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3.12.36-stable review

PATCH In review Jiri Slaby 7 participants 89 messages Jan 9, 2015 – Jan 12, 2015 Stable branch

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Jiri Slaby

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cover 3.12.36-stable review

This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 3.12.36 release. There are 78 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please let me know.

Responses should be made by Tue Jan 13 11:29:45 CET 2015. Anything received after that time might be too late.

The whole patch series can be found in one patch at:

	http://kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/people/jirislaby/stable-review/patch-3.12.36-rc1.xz

and the diffstat can be found below.

thanks,
js

===============

Alexander Kochetkov (2):
i2c: omap: fix NACK and Arbitration Lost irq handling
i2c: omap: fix i207 errata handling

Andreas Müller (1):
mac80211: fix multicast LED blinking and counter

Andrew Morton (1):
mm/vmpressure.c: fix race in vmpressure_work_fn()

Andy Lutomirski (4):
x86/tls: Validate TLS entries to protect espfix
x86/tls: Disallow unusual TLS segments
x86, kvm: Clear paravirt_enabled on KVM guests for espfix32's benefit x86/tls: Don't validate lm in set_thread_area() after all

Anton Blanchard (1):
powerpc: 32 bit getcpu VDSO function uses 64 bit instructions

Baruch Siach (1):
mmc: block: add newline to sysfs display of force_ro

Dan Carpenter (1):
dm space map metadata: fix sm_bootstrap_get_nr_blocks()

Daniel Borkmann (1):
net: sctp: use MAX_HEADER for headroom reserve in output path

Daniel Forrest (1):
mm: fix anon_vma_clone() error treatment

Daniel Vetter (2):
drm/i915: More cautious with pch fifo underruns drm/i915: Unlock panel even when LVDS is disabled

Darrick J. Wong (1):
dm bufio: fix memleak when using a dm_buffer's inline bio

Devin Ryles (1):
AHCI: Add DeviceIDs for Sunrise Point-LP SATA controller

Dmitry Eremin-Solenikov (1):
mfd: tc6393xb: Fail ohci suspend if full state restore is required

Dmitry Torokhov (1):
sata_fsl: fix error handling of irq_of_parse_and_map

Eric Dumazet (1):
net: mvneta: fix race condition in mvneta_tx()

Eric W. Biederman (13):
mnt: Implicitly add MNT_NODEV on remount when it was implicitly added
by mount
mnt: Update unprivileged remount test
umount: Disallow unprivileged mount force
groups: Consolidate the setgroups permission checks
userns: Document what the invariant required for safe unprivileged
mappings.
userns: Don't allow setgroups until a gid mapping has been setablished
userns: Don't allow unprivileged creation of gid mappings
userns: Check euid no fsuid when establishing an unprivileged uid
mapping
userns: Only allow the creator of the userns unprivileged mappings
userns: Rename id_map_mutex to userns_state_mutex
userns: Add a knob to disable setgroups on a per user namespace basis
userns: Allow setting gid_maps without privilege when setgroups is
disabled
userns: Unbreak the unprivileged remount tests

Filipe Manana (1):
Btrfs: fix fs corruption on transaction abort if device supports
discard

Francesco Ruggeri (1):
tty: Fix pty master poll() after slave closes v2

Grygorii Strashko (1):
i2c: davinci: generate STP always when NACK is received

Hannes Reinecke (1):
scsi: correct return values for .eh_abort_handler implementations

Hugh Dickins (2):
mm: fix swapoff hang after page migration and fork
mm: let mm_find_pmd fix buggy race with THP fault

Jack Morgenstein (1):
net/mlx4_core: Limit count field to 24 bits in qp_alloc_res

Jan Kara (4):
isofs: Fix infinite looping over CE entries
isofs: Fix unchecked printing of ER records
ncpfs: return proper error from NCP_IOC_SETROOT ioctl
udf: Verify symlink size before loading it

Johan Hovold (1):
mfd: viperboard: Fix platform-device id collision

Johannes Berg (1):
mac80211: free management frame keys when removing station

Josef Bacik (1):
Btrfs: do not move em to modified list when unpinning

Kan Liang (1):
perf/x86/intel: Protect LBR and extra_regs against KVM lying

Linus Walleij (1):
mfd: stmpe: Fix STMPE24xx GPMR LSB

Luis Henriques (1):
thermal: Fix error path in thermal_init()

Marcelo Leitner (1):
Fix race condition between vxlan_sock_add and vxlan_sock_release

Martin Schwidefsky (2):
s390/3215: fix hanging console issue
s390/3215: fix tty output containing tabs

Mathias Nyman (1):
USB: xhci: Reset a halted endpoint immediately when we encounter a
stall.

Michael Halcrow (1):
eCryptfs: Remove buggy and unnecessary write in file name decode
routine

Nicolas Dichtel (1):
rtnetlink: release net refcnt on error in do_setlink()

Oleg Nesterov (1):
exit: pidns: alloc_pid() leaks pid_namespace if child_reaper is
exiting

Peng Tao (1):
nfs41: fix nfs4_proc_layoutget error handling

Petr Mladek (1):
drm/radeon: kernel panic in drm_calc_vbltimestamp_from_scanoutpos with

    3.18.0-rc6

Rabin Vincent (1):
crypto: af_alg - fix backlog handling

Richard Guy Briggs (2):
audit: change decimal constant to macro for invalid uid
audit: restore AUDIT_LOGINUID unset ABI

Ronald Wahl (1):
usb: gadget: at91_udc: move prepare clk into process context

Sakari Ailus (1):
media: smiapp: Only some selection targets are settable

Seth Forshee (1):
xen-netfront: Remove BUGs on paged skb data which crosses a page
boundary

[email protected] (1):
megaraid_sas: corrected return of wait_event from abort frame path

Takashi Iwai (4):
ALSA: hda - Add EAPD fixup for ASUS Z99He laptop
ALSA: hda - Fix built-in mic at resume on Lenovo Ideapad S210
ALSA: usb-audio: Don't resubmit pending URBs at MIDI error recovery
KEYS: Fix stale key registration at error path

Tejun Heo (1):
ahci: disable MSI on SAMSUNG 0xa800 SSD

Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo (1):
tg3: fix ring init when there are more TX than RX channels

Todd Fujinaka (1):
igb: bring link up when PHY is powered up

Tyler Hicks (1):
eCryptfs: Force RO mount when encrypted view is enabled

Weijie Yang (1):
mm: frontswap: invalidate expired data on a dup-store failure

Yan, Zheng (1):
ceph: fix null pointer dereference in discard_cap_releases()

Yuri Chislov (1):
ipv6: gre: fix wrong skb->protocol in WCCP

willy tarreau (1):
net: mvneta: fix Tx interrupt delay

 arch/powerpc/kernel/vdso32/getcpu.S                |   4 +-
 arch/s390/kernel/compat_linux.c                    |   2 +-
 arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/ldt.h                    |   7 +
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/perf_event.c                   |   3 +
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/perf_event.h                   |  12 +-
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/perf_event_intel.c             |  66 ++++++-
 arch/x86/kernel/kvm.c                              |   9 +-
 arch/x86/kernel/kvmclock.c                         |   1 -
 arch/x86/kernel/tls.c                              |  39 ++++
 crypto/af_alg.c                                    |   3 +
 drivers/ata/ahci.c                                 |   4 +
 drivers/ata/sata_fsl.c                             |   2 +-
 drivers/gpu/drm/i915/intel_display.c               |   2 -
 drivers/gpu/drm/i915/intel_lvds.c                  |  22 +--
 drivers/gpu/drm/radeon/radeon_kms.c                |   2 +
 drivers/i2c/busses/i2c-davinci.c                   |   8 +-
 drivers/i2c/busses/i2c-omap.c                      |  10 +-
 drivers/md/dm-bufio.c                              |  20 +-
 drivers/md/persistent-data/dm-space-map-metadata.c |   4 +-
 drivers/media/i2c/smiapp/smiapp-core.c             |   2 +-
 drivers/mfd/stmpe.h                                |   2 +-
 drivers/mfd/tc6393xb.c                             |  13 +-
 drivers/mfd/viperboard.c                           |   5 +-
 drivers/mmc/card/block.c                           |   2 +-
 drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/tg3.c                |   3 +-
 drivers/net/ethernet/intel/igb/igb_main.c          |   2 +
 drivers/net/ethernet/marvell/mvneta.c              |   5 +-
 .../net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx4/resource_tracker.c  |   2 +-
 drivers/net/vxlan.c                                |  10 +-
 drivers/net/xen-netfront.c                         |   5 -
 drivers/s390/char/con3215.c                        |  52 ++++--
 drivers/scsi/NCR5380.c                             |  12 +-
 drivers/scsi/aha1740.c                             |   2 +-
 drivers/scsi/atari_NCR5380.c                       |   2 +-
 drivers/scsi/esas2r/esas2r_main.c                  |   2 +-
 drivers/scsi/megaraid.c                            |   8 +-
 drivers/scsi/megaraid/megaraid_sas_base.c          |   2 +-
 drivers/scsi/sun3_NCR5380.c                        |  10 +-
 drivers/thermal/thermal_core.c                     |   4 +-
 drivers/tty/n_tty.c                                |   9 +-
 drivers/usb/gadget/at91_udc.c                      |  44 +++--
 drivers/usb/host/xhci-ring.c                       |  40 +---
 drivers/usb/host/xhci.c                            |  60 ++----
 fs/btrfs/disk-io.c                                 |   6 -
 fs/btrfs/extent-tree.c                             |  10 +-
 fs/btrfs/extent_map.c                              |   2 -
 fs/ceph/mds_client.c                               |  21 ++-
 fs/ecryptfs/crypto.c                               |   1 -
 fs/ecryptfs/file.c                                 |  12 --
 fs/ecryptfs/main.c                                 |  16 +-
 fs/isofs/rock.c                                    |   9 +
 fs/namespace.c                                     |  11 +-
 fs/ncpfs/ioctl.c                                   |   1 -
 fs/nfs/nfs4proc.c                                  |   6 +-
 fs/proc/base.c                                     |  53 ++++++
 fs/udf/symlink.c                                   |  17 +-
 include/linux/audit.h                              |   4 +
 include/linux/cred.h                               |   1 +
 include/linux/user_namespace.h                     |  12 ++
 include/uapi/linux/audit.h                         |   2 +
 kernel/auditfilter.c                               |  12 +-
 kernel/groups.c                                    |  11 +-
 kernel/pid.c                                       |   2 +
 kernel/uid16.c                                     |   2 +-
 kernel/user.c                                      |   1 +
 kernel/user_namespace.c                            | 125 +++++++++++--
 mm/frontswap.c                                     |   4 +-
 mm/huge_memory.c                                   |  18 +-
 mm/ksm.c                                           |   1 -
 mm/memory.c                                        |  26 +--
 mm/migrate.c                                       |   2 -
 mm/mmap.c                                          |  10 +-
 mm/rmap.c                                          |  18 +-
 mm/vmpressure.c                                    |   8 +-
 net/core/rtnetlink.c                               |   1 +
 net/ipv6/ip6_gre.c                                 |   4 +-
 net/mac80211/key.c                                 |   2 +-
 net/mac80211/rx.c                                  |  11 +-
 net/sctp/output.c                                  |   4 +-
 security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.c           |   5 +-
 sound/pci/hda/patch_analog.c                       |   1 +
 sound/pci/hda/patch_realtek.c                      |   1 +
 sound/usb/midi.c                                   |   2 +
 .../selftests/mount/unprivileged-remount-test.c    | 204 +++++++++++++++++----
 84 files changed, 845 insertions(+), 332 deletions(-)
Signature · 1 line
2.2.1
author
#1 lore raw

PATCH 1/78 ipv6: gre: fix wrong skb->protocol in WCCP

From: Yuri Chislov <[email protected]>

3.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

===============

[ Upstream commit be6572fdb1bfbe23b2624d477de50af50b02f5d6 ]

When using GRE redirection in WCCP, it sets the wrong skb->protocol, that is, ETH_P_IP instead of ETH_P_IPV6 for the encapuslated traffic.

Fixes c12b395a4664 ("gre: Support GRE over IPv6")
Cc Dmitry Kozlov <[email protected]>
---
 net/ipv6/ip6_gre.c | 4 ++--
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
net/ipv6/ip6_gre.c +2 -2
index 88774ccb3dda..7d640f276e87 100644
@@ -511,11 +511,11 @@ static int ip6gre_rcv(struct sk_buff *skb)
 
 		skb->protocol = gre_proto;
 		/* WCCP version 1 and 2 protocol decoding.
-		 * - Change protocol to IP
+		 * - Change protocol to IPv6
 		 * - When dealing with WCCPv2, Skip extra 4 bytes in GRE header
 		 */
 		if (flags == 0 && gre_proto == htons(ETH_P_WCCP)) {
-			skb->protocol = htons(ETH_P_IP);
+			skb->protocol = htons(ETH_P_IPV6);
 			if ((*(h + offset) & 0xF0) != 0x40)
 				offset += 4;
 		}
Signature · 1 line
2.2.1
author
#2 lore raw

PATCH 2/78 Fix race condition between vxlan_sock_add and vxlan_sock_release

From: Marcelo Leitner <[email protected]>

3.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

===============

[ Upstream commit 00c83b01d58068dfeb2e1351cca6fccf2a83fa8f ]

Currently, when trying to reuse a socket, vxlan_sock_add will grab vn->sock_lock, locate a reusable socket, inc refcount and release vn->sock_lock.

But vxlan_sock_release() will first decrement refcount, and then grab that lock. refcnt operations are atomic but as currently we have deferred works which hold vs->refcnt each, this might happen, leading to a use after free (specially after vxlan_igmp_leave):

CPU 1 CPU 2

deferred work vxlan_sock_add
... ...

                                   spin_lock(&vn->sock_lock)
                                   vs = vxlan_find_sock();
  vxlan_sock_release
    dec vs->refcnt, reaches 0
    spin_lock(&vn->sock_lock)
                                   vxlan_sock_hold(vs), refcnt=1
                                   spin_unlock(&vn->sock_lock)
    hlist_del_rcu(&vs->hlist);
    vxlan_notify_del_rx_port(vs)
    spin_unlock(&vn->sock_lock)

So when we look for a reusable socket, we check if it wasn't freed already before reusing it.

Fixes 7c47cedf43a8b3 ("vxlan: move IGMP join/leave to work queue")
---
 drivers/net/vxlan.c | 10 +++-------
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
drivers/net/vxlan.c +3 -7
index 5407c11a9f14..c8e333306c4c 100644
@@ -2002,9 +2002,8 @@ static int vxlan_init(struct net_device *dev)
 	spin_lock(&vn->sock_lock);
 	vs = vxlan_find_sock(dev_net(dev), ipv6 ? AF_INET6 : AF_INET,
 			     vxlan->dst_port);
-	if (vs) {
+	if (vs && atomic_add_unless(&vs->refcnt, 1, 0)) {
 		/* If we have a socket with same port already, reuse it */
-		atomic_inc(&vs->refcnt);
 		vxlan_vs_add_dev(vs, vxlan);
 	} else {
 		/* otherwise make new socket outside of RTNL */
@@ -2447,12 +2446,9 @@ struct vxlan_sock *vxlan_sock_add(struct net *net, __be16 port,
 
 	spin_lock(&vn->sock_lock);
 	vs = vxlan_find_sock(net, ipv6 ? AF_INET6 : AF_INET, port);
-	if (vs) {
-		if (vs->rcv == rcv)
-			atomic_inc(&vs->refcnt);
-		else
+	if (vs && ((vs->rcv != rcv) ||
+		   !atomic_add_unless(&vs->refcnt, 1, 0)))
 			vs = ERR_PTR(-EBUSY);
-	}
 	spin_unlock(&vn->sock_lock);
 
 	if (!vs)
Signature · 1 line
2.2.1
author
#3 lore raw

PATCH 3/78 tg3: fix ring init when there are more TX than RX channels

In reply to Jiri Slaby

From: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <[email protected]>

3.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

===============

[ Upstream commit a620a6bc1c94c22d6c312892be1e0ae171523125 ]

If TX channels are set to 4 and RX channels are set to less than 4, using ethtool -L, the driver will try to initialize more RX channels than it has allocated, causing an oops.

This fix only initializes the RX ring if it has been allocated.

---
 drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/tg3.c | 3 ++-
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/tg3.c +2 -1
index 18f0d772e544..8d45dce7cfdb 100644
@@ -8523,7 +8523,8 @@ static int tg3_init_rings(struct tg3 *tp)
 		if (tnapi->rx_rcb)
 			memset(tnapi->rx_rcb, 0, TG3_RX_RCB_RING_BYTES(tp));
 
-		if (tg3_rx_prodring_alloc(tp, &tnapi->prodring)) {
+		if (tnapi->prodring.rx_std &&
+		    tg3_rx_prodring_alloc(tp, &tnapi->prodring)) {
 			tg3_free_rings(tp);
 			return -ENOMEM;
 		}
Signature · 1 line
2.2.1
author
#4 lore raw

PATCH 4/78 net/mlx4_core: Limit count field to 24 bits in qp_alloc_res

In reply to Jiri Slaby

From: Jack Morgenstein <[email protected]>

3.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

===============

[ Upstream commit 2d5c57d7fbfaa642fb7f0673df24f32b83d9066c ]

Some VF drivers use the upper byte of "param1" (the qp count field) in mlx4_qp_reserve_range() to pass flags which are used to optimize the range allocation.

Under the current code, if any of these flags are set, the 32-bit count field yields a count greater than 2^24, which is out of range, and this VF fails.

As these flags represent a "best-effort" allocation hint anyway, they may safely be ignored. Therefore, the PF driver may simply mask out the bits.

Fixes c82e9aa0a8 "mlx4_core: resource tracking for HCA resources used by guests"
---
 drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx4/resource_tracker.c | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx4/resource_tracker.c +1 -1
index dd6876321116..cdbe63712d2d 100644
@@ -1227,7 +1227,7 @@ static int qp_alloc_res(struct mlx4_dev *dev, int slave, int op, int cmd,
 
 	switch (op) {
 	case RES_OP_RESERVE:
-		count = get_param_l(&in_param);
+		count = get_param_l(&in_param) & 0xffffff;
 		align = get_param_h(&in_param);
 		err = __mlx4_qp_reserve_range(dev, count, align, &base);
 		if (err)
Signature · 1 line
2.2.1
author
#5 lore raw

PATCH 5/78 rtnetlink: release net refcnt on error in do_setlink()

In reply to Jiri Slaby

From: Nicolas Dichtel <[email protected]>

3.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

===============

[ Upstream commit e0ebde0e131b529fd721b24f62872def5ec3718c ]

rtnl_link_get_net() holds a reference on the 'struct net', we need to release it in case of error.

CC Eric W. Biederman <[email protected]>
Fixes b51642f6d77b ("net: Enable a userns root rtnl calls that are safe for unprivilged users")
---
 net/core/rtnetlink.c | 1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
net/core/rtnetlink.c +1 -0
index 93ad6c5b2d77..f3224755b328 100644
@@ -1391,6 +1391,7 @@ static int do_setlink(const struct sk_buff *skb,
 			goto errout;
 		}
 		if (!netlink_ns_capable(skb, net->user_ns, CAP_NET_ADMIN)) {
+			put_net(net);
 			err = -EPERM;
 			goto errout;
 		}
Signature · 1 line
2.2.1
author
#6 lore raw

PATCH 6/78 xen-netfront: Remove BUGs on paged skb data which crosses a page boundary

In reply to Jiri Slaby

From: Seth Forshee <[email protected]>

3.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

===============

[ Upstream commit 8d609725d4357f499e2103e46011308b32f53513 ]

These BUGs can be erroneously triggered by frags which refer to tail pages within a compound page. The data in these pages may overrun the hardware page while still being contained within the compound page, but since compound_order() evaluates to 0 for tail pages the assertion fails. The code already iterates through subsequent pages correctly in this scenario, so the BUGs are unnecessary and can be removed.

Fixes f36c374782e4 ("xen/netfront: handle compound page fragments on transmit")
Cc <[email protected]> # 3.7+
---
 drivers/net/xen-netfront.c | 5 -----
 1 file changed, 5 deletions(-)
drivers/net/xen-netfront.c +0 -5
index 7c541dc1647e..fd3c1da14495 100644
@@ -468,9 +468,6 @@ static void xennet_make_frags(struct sk_buff *skb, struct net_device *dev,
 		len = skb_frag_size(frag);
 		offset = frag->page_offset;
 
-		/* Data must not cross a page boundary. */
-		BUG_ON(len + offset > PAGE_SIZE<<compound_order(page));
-
 		/* Skip unused frames from start of page */
 		page += offset >> PAGE_SHIFT;
 		offset &= ~PAGE_MASK;
@@ -478,8 +475,6 @@ static void xennet_make_frags(struct sk_buff *skb, struct net_device *dev,
 		while (len > 0) {
 			unsigned long bytes;
 
-			BUG_ON(offset >= PAGE_SIZE);
-
 			bytes = PAGE_SIZE - offset;
 			if (bytes > len)
 				bytes = len;
Signature · 1 line
2.2.1
author
#7 lore raw

PATCH 7/78 net: mvneta: fix Tx interrupt delay

In reply to Jiri Slaby

From: willy tarreau <[email protected]>

3.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

===============

[ Upstream commit aebea2ba0f7495e1a1c9ea5e753d146cb2f6b845 ]

The mvneta driver sets the amount of Tx coalesce packets to 16 by default. Normally that does not cause any trouble since the driver uses a much larger Tx ring size (532 packets). But some sockets might run with very small buffers, much smaller than the equivalent of 16 packets. This is what ping is doing for example, by setting SNDBUF to 324 bytes rounded up to 2kB by the kernel.

The problem is that there is no documented method to force a specific packet to emit an interrupt (eg: the last of the ring) nor is it possible to make the NIC emit an interrupt after a given delay.

In this case, it causes trouble, because when ping sends packets over its raw socket, the few first packets leave the system, and the first 15 packets will be emitted without an IRQ being generated, so without the skbs being freed. And since the socket's buffer is small, there's no way to reach that amount of packets, and the ping ends up with "send: no buffer available" after sending 6 packets. Running with 3 instances of ping in parallel is enough to hide the problem, because with 6 packets per instance, that's 18 packets total, which is enough to grant a Tx interrupt before all are sent.

The original driver in the LSP kernel worked around this design flaw by using a software timer to clean up the Tx descriptors. This timer was slow and caused terrible network performance on some Tx-bound workloads (such as routing) but was enough to make tools like ping work correctly.

Instead here, we simply set the packet counts before interrupt to 1. This ensures that each packet sent will produce an interrupt. NAPI takes care of coalescing interrupts since the interrupt is disabled once generated.

No measurable performance impact nor CPU usage were observed on small nor large packets, including when saturating the link on Tx, and this fixes tools like ping which rely on too small a send buffer. If one wants to increase this value for certain workloads where it is safe to do so, "ethtool -C $dev tx-frames" will override this default setting.

This fix needs to be applied to stable kernels starting with 3.10.

---
 drivers/net/ethernet/marvell/mvneta.c | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/net/ethernet/marvell/mvneta.c +1 -1
index fabdda91fd0e..0e38db6469fb 100644
@@ -172,7 +172,7 @@
 /* Various constants */
 
 /* Coalescing */
-#define MVNETA_TXDONE_COAL_PKTS		16
+#define MVNETA_TXDONE_COAL_PKTS		1
 #define MVNETA_RX_COAL_PKTS		32
 #define MVNETA_RX_COAL_USEC		100
 
Signature · 1 line
2.2.1
author
#8 lore raw

PATCH 8/78 net: mvneta: fix race condition in mvneta_tx()

In reply to Jiri Slaby

From: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>

3.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

===============

[ Upstream commit 5f478b41033606d325e420df693162e2524c2b94 ]

mvneta_tx() dereferences skb to get skb->len too late, as hardware might have completed the transmit and TX completion could have freed the skb from another cpu.

Fixes 71f6d1b31fb1 ("net: mvneta: replace Tx timer with a real interrupt")
---
 drivers/net/ethernet/marvell/mvneta.c | 3 ++-
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/net/ethernet/marvell/mvneta.c +2 -1
index 0e38db6469fb..9c66d3168911 100644
@@ -1524,6 +1524,7 @@ static int mvneta_tx(struct sk_buff *skb, struct net_device *dev)
 	struct mvneta_tx_queue *txq = &pp->txqs[txq_id];
 	struct mvneta_tx_desc *tx_desc;
 	struct netdev_queue *nq;
+	int len = skb->len;
 	int frags = 0;
 	u32 tx_cmd;
 
@@ -1584,7 +1585,7 @@ out:
 	if (frags > 0) {
 		u64_stats_update_begin(&pp->tx_stats.syncp);
 		pp->tx_stats.packets++;
-		pp->tx_stats.bytes += skb->len;
+		pp->tx_stats.bytes += len;
 		u64_stats_update_end(&pp->tx_stats.syncp);
 
 	} else {
Signature · 1 line
2.2.1
author
#9 lore raw

PATCH 9/78 net: sctp: use MAX_HEADER for headroom reserve in output path

In reply to Jiri Slaby

From: Daniel Borkmann <[email protected]>

3.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

===============

[ Upstream commit 9772b54c55266ce80c639a80aa68eeb908f8ecf5 ]

To accomodate for enough headroom for tunnels, use MAX_HEADER instead of LL_MAX_HEADER. Robert reported that he has hit after roughly 40hrs of trinity an skb_under_panic() via SCTP output path (see reference). I couldn't reproduce it from here, but not using MAX_HEADER as elsewhere in other protocols might be one possible cause for this.

In any case, it looks like accounting on chunks themself seems to look good as the skb already passed the SCTP output path and did not hit any skb_over_panic(). Given tunneling was enabled in his .config, the headroom would have been expanded by MAX_HEADER in this case.

