernel/auditsc.c +21
-0tsk->audit = info;if (likely (!audit_ever_enabled))@@ -985,6 +987,8 @@ int audit_alloc(struct task_struct *tsk)struct audit_task_info init_struct_audit = { .loginuid =INVALID_UID , .sessionid =AUDIT_SID_UNSET , + .contid =AUDIT_CID_UNSET , + .inherited = true, .ctx =NULL , };@@ -2112,6 +2116,73 @@ int audit_set_loginuid(kuid_t loginuid) }/** +* audit_set_contid - set current task's audit_context contid +* @contid: contid value +* +* Returns 0 on success, -EPERM on permission failure. +* +* Called (set) from fs/proc/base.c::proc_contid_write(). +*/ +int audit_set_contid (struct task_struct *task,u64 contid) +{ +u64 oldcontid; +int rc =0 ; +struct audit_buffer *ab; +uid_t uid; +struct tty_struct *tty; +char comm[sizeof (current->comm)]; + +/* Can't set if audit disabled */ +if (!task->audit) +return -ENOPROTOOPT ;
kernel/auditsc.c int audit_set_loginuid(kuid_t loginuid) · line 2147
Quoted 10 lines
kernel/auditsc.c +10
-0+ oldcontid =audit_get_contid (task); +/* Don't allow the audit containerid to be unset */ +if (!cid_valid (contid)) + rc = -EINVAL ; +/* if we don't have caps, reject */ +else if (!capable (CAP_AUDIT_CONTROL )) + rc = -EPERM ; +/* if task has children or is not single-threaded, deny */ +else if (!list_empty (&task->children)) + rc = -EBUSY ;
Is this safe without holding tasklist_lock? I worry we might be vulnerable to a race with fork().
kernel/auditsc.c int audit_set_loginuid(kuid_t loginuid) · line 2149
Quoted 2 lines
kernel/auditsc.c +2
-0+else if (!(thread_group_leader (task) &&thread_group_empty (task))) + rc = -EALREADY ;
Similar concern here as well, although related to threads.
kernel/auditsc.c int audit_set_loginuid(kuid_t loginuid) · line 2152
Quoted 3 lines
kernel/auditsc.c +3
-0+/* it is already set, and not inherited from the parent, reject */ + else if (cid_valid(oldcontid) && !task->audit->inherited) + rc = -EEXIST ;
Maybe I'm missing something, but why do we care about preventing reassigning the audit container ID in this case? The task is single threaded and has no descendants at this point so it should be safe, yes? So long as the task changing the audit container ID has capable(CAP_AUDIT_CONTOL) it shouldn't matter, right?
Related, I'm questioning if we would ever care if the audit container ID was inherited or not?
kernel/auditsc.c int audit_set_loginuid(kuid_t loginuid) · line 2157
Quoted 5 lines
kernel/auditsc.c +5
-0+if (!rc) { +task_lock (task); + task->audit->contid = contid; + task->audit->inherited = false; +task_unlock (task);
I suspect the task_lock() may not be what we want here, but if we are using task_lock() to protect the audit fields two things come to mind:
1. We should update the header comments for task_lock() in task.h to indicate that it also protects ->audit.
2. Where else do we need to worry about taking this lock? At the very least we should take this lock near the top of this function before we check task->audit and not drop it until after we have set it, or failed the operation for one of the reasons above.
Quoted 21 lines
kernel/auditsc.c +21
-0+ } + +if (!audit_enabled) +return rc; + + ab =audit_log_start (audit_context (),GFP_KERNEL ,AUDIT_CONTAINER_ID ); +if (!ab) +return rc; + + uid =from_kuid (&init_user_ns,task_uid (current)); + tty =audit_get_tty (current); +audit_log_format (ab,"op=set opid=%d old-contid=%llu contid=%llu pid=%d uid=%u auid=%u tty=%s ses=%u" , +task_tgid_nr (task), oldcontid, contid, + task_tgid_nr(current), uid +from_kuid (&init_user_ns,audit_get_loginuid (current)), + tty ?tty_name (tty) :"(none)" , +audit_get_sessionid (current)); +audit_put_tty (tty); +audit_log_task_context (ab); +audit_log_format (ab," comm=" ); +audit_log_untrustedstring (ab,get_task_comm (comm, current));
kernel/auditsc.c int audit_set_loginuid(kuid_t loginuid) · line 2188
Quoted 10 lines
kernel/auditsc.c +7
-0+audit_log_d_path_exe (ab, current->mm); +audit_log_format (ab," res=%d" , !rc); +audit_log_end (ab); +return rc; +} + +/** * __audit_mq_open - record audit data for a POSIX MQ open * @oflag: open flag * @mode: mode bits
--
paul moore
www.paul-moore.com
Re: [RFC PATCH ghak90 (was ghak32) V3 01/10] audit: add container id
Quoted 46 lines · Paul Moore
Quoted 36 lines · Richard Guy Briggs
Implement the proc fs write to set the audit container identifier of a process, emitting an
AUDIT_CONTAINER_IDrecord to document the event.This is a write from the container orchestrator task to a proc entry of the form
/proc/PID/audit_containeridwhere PID is the process ID of the newly created task that is to become the first task in a container, or an additional task added to a container.The write expects up to a u64 value (unset: 18446744073709551615).
The writer must have capability
CAP_AUDIT_CONTROL.This will produce a record such as this:
type=CONTAINER_ID msg=audit(2018-06-06 12:39:29.636:26949) : op=set opid=2209 old-contid=18446744073709551615 contid=123456 pid=628 auid=root uid=root tty=ttyS0 ses=1 subj=unconfined_u:unconfined_r:unconfined_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 comm=bash exe=/usr/bin/bash res=yesThe "op" field indicates an initial set. The "pid" to "ses" fields are the orchestrator while the "opid" field is the object's PID, the process being "contained". Old and new audit container identifier values are given in the "contid" fields, while res indicates its success.
It is not permitted to unset or re-set the audit container identifier. A child inherits its parent's audit container identifier, but then can be set only once after.
See: https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-kernel/issues/90
See: https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-userspace/issues/51
See: https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-testsuite/issues/64
See: https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-kernel/wiki/RFE-Audit-Container-IDSigned-off-by Richard Guy Briggs <[email protected]>--- fs/proc/base.c | 37 ++++++++++++++++++++++++ include/linux/audit.h | 25 ++++++++++++++++ include/uapi/linux/audit.h | 2 ++ kernel/auditsc.c | 71 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 4 files changed, 135 insertions(+)...
Quoted 6 lines
include/linux/audit.h +0
-0@@ -606,6 +621,16 @@ static inline bool audit_loginuid_set(struct task_struct *tsk)return uid_valid (audit_get_loginuid (tsk)); }
Quoted 12 lines
include/linux/audit.h static inline bool audit_loginuid_set(struct task_struct *tsk) · line 632
Quoted 9 lines
include/linux/audit.h +9
-0+static inline bool cid_valid (u64 contid) +{ +return contid !=AUDIT_CID_UNSET ; +} + +static inline bool audit_contid_set (struct task_struct *tsk) +{ +return cid_valid (audit_get_contid (tsk)); +}For the sake of consistency I think we should rename
cid_valid()toaudit_contid_valid().
Ok.
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 7 lines
kernel/auditsc.c +0
-0@@ -956,6 +956,8 @@ int audit_alloc(struct task_struct *tsk)return -ENOMEM ; info->loginuid =audit_get_loginuid (current);
Quoted 8 lines
kernel/auditsc.c int audit_alloc(struct task_struct *tsk) · line 960
Quoted 3 lines
kernel/auditsc.c +2
-0info->sessionid =audit_get_sessionid (current); + info->contid =audit_get_contid (current); + info->inherited = true;First see my others comments in this patch about inheritence, but if we decide that flagging inherited values is important we should probably rename the "inherited" field to indicate that it applies to just the "contid" field.
Ok.
Quoted 49 lines
Quoted 35 lines
kernel/auditsc.c +21
-0tsk->audit = info;if (likely (!audit_ever_enabled))@@ -985,6 +987,8 @@ int audit_alloc(struct task_struct *tsk)struct audit_task_info init_struct_audit = { .loginuid =INVALID_UID , .sessionid =AUDIT_SID_UNSET , + .contid =AUDIT_CID_UNSET , + .inherited = true, .ctx =NULL , };@@ -2112,6 +2116,73 @@ int audit_set_loginuid(kuid_t loginuid) }/** +* audit_set_contid - set current task's audit_context contid +* @contid: contid value +* +* Returns 0 on success, -EPERM on permission failure. +* +* Called (set) from fs/proc/base.c::proc_contid_write(). +*/ +int audit_set_contid (struct task_struct *task,u64 contid) +{ +u64 oldcontid; +int rc =0 ; +struct audit_buffer *ab; +uid_t uid; +struct tty_struct *tty; +char comm[sizeof (current->comm)]; + +/* Can't set if audit disabled */ +if (!task->audit) +return -ENOPROTOOPT ;kernel/auditsc.c int audit_set_loginuid(kuid_t loginuid) · line 2147
Quoted 10 lines
kernel/auditsc.c +10
-0+ oldcontid =audit_get_contid (task); +/* Don't allow the audit containerid to be unset */ +if (!cid_valid (contid)) + rc = -EINVAL ; +/* if we don't have caps, reject */ +else if (!capable (CAP_AUDIT_CONTROL )) + rc = -EPERM ; +/* if task has children or is not single-threaded, deny */ +else if (!list_empty (&task->children)) + rc = -EBUSY ;Is this safe without holding
tasklist_lock? I worry we might be vulnerable to a race withfork().
Quoted 4 lines
kernel/auditsc.c int audit_set_loginuid(kuid_t loginuid) · line 2149
Quoted 2 lines
kernel/auditsc.c +2
-0+else if (!(thread_group_leader (task) &&thread_group_empty (task))) + rc = -EALREADY ;Similar concern here as well, although related to threads.
I think you are correct here and tasklist_lock should cover both. Do we also want rcu_read_lock() immediately preceeding it?
Quoted 9 lines
kernel/auditsc.c int audit_set_loginuid(kuid_t loginuid) · line 2152
Quoted 3 lines
kernel/auditsc.c +3
-0+/* it is already set, and not inherited from the parent, reject */ + else if (cid_valid(oldcontid) && !task->audit->inherited) + rc = -EEXIST ;Maybe I'm missing something, but why do we care about preventing reassigning the audit container ID in this case? The task is single threaded and has no descendants at this point so it should be safe, yes? So long as the task changing the audit container ID has
capable(CAP_AUDIT_CONTOL)it shouldn't matter, right?
Because we hammered out this idea 6 months ago in the design phase and I thought we all firmly agreed that the audit container identifier could only be set once. Has any significant discussion happenned since then to change that wisdom? I just wonder why this is coming up now.
Quoted 2 lines
Related, I'm questioning if we would ever care if the audit container ID was inherited or not?
We do since that is the only way we can tell if the value has been set once already or inherited unless we check if the parent's audit container identifier is identical (which tells us it was inherited).
Quoted 11 lines
kernel/auditsc.c int audit_set_loginuid(kuid_t loginuid) · line 2157
Quoted 5 lines
kernel/auditsc.c +5
-0+if (!rc) { +task_lock (task); + task->audit->contid = contid; + task->audit->inherited = false; +task_unlock (task);I suspect the
task_lock()may not be what we want here, but if we are usingtask_lock()to protect the audit fields two things come to mind:1. We should update the header comments for
task_lock()intask.hto indicate that it also protects ->audit.
Fair enough.
Quoted 4 lines
2. Where else do we need to worry about taking this lock? At the very least we should take this lock near the top of this function before we check
task->auditand not drop it until after we have set it, or failed the operation for one of the reasons above.
Agreed, since another process on another CPU could race attempting this same operation. However, the task_lock() comment precludes using it with write_lock_irq(&task_lock) that might be required above.
Quoted 27 lines
Quoted 27 lines
kernel/auditsc.c +27
-0+ } + +if (!audit_enabled) +return rc; + + ab =audit_log_start (audit_context (),GFP_KERNEL ,AUDIT_CONTAINER_ID ); +if (!ab) +return rc; + + uid =from_kuid (&init_user_ns,task_uid (current)); + tty =audit_get_tty (current); +audit_log_format (ab,"op=set opid=%d old-contid=%llu contid=%llu pid=%d uid=%u auid=%u tty=%s ses=%u" , +task_tgid_nr (task), oldcontid, contid, + task_tgid_nr(current), uid +from_kuid (&init_user_ns,audit_get_loginuid (current)), + tty ?tty_name (tty) :"(none)" , +audit_get_sessionid (current)); +audit_put_tty (tty); +audit_log_task_context (ab); +audit_log_format (ab," comm=" ); +audit_log_untrustedstring (ab,get_task_comm (comm, current)); +audit_log_d_path_exe (ab, current->mm); +audit_log_format (ab," res=%d" , !rc); +audit_log_end (ab); +return rc; +} +
Quoted 8 lines
kernel/auditsc.c int audit_set_loginuid(kuid_t loginuid) · line 2188
Quoted 4 lines
kernel/auditsc.c +1
-0+/** * __audit_mq_open - record audit data for a POSIX MQ open * @oflag: open flag * @mode: mode bits --
paul moore
www.paul-moore.com
- RGB
--
Richard Guy Briggs <[email protected]>
Sr. S/W Engineer, Kernel Security, Base Operating Systems Remote, Ottawa, Red Hat Canada
IRC: rgb, SunRaycer
Voice: +1.647.777.2635, Internal: (81) 32635
Paul Moore
maintainerRe: [RFC PATCH ghak90 (was ghak32) V3 01/10] audit: add container id
Quoted 38 lines · Richard Guy Briggs
Quoted 37 lines · Paul Moore
Quoted 36 lines · Richard Guy Briggs
Implement the proc fs write to set the audit container identifier of a process, emitting an
AUDIT_CONTAINER_IDrecord to document the event.This is a write from the container orchestrator task to a proc entry of the form
/proc/PID/audit_containeridwhere PID is the process ID of the newly created task that is to become the first task in a container, or an additional task added to a container.The write expects up to a u64 value (unset: 18446744073709551615).
The writer must have capability
CAP_AUDIT_CONTROL.This will produce a record such as this:
type=CONTAINER_ID msg=audit(2018-06-06 12:39:29.636:26949) : op=set opid=2209 old-contid=18446744073709551615 contid=123456 pid=628 auid=root uid=root tty=ttyS0 ses=1 subj=unconfined_u:unconfined_r:unconfined_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 comm=bash exe=/usr/bin/bash res=yesThe "op" field indicates an initial set. The "pid" to "ses" fields are the orchestrator while the "opid" field is the object's PID, the process being "contained". Old and new audit container identifier values are given in the "contid" fields, while res indicates its success.
It is not permitted to unset or re-set the audit container identifier. A child inherits its parent's audit container identifier, but then can be set only once after.
See: https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-kernel/issues/90
See: https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-userspace/issues/51
See: https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-testsuite/issues/64
See: https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-kernel/wiki/RFE-Audit-Container-IDSigned-off-by Richard Guy Briggs <[email protected]>--- fs/proc/base.c | 37 ++++++++++++++++++++++++ include/linux/audit.h | 25 ++++++++++++++++ include/uapi/linux/audit.h | 2 ++ kernel/auditsc.c | 71 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 4 files changed, 135 insertions(+)
...
Quoted 37 lines
Quoted 37 lines
Quoted 23 lines
kernel/auditsc.c +19
-0@@ -2112,6 +2116,73 @@ int audit_set_loginuid(kuid_t loginuid) }/** +* audit_set_contid - set current task's audit_context contid +* @contid: contid value +* +* Returns 0 on success, -EPERM on permission failure. +* +* Called (set) from fs/proc/base.c::proc_contid_write(). +*/ +int audit_set_contid (struct task_struct *task,u64 contid) +{ +u64 oldcontid; +int rc =0 ; +struct audit_buffer *ab; +uid_t uid; +struct tty_struct *tty; +char comm[sizeof (current->comm)]; + +/* Can't set if audit disabled */ +if (!task->audit) +return -ENOPROTOOPT ;kernel/auditsc.c int audit_set_loginuid(kuid_t loginuid) · line 2147
Quoted 10 lines
kernel/auditsc.c +10
-0+ oldcontid =audit_get_contid (task); +/* Don't allow the audit containerid to be unset */ +if (!cid_valid (contid)) + rc = -EINVAL ; +/* if we don't have caps, reject */ +else if (!capable (CAP_AUDIT_CONTROL )) + rc = -EPERM ; +/* if task has children or is not single-threaded, deny */ +else if (!list_empty (&task->children)) + rc = -EBUSY ;Is this safe without holding
tasklist_lock? I worry we might be vulnerable to a race withfork().
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 4 lines
kernel/auditsc.c int audit_set_loginuid(kuid_t loginuid) · line 2149
Quoted 2 lines
kernel/auditsc.c +2
-0+else if (!(thread_group_leader (task) &&thread_group_empty (task))) + rc = -EALREADY ;Similar concern here as well, although related to threads.
I think you are correct here and
tasklist_lockshould cover both. Do we also wantrcu_read_lock()immediately preceeding it?
You'll need to take a closer look and determine the locking scheme. I simply took a quick look while reviewing this patch to see what of the existing locks, if any, would be most applicable here; tasklist_lock seemed like a good starting point.
It looks like tasklist_lock is defined as a rwlock_t so I'm not sure it would make sense to use it with a RCU protected structure (typically it's RCU+spinlock), but maybe that is the case with a task_struct, you'll need to check.
Quoted 10 lines
Quoted 9 lines
kernel/auditsc.c int audit_set_loginuid(kuid_t loginuid) · line 2152
Quoted 3 lines
kernel/auditsc.c +3
-0+/* it is already set, and not inherited from the parent, reject */ + else if (cid_valid(oldcontid) && !task->audit->inherited) + rc = -EEXIST ;Maybe I'm missing something, but why do we care about preventing reassigning the audit container ID in this case? The task is single threaded and has no descendants at this point so it should be safe, yes? So long as the task changing the audit container ID has
capable(CAP_AUDIT_CONTOL)it shouldn't matter, right?
Quoted 4 lines
Because we hammered out this idea 6 months ago in the design phase and I thought we all firmly agreed that the audit container identifier could only be set once. Has any significant discussion happenned since then to change that wisdom? I just wonder why this is coming up now.
Implementation, and time, can change how one looks at an earlier design. I believe this is why most well reasoned specifications have a reference design.
Remind me why the design had the restriction of write once for the audit container ID? At this point given the CAP_AUDIT_CONTROL and the single-thread, no-children restrictions I'm not sure what harm there is in allowing the value to be written multiple times (so long as the changes are audited of course).
Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 2 lines
Related, I'm questioning if we would ever care if the audit container ID was inherited or not?
We do since that is the only way we can tell if the value has been set once already or inherited unless we check if the parent's audit container identifier is identical (which tells us it was inherited).
Tied to the above question. If we don't care about multiple changes, given the other constraints, we probably don't need the inherited flag.
Signature · 2 lines
paul moore www.paul-moore.com
Re: [RFC PATCH ghak90 (was ghak32) V3 01/10] audit: add container id
Quoted 92 lines · Paul Moore
Quoted 38 lines · Richard Guy Briggs
Quoted 37 lines · Paul Moore
Quoted 36 lines · Richard Guy Briggs
Implement the proc fs write to set the audit container identifier of a process, emitting an
AUDIT_CONTAINER_IDrecord to document the event.This is a write from the container orchestrator task to a proc entry of the form
/proc/PID/audit_containeridwhere PID is the process ID of the newly created task that is to become the first task in a container, or an additional task added to a container.The write expects up to a u64 value (unset: 18446744073709551615).
The writer must have capability
CAP_AUDIT_CONTROL.This will produce a record such as this:
type=CONTAINER_ID msg=audit(2018-06-06 12:39:29.636:26949) : op=set opid=2209 old-contid=18446744073709551615 contid=123456 pid=628 auid=root uid=root tty=ttyS0 ses=1 subj=unconfined_u:unconfined_r:unconfined_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 comm=bash exe=/usr/bin/bash res=yesThe "op" field indicates an initial set. The "pid" to "ses" fields are the orchestrator while the "opid" field is the object's PID, the process being "contained". Old and new audit container identifier values are given in the "contid" fields, while res indicates its success.
It is not permitted to unset or re-set the audit container identifier. A child inherits its parent's audit container identifier, but then can be set only once after.
See: https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-kernel/issues/90
See: https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-userspace/issues/51
See: https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-testsuite/issues/64
See: https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-kernel/wiki/RFE-Audit-Container-IDSigned-off-by Richard Guy Briggs <[email protected]>--- fs/proc/base.c | 37 ++++++++++++++++++++++++ include/linux/audit.h | 25 ++++++++++++++++ include/uapi/linux/audit.h | 2 ++ kernel/auditsc.c | 71 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 4 files changed, 135 insertions(+)...
Quoted 37 lines
Quoted 37 lines
Quoted 23 lines
kernel/auditsc.c +19
-0@@ -2112,6 +2116,73 @@ int audit_set_loginuid(kuid_t loginuid) }/** +* audit_set_contid - set current task's audit_context contid +* @contid: contid value +* +* Returns 0 on success, -EPERM on permission failure. +* +* Called (set) from fs/proc/base.c::proc_contid_write(). +*/ +int audit_set_contid (struct task_struct *task,u64 contid) +{ +u64 oldcontid; +int rc =0 ; +struct audit_buffer *ab; +uid_t uid; +struct tty_struct *tty; +char comm[sizeof (current->comm)]; + +/* Can't set if audit disabled */ +if (!task->audit) +return -ENOPROTOOPT ;kernel/auditsc.c int audit_set_loginuid(kuid_t loginuid) · line 2147
Quoted 10 lines
kernel/auditsc.c +10
-0+ oldcontid =audit_get_contid (task); +/* Don't allow the audit containerid to be unset */ +if (!cid_valid (contid)) + rc = -EINVAL ; +/* if we don't have caps, reject */ +else if (!capable (CAP_AUDIT_CONTROL )) + rc = -EPERM ; +/* if task has children or is not single-threaded, deny */ +else if (!list_empty (&task->children)) + rc = -EBUSY ;Is this safe without holding
tasklist_lock? I worry we might be vulnerable to a race withfork().Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 4 lines
kernel/auditsc.c int audit_set_loginuid(kuid_t loginuid) · line 2149
Quoted 2 lines
kernel/auditsc.c +2
-0+else if (!(thread_group_leader (task) &&thread_group_empty (task))) + rc = -EALREADY ;Similar concern here as well, although related to threads.
I think you are correct here and
tasklist_lockshould cover both. Do we also wantrcu_read_lock()immediately preceeding it?You'll need to take a closer look and determine the locking scheme. I simply took a quick look while reviewing this patch to see what of the existing locks, if any, would be most applicable here;
tasklist_lockseemed like a good starting point.
Quoted 4 lines
It looks like
tasklist_lockis defined as arwlock_tso I'm not sure it would make sense to use it with a RCU protected structure (typically it's RCU+spinlock), but maybe that is the case with atask_struct, you'll need to check.
All I need is a read rather than write tasklist_lock since I'm not changing any inter-task relationships, which makes it possible to nest it inside or outside the task_lock(). I don't think I need the RCU lock.