Reference: https://lkml.org/lkml/2014/12/1/507

Fixes 594ccc14dfe4d ("[SCTP] Replace incorrect use of dev_alloc_skb with alloc_skb in sctp_packet_transmit().")
---
 net/sctp/output.c | 4 ++--
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
net/sctp/output.c +2 -2
index 2a41465729ab..69faf79a48c6 100644
@@ -403,12 +403,12 @@ int sctp_packet_transmit(struct sctp_packet *packet)
 	sk = chunk->skb->sk;
 
 	/* Allocate the new skb.  */
-	nskb = alloc_skb(packet->size + LL_MAX_HEADER, GFP_ATOMIC);
+	nskb = alloc_skb(packet->size + MAX_HEADER, GFP_ATOMIC);
 	if (!nskb)
 		goto nomem;
 
 	/* Make sure the outbound skb has enough header room reserved. */
-	skb_reserve(nskb, packet->overhead + LL_MAX_HEADER);
+	skb_reserve(nskb, packet->overhead + MAX_HEADER);
 
 	/* Set the owning socket so that we know where to get the
 	 * destination IP address.
Signature · 1 line
2.2.1
author
#10 lore raw

PATCH 10/78 ceph: fix null pointer dereference in discard_cap_releases()

In reply to Jiri Slaby

From: "Yan, Zheng" <[email protected]>

3.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

===============

commit 00bd8edb861eb41d274938cfc0338999d9c593a3 upstream.

send_mds_reconnect() may call discard_cap_releases() after all release messages have been dropped by cleanup_cap_releases()

---
 fs/ceph/mds_client.c | 21 ++++++++++++---------
 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
fs/ceph/mds_client.c +12 -9
index 788901552eb1..6f1161324f91 100644
@@ -1420,15 +1420,18 @@ static void discard_cap_releases(struct ceph_mds_client *mdsc,
 	dout("discard_cap_releases mds%d\n", session->s_mds);
 	spin_lock(&session->s_cap_lock);
 
-	/* zero out the in-progress message */
-	msg = list_first_entry(&session->s_cap_releases,
-			       struct ceph_msg, list_head);
-	head = msg->front.iov_base;
-	num = le32_to_cpu(head->num);
-	dout("discard_cap_releases mds%d %p %u\n", session->s_mds, msg, num);
-	head->num = cpu_to_le32(0);
-	msg->front.iov_len = sizeof(*head);
-	session->s_num_cap_releases += num;
+	if (!list_empty(&session->s_cap_releases)) {
+		/* zero out the in-progress message */
+		msg = list_first_entry(&session->s_cap_releases,
+					struct ceph_msg, list_head);
+		head = msg->front.iov_base;
+		num = le32_to_cpu(head->num);
+		dout("discard_cap_releases mds%d %p %u\n",
+		     session->s_mds, msg, num);
+		head->num = cpu_to_le32(0);
+		msg->front.iov_len = sizeof(*head);
+		session->s_num_cap_releases += num;
+	}
 
 	/* requeue completed messages */
 	while (!list_empty(&session->s_cap_releases_done)) {
Signature · 1 line
2.2.1
author
#11 lore raw

PATCH 11/78 perf/x86/intel: Protect LBR and extra_regs against KVM lying

In reply to Jiri Slaby

From: Kan Liang <[email protected]>

3.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

===============

commit 338b522ca43cfd32d11a370f4203bcd089c6c877 upstream.

With -cpu host, KVM reports LBR and extra_regs support, if the host has support.

When the guest perf driver tries to access LBR or extra_regs MSR, it #GPs all MSR accesses,since KVM doesn't handle LBR and extra_regs support. So check the related MSRs access right once at initialization time to avoid the error access at runtime.

For reproducing the issue, please build the kernel with CONFIG_KVM_INTEL = y (for host kernel).
And CONFIG_PARAVIRT = n and CONFIG_KVM_GUEST = n (for guest kernel). Start the guest with -cpu host.
Run perf record with --branch-any or --branch-filter in guest to trigger LBR Run perf stat offcore events (E.g. LLC-loads/LLC-load-misses ...) in guest to trigger offcore_rsp #GP

Cc Andi Kleen <[email protected]>
Cc Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <[email protected]>
Cc Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Cc Maria Dimakopoulou <[email protected]>
Cc Mark Davies <[email protected]>
Cc Paul Mackerras <[email protected]>
Cc Stephane Eranian <[email protected]>
Cc Yan, Zheng <[email protected]>
---
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/perf_event.c       |  3 ++
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/perf_event.h       | 12 ++++---
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/perf_event_intel.c | 66 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
 3 files changed, 75 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/perf_event.c +3 -0
index 5edd3c0b437a..c7106f116fb0 100644
@@ -118,6 +118,9 @@ static int x86_pmu_extra_regs(u64 config, struct perf_event *event)
 			continue;
 		if (event->attr.config1 & ~er->valid_mask)
 			return -EINVAL;
+		/* Check if the extra msrs can be safely accessed*/
+		if (!er->extra_msr_access)
+			return -ENXIO;
 
 		reg->idx = er->idx;
 		reg->config = event->attr.config1;
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/perf_event.h +7 -5
index cc16faae0538..53bd2726f4cd 100644
@@ -279,14 +279,16 @@ struct extra_reg {
 	u64			config_mask;
 	u64			valid_mask;
 	int			idx;  /* per_xxx->regs[] reg index */
+	bool			extra_msr_access;
 };
 
 #define EVENT_EXTRA_REG(e, ms, m, vm, i) {	\
-	.event = (e),		\
-	.msr = (ms),		\
-	.config_mask = (m),	\
-	.valid_mask = (vm),	\
-	.idx = EXTRA_REG_##i,	\
+	.event = (e),			\
+	.msr = (ms),			\
+	.config_mask = (m),		\
+	.valid_mask = (vm),		\
+	.idx = EXTRA_REG_##i,		\
+	.extra_msr_access = true,	\
 	}
 
 #define INTEL_EVENT_EXTRA_REG(event, msr, vm, idx)	\
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/perf_event_intel.c +65 -1

84 lines not on this page · raw message

Signature · 1 line
2.2.1
#12 lore raw

Re: [PATCH 3.12 11/78] perf/x86/intel: Protect LBR and extra_regs against KVM lying

Hi Jiry,

Quoted 3 lines · Jiri Slaby

From: Kan Liang <[email protected]>

3.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

Thanks for taking this patch to 3.12-stable.
I've just tested 3.12.36 from your stable-3.12-queue tree. Unfortunately, the kernel still crashes at intel_pmu_init().

It turns out that this commit alone is not enough for fixing the bug. Actually you also need commit c9b08884c9c98929ec2d8abafd78e89062d01ee7 ("perf/x86: Correctly use FEATURE_PDCM").
Can you please pick that commit too?

Thanks,
Dongsu

p.s. In contrast, that commit didn't have to be backported to kernel 3.14.27, as it was already included in 3.14 tree. So situation was slightly different between 3.12 and 3.14. This also explains why I haven't been able to get it working in 3.10 so far.
I'll send a separate mail to stable@.

Quoted 177 lines

===============

commit 338b522ca43cfd32d11a370f4203bcd089c6c877 upstream.

With -cpu host, KVM reports LBR and extra_regs support, if the host has support.

When the guest perf driver tries to access LBR or extra_regs MSR, it #GPs all MSR accesses,since KVM doesn't handle LBR and extra_regs support. So check the related MSRs access right once at initialization time to avoid the error access at runtime.

For reproducing the issue, please build the kernel with CONFIG_KVM_INTEL = y (for host kernel).
And CONFIG_PARAVIRT = n and CONFIG_KVM_GUEST = n (for guest kernel). Start the guest with -cpu host.
Run perf record with --branch-any or --branch-filter in guest to trigger LBR Run perf stat offcore events (E.g. LLC-loads/LLC-load-misses ...) in guest to trigger offcore_rsp #GP

Cc Andi Kleen <[email protected]>
Cc Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <[email protected]>
Cc Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Cc Maria Dimakopoulou <[email protected]>
Cc Mark Davies <[email protected]>
Cc Paul Mackerras <[email protected]>
Cc Stephane Eranian <[email protected]>
Cc Yan, Zheng <[email protected]>
---
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/perf_event.c       |  3 ++
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/perf_event.h       | 12 ++++---
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/perf_event_intel.c | 66 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
 3 files changed, 75 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/perf_event.c +3 -0
index 5edd3c0b437a..c7106f116fb0 100644
@@ -118,6 +118,9 @@ static int x86_pmu_extra_regs(u64 config, struct perf_event *event)
 			continue;
 		if (event->attr.config1 & ~er->valid_mask)
 			return -EINVAL;
+		/* Check if the extra msrs can be safely accessed*/
+		if (!er->extra_msr_access)
+			return -ENXIO;
 
 		reg->idx = er->idx;
 		reg->config = event->attr.config1;
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/perf_event.h +7 -5
index cc16faae0538..53bd2726f4cd 100644
@@ -279,14 +279,16 @@ struct extra_reg {
 	u64			config_mask;
 	u64			valid_mask;
 	int			idx;  /* per_xxx->regs[] reg index */
+	bool			extra_msr_access;
 };
 
 #define EVENT_EXTRA_REG(e, ms, m, vm, i) {	\
-	.event = (e),		\
-	.msr = (ms),		\
-	.config_mask = (m),	\
-	.valid_mask = (vm),	\
-	.idx = EXTRA_REG_##i,	\
+	.event = (e),			\
+	.msr = (ms),			\
+	.config_mask = (m),		\
+	.valid_mask = (vm),		\
+	.idx = EXTRA_REG_##i,		\
+	.extra_msr_access = true,	\
 	}
 
 #define INTEL_EVENT_EXTRA_REG(event, msr, vm, idx)	\
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/perf_event_intel.c +65 -1
index 959bbf204dae..02554ddf8481 100644
@@ -2144,6 +2144,41 @@ static void intel_snb_check_microcode(void)
 	}
 }
 
+/*
+ * Under certain circumstances, access certain MSR may cause #GP.
+ * The function tests if the input MSR can be safely accessed.
+ */
+static bool check_msr(unsigned long msr, u64 mask)
+{
+	u64 val_old, val_new, val_tmp;
+
+	/*
+	 * Read the current value, change it and read it back to see if it
+	 * matches, this is needed to detect certain hardware emulators
+	 * (qemu/kvm) that don't trap on the MSR access and always return 0s.
+	 */
+	if (rdmsrl_safe(msr, &val_old))
+		return false;
+
+	/*
+	 * Only change the bits which can be updated by wrmsrl.
+	 */
+	val_tmp = val_old ^ mask;
+	if (wrmsrl_safe(msr, val_tmp) ||
+	    rdmsrl_safe(msr, &val_new))
+		return false;
+
+	if (val_new != val_tmp)
+		return false;
+
+	/* Here it's sure that the MSR can be safely accessed.
+	 * Restore the old value and return.
+	 */
+	wrmsrl(msr, val_old);
+
+	return true;
+}
+
 static __init void intel_sandybridge_quirk(void)
 {
 	x86_pmu.check_microcode = intel_snb_check_microcode;
@@ -2207,7 +2242,8 @@ __init int intel_pmu_init(void)
 	union cpuid10_ebx ebx;
 	struct event_constraint *c;
 	unsigned int unused;
-	int version;
+	struct extra_reg *er;
+	int version, i;
 
 	if (!cpu_has(&boot_cpu_data, X86_FEATURE_ARCH_PERFMON)) {
 		switch (boot_cpu_data.x86) {
@@ -2515,6 +2551,34 @@ __init int intel_pmu_init(void)
 		}
 	}
 
+	/*
+	 * Access LBR MSR may cause #GP under certain circumstances.
+	 * E.g. KVM doesn't support LBR MSR
+	 * Check all LBT MSR here.
+	 * Disable LBR access if any LBR MSRs can not be accessed.
+	 */
+	if (x86_pmu.lbr_nr && !check_msr(x86_pmu.lbr_tos, 0x3UL))
+		x86_pmu.lbr_nr = 0;
+	for (i = 0; i < x86_pmu.lbr_nr; i++) {
+		if (!(check_msr(x86_pmu.lbr_from + i, 0xffffUL) &&
+		      check_msr(x86_pmu.lbr_to + i, 0xffffUL)))
+			x86_pmu.lbr_nr = 0;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * Access extra MSR may cause #GP under certain circumstances.
+	 * E.g. KVM doesn't support offcore event
+	 * Check all extra_regs here.
+	 */
+	if (x86_pmu.extra_regs) {
+		for (er = x86_pmu.extra_regs; er->msr; er++) {
+			er->extra_msr_access = check_msr(er->msr, 0x1ffUL);
+			/* Disable LBR select mapping */
+			if ((er->idx == EXTRA_REG_LBR) && !er->extra_msr_access)
+				x86_pmu.lbr_sel_map = NULL;
+		}
+	}
+
 	/* Support full width counters using alternative MSR range */
 	if (x86_pmu.intel_cap.full_width_write) {
 		x86_pmu.max_period = x86_pmu.cntval_mask;
Signature · 6 lines
2.2.1

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the body of a message to [email protected]
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author
#13 lore raw

Re: [PATCH 3.12 11/78] perf/x86/intel: Protect LBR and extra_regs against KVM lying

Quoted 7 lines · Dongsu Park

Hi Jiry,

Quoted 3 lines · Jiri Slaby

From: Kan Liang <[email protected]>

3.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

Quoted 8 lines

Thanks for taking this patch to 3.12-stable.
I've just tested 3.12.36 from your stable-3.12-queue tree. Unfortunately, the kernel still crashes at intel_pmu_init().

It turns out that this commit alone is not enough for fixing the bug. Actually you also need commit c9b08884c9c98929ec2d8abafd78e89062d01ee7 ("perf/x86: Correctly use FEATURE_PDCM").
Can you please pick that commit too?

Now applied, thanks.

Signature · 2 lines
js
suse labs
author
#14 lore raw

PATCH 12/78 s390/3215: fix hanging console issue

In reply to Jiri Slaby

From: Martin Schwidefsky <[email protected]>

3.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

===============

commit 26d766c60f4ea08cd14f0f3435a6db3d6cc2ae96 upstream.

The ccw_device_start in raw3215_start_io can fail. raw3215_try_io does not check if the request could be started and removes any pending timer. This can leave the system in a hanging state. Check for pending request after raw3215_start_io and start a timer if necessary.

---
 drivers/s390/char/con3215.c | 32 +++++++++++++++++---------------
 1 file changed, 17 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)
drivers/s390/char/con3215.c +17 -15
index bb86494e2b7b..9a408f6e95db 100644
@@ -288,12 +288,16 @@ static void raw3215_timeout(unsigned long __data)
 	unsigned long flags;
 
 	spin_lock_irqsave(get_ccwdev_lock(raw->cdev), flags);
-	if (raw->flags & RAW3215_TIMER_RUNS) {
-		del_timer(&raw->timer);
-		raw->flags &= ~RAW3215_TIMER_RUNS;
-		if (!(raw->port.flags & ASYNC_SUSPENDED)) {
-			raw3215_mk_write_req(raw);
-			raw3215_start_io(raw);
+	raw->flags &= ~RAW3215_TIMER_RUNS;
+	if (!(raw->port.flags & ASYNC_SUSPENDED)) {
+		raw3215_mk_write_req(raw);
+		raw3215_start_io(raw);
+		if ((raw->queued_read || raw->queued_write) &&
+		    !(raw->flags & RAW3215_WORKING) &&
+		    !(raw->flags & RAW3215_TIMER_RUNS)) {
+			raw->timer.expires = RAW3215_TIMEOUT + jiffies;
+			add_timer(&raw->timer);
+			raw->flags |= RAW3215_TIMER_RUNS;
 		}
 	}
 	spin_unlock_irqrestore(get_ccwdev_lock(raw->cdev), flags);
@@ -317,17 +321,15 @@ static inline void raw3215_try_io(struct raw3215_info *raw)
 		    (raw->flags & RAW3215_FLUSHING)) {
 			/* execute write requests bigger than minimum size */
 			raw3215_start_io(raw);
-			if (raw->flags & RAW3215_TIMER_RUNS) {
-				del_timer(&raw->timer);
-				raw->flags &= ~RAW3215_TIMER_RUNS;
-			}
-		} else if (!(raw->flags & RAW3215_TIMER_RUNS)) {
-			/* delay small writes */
-			raw->timer.expires = RAW3215_TIMEOUT + jiffies;
-			add_timer(&raw->timer);
-			raw->flags |= RAW3215_TIMER_RUNS;
 		}
 	}
+	if ((raw->queued_read || raw->queued_write) &&
+	    !(raw->flags & RAW3215_WORKING) &&
+	    !(raw->flags & RAW3215_TIMER_RUNS)) {
+		raw->timer.expires = RAW3215_TIMEOUT + jiffies;
+		add_timer(&raw->timer);
+		raw->flags |= RAW3215_TIMER_RUNS;
+	}
 }
 
 /*
Signature · 1 line
2.2.1
author
#15 lore raw

PATCH 13/78 s390/3215: fix tty output containing tabs

In reply to Jiri Slaby

From: Martin Schwidefsky <[email protected]>

3.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

===============

commit e512d56c799517f33b301d81e9a5e0ebf30c2d1e upstream.

git commit 37f81fa1f63ad38e16125526bb2769ae0ea8d332 "n_tty: do O_ONLCR translation as a single write" surfaced a bug in the 3215 device driver. In combination this broke tab expansion for tty ouput.

The cause is an asymmetry in the behaviour of tty3215_ops->write vs tty3215_ops->put_char. The put_char function scans for '\t' but the write function does not.

As the driver has logic for the '\t' expansion remove XTABS from c_oflag of the initial termios as well.

---
 drivers/s390/char/con3215.c | 20 +++++++++++++++++---
 1 file changed, 17 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
drivers/s390/char/con3215.c +17 -3
index 9a408f6e95db..19915c5b256f 100644
@@ -1029,12 +1029,26 @@ static int tty3215_write(struct tty_struct * tty,
 			 const unsigned char *buf, int count)
 {
 	struct raw3215_info *raw;
+	int i, written;
 
 	if (!tty)
 		return 0;
 	raw = (struct raw3215_info *) tty->driver_data;
-	raw3215_write(raw, buf, count);
-	return count;
+	written = count;
+	while (count > 0) {
+		for (i = 0; i < count; i++)
+			if (buf[i] == '\t' || buf[i] == '\n')
+				break;
+		raw3215_write(raw, buf, i);
+		count -= i;
+		buf += i;
+		if (count > 0) {
+			raw3215_putchar(raw, *buf);
+			count--;
+			buf++;
+		}
+	}
+	return written;
 }
 
 /*
@@ -1182,7 +1196,7 @@ static int __init tty3215_init(void)
 	driver->subtype = SYSTEM_TYPE_TTY;
 	driver->init_termios = tty_std_termios;
 	driver->init_termios.c_iflag = IGNBRK | IGNPAR;
-	driver->init_termios.c_oflag = ONLCR | XTABS;
+	driver->init_termios.c_oflag = ONLCR;
 	driver->init_termios.c_lflag = ISIG;
 	driver->flags = TTY_DRIVER_REAL_RAW;
 	tty_set_operations(driver, &tty3215_ops);
Signature · 1 line
2.2.1
author
#16 lore raw

PATCH 14/78 usb: gadget: at91_udc: move prepare clk into process context

In reply to Jiri Slaby

From: Ronald Wahl <[email protected]>

3.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

===============

commit b2ba27a5c56ff7204d8a8684893d64d4afe2cee5 upstream.

Commit 7628083227b6bc4a7e33d7c381d7a4e558424b6b (usb: gadget: at91_udc:
prepare clk before calling enable) added clock preparation in interrupt context. This is not allowed as it might sleep. Also setting the clock rate is unsafe to call from there for the same reason. Move clock preparation and setting clock rate into process context (at91udc_probe).

---
 drivers/usb/gadget/at91_udc.c | 44 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------------
 1 file changed, 32 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
drivers/usb/gadget/at91_udc.c +32 -12
index dfd29438a11e..e3101cec93c9 100644
@@ -871,12 +871,10 @@ static void clk_on(struct at91_udc *udc)
 		return;
 	udc->clocked = 1;
 
-	if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_COMMON_CLK)) {
-		clk_set_rate(udc->uclk, 48000000);
-		clk_prepare_enable(udc->uclk);
-	}
-	clk_prepare_enable(udc->iclk);
-	clk_prepare_enable(udc->fclk);
+	if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_COMMON_CLK))
+		clk_enable(udc->uclk);
+	clk_enable(udc->iclk);
+	clk_enable(udc->fclk);
 }
 
 static void clk_off(struct at91_udc *udc)
@@ -885,10 +883,10 @@ static void clk_off(struct at91_udc *udc)
 		return;
 	udc->clocked = 0;
 	udc->gadget.speed = USB_SPEED_UNKNOWN;
-	clk_disable_unprepare(udc->fclk);
-	clk_disable_unprepare(udc->iclk);
+	clk_disable(udc->fclk);
+	clk_disable(udc->iclk);
 	if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_COMMON_CLK))
-		clk_disable_unprepare(udc->uclk);
+		clk_disable(udc->uclk);
 }
 
 /*
@@ -1781,14 +1779,24 @@ static int at91udc_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)
 	}
 
 	/* don't do anything until we have both gadget driver and VBUS */
+	if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_COMMON_CLK)) {
+		clk_set_rate(udc->uclk, 48000000);
+		retval = clk_prepare(udc->uclk);
+		if (retval)
+			goto fail1;
+	}
+	retval = clk_prepare(udc->fclk);
+	if (retval)
+		goto fail1a;
+
 	retval = clk_prepare_enable(udc->iclk);
 	if (retval)
-		goto fail1;
+		goto fail1b;
 	at91_udp_write(udc, AT91_UDP_TXVC, AT91_UDP_TXVC_TXVDIS);
 	at91_udp_write(udc, AT91_UDP_IDR, 0xffffffff);
 	/* Clear all pending interrupts - UDP may be used by bootloader. */
 	at91_udp_write(udc, AT91_UDP_ICR, 0xffffffff);
-	clk_disable_unprepare(udc->iclk);
+	clk_disable(udc->iclk);
 
 	/* request UDC and maybe VBUS irqs */
 	udc->udp_irq = platform_get_irq(pdev, 0);
@@ -1796,7 +1804,7 @@ static int at91udc_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)
 			0, driver_name, udc);
 	if (retval < 0) {
 		DBG("request irq %d failed\n", udc->udp_irq);
-		goto fail1;
+		goto fail1c;
 	}
 	if (gpio_is_valid(udc->board.vbus_pin)) {
 		retval = gpio_request(udc->board.vbus_pin, "udc_vbus");
@@ -1849,6 +1857,13 @@ fail3:
 		gpio_free(udc->board.vbus_pin);
 fail2:
 	free_irq(udc->udp_irq, udc);
+fail1c:
+	clk_unprepare(udc->iclk);
+fail1b:
+	clk_unprepare(udc->fclk);
+fail1a:
+	if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_COMMON_CLK))
+		clk_unprepare(udc->uclk);
 fail1:
 	if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_COMMON_CLK) && !IS_ERR(udc->uclk))
 		clk_put(udc->uclk);
@@ -1897,6 +1912,11 @@ static int __exit at91udc_remove(struct platform_device *pdev)
 	res = platform_get_resource(pdev, IORESOURCE_MEM, 0);
 	release_mem_region(res->start, resource_size(res));
 
+	if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_COMMON_CLK))
+		clk_unprepare(udc->uclk);
+	clk_unprepare(udc->fclk);
+	clk_unprepare(udc->iclk);
+
 	clk_put(udc->iclk);
 	clk_put(udc->fclk);
 	if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_COMMON_CLK))
Signature · 1 line
2.2.1
author
#17 lore raw

PATCH 15/78 tty: Fix pty master poll() after slave closes v2

In reply to Jiri Slaby

From: Francesco Ruggeri <[email protected]>

3.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

===============

commit c4dc304677e8d566572c4738d95c48be150c6606 upstream.

Commit f95499c3030f ("n_tty: Don't wait for buffer work in read() loop") introduces a race window where a pty master can be signalled that the pty slave was closed before all the data that the slave wrote is delivered. Commit f8747d4a466a ("tty: Fix pty master read() after slave closes") fixed the problem in case of n_tty_read, but the problem still exists for n_tty_poll. This can be seen by running 'for ((i=0; i<100;i++));do ./test.py ;done' where test.py is:

import os, select, pty

(pid, pty_fd) = pty.fork()

if pid == 0:
os.write(1, 'This string should be received by parent')
else:
poller = select.epoll()
poller.register( pty_fd, select.EPOLLIN ) ready = poller.poll( 1 * 1000 )
for fd, events in ready:
if not events & select.EPOLLIN:
print 'missed POLLIN event'
else:
print os.read(fd, 100)
poller.close()

The string from the slave is missed several times.
This patch takes the same approach as the fix for read and special cases this condition for poll.
Tested on 3.16.

---
 drivers/tty/n_tty.c | 9 +++++++--
 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/tty/n_tty.c +7 -2
index eac1b0d5b463..1197767b3019 100644
@@ -2410,12 +2410,17 @@ static unsigned int n_tty_poll(struct tty_struct *tty, struct file *file,
 
 	poll_wait(file, &tty->read_wait, wait);
 	poll_wait(file, &tty->write_wait, wait);
+	if (test_bit(TTY_OTHER_CLOSED, &tty->flags))
+		mask |= POLLHUP;
 	if (input_available_p(tty, TIME_CHAR(tty) ? 0 : MIN_CHAR(tty)))
 		mask |= POLLIN | POLLRDNORM;
+	else if (mask & POLLHUP) {
+		tty_flush_to_ldisc(tty);
+		if (input_available_p(tty, TIME_CHAR(tty) ? 0 : MIN_CHAR(tty)))
+			mask |= POLLIN | POLLRDNORM;
+	}
 	if (tty->packet && tty->link->ctrl_status)
 		mask |= POLLPRI | POLLIN | POLLRDNORM;
-	if (test_bit(TTY_OTHER_CLOSED, &tty->flags))
-		mask |= POLLHUP;
 	if (tty_hung_up_p(file))
 		mask |= POLLHUP;
 	if (!(mask & (POLLHUP | POLLIN | POLLRDNORM))) {
Signature · 1 line
2.2.1
author
#18 lore raw

PATCH 16/78 mm: frontswap: invalidate expired data on a dup-store failure

In reply to Jiri Slaby

From: Weijie Yang <[email protected]>

3.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

===============

commit fb993fa1a2f669215fa03a09eed7848f2663e336 upstream.

If a frontswap dup-store failed, it should invalidate the expired page in the backend, or it could trigger some data corruption issue. Such as:
1. use zswap as the frontswap backend with writeback feature
2. store a swap page(version_1) to entry A, success
3. dup-store a newer page(version_2) to the same entry A, fail
4. use __swap_writepage() write version_2 page to swapfile, success
5. zswap do shrink, writeback version_1 page to swapfile
6. version_2 page is overwrited by version_1, data corrupt.

This patch fixes this issue by invalidating expired data immediately when meet a dup-store failure.

Cc Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <[email protected]>
Cc Seth Jennings <[email protected]>
Cc Dan Streetman <[email protected]>
Cc Minchan Kim <[email protected]>
Cc Bob Liu <[email protected]>
---
 mm/frontswap.c | 4 +++-
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
mm/frontswap.c +3 -1
index c30eec536f03..f2a3571c6e22 100644
@@ -244,8 +244,10 @@ int __frontswap_store(struct page *page)
 		  the (older) page from frontswap
 		 */
 		inc_frontswap_failed_stores();
-		if (dup)
+		if (dup) {
 			__frontswap_clear(sis, offset);
+			frontswap_ops->invalidate_page(type, offset);
+		}
 	}
 	if (frontswap_writethrough_enabled)
 		/* report failure so swap also writes to swap device */
Signature · 1 line
2.2.1
author
#19 lore raw

PATCH 17/78 mm/vmpressure.c: fix race in vmpressure_work_fn()

In reply to Jiri Slaby

From: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>

3.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

===============

commit 91b57191cfd152c02ded0745250167d0263084f8 upstream.

In some android devices, there will be a "divide by zero" exception. vmpr->scanned could be zero before spin_lock(&vmpr->sr_lock).

Addresses https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=88051

---
 mm/vmpressure.c | 8 +++++---
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
mm/vmpressure.c +5 -3
index e0f62837c3f4..c98b14ee69d6 100644
@@ -164,6 +164,7 @@ static void vmpressure_work_fn(struct work_struct *work)
 	unsigned long scanned;
 	unsigned long reclaimed;
 
+	spin_lock(&vmpr->sr_lock);
 	/*
 	 * Several contexts might be calling vmpressure(), so it is
 	 * possible that the work was rescheduled again before the old
@@ -172,11 +173,12 @@ static void vmpressure_work_fn(struct work_struct *work)
 	 * here. No need for any locks here since we don't care if
 	 * vmpr->reclaimed is in sync.
 	 */
-	if (!vmpr->scanned)
+	scanned = vmpr->scanned;
+	if (!scanned) {
+		spin_unlock(&vmpr->sr_lock);
 		return;
+	}
 
-	spin_lock(&vmpr->sr_lock);
-	scanned = vmpr->scanned;
 	reclaimed = vmpr->reclaimed;
 	vmpr->scanned = 0;
 	vmpr->reclaimed = 0;
Signature · 1 line
2.2.1
author
#20 lore raw

PATCH 18/78 mm: fix swapoff hang after page migration and fork

In reply to Jiri Slaby

From: Hugh Dickins <[email protected]>

3.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

===============

commit 2022b4d18a491a578218ce7a4eca8666db895a73 upstream.

I've been seeing swapoff hangs in recent testing: it's cycling around trying unsuccessfully to find an mm for some remaining pages of swap.

I have been exercising swap and page migration more heavily recently, and now notice a long-standing error in copy_one_pte(): it's trying to add dst_mm to swapoff's mmlist when it finds a swap entry, but is doing so even when it's a migration entry or an hwpoison entry.

Which wouldn't matter much, except it adds dst_mm next to src_mm, assuming src_mm is already on the mmlist: which may not be so. Then if pages are later swapped out from dst_mm, swapoff won't be able to find where to replace them.

There's already a !non_swap_entry() test for stats: move that up before the swap_duplicate() and the addition to mmlist.

---
 mm/memory.c | 26 +++++++++++++-------------
 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)
mm/memory.c +13 -13
index b5901068495f..827a7ed7f5a2 100644
@@ -808,20 +808,20 @@ copy_one_pte(struct mm_struct *dst_mm, struct mm_struct *src_mm,
 		if (!pte_file(pte)) {
 			swp_entry_t entry = pte_to_swp_entry(pte);
 
-			if (swap_duplicate(entry) < 0)
-				return entry.val;
-
-			/* make sure dst_mm is on swapoff's mmlist. */
-			if (unlikely(list_empty(&dst_mm->mmlist))) {
-				spin_lock(&mmlist_lock);
-				if (list_empty(&dst_mm->mmlist))
-					list_add(&dst_mm->mmlist,
-						 &src_mm->mmlist);
-				spin_unlock(&mmlist_lock);
-			}
-			if (likely(!non_swap_entry(entry)))
+			if (likely(!non_swap_entry(entry))) {
+				if (swap_duplicate(entry) < 0)
+					return entry.val;
+
+				/* make sure dst_mm is on swapoff's mmlist. */
+				if (unlikely(list_empty(&dst_mm->mmlist))) {
+					spin_lock(&mmlist_lock);
+					if (list_empty(&dst_mm->mmlist))
+						list_add(&dst_mm->mmlist,
+							 &src_mm->mmlist);
+					spin_unlock(&mmlist_lock);
+				}
 				rss[MM_SWAPENTS]++;
-			else if (is_migration_entry(entry)) {
+			} else if (is_migration_entry(entry)) {
 				page = migration_entry_to_page(entry);
 
 				if (PageAnon(page))
Signature · 1 line
2.2.1
author
#21 lore raw

PATCH 19/78 mm: fix anon_vma_clone() error treatment

In reply to Jiri Slaby

From: Daniel Forrest <[email protected]>

3.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

===============

commit c4ea95d7cd08d9ffd7fa75e6c5e0332d596dd11e upstream.

Andrew Morton noticed that the error return from anon_vma_clone() was being dropped and replaced with -ENOMEM (which is not itself a bug because the only error return value from anon_vma_clone() is -ENOMEM).

I did an audit of callers of anon_vma_clone() and discovered an actual bug where the error return was being lost. In __split_vma(), between Linux 3.11 and 3.12 the code was changed so the err variable is used before the call to anon_vma_clone() and the default initial value of -ENOMEM is overwritten. So a failure of anon_vma_clone() will return success since err at this point is now zero.

Below is a patch which fixes this bug and also propagates the error return value from anon_vma_clone() in all cases.

Fixes ef0855d334e1 ("mm: mempolicy: turn vma_set_policy() into vma_dup_policy()")
Cc Konstantin Khlebnikov <[email protected]>
Cc Andrea Arcangeli <[email protected]>
Cc Rik van Riel <[email protected]>
Cc Tim Hartrick <[email protected]>
Cc Hugh Dickins <[email protected]>
Cc Michel Lespinasse <[email protected]>
Cc Vlastimil Babka <[email protected]>
---
 mm/mmap.c | 10 +++++++---
 mm/rmap.c |  6 ++++--
 2 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
mm/mmap.c +7 -3
index c1249cb7dc15..15e07d5a75cb 100644
@@ -746,8 +746,11 @@ again:			remove_next = 1 + (end > next->vm_end);
 		 * shrinking vma had, to cover any anon pages imported.
 		 */
 		if (exporter && exporter->anon_vma && !importer->anon_vma) {
-			if (anon_vma_clone(importer, exporter))
-				return -ENOMEM;
+			int error;
+
+			error = anon_vma_clone(importer, exporter);
+			if (error)
+				return error;
 			importer->anon_vma = exporter->anon_vma;
 		}
 	}
@@ -2419,7 +2422,8 @@ static int __split_vma(struct mm_struct * mm, struct vm_area_struct * vma,
 	if (err)
 		goto out_free_vma;
 
-	if (anon_vma_clone(new, vma))
+	err = anon_vma_clone(new, vma);
+	if (err)
 		goto out_free_mpol;
 
 	if (new->vm_file)
mm/rmap.c +4 -2
index 4271107aa46e..5b8675ccc1ef 100644
@@ -274,6 +274,7 @@ int anon_vma_fork(struct vm_area_struct *vma, struct vm_area_struct *pvma)
 {
 	struct anon_vma_chain *avc;
 	struct anon_vma *anon_vma;
+	int error;
 
 	/* Don't bother if the parent process has no anon_vma here. */
 	if (!pvma->anon_vma)
@@ -283,8 +284,9 @@ int anon_vma_fork(struct vm_area_struct *vma, struct vm_area_struct *pvma)
 	 * First, attach the new VMA to the parent VMA's anon_vmas,
 	 * so rmap can find non-COWed pages in child processes.
 	 */
-	if (anon_vma_clone(vma, pvma))
-		return -ENOMEM;
+	error = anon_vma_clone(vma, pvma);
+	if (error)
+		return error;
 
 	/* Then add our own anon_vma. */
 	anon_vma = anon_vma_alloc();
Signature · 1 line
2.2.1
author
#22 lore raw

PATCH 20/78 i2c: omap: fix NACK and Arbitration Lost irq handling

In reply to Jiri Slaby

From: Alexander Kochetkov <[email protected]>

3.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

===============

commit 27caca9d2e01c92b26d0690f065aad093fea01c7 upstream.

commit 1d7afc95946487945cc7f5019b41255b72224b70 (i2c: omap: ack IRQ in parts) changed the interrupt handler to complete transfers without clearing XRDY (AL case) and ARDY (NACK case) flags. XRDY or ARDY interrupts will be fired again. As a result, ISR keep processing transfer after it was already complete (from the driver code point of view).

A didn't see real impacts of the 1d7afc9, but it is really bad idea to have ISR running on user data after transfer was complete.

It looks, what 1d7afc9 violate TI specs in what how AL and NACK should be handled (see Note 1, sprugn4r, Figure 17-31 and Figure 17-32).

According to specs (if I understood correctly), in case of NACK and AL driver must reset NACK, AL, ARDY, RDR, and RRDY (Master Receive Mode), and NACK, AL, ARDY, and XDR (Master Transmitter Mode).

All that is done down the code under the if condition:
if (stat & (OMAP_I2C_STAT_ARDY | OMAP_I2C_STAT_NACK | OMAP_I2C_STAT_AL)) ...

The patch restore pre 1d7afc9 logic of handling NACK and AL interrupts, so no interrupts is fired after ISR informs the rest of driver what transfer complete.

Note: instead of removing break under NACK case, we could just replace 'break' with 'continue' and allow NACK transfer to finish using ARDY event. I found that NACK and ARDY bits usually set together. That case confirm TI wiki:
http://processors.wiki.ti.com/index.php/I2C_Tips#Detecting_and_handling_NACK

In order if someone interested in the event traces for NACK and AL cases, I sent them to mailing list.

Tested on Beagleboard XM C.

---
 drivers/i2c/busses/i2c-omap.c | 2 --
 1 file changed, 2 deletions(-)
drivers/i2c/busses/i2c-omap.c +0 -2
index 9967a6f9c2ff..05f5919a7165 100644
@@ -926,14 +926,12 @@ omap_i2c_isr_thread(int this_irq, void *dev_id)
 		if (stat & OMAP_I2C_STAT_NACK) {
 			err |= OMAP_I2C_STAT_NACK;
 			omap_i2c_ack_stat(dev, OMAP_I2C_STAT_NACK);
-			break;
 		}
 
 		if (stat & OMAP_I2C_STAT_AL) {
 			dev_err(dev->dev, "Arbitration lost\n");
 			err |= OMAP_I2C_STAT_AL;
 			omap_i2c_ack_stat(dev, OMAP_I2C_STAT_AL);
-			break;
 		}
 
 		/*
Signature · 1 line
2.2.1
author
#23 lore raw

PATCH 21/78 i2c: omap: fix i207 errata handling

In reply to Jiri Slaby

From: Alexander Kochetkov <[email protected]>

3.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

===============

commit ccfc866356674cb3a61829d239c685af6e85f197 upstream.

commit 6d9939f651419a63e091105663821f9c7d3fec37 (i2c: omap: split out [XR]DR and [XR]RDY) changed the way how errata i207 (I2C: RDR Flag May Be Incorrectly Set) get handled. 6d9939f6514 code doesn't correspond to workaround provided by errata.

According to errata ISR must filter out spurious RDR before data read not after. ISR must read RXSTAT to get number of bytes available to read. Because RDR could be set while there could no data in the receive FIFO.

Restored pre 6d9939f6514 way of handling errata.

Found by code review. Real impact haven't seen.
Tested on Beagleboard XM C.

Fixes 6d9939f651419a63e09110 i2c: omap: split out [XR]DR and [XR]RDY
---
 drivers/i2c/busses/i2c-omap.c | 8 +++++---
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
drivers/i2c/busses/i2c-omap.c +5 -3
index 05f5919a7165..8eaaff831d7c 100644
@@ -956,11 +956,13 @@ omap_i2c_isr_thread(int this_irq, void *dev_id)
 			if (dev->fifo_size)
 				num_bytes = dev->buf_len;
 
-			omap_i2c_receive_data(dev, num_bytes, true);
-
-			if (dev->errata & I2C_OMAP_ERRATA_I207)
+			if (dev->errata & I2C_OMAP_ERRATA_I207) {
 				i2c_omap_errata_i207(dev, stat);
+				num_bytes = (omap_i2c_read_reg(dev,
+					OMAP_I2C_BUFSTAT_REG) >> 8) & 0x3F;
+			}
 
+			omap_i2c_receive_data(dev, num_bytes, true);
 			omap_i2c_ack_stat(dev, OMAP_I2C_STAT_RDR);
 			continue;
 		}
Signature · 1 line
2.2.1
author
#24 lore raw

PATCH 22/78 i2c: davinci: generate STP always when NACK is received

In reply to Jiri Slaby

From: Grygorii Strashko <[email protected]>

3.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

===============

commit 9ea359f7314132cbcb5a502d2d8ef095be1f45e4 upstream.

According to I2C specification the NACK should be handled as follows:
"When SDA remains HIGH during this ninth clock pulse, this is defined as the Not Acknowledge signal. The master can then generate either a STOP condition to abort the transfer, or a repeated START condition to start a new transfer." [I2C spec Rev. 6, 3.1.6: http://www.nxp.com/documents/user_manual/UM10204.pdf]

Currently the Davinci i2c driver interrupts the transfer on receipt of a NACK but fails to send a STOP in some situations and so makes the bus stuck until next I2C IP reset (idle/enable).

For example, the issue will happen during SMBus read transfer which consists from two i2c messages write command/address and read data:

S Slave Address Wr A Command Code A Sr Slave Address Rd A D1..Dn A P <--- write -----------------------> <--- read --------------------->

The I2C client device will send NACK if it can't recognize "Command Code" and it's expected from I2C master to generate STP in this case. But now, Davinci i2C driver will just exit with -EREMOTEIO and STP will not be generated.

Hence, fix it by generating Stop condition (STP) always when NACK is received.

This patch fixes Davinci I2C in the same way it was done for OMAP I2C commit cda2109a26eb ("i2c: omap: query STP always when NACK is received").

---
 drivers/i2c/busses/i2c-davinci.c | 8 +++-----
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
drivers/i2c/busses/i2c-davinci.c +3 -5
index 132369fad4e0..4e73f3ee05d8 100644
@@ -411,11 +411,9 @@ i2c_davinci_xfer_msg(struct i2c_adapter *adap, struct i2c_msg *msg, int stop)
 	if (dev->cmd_err & DAVINCI_I2C_STR_NACK) {
 		if (msg->flags & I2C_M_IGNORE_NAK)
 			return msg->len;
-		if (stop) {
-			w = davinci_i2c_read_reg(dev, DAVINCI_I2C_MDR_REG);
-			w |= DAVINCI_I2C_MDR_STP;
-			davinci_i2c_write_reg(dev, DAVINCI_I2C_MDR_REG, w);
-		}
+		w = davinci_i2c_read_reg(dev, DAVINCI_I2C_MDR_REG);
+		w |= DAVINCI_I2C_MDR_STP;
+		davinci_i2c_write_reg(dev, DAVINCI_I2C_MDR_REG, w);
 		return -EREMOTEIO;
 	}
 	return -EIO;
Signature · 1 line
2.2.1
author
#25 lore raw

PATCH 23/78 drm/radeon: kernel panic in drm_calc_vbltimestamp_from_scanoutpos with 3.18.0-rc6

In reply to Jiri Slaby

From: Petr Mladek <[email protected]>

3.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

===============

commit f5475cc43c899e33098d4db44b7c5e710f16589d upstream.

I was unable too boot 3.18.0-rc6 because of the following kernel panic in drm_calc_vbltimestamp_from_scanoutpos():

    [drm] Initialized drm 1.1.0 20060810
    [drm] radeon kernel modesetting enabled.
    [drm] initializing kernel modesetting (RV100 0x1002:0x515E 0x15D9:0x8080).
    [drm] register mmio base: 0xC8400000
    [drm] register mmio size: 65536
    radeon 0000:0b:01.0: VRAM: 128M 0x00000000D0000000 - 0x00000000D7FFFFFF (16M used)
    radeon 0000:0b:01.0: GTT: 512M 0x00000000B0000000 - 0x00000000CFFFFFFF
    [drm] Detected VRAM RAM=128M, BAR=128M
    [drm] RAM width 16bits DDR
    [TTM] Zone  kernel: Available graphics memory: 3829346 kiB
    [TTM] Zone   dma32: Available graphics memory: 2097152 kiB
    [TTM] Initializing pool allocator
    [TTM] Initializing DMA pool allocator
    [drm] radeon: 16M of VRAM memory ready
    [drm] radeon: 512M of GTT memory ready.
    [drm] GART: num cpu pages 131072, num gpu pages 131072
    [drm] PCI GART of 512M enabled (table at 0x0000000037880000).
    radeon 0000:0b:01.0: WB disabled
    radeon 0000:0b:01.0: fence driver on ring 0 use gpu addr 0x00000000b0000000 and cpu addr 0xffff8800bbbfa000
    [drm] Supports vblank timestamp caching Rev 2 (21.10.2013).
    [drm] Driver supports precise vblank timestamp query.
    [drm] radeon: irq initialized.
    [drm] Loading R100 Microcode
    radeon 0000:0b:01.0: Direct firmware load for radeon/R100_cp.bin failed with error -2
    radeon_cp: Failed to load firmware "radeon/R100_cp.bin"
    [drm:r100_cp_init] *ERROR* Failed to load firmware!
    radeon 0000:0b:01.0: failed initializing CP (-2).
    radeon 0000:0b:01.0: Disabling GPU acceleration
    [drm] radeon: cp finalized
    BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 000000000000025c
    IP: [<ffffffff8150423b>] drm_calc_vbltimestamp_from_scanoutpos+0x4b/0x320
    PGD 0
    Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP
    Modules linked in:
    CPU: 1 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 3.18.0-rc6-4-default #2649
    Hardware name: Supermicro X7DB8/X7DB8, BIOS 6.00 07/26/2006
    task: ffff880234da2010 ti: ffff880234da4000 task.ti: ffff880234da4000
    RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff8150423b>]  [<ffffffff8150423b>] drm_calc_vbltimestamp_from_scanoutpos+0x4b/0x320
    RSP: 0000:ffff880234da7918  EFLAGS: 00010086
    RAX: ffffffff81557890 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: ffff880234da7a48
    RDX: ffff880234da79f4 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: ffff880232e15000
    RBP: ffff880234da79b8 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
    R10: 000000000000000a R11: 0000000000000001 R12: ffff880232dda1c0
    R13: ffff880232e1518c R14: 0000000000000292 R15: ffff880232e15000
    FS:  0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88023fc40000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
    CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 000000008005003b
    CR2: 000000000000025c CR3: 0000000002014000 CR4: 00000000000007e0
    Stack:
     ffff880234da79d8 0000000000000286 ffff880232dcbc00 0000000000002480
     ffff880234da7958 0000000000000296 ffff880234da7998 ffffffff8151b51d
     ffff880234da7a48 0000000032dcbeb0 ffff880232dcbc00 ffff880232dcbc58
    Call Trace:
     [<ffffffff8151b51d>] ? drm_vma_offset_remove+0x1d/0x110
     [<ffffffff8152dc98>] radeon_get_vblank_timestamp_kms+0x38/0x60
     [<ffffffff8152076a>] ? ttm_bo_release_list+0xba/0x180
     [<ffffffff81503751>] drm_get_last_vbltimestamp+0x41/0x70
     [<ffffffff81503933>] vblank_disable_and_save+0x73/0x1d0
     [<ffffffff81106b2f>] ? try_to_del_timer_sync+0x4f/0x70
     [<ffffffff81505245>] drm_vblank_cleanup+0x65/0xa0
     [<ffffffff815604fa>] radeon_irq_kms_fini+0x1a/0x70
     [<ffffffff8156c07e>] r100_init+0x26e/0x410
     [<ffffffff8152ae3e>] radeon_device_init+0x7ae/0xb50
     [<ffffffff8152d57f>] radeon_driver_load_kms+0x8f/0x210
     [<ffffffff81506965>] drm_dev_register+0xb5/0x110
     [<ffffffff8150998f>] drm_get_pci_dev+0x8f/0x200
     [<ffffffff815291cd>] radeon_pci_probe+0xad/0xe0
     [<ffffffff8141a365>] local_pci_probe+0x45/0xa0
     [<ffffffff8141b741>] pci_device_probe+0xd1/0x130
     [<ffffffff81633dad>] driver_probe_device+0x12d/0x3e0
     [<ffffffff8163413b>] __driver_attach+0x9b/0xa0
     [<ffffffff816340a0>] ? __device_attach+0x40/0x40
     [<ffffffff81631cd3>] bus_for_each_dev+0x63/0xa0
     [<ffffffff8163378e>] driver_attach+0x1e/0x20
     [<ffffffff81633390>] bus_add_driver+0x180/0x240
     [<ffffffff81634914>] driver_register+0x64/0xf0
     [<ffffffff81419cac>] __pci_register_driver+0x4c/0x50
     [<ffffffff81509bf5>] drm_pci_init+0xf5/0x120
     [<ffffffff821dc871>] ? ttm_init+0x6a/0x6a
     [<ffffffff821dc908>] radeon_init+0x97/0xb5
     [<ffffffff810002fc>] do_one_initcall+0xbc/0x1f0
     [<ffffffff810e3278>] ? __wake_up+0x48/0x60
     [<ffffffff8218e256>] kernel_init_freeable+0x18a/0x215
     [<ffffffff8218d983>] ? initcall_blacklist+0xc0/0xc0
     [<ffffffff818a78f0>] ? rest_init+0x80/0x80
     [<ffffffff818a78fe>] kernel_init+0xe/0xf0
     [<ffffffff818c0c3c>] ret_from_fork+0x7c/0xb0
     [<ffffffff818a78f0>] ? rest_init+0x80/0x80
    Code: 45 ac 0f 88 a8 01 00 00 3b b7 d0 01 00 00 49 89 ff 0f 83 99 01 00 00 48 8b 47 20 48 8b 80 88 00 00 00 48 85 c0 0f 84 cd 01 00 00 <41> 8b b1 5c 02 00 00 41 8b 89 58 02 00 00 89 75 98 41 8b b1 60
    RIP  [<ffffffff8150423b>] drm_calc_vbltimestamp_from_scanoutpos+0x4b/0x320
     RSP <ffff880234da7918>
    CR2: 000000000000025c
    ---[ end trace ad2c0aadf48e2032 ]---
    Kernel panic - not syncing: Attempted to kill init! exitcode=0x00000009

It has helped me to add a NULL pointer check that was suggested at
http://lists.freedesktop.org/archives/dri-devel/2014-October/070663.html

I am not familiar with the code. But the change looks sane and we need something fast at this stage of 3.18 development.

---
 drivers/gpu/drm/radeon/radeon_kms.c | 2 ++
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
drivers/gpu/drm/radeon/radeon_kms.c +2 -0
index a134e8bf53f5..03ff6726ce9f 100644
@@ -684,6 +684,8 @@ int radeon_get_vblank_timestamp_kms(struct drm_device *dev, int crtc,
 
 	/* Get associated drm_crtc: */
 	drmcrtc = &rdev->mode_info.crtcs[crtc]->base;
+	if (!drmcrtc)
+		return -EINVAL;
 
 	/* Helper routine in DRM core does all the work: */
 	return drm_calc_vbltimestamp_from_scanoutpos(dev, crtc, max_error,
Signature · 1 line
2.2.1
author
#26 lore raw

PATCH 24/78 drm/i915: More cautious with pch fifo underruns

In reply to Jiri Slaby

From: Daniel Vetter <[email protected]>

3.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

===============

commit b68362278af94e1171f5be9d4e44988601fb0439 upstream.

Apparently PCH fifo underruns are tricky, we have plenty reports that we see the occasional underrun (especially at boot-up).

So for a change let's see what happens when we don't re-enable pch fifo underrun reporting when the pipe is disabled. This means that the kernel can't catch pch fifo underruns when they happen (except when all pipes are on on the pch). But we'll still catch underruns when disabling the pipe again. So not a terrible reduction in test coverage.

Since the DRM_ERROR is new and hence a regression plan B would be to revert it back to a debug output. Which would be a lot worse than this hack for underrun test coverage in the wild. See the referenced discussions for more.