Quoted 19 lines
Quoted 10 lines
Quoted 9 lines
kernel/auditsc.c int audit_set_loginuid(kuid_t loginuid) · line 2152
Quoted 3 lines
kernel/auditsc.c +3
-0+/* it is already set, and not inherited from the parent, reject */ + else if (cid_valid(oldcontid) && !task->audit->inherited) + rc = -EEXIST ;Maybe I'm missing something, but why do we care about preventing reassigning the audit container ID in this case? The task is single threaded and has no descendants at this point so it should be safe, yes? So long as the task changing the audit container ID has
capable(CAP_AUDIT_CONTOL)it shouldn't matter, right?Quoted 4 lines
Because we hammered out this idea 6 months ago in the design phase and I thought we all firmly agreed that the audit container identifier could only be set once. Has any significant discussion happenned since then to change that wisdom? I just wonder why this is coming up now.
Implementation, and time, can change how one looks at an earlier design. I believe this is why most well reasoned specifications have a reference design.
Quoted 5 lines
Remind me why the design had the restriction of write once for the audit container ID? At this point given the
CAP_AUDIT_CONTROLand the single-thread, no-children restrictions I'm not sure what harm there is in allowing the value to be written multiple times (so long as the changes are audited of course).
Looking back through the conversations, I think you may be right that we no longer need it, but it is easy to re-add if we find it necessary.
Quoted 10 lines
Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 2 lines
Related, I'm questioning if we would ever care if the audit container ID was inherited or not?
We do since that is the only way we can tell if the value has been set once already or inherited unless we check if the parent's audit container identifier is identical (which tells us it was inherited).
Tied to the above question. If we don't care about multiple changes, given the other constraints, we probably don't need the inherited flag.
Agreed.
Quoted 1 line
paul moore
- RGB
RFC PATCH v3 2/10 audit: log container info of syscalls
In reply to Richard Guy BriggsCreate a new audit record AUDIT_CONTAINER to document the audit container identifier of a process if it is present.
Called from audit_log_exit(), syscalls are covered.
A sample raw event:
type=SYSCALL msg=audit(1519924845.499:257): arch=c000003e syscall=257 success=yes exit=3 a0=ffffff9c a1=56374e1cef30 a2=241 a3=1b6 items=2 ppid=606 pid=635 auid=0 uid=0 gid=0 euid=0 suid=0 fsuid=0 egid=0 sgid=0 fsgid=0 tty=pts0 ses=3 comm="bash" exe="/usr/bin/bash" subj=unconfined_u:unconfined_r:unconfined_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 key="tmpcontainerid" type=CWD msg=audit(1519924845.499:257): cwd="/root"
type=PATH msg=audit(1519924845.499:257): item=0 name="/tmp/" inode=13863 dev=00:27 mode=041777 ouid=0 ogid=0 rdev=00:00 obj=system_u:object_r:tmp_t:s0 nametype= PARENT cap_fp=0000000000000000 cap_fi=0000000000000000 cap_fe=0 cap_fver=0
type=PATH msg=audit(1519924845.499:257): item=1 name="/tmp/tmpcontainerid" inode=17729 dev=00:27 mode=0100644 ouid=0 ogid=0 rdev=00:00 obj=unconfined_u:object_r:user_tmp_t:s0 nametype=CREATE cap_fp=0000000000000000 cap_fi=0000000000000000 cap_fe=0 cap_fver=0
type=PROCTITLE msg=audit(1519924845.499:257): proctitle=62617368002D6300736C65657020313B206563686F2074657374203E202F746D702F746D70636F6E7461696E65726964
type=CONTAINER msg=audit(1519924845.499:257): op=task contid=123458
See: https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-kernel/issues/90
See: https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-userspace/issues/51
See: https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-testsuite/issues/64
See: https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-kernel/wiki/RFE-Audit-Container-ID
--- include/linux/audit.h | 7 +++++++ include/uapi/linux/audit.h | 1 + kernel/audit.c | 23 +++++++++++++++++++++++ kernel/auditsc.c | 3 +++ 4 files changed, 34 insertions(+)
include/linux/audit.h +7 -0
@@ -152,6 +152,9 @@ extern void audit_log_key(struct audit_buffer *ab,extern int audit_log_task_context (struct audit_buffer *ab);extern void audit_log_task_info (struct audit_buffer *ab,struct task_struct *tsk); +extern int audit_log_contid (struct task_struct *tsk, +struct audit_context *context, +char *op);extern int audit_update_lsm_rules (void );
@@ -202,6 +205,10 @@ static inline int audit_log_task_context(struct audit_buffer *ab)static inline void audit_log_task_info (struct audit_buffer *ab,struct task_struct *tsk) { } +static inline int audit_log_contid (struct task_struct *tsk, +struct audit_context *context, +char *op) +{ }#define audit_enabled 0#endif /* CONFIG_AUDIT */
include/uapi/linux/audit.h +1 -0
@@ -115,6 +115,7 @@#define AUDIT_REPLACE 1329/* Replace auditd if this packet unanswerd */ #define AUDIT_KERN_MODULE 1330/* Kernel Module events */ #define AUDIT_FANOTIFY 1331/* Fanotify access decision */ +#define AUDIT_CONTAINER 1332/* Container ID */ #define AUDIT_AVC 1400/* SE Linux avc denial or grant */ #define AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR 1401/* Internal SE Linux Errors */
kernel/audit.c +23 -0
@@ -2048,6 +2048,29 @@ void audit_log_session_info(struct audit_buffer *ab)audit_log_format (ab," auid=%u ses=%u" , auid, sessionid); } +/* +* audit_log_contid - report container info +* @tsk: task to be recorded +* @context: task or local context for record +* @op: contid string description +*/ +int audit_log_contid (struct task_struct *tsk, +struct audit_context *context,char *op) +{ +struct audit_buffer *ab; + +if (!audit_contid_set (tsk)) +return 0 ; +/* Generate AUDIT_CONTAINER record with container ID */ + ab =audit_log_start (context,GFP_KERNEL ,AUDIT_CONTAINER ); +if (!ab) +return -ENOMEM ; +audit_log_format (ab,"op=%s contid=%llu" , + op,audit_get_contid (tsk)); +audit_log_end (ab); +return 0 ; +} +void audit_log_key (struct audit_buffer *ab,char *key) {audit_log_format (ab," key=" );
kernel/auditsc.c +3 -0
@@ -1490,10 +1490,13 @@ static void audit_log_exit(struct audit_context *context, struct task_struct *tsaudit_log_proctitle (tsk, context); +audit_log_contid (tsk, context,"task" ); +/* Send end of event record to help user space know we are finished */ ab =audit_log_start (context,GFP_KERNEL ,AUDIT_EOE );if (ab)audit_log_end (ab); +if (call_panic)audit_panic ("error converting sid to string" ); }
Signature · 1 line
1.8.3.1
Re: [RFC PATCH ghak90 (was ghak32) V3 02/10] audit: log container info of syscalls
Quoted 16 lines · EDT Richard Guy Briggs
Create a new audit record
AUDIT_CONTAINERto document the audit container identifier of a process if it is present.Called from
audit_log_exit(), syscalls are covered.A sample raw event:
type=SYSCALL msg=audit(1519924845.499:257): arch=c000003e syscall=257 success=yes exit=3 a0=ffffff9c a1=56374e1cef30 a2=241 a3=1b6 items=2 ppid=606 pid=635 auid=0 uid=0 gid=0 euid=0 suid=0 fsuid=0 egid=0 sgid=0 fsgid=0 tty=pts0 ses=3 comm="bash" exe="/usr/bin/bash" subj=unconfined_u:unconfined_r:unconfined_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 key="tmpcontainerid" type=CWD msg=audit(1519924845.499:257): cwd="/root" type=PATH msg=audit(1519924845.499:257): item=0 name="/tmp/" inode=13863 dev=00:27 mode=041777 ouid=0 ogid=0 rdev=00:00 obj=system_u:object_r:tmp_t:s0 nametype= PARENT cap_fp=0000000000000000 cap_fi=0000000000000000 cap_fe=0 cap_fver=0 type=PATH
Quoted 8 lines
msg=audit(1519924845.499:257): item=1 name="/tmp/tmpcontainerid" inode=17729 dev=00:27 mode=0100644 ouid=0 ogid=0 rdev=00:00 obj=unconfined_u:object_r:user_tmp_t:s0 nametype=CREATE cap_fp=0000000000000000 cap_fi=0000000000000000 cap_fe=0 cap_fver=0 type=PROCTITLE msg=audit(1519924845.499:257):
proctitle=62617368002D6300736C65657020313B206563686F2074657374203E202F746D 702F746D70636F6E7461696E65726964 type=CONTAINER msg=audit(1519924845.499:257): op=task contid=123458
Ack for the audit record names.
-Steve
include/linux/audit.h extern void audit_log_key(struct audit_buffer
Quoted 18 lines
See: https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-kernel/issues/90
See: https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-userspace/issues/51
See: https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-testsuite/issues/64
See:
https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-kernel/wiki/RFE-Audit-Container-IDSigned-off-by Richard Guy Briggs <[email protected]>--- include/linux/audit.h | 7 +++++++ include/uapi/linux/audit.h | 1 + kernel/audit.c | 23 +++++++++++++++++++++++ kernel/auditsc.c | 3 +++ 4 files changed, 34 insertions(+)include/linux/audit.h +0
-0@@ -152,6 +152,9 @@ extern void audit_log_key(struct audit_buffer
*ab,
Quoted 26 lines
include/linux/audit.h +3
-0extern int audit_log_task_context (struct audit_buffer *ab);extern void audit_log_task_info (struct audit_buffer *ab,struct task_struct *tsk); +extern int audit_log_contid (struct task_struct *tsk, +struct audit_context *context, +char *op);extern int audit_update_lsm_rules (void );@@ -202,6 +205,10 @@ static inline int audit_log_task_context(struct
audit_buffer*ab) static inline void audit_log_task_info(structaudit_buffer*ab,include/linux/audit.h +4
-0struct task_struct *tsk) { } +static inline int audit_log_contid (struct task_struct *tsk, +struct audit_context *context, +char *op) +{ }#define audit_enabled 0#endif /* CONFIG_AUDIT */ include/uapi/linux/audit.h +0
-0
include/uapi/linux/audit.h line 115
Quoted 1 line
include/uapi/linux/audit.h +0
-0@@ -115,6 +115,7 @@#define AUDIT_REPLACE 1329/* Replace auditd if this packet unanswerd
*/
Quoted 59 lines
include/uapi/linux/audit.h +1
-0#define AUDIT_KERN_MODULE 1330/* Kernel Module events */ #define AUDIT_FANOTIFY 1331/* Fanotify access decision */ +#define AUDIT_CONTAINER 1332/* Container ID */ #define AUDIT_AVC 1400/* SE Linux avc denial or grant */ #define AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR 1401/* Internal SE Linux Errors */ kernel/audit.c +23
-0@@ -2048,6 +2048,29 @@ void audit_log_session_info(struct audit_buffer *ab)audit_log_format (ab," auid=%u ses=%u" , auid, sessionid); } +/* +* audit_log_contid - report container info +* @tsk: task to be recorded +* @context: task or local context for record +* @op: contid string description +*/ +int audit_log_contid (struct task_struct *tsk, +struct audit_context *context,char *op) +{ +struct audit_buffer *ab; + +if (!audit_contid_set (tsk)) +return 0 ; +/* Generate AUDIT_CONTAINER record with container ID */ + ab =audit_log_start (context,GFP_KERNEL ,AUDIT_CONTAINER ); +if (!ab) +return -ENOMEM ; +audit_log_format (ab,"op=%s contid=%llu" , + op,audit_get_contid (tsk)); +audit_log_end (ab); +return 0 ; +} +void audit_log_key (struct audit_buffer *ab,char *key) {audit_log_format (ab," key=" );kernel/auditsc.c +3
-0@@ -1490,10 +1490,13 @@ static void audit_log_exit(struct audit_context *context, struct task_struct *tsaudit_log_proctitle (tsk, context); +audit_log_contid (tsk, context,"task" ); +/* Send end of event record to help user space know we are finished */ ab =audit_log_start (context,GFP_KERNEL ,AUDIT_EOE );if (ab)audit_log_end (ab); +if (call_panic)audit_panic ("error converting sid to string" );}
Paul Moore
maintainerRe: [RFC PATCH ghak90 (was ghak32) V3 02/10] audit: log container info of syscalls
In reply to Richard Guy BriggsQuoted 24 lines · Richard Guy Briggs
Create a new audit record
AUDIT_CONTAINERto document the audit container identifier of a process if it is present.Called from
audit_log_exit(), syscalls are covered.A sample raw event:
type=SYSCALL msg=audit(1519924845.499:257): arch=c000003e syscall=257 success=yes exit=3 a0=ffffff9c a1=56374e1cef30 a2=241 a3=1b6 items=2 ppid=606 pid=635 auid=0 uid=0 gid=0 euid=0 suid=0 fsuid=0 egid=0 sgid=0 fsgid=0 tty=pts0 ses=3 comm="bash" exe="/usr/bin/bash" subj=unconfined_u:unconfined_r:unconfined_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 key="tmpcontainerid" type=CWD msg=audit(1519924845.499:257): cwd="/root"
type=PATH msg=audit(1519924845.499:257): item=0 name="/tmp/" inode=13863 dev=00:27 mode=041777 ouid=0 ogid=0 rdev=00:00 obj=system_u:object_r:tmp_t:s0 nametype= PARENT cap_fp=0000000000000000 cap_fi=0000000000000000 cap_fe=0 cap_fver=0
type=PATH msg=audit(1519924845.499:257): item=1 name="/tmp/tmpcontainerid" inode=17729 dev=00:27 mode=0100644 ouid=0 ogid=0 rdev=00:00 obj=unconfined_u:object_r:user_tmp_t:s0 nametype=CREATE cap_fp=0000000000000000 cap_fi=0000000000000000 cap_fe=0 cap_fver=0
type=PROCTITLE msg=audit(1519924845.499:257): proctitle=62617368002D6300736C65657020313B206563686F2074657374203E202F746D702F746D70636F6E7461696E65726964
type=CONTAINER msg=audit(1519924845.499:257): op=task contid=123458See: https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-kernel/issues/90
See: https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-userspace/issues/51
See: https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-testsuite/issues/64
See: https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-kernel/wiki/RFE-Audit-Container-IDSigned-off-by Richard Guy Briggs <[email protected]>--- include/linux/audit.h | 7 +++++++ include/uapi/linux/audit.h | 1 + kernel/audit.c | 23 +++++++++++++++++++++++ kernel/auditsc.c | 3 +++ 4 files changed, 34 insertions(+)
...
include/uapi/linux/audit.h line 118
Quoted 7 lines
include/uapi/linux/audit.h +1
-0@@ -115,6 +115,7 @@#define AUDIT_REPLACE 1329/* Replace auditd if this packet unanswerd */ #define AUDIT_KERN_MODULE 1330/* Kernel Module events */ #define AUDIT_FANOTIFY 1331/* Fanotify access decision */ +#define AUDIT_CONTAINER 1332/* Container ID */
I'm not sure I'm completely sold on the AUDIT_CONTAINER_ID and AUDIT_CONTAINER record type names. From what I can tell AUDIT_CONTAINER_ID seems to be used for audit container ID management operations, e.g. setting the ID, whereas the AUDIT_CONTAINER is used to tag events with the corresponding audit container ID. Assuming that is correct, it seems like AUDIT_CONTAINER might be better served if it was named AUDIT_CONTAINER_ID and if we could change AUDIT_CONTAINER_ID to AUDIT_CONTAINER_OP/MGMT/etc. Thoughts?
Quoted 19 lines
include/uapi/linux/audit.h +0
-0#define AUDIT_AVC 1400/* SE Linux avc denial or grant */ #define AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR 1401/* Internal SE Linux Errors */ kernel/audit.c +9
-0@@ -2048,6 +2048,29 @@ void audit_log_session_info(struct audit_buffer *ab)audit_log_format (ab," auid=%u ses=%u" , auid, sessionid); } +/* +* audit_log_contid - report container info +* @tsk: task to be recorded +* @context: task or local context for record +* @op: contid string description +*/ +int audit_log_contid (struct task_struct *tsk, +struct audit_context *context,char *op) +{
kernel/audit.c void audit_log_session_info(struct audit_buffer *ab) · line 2069
Quoted 10 lines
kernel/audit.c +10
-0+struct audit_buffer *ab; + +if (!audit_contid_set (tsk)) +return 0 ; +/* Generate AUDIT_CONTAINER record with container ID */ + ab =audit_log_start (context,GFP_KERNEL ,AUDIT_CONTAINER ); +if (!ab) +return -ENOMEM ; +audit_log_format (ab,"op=%s contid=%llu" , + op,audit_get_contid (tsk));
Can you explain your reason for including an "op" field in this record type? I've been looking at the rest of the patches in this patchset and it seems to be used more as an indicator of the record's generating context rather than any sort of audit container ID operation.
kernel/audit.c void audit_log_session_info(struct audit_buffer *ab) · line 2072
Quoted 3 lines
kernel/audit.c +3
-0+audit_log_end (ab); +return 0 ; +}
--
paul moore
www.paul-moore.com
Re: [RFC PATCH ghak90 (was ghak32) V3 02/10] audit: log container info of syscalls
Quoted 28 lines · Paul Moore
Quoted 24 lines · Richard Guy Briggs
Create a new audit record
AUDIT_CONTAINERto document the audit container identifier of a process if it is present.Called from
audit_log_exit(), syscalls are covered.A sample raw event:
type=SYSCALL msg=audit(1519924845.499:257): arch=c000003e syscall=257 success=yes exit=3 a0=ffffff9c a1=56374e1cef30 a2=241 a3=1b6 items=2 ppid=606 pid=635 auid=0 uid=0 gid=0 euid=0 suid=0 fsuid=0 egid=0 sgid=0 fsgid=0 tty=pts0 ses=3 comm="bash" exe="/usr/bin/bash" subj=unconfined_u:unconfined_r:unconfined_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 key="tmpcontainerid" type=CWD msg=audit(1519924845.499:257): cwd="/root"
type=PATH msg=audit(1519924845.499:257): item=0 name="/tmp/" inode=13863 dev=00:27 mode=041777 ouid=0 ogid=0 rdev=00:00 obj=system_u:object_r:tmp_t:s0 nametype= PARENT cap_fp=0000000000000000 cap_fi=0000000000000000 cap_fe=0 cap_fver=0
type=PATH msg=audit(1519924845.499:257): item=1 name="/tmp/tmpcontainerid" inode=17729 dev=00:27 mode=0100644 ouid=0 ogid=0 rdev=00:00 obj=unconfined_u:object_r:user_tmp_t:s0 nametype=CREATE cap_fp=0000000000000000 cap_fi=0000000000000000 cap_fe=0 cap_fver=0
type=PROCTITLE msg=audit(1519924845.499:257): proctitle=62617368002D6300736C65657020313B206563686F2074657374203E202F746D702F746D70636F6E7461696E65726964
type=CONTAINER msg=audit(1519924845.499:257): op=task contid=123458See: https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-kernel/issues/90
See: https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-userspace/issues/51
See: https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-testsuite/issues/64
See: https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-kernel/wiki/RFE-Audit-Container-IDSigned-off-by Richard Guy Briggs <[email protected]>--- include/linux/audit.h | 7 +++++++ include/uapi/linux/audit.h | 1 + kernel/audit.c | 23 +++++++++++++++++++++++ kernel/auditsc.c | 3 +++ 4 files changed, 34 insertions(+)...
Quoted 16 lines
include/uapi/linux/audit.h line 118
Quoted 7 lines
include/uapi/linux/audit.h +1
-0@@ -115,6 +115,7 @@#define AUDIT_REPLACE 1329/* Replace auditd if this packet unanswerd */ #define AUDIT_KERN_MODULE 1330/* Kernel Module events */ #define AUDIT_FANOTIFY 1331/* Fanotify access decision */ +#define AUDIT_CONTAINER 1332/* Container ID */ I'm not sure I'm completely sold on the
AUDIT_CONTAINER_IDandAUDIT_CONTAINERrecord type names. From what I can tellAUDIT_CONTAINER_IDseems to be used for audit container ID management operations, e.g. setting the ID, whereas theAUDIT_CONTAINERis used to tag events with the corresponding audit container ID. Assuming that is correct, it seems likeAUDIT_CONTAINERmight be better served if it was namedAUDIT_CONTAINER_IDand if we could changeAUDIT_CONTAINER_IDto AUDIT_CONTAINER_OP/MGMT/etc. Thoughts?
Please see discussion at:
https://www.redhat.com/archives/linux-audit/2018-May/msg00101.html
I'm fine with changing AUDIT_CONTAINER_ID to AUDIT_CONTAINER_OP/MGMT/etc.
Quoted 27 lines
Quoted 27 lines
include/uapi/linux/audit.h +0
-0#define AUDIT_AVC 1400/* SE Linux avc denial or grant */ #define AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR 1401/* Internal SE Linux Errors */ kernel/audit.c +17
-0@@ -2048,6 +2048,29 @@ void audit_log_session_info(struct audit_buffer *ab)audit_log_format (ab," auid=%u ses=%u" , auid, sessionid); } +/* +* audit_log_contid - report container info +* @tsk: task to be recorded +* @context: task or local context for record +* @op: contid string description +*/ +int audit_log_contid (struct task_struct *tsk, +struct audit_context *context,char *op) +{ +struct audit_buffer *ab; + +if (!audit_contid_set (tsk)) +return 0 ; +/* Generate AUDIT_CONTAINER record with container ID */ + ab =audit_log_start (context,GFP_KERNEL ,AUDIT_CONTAINER ); +if (!ab) +return -ENOMEM ;
Quoted 8 lines
kernel/audit.c void audit_log_session_info(struct audit_buffer *ab) · line 2069
Quoted 2 lines
kernel/audit.c +2
-0+audit_log_format (ab,"op=%s contid=%llu" , + op,audit_get_contid (tsk));Can you explain your reason for including an "op" field in this record type? I've been looking at the rest of the patches in this patchset and it seems to be used more as an indicator of the record's generating context rather than any sort of audit container ID operation.
"action" might work, but that's netfilter and numeric... "kind"? Nothing else really seems to fit from a field name, type or lack of searchability perspective.
Steve, do you have an opinion?
Quoted 7 lines
kernel/audit.c void audit_log_session_info(struct audit_buffer *ab) · line 2072
Quoted 3 lines
kernel/audit.c +3
-0+audit_log_end (ab); +return 0 ; +}--
paul moore
www.paul-moore.com
- RGB
--
Richard Guy Briggs <[email protected]>
Sr. S/W Engineer, Kernel Security, Base Operating Systems Remote, Ottawa, Red Hat Canada
IRC: rgb, SunRaycer
Voice: +1.647.777.2635, Internal: (81) 32635
Re: [RFC PATCH ghak90 (was ghak32) V3 02/10] audit: log container info of syscalls
Quoted 25 lines · EDT Richard Guy Briggs
Quoted 16 lines
Quoted 16 lines
+ *
audit_log_contid- report container info
+ * @tsk: task to be recorded
+ * @context: task or local context for record
+ * @op: contid string description
+ */kernel/audit.c +11
-0+int audit_log_contid (struct task_struct *tsk, +struct audit_context *context,char *op) +{ +struct audit_buffer *ab; + +if (!audit_contid_set (tsk)) +return 0 ; +/* Generate AUDIT_CONTAINER record with container ID */ + ab =audit_log_start (context,GFP_KERNEL ,AUDIT_CONTAINER ); +if (!ab) +return -ENOMEM ;Quoted 8 lines
kernel/audit.c void audit_log_session_info(struct audit_buffer *ab) · line 2069
Quoted 2 lines
kernel/audit.c +2
-0+audit_log_format (ab,"op=%s contid=%llu" , + op,audit_get_contid (tsk));Can you explain your reason for including an "op" field in this record type? I've been looking at the rest of the patches in this patchset and it seems to be used more as an indicator of the record's generating context rather than any sort of audit container ID operation.