References: http://mid.gmane.org/CA+gsUGRfGe3t4NcjdeA=qXysrhLY3r4CEu7z4bjTwxi1uOfy+g@mail.gmail.com
Bugzilla: https://bugs.freedesktop.org/show_bug.cgi?id=85898
References: https://bugs.freedesktop.org/show_bug.cgi?id=85898
References: https://bugs.freedesktop.org/show_bug.cgi?id=86233
References: https://bugs.freedesktop.org/show_bug.cgi?id=86478

---
 drivers/gpu/drm/i915/intel_display.c | 2 --
 1 file changed, 2 deletions(-)
drivers/gpu/drm/i915/intel_display.c +0 -2
index 837cc6cd7472..37a9d3c89feb 100644
@@ -3537,7 +3537,6 @@ static void ironlake_crtc_disable(struct drm_crtc *crtc)
 		ironlake_fdi_disable(crtc);
 
 		ironlake_disable_pch_transcoder(dev_priv, pipe);
-		intel_set_pch_fifo_underrun_reporting(dev, pipe, true);
 
 		if (HAS_PCH_CPT(dev)) {
 			/* disable TRANS_DP_CTL */
@@ -3613,7 +3612,6 @@ static void haswell_crtc_disable(struct drm_crtc *crtc)
 
 	if (intel_crtc->config.has_pch_encoder) {
 		lpt_disable_pch_transcoder(dev_priv);
-		intel_set_pch_fifo_underrun_reporting(dev, TRANSCODER_A, true);
 		intel_ddi_fdi_disable(crtc);
 	}
 
Signature · 1 line
2.2.1
author
#27 lore raw

PATCH 25/78 drm/i915: Unlock panel even when LVDS is disabled

In reply to Jiri Slaby

From: Daniel Vetter <[email protected]>

3.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

===============

commit b0616c5306b342ceca07044dbc4f917d95c4f825 upstream.

Otherwise we'll have backtraces in assert_panel_unlocked because the BIOS locks the register. In the reporter's case this regression was introduced in

commit c31407a3672aaebb4acddf90944a114fa5c8af7b

Author: Chris Wilson <[email protected]>
Date:   Thu Oct 18 21:07:01 2012 +0100

drm/i915: Add no-lvds quirk for Supermicro X7SPA-H

---
 drivers/gpu/drm/i915/intel_lvds.c | 22 +++++++++++-----------
 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
drivers/gpu/drm/i915/intel_lvds.c +11 -11
index 667f2117e1d9..e5473daab676 100644
@@ -934,6 +934,17 @@ void intel_lvds_init(struct drm_device *dev)
 	int pipe;
 	u8 pin;
 
+	/*
+	 * Unlock registers and just leave them unlocked. Do this before
+	 * checking quirk lists to avoid bogus WARNINGs.
+	 */
+	if (HAS_PCH_SPLIT(dev)) {
+		I915_WRITE(PCH_PP_CONTROL,
+			   I915_READ(PCH_PP_CONTROL) | PANEL_UNLOCK_REGS);
+	} else {
+		I915_WRITE(PP_CONTROL,
+			   I915_READ(PP_CONTROL) | PANEL_UNLOCK_REGS);
+	}
 	if (!intel_lvds_supported(dev))
 		return;
 
@@ -1113,17 +1124,6 @@ out:
 	DRM_DEBUG_KMS("detected %s-link lvds configuration\n",
 		      lvds_encoder->is_dual_link ? "dual" : "single");
 
-	/*
-	 * Unlock registers and just
-	 * leave them unlocked
-	 */
-	if (HAS_PCH_SPLIT(dev)) {
-		I915_WRITE(PCH_PP_CONTROL,
-			   I915_READ(PCH_PP_CONTROL) | PANEL_UNLOCK_REGS);
-	} else {
-		I915_WRITE(PP_CONTROL,
-			   I915_READ(PP_CONTROL) | PANEL_UNLOCK_REGS);
-	}
 	lvds_connector->lid_notifier.notifier_call = intel_lid_notify;
 	if (acpi_lid_notifier_register(&lvds_connector->lid_notifier)) {
 		DRM_DEBUG_KMS("lid notifier registration failed\n");
Signature · 1 line
2.2.1
author
#28 lore raw

PATCH 26/78 media: smiapp: Only some selection targets are settable

In reply to Jiri Slaby

From: Sakari Ailus <[email protected]>

3.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

===============

commit b31eb901c4e5eeef4c83c43dfbc7fe0d4348cb21 upstream.

Setting a non-settable selection target caused BUG() to be called. The check for valid selections only takes the selection target into account, but does not tell whether it may be set, or only get. Fix the issue by simply returning an error to the user.

---
 drivers/media/i2c/smiapp/smiapp-core.c | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/media/i2c/smiapp/smiapp-core.c +1 -1
index ae66d91bf713..371ca22843ee 100644
@@ -2139,7 +2139,7 @@ static int smiapp_set_selection(struct v4l2_subdev *subdev,
 		ret = smiapp_set_compose(subdev, fh, sel);
 		break;
 	default:
-		BUG();
+		ret = -EINVAL;
 	}
 
 	mutex_unlock(&sensor->mutex);
Signature · 1 line
2.2.1
author
#29 lore raw

PATCH 27/78 USB: xhci: Reset a halted endpoint immediately when we encounter a stall.

In reply to Jiri Slaby

From: Mathias Nyman <[email protected]>

3.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

===============

commit 8e71a322fdb127814bcba423a512914ca5bc6cf5 upstream.

If a device is halted and reuturns a STALL, then the halted endpoint needs to be cleared both on the host and device side. The host side halt is cleared by issueing a xhci reset endpoint command. The device side is cleared with a ClearFeature(ENDPOINT_HALT) request, which should be issued by the device driver if a URB reruen -EPIPE.

Previously we cleared the host side halt after the device side was cleared. To make sure the host side halt is cleared in time we want to issue the reset endpoint command immedialtely when a STALL status is encountered.

Otherwise we end up not following the specs and not returning -EPIPE several times in a row when trying to transfer data to a halted endpoint.

Fixes bcef3fd (USB: xhci: Handle errors that cause endpoint halts.)
---
 drivers/usb/host/xhci-ring.c | 40 ++++++++---------------------
 drivers/usb/host/xhci.c      | 60 +++++++++++---------------------------------
 2 files changed, 25 insertions(+), 75 deletions(-)
drivers/usb/host/xhci-ring.c +10 -30
index d761c040ee2e..6f052daed694 100644
@@ -1965,22 +1965,13 @@ static int finish_td(struct xhci_hcd *xhci, struct xhci_td *td,
 		ep->stopped_td = td;
 		return 0;
 	} else {
-		if (trb_comp_code == COMP_STALL) {
-			/* The transfer is completed from the driver's
-			 * perspective, but we need to issue a set dequeue
-			 * command for this stalled endpoint to move the dequeue
-			 * pointer past the TD.  We can't do that here because
-			 * the halt condition must be cleared first.  Let the
-			 * USB class driver clear the stall later.
-			 */
-			ep->stopped_td = td;
-			ep->stopped_stream = ep_ring->stream_id;
-		} else if (xhci_requires_manual_halt_cleanup(xhci,
-					ep_ctx, trb_comp_code)) {
-			/* Other types of errors halt the endpoint, but the
-			 * class driver doesn't call usb_reset_endpoint() unless
-			 * the error is -EPIPE.  Clear the halted status in the
-			 * xHCI hardware manually.
+		if (trb_comp_code == COMP_STALL ||
+		    xhci_requires_manual_halt_cleanup(xhci, ep_ctx,
+						      trb_comp_code)) {
+			/* Issue a reset endpoint command to clear the host side
+			 * halt, followed by a set dequeue command to move the
+			 * dequeue pointer past the TD.
+			 * The class driver clears the device side halt later.
 			 */
 			xhci_cleanup_halted_endpoint(xhci,
 					slot_id, ep_index, ep_ring->stream_id,
@@ -2100,9 +2091,7 @@ static int process_ctrl_td(struct xhci_hcd *xhci, struct xhci_td *td,
 		else
 			td->urb->actual_length = 0;
 
-		xhci_cleanup_halted_endpoint(xhci,
-			slot_id, ep_index, 0, td, event_trb);
-		return finish_td(xhci, td, event_trb, event, ep, status, true);
+		return finish_td(xhci, td, event_trb, event, ep, status, false);
 	}
 	/*
 	 * Did we transfer any data, despite the errors that might have
@@ -2656,17 +2645,8 @@ cleanup:
 		if (ret) {
 			urb = td->urb;
 			urb_priv = urb->hcpriv;
-			/* Leave the TD around for the reset endpoint function
-			 * to use(but only if it's not a control endpoint,
-			 * since we already queued the Set TR dequeue pointer
-			 * command for stalled control endpoints).
-			 */
-			if (usb_endpoint_xfer_control(&urb->ep->desc) ||
-				(trb_comp_code != COMP_STALL &&
-					trb_comp_code != COMP_BABBLE))
-				xhci_urb_free_priv(xhci, urb_priv);
-			else
-				kfree(urb_priv);
+
+			xhci_urb_free_priv(xhci, urb_priv);
 
 			usb_hcd_unlink_urb_from_ep(bus_to_hcd(urb->dev->bus), urb);
 			if ((urb->actual_length != urb->transfer_buffer_length &&
drivers/usb/host/xhci.c +15 -45

78 lines not on this page · raw message

Signature · 1 line
2.2.1
author
#30 lore raw

PATCH 28/78 AHCI: Add DeviceIDs for Sunrise Point-LP SATA controller

In reply to Jiri Slaby

From: Devin Ryles <[email protected]>

3.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

===============

commit 249cd0a187ed4ef1d0af7f74362cc2791ec5581b upstream.

This patch adds DeviceIDs for Sunrise Point-LP.

---
 drivers/ata/ahci.c | 3 +++
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
drivers/ata/ahci.c +3 -0
index 4432c9dc9c7a..e0a8a793d14a 100644
@@ -320,6 +320,9 @@ static const struct pci_device_id ahci_pci_tbl[] = {
 	{ PCI_VDEVICE(INTEL, 0x8c87), board_ahci }, /* 9 Series RAID */
 	{ PCI_VDEVICE(INTEL, 0x8c8e), board_ahci }, /* 9 Series RAID */
 	{ PCI_VDEVICE(INTEL, 0x8c8f), board_ahci }, /* 9 Series RAID */
+	{ PCI_VDEVICE(INTEL, 0x9d03), board_ahci }, /* Sunrise Point-LP AHCI */
+	{ PCI_VDEVICE(INTEL, 0x9d05), board_ahci }, /* Sunrise Point-LP RAID */
+	{ PCI_VDEVICE(INTEL, 0x9d07), board_ahci }, /* Sunrise Point-LP RAID */
 	{ PCI_VDEVICE(INTEL, 0xa103), board_ahci }, /* Sunrise Point-H AHCI */
 	{ PCI_VDEVICE(INTEL, 0xa103), board_ahci }, /* Sunrise Point-H RAID */
 	{ PCI_VDEVICE(INTEL, 0xa105), board_ahci }, /* Sunrise Point-H RAID */
Signature · 1 line
2.2.1
author
#31 lore raw

PATCH 29/78 ahci: disable MSI on SAMSUNG 0xa800 SSD

In reply to Jiri Slaby

From: Tejun Heo <[email protected]>

3.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

===============

commit 2b21ef0aae65f22f5ba86b13c4588f6f0c2dbefb upstream.

Just like 0x1600 which got blacklisted by 66a7cbc303f4 ("ahci: disable MSI instead of NCQ on Samsung pci-e SSDs on macbooks"), 0xa800 chokes on NCQ commands if MSI is enabled. Disable MSI.

---
 drivers/ata/ahci.c | 1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
drivers/ata/ahci.c +1 -0
index e0a8a793d14a..53111fd27ebb 100644
@@ -494,6 +494,7 @@ static const struct pci_device_id ahci_pci_tbl[] = {
 	 * enabled.  https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=60731
 	 */
 	{ PCI_VDEVICE(SAMSUNG, 0x1600), board_ahci_nomsi },
+	{ PCI_VDEVICE(SAMSUNG, 0xa800), board_ahci_nomsi },
 
 	/* Enmotus */
 	{ PCI_DEVICE(0x1c44, 0x8000), board_ahci },
Signature · 1 line
2.2.1
author
#32 lore raw

PATCH 30/78 sata_fsl: fix error handling of irq_of_parse_and_map

In reply to Jiri Slaby

From: Dmitry Torokhov <[email protected]>

3.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

===============

commit aad0b624129709c94c2e19e583b6053520353fa8 upstream.

irq_of_parse_and_map() returns 0 on error (the result is unsigned int), so testing for negative result never works.

---
 drivers/ata/sata_fsl.c | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/ata/sata_fsl.c +1 -1
index 851bd3f43ac6..017ed84a0cc4 100644
@@ -1501,7 +1501,7 @@ static int sata_fsl_probe(struct platform_device *ofdev)
 	host_priv->csr_base = csr_base;
 
 	irq = irq_of_parse_and_map(ofdev->dev.of_node, 0);
-	if (irq < 0) {
+	if (!irq) {
 		dev_err(&ofdev->dev, "invalid irq from platform\n");
 		goto error_exit_with_cleanup;
 	}
Signature · 1 line
2.2.1
author
#33 lore raw

PATCH 31/78 igb: bring link up when PHY is powered up

In reply to Jiri Slaby

From: Todd Fujinaka <[email protected]>

3.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

===============

commit aec653c43b0c55667355e26d7de1236bda9fb4e3 upstream.

Call igb_setup_link() when the PHY is powered up.

---
 drivers/net/ethernet/intel/igb/igb_main.c | 2 ++
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
drivers/net/ethernet/intel/igb/igb_main.c +2 -0
index 2b76ae55f2af..02544ce60b1f 100644
@@ -1587,6 +1587,8 @@ void igb_power_up_link(struct igb_adapter *adapter)
 		igb_power_up_phy_copper(&adapter->hw);
 	else
 		igb_power_up_serdes_link_82575(&adapter->hw);
+
+	igb_setup_link(&adapter->hw);
 }
 
 /**
Signature · 1 line
2.2.1
author
#34 lore raw

PATCH 32/78 powerpc: 32 bit getcpu VDSO function uses 64 bit instructions

In reply to Jiri Slaby

From: Anton Blanchard <[email protected]>

3.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

===============

commit 152d44a853e42952f6c8a504fb1f8eefd21fd5fd upstream.

I used some 64 bit instructions when adding the 32 bit getcpu VDSO function. Fix it.

Fixes 18ad51dd342a ("powerpc: Add VDSO version of getcpu")
---
 arch/powerpc/kernel/vdso32/getcpu.S | 4 ++--
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
arch/powerpc/kernel/vdso32/getcpu.S +2 -2
index 47afd08c90f7..fe7e97a1aad9 100644
@@ -30,8 +30,8 @@
 V_FUNCTION_BEGIN(__kernel_getcpu)
   .cfi_startproc
 	mfspr	r5,SPRN_USPRG3
-	cmpdi	cr0,r3,0
-	cmpdi	cr1,r4,0
+	cmpwi	cr0,r3,0
+	cmpwi	cr1,r4,0
 	clrlwi  r6,r5,16
 	rlwinm  r7,r5,16,31-15,31-0
 	beq	cr0,1f
Signature · 1 line
2.2.1
author
#35 lore raw

PATCH 33/78 ALSA: hda - Add EAPD fixup for ASUS Z99He laptop

In reply to Jiri Slaby

From: Takashi Iwai <[email protected]>

3.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

===============

commit f62f5eff3d40a56ad1cf0d81a6cac8dd8743e8a1 upstream.

The same fixup to enable EAPD is needed for ASUS Z99He with AD1986A codec like another ASUS machine.

---
 sound/pci/hda/patch_analog.c | 1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
sound/pci/hda/patch_analog.c +1 -0
index 01338064260e..10dc0c8fbb87 100644
@@ -316,6 +316,7 @@ static const struct hda_fixup ad1986a_fixups[] = {
 
 static const struct snd_pci_quirk ad1986a_fixup_tbl[] = {
 	SND_PCI_QUIRK(0x103c, 0x30af, "HP B2800", AD1986A_FIXUP_LAPTOP_IMIC),
+	SND_PCI_QUIRK(0x1043, 0x1443, "ASUS Z99He", AD1986A_FIXUP_EAPD),
 	SND_PCI_QUIRK(0x1043, 0x1447, "ASUS A8JN", AD1986A_FIXUP_EAPD),
 	SND_PCI_QUIRK_MASK(0x1043, 0xff00, 0x8100, "ASUS P5", AD1986A_FIXUP_3STACK),
 	SND_PCI_QUIRK_MASK(0x1043, 0xff00, 0x8200, "ASUS M2", AD1986A_FIXUP_3STACK),
Signature · 1 line
2.2.1
author
#36 lore raw

PATCH 34/78 ALSA: hda - Fix built-in mic at resume on Lenovo Ideapad S210

In reply to Jiri Slaby

From: Takashi Iwai <[email protected]>

3.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

===============

commit fedb2245cbb8d823e449ebdd48ba9bb35c071ce0 upstream.

The built-in mic boost volume gets almost muted after suspend/resume on Lenovo Ideapad S210.

Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=88121

---
 sound/pci/hda/patch_realtek.c | 1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
sound/pci/hda/patch_realtek.c +1 -0
index 8be86358f640..09193457d0b0 100644
@@ -4147,6 +4147,7 @@ static const struct snd_pci_quirk alc269_fixup_tbl[] = {
 	SND_PCI_QUIRK(0x17aa, 0x2212, "Thinkpad", ALC269_FIXUP_LIMIT_INT_MIC_BOOST),
 	SND_PCI_QUIRK(0x17aa, 0x2214, "Thinkpad", ALC269_FIXUP_LIMIT_INT_MIC_BOOST),
 	SND_PCI_QUIRK(0x17aa, 0x2215, "Thinkpad", ALC269_FIXUP_LIMIT_INT_MIC_BOOST),
+	SND_PCI_QUIRK(0x17aa, 0x3977, "IdeaPad S210", ALC283_FIXUP_INT_MIC),
 	SND_PCI_QUIRK(0x17aa, 0x3978, "IdeaPad Y410P", ALC269_FIXUP_NO_SHUTUP),
 	SND_PCI_QUIRK(0x17aa, 0x5013, "Thinkpad", ALC269_FIXUP_LIMIT_INT_MIC_BOOST),
 	SND_PCI_QUIRK(0x17aa, 0x501a, "Thinkpad", ALC283_FIXUP_INT_MIC),
Signature · 1 line
2.2.1
author
#37 lore raw

PATCH 35/78 ALSA: usb-audio: Don't resubmit pending URBs at MIDI error recovery

In reply to Jiri Slaby

From: Takashi Iwai <[email protected]>

3.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

===============

commit 66139a48cee1530c91f37c145384b4ee7043f0b7 upstream.

In snd_usbmidi_error_timer(), the driver tries to resubmit MIDI input URBs to reactivate the MIDI stream, but this causes the error when some of URBs are still pending like:

 WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 0 at ../drivers/usb/core/urb.c:339 usb_submit_urb+0x5f/0x70()
 URB ef705c40 submitted while active
 CPU: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 3.16.6-2-desktop #1
 Hardware name: FOXCONN TPS01/TPS01, BIOS 080015  03/23/2010
  c0984bfa f4009ed4 c078deaf f4009ee4 c024c884 c09a135c f4009f00 00000000
  c0984bfa 00000153 c061ac4f c061ac4f 00000009 00000001 ef705c40 e854d1c0
  f4009eec c024c8d3 00000009 f4009ee4 c09a135c f4009f00 f4009f04 c061ac4f
 Call Trace:
  [<c0205df6>] try_stack_unwind+0x156/0x170
  [<c020482a>] dump_trace+0x5a/0x1b0
  [<c0205e56>] show_trace_log_lvl+0x46/0x50
  [<c02049d1>] show_stack_log_lvl+0x51/0xe0
  [<c0205eb7>] show_stack+0x27/0x50
  [<c078deaf>] dump_stack+0x45/0x65
  [<c024c884>] warn_slowpath_common+0x84/0xa0
  [<c024c8d3>] warn_slowpath_fmt+0x33/0x40
  [<c061ac4f>] usb_submit_urb+0x5f/0x70
  [<f7974104>] snd_usbmidi_submit_urb+0x14/0x60 [snd_usbmidi_lib]
  [<f797483a>] snd_usbmidi_error_timer+0x6a/0xa0 [snd_usbmidi_lib]
  [<c02570c0>] call_timer_fn+0x30/0x130
  [<c0257442>] run_timer_softirq+0x1c2/0x260
  [<c0251493>] __do_softirq+0xc3/0x270
  [<c0204732>] do_softirq_own_stack+0x22/0x30
  [<c025186d>] irq_exit+0x8d/0xa0
  [<c0795228>] smp_apic_timer_interrupt+0x38/0x50
  [<c0794a3c>] apic_timer_interrupt+0x34/0x3c
  [<c0673d9e>] cpuidle_enter_state+0x3e/0xd0
  [<c028bb8d>] cpu_idle_loop+0x29d/0x3e0
  [<c028bd23>] cpu_startup_entry+0x53/0x60
  [<c0bfac1e>] start_kernel+0x415/0x41a

For avoiding these errors, check the pending URBs and skip resubmitting such ones.

---
 sound/usb/midi.c | 2 ++
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
sound/usb/midi.c +2 -0
index b901f468b67a..c7aa71ee775b 100644
@@ -364,6 +364,8 @@ static void snd_usbmidi_error_timer(unsigned long data)
 		if (in && in->error_resubmit) {
 			in->error_resubmit = 0;
 			for (j = 0; j < INPUT_URBS; ++j) {
+				if (atomic_read(&in->urbs[j]->use_count))
+					continue;
 				in->urbs[j]->dev = umidi->dev;
 				snd_usbmidi_submit_urb(in->urbs[j], GFP_ATOMIC);
 			}
Signature · 1 line
2.2.1
author
#38 lore raw

PATCH 36/78 isofs: Fix infinite looping over CE entries

In reply to Jiri Slaby

From: Jan Kara <[email protected]>

3.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

===============

commit f54e18f1b831c92f6512d2eedb224cd63d607d3d upstream.

Rock Ridge extensions define so called Continuation Entries (CE) which define where is further space with Rock Ridge data. Corrupted isofs image can contain arbitrarily long chain of these, including a one containing loop and thus causing kernel to end in an infinite loop when traversing these entries.

Limit the traversal to 32 entries which should be more than enough space to store all the Rock Ridge data.

---
 fs/isofs/rock.c | 6 ++++++
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)
fs/isofs/rock.c +6 -0
index f488bbae541a..bb63254ed848 100644
@@ -30,6 +30,7 @@ struct rock_state {
 	int cont_size;
 	int cont_extent;
 	int cont_offset;
+	int cont_loops;
 	struct inode *inode;
 };
 
@@ -73,6 +74,9 @@ static void init_rock_state(struct rock_state *rs, struct inode *inode)
 	rs->inode = inode;
 }
 
+/* Maximum number of Rock Ridge continuation entries */
+#define RR_MAX_CE_ENTRIES 32
+
 /*
  * Returns 0 if the caller should continue scanning, 1 if the scan must end
  * and -ve on error.
@@ -105,6 +109,8 @@ static int rock_continue(struct rock_state *rs)
 			goto out;
 		}
 		ret = -EIO;
+		if (++rs->cont_loops >= RR_MAX_CE_ENTRIES)
+			goto out;
 		bh = sb_bread(rs->inode->i_sb, rs->cont_extent);
 		if (bh) {
 			memcpy(rs->buffer, bh->b_data + rs->cont_offset,
Signature · 1 line
2.2.1
author
#39 lore raw

PATCH 37/78 x86/tls: Validate TLS entries to protect espfix

In reply to Jiri Slaby

From: Andy Lutomirski <[email protected]>

3.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

===============

commit 41bdc78544b8a93a9c6814b8bbbfef966272abbe upstream.

Installing a 16-bit RW data segment into the GDT defeats espfix. AFAICT this will not affect glibc, Wine, or dosemu at all.

---
 arch/x86/kernel/tls.c | 23 +++++++++++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 23 insertions(+)
arch/x86/kernel/tls.c +23 -0
index f7fec09e3e3a..e7650bd71109 100644
@@ -27,6 +27,21 @@ static int get_free_idx(void)
 	return -ESRCH;
 }
 
+static bool tls_desc_okay(const struct user_desc *info)
+{
+	if (LDT_empty(info))
+		return true;
+
+	/*
+	 * espfix is required for 16-bit data segments, but espfix
+	 * only works for LDT segments.
+	 */
+	if (!info->seg_32bit)
+		return false;
+
+	return true;
+}
+
 static void set_tls_desc(struct task_struct *p, int idx,
 			 const struct user_desc *info, int n)
 {
@@ -66,6 +81,9 @@ int do_set_thread_area(struct task_struct *p, int idx,
 	if (copy_from_user(&info, u_info, sizeof(info)))
 		return -EFAULT;
 
+	if (!tls_desc_okay(&info))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
 	if (idx == -1)
 		idx = info.entry_number;
 
@@ -192,6 +210,7 @@ int regset_tls_set(struct task_struct *target, const struct user_regset *regset,
 {
 	struct user_desc infobuf[GDT_ENTRY_TLS_ENTRIES];
 	const struct user_desc *info;
+	int i;
 
 	if (pos >= GDT_ENTRY_TLS_ENTRIES * sizeof(struct user_desc) ||
 	    (pos % sizeof(struct user_desc)) != 0 ||
@@ -205,6 +224,10 @@ int regset_tls_set(struct task_struct *target, const struct user_regset *regset,
 	else
 		info = infobuf;
 
+	for (i = 0; i < count / sizeof(struct user_desc); i++)
+		if (!tls_desc_okay(info + i))
+			return -EINVAL;
+
 	set_tls_desc(target,
 		     GDT_ENTRY_TLS_MIN + (pos / sizeof(struct user_desc)),
 		     info, count / sizeof(struct user_desc));
Signature · 1 line
2.2.1
author
#40 lore raw

PATCH 38/78 x86/tls: Disallow unusual TLS segments

In reply to Jiri Slaby

From: Andy Lutomirski <[email protected]>

3.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

===============

commit 0e58af4e1d2166e9e33375a0f121e4867010d4f8 upstream.

Users have no business installing custom code segments into the GDT, and segments that are not present but are otherwise valid are a historical source of interesting attacks.