Quoted 5 lines
"action" might work, but that's netfilter and numeric... "kind"? Nothing else really seems to fit from a field name, type or lack of searchability perspective.
Steve, do you have an opinion?
We only have 1 sample event where we have op=task. What are the other possible values?
-Steve
Re: [RFC PATCH ghak90 (was ghak32) V3 02/10] audit: log container info of syscalls
Quoted 26 lines · Steve Grubb
Quoted 25 lines · EDT Richard Guy Briggs
Quoted 24 lines
Quoted 8 lines
+ *
audit_log_contid- report container info
+ * @tsk: task to be recorded
+ * @context: task or local context for record
+ * @op: contid string description
+ */kernel/audit.c +3
-0+int audit_log_contid (struct task_struct *tsk, +struct audit_context *context,char *op) +{kernel/audit.c void audit_log_session_info(struct audit_buffer *ab) · line 2069
Quoted 10 lines
kernel/audit.c +10
-0+struct audit_buffer *ab; + +if (!audit_contid_set (tsk)) +return 0 ; +/* Generate AUDIT_CONTAINER record with container ID */ + ab =audit_log_start (context,GFP_KERNEL ,AUDIT_CONTAINER ); +if (!ab) +return -ENOMEM ; +audit_log_format (ab,"op=%s contid=%llu" , + op,audit_get_contid (tsk));Can you explain your reason for including an "op" field in this record type? I've been looking at the rest of the patches in this patchset and it seems to be used more as an indicator of the record's generating context rather than any sort of audit container ID operation.
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 5 lines
"action" might work, but that's netfilter and numeric... "kind"? Nothing else really seems to fit from a field name, type or lack of searchability perspective.
Steve, do you have an opinion?
We only have 1 sample event where we have op=task. What are the other possible values?
For the AUDIT_CONTAINER record we have op= "task", "target" (from the ptrace and signals patch), "tty".
For the AUDIT_CONTAINER_ID record we have "op=set".
Quoted 1 line
-Steve
- RGB
--
Richard Guy Briggs <[email protected]>
Sr. S/W Engineer, Kernel Security, Base Operating Systems Remote, Ottawa, Red Hat Canada
IRC: rgb, SunRaycer
Voice: +1.647.777.2635, Internal: (81) 32635
Re: [RFC PATCH ghak90 (was ghak32) V3 02/10] audit: log container info of syscalls
Quoted 31 lines · Richard Guy Briggs
Quoted 30 lines · Steve Grubb
Quoted 29 lines · EDT Richard Guy Briggs
Quoted 16 lines
Quoted 16 lines
+ *
audit_log_contid- report container info
+ * @tsk: task to be recorded
+ * @context: task or local context for record
+ * @op: contid string description
+ */kernel/audit.c +11
-0+int audit_log_contid (struct task_struct *tsk, +struct audit_context *context,char *op) +{ +struct audit_buffer *ab; + +if (!audit_contid_set (tsk)) +return 0 ; +/* Generate AUDIT_CONTAINER record with container ID */ + ab =audit_log_start (context,GFP_KERNEL ,AUDIT_CONTAINER ); +if (!ab) +return -ENOMEM ;Quoted 8 lines
kernel/audit.c void audit_log_session_info(struct audit_buffer *ab) · line 2069
Quoted 2 lines
kernel/audit.c +2
-0+audit_log_format (ab,"op=%s contid=%llu" , + op,audit_get_contid (tsk));Can you explain your reason for including an "op" field in this record type? I've been looking at the rest of the patches in this patchset and it seems to be used more as an indicator of the record's generating context rather than any sort of audit container ID operation.
"action" might work, but that's netfilter and numeric... "kind"? Nothing else really seems to fit from a field name, type or lack of searchability perspective.
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 4 lines
Quoted 1 line
Steve, do you have an opinion?
We only have 1 sample event where we have op=task. What are the other possible values?
For the
AUDIT_CONTAINERrecord we have op= "task", "target" (from the ptrace and signals patch), "tty".
Sorry, pressed "send" too quickly. Also "aux0x%x" (also from the ptrace/signals patch), "net%u" (from the AUDIT_NETFILTER_PKT patch).
Quoted 5 lines
For the
AUDIT_CONTAINER_IDrecord we have "op=set".Quoted 1 line
-Steve
- RGB
- RGB
--
Richard Guy Briggs <[email protected]>
Sr. S/W Engineer, Kernel Security, Base Operating Systems Remote, Ottawa, Red Hat Canada
IRC: rgb, SunRaycer
Voice: +1.647.777.2635, Internal: (81) 32635
Re: [RFC PATCH ghak90 (was ghak32) V3 02/10] audit: log container info of syscalls
In reply to Richard Guy BriggsQuoted 35 lines · EDT Richard Guy Briggs
Quoted 34 lines · Steve Grubb
Quoted 32 lines · EDT Richard Guy Briggs
Quoted 18 lines
Quoted 18 lines
+ *
audit_log_contid- report container info
+ * @tsk: task to be recorded
+ * @context: task or local context for record
+ * @op: contid string description
+ */(quoted diff) +2
-0+int audit_log_contid(struct task_struct *tsk, + struct audit_context *context, char*op)
kernel/audit.c +10
-0+{ +struct audit_buffer *ab; + +if (!audit_contid_set (tsk)) +return 0 ; +/* Generate AUDIT_CONTAINER record with container ID */ + ab =audit_log_start (context,GFP_KERNEL ,AUDIT_CONTAINER ); +if (!ab) +return -ENOMEM ; + audit_log_format(ab, "op=%s contid=%llu",Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 1 line
+ op,
audit_get_contid(tsk));Can you explain your reason for including an "op" field in this record
type? I've been looking at the rest of the patches in this patchset and it seems to be used more as an indicator of the record's generating context rather than any sort of audit container ID operation."action" might work, but that's netfilter and numeric... "kind"? Nothing else really seems to fit from a field name, type or lack of searchability perspective.
Steve, do you have an opinion?
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 2 lines
We only have 1 sample event where we have op=task. What are the other possible values?
For the
AUDIT_CONTAINERrecord we have op= "task", "target" (from the ptrace and signals patch), "tty".For the
AUDIT_CONTAINER_IDrecord we have "op=set".
Since the purpose of this record is to log the container id, I think that is all that is needed. We can get the context from the other records in the event. I'd suggest dropping the "op" field.
-Steve
Re: [RFC PATCH ghak90 (was ghak32) V3 02/10] audit: log container info of syscalls
Quoted 39 lines · Steve Grubb
Quoted 38 lines · EDT Richard Guy Briggs
Quoted 36 lines · Steve Grubb
Quoted 27 lines · EDT Richard Guy Briggs
Quoted 18 lines
Quoted 18 lines
+ *
audit_log_contid- report container info
+ * @tsk: task to be recorded
+ * @context: task or local context for record
+ * @op: contid string description
+ */(quoted diff) +2
-0+int audit_log_contid(struct task_struct *tsk, + struct audit_context *context, char*op)
kernel/audit.c +10
-0+{ +struct audit_buffer *ab; + +if (!audit_contid_set (tsk)) +return 0 ; +/* Generate AUDIT_CONTAINER record with container ID */ + ab =audit_log_start (context,GFP_KERNEL ,AUDIT_CONTAINER ); +if (!ab) +return -ENOMEM ; + audit_log_format(ab, "op=%s contid=%llu",Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 1 line
+ op,
audit_get_contid(tsk));Can you explain your reason for including an "op" field in this record
type? I've been looking at the rest of the patches in this patchset and it seems to be used more as an indicator of the record's generating context rather than any sort of audit container ID operation.Quoted 5 lines
"action" might work, but that's netfilter and numeric... "kind"? Nothing else really seems to fit from a field name, type or lack of searchability perspective.
Steve, do you have an opinion?
We only have 1 sample event where we have op=task. What are the other possible values?
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 4 lines
For the
AUDIT_CONTAINERrecord we have op= "task", "target" (from the ptrace and signals patch), "tty".For the
AUDIT_CONTAINER_IDrecord we have "op=set".Since the purpose of this record is to log the container id, I think that is all that is needed. We can get the context from the other records in the event. I'd suggest dropping the "op" field.
Ok, the information above it for two different audit container identifier records. Which one should drop the "op=" field? Both? Or just the AUDIT_CONTAINER record? The AUDIT_CONTAINER_ID record (which might be renamed) could use it to distinguish a "set" record from a dropped audit container identifier that is no longer registered by any task or namespace.
Quoted 1 line
-Steve
- RGB
--
Richard Guy Briggs <[email protected]>
Sr. S/W Engineer, Kernel Security, Base Operating Systems Remote, Ottawa, Red Hat Canada
IRC: rgb, SunRaycer
Voice: +1.647.777.2635, Internal: (81) 32635
Re: [RFC PATCH ghak90 (was ghak32) V3 02/10] audit: log container info of syscalls
Quoted 52 lines · EDT Richard Guy Briggs
Quoted 42 lines · Steve Grubb
Quoted 41 lines · EDT Richard Guy Briggs
Quoted 39 lines · Steve Grubb
Quoted 30 lines · EDT Richard Guy Briggs
Quoted 22 lines
Quoted 17 lines
+ *
audit_log_contid- report container info
+ * @tsk: task to be recorded
+ * @context: task or local context for record
+ * @op: contid string description
+ */(quoted diff) +2
-0+int audit_log_contid(struct task_struct *tsk, + struct audit_context *context,char
*op)(quoted diff) +7
-0+{ + struct audit_buffer *ab; + + if (!audit_contid_set(tsk)) + return 0; + /* Generate AUDIT_CONTAINER record with container ID */ + ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL,
AUDIT_CONTAINER);Review
Quoted 4 lines
(quoted diff) +4
-0+ if (!ab) + return -ENOMEM; + audit_log_format(ab, "op=%s contid=%llu", + op, audit_get_contid(tsk));Quoted 7 lines
Can you explain your reason for including an "op" field in this record
type? I've been looking at the rest of the patches in this patchset
and it seems to be used more as an indicator of the record's generating context rather than any sort of audit container ID operation.Quoted 5 lines
"action" might work, but that's netfilter and numeric... "kind"? Nothing else really seems to fit from a field name, type or lack of searchability perspective.
Steve, do you have an opinion?
We only have 1 sample event where we have op=task. What are the other possible values?
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 4 lines
For the
AUDIT_CONTAINERrecord we have op= "task", "target" (from the ptrace and signals patch), "tty".For the
AUDIT_CONTAINER_IDrecord we have "op=set".Since the purpose of this record is to log the container id, I think that is all that is needed. We can get the context from the other records in the event. I'd suggest dropping the "op" field.
Quoted 6 lines
Ok, the information above it for two different audit container identifier records. Which one should drop the "op=" field? Both? Or just the
AUDIT_CONTAINERrecord? TheAUDIT_CONTAINER_IDrecord (which might be renamed) could use it to distinguish a "set" record from a dropped audit container identifier that is no longer registered by any task or namespace.
Neither of them need it. All they need to do is state the container that is being acted upon.
-Steve
Paul Moore
maintainerRe: [RFC PATCH ghak90 (was ghak32) V3 02/10] audit: log container info of syscalls
Quoted 60 lines · Steve Grubb
Quoted 52 lines · EDT Richard Guy Briggs
Quoted 42 lines · Steve Grubb
Quoted 41 lines · EDT Richard Guy Briggs
Quoted 39 lines · Steve Grubb
Quoted 30 lines · EDT Richard Guy Briggs
Quoted 22 lines
Quoted 17 lines
+ *
audit_log_contid- report container info
+ * @tsk: task to be recorded
+ * @context: task or local context for record
+ * @op: contid string description
+ */(quoted diff) +2
-0+int audit_log_contid(struct task_struct *tsk, + struct audit_context *context,char
*op)(quoted diff) +7
-0+{ + struct audit_buffer *ab; + + if (!audit_contid_set(tsk)) + return 0; + /* Generate AUDIT_CONTAINER record with container ID */ + ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL,
AUDIT_CONTAINER);Review
Quoted 4 lines
(quoted diff) +4
-0+ if (!ab) + return -ENOMEM; + audit_log_format(ab, "op=%s contid=%llu", + op, audit_get_contid(tsk));Quoted 7 lines
Can you explain your reason for including an "op" field in this record
type? I've been looking at the rest of the patches in this patchset
and it seems to be used more as an indicator of the record's generating context rather than any sort of audit container ID operation.Quoted 5 lines
"action" might work, but that's netfilter and numeric... "kind"? Nothing else really seems to fit from a field name, type or lack of searchability perspective.
Steve, do you have an opinion?
We only have 1 sample event where we have op=task. What are the other possible values?
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 4 lines
For the
AUDIT_CONTAINERrecord we have op= "task", "target" (from the ptrace and signals patch), "tty".For the
AUDIT_CONTAINER_IDrecord we have "op=set".Since the purpose of this record is to log the container id, I think that is all that is needed. We can get the context from the other records in the event. I'd suggest dropping the "op" field.
Quoted 6 lines
Ok, the information above it for two different audit container identifier records. Which one should drop the "op=" field? Both? Or just the
AUDIT_CONTAINERrecord? TheAUDIT_CONTAINER_IDrecord (which might be renamed) could use it to distinguish a "set" record from a dropped audit container identifier that is no longer registered by any task or namespace.
Quoted 2 lines
Neither of them need it. All they need to do is state the container that is being acted upon.
I think we should keep the "op" field for audit container ID management operations, even though we really only have a "set" operation at the moment, but the others should drop the "op" field (see my previous emails in this thread).
Signature · 2 lines
paul moore www.paul-moore.com
Re: [RFC PATCH ghak90 (was ghak32) V3 02/10] audit: log container info of syscalls
Quoted 61 lines · Paul Moore
Quoted 60 lines · Steve Grubb
Quoted 58 lines · EDT Richard Guy Briggs
Quoted 42 lines · Steve Grubb
Quoted 41 lines · EDT Richard Guy Briggs
Quoted 39 lines · Steve Grubb
Quoted 30 lines · EDT Richard Guy Briggs
Quoted 22 lines
Quoted 17 lines
+ *
audit_log_contid- report container info
+ * @tsk: task to be recorded
+ * @context: task or local context for record
+ * @op: contid string description
+ */(quoted diff) +2
-0+int audit_log_contid(struct task_struct *tsk, + struct audit_context *context,char
*op)(quoted diff) +7
-0+{ + struct audit_buffer *ab; + + if (!audit_contid_set(tsk)) + return 0; + /* Generate AUDIT_CONTAINER record with container ID */ + ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL,
AUDIT_CONTAINER);Review
Quoted 4 lines
(quoted diff) +4
-0+ if (!ab) + return -ENOMEM; + audit_log_format(ab, "op=%s contid=%llu", + op, audit_get_contid(tsk));Quoted 7 lines
Can you explain your reason for including an "op" field in this record
type? I've been looking at the rest of the patches in this patchset
and it seems to be used more as an indicator of the record's generating context rather than any sort of audit container ID operation.Quoted 5 lines
"action" might work, but that's netfilter and numeric... "kind"? Nothing else really seems to fit from a field name, type or lack of searchability perspective.
Steve, do you have an opinion?
We only have 1 sample event where we have op=task. What are the other possible values?
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 4 lines
For the
AUDIT_CONTAINERrecord we have op= "task", "target" (from the ptrace and signals patch), "tty".For the
AUDIT_CONTAINER_IDrecord we have "op=set".Since the purpose of this record is to log the container id, I think that is all that is needed. We can get the context from the other records in the event. I'd suggest dropping the "op" field.
Ok, the information above it for two different audit container identifier records. Which one should drop the "op=" field? Both? Or just the
AUDIT_CONTAINERrecord? TheAUDIT_CONTAINER_IDrecord (which might be renamed) could use it to distinguish a "set" record from a dropped audit container identifier that is no longer registered by any task or namespace.
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 2 lines
Neither of them need it. All they need to do is state the container that is being acted upon.
I think we should keep the "op" field for audit container ID management operations, even though we really only have a "set" operation at the moment, but the others should drop the "op" field (see my previous emails in this thread).
In fact, I'd like to question the wisdom of dropping this field and perhaps fine a better or new name for it, since these contid records could be multiple and different from the primary task that is generating this record. In particular, there are extra contid records generated by the ptrace/signals patch that could be from other processes in other containers that I mentioned in a branch thread that got dropped including the auc_pids data and the target_pid also attached to the primary task's audit context.
Quoted 2 lines
paul moore
www.paul-moore.com
- RGB
--
Richard Guy Briggs <[email protected]>
Sr. S/W Engineer, Kernel Security, Base Operating Systems Remote, Ottawa, Red Hat Canada
IRC: rgb, SunRaycer
Voice: +1.647.777.2635, Internal: (81) 32635
Re: [RFC PATCH ghak90 (was ghak32) V3 02/10] audit: log container info of syscalls
Quoted 70 lines · Richard Guy Briggs
Quoted 61 lines · Paul Moore
Quoted 60 lines · Steve Grubb
Quoted 58 lines · EDT Richard Guy Briggs
Quoted 42 lines · Steve Grubb
Quoted 41 lines · EDT Richard Guy Briggs
Quoted 39 lines · Steve Grubb
Quoted 30 lines · EDT Richard Guy Briggs
Quoted 22 lines
Quoted 17 lines
+ *
audit_log_contid- report container info
+ * @tsk: task to be recorded
+ * @context: task or local context for record
+ * @op: contid string description
+ */(quoted diff) +2
-0+int audit_log_contid(struct task_struct *tsk, + struct audit_context *context,char
*op)(quoted diff) +7
-0+{ + struct audit_buffer *ab; + + if (!audit_contid_set(tsk)) + return 0; + /* Generate AUDIT_CONTAINER record with container ID */ + ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL,
AUDIT_CONTAINER);Review
Quoted 4 lines
(quoted diff) +4
-0+ if (!ab) + return -ENOMEM; + audit_log_format(ab, "op=%s contid=%llu", + op, audit_get_contid(tsk));Quoted 7 lines
Can you explain your reason for including an "op" field in this record
type? I've been looking at the rest of the patches in this patchset
and it seems to be used more as an indicator of the record's generating context rather than any sort of audit container ID operation.Quoted 5 lines
"action" might work, but that's netfilter and numeric... "kind"? Nothing else really seems to fit from a field name, type or lack of searchability perspective.
Steve, do you have an opinion?
We only have 1 sample event where we have op=task. What are the other possible values?
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 4 lines
For the
AUDIT_CONTAINERrecord we have op= "task", "target" (from the ptrace and signals patch), "tty".For the
AUDIT_CONTAINER_IDrecord we have "op=set".Since the purpose of this record is to log the container id, I think that is all that is needed. We can get the context from the other records in the event. I'd suggest dropping the "op" field.
Ok, the information above it for two different audit container identifier records. Which one should drop the "op=" field? Both? Or just the
AUDIT_CONTAINERrecord? TheAUDIT_CONTAINER_IDrecord (which might be renamed) could use it to distinguish a "set" record from a dropped audit container identifier that is no longer registered by any task or namespace.Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 2 lines
Neither of them need it. All they need to do is state the container that is being acted upon.
I think we should keep the "op" field for audit container ID management operations, even though we really only have a "set" operation at the moment, but the others should drop the "op" field (see my previous emails in this thread).
Quoted 8 lines
In fact, I'd like to question the wisdom of dropping this field and perhaps fine a better or new name for it, since these contid records could be multiple and different from the primary task that is generating this record. In particular, there are extra contid records generated by the ptrace/signals patch that could be from other processes in other containers that I mentioned in a branch thread that got dropped including the
auc_pidsdata and thetarget_pidalso attached to the primary task's audit context.
Ok, not seeing any further follow-up on this item in almost a week, I'll not delay any more and post rev 4 of the patchset.
Quoted 3 lines
Quoted 1 line
paul moore
- RGB
- RGB
--
Richard Guy Briggs <[email protected]>
Sr. S/W Engineer, Kernel Security, Base Operating Systems Remote, Ottawa, Red Hat Canada
IRC: rgb, SunRaycer
Voice: +1.647.777.2635, Internal: (81) 32635
Paul Moore
maintainerRe: [RFC PATCH ghak90 (was ghak32) V3 02/10] audit: log container info of syscalls
In reply to Richard Guy BriggsQuoted 46 lines · Richard Guy Briggs
Quoted 28 lines · Paul Moore
Quoted 24 lines · Richard Guy Briggs
Create a new audit record
AUDIT_CONTAINERto document the audit container identifier of a process if it is present.Called from
audit_log_exit(), syscalls are covered.A sample raw event:
type=SYSCALL msg=audit(1519924845.499:257): arch=c000003e syscall=257 success=yes exit=3 a0=ffffff9c a1=56374e1cef30 a2=241 a3=1b6 items=2 ppid=606 pid=635 auid=0 uid=0 gid=0 euid=0 suid=0 fsuid=0 egid=0 sgid=0 fsgid=0 tty=pts0 ses=3 comm="bash" exe="/usr/bin/bash" subj=unconfined_u:unconfined_r:unconfined_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 key="tmpcontainerid" type=CWD msg=audit(1519924845.499:257): cwd="/root"
type=PATH msg=audit(1519924845.499:257): item=0 name="/tmp/" inode=13863 dev=00:27 mode=041777 ouid=0 ogid=0 rdev=00:00 obj=system_u:object_r:tmp_t:s0 nametype= PARENT cap_fp=0000000000000000 cap_fi=0000000000000000 cap_fe=0 cap_fver=0
type=PATH msg=audit(1519924845.499:257): item=1 name="/tmp/tmpcontainerid" inode=17729 dev=00:27 mode=0100644 ouid=0 ogid=0 rdev=00:00 obj=unconfined_u:object_r:user_tmp_t:s0 nametype=CREATE cap_fp=0000000000000000 cap_fi=0000000000000000 cap_fe=0 cap_fver=0
type=PROCTITLE msg=audit(1519924845.499:257): proctitle=62617368002D6300736C65657020313B206563686F2074657374203E202F746D702F746D70636F6E7461696E65726964
type=CONTAINER msg=audit(1519924845.499:257): op=task contid=123458See: https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-kernel/issues/90
See: https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-userspace/issues/51
See: https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-testsuite/issues/64
See: https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-kernel/wiki/RFE-Audit-Container-IDSigned-off-by Richard Guy Briggs <[email protected]>--- include/linux/audit.h | 7 +++++++ include/uapi/linux/audit.h | 1 + kernel/audit.c | 23 +++++++++++++++++++++++ kernel/auditsc.c | 3 +++ 4 files changed, 34 insertions(+)...