For completeness, block attempts to set the L bit. (Prior to this patch, the L bit would have been silently dropped.)

This is an ABI break. I've checked glibc, musl, and Wine, and none of them look like they'll have any trouble.

Note to stable maintainers: this is a hardening patch that fixes no known bugs. Given the possibility of ABI issues, this probably shouldn't be backported quickly.

---
 arch/x86/kernel/tls.c | 22 ++++++++++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 22 insertions(+)
arch/x86/kernel/tls.c +22 -0
index e7650bd71109..3e551eee87b9 100644
@@ -39,6 +39,28 @@ static bool tls_desc_okay(const struct user_desc *info)
 	if (!info->seg_32bit)
 		return false;
 
+	/* Only allow data segments in the TLS array. */
+	if (info->contents > 1)
+		return false;
+
+	/*
+	 * Non-present segments with DPL 3 present an interesting attack
+	 * surface.  The kernel should handle such segments correctly,
+	 * but TLS is very difficult to protect in a sandbox, so prevent
+	 * such segments from being created.
+	 *
+	 * If userspace needs to remove a TLS entry, it can still delete
+	 * it outright.
+	 */
+	if (info->seg_not_present)
+		return false;
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
+	/* The L bit makes no sense for data. */
+	if (info->lm)
+		return false;
+#endif
+
 	return true;
 }
 
Signature · 1 line
2.2.1
author
#41 lore raw

PATCH 39/78 x86, kvm: Clear paravirt_enabled on KVM guests for espfix32's benefit

In reply to Jiri Slaby

From: Andy Lutomirski <[email protected]>

3.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

===============

commit 29fa6825463c97e5157284db80107d1bfac5d77b upstream.

paravirt_enabled has the following effects:

- Disables the F00F bug workaround warning. There is no F00F bug workaround any more because Linux's standard IDT handling already works around the F00F bug, but the warning still exists. This is only cosmetic, and, in any event, there is no such thing as KVM on a CPU with the F00F bug.

- Disables 32-bit APM BIOS detection. On a KVM paravirt system, there should be no APM BIOS anyway.

- Disables tboot. I think that the tboot code should check the CPUID hypervisor bit directly if it matters.

- paravirt_enabled disables espfix32. espfix32 should *not* be disabled under KVM paravirt.

The last point is the purpose of this patch. It fixes a leak of the high 16 bits of the kernel stack address on 32-bit KVM paravirt guests. Fixes CVE-2014-8134.

---
 arch/x86/kernel/kvm.c      | 9 ++++++++-
 arch/x86/kernel/kvmclock.c | 1 -
 2 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
arch/x86/kernel/kvm.c +8 -1
index f022c54a79a4..e72593338df6 100644
@@ -280,7 +280,14 @@ do_async_page_fault(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long error_code)
 static void __init paravirt_ops_setup(void)
 {
 	pv_info.name = "KVM";
-	pv_info.paravirt_enabled = 1;
+
+	/*
+	 * KVM isn't paravirt in the sense of paravirt_enabled.  A KVM
+	 * guest kernel works like a bare metal kernel with additional
+	 * features, and paravirt_enabled is about features that are
+	 * missing.
+	 */
+	pv_info.paravirt_enabled = 0;
 
 	if (kvm_para_has_feature(KVM_FEATURE_NOP_IO_DELAY))
 		pv_cpu_ops.io_delay = kvm_io_delay;
arch/x86/kernel/kvmclock.c +0 -1
index 1570e0741344..23457e5f0f4f 100644
@@ -262,7 +262,6 @@ void __init kvmclock_init(void)
 #endif
 	kvm_get_preset_lpj();
 	clocksource_register_hz(&kvm_clock, NSEC_PER_SEC);
-	pv_info.paravirt_enabled = 1;
 	pv_info.name = "KVM";
 
 	if (kvm_para_has_feature(KVM_FEATURE_CLOCKSOURCE_STABLE_BIT))
Signature · 1 line
2.2.1
author
#42 lore raw

PATCH 40/78 mfd: tc6393xb: Fail ohci suspend if full state restore is required

In reply to Jiri Slaby

From: Dmitry Eremin-Solenikov <[email protected]>

3.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

===============

commit 1a5fb99de4850cba710d91becfa2c65653048589 upstream.

Some boards with TC6393XB chip require full state restore during system resume thanks to chip's VCC being cut off during suspend (Sharp SL-6000 tosa is one of them). Failing to do so would result in ohci Oops on resume due to internal memory contentes being changed. Fail ohci suspend on tc6393xb is full state restore is required.

Recommended workaround is to unbind tmio-ohci driver before suspend and rebind it after resume.

---
 drivers/mfd/tc6393xb.c | 13 ++++++++++++-
 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/mfd/tc6393xb.c +12 -1
index 11c19e538551..48579e5ef02c 100644
@@ -263,6 +263,17 @@ static int tc6393xb_ohci_disable(struct platform_device *dev)
 	return 0;
 }
 
+static int tc6393xb_ohci_suspend(struct platform_device *dev)
+{
+	struct tc6393xb_platform_data *tcpd = dev_get_platdata(dev->dev.parent);
+
+	/* We can't properly store/restore OHCI state, so fail here */
+	if (tcpd->resume_restore)
+		return -EBUSY;
+
+	return tc6393xb_ohci_disable(dev);
+}
+
 static int tc6393xb_fb_enable(struct platform_device *dev)
 {
 	struct tc6393xb *tc6393xb = dev_get_drvdata(dev->dev.parent);
@@ -403,7 +414,7 @@ static struct mfd_cell tc6393xb_cells[] = {
 		.num_resources = ARRAY_SIZE(tc6393xb_ohci_resources),
 		.resources = tc6393xb_ohci_resources,
 		.enable = tc6393xb_ohci_enable,
-		.suspend = tc6393xb_ohci_disable,
+		.suspend = tc6393xb_ohci_suspend,
 		.resume = tc6393xb_ohci_enable,
 		.disable = tc6393xb_ohci_disable,
 	},
Signature · 1 line
2.2.1
author
#43 lore raw

PATCH 41/78 mmc: block: add newline to sysfs display of force_ro

In reply to Jiri Slaby

From: Baruch Siach <[email protected]>

3.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

===============

commit 0031a98a85e9fca282624bfc887f9531b2768396 upstream.

Make force_ro consistent with other sysfs entries.

Fixes 371a689f64b0d ('mmc: MMC boot partitions support')
Cc Andrei Warkentin <[email protected]>
---
 drivers/mmc/card/block.c | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/mmc/card/block.c +1 -1
index 4e8212c714b1..2aea365e096e 100644
@@ -260,7 +260,7 @@ static ssize_t force_ro_show(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr,
 	int ret;
 	struct mmc_blk_data *md = mmc_blk_get(dev_to_disk(dev));
 
-	ret = snprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, "%d",
+	ret = snprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, "%d\n",
 		       get_disk_ro(dev_to_disk(dev)) ^
 		       md->read_only);
 	mmc_blk_put(md);
Signature · 1 line
2.2.1
author
#44 lore raw

PATCH 42/78 megaraid_sas: corrected return of wait_event from abort frame path

In reply to Jiri Slaby

From: "[email protected]" <[email protected]>

3.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

===============

commit 170c238701ec38b1829321b17c70671c101bac55 upstream.

Corrected wait_event() call which was waiting for wrong completion status (0xFF).

---
 drivers/scsi/megaraid/megaraid_sas_base.c | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/scsi/megaraid/megaraid_sas_base.c +1 -1
index a59a5526a318..855dc7c4cad7 100644
@@ -953,7 +953,7 @@ megasas_issue_blocked_abort_cmd(struct megasas_instance *instance,
 		cpu_to_le32(upper_32_bits(cmd_to_abort->frame_phys_addr));
 
 	cmd->sync_cmd = 1;
-	cmd->cmd_status = 0xFF;
+	cmd->cmd_status = ENODATA;
 
 	instance->instancet->issue_dcmd(instance, cmd);
 
Signature · 1 line
2.2.1
author
#45 lore raw

PATCH 43/78 scsi: correct return values for .eh_abort_handler implementations

In reply to Jiri Slaby

From: Hannes Reinecke <[email protected]>

3.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

===============

commit b6c92b7e0af575e2b8b05bdf33633cf9e1661cbf upstream.

The .eh_abort_handler needs to return SUCCESS, FAILED, or FAST_IO_FAIL. So fixup all callers to adhere to this requirement.

---
 drivers/scsi/NCR5380.c            | 12 ++++++------
 drivers/scsi/aha1740.c            |  2 +-
 drivers/scsi/atari_NCR5380.c      |  2 +-
 drivers/scsi/esas2r/esas2r_main.c |  2 +-
 drivers/scsi/megaraid.c           |  8 ++++----
 drivers/scsi/sun3_NCR5380.c       | 10 +++++-----
 6 files changed, 18 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-)
drivers/scsi/NCR5380.c +6 -6
index 1e9d6ad9302b..7563b3d9cc76 100644
@@ -2655,14 +2655,14 @@ static void NCR5380_dma_complete(NCR5380_instance * instance) {
  *
  * Purpose : abort a command
  *
- * Inputs : cmd - the Scsi_Cmnd to abort, code - code to set the 
- *      host byte of the result field to, if zero DID_ABORTED is 
+ * Inputs : cmd - the Scsi_Cmnd to abort, code - code to set the
+ *      host byte of the result field to, if zero DID_ABORTED is
  *      used.
  *
- * Returns : 0 - success, -1 on failure.
+ * Returns : SUCCESS - success, FAILED on failure.
  *
- *	XXX - there is no way to abort the command that is currently 
- *	connected, you have to wait for it to complete.  If this is 
+ *	XXX - there is no way to abort the command that is currently
+ *	connected, you have to wait for it to complete.  If this is
  *	a problem, we could implement longjmp() / setjmp(), setjmp()
  *	called where the loop started in NCR5380_main().
  *
@@ -2712,7 +2712,7 @@ static int NCR5380_abort(Scsi_Cmnd * cmd) {
  * aborted flag and get back into our main loop.
  */
 
-		return 0;
+		return SUCCESS;
 	}
 #endif
 
drivers/scsi/aha1740.c +1 -1
index 5f3101797c93..31ace4bef8fe 100644
@@ -531,7 +531,7 @@ static int aha1740_eh_abort_handler (Scsi_Cmnd *dummy)
  * quiet as possible...
  */
 
-	return 0;
+	return SUCCESS;
 }
 
 static struct scsi_host_template aha1740_template = {
drivers/scsi/atari_NCR5380.c +1 -1
index 0f3cdbc80ba6..30073d43d87b 100644
@@ -2613,7 +2613,7 @@ static void NCR5380_reselect(struct Scsi_Host *instance)
  *	host byte of the result field to, if zero DID_ABORTED is
  *	used.
  *
- * Returns : 0 - success, -1 on failure.
+ * Returns : SUCCESS - success, FAILED on failure.
  *
  * XXX - there is no way to abort the command that is currently
  *	 connected, you have to wait for it to complete.  If this is
drivers/scsi/esas2r/esas2r_main.c +1 -1
index 4abf1272e1eb..5718b1febd57 100644
@@ -1057,7 +1057,7 @@ int esas2r_eh_abort(struct scsi_cmnd *cmd)
 
 		cmd->scsi_done(cmd);
 
-		return 0;
+		return SUCCESS;
 	}
 
 	spin_lock_irqsave(&a->queue_lock, flags);
drivers/scsi/megaraid.c +4 -4
index 816db12ef5d5..52587ceac099 100644
@@ -1967,7 +1967,7 @@ megaraid_abort_and_reset(adapter_t *adapter, Scsi_Cmnd *cmd, int aor)
 	     cmd->device->id, cmd->device->lun);
 
 	if(list_empty(&adapter->pending_list))
-		return FALSE;
+		return FAILED;
 
 	list_for_each_safe(pos, next, &adapter->pending_list) {
 
@@ -1990,7 +1990,7 @@ megaraid_abort_and_reset(adapter_t *adapter, Scsi_Cmnd *cmd, int aor)
 					(aor==SCB_ABORT) ? "ABORTING":"RESET",
 					scb->idx);
 
-				return FALSE;
+				return FAILED;
 			}
 			else {
 
@@ -2015,12 +2015,12 @@ megaraid_abort_and_reset(adapter_t *adapter, Scsi_Cmnd *cmd, int aor)
 				list_add_tail(SCSI_LIST(cmd),
 						&adapter->completed_list);
 
-				return TRUE;
+				return SUCCESS;
 			}
 		}
 	}
 
-	return FALSE;
+	return FAILED;
 }
 
 static inline int
drivers/scsi/sun3_NCR5380.c +5 -5
index 636bbe0ea84c..fc57c8aec2b3 100644
@@ -2597,15 +2597,15 @@ static void NCR5380_reselect (struct Scsi_Host *instance)
  * Purpose : abort a command
  *
  * Inputs : cmd - the struct scsi_cmnd to abort, code - code to set the
- * 	host byte of the result field to, if zero DID_ABORTED is 
+ *	host byte of the result field to, if zero DID_ABORTED is
  *	used.
  *
- * Returns : 0 - success, -1 on failure.
+ * Returns : SUCCESS - success, FAILED on failure.
  *
- * XXX - there is no way to abort the command that is currently 
- * 	 connected, you have to wait for it to complete.  If this is 
+ * XXX - there is no way to abort the command that is currently
+ *	 connected, you have to wait for it to complete.  If this is
  *	 a problem, we could implement longjmp() / setjmp(), setjmp()
- * 	 called where the loop started in NCR5380_main().
+ *	 called where the loop started in NCR5380_main().
  */
 
 static int NCR5380_abort(struct scsi_cmnd *cmd)
Signature · 1 line
2.2.1
author
#46 lore raw

PATCH 44/78 nfs41: fix nfs4_proc_layoutget error handling

In reply to Jiri Slaby

From: Peng Tao <[email protected]>

3.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

===============

commit 4bd5a980de87d2b5af417485bde97b8eb3d6cf6a upstream.

nfs4_layoutget_release() drops layout hdr refcnt. Grab the refcnt early so that it is safe to call .release in case nfs4_alloc_pages fails.

Fixes a47970ff78147 ("NFSv4.1: Hold reference to layout hdr in layoutget")
---
 fs/nfs/nfs4proc.c | 6 +++---
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
fs/nfs/nfs4proc.c +3 -3
index 759875038791..43c27110387a 100644
@@ -7238,6 +7238,9 @@ nfs4_proc_layoutget(struct nfs4_layoutget *lgp, gfp_t gfp_flags)
 
 	dprintk("--> %s\n", __func__);
 
+	/* nfs4_layoutget_release calls pnfs_put_layout_hdr */
+	pnfs_get_layout_hdr(NFS_I(inode)->layout);
+
 	lgp->args.layout.pages = nfs4_alloc_pages(max_pages, gfp_flags);
 	if (!lgp->args.layout.pages) {
 		nfs4_layoutget_release(lgp);
@@ -7250,9 +7253,6 @@ nfs4_proc_layoutget(struct nfs4_layoutget *lgp, gfp_t gfp_flags)
 	lgp->res.seq_res.sr_slot = NULL;
 	nfs4_init_sequence(&lgp->args.seq_args, &lgp->res.seq_res, 0);
 
-	/* nfs4_layoutget_release calls pnfs_put_layout_hdr */
-	pnfs_get_layout_hdr(NFS_I(inode)->layout);
-
 	task = rpc_run_task(&task_setup_data);
 	if (IS_ERR(task))
 		return ERR_CAST(task);
Signature · 1 line
2.2.1
author
#47 lore raw

PATCH 45/78 dm bufio: fix memleak when using a dm_buffer's inline bio

In reply to Jiri Slaby

From: "Darrick J. Wong" <[email protected]>

3.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

===============

commit 445559cdcb98a141f5de415b94fd6eaccab87e6d upstream.

When dm-bufio sets out to use the bio built into a struct dm_buffer to issue an IO, it needs to call bio_reset after it's done with the bio so that we can free things attached to the bio such as the integrity payload. Therefore, inject our own endio callback to take care of the bio_reset after calling submit_io's end_io callback.

Test case:
1. modprobe scsi_debug delay=0 dif=1 dix=199 ato=1 dev_size_mb=300
2. Set up a dm-bufio client, e.g. dm-verity, on the scsi_debug device
3. Repeatedly read metadata and watch kmalloc-192 leak!

---
 drivers/md/dm-bufio.c | 20 +++++++++++++++++++-
 1 file changed, 19 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/md/dm-bufio.c +19 -1
index 140be2dd3e23..93edd894e94b 100644
@@ -530,6 +530,19 @@ static void use_dmio(struct dm_buffer *b, int rw, sector_t block,
 		end_io(&b->bio, r);
 }
 
+static void inline_endio(struct bio *bio, int error)
+{
+	bio_end_io_t *end_fn = bio->bi_private;
+
+	/*
+	 * Reset the bio to free any attached resources
+	 * (e.g. bio integrity profiles).
+	 */
+	bio_reset(bio);
+
+	end_fn(bio, error);
+}
+
 static void use_inline_bio(struct dm_buffer *b, int rw, sector_t block,
 			   bio_end_io_t *end_io)
 {
@@ -541,7 +554,12 @@ static void use_inline_bio(struct dm_buffer *b, int rw, sector_t block,
 	b->bio.bi_max_vecs = DM_BUFIO_INLINE_VECS;
 	b->bio.bi_sector = block << b->c->sectors_per_block_bits;
 	b->bio.bi_bdev = b->c->bdev;
-	b->bio.bi_end_io = end_io;
+	b->bio.bi_end_io = inline_endio;
+	/*
+	 * Use of .bi_private isn't a problem here because
+	 * the dm_buffer's inline bio is local to bufio.
+	 */
+	b->bio.bi_private = end_io;
 
 	/*
 	 * We assume that if len >= PAGE_SIZE ptr is page-aligned.
Signature · 1 line
2.2.1
author
#48 lore raw

PATCH 46/78 dm space map metadata: fix sm_bootstrap_get_nr_blocks()

In reply to Jiri Slaby

From: Dan Carpenter <[email protected]>

3.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

===============

commit c1c6156fe4d4577444b769d7edd5dd503e57bbc9 upstream.

This function isn't right and it causes a static checker warning:

	drivers/md/dm-thin.c:3016 maybe_resize_data_dev()
	error: potentially using uninitialized 'sb_data_size'.

It should set "*count" and return zero on success the same as the sm_metadata_get_nr_blocks() function does earlier.

Fixes 3241b1d3e0aa ('dm: add persistent data library')
---
 drivers/md/persistent-data/dm-space-map-metadata.c | 4 +++-
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/md/persistent-data/dm-space-map-metadata.c +3 -1
index 579b58200bf2..d9a5aa532017 100644
@@ -564,7 +564,9 @@ static int sm_bootstrap_get_nr_blocks(struct dm_space_map *sm, dm_block_t *count
 {
 	struct sm_metadata *smm = container_of(sm, struct sm_metadata, sm);
 
-	return smm->ll.nr_blocks;
+	*count = smm->ll.nr_blocks;
+
+	return 0;
 }
 
 static int sm_bootstrap_get_nr_free(struct dm_space_map *sm, dm_block_t *count)
Signature · 1 line
2.2.1
author
#49 lore raw

PATCH 47/78 x86/tls: Don't validate lm in set_thread_area() after all

In reply to Jiri Slaby

From: Andy Lutomirski <[email protected]>

3.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

===============

commit 3fb2f4237bb452eb4e98f6a5dbd5a445b4fed9d0 upstream.

It turns out that there's a lurking ABI issue. GCC, when compiling this in a 32-bit program:

struct user_desc desc = {
	.entry_number    = idx,
	.base_addr       = base,
	.limit           = 0xfffff,
	.seg_32bit       = 1,
	.contents        = 0, /* Data, grow-up */
	.read_exec_only  = 0,
	.limit_in_pages  = 1,
	.seg_not_present = 0,
	.useable         = 0,
};

will leave .lm uninitialized. This means that anything in the kernel that reads user_desc.lm for 32-bit tasks is unreliable.

Revert the .lm check in set_thread_area(). The value never did anything in the first place.

---
 arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/ldt.h | 7 +++++++
 arch/x86/kernel/tls.c           | 6 ------
 2 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/ldt.h +7 -0
index 46727eb37bfe..6e1aaf73852a 100644
@@ -28,6 +28,13 @@ struct user_desc {
 	unsigned int  seg_not_present:1;
 	unsigned int  useable:1;
 #ifdef __x86_64__
+	/*
+	 * Because this bit is not present in 32-bit user code, user
+	 * programs can pass uninitialized values here.  Therefore, in
+	 * any context in which a user_desc comes from a 32-bit program,
+	 * the kernel must act as though lm == 0, regardless of the
+	 * actual value.
+	 */
 	unsigned int  lm:1;
 #endif
 };
arch/x86/kernel/tls.c +0 -6
index 3e551eee87b9..4e942f31b1a7 100644
@@ -55,12 +55,6 @@ static bool tls_desc_okay(const struct user_desc *info)
 	if (info->seg_not_present)
 		return false;
 
-#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
-	/* The L bit makes no sense for data. */
-	if (info->lm)
-		return false;
-#endif
-
 	return true;
 }
 
Signature · 1 line
2.2.1
author
#50 lore raw

PATCH 48/78 audit: change decimal constant to macro for invalid uid

In reply to Jiri Slaby

From: Richard Guy Briggs <[email protected]>

3.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

===============

commit 42f74461a5b60cf6b42887e6d2ff5b7be4abf1ca upstream.

SFR reported this 2013-05-15:

Quoted 9 lines

After merging the final tree, today's linux-next build (i386 defconfig) produced this warning:

kernel/auditfilter.c: In function 'audit_data_to_entry':
kernel/auditfilter.c:426:3: warning: this decimal constant is unsigned only in ISO C90 [enabled by default]

Introduced by commit 780a7654cee8 ("audit: Make testing for a valid loginuid explicit") from Linus' tree.

Replace this decimal constant in the code with a macro to make it more readable (add to the unsigned cast to quiet the warning).

---
 include/uapi/linux/audit.h | 2 ++
 kernel/auditfilter.c       | 2 +-
 2 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
include/uapi/linux/audit.h +2 -0
index 75cef3fd97ad..b7cb978ed579 100644
@@ -374,6 +374,8 @@ struct audit_tty_status {
 	__u32		log_passwd;	/* 1 = enabled, 0 = disabled */
 };
 
+#define AUDIT_UID_UNSET (unsigned int)-1
+
 /* audit_rule_data supports filter rules with both integer and string
  * fields.  It corresponds with AUDIT_ADD_RULE, AUDIT_DEL_RULE and
  * AUDIT_LIST_RULES requests.
kernel/auditfilter.c +1 -1
index f7aee8be7fb2..8a344cebd8bf 100644
@@ -423,7 +423,7 @@ static struct audit_entry *audit_data_to_entry(struct audit_rule_data *data,
 		f->lsm_rule = NULL;
 
 		/* Support legacy tests for a valid loginuid */
-		if ((f->type == AUDIT_LOGINUID) && (f->val == ~0U)) {
+		if ((f->type == AUDIT_LOGINUID) && (f->val == AUDIT_UID_UNSET)) {
 			f->type = AUDIT_LOGINUID_SET;
 			f->val = 0;
 		}
Signature · 1 line
2.2.1
author
#51 lore raw

PATCH 49/78 isofs: Fix unchecked printing of ER records

In reply to Jiri Slaby

From: Jan Kara <[email protected]>

3.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

===============

commit 4e2024624e678f0ebb916e6192bd23c1f9fdf696 upstream.

We didn't check length of rock ridge ER records before printing them. Thus corrupted isofs image can cause us to access and print some memory behind the buffer with obvious consequences.

---
 fs/isofs/rock.c | 3 +++
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
fs/isofs/rock.c +3 -0
index bb63254ed848..735d7522a3a9 100644
@@ -362,6 +362,9 @@ repeat:
 			rs.cont_size = isonum_733(rr->u.CE.size);
 			break;
 		case SIG('E', 'R'):
+			/* Invalid length of ER tag id? */
+			if (rr->u.ER.len_id + offsetof(struct rock_ridge, u.ER.data) > rr->len)
+				goto out;
 			ISOFS_SB(inode->i_sb)->s_rock = 1;
 			printk(KERN_DEBUG "ISO 9660 Extensions: ");
 			{
Signature · 1 line
2.2.1
author
#52 lore raw

PATCH 50/78 KEYS: Fix stale key registration at error path

In reply to Jiri Slaby

From: Takashi Iwai <[email protected]>

3.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

===============

commit b26bdde5bb27f3f900e25a95e33a0c476c8c2c48 upstream.

When loading encrypted-keys module, if the last check of aes_get_sizes() in init_encrypted() fails, the driver just returns an error without unregistering its key type. This results in the stale entry in the list. In addition to memory leaks, this leads to a kernel crash when registering a new key type later.

This patch fixes the problem by swapping the calls of aes_get_sizes() and register_key_type(), and releasing resources properly at the error paths.

Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.opensuse.org/show_bug.cgi?id=908163

---
 security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.c | 5 ++++-
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.c +4 -1
index 9e1e005c7596..c4c8df4b214d 100644
@@ -1018,10 +1018,13 @@ static int __init init_encrypted(void)
 	ret = encrypted_shash_alloc();
 	if (ret < 0)
 		return ret;
+	ret = aes_get_sizes();
+	if (ret < 0)
+		goto out;
 	ret = register_key_type(&key_type_encrypted);
 	if (ret < 0)
 		goto out;
-	return aes_get_sizes();
+	return 0;
 out:
 	encrypted_shash_release();
 	return ret;
Signature · 1 line
2.2.1
author
#53 lore raw

PATCH 51/78 mac80211: fix multicast LED blinking and counter

In reply to Jiri Slaby

From: Andreas Müller <[email protected]>

3.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

===============

commit d025933e29872cb1fe19fc54d80e4dfa4ee5779c upstream.

As multicast-frames can't be fragmented, "dot11MulticastReceivedFrameCount" stopped being incremented after the use-after-free fix. Furthermore, the RX-LED will be triggered by every multicast frame (which wouldn't happen before) which wouldn't allow the LED to rest at all.