Quoted 16 lines
include/uapi/linux/audit.h line 118
Quoted 7 lines
include/uapi/linux/audit.h +1
-0@@ -115,6 +115,7 @@#define AUDIT_REPLACE 1329/* Replace auditd if this packet unanswerd */ #define AUDIT_KERN_MODULE 1330/* Kernel Module events */ #define AUDIT_FANOTIFY 1331/* Fanotify access decision */ +#define AUDIT_CONTAINER 1332/* Container ID */ I'm not sure I'm completely sold on the
AUDIT_CONTAINER_IDandAUDIT_CONTAINERrecord type names. From what I can tellAUDIT_CONTAINER_IDseems to be used for audit container ID management operations, e.g. setting the ID, whereas theAUDIT_CONTAINERis used to tag events with the corresponding audit container ID. Assuming that is correct, it seems likeAUDIT_CONTAINERmight be better served if it was namedAUDIT_CONTAINER_IDand if we could changeAUDIT_CONTAINER_IDto AUDIT_CONTAINER_OP/MGMT/etc. Thoughts?
Quoted 4 lines
Please see discussion at:
https://www.redhat.com/archives/linux-audit/2018-May/msg00101.htmlI'm fine with changing
AUDIT_CONTAINER_IDto AUDIT_CONTAINER_OP/MGMT/etc.
Noted, and while I'm generally a big fan of consistency for things like this, I think these things are different enough (the loginuid is recorded as a field, the audit container ID is recorded in a dedicated record) that we don't need to be bound by LOGINUID's naming convention.
Quoted 36 lines
Quoted 27 lines
Quoted 27 lines
include/uapi/linux/audit.h +0
-0#define AUDIT_AVC 1400/* SE Linux avc denial or grant */ #define AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR 1401/* Internal SE Linux Errors */ kernel/audit.c +17
-0@@ -2048,6 +2048,29 @@ void audit_log_session_info(struct audit_buffer *ab)audit_log_format (ab," auid=%u ses=%u" , auid, sessionid); } +/* +* audit_log_contid - report container info +* @tsk: task to be recorded +* @context: task or local context for record +* @op: contid string description +*/ +int audit_log_contid (struct task_struct *tsk, +struct audit_context *context,char *op) +{ +struct audit_buffer *ab; + +if (!audit_contid_set (tsk)) +return 0 ; +/* Generate AUDIT_CONTAINER record with container ID */ + ab =audit_log_start (context,GFP_KERNEL ,AUDIT_CONTAINER ); +if (!ab) +return -ENOMEM ;Quoted 8 lines
kernel/audit.c void audit_log_session_info(struct audit_buffer *ab) · line 2069
Quoted 2 lines
kernel/audit.c +2
-0+audit_log_format (ab,"op=%s contid=%llu" , + op,audit_get_contid (tsk));Can you explain your reason for including an "op" field in this record type? I've been looking at the rest of the patches in this patchset and it seems to be used more as an indicator of the record's generating context rather than any sort of audit container ID operation.
Quoted 3 lines
"action" might work, but that's netfilter and numeric... "kind"? Nothing else really seems to fit from a field name, type or lack of searchability perspective.
My concern isn't so much the name of the "op" field, although that does seem wrong, but rather the existence of the field in the first place. This audit container ID record (whatever we end up calling it) exists to attach an audit container ID to an audit event, that's it; an audit event should have other records which provide the context (granted, the exact number of records depends on the event and the system's configuration). If we are relying on this record to provide critical information about the audit event other than the audit container ID, I believe this is a strong indicator that the existing audit records are lacking and should be augmented.
Signature · 2 lines
paul moore www.paul-moore.com
RFC PATCH v3 3/10 audit: add containerid support for ptrace and signals
In reply to Richard Guy BriggsAdd audit container identifier support to ptrace and signals. In particular, the "op" field provides a way to label the auxiliary record to which it is associated.
--- include/linux/audit.h | 11 +++++------ kernel/audit.c | 13 +++++++------ kernel/audit.h | 2 ++ kernel/auditsc.c | 21 ++++++++++++++++----- 4 files changed, 30 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-)
include/linux/audit.h +5 -6
@@ -34,6 +34,7 @@ struct audit_sig_info {uid_t uid;pid_t pid;char ctx[0 ]; +u64 cid; };struct audit_buffer ;
@@ -152,9 +153,8 @@ extern void audit_log_key(struct audit_buffer *ab,extern int audit_log_task_context (struct audit_buffer *ab);extern void audit_log_task_info (struct audit_buffer *ab,struct task_struct *tsk); -extern int audit_log_contid (struct task_struct *tsk, -struct audit_context *context, -char *op); +extern int audit_log_contid (struct audit_context *context, +char *op,u64 contid);extern int audit_update_lsm_rules (void );
@@ -205,9 +205,8 @@ static inline int audit_log_task_context(struct audit_buffer *ab)static inline void audit_log_task_info (struct audit_buffer *ab,struct task_struct *tsk) { } -static inline int audit_log_contid (struct task_struct *tsk, -struct audit_context *context, -char *op) +static inline int audit_log_contid (struct audit_context *context, +char *op,u64 contid) { }#define audit_enabled 0#endif /* CONFIG_AUDIT */
kernel/audit.c +7 -6
@@ -142,6 +142,7 @@ struct audit_net {kuid_t audit_sig_uid =INVALID_UID ;pid_t audit_sig_pid =-1 ;u32 audit_sig_sid =0 ; +u64 audit_sig_cid =AUDIT_CID_UNSET ;/* Records can be lost in several ways: 0) [suppressed in audit_alloc]
@@ -1437,6 +1438,7 @@ static int audit_receive_msg(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh)memcpy (sig_data->ctx, ctx, len);security_release_secctx (ctx, len); } + sig_data->cid = audit_sig_cid;audit_send_reply (skb, seq,AUDIT_SIGNAL_INFO ,0 ,0 , sig_data,sizeof (*sig_data) + len);kfree (sig_data);
@@ -2050,23 +2052,22 @@ void audit_log_session_info(struct audit_buffer *ab)/* * audit_log_contid - report container info -* @tsk: task to be recorded * @context: task or local context for record * @op: contid string description +* @contid: container ID to report */ -int audit_log_contid (struct task_struct *tsk, -struct audit_context *context,char *op) +int audit_log_contid (struct audit_context *context, +char *op,u64 contid) {struct audit_buffer *ab; -if (!audit_contid_set (tsk)) +if (!cid_valid (contid))return 0 ;/* Generate AUDIT_CONTAINER record with container ID */ ab =audit_log_start (context,GFP_KERNEL ,AUDIT_CONTAINER );if (!ab)return -ENOMEM ; -audit_log_format (ab,"op=%s contid=%llu" , - op,audit_get_contid (tsk)); +audit_log_format (ab,"op=%s contid=%llu" , op, contid);audit_log_end (ab);return 0 ; }
kernel/audit.h +2 -0
@@ -147,6 +147,7 @@ struct audit_context {kuid_t target_uid;unsigned int target_sessionid;u32 target_sid; +u64 target_cid;char target_comm[TASK_COMM_LEN ];struct audit_tree_refs *trees, *first_trees;
@@ -329,6 +330,7 @@ extern void audit_log_d_path_exe(struct audit_buffer *ab,extern pid_t audit_sig_pid;extern kuid_t audit_sig_uid;extern u32 audit_sig_sid; +extern u64 audit_sig_cid;extern int audit_filter (int msgtype,unsigned int listtype);
kernel/auditsc.c +16 -5
@@ -113,6 +113,7 @@ struct audit_aux_data_pids {kuid_t target_uid[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS ];unsigned int target_sessionid[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS ];u32 target_sid[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS ]; +u64 target_cid[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS ];char target_comm[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS ][TASK_COMM_LEN ];int pid_count; };
@@ -1456,21 +1457,27 @@ static void audit_log_exit(struct audit_context *context, struct task_struct *tsfor (aux = context->aux_pids; aux; aux = aux->next) {struct audit_aux_data_pids *axs = (void *)aux; -for (i =0 ; i < axs->pid_count; i++) +for (i =0 ; i < axs->pid_count; i++) { +char axsn[sizeof ("aux0xN " )]; + +sprintf (axsn,"aux0x%x" , i);if (audit_log_pid_context (context, axs->target_pid[i], axs->target_auid[i], axs->target_uid[i], axs->target_sessionid[i], axs->target_sid[i], - axs->target_comm[i])) + axs->target_comm[i]) + ||audit_log_contid (context, axsn, axs->target_cid[i])) call_panic =1 ; + } }if (context->target_pid && -audit_log_pid_context (context, context->target_pid, + (audit_log_pid_context (context, context->target_pid, context->target_auid, context->target_uid, context->target_sessionid, - context->target_sid, context->target_comm)) + context->target_sid, context->target_comm) + ||audit_log_contid (context,"target" , context->target_cid))) call_panic =1 ;if (context->pwd.dentry && context->pwd.mnt) {
@@ -1490,7 +1497,7 @@ static void audit_log_exit(struct audit_context *context, struct task_struct *tsaudit_log_proctitle (tsk, context); -audit_log_contid (tsk, context,"task" ); +audit_log_contid (context,"task" ,audit_get_contid (tsk));/* Send end of event record to help user space know we are finished */ ab =audit_log_start (context,GFP_KERNEL ,AUDIT_EOE );
@@ -2375,6 +2382,7 @@ void __audit_ptrace(struct task_struct *t) context->target_uid =task_uid (t); context->target_sessionid =audit_get_sessionid (t);security_task_getsecid (t, &context->target_sid); + context->target_cid =audit_get_contid (t);memcpy (context->target_comm, t->comm,TASK_COMM_LEN ); }
@@ -2402,6 +2410,7 @@ int audit_signal_info(int sig, struct task_struct *t)else audit_sig_uid = uid;security_task_getsecid (current, &audit_sig_sid); + audit_sig_cid =audit_get_contid (current); }if (!audit_signals ||audit_dummy_context ())
@@ -2415,6 +2424,7 @@ int audit_signal_info(int sig, struct task_struct *t) ctx->target_uid = t_uid; ctx->target_sessionid =audit_get_sessionid (t);security_task_getsecid (t, &ctx->target_sid); + ctx->target_cid =audit_get_contid (t);memcpy (ctx->target_comm, t->comm,TASK_COMM_LEN );return 0 ; }
@@ -2436,6 +2446,7 @@ int audit_signal_info(int sig, struct task_struct *t) axp->target_uid[axp->pid_count] = t_uid; axp->target_sessionid[axp->pid_count] =audit_get_sessionid (t);security_task_getsecid (t, &axp->target_sid[axp->pid_count]); + axp->target_cid[axp->pid_count] =audit_get_contid (t);memcpy (axp->target_comm[axp->pid_count], t->comm,TASK_COMM_LEN ); axp->pid_count++;
Signature · 1 line
1.8.3.1
Paul Moore
maintainerRe: [RFC PATCH ghak90 (was ghak32) V3 03/10] audit: add containerid support for ptrace and signals
Quoted 11 lines · Richard Guy Briggs
Add audit container identifier support to ptrace and signals. In particular, the "op" field provides a way to label the auxiliary record to which it is associated.
Signed-off-by Richard Guy Briggs <[email protected]>--- include/linux/audit.h | 11 +++++------ kernel/audit.c | 13 +++++++------ kernel/audit.h | 2 ++ kernel/auditsc.c | 21 ++++++++++++++++----- 4 files changed, 30 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-)
...
Quoted 39 lines
kernel/audit.c +6
-4@@ -142,6 +142,7 @@ struct audit_net {kuid_t audit_sig_uid =INVALID_UID ;pid_t audit_sig_pid =-1 ;u32 audit_sig_sid =0 ; +u64 audit_sig_cid =AUDIT_CID_UNSET ;/* Records can be lost in several ways: 0) [suppressed in audit_alloc] @@ -1437,6 +1438,7 @@ static int audit_receive_msg(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh)memcpy (sig_data->ctx, ctx, len);security_release_secctx (ctx, len); } + sig_data->cid = audit_sig_cid;audit_send_reply (skb, seq,AUDIT_SIGNAL_INFO ,0 ,0 , sig_data,sizeof (*sig_data) + len);kfree (sig_data);@@ -2050,23 +2052,22 @@ void audit_log_session_info(struct audit_buffer *ab)/* * audit_log_contid - report container info -* @tsk: task to be recorded * @context: task or local context for record * @op: contid string description +* @contid: container ID to report */ -int audit_log_contid (struct task_struct *tsk, -struct audit_context *context,char *op) +int audit_log_contid (struct audit_context *context, +char *op,u64 contid) {struct audit_buffer *ab; -if (!audit_contid_set (tsk)) +if (!cid_valid (contid))return 0 ;
kernel/audit.c void audit_log_session_info(struct audit_buffer *ab) · line 2073
Quoted 10 lines
kernel/audit.c +1
-2/* Generate AUDIT_CONTAINER record with container ID */ ab =audit_log_start (context,GFP_KERNEL ,AUDIT_CONTAINER );if (!ab)return -ENOMEM ; -audit_log_format (ab,"op=%s contid=%llu" , - op,audit_get_contid (tsk)); +audit_log_format (ab,"op=%s contid=%llu" , op, contid);audit_log_end (ab);return 0 ; }
You might as well just make these changes to audit_log_contid() in patch 2 when you first define audit_log_contid().
--
paul moore
www.paul-moore.com
RFC PATCH v3 4/10 audit: add support for non-syscall auxiliary records
In reply to Richard Guy BriggsStandalone audit records have the timestamp and serial number generated on the fly and as such are unique, making them standalone. This new function audit_alloc_local() generates a local audit context that will be used only for a standalone record and its auxiliary record(s). The context is discarded immediately after the local associated records are produced.
--- include/linux/audit.h | 8 ++++++++ kernel/auditsc.c | 25 +++++++++++++++++++++++-- 2 files changed, 31 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
include/linux/audit.h +8 -0
@@ -232,7 +232,9 @@ struct audit_task_info {extern struct audit_task_info init_struct_audit;extern void __init audit_task_init (void );extern int audit_alloc (struct task_struct *task); +extern struct audit_context *audit_alloc_local (void );extern void audit_free (struct task_struct *task); +extern void audit_free_context (struct audit_context *context);extern void __audit_syscall_entry (int major,unsigned long a0,unsigned long a1,unsigned long a2,unsigned long a3);extern void __audit_syscall_exit (int ret_success,long ret_value);
@@ -493,6 +495,12 @@ static inline int audit_alloc(struct task_struct *task) {return 0 ; } +static inline struct audit_context *audit_alloc_local (void ) +{ +return NULL ; +} +static inline void audit_free_context (struct audit_context *context) +{ }static inline void audit_free (struct task_struct *task) { } static inline void audit_syscall_entry(int major, unsigned long a0,
kernel/auditsc.c +23 -2
@@ -916,8 +916,11 @@ static inline void audit_free_aux(struct audit_context *context)static inline struct audit_context *audit_alloc_context (enum audit_state state) {struct audit_context *context; +gfp_t gfpflags; - context =kzalloc (sizeof (*context),GFP_KERNEL ); +/* We can be called in atomic context via audit_tg() */ + gfpflags = (in_atomic () ||irqs_disabled ()) ?GFP_ATOMIC :GFP_KERNEL ; + context =kzalloc (sizeof (*context), gfpflags);if (!context)return NULL ; context->state = state;
@@ -993,8 +996,26 @@ struct audit_task_info init_struct_audit = { .ctx = NULL, }; -static inline void audit_free_context (struct audit_context *context) +struct audit_context *audit_alloc_local (void ) { +struct audit_context *context; + +if (!audit_ever_enabled) +return NULL ;/* Return if not auditing. */ + + context =audit_alloc_context (AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT ); +if (!context) +return NULL ; + context->serial =audit_serial (); + context->ctime =current_kernel_time64 (); + context->in_syscall =1 ; +return context; +} + +void audit_free_context (struct audit_context *context) +{ +if (!context) +return ;audit_free_names (context);unroll_tree_refs (context,NULL ,0 );free_tree_refs (context);
Signature · 1 line
1.8.3.1
Paul Moore
maintainerRe: [RFC PATCH ghak90 (was ghak32) V3 04/10] audit: add support for non-syscall auxiliary records
Quoted 12 lines · Richard Guy Briggs
Standalone audit records have the timestamp and serial number generated on the fly and as such are unique, making them standalone. This new function
audit_alloc_local()generates a local audit context that will be used only for a standalone record and its auxiliary record(s). The context is discarded immediately after the local associated records are produced.Signed-off-by Richard Guy Briggs <[email protected]>--- include/linux/audit.h | 8 ++++++++ kernel/auditsc.c | 25 +++++++++++++++++++++++-- 2 files changed, 31 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
...
kernel/auditsc.c static inline void audit_free_aux(struct audit_context *context) · line 922
Quoted 11 lines
kernel/auditsc.c +3
-1@@ -916,8 +916,11 @@ static inline void audit_free_aux(struct audit_context *context)static inline struct audit_context *audit_alloc_context (enum audit_state state) {struct audit_context *context; +gfp_t gfpflags; - context =kzalloc (sizeof (*context),GFP_KERNEL ); +/* We can be called in atomic context via audit_tg() */ + gfpflags = (in_atomic () ||irqs_disabled ()) ?GFP_ATOMIC :GFP_KERNEL ;
Instead of trying to guess the proper gfp flags, and likely getting it wrong at some point (the in_atomic() comment in preempt.h don't give me the warm fuzzies), why not pass the gfp flags as an argument?
Right now it looks like we would only have two callers: audit_alloc() and audit_audit_local(). The audit_alloc() invocation would simply pass GFP_KERNEL and we could allow the audit_alloc_local() callers to specify the gfp flags when calling audit_alloc_local() (although I suspect that will always be GFP_ATOMIC since we should only be calling audit_alloc_local() from interrupt-like context, in all other cases we should use the audit_context from the current task_struct.
kernel/auditsc.c struct audit_task_info init_struct_audit = { · line 1000
Quoted 11 lines
kernel/auditsc.c +2
-1+ context =kzalloc (sizeof (*context), gfpflags);if (!context)return NULL ; context->state = state;@@ -993,8 +996,26 @@ struct audit_task_info init_struct_audit = { .ctx = NULL, }; -static inline void audit_free_context (struct audit_context *context) +struct audit_context *audit_alloc_local (void ) {
Let's see where this goes, but we may want to rename this slightly to indicate that this should only be called from interrupt context when we can't rely on current's audit_context. Bonus points if we can find a way to enforce this with a WARN() assertion so we can better catch abuse.
kernel/auditsc.c struct audit_task_info init_struct_audit = { · line 1011
Quoted 11 lines
kernel/auditsc.c +11
-0+struct audit_context *context; + +if (!audit_ever_enabled) +return NULL ;/* Return if not auditing. */ + + context =audit_alloc_context (AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT ); +if (!context) +return NULL ; + context->serial =audit_serial (); + context->ctime =current_kernel_time64 (); + context->in_syscall =1 ;
Setting in_syscall is both interesting and a bit troubling, if for no other reason than I expect most (all?) callers to be in an interrupt context when audit_alloc_local() is called. Setting in_syscall would appear to be conceptually in this case. Can you help explain why this is the right thing to do, or necessary to ensure things are handled correctly?
Looking quickly at the audit code, it seems to only be used on record and/or syscall termination to end things properly as well as in some of the PATH record code paths to limit filename collection to actual syscalls. However, this was just a quick look so I could be missing some important points.
Quoted 13 lines
kernel/auditsc.c +7
-1+return context; +} + +void audit_free_context (struct audit_context *context) +{ +if (!context) +return ;audit_free_names (context);unroll_tree_refs (context,NULL ,0 );free_tree_refs (context); --1.8.3.1
Quoted 4 lines
--
Linux-audit mailing list
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https://www.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/linux-audit
--
paul moore
www.paul-moore.com
Re: [RFC PATCH ghak90 (was ghak32) V3 04/10] audit: add support for non-syscall auxiliary records
Quoted 32 lines · Paul Moore
Quoted 12 lines · Richard Guy Briggs
Standalone audit records have the timestamp and serial number generated on the fly and as such are unique, making them standalone. This new function
audit_alloc_local()generates a local audit context that will be used only for a standalone record and its auxiliary record(s). The context is discarded immediately after the local associated records are produced.Signed-off-by Richard Guy Briggs <[email protected]>--- include/linux/audit.h | 8 ++++++++ kernel/auditsc.c | 25 +++++++++++++++++++++++-- 2 files changed, 31 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)...
kernel/auditsc.c static inline void audit_free_aux(struct audit_context *context) · line 922
Quoted 11 lines
kernel/auditsc.c +3
-1@@ -916,8 +916,11 @@ static inline void audit_free_aux(struct audit_context *context)static inline struct audit_context *audit_alloc_context (enum audit_state state) {struct audit_context *context; +gfp_t gfpflags; - context =kzalloc (sizeof (*context),GFP_KERNEL ); +/* We can be called in atomic context via audit_tg() */ + gfpflags = (in_atomic () ||irqs_disabled ()) ?GFP_ATOMIC :GFP_KERNEL ;Instead of trying to guess the proper gfp flags, and likely getting it wrong at some point (the
in_atomic()comment inpreempt.hdon't give me the warm fuzzies), why not pass the gfp flags as an argument?
Quoted 7 lines
Right now it looks like we would only have two callers:
audit_alloc()andaudit_audit_local(). Theaudit_alloc()invocation would simply passGFP_KERNELand we could allow theaudit_alloc_local()callers to specify the gfp flags when callingaudit_alloc_local()(although I suspect that will always beGFP_ATOMICsince we should only be callingaudit_alloc_local()from interrupt-like context, in all other cases we should use theaudit_contextfrom the currenttask_struct.
Ok, I'll explicitly pass it in.
Quoted 8 lines
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kernel/auditsc.c +1
-0+ context =kzalloc (sizeof (*context), gfpflags);if (!context)return NULL ; context->state = state;@@ -993,8 +996,26 @@ struct audit_task_info init_struct_audit = { .ctx = NULL, };
Quoted 9 lines
kernel/auditsc.c struct audit_task_info init_struct_audit = { · line 1000
Quoted 3 lines
kernel/auditsc.c +1
-1-static inline void audit_free_context (struct audit_context *context) +struct audit_context *audit_alloc_local (void ) {Let's see where this goes, but we may want to rename this slightly to indicate that this should only be called from interrupt context when we can't rely on current's
audit_context. Bonus points if we can find a way to enforce this with aWARN()assertion so we can better catch abuse.
I'll see what I can come up with.
Quoted 10 lines
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kernel/auditsc.c +10
-0+struct audit_context *context; + +if (!audit_ever_enabled) +return NULL ;/* Return if not auditing. */ + + context =audit_alloc_context (AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT ); +if (!context) +return NULL ; + context->serial =audit_serial (); + context->ctime =current_kernel_time64 ();
Quoted 8 lines
kernel/auditsc.c struct audit_task_info init_struct_audit = { · line 1011
Quoted 1 line
kernel/auditsc.c +1
-0+ context->in_syscall =1 ;Setting
in_syscallis both interesting and a bit troubling, if for no other reason than I expect most (all?) callers to be in an interrupt context whenaudit_alloc_local()is called. Settingin_syscallwould appear to be conceptually in this case. Can you help explain why this is the right thing to do, or necessary to ensure things are handled correctly?
I'll admit this is cheating a bit, but seemed harmless. It is needed so that auditsc_get_stamp() from audit_get_stamp() from audit_log_start() doesn't bail on me without giving me its already assigned time and serial values rather than generating a new one. I did look to see if there were any other undesireable side effects and found none, so I'm tmepted to rename the ->in_syscall to something a bit more helpful. I could add a new audit_context structure member to make auditsc_get_stamp() co-operative, but this seems wasteful and unnecessary.