Fixes https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=89431 which also had the patch.

Fixes b8fff407a180 ("mac80211: fix use-after-free in defragmentation")
[rewrite commit message]
---
 net/mac80211/rx.c | 11 ++++++-----
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
net/mac80211/rx.c +6 -5
index 275cb85bfa31..ef3bdba9309e 100644
@@ -1646,14 +1646,14 @@ ieee80211_rx_h_defragment(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx)
 	sc = le16_to_cpu(hdr->seq_ctrl);
 	frag = sc & IEEE80211_SCTL_FRAG;
 
-	if (likely(!ieee80211_has_morefrags(fc) && frag == 0))
-		goto out;
-
 	if (is_multicast_ether_addr(hdr->addr1)) {
 		rx->local->dot11MulticastReceivedFrameCount++;
-		goto out;
+		goto out_no_led;
 	}
 
+	if (likely(!ieee80211_has_morefrags(fc) && frag == 0))
+		goto out;
+
 	I802_DEBUG_INC(rx->local->rx_handlers_fragments);
 
 	if (skb_linearize(rx->skb))
@@ -1744,9 +1744,10 @@ ieee80211_rx_h_defragment(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx)
 	status->rx_flags |= IEEE80211_RX_FRAGMENTED;
 
  out:
+	ieee80211_led_rx(rx->local);
+ out_no_led:
 	if (rx->sta)
 		rx->sta->rx_packets++;
-	ieee80211_led_rx(rx->local);
 	return RX_CONTINUE;
 }
 
Signature · 1 line
2.2.1
author
#54 lore raw

PATCH 52/78 mac80211: free management frame keys when removing station

In reply to Jiri Slaby

From: Johannes Berg <[email protected]>

3.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

===============

commit 28a9bc68124c319b2b3dc861e80828a8865fd1ba upstream.

When writing the code to allow per-station GTKs, I neglected to take into account the management frame keys (index 4 and 5) when freeing the station and only added code to free the first four data frame keys.

Fix this by iterating the array of keys over the right length.

Fixes e31b82136d1a ("cfg80211/mac80211: allow per-station GTKs")
---
 net/mac80211/key.c | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
net/mac80211/key.c +1 -1
index 620677e897bd..23dfd244c892 100644
@@ -615,7 +615,7 @@ void ieee80211_free_sta_keys(struct ieee80211_local *local,
 	int i;
 
 	mutex_lock(&local->key_mtx);
-	for (i = 0; i < NUM_DEFAULT_KEYS; i++) {
+	for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(sta->gtk); i++) {
 		key = key_mtx_dereference(local, sta->gtk[i]);
 		if (!key)
 			continue;
Signature · 1 line
2.2.1
author
#55 lore raw

PATCH 53/78 thermal: Fix error path in thermal_init()

In reply to Jiri Slaby

From: Luis Henriques <[email protected]>

3.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

===============

commit 9d367e5e7b05c71a8c1ac4e9b6e00ba45a79f2fc upstream.

thermal_unregister_governors() and class_unregister() were being called in the wrong order.

Fixes 80a26a5c22b9 ("Thermal: build thermal governors into thermal_sys module")
---
 drivers/thermal/thermal_core.c | 4 ++--
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/thermal/thermal_core.c +2 -2
index 4962a6aaf295..4f35f1ca3ce3 100644
@@ -1747,10 +1747,10 @@ static int __init thermal_init(void)
 
 	return 0;
 
-unregister_governors:
-	thermal_unregister_governors();
 unregister_class:
 	class_unregister(&thermal_class);
+unregister_governors:
+	thermal_unregister_governors();
 error:
 	idr_destroy(&thermal_tz_idr);
 	idr_destroy(&thermal_cdev_idr);
Signature · 1 line
2.2.1
author
#56 lore raw

PATCH 54/78 mnt: Implicitly add MNT_NODEV on remount when it was implicitly added by mount

In reply to Jiri Slaby

From: "Eric W. Biederman" <[email protected]>

3.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

===============

commit 3e1866410f11356a9fd869beb3e95983dc79c067 upstream.

Now that remount is properly enforcing the rule that you can't remove nodev at least sandstorm.io is breaking when performing a remount.

It turns out that there is an easy intuitive solution implicitly add nodev on remount when nodev was implicitly added on mount.

---
 fs/namespace.c | 8 +++++++-
 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
fs/namespace.c +7 -1
index d00750d2f91e..6b42c6d1590e 100644
@@ -1858,7 +1858,13 @@ static int do_remount(struct path *path, int flags, int mnt_flags,
 	}
 	if ((mnt->mnt.mnt_flags & MNT_LOCK_NODEV) &&
 	    !(mnt_flags & MNT_NODEV)) {
-		return -EPERM;
+		/* Was the nodev implicitly added in mount? */
+		if ((mnt->mnt_ns->user_ns != &init_user_ns) &&
+		    !(sb->s_type->fs_flags & FS_USERNS_DEV_MOUNT)) {
+			mnt_flags |= MNT_NODEV;
+		} else {
+			return -EPERM;
+		}
 	}
 	if ((mnt->mnt.mnt_flags & MNT_LOCK_NOSUID) &&
 	    !(mnt_flags & MNT_NOSUID)) {
Signature · 1 line
2.2.1
author
#57 lore raw

PATCH 55/78 mnt: Update unprivileged remount test

In reply to Jiri Slaby

From: "Eric W. Biederman" <[email protected]>

3.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

===============

commit 4a44a19b470a886997d6647a77bb3e38dcbfa8c5 upstream.

- MNT_NODEV should be irrelevant except when reading back mount flags, no longer specify MNT_NODEV on remount.

- Test MNT_NODEV on devpts where it is meaningful even for unprivileged mounts.

- Add a test to verify that remount of a prexisting mount with the same flags is allowed and does not change those flags.

- Cleanup up the definitions of MS_REC, MS_RELATIME, MS_STRICTATIME that are used when the code is built in an environment without them.

- Correct the test error messages when tests fail. There were not 5 tests that tested MS_RELATIME.

---
 .../selftests/mount/unprivileged-remount-test.c    | 172 +++++++++++++++++----
 1 file changed, 142 insertions(+), 30 deletions(-)
tools/testing/selftests/mount/unprivileged-remount-test.c +142 -30
index 1b3ff2fda4d0..9669d375625a 100644
@@ -6,6 +6,8 @@
 #include <sys/types.h>
 #include <sys/mount.h>
 #include <sys/wait.h>
+#include <sys/vfs.h>
+#include <sys/statvfs.h>
 #include <stdlib.h>
 #include <unistd.h>
 #include <fcntl.h>
@@ -32,11 +34,14 @@
 # define CLONE_NEWPID 0x20000000
 #endif
 
+#ifndef MS_REC
+# define MS_REC 16384
+#endif
 #ifndef MS_RELATIME
-#define MS_RELATIME (1 << 21)
+# define MS_RELATIME (1 << 21)
 #endif
 #ifndef MS_STRICTATIME
-#define MS_STRICTATIME (1 << 24)
+# define MS_STRICTATIME (1 << 24)
 #endif
 
 static void die(char *fmt, ...)
@@ -87,6 +92,45 @@ static void write_file(char *filename, char *fmt, ...)
 	}
 }
 
+static int read_mnt_flags(const char *path)
+{
+	int ret;
+	struct statvfs stat;
+	int mnt_flags;
+
+	ret = statvfs(path, &stat);
+	if (ret != 0) {
+		die("statvfs of %s failed: %s\n",
+			path, strerror(errno));
+	}
+	if (stat.f_flag & ~(ST_RDONLY | ST_NOSUID | ST_NODEV | \
+			ST_NOEXEC | ST_NOATIME | ST_NODIRATIME | ST_RELATIME | \
+			ST_SYNCHRONOUS | ST_MANDLOCK)) {
+		die("Unrecognized mount flags\n");
+	}
+	mnt_flags = 0;
+	if (stat.f_flag & ST_RDONLY)
+		mnt_flags |= MS_RDONLY;
+	if (stat.f_flag & ST_NOSUID)
+		mnt_flags |= MS_NOSUID;
+	if (stat.f_flag & ST_NODEV)
+		mnt_flags |= MS_NODEV;
+	if (stat.f_flag & ST_NOEXEC)
+		mnt_flags |= MS_NOEXEC;
+	if (stat.f_flag & ST_NOATIME)
+		mnt_flags |= MS_NOATIME;
+	if (stat.f_flag & ST_NODIRATIME)
+		mnt_flags |= MS_NODIRATIME;
+	if (stat.f_flag & ST_RELATIME)
+		mnt_flags |= MS_RELATIME;
+	if (stat.f_flag & ST_SYNCHRONOUS)
+		mnt_flags |= MS_SYNCHRONOUS;
+	if (stat.f_flag & ST_MANDLOCK)
+		mnt_flags |= ST_MANDLOCK;
+
+	return mnt_flags;
+}
+
 static void create_and_enter_userns(void)
 {
 	uid_t uid;
@@ -118,7 +162,8 @@ static void create_and_enter_userns(void)
 }
 
 static
-bool test_unpriv_remount(int mount_flags, int remount_flags, int invalid_flags)
+bool test_unpriv_remount(const char *fstype, const char *mount_options,
+			 int mount_flags, int remount_flags, int invalid_flags)
 {
 	pid_t child;
 
@@ -151,9 +196,11 @@ bool test_unpriv_remount(int mount_flags, int remount_flags, int invalid_flags)
 			strerror(errno));
 	}
 
-	if (mount("testing", "/tmp", "ramfs", mount_flags, NULL) != 0) {
-		die("mount of /tmp failed: %s\n",
-			strerror(errno));
+	if (mount("testing", "/tmp", fstype, mount_flags, mount_options) != 0) {
+		die("mount of %s with options '%s' on /tmp failed: %s\n",
+		    fstype,
+		    mount_options? mount_options : "",
+		    strerror(errno));
 	}
 
 	create_and_enter_userns();
@@ -181,62 +228,127 @@ bool test_unpriv_remount(int mount_flags, int remount_flags, int invalid_flags)
 
 static bool test_unpriv_remount_simple(int mount_flags)
 {
-	return test_unpriv_remount(mount_flags, mount_flags, 0);
+	return test_unpriv_remount("ramfs", NULL, mount_flags, mount_flags, 0);
 }
 
 static bool test_unpriv_remount_atime(int mount_flags, int invalid_flags)
 {
-	return test_unpriv_remount(mount_flags, mount_flags, invalid_flags);
+	return test_unpriv_remount("ramfs", NULL, mount_flags, mount_flags,
+				   invalid_flags);
+}
+
+static bool test_priv_mount_unpriv_remount(void)
+{
+	pid_t child;
+	int ret;
+	const char *orig_path = "/dev";
+	const char *dest_path = "/tmp";
+	int orig_mnt_flags, remount_mnt_flags;
+
+	child = fork();
+	if (child == -1) {
+		die("fork failed: %s\n",
+			strerror(errno));
+	}
+	if (child != 0) { /* parent */
+		pid_t pid;
+		int status;
+		pid = waitpid(child, &status, 0);
+		if (pid == -1) {
+			die("waitpid failed: %s\n",
+				strerror(errno));
+		}
+		if (pid != child) {
+			die("waited for %d got %d\n",
+				child, pid);
+		}
+		if (!WIFEXITED(status)) {
+			die("child did not terminate cleanly\n");
+		}
+		return WEXITSTATUS(status) == EXIT_SUCCESS ? true : false;
+	}
+
+	orig_mnt_flags = read_mnt_flags(orig_path);
+
+	create_and_enter_userns();
+	ret = unshare(CLONE_NEWNS);
+	if (ret != 0) {
+		die("unshare(CLONE_NEWNS) failed: %s\n",
+			strerror(errno));
+	}
+
+	ret = mount(orig_path, dest_path, "bind", MS_BIND | MS_REC, NULL);
+	if (ret != 0) {
+		die("recursive bind mount of %s onto %s failed: %s\n",
+			orig_path, dest_path, strerror(errno));
+	}
+
+	ret = mount(dest_path, dest_path, "none",
+		    MS_REMOUNT | MS_BIND | orig_mnt_flags , NULL);
+	if (ret != 0) {
+		/* system("cat /proc/self/mounts"); */
+		die("remount of /tmp failed: %s\n",
+		    strerror(errno));
+	}
+
+	remount_mnt_flags = read_mnt_flags(dest_path);
+	if (orig_mnt_flags != remount_mnt_flags) {
+		die("Mount flags unexpectedly changed during remount of %s originally mounted on %s\n",
+			dest_path, orig_path);
+	}
+	exit(EXIT_SUCCESS);
 }
 
 int main(int argc, char **argv)
 {
-	if (!test_unpriv_remount_simple(MS_RDONLY|MS_NODEV)) {
+	if (!test_unpriv_remount_simple(MS_RDONLY)) {
 		die("MS_RDONLY malfunctions\n");
 	}
-	if (!test_unpriv_remount_simple(MS_NODEV)) {
+	if (!test_unpriv_remount("devpts", "newinstance", MS_NODEV, MS_NODEV, 0)) {
 		die("MS_NODEV malfunctions\n");
 	}
-	if (!test_unpriv_remount_simple(MS_NOSUID|MS_NODEV)) {
+	if (!test_unpriv_remount_simple(MS_NOSUID)) {
 		die("MS_NOSUID malfunctions\n");
 	}
-	if (!test_unpriv_remount_simple(MS_NOEXEC|MS_NODEV)) {
+	if (!test_unpriv_remount_simple(MS_NOEXEC)) {
 		die("MS_NOEXEC malfunctions\n");
 	}
-	if (!test_unpriv_remount_atime(MS_RELATIME|MS_NODEV,
-				       MS_NOATIME|MS_NODEV))
+	if (!test_unpriv_remount_atime(MS_RELATIME,
+				       MS_NOATIME))
 	{
 		die("MS_RELATIME malfunctions\n");
 	}
-	if (!test_unpriv_remount_atime(MS_STRICTATIME|MS_NODEV,
-				       MS_NOATIME|MS_NODEV))
+	if (!test_unpriv_remount_atime(MS_STRICTATIME,
+				       MS_NOATIME))
 	{
 		die("MS_STRICTATIME malfunctions\n");
 	}
-	if (!test_unpriv_remount_atime(MS_NOATIME|MS_NODEV,
-				       MS_STRICTATIME|MS_NODEV))
+	if (!test_unpriv_remount_atime(MS_NOATIME,
+				       MS_STRICTATIME))
 	{
-		die("MS_RELATIME malfunctions\n");
+		die("MS_NOATIME malfunctions\n");
 	}
-	if (!test_unpriv_remount_atime(MS_RELATIME|MS_NODIRATIME|MS_NODEV,
-				       MS_NOATIME|MS_NODEV))
+	if (!test_unpriv_remount_atime(MS_RELATIME|MS_NODIRATIME,
+				       MS_NOATIME))
 	{
-		die("MS_RELATIME malfunctions\n");
+		die("MS_RELATIME|MS_NODIRATIME malfunctions\n");
 	}
-	if (!test_unpriv_remount_atime(MS_STRICTATIME|MS_NODIRATIME|MS_NODEV,
-				       MS_NOATIME|MS_NODEV))
+	if (!test_unpriv_remount_atime(MS_STRICTATIME|MS_NODIRATIME,
+				       MS_NOATIME))
 	{
-		die("MS_RELATIME malfunctions\n");
+		die("MS_STRICTATIME|MS_NODIRATIME malfunctions\n");
 	}
-	if (!test_unpriv_remount_atime(MS_NOATIME|MS_NODIRATIME|MS_NODEV,
-				       MS_STRICTATIME|MS_NODEV))
+	if (!test_unpriv_remount_atime(MS_NOATIME|MS_NODIRATIME,
+				       MS_STRICTATIME))
 	{
-		die("MS_RELATIME malfunctions\n");
+		die("MS_NOATIME|MS_DIRATIME malfunctions\n");
 	}
-	if (!test_unpriv_remount(MS_STRICTATIME|MS_NODEV, MS_NODEV,
-				 MS_NOATIME|MS_NODEV))
+	if (!test_unpriv_remount("ramfs", NULL, MS_STRICTATIME, 0, MS_NOATIME))
 	{
 		die("Default atime malfunctions\n");
 	}
+	if (!test_priv_mount_unpriv_remount()) {
+		die("Mount flags unexpectedly changed after remount\n");
+	}
 	return EXIT_SUCCESS;
 }
Signature · 1 line
2.2.1
author
#58 lore raw

PATCH 56/78 umount: Disallow unprivileged mount force

In reply to Jiri Slaby

From: "Eric W. Biederman" <[email protected]>

3.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

===============

commit b2f5d4dc38e034eecb7987e513255265ff9aa1cf upstream.

Forced unmount affects not just the mount namespace but the underlying superblock as well. Restrict forced unmount to the global root user for now. Otherwise it becomes possible a user in a less privileged mount namespace to force the shutdown of a superblock of a filesystem in a more privileged mount namespace, allowing a DOS attack on root.

---
 fs/namespace.c | 3 +++
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
fs/namespace.c +3 -0
index 6b42c6d1590e..7c3c0f6d2744 100644
@@ -1347,6 +1347,9 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE2(umount, char __user *, name, int, flags)
 		goto dput_and_out;
 	if (mnt->mnt.mnt_flags & MNT_LOCKED)
 		goto dput_and_out;
+	retval = -EPERM;
+	if (flags & MNT_FORCE && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
+		goto dput_and_out;
 
 	retval = do_umount(mnt, flags);
 dput_and_out:
Signature · 1 line
2.2.1
author
#59 lore raw

PATCH 57/78 groups: Consolidate the setgroups permission checks

In reply to Jiri Slaby

From: "Eric W. Biederman" <[email protected]>

3.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

===============

commit 7ff4d90b4c24a03666f296c3d4878cd39001e81e upstream.

Today there are 3 instances of setgroups and due to an oversight their permission checking has diverged. Add a common function so that they may all share the same permission checking code.

This corrects the current oversight in the current permission checks and adds a helper to avoid this in the future.

A user namespace security fix will update this new helper, shortly.

---
 arch/s390/kernel/compat_linux.c | 2 +-
 include/linux/cred.h            | 1 +
 kernel/groups.c                 | 9 ++++++++-
 kernel/uid16.c                  | 2 +-
 4 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
arch/s390/kernel/compat_linux.c +1 -1
index 1f1b8c70ab97..0ebb699aad1e 100644
@@ -249,7 +249,7 @@ asmlinkage long sys32_setgroups16(int gidsetsize, u16 __user *grouplist)
 	struct group_info *group_info;
 	int retval;
 
-	if (!capable(CAP_SETGID))
+	if (!may_setgroups())
 		return -EPERM;
 	if ((unsigned)gidsetsize > NGROUPS_MAX)
 		return -EINVAL;
include/linux/cred.h +1 -0
index 04421e825365..6c58dd7cb9ac 100644
@@ -68,6 +68,7 @@ extern void groups_free(struct group_info *);
 extern int set_current_groups(struct group_info *);
 extern int set_groups(struct cred *, struct group_info *);
 extern int groups_search(const struct group_info *, kgid_t);
+extern bool may_setgroups(void);
 
 /* access the groups "array" with this macro */
 #define GROUP_AT(gi, i) \
kernel/groups.c +8 -1
index 90cf1c38c8ea..984bb629c68c 100644
@@ -223,6 +223,13 @@ out:
 	return i;
 }
 
+bool may_setgroups(void)
+{
+	struct user_namespace *user_ns = current_user_ns();
+
+	return ns_capable(user_ns, CAP_SETGID);
+}
+
 /*
  *	SMP: Our groups are copy-on-write. We can set them safely
  *	without another task interfering.
@@ -233,7 +240,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE2(setgroups, int, gidsetsize, gid_t __user *, grouplist)
 	struct group_info *group_info;
 	int retval;
 
-	if (!ns_capable(current_user_ns(), CAP_SETGID))
+	if (!may_setgroups())
 		return -EPERM;
 	if ((unsigned)gidsetsize > NGROUPS_MAX)
 		return -EINVAL;
kernel/uid16.c +1 -1
index 602e5bbbceff..d58cc4d8f0d1 100644
@@ -176,7 +176,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE2(setgroups16, int, gidsetsize, old_gid_t __user *, grouplist)
 	struct group_info *group_info;
 	int retval;
 
-	if (!ns_capable(current_user_ns(), CAP_SETGID))
+	if (!may_setgroups())
 		return -EPERM;
 	if ((unsigned)gidsetsize > NGROUPS_MAX)
 		return -EINVAL;
Signature · 1 line
2.2.1
author
#60 lore raw

PATCH 58/78 userns: Document what the invariant required for safe unprivileged mappings.

In reply to Jiri Slaby

From: "Eric W. Biederman" <[email protected]>

3.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

===============

commit 0542f17bf2c1f2430d368f44c8fcf2f82ec9e53e upstream.

The rule is simple. Don't allow anything that wouldn't be allowed without unprivileged mappings.

It was previously overlooked that establishing gid mappings would allow dropping groups and potentially gaining permission to files and directories that had lesser permissions for a specific group than for all other users.

This is the rule needed to fix CVE-2014-8989 and prevent any other security issues with new_idmap_permitted.

The reason for this rule is that the unix permission model is old and there are programs out there somewhere that take advantage of every little corner of it. So allowing a uid or gid mapping to be established without privielge that would allow anything that would not be allowed without that mapping will result in expectations from some code somewhere being violated. Violated expectations about the behavior of the OS is a long way to say a security issue.

---
 kernel/user_namespace.c | 4 +++-
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
kernel/user_namespace.c +3 -1
index 6991139e3303..c9aa0e2c07ba 100644
@@ -798,7 +798,9 @@ static bool new_idmap_permitted(const struct file *file,
 				struct user_namespace *ns, int cap_setid,
 				struct uid_gid_map *new_map)
 {
-	/* Allow mapping to your own filesystem ids */
+	/* Don't allow mappings that would allow anything that wouldn't
+	 * be allowed without the establishment of unprivileged mappings.
+	 */
 	if ((new_map->nr_extents == 1) && (new_map->extent[0].count == 1)) {
 		u32 id = new_map->extent[0].lower_first;
 		if (cap_setid == CAP_SETUID) {
Signature · 1 line
2.2.1
author
#61 lore raw

PATCH 59/78 userns: Don't allow setgroups until a gid mapping has been setablished

In reply to Jiri Slaby

From: "Eric W. Biederman" <[email protected]>

3.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

===============

commit 273d2c67c3e179adb1e74f403d1e9a06e3f841b5 upstream.

setgroups is unique in not needing a valid mapping before it can be called, in the case of setgroups(0, NULL) which drops all supplemental groups.

The design of the user namespace assumes that CAP_SETGID can not actually be used until a gid mapping is established. Therefore add a helper function to see if the user namespace gid mapping has been established and call that function in the setgroups permission check.

This is part of the fix for CVE-2014-8989, being able to drop groups without privilege using user namespaces.

---
 include/linux/user_namespace.h |  5 +++++
 kernel/groups.c                |  4 +++-
 kernel/user_namespace.c        | 14 ++++++++++++++
 3 files changed, 22 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
include/linux/user_namespace.h +5 -0
index 4db29859464f..736bee2b5664 100644
@@ -57,6 +57,7 @@ extern struct seq_operations proc_projid_seq_operations;
 extern ssize_t proc_uid_map_write(struct file *, const char __user *, size_t, loff_t *);
 extern ssize_t proc_gid_map_write(struct file *, const char __user *, size_t, loff_t *);
 extern ssize_t proc_projid_map_write(struct file *, const char __user *, size_t, loff_t *);
+extern bool userns_may_setgroups(const struct user_namespace *ns);
 #else
 
 static inline struct user_namespace *get_user_ns(struct user_namespace *ns)
@@ -81,6 +82,10 @@ static inline void put_user_ns(struct user_namespace *ns)
 {
 }
 
+static inline bool userns_may_setgroups(const struct user_namespace *ns)
+{
+	return true;
+}
 #endif
 
 #endif /* _LINUX_USER_H */
kernel/groups.c +3 -1
index 984bb629c68c..67b4ba30475f 100644
@@ -6,6 +6,7 @@
 #include <linux/slab.h>
 #include <linux/security.h>
 #include <linux/syscalls.h>
+#include <linux/user_namespace.h>
 #include <asm/uaccess.h>
 
 /* init to 2 - one for init_task, one to ensure it is never freed */
@@ -227,7 +228,8 @@ bool may_setgroups(void)
 {
 	struct user_namespace *user_ns = current_user_ns();
 
-	return ns_capable(user_ns, CAP_SETGID);
+	return ns_capable(user_ns, CAP_SETGID) &&
+		userns_may_setgroups(user_ns);
 }
 
 /*
kernel/user_namespace.c +14 -0
index c9aa0e2c07ba..048bb7b641a9 100644
@@ -830,6 +830,20 @@ static bool new_idmap_permitted(const struct file *file,
 	return false;
 }
 
+bool userns_may_setgroups(const struct user_namespace *ns)
+{
+	bool allowed;
+
+	mutex_lock(&id_map_mutex);
+	/* It is not safe to use setgroups until a gid mapping in
+	 * the user namespace has been established.
+	 */
+	allowed = ns->gid_map.nr_extents != 0;
+	mutex_unlock(&id_map_mutex);
+
+	return allowed;
+}
+
 static void *userns_get(struct task_struct *task)
 {
 	struct user_namespace *user_ns;
Signature · 1 line
2.2.1
author
#62 lore raw

PATCH 60/78 userns: Don't allow unprivileged creation of gid mappings

In reply to Jiri Slaby

From: "Eric W. Biederman" <[email protected]>

3.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

===============

commit be7c6dba2332cef0677fbabb606e279ae76652c3 upstream.

As any gid mapping will allow and must allow for backwards compatibility dropping groups don't allow any gid mappings to be established without CAP_SETGID in the parent user namespace.