Quoted 19 lines
Looking quickly at the audit code, it seems to only be used on record and/or syscall termination to end things properly as well as in some of the PATH record code paths to limit filename collection to actual syscalls. However, this was just a quick look so I could be missing some important points.
Quoted 13 lines
kernel/auditsc.c +7
-1+return context; +} + +void audit_free_context (struct audit_context *context) +{ +if (!context) +return ;audit_free_names (context);unroll_tree_refs (context,NULL ,0 );free_tree_refs (context); --1.8.3.1
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--
Linux-audit mailing list
[email protected]
https://www.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/linux-audit--
paul moore
www.paul-moore.com
- RGB
--
Richard Guy Briggs <[email protected]>
Sr. S/W Engineer, Kernel Security, Base Operating Systems Remote, Ottawa, Red Hat Canada
IRC: rgb, SunRaycer
Voice: +1.647.777.2635, Internal: (81) 32635
Paul Moore
maintainerRe: [RFC PATCH ghak90 (was ghak32) V3 04/10] audit: add support for non-syscall auxiliary records
Quoted 14 lines · Richard Guy Briggs
Quoted 13 lines · Paul Moore
Quoted 12 lines · Richard Guy Briggs
Standalone audit records have the timestamp and serial number generated on the fly and as such are unique, making them standalone. This new function
audit_alloc_local()generates a local audit context that will be used only for a standalone record and its auxiliary record(s). The context is discarded immediately after the local associated records are produced.Signed-off-by Richard Guy Briggs <[email protected]>--- include/linux/audit.h | 8 ++++++++ kernel/auditsc.c | 25 +++++++++++++++++++++++-- 2 files changed, 31 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
...
Quoted 19 lines
Quoted 10 lines
Quoted 10 lines
kernel/auditsc.c +10
-0+struct audit_context *context; + +if (!audit_ever_enabled) +return NULL ;/* Return if not auditing. */ + + context =audit_alloc_context (AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT ); +if (!context) +return NULL ; + context->serial =audit_serial (); + context->ctime =current_kernel_time64 ();Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 1 line
+
context->in_syscall= 1;Setting
in_syscallis both interesting and a bit troubling, if for no other reason than I expect most (all?) callers to be in an interrupt context whenaudit_alloc_local()is called. Settingin_syscallwould appear to be conceptually in this case. Can you help explain why this is the right thing to do, or necessary to ensure things are handled correctly?
Quoted 9 lines
I'll admit this is cheating a bit, but seemed harmless. It is needed so that
auditsc_get_stamp()fromaudit_get_stamp()fromaudit_log_start()doesn't bail on me without giving me its already assigned time and serial values rather than generating a new one. I did look to see if there were any other undesireable side effects and found none, so I'm tmepted to rename the ->in_syscall to something a bit more helpful. I could add a newaudit_contextstructure member to makeauditsc_get_stamp()co-operative, but this seems wasteful and unnecessary.
That's what I suspected.
Let's look into renaming the "in_syscall" field, it borderline confusing now, and hijacking it for something which is very obviously not "in syscall" is A Very Bad Thing.
Signature · 2 lines
paul moore www.paul-moore.com
Re: [RFC PATCH ghak90 (was ghak32) V3 04/10] audit: add support for non-syscall auxiliary records
Quoted 47 lines · Paul Moore
Quoted 14 lines · Richard Guy Briggs
Quoted 13 lines · Paul Moore
Quoted 12 lines · Richard Guy Briggs
Standalone audit records have the timestamp and serial number generated on the fly and as such are unique, making them standalone. This new function
audit_alloc_local()generates a local audit context that will be used only for a standalone record and its auxiliary record(s). The context is discarded immediately after the local associated records are produced.Signed-off-by Richard Guy Briggs <[email protected]>--- include/linux/audit.h | 8 ++++++++ kernel/auditsc.c | 25 +++++++++++++++++++++++-- 2 files changed, 31 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)...
Quoted 19 lines
Quoted 10 lines
Quoted 10 lines
kernel/auditsc.c +10
-0+struct audit_context *context; + +if (!audit_ever_enabled) +return NULL ;/* Return if not auditing. */ + + context =audit_alloc_context (AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT ); +if (!context) +return NULL ; + context->serial =audit_serial (); + context->ctime =current_kernel_time64 ();Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 1 line
+
context->in_syscall= 1;Setting
in_syscallis both interesting and a bit troubling, if for no other reason than I expect most (all?) callers to be in an interrupt context whenaudit_alloc_local()is called. Settingin_syscallwould appear to be conceptually in this case. Can you help explain why this is the right thing to do, or necessary to ensure things are handled correctly?Quoted 9 lines
I'll admit this is cheating a bit, but seemed harmless. It is needed so that
auditsc_get_stamp()fromaudit_get_stamp()fromaudit_log_start()doesn't bail on me without giving me its already assigned time and serial values rather than generating a new one. I did look to see if there were any other undesireable side effects and found none, so I'm tmepted to rename the ->in_syscall to something a bit more helpful. I could add a newaudit_contextstructure member to makeauditsc_get_stamp()co-operative, but this seems wasteful and unnecessary.
Quoted 5 lines
That's what I suspected.
Let's look into renaming the "
in_syscall" field, it borderline confusing now, and hijacking it for something which is very obviously not "in syscall" is A Very Bad Thing.
Ok, looking more carefully, I'm not going to touch in_syscall, since it does more than I remember discovering when investigating why the existing stamp wasn't being used. I don't want to change the existing behaviour. I'll somewhat reluctantly grow the context struct and add a "local" boolean to it so that auditsc_get_stamp knows to use the existing stamp in both the in_syscall and local cases.
Quoted 1 line
paul moore
- RGB
RFC PATCH v3 5/10 audit: add containerid support for tty_audit
In reply to Richard Guy BriggsAdd audit container identifier auxiliary record to tty logging rule event standalone records.
--- drivers/tty/tty_audit.c | 5 ++++- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/tty/tty_audit.c +4 -1
@@ -66,8 +66,9 @@ static void tty_audit_log(const char *description, dev_t dev,uid_t uid =from_kuid (&init_user_ns,task_uid (tsk));uid_t loginuid =from_kuid (&init_user_ns,audit_get_loginuid (tsk));unsigned int sessionid =audit_get_sessionid (tsk); +struct audit_context *context =audit_alloc_local (); - ab =audit_log_start (NULL ,GFP_KERNEL ,AUDIT_TTY ); + ab =audit_log_start (context,GFP_KERNEL ,AUDIT_TTY );if (ab) {char name[sizeof (tsk->comm)];
@@ -80,6 +81,8 @@ static void tty_audit_log(const char *description, dev_t dev,audit_log_n_hex (ab, data, size);audit_log_end (ab); } +audit_log_contid (context,"tty" ,audit_get_contid (tsk)); +audit_free_context (context); }/**
Signature · 1 line
1.8.3.1
Paul Moore
maintainerRe: [RFC PATCH ghak90 (was ghak32) V3 05/10] audit: add containerid support for tty_audit
Quoted 13 lines · Richard Guy Briggs
Add audit container identifier auxiliary record to tty logging rule event standalone records.
Signed-off-by Richard Guy Briggs <[email protected]>--- drivers/tty/tty_audit.c | 5 ++++- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)drivers/tty/tty_audit.c +0
-0
drivers/tty/tty_audit.c static void tty_audit_log(const char *description, dev_t dev, · line 69
Quoted 4 lines
drivers/tty/tty_audit.c +1
-0@@ -66,8 +66,9 @@ static void tty_audit_log(const char *description, dev_t dev,uid_t uid =from_kuid (&init_user_ns,task_uid (tsk));uid_t loginuid =from_kuid (&init_user_ns,audit_get_loginuid (tsk));unsigned int sessionid =audit_get_sessionid (tsk); +struct audit_context *context =audit_alloc_local ();
We should be using current's audit_context in tty_audit_log(). Actually, we should probably just get rid of the tsk variable in tty_audit_log() and use current directly to make things a bit more obvious.
<time passes>
I did some digging and I have a two year old, half-baked patch that cleans up this tsk/current usage as well as a few others. I just rebased it against audit/next and surprisingly it seems to pass a basic smoke test (kernel boots and audit-testsuite passes); I'll post it to the list as a RFC once I'm done reviewing these patches.
Quoted 12 lines
drivers/tty/tty_audit.c +3
-1- ab =audit_log_start (NULL ,GFP_KERNEL ,AUDIT_TTY ); + ab =audit_log_start (context,GFP_KERNEL ,AUDIT_TTY );if (ab) {char name[sizeof (tsk->comm)];@@ -80,6 +81,8 @@ static void tty_audit_log(const char *description, dev_t dev,audit_log_n_hex (ab, data, size);audit_log_end (ab); } +audit_log_contid (context,"tty" ,audit_get_contid (tsk)); +audit_free_context (context); }
Re: [RFC PATCH ghak90 (was ghak32) V3 05/10] audit: add containerid support for tty_audit
Quoted 9 lines · Paul Moore
Quoted 8 lines · Richard Guy Briggs
Add audit container identifier auxiliary record to tty logging rule event standalone records.
Signed-off-by Richard Guy Briggs <[email protected]>--- drivers/tty/tty_audit.c | 5 ++++- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
Quoted 14 lines
drivers/tty/tty_audit.c static void tty_audit_log(const char *description, dev_t dev, · line 69
Quoted 9 lines
drivers/tty/tty_audit.c +1
-0@@ -66,8 +66,9 @@ static void tty_audit_log(const char *description, dev_t dev,uid_t uid =from_kuid (&init_user_ns,task_uid (tsk));uid_t loginuid =from_kuid (&init_user_ns,audit_get_loginuid (tsk));unsigned int sessionid =audit_get_sessionid (tsk); +struct audit_context *context =audit_alloc_local ();We should be using current's
audit_contextintty_audit_log(). Actually, we should probably just get rid of the tsk variable intty_audit_log()and use current directly to make things a bit more obvious.
Ok, agreed. At this point, it it current passed in anyways so no harm other than efficiency.
Quoted 7 lines
<time passes>
I did some digging and I have a two year old, half-baked patch that cleans up this tsk/current usage as well as a few others. I just rebased it against audit/next and surprisingly it seems to pass a basic smoke test (kernel boots and audit-testsuite passes); I'll post it to the list as a RFC once I'm done reviewing these patches.
I'll leave this patch the way it is since there should be no difference and trust this other patch will work its way through the system and solve that.
Quoted 5 lines
Quoted 5 lines
drivers/tty/tty_audit.c +1
-1- ab =audit_log_start (NULL ,GFP_KERNEL ,AUDIT_TTY ); + ab =audit_log_start (context,GFP_KERNEL ,AUDIT_TTY );if (ab) {char name[sizeof (tsk->comm)];
Quoted 11 lines
drivers/tty/tty_audit.c static void tty_audit_log(const char *description, dev_t dev, · line 86
Quoted 7 lines
drivers/tty/tty_audit.c +2
-0@@ -80,6 +81,8 @@ static void tty_audit_log(const char *description, dev_t dev,audit_log_n_hex (ab, data, size);audit_log_end (ab); } +audit_log_contid (context,"tty" ,audit_get_contid (tsk)); +audit_free_context (context); }--
paul moore
www.paul-moore.com
- RGB
--
Richard Guy Briggs <[email protected]>
Sr. S/W Engineer, Kernel Security, Base Operating Systems Remote, Ottawa, Red Hat Canada
IRC: rgb, SunRaycer
Voice: +1.647.777.2635, Internal: (81) 32635
Paul Moore
maintainerRe: [RFC PATCH ghak90 (was ghak32) V3 05/10] audit: add containerid support for tty_audit
Quoted 36 lines · Richard Guy Briggs
Quoted 9 lines · Paul Moore
Quoted 8 lines · Richard Guy Briggs
Add audit container identifier auxiliary record to tty logging rule event standalone records.
Signed-off-by Richard Guy Briggs <[email protected]>--- drivers/tty/tty_audit.c | 5 ++++- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)Quoted 14 lines
drivers/tty/tty_audit.c static void tty_audit_log(const char *description, dev_t dev, · line 69
Quoted 9 lines
drivers/tty/tty_audit.c +1
-0@@ -66,8 +66,9 @@ static void tty_audit_log(const char *description, dev_t dev,uid_t uid =from_kuid (&init_user_ns,task_uid (tsk));uid_t loginuid =from_kuid (&init_user_ns,audit_get_loginuid (tsk));unsigned int sessionid =audit_get_sessionid (tsk); +struct audit_context *context =audit_alloc_local ();We should be using current's
audit_contextintty_audit_log(). Actually, we should probably just get rid of the tsk variable intty_audit_log()and use current directly to make things a bit more obvious.Ok, agreed. At this point, it it current passed in anyways so no harm other than efficiency.
Quoted 7 lines
<time passes>
I did some digging and I have a two year old, half-baked patch that cleans up this tsk/current usage as well as a few others. I just rebased it against audit/next and surprisingly it seems to pass a basic smoke test (kernel boots and audit-testsuite passes); I'll post it to the list as a RFC once I'm done reviewing these patches.
Quoted 3 lines
I'll leave this patch the way it is since there should be no difference and trust this other patch will work its way through the system and solve that.
Yep, that's a merge issue I'll deal with when we get to that point. Although, I would expect that when you post an updated patchset that it applies cleanly to the then-current audit/next tree (or Linus' tree, but audit/next is preferable). In other words, please rebase your development branch before doing your final dev testing and posting.
Quoted 25 lines
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drivers/tty/tty_audit.c +1
-1- ab =audit_log_start (NULL ,GFP_KERNEL ,AUDIT_TTY ); + ab =audit_log_start (context,GFP_KERNEL ,AUDIT_TTY );if (ab) {char name[sizeof (tsk->comm)];Quoted 11 lines
drivers/tty/tty_audit.c static void tty_audit_log(const char *description, dev_t dev, · line 86
Quoted 7 lines
drivers/tty/tty_audit.c +2
-0@@ -80,6 +81,8 @@ static void tty_audit_log(const char *description, dev_t dev,audit_log_n_hex (ab, data, size);audit_log_end (ab); } +audit_log_contid (context,"tty" ,audit_get_contid (tsk)); +audit_free_context (context); }--
paul moore
www.paul-moore.com- RGB
--
Richard Guy Briggs <[email protected]>
Sr. S/W Engineer, Kernel Security, Base Operating Systems Remote, Ottawa, Red Hat Canada
IRC: rgb, SunRaycer
Voice: +1.647.777.2635, Internal: (81) 32635
Signature · 2 lines
paul moore www.paul-moore.com
RFC PATCH v3 6/10 audit: add containerid filtering
In reply to Richard Guy BriggsImplement audit container identifier filtering using the AUDIT_CONTID field name to send an 8-character string representing a u64 since the value field is only u32.
Sending it as two u32 was considered, but gathering and comparing two fields was more complex.
The feature indicator is AUDIT_FEATURE_BITMAP_CONTAINERID_FILTER.
See: https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-kernel/issues/91
See: https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-userspace/issues/40
See: https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-testsuite/issues/64
See: https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-kernel/wiki/RFE-Audit-Container-ID
--- include/linux/audit.h | 1 + include/uapi/linux/audit.h | 5 ++++- kernel/audit.h | 1 + kernel/auditfilter.c | 47 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ kernel/auditsc.c | 3 +++ 5 files changed, 56 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
include/linux/audit.h +1 -0
@@ -76,6 +76,7 @@ struct audit_field {u32 type;union {u32 val; +u64 val64;kuid_t uid;kgid_t gid;struct {
include/uapi/linux/audit.h +4 -1
@@ -262,6 +262,7 @@#define AUDIT_LOGINUID_SET 24#define AUDIT_SESSIONID 25/* Session ID */ #define AUDIT_FSTYPE 26/* FileSystem Type */ +#define AUDIT_CONTID 27/* Container ID */ /* These are ONLY useful when checking * at syscall exit time (AUDIT_AT_EXIT). */
@@ -342,6 +343,7 @@ enum {#define AUDIT_FEATURE_BITMAP_SESSIONID_FILTER 0x00000010#define AUDIT_FEATURE_BITMAP_LOST_RESET 0x00000020#define AUDIT_FEATURE_BITMAP_FILTER_FS 0x00000040 +#define AUDIT_FEATURE_BITMAP_CONTAINERID_FILTER 0x00000080#define AUDIT_FEATURE_BITMAP_ALL (AUDIT_FEATURE_BITMAP_BACKLOG_LIMIT | \ AUDIT_FEATURE_BITMAP_BACKLOG_WAIT_TIME | \
@@ -349,7 +351,8 @@ enum { AUDIT_FEATURE_BITMAP_EXCLUDE_EXTEND | \ AUDIT_FEATURE_BITMAP_SESSIONID_FILTER | \ AUDIT_FEATURE_BITMAP_LOST_RESET | \ - AUDIT_FEATURE_BITMAP_FILTER_FS) + AUDIT_FEATURE_BITMAP_FILTER_FS | \ + AUDIT_FEATURE_BITMAP_CONTAINERID_FILTER)/* deprecated: AUDIT_VERSION_* */ #define AUDIT_VERSION_LATEST AUDIT_FEATURE_BITMAP_ALL
kernel/audit.h +1 -0
@@ -235,6 +235,7 @@ static inline int audit_hash_ino(u32 ino)extern int audit_match_class (int class,unsigned syscall);extern int audit_comparator (const u32 left,const u32 op,const u32 right); +extern int audit_comparator64 (const u64 left,const u32 op,const u64 right);extern int audit_uid_comparator (kuid_t left,u32 op,kuid_t right);extern int audit_gid_comparator (kgid_t left,u32 op,kgid_t right);extern int parent_len (const char *path);
kernel/auditfilter.c +47 -0
83 lines not on this page · raw message
kernel/auditsc.c +3 -0
@@ -622,6 +622,9 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,case AUDIT_LOGINUID_SET : result =audit_comparator (audit_loginuid_set (tsk), f->op, f->val);break ; +case AUDIT_CONTID : + result =audit_comparator64 (audit_get_contid (tsk), f->op, f->val64); +break ;case AUDIT_SUBJ_USER :case AUDIT_SUBJ_ROLE :case AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE :
Signature · 1 line
1.8.3.1
Paul Moore
maintainerRe: [RFC PATCH ghak90 (was ghak32) V3 06/10] audit: add containerid filtering
Quoted 8 lines · Richard Guy Briggs
Implement audit container identifier filtering using the
AUDIT_CONTIDfield name to send an 8-character string representing a u64 since the value field is only u32.Sending it as two u32 was considered, but gathering and comparing two fields was more complex.
The feature indicator is
AUDIT_FEATURE_BITMAP_CONTAINERID_FILTER.
We've had some discussions about starting to be a bit more "stingy" with our feature bitmap fields, and normally I'm not sure I would want to burn one on a new filter (we should be able to fail safely here), but considering the significance of the audit container ID work I think it might be okay to burn a bit :)
How about renaming this to just AUDIT_FEATURE_BITMAP_CONTAINERID?
Quoted 181 lines
See: https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-kernel/issues/91
See: https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-userspace/issues/40
See: https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-testsuite/issues/64
See: https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-kernel/wiki/RFE-Audit-Container-IDSigned-off-by Richard Guy Briggs <[email protected]>--- include/linux/audit.h | 1 + include/uapi/linux/audit.h | 5 ++++- kernel/audit.h | 1 + kernel/auditfilter.c | 47 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ kernel/auditsc.c | 3 +++ 5 files changed, 56 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)include/linux/audit.h +1
-0@@ -76,6 +76,7 @@ struct audit_field {u32 type;union {u32 val; +u64 val64;kuid_t uid;kgid_t gid;struct {include/uapi/linux/audit.h +4
-1@@ -262,6 +262,7 @@#define AUDIT_LOGINUID_SET 24#define AUDIT_SESSIONID 25/* Session ID */ #define AUDIT_FSTYPE 26/* FileSystem Type */ +#define AUDIT_CONTID 27/* Container ID */ /* These are ONLY useful when checking * at syscall exit time (AUDIT_AT_EXIT). */ @@ -342,6 +343,7 @@ enum {#define AUDIT_FEATURE_BITMAP_SESSIONID_FILTER 0x00000010#define AUDIT_FEATURE_BITMAP_LOST_RESET 0x00000020#define AUDIT_FEATURE_BITMAP_FILTER_FS 0x00000040 +#define AUDIT_FEATURE_BITMAP_CONTAINERID_FILTER 0x00000080#define AUDIT_FEATURE_BITMAP_ALL (AUDIT_FEATURE_BITMAP_BACKLOG_LIMIT | \ AUDIT_FEATURE_BITMAP_BACKLOG_WAIT_TIME | \@@ -349,7 +351,8 @@ enum {AUDIT_FEATURE_BITMAP_EXCLUDE_EXTEND | \AUDIT_FEATURE_BITMAP_SESSIONID_FILTER | \AUDIT_FEATURE_BITMAP_LOST_RESET | \ - AUDIT_FEATURE_BITMAP_FILTER_FS) +AUDIT_FEATURE_BITMAP_FILTER_FS | \ + AUDIT_FEATURE_BITMAP_CONTAINERID_FILTER) /* deprecated: AUDIT_VERSION_* */ #define AUDIT_VERSION_LATEST AUDIT_FEATURE_BITMAP_ALLkernel/audit.h +1
-0@@ -235,6 +235,7 @@ static inline int audit_hash_ino(u32 ino)extern int audit_match_class (int class,unsigned syscall);extern int audit_comparator (const u32 left,const u32 op,const u32 right); +extern int audit_comparator64 (const u64 left,const u32 op,const u64 right);extern int audit_uid_comparator (kuid_t left,u32 op,kuid_t right);extern int audit_gid_comparator (kgid_t left,u32 op,kgid_t right);extern int parent_len (const char *path);kernel/auditfilter.c +47
-0@@ -410,6 +410,7 @@ static int audit_field_valid(struct audit_entry *entry, struct audit_field *f)/* FALL THROUGH */ case AUDIT_ARCH :case AUDIT_FSTYPE : +case AUDIT_CONTID :if (f->op != Audit_not_equal && f->op != Audit_equal)return -EINVAL ;break ;@@ -584,6 +585,14 @@ static struct audit_entry *audit_data_to_entry(struct audit_rule_data *data, } entry->rule.exe = audit_mark;break ; +case AUDIT_CONTID : +if (f->val !=sizeof (u64)) + goto exit_free; + str =audit_unpack_string (&bufp, &remain, f->val); +if (IS_ERR (str)) + goto exit_free; + f->val64 = ((u64 *)str)[0 ]; +break ; } }@@ -666,6 +675,11 @@ static struct audit_rule_data *audit_krule_to_data(struct audit_krule *krule) data->buflen += data->values[i] =audit_pack_string (&bufp,audit_mark_path (krule->exe));break ; +case AUDIT_CONTID : + data->buflen += data->values[i] =sizeof (u64); +for (i =0 ; i <sizeof (u64); i++) + ((char *)bufp)[i] = ((char *)&f->val64)[i]; +break ;case AUDIT_LOGINUID_SET :if (krule->pflags &AUDIT_LOGINUID_LEGACY && !f->val) { data->fields[i] =AUDIT_LOGINUID ;@@ -752,6 +766,10 @@ static int audit_compare_rule(struct audit_krule *a, struct audit_krule *b)if (!gid_eq (a->fields[i].gid, b->fields[i].gid))return 1 ;break ; +case AUDIT_CONTID : +if (a->fields[i].val64 != b->fields[i].val64) +return 1 ; +break ;default :if (a->fields[i].val != b->fields[i].val)return 1 ;@@ -1208,6 +1226,31 @@ int audit_comparator(u32 left, u32 op, u32 right) } } +int audit_comparator64 (u64 left,u32 op,u64 right) +{ +switch (op) { +case Audit_equal: +return (left == right); +case Audit_not_equal: +return (left != right); +case Audit_lt: +return (left < right); +case Audit_le: +return (left <= right); +case Audit_gt: +return (left > right); +case Audit_ge: +return (left >= right); +case Audit_bitmask: +return (left & right); +case Audit_bittest: +return ((left & right) == right); +default : +BUG (); +return 0 ; + } +} +int audit_uid_comparator (kuid_t left,u32 op,kuid_t right) {switch (op) {@@ -1346,6 +1389,10 @@ int audit_filter(int msgtype, unsigned int listtype) result =audit_comparator (audit_loginuid_set (current), f->op, f->val);break ; +case AUDIT_CONTID : + result =audit_comparator64 (audit_get_contid (current), + f->op, f->val64); +break ;case AUDIT_MSGTYPE : result =audit_comparator (msgtype, f->op, f->val);break ;kernel/auditsc.c +3
-1@@ -622,6 +622,9 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,case AUDIT_LOGINUID_SET : result =audit_comparator (audit_loginuid_set (tsk), f->op, f->val);break ; +case AUDIT_CONTID : + result =audit_comparator64 (audit_get_contid (tsk), f->op, f->val64); +break ;case AUDIT_SUBJ_USER :case AUDIT_SUBJ_ROLE :case AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE : --1.8.3.1
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RFC PATCH v3 7/10 audit: add support for containerid to network namespaces
In reply to Richard Guy BriggsAudit events could happen in a network namespace outside of a task context due to packets received from the net that trigger an auditing rule prior to being associated with a running task. The network namespace could in use by multiple containers by association to the tasks in that network namespace. We still want a way to attribute these events to any potential containers. Keep a list per network namespace to track these audit container identifiiers.
Add/increment the audit container identifier on:
- initial setting of the audit container identifier via /proc
- clone/fork call that inherits an audit container identifier
- unshare call that inherits an audit container identifier
- setns call that inherits an audit container identifier Delete/decrement the audit container identifier on:
- an inherited audit container identifier dropped when child set
- process exit
- unshare call that drops a net namespace
- setns call that drops a net namespace
See: https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-kernel/issues/92
See: https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-testsuite/issues/64
See: https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-kernel/wiki/RFE-Audit-Container-ID
--- include/linux/audit.h | 23 ++++++++++++++++ kernel/audit.c | 72 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ kernel/auditsc.c | 5 ++++ kernel/nsproxy.c | 4 +++ 4 files changed, 104 insertions(+)
include/linux/audit.h +23 -0
@@ -26,6 +26,7 @@#include <linux/sched.h> #include <linux/ptrace.h> #include <uapi/linux/audit.h> +#include <linux/refcount.h> #define AUDIT_INO_UNSET ((unsigned long)-1)#define AUDIT_DEV_UNSET ((dev_t)-1)
@@ -87,6 +88,12 @@ struct audit_field {u32 op; }; +struct audit_contid { +struct list_head list; +u64 id; +refcount_t refcount; +}; +extern int is_audit_feature_set (int which);extern int __init audit_register_class (int class,unsigned *list);
@@ -156,6 +163,10 @@ extern void audit_log_task_info(struct audit_buffer *ab, struct task_struct *tsk);extern int audit_log_contid (struct audit_context *context,char *op,u64 contid); +extern struct list_head *audit_get_contid_list (const struct net *net); +extern void audit_contid_add (struct net *net,u64 contid); +extern void audit_contid_del (struct net *net,u64 contid); +extern void audit_switch_task_namespaces (struct nsproxy *ns,struct task_struct *p);extern int audit_update_lsm_rules (void );
@@ -209,6 +220,18 @@ static inline void audit_log_task_info(struct audit_buffer *ab,static inline int audit_log_contid (struct audit_context *context,char *op,u64 contid) { } +static inline struct list_head *audit_get_contid_list (const struct net *net) +{ +static LIST_HEAD (list); +return &list; +} +static inline void audit_contid_add (struct net *net,u64 contid) +{ } +static inline void audit_contid_del (struct net *net,u64 contid) +{ } +static inline void audit_switch_task_namespaces (struct nsproxy *ns,struct task_struct *p) +{ } +#define audit_enabled 0#endif /* CONFIG_AUDIT */
kernel/audit.c +72 -0
90 lines not on this page · raw message
kernel/auditsc.c +5 -0
@@ -75,6 +75,7 @@#include <linux/uaccess.h> #include <linux/fsnotify_backend.h> #include <uapi/linux/limits.h> +#include <net/net_namespace.h> #include "audit.h"
@@ -2165,6 +2166,7 @@ int audit_set_contid(struct task_struct *task, u64 contid)uid_t uid;struct tty_struct *tty;char comm[sizeof (current->comm)]; +struct net *net = task->nsproxy->net_ns;/* Can't set if audit disabled */ if (!task->audit)
@@ -2185,10 +2187,13 @@ int audit_set_contid(struct task_struct *task, u64 contid)else if (cid_valid (oldcontid) && !task->audit->inherited) rc = -EEXIST ;if (!rc) { +if (cid_valid (oldcontid)) +audit_contid_del (net, oldcontid);task_lock (task); task->audit->contid = contid; task->audit->inherited = false;task_unlock (task); +audit_contid_add (net, contid); }if (!audit_enabled)
kernel/nsproxy.c +4 -0
@@ -27,6 +27,7 @@#include <linux/syscalls.h> #include <linux/cgroup.h> #include <linux/perf_event.h> +#include <linux/audit.h> static struct kmem_cache *nsproxy_cachep;
@@ -140,6 +141,7 @@ int copy_namespaces(unsigned long flags, struct task_struct *tsk)struct nsproxy *old_ns = tsk->nsproxy;struct user_namespace *user_ns =task_cred_xxx (tsk, user_ns);struct nsproxy *new_ns; +u64 contid =audit_get_contid (tsk); if (likely(!(flags & (CLONE_NEWNS | CLONE_NEWUTS | CLONE_NEWIPC | CLONE_NEWPID | CLONE_NEWNET |
@@ -167,6 +169,7 @@ int copy_namespaces(unsigned long flags, struct task_struct *tsk)return PTR_ERR (new_ns); tsk->nsproxy = new_ns; +audit_contid_add (new_ns->net_ns, contid);return 0 ; }
@@ -224,6 +227,7 @@ void switch_task_namespaces(struct task_struct *p, struct nsproxy *new) ns = p->nsproxy; p->nsproxy = new;task_unlock (p); +audit_switch_task_namespaces (ns, p);if (ns &&atomic_dec_and_test (&ns->count))free_nsproxy (ns);
Signature · 1 line
1.8.3.1
Paul Moore
maintainerRe: [RFC PATCH ghak90 (was ghak32) V3 07/10] audit: add support for containerid to network namespaces
Quoted 29 lines · Richard Guy Briggs
Audit events could happen in a network namespace outside of a task context due to packets received from the net that trigger an auditing rule prior to being associated with a running task. The network namespace could in use by multiple containers by association to the tasks in that network namespace. We still want a way to attribute these events to any potential containers. Keep a list per network namespace to track these audit container identifiiers.
Add/increment the audit container identifier on:
- initial setting of the audit container identifier via /proc
- clone/fork call that inherits an audit container identifier
- unshare call that inherits an audit container identifier
- setns call that inherits an audit container identifier Delete/decrement the audit container identifier on:
- an inherited audit container identifier dropped when child set
- process exit
- unshare call that drops a net namespace
- setns call that drops a net namespaceSee: https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-kernel/issues/92
See: https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-testsuite/issues/64
See: https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-kernel/wiki/RFE-Audit-Container-IDSigned-off-by Richard Guy Briggs <[email protected]>--- include/linux/audit.h | 23 ++++++++++++++++ kernel/audit.c | 72 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ kernel/auditsc.c | 5 ++++ kernel/nsproxy.c | 4 +++ 4 files changed, 104 insertions(+)
...
include/linux/audit.h struct audit_field { · line 95
Quoted 13 lines
include/linux/audit.h +5
-0@@ -87,6 +88,12 @@ struct audit_field {u32 op; }; +struct audit_contid { +struct list_head list; +u64 id; +refcount_t refcount; +};
Do we need to worry about locking the audit container ID list? Does the network namespace code (or some other namespace code) ensure that add/deletes are serialized?
include/linux/audit.h extern void audit_log_task_info(struct audit_buffer *ab, · line 168
Quoted 7 lines
include/linux/audit.h +3
-0@@ -156,6 +163,10 @@ extern void audit_log_task_info(struct audit_buffer *ab, struct task_struct *tsk);extern int audit_log_contid (struct audit_context *context,char *op,u64 contid); +extern struct list_head *audit_get_contid_list (const struct net *net); +extern void audit_contid_add (struct net *net,u64 contid); +extern void audit_contid_del (struct net *net,u64 contid);
I wonder if we should change these function names to indicate that they are managing the netns/cid list? Right now there is no mention of networking other than the first parameter.
Maybe audit_netns_contid_*()?
include/linux/audit.h static inline void audit_log_task_info(struct audit_buffer *ab, · line 227
Quoted 13 lines
include/linux/audit.h +6
-0+extern void audit_switch_task_namespaces (struct nsproxy *ns,struct task_struct *p);extern int audit_update_lsm_rules (void );@@ -209,6 +220,18 @@ static inline void audit_log_task_info(struct audit_buffer *ab,static inline int audit_log_contid (struct audit_context *context,char *op,u64 contid) { } +static inline struct list_head *audit_get_contid_list (const struct net *net) +{ +static LIST_HEAD (list); +return &list; +}
Why can't we just return NULL here like a normal dummy function? It's only ever used inside audit. Actually, why is this even in include/linux/audit.h, couldn't we put it in kernel/audit.h or even just make it a static in audit.c?
Quoted 44 lines
include/linux/audit.h +7
-0+static inline void audit_contid_add (struct net *net,u64 contid) +{ } +static inline void audit_contid_del (struct net *net,u64 contid) +{ } +static inline void audit_switch_task_namespaces (struct nsproxy *ns,struct task_struct *p) +{ } +#define audit_enabled 0#endif /* CONFIG_AUDIT */ kernel/audit.c +19
-0@@ -106,6 +106,7 @@*/ struct audit_net {struct sock *sk; +struct list_head contid_list; };/** @@ -311,6 +312,76 @@ static struct sock *audit_get_sk(const struct net *net)return aunet->sk; } +/** +* audit_get_contid_list - Return the audit container ID list for the given network namespace +* @net: the destination network namespace +* +* Description: +* Returns the list pointer if valid, NULL otherwise. The caller must ensure +* that a reference is held for the network namespace while the sock is in use. +*/ +struct list_head *audit_get_contid_list (const struct net *net) +{ +struct audit_net *aunet =net_generic (net, audit_net_id); + +return &aunet->contid_list; +} + +void audit_contid_add (struct net *net,u64 contid) +{ +struct list_head *contid_list =audit_get_contid_list (net);
kernel/audit.c static struct sock *audit_get_sk(const struct net *net) · line 342
Quoted 10 lines
kernel/audit.c +10
-0+struct audit_contid *cont; + +if (!cid_valid (contid)) +return ; +if (!list_empty (contid_list)) +list_for_each_entry (cont, contid_list, list) +if (cont->id == contid) { +refcount_inc (&cont->refcount); +return ; + }
<thinking out loud>I think this is fine for right now, but we may need to be a bit clever about how we store the IDs - walking an unsorted list with lots of entries may prove to be too painful.</thinking out loud>
Quoted 12 lines
kernel/audit.c +12
-0+ cont =kmalloc (sizeof (struct audit_contid ),GFP_KERNEL ); +if (!cont) +return ; +INIT_LIST_HEAD (&cont->list); + cont->id = contid; +refcount_set (&cont->refcount,1 ); +list_add (&cont->list, contid_list); +} + +void audit_contid_del (struct net *net,u64 contid) +{ +struct list_head *contid_list =audit_get_contid_list (net);
kernel/audit.c static struct sock *audit_get_sk(const struct net *net) · line 364
Quoted 10 lines
kernel/audit.c +10
-0+struct audit_contid *cont =NULL ; +int found =0 ; + +if (!cid_valid (contid)) +return ; +if (!list_empty (contid_list)) +list_for_each_entry (cont, contid_list, list) +if (cont->id == contid) { + found =1 ; +break ;
You don't really need the found variable, you can just move all of the work you need to do up into the if statement and return from inside the if statement.
kernel/audit.c static struct sock *audit_get_sk(const struct net *net) · line 370
Quoted 6 lines
kernel/audit.c +6
-0+ } +if (!found) +return ; +list_del (&cont->list); +if (refcount_dec_and_test (&cont->refcount)) +kfree (cont);
Don't you want to dec_and_test first and only remove it from the list if there are no other references?
Quoted 98 lines
kernel/audit.c +14
-0+} +void audit_switch_task_namespaces (struct nsproxy *ns,struct task_struct *p) +{ +u64 contid =audit_get_contid (p); +struct nsproxy *new = p->nsproxy; + +if (!cid_valid (contid)) +return ; +audit_contid_del (ns->net_ns, contid); +if (new) +audit_contid_add (new->net_ns, contid); +} +void audit_panic (const char *message) {switch (audit_failure) {@@ -1550,6 +1621,7 @@ static int __net_init audit_net_init(struct net *net)return -ENOMEM ; } aunet->sk->sk_sndtimeo =MAX_SCHEDULE_TIMEOUT ; +INIT_LIST_HEAD (&aunet->contid_list);return 0 ; }kernel/auditsc.c +5
-0@@ -75,6 +75,7 @@#include <linux/uaccess.h> #include <linux/fsnotify_backend.h> #include <uapi/linux/limits.h> +#include <net/net_namespace.h> #include "audit.h" @@ -2165,6 +2166,7 @@ int audit_set_contid(struct task_struct *task, u64 contid)uid_t uid;struct tty_struct *tty;char comm[sizeof (current->comm)]; +struct net *net = task->nsproxy->net_ns;/* Can't set if audit disabled */ if (!task->audit)@@ -2185,10 +2187,13 @@ int audit_set_contid(struct task_struct *task, u64 contid)else if (cid_valid (oldcontid) && !task->audit->inherited) rc = -EEXIST ;if (!rc) { +if (cid_valid (oldcontid)) +audit_contid_del (net, oldcontid);task_lock (task); task->audit->contid = contid; task->audit->inherited = false;task_unlock (task); +audit_contid_add (net, contid); }if (!audit_enabled)kernel/nsproxy.c +4
-1@@ -27,6 +27,7 @@#include <linux/syscalls.h> #include <linux/cgroup.h> #include <linux/perf_event.h> +#include <linux/audit.h> static struct kmem_cache *nsproxy_cachep;@@ -140,6 +141,7 @@ int copy_namespaces(unsigned long flags, struct task_struct *tsk)struct nsproxy *old_ns = tsk->nsproxy;struct user_namespace *user_ns =task_cred_xxx (tsk, user_ns);struct nsproxy *new_ns; +u64 contid =audit_get_contid (tsk); if (likely(!(flags & (CLONE_NEWNS | CLONE_NEWUTS | CLONE_NEWIPC | CLONE_NEWPID | CLONE_NEWNET |@@ -167,6 +169,7 @@ int copy_namespaces(unsigned long flags, struct task_struct *tsk)return PTR_ERR (new_ns); tsk->nsproxy = new_ns; +audit_contid_add (new_ns->net_ns, contid);return 0 ; }@@ -224,6 +227,7 @@ void switch_task_namespaces(struct task_struct *p, struct nsproxy *new) ns = p->nsproxy; p->nsproxy = new;task_unlock (p); +audit_switch_task_namespaces (ns, p);if (ns &&atomic_dec_and_test (&ns->count))free_nsproxy (ns); --1.8.3.1
Quoted 4 lines
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--
paul moore
www.paul-moore.com
Re: [RFC PATCH ghak90 (was ghak32) V3 07/10] audit: add support for containerid to network namespaces
Quoted 41 lines · Paul Moore
Quoted 29 lines · Richard Guy Briggs
Audit events could happen in a network namespace outside of a task context due to packets received from the net that trigger an auditing rule prior to being associated with a running task. The network namespace could in use by multiple containers by association to the tasks in that network namespace. We still want a way to attribute these events to any potential containers. Keep a list per network namespace to track these audit container identifiiers.
Add/increment the audit container identifier on:
- initial setting of the audit container identifier via /proc
- clone/fork call that inherits an audit container identifier
- unshare call that inherits an audit container identifier
- setns call that inherits an audit container identifier Delete/decrement the audit container identifier on:
- an inherited audit container identifier dropped when child set
- process exit
- unshare call that drops a net namespace
- setns call that drops a net namespaceSee: https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-kernel/issues/92
See: https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-testsuite/issues/64
See: https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-kernel/wiki/RFE-Audit-Container-IDSigned-off-by Richard Guy Briggs <[email protected]>--- include/linux/audit.h | 23 ++++++++++++++++ kernel/audit.c | 72 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ kernel/auditsc.c | 5 ++++ kernel/nsproxy.c | 4 +++ 4 files changed, 104 insertions(+)...
Quoted 8 lines
include/linux/audit.h +0
-0@@ -87,6 +88,12 @@ struct audit_field {u32 op; };
Quoted 9 lines
include/linux/audit.h struct audit_field { · line 95
Quoted 5 lines
include/linux/audit.h +5
-0+struct audit_contid { +struct list_head list; +u64 id; +refcount_t refcount; +};Do we need to worry about locking the audit container ID list? Does the network namespace code (or some other namespace code) ensure that add/deletes are serialized?
Now that you mention it, I don't have any idea. I'll need to look into this.
Quoted 12 lines
include/linux/audit.h extern void audit_log_task_info(struct audit_buffer *ab, · line 168
Quoted 7 lines
include/linux/audit.h +3
-0@@ -156,6 +163,10 @@ extern void audit_log_task_info(struct audit_buffer *ab, struct task_struct *tsk);extern int audit_log_contid (struct audit_context *context,char *op,u64 contid); +extern struct list_head *audit_get_contid_list (const struct net *net); +extern void audit_contid_add (struct net *net,u64 contid); +extern void audit_contid_del (struct net *net,u64 contid);I wonder if we should change these function names to indicate that they are managing the netns/cid list? Right now there is no mention of networking other than the first parameter.
Quoted 1 line
Maybe audit_netns_contid_*()?
I was going to protest that they should be more generally named functions to deal with namespaces rather than specifically network namespaces, but each type of namespace will need its own accessor functions since each type of namespace has a different namespace type pointer. It is tempting to try to generalize it, but that could be an excercise for the reader if another type of namespace needs this sort of support.
Quoted 4 lines
Quoted 4 lines
include/linux/audit.h +1
-0+extern void audit_switch_task_namespaces (struct nsproxy *ns,struct task_struct *p);extern int audit_update_lsm_rules (void );
Quoted 14 lines
include/linux/audit.h static inline void audit_log_task_info(struct audit_buffer *ab, · line 227
Quoted 9 lines
include/linux/audit.h +5
-0@@ -209,6 +220,18 @@ static inline void audit_log_task_info(struct audit_buffer *ab,static inline int audit_log_contid (struct audit_context *context,char *op,u64 contid) { } +static inline struct list_head *audit_get_contid_list (const struct net *net) +{ +static LIST_HEAD (list); +return &list; +}Why can't we just return NULL here like a normal dummy function? It's only ever used inside audit. Actually, why is this even in
include/linux/audit.h, couldn't we put it inkernel/audit.hor even just make it a static inaudit.c?
You are right, static in kernel/audit.c is sufficient.
Quoted 51 lines
Quoted 51 lines
include/linux/audit.h +7
-0+static inline void audit_contid_add (struct net *net,u64 contid) +{ } +static inline void audit_contid_del (struct net *net,u64 contid) +{ } +static inline void audit_switch_task_namespaces (struct nsproxy *ns,struct task_struct *p) +{ } +#define audit_enabled 0#endif /* CONFIG_AUDIT */ kernel/audit.c +26
-0@@ -106,6 +106,7 @@*/ struct audit_net {struct sock *sk; +struct list_head contid_list; };/** @@ -311,6 +312,76 @@ static struct sock *audit_get_sk(const struct net *net)return aunet->sk; } +/** +* audit_get_contid_list - Return the audit container ID list for the given network namespace +* @net: the destination network namespace +* +* Description: +* Returns the list pointer if valid, NULL otherwise. The caller must ensure +* that a reference is held for the network namespace while the sock is in use. +*/ +struct list_head *audit_get_contid_list (const struct net *net) +{ +struct audit_net *aunet =net_generic (net, audit_net_id); + +return &aunet->contid_list; +} + +void audit_contid_add (struct net *net,u64 contid) +{ +struct list_head *contid_list =audit_get_contid_list (net); +struct audit_contid *cont; + +if (!cid_valid (contid)) +return ; +if (!list_empty (contid_list)) +list_for_each_entry (cont, contid_list, list) +if (cont->id == contid) {
Quoted 8 lines
kernel/audit.c static struct sock *audit_get_sk(const struct net *net) · line 342
Quoted 3 lines
kernel/audit.c +3
-0+refcount_inc (&cont->refcount); +return ; + }<thinking out loud>I think this is fine for right now, but we may need to be a bit clever about how we store the IDs - walking an unsorted list with lots of entries may prove to be too painful.</thinking out loud>
Ok, agreed, it may want a hash array list... That should be a straightforward optimization later.
Quoted 18 lines
Quoted 18 lines
kernel/audit.c +18
-0+ cont =kmalloc (sizeof (struct audit_contid ),GFP_KERNEL ); +if (!cont) +return ; +INIT_LIST_HEAD (&cont->list); + cont->id = contid; +refcount_set (&cont->refcount,1 ); +list_add (&cont->list, contid_list); +} + +void audit_contid_del (struct net *net,u64 contid) +{ +struct list_head *contid_list =audit_get_contid_list (net); +struct audit_contid *cont =NULL ; +int found =0 ; + +if (!cid_valid (contid)) +return ; +if (!list_empty (contid_list))
Quoted 8 lines
kernel/audit.c static struct sock *audit_get_sk(const struct net *net) · line 364
Quoted 4 lines
kernel/audit.c +4
-0+list_for_each_entry (cont, contid_list, list) +if (cont->id == contid) { + found =1 ; +break ;You don't really need the found variable, you can just move all of the work you need to do up into the if statement and return from inside the if statement.
Fine, sure.
Quoted 9 lines
kernel/audit.c static struct sock *audit_get_sk(const struct net *net) · line 370
Quoted 6 lines
kernel/audit.c +6
-0+ } +if (!found) +return ; +list_del (&cont->list); +if (refcount_dec_and_test (&cont->refcount)) +kfree (cont);Don't you want to
dec_and_testfirst and only remove it from the list if there are no other references?