For a small class of applications this change breaks userspace and removes useful functionality. This small class of applications includes tools/testing/selftests/mount/unprivilged-remount-test.c

Most of the removed functionality will be added back with the addition of a one way knob to disable setgroups. Once setgroups is disabled setting the gid_map becomes as safe as setting the uid_map.

For more common applications that set the uid_map and the gid_map with privilege this change will have no affect.

This is part of a fix for CVE-2014-8989.

---
 kernel/user_namespace.c | 5 -----
 1 file changed, 5 deletions(-)
kernel/user_namespace.c +0 -5
index 048bb7b641a9..a5809c42a1b3 100644
@@ -808,11 +808,6 @@ static bool new_idmap_permitted(const struct file *file,
 			if (uid_eq(uid, file->f_cred->fsuid))
 				return true;
 		}
-		else if (cap_setid == CAP_SETGID) {
-			kgid_t gid = make_kgid(ns->parent, id);
-			if (gid_eq(gid, file->f_cred->fsgid))
-				return true;
-		}
 	}
 
 	/* Allow anyone to set a mapping that doesn't require privilege */
Signature · 1 line
2.2.1
author
#63 lore raw

PATCH 61/78 userns: Check euid no fsuid when establishing an unprivileged uid mapping

In reply to Jiri Slaby

From: "Eric W. Biederman" <[email protected]>

3.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

===============

commit 80dd00a23784b384ccea049bfb3f259d3f973b9d upstream.

setresuid allows the euid to be set to any of uid, euid, suid, and fsuid. Therefor it is safe to allow an unprivileged user to map their euid and use CAP_SETUID privileged with exactly that uid, as no new credentials can be obtained.

I can not find a combination of existing system calls that allows setting uid, euid, suid, and fsuid from the fsuid making the previous use of fsuid for allowing unprivileged mappings a bug.

This is part of a fix for CVE-2014-8989.

---
 kernel/user_namespace.c | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
kernel/user_namespace.c +1 -1
index a5809c42a1b3..6e495bd672a7 100644
@@ -805,7 +805,7 @@ static bool new_idmap_permitted(const struct file *file,
 		u32 id = new_map->extent[0].lower_first;
 		if (cap_setid == CAP_SETUID) {
 			kuid_t uid = make_kuid(ns->parent, id);
-			if (uid_eq(uid, file->f_cred->fsuid))
+			if (uid_eq(uid, file->f_cred->euid))
 				return true;
 		}
 	}
Signature · 1 line
2.2.1
author
#64 lore raw

PATCH 62/78 userns: Only allow the creator of the userns unprivileged mappings

In reply to Jiri Slaby

From: "Eric W. Biederman" <[email protected]>

3.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

===============

commit f95d7918bd1e724675de4940039f2865e5eec5fe upstream.

If you did not create the user namespace and are allowed to write to uid_map or gid_map you should already have the necessary privilege in the parent user namespace to establish any mapping you want so this will not affect userspace in practice.

Limiting unprivileged uid mapping establishment to the creator of the user namespace makes it easier to verify all credentials obtained with the uid mapping can be obtained without the uid mapping without privilege.

Limiting unprivileged gid mapping establishment (which is temporarily absent) to the creator of the user namespace also ensures that the combination of uid and gid can already be obtained without privilege.

This is part of the fix for CVE-2014-8989.

---
 kernel/user_namespace.c | 6 ++++--
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
kernel/user_namespace.c +4 -2
index 6e495bd672a7..c2ca6c01e575 100644
@@ -798,14 +798,16 @@ static bool new_idmap_permitted(const struct file *file,
 				struct user_namespace *ns, int cap_setid,
 				struct uid_gid_map *new_map)
 {
+	const struct cred *cred = file->f_cred;
 	/* Don't allow mappings that would allow anything that wouldn't
 	 * be allowed without the establishment of unprivileged mappings.
 	 */
-	if ((new_map->nr_extents == 1) && (new_map->extent[0].count == 1)) {
+	if ((new_map->nr_extents == 1) && (new_map->extent[0].count == 1) &&
+	    uid_eq(ns->owner, cred->euid)) {
 		u32 id = new_map->extent[0].lower_first;
 		if (cap_setid == CAP_SETUID) {
 			kuid_t uid = make_kuid(ns->parent, id);
-			if (uid_eq(uid, file->f_cred->euid))
+			if (uid_eq(uid, cred->euid))
 				return true;
 		}
 	}
Signature · 1 line
2.2.1
author
#65 lore raw

PATCH 63/78 userns: Rename id_map_mutex to userns_state_mutex

In reply to Jiri Slaby

From: "Eric W. Biederman" <[email protected]>

3.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

===============

commit f0d62aec931e4ae3333c797d346dc4f188f454ba upstream.

Generalize id_map_mutex so it can be used for more state of a user namespace.

---
 kernel/user_namespace.c | 14 ++++++--------
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
kernel/user_namespace.c +6 -8
index c2ca6c01e575..a607b24bec0b 100644
@@ -24,6 +24,7 @@
 #include <linux/fs_struct.h>
 
 static struct kmem_cache *user_ns_cachep __read_mostly;
+static DEFINE_MUTEX(userns_state_mutex);
 
 static bool new_idmap_permitted(const struct file *file,
 				struct user_namespace *ns, int cap_setid,
@@ -575,9 +576,6 @@ static bool mappings_overlap(struct uid_gid_map *new_map, struct uid_gid_extent
 	return false;
 }
 
-
-static DEFINE_MUTEX(id_map_mutex);
-
 static ssize_t map_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
 			 size_t count, loff_t *ppos,
 			 int cap_setid,
@@ -594,7 +592,7 @@ static ssize_t map_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
 	ssize_t ret = -EINVAL;
 
 	/*
-	 * The id_map_mutex serializes all writes to any given map.
+	 * The userns_state_mutex serializes all writes to any given map.
 	 *
 	 * Any map is only ever written once.
 	 *
@@ -612,7 +610,7 @@ static ssize_t map_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
 	 * order and smp_rmb() is guaranteed that we don't have crazy
 	 * architectures returning stale data.
 	 */
-	mutex_lock(&id_map_mutex);
+	mutex_lock(&userns_state_mutex);
 
 	ret = -EPERM;
 	/* Only allow one successful write to the map */
@@ -739,7 +737,7 @@ static ssize_t map_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
 	*ppos = count;
 	ret = count;
 out:
-	mutex_unlock(&id_map_mutex);
+	mutex_unlock(&userns_state_mutex);
 	if (page)
 		free_page(page);
 	return ret;
@@ -831,12 +829,12 @@ bool userns_may_setgroups(const struct user_namespace *ns)
 {
 	bool allowed;
 
-	mutex_lock(&id_map_mutex);
+	mutex_lock(&userns_state_mutex);
 	/* It is not safe to use setgroups until a gid mapping in
 	 * the user namespace has been established.
 	 */
 	allowed = ns->gid_map.nr_extents != 0;
-	mutex_unlock(&id_map_mutex);
+	mutex_unlock(&userns_state_mutex);
 
 	return allowed;
 }
Signature · 1 line
2.2.1
author
#66 lore raw

PATCH 64/78 userns: Add a knob to disable setgroups on a per user namespace basis

In reply to Jiri Slaby

From: "Eric W. Biederman" <[email protected]>

3.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

===============

commit 9cc46516ddf497ea16e8d7cb986ae03a0f6b92f8 upstream.

- Expose the knob to user space through a proc file /proc/<pid>/setgroups

A value of "deny" means the setgroups system call is disabled in the current processes user namespace and can not be enabled in the future in this user namespace.

A value of "allow" means the segtoups system call is enabled.

- Descendant user namespaces inherit the value of setgroups from their parents.

- A proc file is used (instead of a sysctl) as sysctls currently do not allow checking the permissions at open time.

- Writing to the proc file is restricted to before the gid_map for the user namespace is set.

This ensures that disabling setgroups at a user namespace level will never remove the ability to call setgroups from a process that already has that ability.

A process may opt in to the setgroups disable for itself by creating, entering and configuring a user namespace or by calling setns on an existing user namespace with setgroups disabled. Processes without privileges already can not call setgroups so this is a noop. Prodcess with privilege become processes without privilege when entering a user namespace and as with any other path to dropping privilege they would not have the ability to call setgroups. So this remains within the bounds of what is possible without a knob to disable setgroups permanently in a user namespace.

---
 fs/proc/base.c                 | 53 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 include/linux/user_namespace.h |  7 ++++
 kernel/user.c                  |  1 +
 kernel/user_namespace.c        | 85 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 4 files changed, 146 insertions(+)
fs/proc/base.c +53 -0
index c35eaa404933..dfce13e5327b 100644
@@ -2544,6 +2544,57 @@ static const struct file_operations proc_projid_map_operations = {
 	.llseek		= seq_lseek,
 	.release	= proc_id_map_release,
 };
+
+static int proc_setgroups_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
+{
+	struct user_namespace *ns = NULL;
+	struct task_struct *task;
+	int ret;
+
+	ret = -ESRCH;
+	task = get_proc_task(inode);
+	if (task) {
+		rcu_read_lock();
+		ns = get_user_ns(task_cred_xxx(task, user_ns));
+		rcu_read_unlock();
+		put_task_struct(task);
+	}
+	if (!ns)
+		goto err;
+
+	if (file->f_mode & FMODE_WRITE) {
+		ret = -EACCES;
+		if (!ns_capable(ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
+			goto err_put_ns;
+	}
+
+	ret = single_open(file, &proc_setgroups_show, ns);
+	if (ret)
+		goto err_put_ns;
+
+	return 0;
+err_put_ns:
+	put_user_ns(ns);
+err:
+	return ret;
+}
+
+static int proc_setgroups_release(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
+{
+	struct seq_file *seq = file->private_data;
+	struct user_namespace *ns = seq->private;
+	int ret = single_release(inode, file);
+	put_user_ns(ns);
+	return ret;
+}
+
+static const struct file_operations proc_setgroups_operations = {
+	.open		= proc_setgroups_open,
+	.write		= proc_setgroups_write,
+	.read		= seq_read,
+	.llseek		= seq_lseek,
+	.release	= proc_setgroups_release,
+};
 #endif /* CONFIG_USER_NS */
 
 static int proc_pid_personality(struct seq_file *m, struct pid_namespace *ns,
@@ -2652,6 +2703,7 @@ static const struct pid_entry tgid_base_stuff[] = {
 	REG("uid_map",    S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR, proc_uid_map_operations),
 	REG("gid_map",    S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR, proc_gid_map_operations),
 	REG("projid_map", S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR, proc_projid_map_operations),
+	REG("setgroups",  S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR, proc_setgroups_operations),
 #endif
 #ifdef CONFIG_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE
 	REG("timers",	  S_IRUGO, proc_timers_operations),
@@ -2987,6 +3039,7 @@ static const struct pid_entry tid_base_stuff[] = {
 	REG("uid_map",    S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR, proc_uid_map_operations),
 	REG("gid_map",    S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR, proc_gid_map_operations),
 	REG("projid_map", S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR, proc_projid_map_operations),
+	REG("setgroups",  S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR, proc_setgroups_operations),
 #endif
 };
 
include/linux/user_namespace.h +7 -0
index 736bee2b5664..67c11082bde2 100644
@@ -17,6 +17,10 @@ struct uid_gid_map {	/* 64 bytes -- 1 cache line */
 	} extent[UID_GID_MAP_MAX_EXTENTS];
 };
 
+#define USERNS_SETGROUPS_ALLOWED 1UL
+
+#define USERNS_INIT_FLAGS USERNS_SETGROUPS_ALLOWED
+
 struct user_namespace {
 	struct uid_gid_map	uid_map;
 	struct uid_gid_map	gid_map;
@@ -27,6 +31,7 @@ struct user_namespace {
 	kuid_t			owner;
 	kgid_t			group;
 	unsigned int		proc_inum;
+	unsigned long		flags;
 };
 
 extern struct user_namespace init_user_ns;
@@ -57,6 +62,8 @@ extern struct seq_operations proc_projid_seq_operations;
 extern ssize_t proc_uid_map_write(struct file *, const char __user *, size_t, loff_t *);
 extern ssize_t proc_gid_map_write(struct file *, const char __user *, size_t, loff_t *);
 extern ssize_t proc_projid_map_write(struct file *, const char __user *, size_t, loff_t *);
+extern ssize_t proc_setgroups_write(struct file *, const char __user *, size_t, loff_t *);
+extern int proc_setgroups_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v);
 extern bool userns_may_setgroups(const struct user_namespace *ns);
 #else
 
kernel/user.c +1 -0
index 5bbb91988e69..75774ce9bf58 100644
@@ -51,6 +51,7 @@ struct user_namespace init_user_ns = {
 	.owner = GLOBAL_ROOT_UID,
 	.group = GLOBAL_ROOT_GID,
 	.proc_inum = PROC_USER_INIT_INO,
+	.flags = USERNS_INIT_FLAGS,
 };
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(init_user_ns);
 
kernel/user_namespace.c +85 -0

103 lines not on this page · raw message

Signature · 1 line
2.2.1
author
#67 lore raw

PATCH 65/78 userns: Allow setting gid_maps without privilege when setgroups is disabled

In reply to Jiri Slaby

From: "Eric W. Biederman" <[email protected]>

3.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

===============

commit 66d2f338ee4c449396b6f99f5e75cd18eb6df272 upstream.

Now that setgroups can be disabled and not reenabled, setting gid_map without privielge can now be enabled when setgroups is disabled.

This restores most of the functionality that was lost when unprivileged setting of gid_map was removed. Applications that use this functionality will need to check to see if they use setgroups or init_groups, and if they don't they can be fixed by simply disabling setgroups before writing to gid_map.

---
 kernel/user_namespace.c | 5 +++++
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)
kernel/user_namespace.c +5 -0
index 7737b3da335c..c09fe8b87cb0 100644
@@ -812,6 +812,11 @@ static bool new_idmap_permitted(const struct file *file,
 			kuid_t uid = make_kuid(ns->parent, id);
 			if (uid_eq(uid, cred->euid))
 				return true;
+		} else if (cap_setid == CAP_SETGID) {
+			kgid_t gid = make_kgid(ns->parent, id);
+			if (!(ns->flags & USERNS_SETGROUPS_ALLOWED) &&
+			    gid_eq(gid, cred->egid))
+				return true;
 		}
 	}
 
Signature · 1 line
2.2.1
author
#68 lore raw

PATCH 66/78 userns: Unbreak the unprivileged remount tests

In reply to Jiri Slaby

From: "Eric W. Biederman" <[email protected]>

3.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

===============

commit db86da7cb76f797a1a8b445166a15cb922c6ff85 upstream.

A security fix in caused the way the unprivileged remount tests were using user namespaces to break. Tweak the way user namespaces are being used so the test works again.

---
 .../selftests/mount/unprivileged-remount-test.c    | 32 ++++++++++++++++------
 1 file changed, 24 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
tools/testing/selftests/mount/unprivileged-remount-test.c +24 -8
index 9669d375625a..517785052f1c 100644
@@ -53,17 +53,14 @@ static void die(char *fmt, ...)
 	exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
 }
 
-static void write_file(char *filename, char *fmt, ...)
+static void vmaybe_write_file(bool enoent_ok, char *filename, char *fmt, va_list ap)
 {
 	char buf[4096];
 	int fd;
 	ssize_t written;
 	int buf_len;
-	va_list ap;
 
-	va_start(ap, fmt);
 	buf_len = vsnprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), fmt, ap);
-	va_end(ap);
 	if (buf_len < 0) {
 		die("vsnprintf failed: %s\n",
 		    strerror(errno));
@@ -74,6 +71,8 @@ static void write_file(char *filename, char *fmt, ...)
 
 	fd = open(filename, O_WRONLY);
 	if (fd < 0) {
+		if ((errno == ENOENT) && enoent_ok)
+			return;
 		die("open of %s failed: %s\n",
 		    filename, strerror(errno));
 	}
@@ -92,6 +91,26 @@ static void write_file(char *filename, char *fmt, ...)
 	}
 }
 
+static void maybe_write_file(char *filename, char *fmt, ...)
+{
+	va_list ap;
+
+	va_start(ap, fmt);
+	vmaybe_write_file(true, filename, fmt, ap);
+	va_end(ap);
+
+}
+
+static void write_file(char *filename, char *fmt, ...)
+{
+	va_list ap;
+
+	va_start(ap, fmt);
+	vmaybe_write_file(false, filename, fmt, ap);
+	va_end(ap);
+
+}
+
 static int read_mnt_flags(const char *path)
 {
 	int ret;
@@ -144,13 +163,10 @@ static void create_and_enter_userns(void)
 			strerror(errno));
 	}
 
+	maybe_write_file("/proc/self/setgroups", "deny");
 	write_file("/proc/self/uid_map", "0 %d 1", uid);
 	write_file("/proc/self/gid_map", "0 %d 1", gid);
 
-	if (setgroups(0, NULL) != 0) {
-		die("setgroups failed: %s\n",
-			strerror(errno));
-	}
 	if (setgid(0) != 0) {
 		die ("setgid(0) failed %s\n",
 			strerror(errno));
Signature · 1 line
2.2.1
author
#69 lore raw

PATCH 67/78 audit: restore AUDIT_LOGINUID unset ABI

In reply to Jiri Slaby

From: Richard Guy Briggs <[email protected]>

3.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

===============

commit 041d7b98ffe59c59fdd639931dea7d74f9aa9a59 upstream.

A regression was caused by commit 780a7654cee8:
audit: Make testing for a valid loginuid explicit.
(which in turn attempted to fix a regression caused by e1760bd)

When audit_krule_to_data() fills in the rules to get a listing, there was a missing clause to convert back from AUDIT_LOGINUID_SET to AUDIT_LOGINUID.

This broke userspace by not returning the same information that was sent and expected.

The rule:
auditctl -a exit,never -F auid=-1
gives:
auditctl -l
LIST_RULES: exit,never f24=0 syscall=all
when it should give:

		LIST_RULES: exit,never auid=-1 (0xffffffff) syscall=all

Tag it so that it is reported the same way it was set. Create a new private flags audit_krule field (pflags) to store it that won't interact with the public one from the API.

---
 include/linux/audit.h |  4 ++++
 kernel/auditfilter.c  | 10 ++++++++++
 2 files changed, 14 insertions(+)
include/linux/audit.h +4 -0
index 4fb28b23a4a4..c25cb64db967 100644
@@ -46,6 +46,7 @@ struct audit_tree;
 
 struct audit_krule {
 	int			vers_ops;
+	u32			pflags;
 	u32			flags;
 	u32			listnr;
 	u32			action;
@@ -63,6 +64,9 @@ struct audit_krule {
 	u64			prio;
 };
 
+/* Flag to indicate legacy AUDIT_LOGINUID unset usage */
+#define AUDIT_LOGINUID_LEGACY		0x1
+
 struct audit_field {
 	u32				type;
 	u32				val;
kernel/auditfilter.c +10 -0
index 8a344cebd8bf..dfd2f4af81a9 100644
@@ -426,6 +426,7 @@ static struct audit_entry *audit_data_to_entry(struct audit_rule_data *data,
 		if ((f->type == AUDIT_LOGINUID) && (f->val == AUDIT_UID_UNSET)) {
 			f->type = AUDIT_LOGINUID_SET;
 			f->val = 0;
+			entry->rule.pflags |= AUDIT_LOGINUID_LEGACY;
 		}
 
 		err = audit_field_valid(entry, f);
@@ -601,6 +602,13 @@ static struct audit_rule_data *audit_krule_to_data(struct audit_krule *krule)
 			data->buflen += data->values[i] =
 				audit_pack_string(&bufp, krule->filterkey);
 			break;
+		case AUDIT_LOGINUID_SET:
+			if (krule->pflags & AUDIT_LOGINUID_LEGACY && !f->val) {
+				data->fields[i] = AUDIT_LOGINUID;
+				data->values[i] = AUDIT_UID_UNSET;
+				break;
+			}
+			/* fallthrough if set */
 		default:
 			data->values[i] = f->val;
 		}
@@ -617,6 +625,7 @@ static int audit_compare_rule(struct audit_krule *a, struct audit_krule *b)
 	int i;
 
 	if (a->flags != b->flags ||
+	    a->pflags != b->pflags ||
 	    a->listnr != b->listnr ||
 	    a->action != b->action ||
 	    a->field_count != b->field_count)
@@ -735,6 +744,7 @@ struct audit_entry *audit_dupe_rule(struct audit_krule *old)
 	new = &entry->rule;
 	new->vers_ops = old->vers_ops;
 	new->flags = old->flags;
+	new->pflags = old->pflags;
 	new->listnr = old->listnr;
 	new->action = old->action;
 	for (i = 0; i < AUDIT_BITMASK_SIZE; i++)
Signature · 1 line
2.2.1
author
#70 lore raw

PATCH 68/78 crypto: af_alg - fix backlog handling

In reply to Jiri Slaby

From: Rabin Vincent <[email protected]>

3.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

===============

commit 7e77bdebff5cb1e9876c561f69710b9ab8fa1f7e upstream.

If a request is backlogged, it's complete() handler will get called
twice: once with -EINPROGRESS, and once with the final error code.

af_alg's complete handler, unlike other users, does not handle the -EINPROGRESS but instead always completes the completion that recvmsg() is waiting on. This can lead to a return to user space while the request is still pending in the driver. If userspace closes the sockets before the requests are handled by the driver, this will lead to use-after-frees (and potential crashes) in the kernel due to the tfm having been freed.

The crashes can be easily reproduced (for example) by reducing the max queue length in cryptod.c and running the following (from
http://www.chronox.de/libkcapi.html) on AES-NI capable hardware:

 $ while true; do kcapi -x 1 -e -c '__ecb-aes-aesni' \
    -k 00000000000000000000000000000000 \
    -p 00000000000000000000000000000000 >/dev/null & done
---
 crypto/af_alg.c | 3 +++
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
crypto/af_alg.c +3 -0
index bf948e134981..6ef6e2ad344e 100644
@@ -449,6 +449,9 @@ void af_alg_complete(struct crypto_async_request *req, int err)
 {
 	struct af_alg_completion *completion = req->data;
 
+	if (err == -EINPROGRESS)
+		return;
+
 	completion->err = err;
 	complete(&completion->completion);
 }
Signature · 1 line
2.2.1
author
#71 lore raw

PATCH 69/78 ncpfs: return proper error from NCP_IOC_SETROOT ioctl

In reply to Jiri Slaby

From: Jan Kara <[email protected]>

3.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

===============

commit a682e9c28cac152e6e54c39efcf046e0c8cfcf63 upstream.

If some error happens in NCP_IOC_SETROOT ioctl, the appropriate error return value is then (in most cases) just overwritten before we return. This can result in reporting success to userspace although error happened.

This bug was introduced by commit 2e54eb96e2c8 ("BKL: Remove BKL from ncpfs"). Propagate the errors correctly.

Coverity id: 1226925.

Fixes 2e54eb96e2c80 ("BKL: Remove BKL from ncpfs")
Cc Petr Vandrovec <[email protected]>
---
 fs/ncpfs/ioctl.c | 1 -
 1 file changed, 1 deletion(-)
fs/ncpfs/ioctl.c +0 -1
index 60426ccb3b65..2f970de02b16 100644
@@ -448,7 +448,6 @@ static long __ncp_ioctl(struct inode *inode, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg
 						result = -EIO;
 					}
 				}
-				result = 0;
 			}
 			mutex_unlock(&server->root_setup_lock);
 
Signature · 1 line
2.2.1
author
#72 lore raw

PATCH 70/78 exit: pidns: alloc_pid() leaks pid_namespace if child_reaper is exiting

In reply to Jiri Slaby

From: Oleg Nesterov <[email protected]>

3.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

===============

commit 24c037ebf5723d4d9ab0996433cee4f96c292a4d upstream.

alloc_pid() does get_pid_ns() beforehand but forgets to put_pid_ns() if it fails because disable_pid_allocation() was called by the exiting child_reaper.

We could simply move get_pid_ns() down to successful return, but this fix tries to be as trivial as possible.

---
 kernel/pid.c | 2 ++
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
kernel/pid.c +2 -0
index 9b9a26698144..82430c858d69 100644
@@ -341,6 +341,8 @@ out:
 
 out_unlock:
 	spin_unlock_irq(&pidmap_lock);
+	put_pid_ns(ns);
+
 out_free:
 	while (++i <= ns->level)
 		free_pidmap(pid->numbers + i);
Signature · 1 line
2.2.1
author
#73 lore raw

PATCH 71/78 udf: Verify symlink size before loading it

In reply to Jiri Slaby

From: Jan Kara <[email protected]>

3.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

===============

commit a1d47b262952a45aae62bd49cfaf33dd76c11a2c upstream.

UDF specification allows arbitrarily large symlinks. However we support only symlinks at most one block large. Check the length of the symlink so that we don't access memory beyond end of the symlink block.

---
 fs/udf/symlink.c | 17 +++++++++++++----
 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
fs/udf/symlink.c +13 -4
index d7c6dbe4194b..d89f324bc387 100644
@@ -80,11 +80,17 @@ static int udf_symlink_filler(struct file *file, struct page *page)
 	struct inode *inode = page->mapping->host;
 	struct buffer_head *bh = NULL;
 	unsigned char *symlink;
-	int err = -EIO;
+	int err;
 	unsigned char *p = kmap(page);
 	struct udf_inode_info *iinfo;
 	uint32_t pos;
 
+	/* We don't support symlinks longer than one block */
+	if (inode->i_size > inode->i_sb->s_blocksize) {
+		err = -ENAMETOOLONG;
+		goto out_unmap;
+	}
+
 	iinfo = UDF_I(inode);
 	pos = udf_block_map(inode, 0);
 
@@ -94,8 +100,10 @@ static int udf_symlink_filler(struct file *file, struct page *page)
 	} else {
 		bh = sb_bread(inode->i_sb, pos);
 
-		if (!bh)
-			goto out;
+		if (!bh) {
+			err = -EIO;
+			goto out_unlock_inode;
+		}
 
 		symlink = bh->b_data;
 	}
@@ -109,9 +117,10 @@ static int udf_symlink_filler(struct file *file, struct page *page)
 	unlock_page(page);
 	return 0;
 
-out:
+out_unlock_inode:
 	up_read(&iinfo->i_data_sem);
 	SetPageError(page);
+out_unmap:
 	kunmap(page);
 	unlock_page(page);
 	return err;
Signature · 1 line
2.2.1
author
#74 lore raw

PATCH 72/78 eCryptfs: Force RO mount when encrypted view is enabled

In reply to Jiri Slaby

From: Tyler Hicks <[email protected]>

3.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

===============

commit 332b122d39c9cbff8b799007a825d94b2e7c12f2 upstream.