I don't think so. Let me try to describe it in prose to see if I understood this properly and see if this makes more sense: I want to remove this audit_contid list member from this net's audit_contid list and decrement unconditionally this member's refcount so it knows there is one less thing pointing at it and when there is no longer anything pointing at it, free it.
Quoted 98 lines
Quoted 98 lines
kernel/audit.c +14
-0+} +void audit_switch_task_namespaces (struct nsproxy *ns,struct task_struct *p) +{ +u64 contid =audit_get_contid (p); +struct nsproxy *new = p->nsproxy; + +if (!cid_valid (contid)) +return ; +audit_contid_del (ns->net_ns, contid); +if (new) +audit_contid_add (new->net_ns, contid); +} +void audit_panic (const char *message) {switch (audit_failure) {@@ -1550,6 +1621,7 @@ static int __net_init audit_net_init(struct net *net)return -ENOMEM ; } aunet->sk->sk_sndtimeo =MAX_SCHEDULE_TIMEOUT ; +INIT_LIST_HEAD (&aunet->contid_list);return 0 ; }kernel/auditsc.c +5
-0@@ -75,6 +75,7 @@#include <linux/uaccess.h> #include <linux/fsnotify_backend.h> #include <uapi/linux/limits.h> +#include <net/net_namespace.h> #include "audit.h" @@ -2165,6 +2166,7 @@ int audit_set_contid(struct task_struct *task, u64 contid)uid_t uid;struct tty_struct *tty;char comm[sizeof (current->comm)]; +struct net *net = task->nsproxy->net_ns;/* Can't set if audit disabled */ if (!task->audit)@@ -2185,10 +2187,13 @@ int audit_set_contid(struct task_struct *task, u64 contid)else if (cid_valid (oldcontid) && !task->audit->inherited) rc = -EEXIST ;if (!rc) { +if (cid_valid (oldcontid)) +audit_contid_del (net, oldcontid);task_lock (task); task->audit->contid = contid; task->audit->inherited = false;task_unlock (task); +audit_contid_add (net, contid); }if (!audit_enabled)kernel/nsproxy.c +4
-1@@ -27,6 +27,7 @@#include <linux/syscalls.h> #include <linux/cgroup.h> #include <linux/perf_event.h> +#include <linux/audit.h> static struct kmem_cache *nsproxy_cachep;@@ -140,6 +141,7 @@ int copy_namespaces(unsigned long flags, struct task_struct *tsk)struct nsproxy *old_ns = tsk->nsproxy;struct user_namespace *user_ns =task_cred_xxx (tsk, user_ns);struct nsproxy *new_ns; +u64 contid =audit_get_contid (tsk); if (likely(!(flags & (CLONE_NEWNS | CLONE_NEWUTS | CLONE_NEWIPC | CLONE_NEWPID | CLONE_NEWNET |@@ -167,6 +169,7 @@ int copy_namespaces(unsigned long flags, struct task_struct *tsk)return PTR_ERR (new_ns); tsk->nsproxy = new_ns; +audit_contid_add (new_ns->net_ns, contid);return 0 ; }@@ -224,6 +227,7 @@ void switch_task_namespaces(struct task_struct *p, struct nsproxy *new) ns = p->nsproxy; p->nsproxy = new;task_unlock (p); +audit_switch_task_namespaces (ns, p);if (ns &&atomic_dec_and_test (&ns->count))free_nsproxy (ns); --1.8.3.1
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 4 lines
--
Linux-audit mailing list
[email protected]
https://www.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/linux-audit--
paul moore
www.paul-moore.com
- RGB
--
Richard Guy Briggs <[email protected]>
Sr. S/W Engineer, Kernel Security, Base Operating Systems Remote, Ottawa, Red Hat Canada
IRC: rgb, SunRaycer
Voice: +1.647.777.2635, Internal: (81) 32635
Paul Moore
maintainerRe: [RFC PATCH ghak90 (was ghak32) V3 07/10] audit: add support for containerid to network namespaces
Quoted 31 lines · Richard Guy Briggs
Quoted 30 lines · Paul Moore
Quoted 29 lines · Richard Guy Briggs
Audit events could happen in a network namespace outside of a task context due to packets received from the net that trigger an auditing rule prior to being associated with a running task. The network namespace could in use by multiple containers by association to the tasks in that network namespace. We still want a way to attribute these events to any potential containers. Keep a list per network namespace to track these audit container identifiiers.
Add/increment the audit container identifier on:
- initial setting of the audit container identifier via /proc
- clone/fork call that inherits an audit container identifier
- unshare call that inherits an audit container identifier
- setns call that inherits an audit container identifier Delete/decrement the audit container identifier on:
- an inherited audit container identifier dropped when child set
- process exit
- unshare call that drops a net namespace
- setns call that drops a net namespaceSee: https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-kernel/issues/92
See: https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-testsuite/issues/64
See: https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-kernel/wiki/RFE-Audit-Container-IDSigned-off-by Richard Guy Briggs <[email protected]>--- include/linux/audit.h | 23 ++++++++++++++++ kernel/audit.c | 72 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ kernel/auditsc.c | 5 ++++ kernel/nsproxy.c | 4 +++ 4 files changed, 104 insertions(+)
...
Quoted 10 lines
Quoted 9 lines
kernel/audit.c static struct sock *audit_get_sk(const struct net *net) · line 370
Quoted 6 lines
kernel/audit.c +6
-0+ } +if (!found) +return ; +list_del (&cont->list); +if (refcount_dec_and_test (&cont->refcount)) +kfree (cont);Don't you want to
dec_and_testfirst and only remove it from the list if there are no other references?
Quoted 6 lines
I don't think so. Let me try to describe it in prose to see if I understood this properly and see if this makes more sense: I want to remove this
audit_contidlist member from this net'saudit_contidlist and decrement unconditionally this member's refcount so it knows there is one less thing pointing at it and when there is no longer anything pointing at it, free it.
Yep, sorry, my mistake, I was thinking the other way around (netns going away) ... which actually, this patchset doesn't handle that does it (I don't see any new code in audit_net_exit())? Is is in a later patch? If so, it really should be in the same patch as this code to prevent bisect nasties.
Signature · 2 lines
paul moore www.paul-moore.com
Re: [RFC PATCH ghak90 (was ghak32) V3 07/10] audit: add support for containerid to network namespaces
Quoted 52 lines · Paul Moore
Quoted 31 lines · Richard Guy Briggs
Quoted 30 lines · Paul Moore
Quoted 29 lines · Richard Guy Briggs
Audit events could happen in a network namespace outside of a task context due to packets received from the net that trigger an auditing rule prior to being associated with a running task. The network namespace could in use by multiple containers by association to the tasks in that network namespace. We still want a way to attribute these events to any potential containers. Keep a list per network namespace to track these audit container identifiiers.
Add/increment the audit container identifier on:
- initial setting of the audit container identifier via /proc
- clone/fork call that inherits an audit container identifier
- unshare call that inherits an audit container identifier
- setns call that inherits an audit container identifier Delete/decrement the audit container identifier on:
- an inherited audit container identifier dropped when child set
- process exit
- unshare call that drops a net namespace
- setns call that drops a net namespaceSee: https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-kernel/issues/92
See: https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-testsuite/issues/64
See: https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-kernel/wiki/RFE-Audit-Container-IDSigned-off-by Richard Guy Briggs <[email protected]>--- include/linux/audit.h | 23 ++++++++++++++++ kernel/audit.c | 72 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ kernel/auditsc.c | 5 ++++ kernel/nsproxy.c | 4 +++ 4 files changed, 104 insertions(+)...
Quoted 10 lines
Quoted 9 lines
kernel/audit.c static struct sock *audit_get_sk(const struct net *net) · line 370
Quoted 6 lines
kernel/audit.c +6
-0+ } +if (!found) +return ; +list_del (&cont->list); +if (refcount_dec_and_test (&cont->refcount)) +kfree (cont);Don't you want to
dec_and_testfirst and only remove it from the list if there are no other references?Quoted 6 lines
I don't think so. Let me try to describe it in prose to see if I understood this properly and see if this makes more sense: I want to remove this
audit_contidlist member from this net'saudit_contidlist and decrement unconditionally this member's refcount so it knows there is one less thing pointing at it and when there is no longer anything pointing at it, free it.
Quoted 5 lines
Yep, sorry, my mistake, I was thinking the other way around (netns going away) ... which actually, this patchset doesn't handle that does it (I don't see any new code in
audit_net_exit())? Is is in a later patch? If so, it really should be in the same patch as this code to prevent bisect nasties.
I don't think any code is needed in audit_net_exit() other than a WARN() that the contid list is empty, since if a netns is going away, all its tasks would have exited (removing its contid from the list) or moved to a new nstns (moving its contid from this list to another netns). At worst, this is a memory leak and not a bad pointer dereference.
Quoted 1 line
paul moore
- RGB
RFC PATCH v3 8/10 audit: NETFILTER_PKT: record each container ID associated with a netNS
In reply to Richard Guy BriggsAdd audit container identifier auxiliary record(s) to NETFILTER_PKT event standalone records. Iterate through all potential audit container identifiers associated with a network namespace.
--- include/linux/audit.h | 5 +++++ kernel/audit.c | 20 +++++++++++++++++++- kernel/auditsc.c | 2 ++ net/netfilter/xt_AUDIT.c | 12 ++++++++++-- 4 files changed, 36 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
include/linux/audit.h +5 -0
@@ -167,6 +167,8 @@ extern int audit_log_contid(struct audit_context *context,extern void audit_contid_add (struct net *net,u64 contid);extern void audit_contid_del (struct net *net,u64 contid);extern void audit_switch_task_namespaces (struct nsproxy *ns,struct task_struct *p); +extern void audit_log_contid_list (struct net *net, +struct audit_context *context);extern int audit_update_lsm_rules (void );
@@ -231,6 +233,9 @@ static inline void audit_contid_del(struct net *net, u64 contid) { }static inline void audit_switch_task_namespaces (struct nsproxy *ns,struct task_struct *p) { } +static inline void audit_log_contid_list (struct net *net, +struct audit_context *context) +{ }#define audit_enabled 0#endif /* CONFIG_AUDIT */
kernel/audit.c +19 -1
@@ -382,6 +382,20 @@ void audit_switch_task_namespaces(struct nsproxy *ns, struct task_struct *p)audit_contid_add (new->net_ns, contid); } +void audit_log_contid_list (struct net *net,struct audit_context *context) +{ +struct audit_contid *cont; +int i =0 ; + +list_for_each_entry (cont,audit_get_contid_list (net), list) { +char buf[14 ]; + +sprintf (buf,"net%u" , i++); +audit_log_contid (context, buf, cont->id); + } +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL (audit_log_contid_list); +void audit_panic (const char *message) {switch (audit_failure) {
@@ -2132,17 +2146,21 @@ int audit_log_contid(struct audit_context *context, char *op, u64 contid) {struct audit_buffer *ab; +gfp_t gfpflags;if (!cid_valid (contid))return 0 ; +/* We can be called in atomic context via audit_tg() */ + gfpflags = (in_atomic () ||irqs_disabled ()) ?GFP_ATOMIC :GFP_KERNEL ;/* Generate AUDIT_CONTAINER record with container ID */ - ab =audit_log_start (context,GFP_KERNEL ,AUDIT_CONTAINER ); + ab =audit_log_start (context, gfpflags,AUDIT_CONTAINER );if (!ab)return -ENOMEM ;audit_log_format (ab,"op=%s contid=%llu" , op, contid);audit_log_end (ab);return 0 ; } +EXPORT_SYMBOL (audit_log_contid);void audit_log_key (struct audit_buffer *ab,char *key) {
kernel/auditsc.c +2 -0
@@ -1015,6 +1015,7 @@ struct audit_context *audit_alloc_local(void) context->in_syscall =1 ;return context; } +EXPORT_SYMBOL (audit_alloc_local);void audit_free_context (struct audit_context *context) {
@@ -1029,6 +1030,7 @@ void audit_free_context(struct audit_context *context)audit_proctitle_free (context);kfree (context); } +EXPORT_SYMBOL (audit_free_context); static int audit_log_pid_context(struct audit_context *context, pid_t pid, kuid_t auid, kuid_t uid, unsigned int sessionid,
net/netfilter/xt_AUDIT.c +10 -2
@@ -71,10 +71,13 @@ static bool audit_ip6(struct audit_buffer *ab, struct sk_buff *skb) {struct audit_buffer *ab;int fam =-1 ; +struct audit_context *context; +struct net *net;if (audit_enabled ==0 ) - goto errout; - ab =audit_log_start (NULL ,GFP_ATOMIC ,AUDIT_NETFILTER_PKT ); + goto out; + context =audit_alloc_local (); + ab =audit_log_start (context,GFP_ATOMIC ,AUDIT_NETFILTER_PKT );if (ab ==NULL ) goto errout;
@@ -104,7 +107,12 @@ static bool audit_ip6(struct audit_buffer *ab, struct sk_buff *skb)audit_log_end (ab); + net =xt_net (par); +audit_log_contid_list (net, context); + errout: +audit_free_context (context); +out:return XT_CONTINUE ; }
Signature · 1 line
1.8.3.1
Paul Moore
maintainerRe: [RFC PATCH ghak90 (was ghak32) V3 08/10] audit: NETFILTER_PKT: record each container ID associated with a netNS
Quoted 11 lines · Richard Guy Briggs
Add audit container identifier auxiliary record(s) to
NETFILTER_PKTevent standalone records. Iterate through all potential audit container identifiers associated with a network namespace.Signed-off-by Richard Guy Briggs <[email protected]>--- include/linux/audit.h | 5 +++++ kernel/audit.c | 20 +++++++++++++++++++- kernel/auditsc.c | 2 ++ net/netfilter/xt_AUDIT.c | 12 ++++++++++-- 4 files changed, 36 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
...
include/linux/audit.h extern int audit_log_contid(struct audit_context *context, · line 171
Quoted 10 lines
include/linux/audit.h +2
-0@@ -167,6 +167,8 @@ extern int audit_log_contid(struct audit_context *context,extern void audit_contid_add (struct net *net,u64 contid);extern void audit_contid_del (struct net *net,u64 contid);extern void audit_switch_task_namespaces (struct nsproxy *ns,struct task_struct *p); +extern void audit_log_contid_list (struct net *net, +struct audit_context *context);
See my comment in previous patches about changing the function name to better indicate it's dedicate use for network namespaces.
Quoted 20 lines
include/linux/audit.h +3
-0extern int audit_update_lsm_rules (void );@@ -231,6 +233,9 @@ static inline void audit_contid_del(struct net *net, u64 contid) { }static inline void audit_switch_task_namespaces (struct nsproxy *ns,struct task_struct *p) { } +static inline void audit_log_contid_list (struct net *net, +struct audit_context *context) +{ }#define audit_enabled 0#endif /* CONFIG_AUDIT */ kernel/audit.c +0
-0@@ -382,6 +382,20 @@ void audit_switch_task_namespaces(struct nsproxy *ns, struct task_struct *p)audit_contid_add (new->net_ns, contid); }
kernel/audit.c void audit_switch_task_namespaces(struct nsproxy *ns, struct task_struct *p) · line 394
Quoted 10 lines
kernel/audit.c +10
-0+void audit_log_contid_list (struct net *net,struct audit_context *context) +{ +struct audit_contid *cont; +int i =0 ; + +list_for_each_entry (cont,audit_get_contid_list (net), list) { +char buf[14 ]; + +sprintf (buf,"net%u" , i++); +audit_log_contid (context, buf, cont->id);
Hmm. It looks like this will generate multiple audit container ID records with "op=netX contid=Y" (X=netns number, Y=audit container ID), is that what we want? I've mentioned my concern around the "op" values in these records earlier in the patchset, that still applies here, but now I'm also concerned about the multiple records. I'm thinking we might be better served with a single record with either multiple "contid" fields, or a single "contid" field with a set of comma separated values (or some other delimiter that Steve's tools will tolerate).
Steve, thoughts?
Quoted 8 lines
kernel/audit.c +4
-0+ } +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL (audit_log_contid_list); +void audit_panic (const char *message) {switch (audit_failure) {
kernel/audit.c int audit_log_contid(struct audit_context *context, · line 2154
Quoted 9 lines
kernel/audit.c +3
-0@@ -2132,17 +2146,21 @@ int audit_log_contid(struct audit_context *context, char *op, u64 contid) {struct audit_buffer *ab; +gfp_t gfpflags;if (!cid_valid (contid))return 0 ; +/* We can be called in atomic context via audit_tg() */ + gfpflags = (in_atomic () ||irqs_disabled ()) ?GFP_ATOMIC :GFP_KERNEL ;
See my previous comments in the earlier patches about guessing at gfpflags; let's just add a gfpflags parameter to audit_log_contid().
kernel/audit.c int audit_log_contid(struct audit_context *context, · line 2163
Quoted 10 lines
kernel/audit.c +2
-1/* Generate AUDIT_CONTAINER record with container ID */ - ab =audit_log_start (context,GFP_KERNEL ,AUDIT_CONTAINER ); + ab =audit_log_start (context, gfpflags,AUDIT_CONTAINER );if (!ab)return -ENOMEM ;audit_log_format (ab,"op=%s contid=%llu" , op, contid);audit_log_end (ab);return 0 ; } +EXPORT_SYMBOL (audit_log_contid);
Move the EXPORT_SYMBOL() to earlier in the patchset when you first define audit_log_contid().
kernel/auditsc.c struct audit_context *audit_alloc_local(void) · line 1018
Quoted 9 lines
kernel/auditsc.c +1
-0@@ -1015,6 +1015,7 @@ struct audit_context *audit_alloc_local(void) context->in_syscall =1 ;return context; } +EXPORT_SYMBOL (audit_alloc_local);
Same as above.
kernel/auditsc.c void audit_free_context(struct audit_context *context) · line 1033
Quoted 7 lines
kernel/auditsc.c +1
-0void audit_free_context (struct audit_context *context) {@@ -1029,6 +1030,7 @@ void audit_free_context(struct audit_context *context)audit_proctitle_free (context);kfree (context); } +EXPORT_SYMBOL (audit_free_context);
Same.
Quoted 42 lines
kernel/auditsc.c +0
-0static int audit_log_pid_context(struct audit_context *context, pid_t pid, kuid_t auid, kuid_t uid, unsigned int sessionid,net/netfilter/xt_AUDIT.c +10
-3@@ -71,10 +71,13 @@ static bool audit_ip6(struct audit_buffer *ab, struct sk_buff *skb) {struct audit_buffer *ab;int fam =-1 ; +struct audit_context *context; +struct net *net;if (audit_enabled ==0 ) - goto errout; - ab =audit_log_start (NULL ,GFP_ATOMIC ,AUDIT_NETFILTER_PKT ); + goto out; + context =audit_alloc_local (); + ab =audit_log_start (context,GFP_ATOMIC ,AUDIT_NETFILTER_PKT );if (ab ==NULL ) goto errout;@@ -104,7 +107,12 @@ static bool audit_ip6(struct audit_buffer *ab, struct sk_buff *skb)audit_log_end (ab); + net =xt_net (par); +audit_log_contid_list (net, context); + errout: +audit_free_context (context); +out:return XT_CONTINUE ; } --1.8.3.1
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Re: [RFC PATCH ghak90 (was ghak32) V3 08/10] audit: NETFILTER_PKT: record each container ID associated with a netNS
Quoted 70 lines · EDT Paul Moore
Quoted 11 lines · Richard Guy Briggs
Add audit container identifier auxiliary record(s) to
NETFILTER_PKTevent standalone records. Iterate through all potential audit container identifiers associated with a network namespace.Signed-off-by Richard Guy Briggs <[email protected]>---
include/linux/audit.h | 5 +++++ kernel/audit.c | 20 +++++++++++++++++++- kernel/auditsc.c | 2 ++ net/netfilter/xt_AUDIT.c | 12 ++++++++++-- 4 files changed, 36 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)...
Quoted 10 lines
include/linux/audit.h +0
-0@@ -167,6 +167,8 @@ extern int audit_log_contid(struct audit_context *context, extern void audit_contid_add(struct net *net, u64 contid);extern void audit_contid_del (struct net *net,u64 contid);extern void
audit_switch_task_namespaces(struct nsproxy *ns, struct task_struct *p); +extern void audit_log_contid_list(struct net *net,
+ structaudit_context*context);See my comment in previous patches about changing the function name to better indicate it's dedicate use for network namespaces.
Quoted 20 lines
extern int
audit_update_lsm_rules(void);include/linux/audit.h +3
-0@@ -231,6 +233,9 @@ static inline void audit_contid_del(struct net *net, u64 contid) { }static inline void audit_switch_task_namespaces (struct nsproxy *ns,struct task_struct *p) { } +static inline void audit_log_contid_list (struct net *net, +struct audit_context *context) +{ }#define audit_enabled 0#endif /* CONFIG_AUDIT */ kernel/audit.c +0
-0@@ -382,6 +382,20 @@ void audit_switch_task_namespaces(struct nsproxy *ns, struct task_struct *p) audit_contid_add(new->net_ns, contid); }kernel/audit.c void audit_switch_task_namespaces(struct nsproxy · line 394
Quoted 10 lines
kernel/audit.c +9
-0+void audit_log_contid_list (struct net *net,struct audit_context *context) +{ +struct audit_contid *cont; +int i =0 ; + +list_for_each_entry (cont,audit_get_contid_list (net), list) { +char buf[14 ]; + +sprintf (buf,"net%u" , i++); +audit_log_contid (context, buf, cont->id);Hmm. It looks like this will generate multiple audit container ID records with "op=netX contid=Y" (X=netns number, Y=audit container ID), is that what we want? I've mentioned my concern around the "op" values in these records earlier in the patchset, that still applies here, but now I'm also concerned about the multiple records. I'm thinking we might be better served with a single record with either multiple "contid" fields, or a single "contid" field with a set of comma separated values (or some other delimiter that Steve's tools will tolerate).
Quoted 1 line
Steve, thoughts?
A single record is best. Maybe pattern this after the args listed in an execve record.
-Steve
Paul Moore
maintainerRe: [RFC PATCH ghak90 (was ghak32) V3 08/10] audit: NETFILTER_PKT: record each container ID associated with a netNS
Quoted 71 lines · Steve Grubb
Quoted 70 lines · EDT Paul Moore
Quoted 11 lines · Richard Guy Briggs
Add audit container identifier auxiliary record(s) to
NETFILTER_PKTevent standalone records. Iterate through all potential audit container identifiers associated with a network namespace.Signed-off-by Richard Guy Briggs <[email protected]>---
include/linux/audit.h | 5 +++++ kernel/audit.c | 20 +++++++++++++++++++- kernel/auditsc.c | 2 ++ net/netfilter/xt_AUDIT.c | 12 ++++++++++-- 4 files changed, 36 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)...
Quoted 10 lines
include/linux/audit.h +0
-0@@ -167,6 +167,8 @@ extern int audit_log_contid(struct audit_context *context, extern void audit_contid_add(struct net *net, u64 contid);extern void audit_contid_del (struct net *net,u64 contid);extern void
audit_switch_task_namespaces(struct nsproxy *ns, struct task_struct *p); +extern void audit_log_contid_list(struct net *net,
+ structaudit_context*context);See my comment in previous patches about changing the function name to better indicate it's dedicate use for network namespaces.
Quoted 20 lines
extern int
audit_update_lsm_rules(void);include/linux/audit.h +3
-0@@ -231,6 +233,9 @@ static inline void audit_contid_del(struct net *net, u64 contid) { }static inline void audit_switch_task_namespaces (struct nsproxy *ns,struct task_struct *p) { } +static inline void audit_log_contid_list (struct net *net, +struct audit_context *context) +{ }#define audit_enabled 0#endif /* CONFIG_AUDIT */ kernel/audit.c +0
-0@@ -382,6 +382,20 @@ void audit_switch_task_namespaces(struct nsproxy *ns, struct task_struct *p) audit_contid_add(new->net_ns, contid); }kernel/audit.c void audit_switch_task_namespaces(struct nsproxy · line 394
Quoted 10 lines
kernel/audit.c +9
-0+void audit_log_contid_list (struct net *net,struct audit_context *context) +{ +struct audit_contid *cont; +int i =0 ; + +list_for_each_entry (cont,audit_get_contid_list (net), list) { +char buf[14 ]; + +sprintf (buf,"net%u" , i++); +audit_log_contid (context, buf, cont->id);Hmm. It looks like this will generate multiple audit container ID records with "op=netX contid=Y" (X=netns number, Y=audit container ID), is that what we want? I've mentioned my concern around the "op" values in these records earlier in the patchset, that still applies here, but now I'm also concerned about the multiple records. I'm thinking we might be better served with a single record with either multiple "contid" fields, or a single "contid" field with a set of comma separated values (or some other delimiter that Steve's tools will tolerate).
Quoted 4 lines
Quoted 1 line
Steve, thoughts?
A single record is best. Maybe pattern this after the args listed in an execve record.
I'm concerned that an execve-like approach might not scale very well as would could potentially have a lot of containers sharing a single network namespace ("a%d=%d" vs ",%d"). Further, with execve we log the argument position in addition to the argument itself, that isn't something we need to worry about with the audit container IDs.
Signature · 2 lines
paul moore www.paul-moore.com
Re: [RFC PATCH ghak90 (was ghak32) V3 08/10] audit: NETFILTER_PKT: record each container ID associated with a netNS
Quoted 74 lines · Paul Moore
Quoted 73 lines · Steve Grubb
Quoted 71 lines · EDT Paul Moore
Quoted 11 lines · Richard Guy Briggs
Add audit container identifier auxiliary record(s) to
NETFILTER_PKTevent standalone records. Iterate through all potential audit container identifiers associated with a network namespace.Signed-off-by Richard Guy Briggs <[email protected]>---
include/linux/audit.h | 5 +++++ kernel/audit.c | 20 +++++++++++++++++++- kernel/auditsc.c | 2 ++ net/netfilter/xt_AUDIT.c | 12 ++++++++++-- 4 files changed, 36 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)...
Quoted 10 lines
include/linux/audit.h +0
-0@@ -167,6 +167,8 @@ extern int audit_log_contid(struct audit_context *context, extern void audit_contid_add(struct net *net, u64 contid);extern void audit_contid_del (struct net *net,u64 contid);extern void
audit_switch_task_namespaces(struct nsproxy *ns, struct task_struct *p); +extern void audit_log_contid_list(struct net *net,
+ structaudit_context*context);See my comment in previous patches about changing the function name to better indicate it's dedicate use for network namespaces.
Quoted 20 lines
extern int
audit_update_lsm_rules(void);include/linux/audit.h +3
-0@@ -231,6 +233,9 @@ static inline void audit_contid_del(struct net *net, u64 contid) { }static inline void audit_switch_task_namespaces (struct nsproxy *ns,struct task_struct *p) { } +static inline void audit_log_contid_list (struct net *net, +struct audit_context *context) +{ }#define audit_enabled 0#endif /* CONFIG_AUDIT */ kernel/audit.c +0
-0@@ -382,6 +382,20 @@ void audit_switch_task_namespaces(struct nsproxy *ns, struct task_struct *p) audit_contid_add(new->net_ns, contid); }kernel/audit.c void audit_switch_task_namespaces(struct nsproxy · line 394
Quoted 10 lines
kernel/audit.c +9
-0+void audit_log_contid_list (struct net *net,struct audit_context *context) +{ +struct audit_contid *cont; +int i =0 ; + +list_for_each_entry (cont,audit_get_contid_list (net), list) { +char buf[14 ]; + +sprintf (buf,"net%u" , i++); +audit_log_contid (context, buf, cont->id);Hmm. It looks like this will generate multiple audit container ID records with "op=netX contid=Y" (X=netns number, Y=audit container ID), is that what we want? I've mentioned my concern around the "op" values in these records earlier in the patchset, that still applies here, but now I'm also concerned about the multiple records. I'm thinking we might be better served with a single record with either multiple "contid" fields, or a single "contid" field with a set of comma separated values (or some other delimiter that Steve's tools will tolerate).
Steve, thoughts?
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 2 lines
A single record is best. Maybe pattern this after the args listed in an execve record.
I'm concerned that an execve-like approach might not scale very well as would could potentially have a lot of containers sharing a single network namespace ("a%d=%d" vs ",%d"). Further, with execve we log the argument position in addition to the argument itself, that isn't something we need to worry about with the audit container IDs.
I think a comma-separated list would be most efficient, but could potentially overload one record. The "netX" labels are pretty meaningless unless they are that netNS' inode number (with qualifying dev, of course), but that would be elsewhere in another record.
Quoted 1 line
paul moore
- RGB
--
Richard Guy Briggs <[email protected]>
Sr. S/W Engineer, Kernel Security, Base Operating Systems Remote, Ottawa, Red Hat Canada
IRC: rgb, SunRaycer
Voice: +1.647.777.2635, Internal: (81) 32635
Re: [RFC PATCH ghak90 (was ghak32) V3 08/10] audit: NETFILTER_PKT: record each container ID associated with a netNS
In reply to Richard Guy BriggsCC'ing Netfilter.
Quoted 139 lines · Richard Guy Briggs
Add audit container identifier auxiliary record(s) to
NETFILTER_PKTevent standalone records. Iterate through all potential audit container identifiers associated with a network namespace.Signed-off-by Richard Guy Briggs <[email protected]>--- include/linux/audit.h | 5 +++++ kernel/audit.c | 20 +++++++++++++++++++- kernel/auditsc.c | 2 ++ net/netfilter/xt_AUDIT.c | 12 ++++++++++-- 4 files changed, 36 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)include/linux/audit.h +5
-0@@ -167,6 +167,8 @@ extern int audit_log_contid(struct audit_context *context,extern void audit_contid_add (struct net *net,u64 contid);extern void audit_contid_del (struct net *net,u64 contid);extern void audit_switch_task_namespaces (struct nsproxy *ns,struct task_struct *p); +extern void audit_log_contid_list (struct net *net, +struct audit_context *context);extern int audit_update_lsm_rules (void );@@ -231,6 +233,9 @@ static inline void audit_contid_del(struct net *net, u64 contid) { }static inline void audit_switch_task_namespaces (struct nsproxy *ns,struct task_struct *p) { } +static inline void audit_log_contid_list (struct net *net, +struct audit_context *context) +{ }#define audit_enabled 0#endif /* CONFIG_AUDIT */ kernel/audit.c +19
-1@@ -382,6 +382,20 @@ void audit_switch_task_namespaces(struct nsproxy *ns, struct task_struct *p)audit_contid_add (new->net_ns, contid); } +void audit_log_contid_list (struct net *net,struct audit_context *context) +{ +struct audit_contid *cont; +int i =0 ; + +list_for_each_entry (cont,audit_get_contid_list (net), list) { +char buf[14 ]; + +sprintf (buf,"net%u" , i++); +audit_log_contid (context, buf, cont->id); + } +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL (audit_log_contid_list); +void audit_panic (const char *message) {switch (audit_failure) {@@ -2132,17 +2146,21 @@ int audit_log_contid(struct audit_context *context, char *op, u64 contid) {struct audit_buffer *ab; +gfp_t gfpflags;if (!cid_valid (contid))return 0 ; +/* We can be called in atomic context via audit_tg() */ + gfpflags = (in_atomic () ||irqs_disabled ()) ?GFP_ATOMIC :GFP_KERNEL ;/* Generate AUDIT_CONTAINER record with container ID */ - ab =audit_log_start (context,GFP_KERNEL ,AUDIT_CONTAINER ); + ab =audit_log_start (context, gfpflags,AUDIT_CONTAINER );if (!ab)return -ENOMEM ;audit_log_format (ab,"op=%s contid=%llu" , op, contid);audit_log_end (ab);return 0 ; } +EXPORT_SYMBOL (audit_log_contid);void audit_log_key (struct audit_buffer *ab,char *key) {kernel/auditsc.c +2
-0@@ -1015,6 +1015,7 @@ struct audit_context *audit_alloc_local(void) context->in_syscall =1 ;return context; } +EXPORT_SYMBOL (audit_alloc_local);void audit_free_context (struct audit_context *context) {@@ -1029,6 +1030,7 @@ void audit_free_context(struct audit_context *context)audit_proctitle_free (context);kfree (context); } +EXPORT_SYMBOL (audit_free_context); static int audit_log_pid_context(struct audit_context *context, pid_t pid, kuid_t auid, kuid_t uid, unsigned int sessionid,net/netfilter/xt_AUDIT.c +10
-3@@ -71,10 +71,13 @@ static bool audit_ip6(struct audit_buffer *ab, struct sk_buff *skb) {struct audit_buffer *ab;int fam =-1 ; +struct audit_context *context; +struct net *net;if (audit_enabled ==0 ) - goto errout; - ab =audit_log_start (NULL ,GFP_ATOMIC ,AUDIT_NETFILTER_PKT ); + goto out; + context =audit_alloc_local (); + ab =audit_log_start (context,GFP_ATOMIC ,AUDIT_NETFILTER_PKT );if (ab ==NULL ) goto errout;@@ -104,7 +107,12 @@ static bool audit_ip6(struct audit_buffer *ab, struct sk_buff *skb)audit_log_end (ab); + net =xt_net (par); +audit_log_contid_list (net, context); + errout: +audit_free_context (context); +out:return XT_CONTINUE ; } --1.8.3.1
RFC PATCH v3 9/10 debug audit: read container ID of a process
In reply to Richard Guy BriggsAdd support for reading the audit container identifier from the proc filesystem.
This is a read from the proc entry of the form /proc/PID/audit_containerid where PID is the process ID of the task whose audit container identifier is sought.
The read expects up to a u64 value (unset: 18446744073709551615).
--- fs/proc/base.c | 20 ++++++++++++++++++-- 1 file changed, 18 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
fs/proc/base.c +18 -2
@@ -1303,6 +1303,21 @@ static ssize_t proc_sessionid_read(struct file * file, char __user * buf, .llseek = generic_file_llseek, }; +static ssize_t proc_contid_read (struct file *file,char __user *buf, +size_t count,loff_t *ppos) +{ +struct inode *inode =file_inode (file); +struct task_struct *task =get_proc_task (inode); +ssize_t length; +char tmpbuf[TMPBUFLEN *2 ]; + +if (!task) +return -ESRCH ; + length =scnprintf (tmpbuf,TMPBUFLEN *2 ,"%llu" ,audit_get_contid (task)); +put_task_struct (task); +return simple_read_from_buffer (buf, count, ppos, tmpbuf, length); +} +static ssize_t proc_contid_write (struct file *file,const char __user *buf,size_t count,loff_t *ppos) {
@@ -1333,6 +1348,7 @@ static ssize_t proc_contid_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buf, }static const struct file_operations proc_contid_operations = { + .read = proc_contid_read, .write = proc_contid_write, .llseek = generic_file_llseek, };
@@ -3030,7 +3046,7 @@ static int proc_pid_patch_state(struct seq_file *m, struct pid_namespace *ns,#ifdef CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL REG ("loginuid" ,S_IWUSR |S_IRUGO , proc_loginuid_operations),REG ("sessionid" ,S_IRUGO , proc_sessionid_operations), -REG ("audit_containerid" ,S_IWUSR , proc_contid_operations), +REG ("audit_containerid" ,S_IWUSR |S_IRUSR , proc_contid_operations), #endif #ifdef CONFIG_FAULT_INJECTION REG("make-it-fail", S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR, proc_fault_inject_operations),
@@ -3422,7 +3438,7 @@ static int proc_tid_comm_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask)#ifdef CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL REG ("loginuid" ,S_IWUSR |S_IRUGO , proc_loginuid_operations),REG ("sessionid" ,S_IRUGO , proc_sessionid_operations), -REG ("audit_containerid" ,S_IWUSR , proc_contid_operations), +REG ("audit_containerid" ,S_IWUSR |S_IRUSR , proc_contid_operations), #endif #ifdef CONFIG_FAULT_INJECTION REG("make-it-fail", S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR, proc_fault_inject_operations),
Signature · 1 line
1.8.3.1
Paul Moore
maintainerRe: [RFC PATCH ghak90 (was ghak32) V3 09/10] debug audit: read container ID of a process
Quoted 26 lines · Richard Guy Briggs
Add support for reading the audit container identifier from the proc filesystem.
This is a read from the proc entry of the form
/proc/PID/audit_containeridwhere PID is the process ID of the task whose audit container identifier is sought.The read expects up to a u64 value (unset: 18446744073709551615).
Signed-off-by Richard Guy Briggs <[email protected]>--- fs/proc/base.c | 20 ++++++++++++++++++-- 1 file changed, 18 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)fs/proc/base.c +4
-0@@ -1303,6 +1303,21 @@ static ssize_t proc_sessionid_read(struct file * file, char __user * buf, .llseek = generic_file_llseek, }; +static ssize_t proc_contid_read (struct file *file,char __user *buf, +size_t count,loff_t *ppos) +{ +struct inode *inode =file_inode (file);
fs/proc/base.c static ssize_t proc_sessionid_read(struct file * file, char __user * buf, · line 1319
Quoted 10 lines
fs/proc/base.c +10
-0+struct task_struct *task =get_proc_task (inode); +ssize_t length; +char tmpbuf[TMPBUFLEN *2 ]; + +if (!task) +return -ESRCH ; + length =scnprintf (tmpbuf,TMPBUFLEN *2 ,"%llu" ,audit_get_contid (task)); +put_task_struct (task); +return simple_read_from_buffer (buf, count, ppos, tmpbuf, length); +}
While I still remain very nervous about opening the audit container ID up for abuse by making it accessible, I understand that this would make things a lot easier us (e.g. testing) and perhaps the container engines as well. In order to limit the potential for abuse, what do you think about restricting read access to those processes which have CAP_AUDIT_CONTROL, similar to what we do for setting the audit container ID?
Quoted 29 lines
fs/proc/base.c +3
-2static ssize_t proc_contid_write (struct file *file,const char __user *buf,size_t count,loff_t *ppos) {@@ -1333,6 +1348,7 @@ static ssize_t proc_contid_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buf, }static const struct file_operations proc_contid_operations = { + .read = proc_contid_read, .write = proc_contid_write, .llseek = generic_file_llseek, };@@ -3030,7 +3046,7 @@ static int proc_pid_patch_state(struct seq_file *m, struct pid_namespace *ns,#ifdef CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL REG ("loginuid" ,S_IWUSR |S_IRUGO , proc_loginuid_operations),REG ("sessionid" ,S_IRUGO , proc_sessionid_operations), -REG ("audit_containerid" ,S_IWUSR , proc_contid_operations), +REG ("audit_containerid" ,S_IWUSR |S_IRUSR , proc_contid_operations), #endif #ifdef CONFIG_FAULT_INJECTION REG("make-it-fail", S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR, proc_fault_inject_operations),@@ -3422,7 +3438,7 @@ static int proc_tid_comm_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask)#ifdef CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL REG ("loginuid" ,S_IWUSR |S_IRUGO , proc_loginuid_operations),REG ("sessionid" ,S_IRUGO , proc_sessionid_operations), -REG ("audit_containerid" ,S_IWUSR , proc_contid_operations), +REG ("audit_containerid" ,S_IWUSR |S_IRUSR , proc_contid_operations), #endif #ifdef CONFIG_FAULT_INJECTION REG("make-it-fail", S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR, proc_fault_inject_operations),
Re: [RFC PATCH ghak90 (was ghak32) V3 09/10] debug audit: read container ID of a process
Quoted 38 lines · Paul Moore
Quoted 26 lines · Richard Guy Briggs
Add support for reading the audit container identifier from the proc filesystem.
This is a read from the proc entry of the form
/proc/PID/audit_containeridwhere PID is the process ID of the task whose audit container identifier is sought.The read expects up to a u64 value (unset: 18446744073709551615).
Signed-off-by Richard Guy Briggs <[email protected]>--- fs/proc/base.c | 20 ++++++++++++++++++-- 1 file changed, 18 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)fs/proc/base.c +4
-0@@ -1303,6 +1303,21 @@ static ssize_t proc_sessionid_read(struct file * file, char __user * buf, .llseek = generic_file_llseek, }; +static ssize_t proc_contid_read (struct file *file,char __user *buf, +size_t count,loff_t *ppos) +{ +struct inode *inode =file_inode (file);fs/proc/base.c static ssize_t proc_sessionid_read(struct file * file, char __user * buf, · line 1319
Quoted 10 lines
fs/proc/base.c +10
-0+struct task_struct *task =get_proc_task (inode); +ssize_t length; +char tmpbuf[TMPBUFLEN *2 ]; + +if (!task) +return -ESRCH ; + length =scnprintf (tmpbuf,TMPBUFLEN *2 ,"%llu" ,audit_get_contid (task)); +put_task_struct (task); +return simple_read_from_buffer (buf, count, ppos, tmpbuf, length); +}
Quoted 7 lines
While I still remain very nervous about opening the audit container ID up for abuse by making it accessible, I understand that this would make things a lot easier us (e.g. testing) and perhaps the container engines as well. In order to limit the potential for abuse, what do you think about restricting read access to those processes which have
CAP_AUDIT_CONTROL, similar to what we do for setting the audit container ID?
That seems like a reasonable restriction.
Quoted 25 lines
Quoted 25 lines
fs/proc/base.c +2
-2static ssize_t proc_contid_write (struct file *file,const char __user *buf,size_t count,loff_t *ppos) {@@ -1333,6 +1348,7 @@ static ssize_t proc_contid_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buf, }static const struct file_operations proc_contid_operations = { + .read = proc_contid_read, .write = proc_contid_write, .llseek = generic_file_llseek, };@@ -3030,7 +3046,7 @@ static int proc_pid_patch_state(struct seq_file *m, struct pid_namespace *ns,#ifdef CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL REG ("loginuid" ,S_IWUSR |S_IRUGO , proc_loginuid_operations),REG ("sessionid" ,S_IRUGO , proc_sessionid_operations), -REG ("audit_containerid" ,S_IWUSR , proc_contid_operations), +REG ("audit_containerid" ,S_IWUSR |S_IRUSR , proc_contid_operations), #endif #ifdef CONFIG_FAULT_INJECTION REG("make-it-fail", S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR, proc_fault_inject_operations),@@ -3422,7 +3438,7 @@ static int proc_tid_comm_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask)#ifdef CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL REG ("loginuid" ,S_IWUSR |S_IRUGO , proc_loginuid_operations), REG("sessionid", S_IRUGO, proc_sessionid_operations), - REG("audit_containerid", S_IWUSR, proc_contid_operations),
Quoted 8 lines
fs/proc/base.c static int proc_pid_patch_state(struct seq_file *m, struct pid_namespace *ns, · line 3052
Quoted 4 lines
fs/proc/base.c +1
-0+ REG("audit_containerid", S_IWUSR|S_IRUSR, proc_contid_operations),#endif #ifdef CONFIG_FAULT_INJECTION REG("make-it-fail", S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR, proc_fault_inject_operations),--
paul moore
www.paul-moore.com
- RGB
--
Richard Guy Briggs <[email protected]>
Sr. S/W Engineer, Kernel Security, Base Operating Systems Remote, Ottawa, Red Hat Canada
IRC: rgb, SunRaycer
Voice: +1.647.777.2635, Internal: (81) 32635
RFC PATCH v3 10/10 rfkill: fix spelling mistake contidion to condition
In reply to Richard Guy Briggs--- net/rfkill/core.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
net/rfkill/core.c +1 -1
@@ -494,7 +494,7 @@ void rfkill_remove_epo_lock(void)/** * rfkill_is_epo_lock_active - returns true EPO is active * -* Returns 0 (false) if there is NOT an active EPO contidion, +* Returns 0 (false) if there is NOT an active EPO condition, * and 1 (true) if there is an active EPO contition, which * locks all radios in one of the BLOCKED states. *
Signature · 1 line
1.8.3.1
Paul Moore
maintainerRe: [RFC PATCH ghak90 (was ghak32) V3 10/10] rfkill: fix spelling mistake contidion to condition
Quoted 4 lines · Richard Guy Briggs
Signed-off-by Richard Guy Briggs <[email protected]>--- net/rfkill/core.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
I would suggest splitting this patch from the audit container ID patchset and sending it to the netdev folks. It really has nothing to do with the audit container ID work, although I suspect I know why you bumped into this spelling mistake ;)
Quoted 15 lines
net/rfkill/core.c +1
-2@@ -494,7 +494,7 @@ void rfkill_remove_epo_lock(void)/** * rfkill_is_epo_lock_active - returns true EPO is active * -* Returns 0 (false) if there is NOT an active EPO contidion, +* Returns 0 (false) if there is NOT an active EPO condition, * and 1 (true) if there is an active EPO contition, which * locks all radios in one of the BLOCKED states. * -- 1.8.3.1
Signature · 2 lines
paul moore www.paul-moore.com
Quoted 1 line · Richard Guy Briggs
Implement kernel audit container identifier.
What tree does this series build upon as a base? I don't seem to find one with the necessary base patches applied.
Stefan
--
Linux-audit mailing list
[email protected]
https://www.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/linux-audit
Quoted 5 lines · Stefan Berger
Quoted 1 line · Richard Guy Briggs
Implement kernel audit container identifier.
What tree does this series build upon as a base? I don't seem to find one with the necessary base patches applied.
It is Paul Moore's audit next tree, with patch ("collect audit task parameters") of ghak81:
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/audit.git https://www.redhat.com/archives/linux-audit/2018-May/msg00091.html https://www.redhat.com/archives/linux-audit/2018-May/msg00100.html
Quoted 1 line
Stefan
- RGB
--
Richard Guy Briggs <[email protected]>
Sr. S/W Engineer, Kernel Security, Base Operating Systems Remote, Ottawa, Red Hat Canada
IRC: rgb, SunRaycer
Voice: +1.647.777.2635, Internal: (81) 32635
Paul Moore
maintainerQuoted 7 lines · Richard Guy Briggs
Quoted 5 lines · Stefan Berger
Quoted 1 line · Richard Guy Briggs
Implement kernel audit container identifier.
What tree does this series build upon as a base? I don't seem to find one with the necessary base patches applied.
Quoted 6 lines
It is Paul Moore's audit next tree, with patch ("collect audit task parameters") of ghak81:
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/audit.git https://www.redhat.com/archives/linux-audit/2018-May/msg00091.html https://www.redhat.com/archives/linux-audit/2018-May/msg00100.html
To help reduce the confusion on the next re-spin of this patchset please include the "collect audit task parameters" patch. I just lost a few minutes trying to figure out where the task_struct changes myself ...
Signature · 2 lines
paul moore www.paul-moore.com