The ecryptfs_encrypted_view mount option greatly changes the functionality of an eCryptfs mount. Instead of encrypting and decrypting lower files, it provides a unified view of the encrypted files in the lower filesystem. The presence of the ecryptfs_encrypted_view mount option is intended to force a read-only mount and modifying files is not supported when the feature is in use. See the following commit for more information:

e77a56d [PATCH] eCryptfs: Encrypted passthrough

This patch forces the mount to be read-only when the ecryptfs_encrypted_view mount option is specified by setting the MS_RDONLY flag on the superblock. Additionally, this patch removes some broken logic in ecryptfs_open() that attempted to prevent modifications of files when the encrypted view feature was in use. The check in ecryptfs_open() was not sufficient to prevent file modifications using system calls that do not operate on a file descriptor.

---
 fs/ecryptfs/file.c | 12 ------------
 fs/ecryptfs/main.c | 16 +++++++++++++---
 2 files changed, 13 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)
fs/ecryptfs/file.c +0 -12
index 992cf95830b5..f3fd66acae47 100644
@@ -191,23 +191,11 @@ static int ecryptfs_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
 {
 	int rc = 0;
 	struct ecryptfs_crypt_stat *crypt_stat = NULL;
-	struct ecryptfs_mount_crypt_stat *mount_crypt_stat;
 	struct dentry *ecryptfs_dentry = file->f_path.dentry;
 	/* Private value of ecryptfs_dentry allocated in
 	 * ecryptfs_lookup() */
 	struct ecryptfs_file_info *file_info;
 
-	mount_crypt_stat = &ecryptfs_superblock_to_private(
-		ecryptfs_dentry->d_sb)->mount_crypt_stat;
-	if ((mount_crypt_stat->flags & ECRYPTFS_ENCRYPTED_VIEW_ENABLED)
-	    && ((file->f_flags & O_WRONLY) || (file->f_flags & O_RDWR)
-		|| (file->f_flags & O_CREAT) || (file->f_flags & O_TRUNC)
-		|| (file->f_flags & O_APPEND))) {
-		printk(KERN_WARNING "Mount has encrypted view enabled; "
-		       "files may only be read\n");
-		rc = -EPERM;
-		goto out;
-	}
 	/* Released in ecryptfs_release or end of function if failure */
 	file_info = kmem_cache_zalloc(ecryptfs_file_info_cache, GFP_KERNEL);
 	ecryptfs_set_file_private(file, file_info);
fs/ecryptfs/main.c +13 -3
index eb1c5979ecaf..539a399b8339 100644
@@ -493,6 +493,7 @@ static struct dentry *ecryptfs_mount(struct file_system_type *fs_type, int flags
 {
 	struct super_block *s;
 	struct ecryptfs_sb_info *sbi;
+	struct ecryptfs_mount_crypt_stat *mount_crypt_stat;
 	struct ecryptfs_dentry_info *root_info;
 	const char *err = "Getting sb failed";
 	struct inode *inode;
@@ -511,6 +512,7 @@ static struct dentry *ecryptfs_mount(struct file_system_type *fs_type, int flags
 		err = "Error parsing options";
 		goto out;
 	}
+	mount_crypt_stat = &sbi->mount_crypt_stat;
 
 	s = sget(fs_type, NULL, set_anon_super, flags, NULL);
 	if (IS_ERR(s)) {
@@ -557,11 +559,19 @@ static struct dentry *ecryptfs_mount(struct file_system_type *fs_type, int flags
 
 	/**
 	 * Set the POSIX ACL flag based on whether they're enabled in the lower
-	 * mount. Force a read-only eCryptfs mount if the lower mount is ro.
-	 * Allow a ro eCryptfs mount even when the lower mount is rw.
+	 * mount.
 	 */
 	s->s_flags = flags & ~MS_POSIXACL;
-	s->s_flags |= path.dentry->d_sb->s_flags & (MS_RDONLY | MS_POSIXACL);
+	s->s_flags |= path.dentry->d_sb->s_flags & MS_POSIXACL;
+
+	/**
+	 * Force a read-only eCryptfs mount when:
+	 *   1) The lower mount is ro
+	 *   2) The ecryptfs_encrypted_view mount option is specified
+	 */
+	if (path.dentry->d_sb->s_flags & MS_RDONLY ||
+	    mount_crypt_stat->flags & ECRYPTFS_ENCRYPTED_VIEW_ENABLED)
+		s->s_flags |= MS_RDONLY;
 
 	s->s_maxbytes = path.dentry->d_sb->s_maxbytes;
 	s->s_blocksize = path.dentry->d_sb->s_blocksize;
Signature · 1 line
2.2.1
author
#75 lore raw

PATCH 73/78 eCryptfs: Remove buggy and unnecessary write in file name decode routine

In reply to Jiri Slaby

From: Michael Halcrow <[email protected]>

3.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

===============

commit 942080643bce061c3dd9d5718d3b745dcb39a8bc upstream.

Dmitry Chernenkov used KASAN to discover that eCryptfs writes past the end of the allocated buffer during encrypted filename decoding. This fix corrects the issue by getting rid of the unnecessary 0 write when the current bit offset is 2.

---
 fs/ecryptfs/crypto.c | 1 -
 1 file changed, 1 deletion(-)
fs/ecryptfs/crypto.c +0 -1
index 000eae2782b6..bf926f7a5f0c 100644
@@ -1917,7 +1917,6 @@ ecryptfs_decode_from_filename(unsigned char *dst, size_t *dst_size,
 			break;
 		case 2:
 			dst[dst_byte_offset++] |= (src_byte);
-			dst[dst_byte_offset] = 0;
 			current_bit_offset = 0;
 			break;
 		}
Signature · 1 line
2.2.1
author
#76 lore raw

PATCH 74/78 Btrfs: do not move em to modified list when unpinning

In reply to Jiri Slaby

From: Josef Bacik <[email protected]>

3.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

===============

commit a28046956c71985046474283fa3bcd256915fb72 upstream.

We use the modified list to keep track of which extents have been modified so we know which ones are candidates for logging at fsync() time. Newly modified extents are added to the list at modification time, around the same time the ordered extent is created. We do this so that we don't have to wait for ordered extents to complete before we know what we need to log. The problem is when something like this happens

log extent 0-4k on inode 1
copy csum for 0-4k from ordered extent into log
sync log
commit transaction
log some other extent on inode 1
ordered extent for 0-4k completes and adds itself onto modified list again log changed extents
see ordered extent for 0-4k has already been logged
at this point we assume the csum has been copied
sync log
crash

On replay we will see the extent 0-4k in the log, drop the original 0-4k extent which is the same one that we are replaying which also drops the csum, and then we won't find the csum in the log for that bytenr. This of course causes us to have errors about not having csums for certain ranges of our inode. So remove the modified list manipulation in unpin_extent_cache, any modified extents should have been added well before now, and we don't want them re-logged. This fixes my test that I could reliably reproduce this problem with. Thanks,

---
 fs/btrfs/extent_map.c | 2 --
 1 file changed, 2 deletions(-)
fs/btrfs/extent_map.c +0 -2
index a4a7a1a8da95..0a3809500599 100644
@@ -263,8 +263,6 @@ int unpin_extent_cache(struct extent_map_tree *tree, u64 start, u64 len,
 	if (!em)
 		goto out;
 
-	if (!test_bit(EXTENT_FLAG_LOGGING, &em->flags))
-		list_move(&em->list, &tree->modified_extents);
 	em->generation = gen;
 	clear_bit(EXTENT_FLAG_PINNED, &em->flags);
 	em->mod_start = em->start;
Signature · 1 line
2.2.1
author
#77 lore raw

PATCH 75/78 Btrfs: fix fs corruption on transaction abort if device supports discard

In reply to Jiri Slaby

From: Filipe Manana <[email protected]>

3.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

===============

commit 678886bdc6378c1cbd5072da2c5a3035000214e3 upstream.

When we abort a transaction we iterate over all the ranges marked as dirty in fs_info->freed_extents[0] and fs_info->freed_extents[1], clear them from those trees, add them back (unpin) to the free space caches and, if the fs was mounted with "-o discard", perform a discard on those regions. Also, after adding the regions to the free space caches, a fitrim ioctl call can see those ranges in a block group's free space cache and perform a discard on the ranges, so the same issue can happen without "-o discard" as well.

This causes corruption, affecting one or multiple btree nodes (in the worst case leaving the fs unmountable) because some of those ranges (the ones in the fs_info->pinned_extents tree) correspond to btree nodes/leafs that are referred by the last committed super block - breaking the rule that anything that was committed by a transaction is untouched until the next transaction commits successfully.

I ran into this while running in a loop (for several hours) the fstest that I recently submitted:

[PATCH] fstests: add btrfs test to stress chunk allocation/removal and fstrim

The corruption always happened when a transaction aborted and then fsck complained like this:

_check_btrfs_filesystem: filesystem on /dev/sdc is inconsistent *** fsck.btrfs output ***
Check tree block failed, want=94945280, have=0
Check tree block failed, want=94945280, have=0
Check tree block failed, want=94945280, have=0
Check tree block failed, want=94945280, have=0
Check tree block failed, want=94945280, have=0
read block failed check_tree_block
Couldn't open file system

In this case 94945280 corresponded to the root of a tree. Using frace what I observed was the following sequence of steps happened:

1) transaction N started, fs_info->pinned_extents pointed to

      fs_info->freed_extents[0];

2) node/eb 94945280 is created;

3) eb is persisted to disk;

4) transaction N commit starts, fs_info->pinned_extents now points to

      fs_info->freed_extents[1], and transaction N completes;

5) transaction N + 1 starts;

6) eb is COWed, and btrfs_free_tree_block() called for this eb;

7) eb range (94945280 to 94945280 + 16Kb) is added to

      fs_info->pinned_extents (fs_info->freed_extents[1]);

8) Something goes wrong in transaction N + 1, like hitting ENOSPC

      for example, and the transaction is aborted, turning the fs into
      readonly mode. The stack trace I got for example:

      [112065.253935]  [<ffffffff8140c7b6>] dump_stack+0x4d/0x66
      [112065.254271]  [<ffffffff81042984>] warn_slowpath_common+0x7f/0x98
      [112065.254567]  [<ffffffffa0325990>] ? __btrfs_abort_transaction+0x50/0x10b [btrfs]
      [112065.261674]  [<ffffffff810429e5>] warn_slowpath_fmt+0x48/0x50
      [112065.261922]  [<ffffffffa032949e>] ? btrfs_free_path+0x26/0x29 [btrfs]
      [112065.262211]  [<ffffffffa0325990>] __btrfs_abort_transaction+0x50/0x10b [btrfs]
      [112065.262545]  [<ffffffffa036b1d6>] btrfs_remove_chunk+0x537/0x58b [btrfs]
      [112065.262771]  [<ffffffffa033840f>] btrfs_delete_unused_bgs+0x1de/0x21b [btrfs]
      [112065.263105]  [<ffffffffa0343106>] cleaner_kthread+0x100/0x12f [btrfs]
      (...)
      [112065.264493] ---[ end trace dd7903a975a31a08 ]---
      [112065.264673] BTRFS: error (device sdc) in btrfs_remove_chunk:2625: errno=-28 No space left
      [112065.264997] BTRFS info (device sdc): forced readonly

9) The clear kthread sees that the BTRFS_FS_STATE_ERROR bit is set in

      fs_info->fs_state and calls btrfs_cleanup_transaction(), which in
      turn calls btrfs_destroy_pinned_extent();

10) Then btrfs_destroy_pinned_extent() iterates over all the ranges marked as dirty in fs_info->freed_extents[], and for each one it calls discard, if the fs was mounted with "-o discard", and adds the range to the free space cache of the respective block group;

11) btrfs_trim_block_group(), invoked from the fitrim ioctl code path,

       sees the free space entries and performs a discard;

12) After an umount and mount (or fsck), our eb's location on disk was full of zeroes, and it should have been untouched, because it was marked as dirty in the fs_info->pinned_extents tree, and therefore used by the trees that the last committed superblock points to.

Fix this by not performing a discard and not adding the ranges to the free space caches - it's useless from this point since the fs is now in readonly mode and we won't write free space caches to disk anymore (otherwise we would leak space) nor any new superblock. By not adding the ranges to the free space caches, it prevents other code paths from allocating that space and write to it as well, therefore being safer and simpler.

This isn't a new problem, as it's been present since 2011 (git commit acce952b0263825da32cf10489413dec78053347).

---
 fs/btrfs/disk-io.c     |  6 ------
 fs/btrfs/extent-tree.c | 10 ++++++----
 2 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
fs/btrfs/disk-io.c +0 -6
index 8964b59fee92..f46ad53626be 100644
@@ -3995,12 +3995,6 @@ again:
 		if (ret)
 			break;
 
-		/* opt_discard */
-		if (btrfs_test_opt(root, DISCARD))
-			ret = btrfs_error_discard_extent(root, start,
-							 end + 1 - start,
-							 NULL);
-
 		clear_extent_dirty(unpin, start, end, GFP_NOFS);
 		btrfs_error_unpin_extent_range(root, start, end);
 		cond_resched();
fs/btrfs/extent-tree.c +6 -4
index 63ee604efa6c..b1c6e490379c 100644
@@ -5476,7 +5476,8 @@ void btrfs_prepare_extent_commit(struct btrfs_trans_handle *trans,
 	update_global_block_rsv(fs_info);
 }
 
-static int unpin_extent_range(struct btrfs_root *root, u64 start, u64 end)
+static int unpin_extent_range(struct btrfs_root *root, u64 start, u64 end,
+			      const bool return_free_space)
 {
 	struct btrfs_fs_info *fs_info = root->fs_info;
 	struct btrfs_block_group_cache *cache = NULL;
@@ -5500,7 +5501,8 @@ static int unpin_extent_range(struct btrfs_root *root, u64 start, u64 end)
 
 		if (start < cache->last_byte_to_unpin) {
 			len = min(len, cache->last_byte_to_unpin - start);
-			btrfs_add_free_space(cache, start, len);
+			if (return_free_space)
+				btrfs_add_free_space(cache, start, len);
 		}
 
 		start += len;
@@ -5563,7 +5565,7 @@ int btrfs_finish_extent_commit(struct btrfs_trans_handle *trans,
 						   end + 1 - start, NULL);
 
 		clear_extent_dirty(unpin, start, end, GFP_NOFS);
-		unpin_extent_range(root, start, end);
+		unpin_extent_range(root, start, end, true);
 		cond_resched();
 	}
 
@@ -8809,7 +8811,7 @@ out:
 
 int btrfs_error_unpin_extent_range(struct btrfs_root *root, u64 start, u64 end)
 {
-	return unpin_extent_range(root, start, end);
+	return unpin_extent_range(root, start, end, false);
 }
 
 int btrfs_error_discard_extent(struct btrfs_root *root, u64 bytenr,
Signature · 1 line
2.2.1
author
#78 lore raw

PATCH 76/78 mfd: stmpe: Fix STMPE24xx GPMR LSB

In reply to Jiri Slaby

From: Linus Walleij <[email protected]>

3.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

===============

commit 871c3cf4ea7d5baf58e0a40bce7431ca5525aa2a upstream.

The least significat byte of the GPIO value read register on the STMPE24xx series is on addres 0xA4 not 0xA5. Correct against datasheet and tested on the STMPE2401 hardware.

---
 drivers/mfd/stmpe.h | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/mfd/stmpe.h +1 -1
index ff2b09ba8797..50a5c8697bf7 100644
@@ -269,7 +269,7 @@ int stmpe_remove(struct stmpe *stmpe);
 #define STMPE24XX_REG_CHIP_ID		0x80
 #define STMPE24XX_REG_IEGPIOR_LSB	0x18
 #define STMPE24XX_REG_ISGPIOR_MSB	0x19
-#define STMPE24XX_REG_GPMR_LSB		0xA5
+#define STMPE24XX_REG_GPMR_LSB		0xA4
 #define STMPE24XX_REG_GPSR_LSB		0x85
 #define STMPE24XX_REG_GPCR_LSB		0x88
 #define STMPE24XX_REG_GPDR_LSB		0x8B
Signature · 1 line
2.2.1
author
#79 lore raw

PATCH 77/78 mfd: viperboard: Fix platform-device id collision

In reply to Jiri Slaby

From: Johan Hovold <[email protected]>

3.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

===============

commit b6684228726cc25551a43f5c0bd9c5f977f10f48 upstream.

Allow more than one viperboard to be connected by registering with PLATFORM_DEVID_AUTO instead of PLATFORM_DEVID_NONE.

The subdevices are currently registered with PLATFORM_DEVID_NONE, which will cause a name collision on the platform bus when a second viperboard is plugged in:

viperboard 1-2.4:1.0: version 0.00 found at bus 001 address 004

------------[ cut here ]------------
WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 181 at /home/johan/work/omicron/src/linux/fs/sysfs/dir.c:31 sysfs_warn_dup+0x74/0x84()
sysfs: cannot create duplicate filename '/bus/platform/devices/viperboard-gpio'
Modules linked in: i2c_viperboard viperboard netconsole [last unloaded: viperboard]
CPU: 0 PID: 181 Comm: bash Tainted: G        W      3.17.0-rc6 #1
[<c0016bf4>] (unwind_backtrace) from [<c0013860>] (show_stack+0x20/0x24)
[<c0013860>] (show_stack) from [<c04305f8>] (dump_stack+0x24/0x28)
[<c04305f8>] (dump_stack) from [<c0040fb4>] (warn_slowpath_common+0x80/0x98)
[<c0040fb4>] (warn_slowpath_common) from [<c004100c>] (warn_slowpath_fmt+0x40/0x48)
[<c004100c>] (warn_slowpath_fmt) from [<c016f1bc>] (sysfs_warn_dup+0x74/0x84)
[<c016f1bc>] (sysfs_warn_dup) from [<c016f548>] (sysfs_do_create_link_sd.isra.2+0xcc/0xd0)
[<c016f548>] (sysfs_do_create_link_sd.isra.2) from [<c016f588>] (sysfs_create_link+0x3c/0x48)
[<c016f588>] (sysfs_create_link) from [<c02867ec>] (bus_add_device+0x12c/0x1e0)
[<c02867ec>] (bus_add_device) from [<c0284820>] (device_add+0x410/0x584)
[<c0284820>] (device_add) from [<c0289440>] (platform_device_add+0xd8/0x26c)
[<c0289440>] (platform_device_add) from [<c02a5ae4>] (mfd_add_device+0x240/0x344)
[<c02a5ae4>] (mfd_add_device) from [<c02a5ce0>] (mfd_add_devices+0xb8/0x110)
[<c02a5ce0>] (mfd_add_devices) from [<bf00d1c8>] (vprbrd_probe+0x160/0x1b0 [viperboard])
[<bf00d1c8>] (vprbrd_probe [viperboard]) from [<c030c000>] (usb_probe_interface+0x1bc/0x2a8)
[<c030c000>] (usb_probe_interface) from [<c028768c>] (driver_probe_device+0x14c/0x3ac)
[<c028768c>] (driver_probe_device) from [<c02879e4>] (__driver_attach+0xa4/0xa8)
[<c02879e4>] (__driver_attach) from [<c0285698>] (bus_for_each_dev+0x70/0xa4)
[<c0285698>] (bus_for_each_dev) from [<c0287030>] (driver_attach+0x2c/0x30)
[<c0287030>] (driver_attach) from [<c030a288>] (usb_store_new_id+0x170/0x1ac)
[<c030a288>] (usb_store_new_id) from [<c030a2f8>] (new_id_store+0x34/0x3c)
[<c030a2f8>] (new_id_store) from [<c02853ec>] (drv_attr_store+0x30/0x3c)
[<c02853ec>] (drv_attr_store) from [<c016eaa8>] (sysfs_kf_write+0x5c/0x60)
[<c016eaa8>] (sysfs_kf_write) from [<c016dc68>] (kernfs_fop_write+0xd4/0x194)
[<c016dc68>] (kernfs_fop_write) from [<c010fe40>] (vfs_write+0xb4/0x1c0)
[<c010fe40>] (vfs_write) from [<c01104a8>] (SyS_write+0x4c/0xa0)
[<c01104a8>] (SyS_write) from [<c000f900>] (ret_fast_syscall+0x0/0x48)
---[ end trace 98e8603c22d65817 ]---

viperboard 1-2.4:1.0: Failed to add mfd devices to core.
viperboard: probe of 1-2.4:1.0 failed with error -17

---
 drivers/mfd/viperboard.c | 5 +++--
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/mfd/viperboard.c +3 -2
index af2a6703f34f..7bf6dd9625b9 100644
@@ -93,8 +93,9 @@ static int vprbrd_probe(struct usb_interface *interface,
 		 version >> 8, version & 0xff,
 		 vb->usb_dev->bus->busnum, vb->usb_dev->devnum);
 
-	ret = mfd_add_devices(&interface->dev, -1, vprbrd_devs,
-				ARRAY_SIZE(vprbrd_devs), NULL, 0, NULL);
+	ret = mfd_add_devices(&interface->dev, PLATFORM_DEVID_AUTO,
+				vprbrd_devs, ARRAY_SIZE(vprbrd_devs), NULL, 0,
+				NULL);
 	if (ret != 0) {
 		dev_err(&interface->dev, "Failed to add mfd devices to core.");
 		goto error;
Signature · 1 line
2.2.1
author
#80 lore raw

PATCH 78/78 mm: let mm_find_pmd fix buggy race with THP fault

In reply to Jiri Slaby

From: Hugh Dickins <[email protected]>

3.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

===============

commit f72e7dcdd25229446b102e587ef2f826f76bff28 upstream.

Trinity has reported:

    BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000018
    IP: __lock_acquire (kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3070 (discriminator 1))
    CPU: 6 PID: 16173 Comm: trinity-c364 Tainted: G        W
                            3.15.0-rc1-next-20140415-sasha-00020-gaa90d09 #398
    lock_acquire (arch/x86/include/asm/current.h:14
                  kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3602)
    _raw_spin_lock (include/linux/spinlock_api_smp.h:143
                    kernel/locking/spinlock.c:151)
    remove_migration_pte (mm/migrate.c:137)
    rmap_walk (mm/rmap.c:1628 mm/rmap.c:1699)
    remove_migration_ptes (mm/migrate.c:224)
    migrate_pages (mm/migrate.c:922 mm/migrate.c:960 mm/migrate.c:1126)
    migrate_misplaced_page (mm/migrate.c:1733)
    __handle_mm_fault (mm/memory.c:3762 mm/memory.c:3812 mm/memory.c:3925)
    handle_mm_fault (mm/memory.c:3948)
    __get_user_pages (mm/memory.c:1851)
    __mlock_vma_pages_range (mm/mlock.c:255)
    __mm_populate (mm/mlock.c:711)
    SyS_mlockall (include/linux/mm.h:1799 mm/mlock.c:817 mm/mlock.c:791)

I believe this comes about because, whereas collapsing and splitting THP functions take anon_vma lock in write mode (which excludes concurrent rmap walks), faulting THP functions (write protection and misplaced NUMA) do not - and mostly they do not need to.

But they do use a pmdp_clear_flush(), set_pmd_at() sequence which, for an instant (indeed, for a long instant, given the inter-CPU TLB flush in there), leaves *pmd neither present not trans_huge.

Which can confuse a concurrent rmap walk, as when removing migration ptes, seen in the dumped trace. Although that rmap walk has a 4k page to insert, anon_vmas containing THPs are in no way segregated from 4k-page anon_vmas, so the 4k-intent mm_find_pmd() does need to cope with that instant when a trans_huge pmd is temporarily absent.

I don't think we need strengthen the locking at the THP end: it's easily handled with an ACCESS_ONCE() before testing both conditions.

And since mm_find_pmd() had only one caller who wanted a THP rather than a pmd, let's slightly repurpose it to fail when it hits a THP or non-present pmd, and open code split_huge_page_address() again.

---
 mm/huge_memory.c | 18 ++++++++++++------
 mm/ksm.c         |  1 -
 mm/migrate.c     |  2 --
 mm/rmap.c        | 12 ++++++++----
 4 files changed, 20 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)
mm/huge_memory.c +12 -6
index e497843f5f65..04d17ba00893 100644
@@ -2408,8 +2408,6 @@ static void collapse_huge_page(struct mm_struct *mm,
 	pmd = mm_find_pmd(mm, address);
 	if (!pmd)
 		goto out;
-	if (pmd_trans_huge(*pmd))
-		goto out;
 
 	anon_vma_lock_write(vma->anon_vma);
 
@@ -2508,8 +2506,6 @@ static int khugepaged_scan_pmd(struct mm_struct *mm,
 	pmd = mm_find_pmd(mm, address);
 	if (!pmd)
 		goto out;
-	if (pmd_trans_huge(*pmd))
-		goto out;
 
 	memset(khugepaged_node_load, 0, sizeof(khugepaged_node_load));
 	pte = pte_offset_map_lock(mm, pmd, address, &ptl);
@@ -2863,12 +2859,22 @@ void split_huge_page_pmd_mm(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned long address,
 static void split_huge_page_address(struct mm_struct *mm,
 				    unsigned long address)
 {
+	pgd_t *pgd;
+	pud_t *pud;
 	pmd_t *pmd;
 
 	VM_BUG_ON(!(address & ~HPAGE_PMD_MASK));
 
-	pmd = mm_find_pmd(mm, address);
-	if (!pmd)
+	pgd = pgd_offset(mm, address);
+	if (!pgd_present(*pgd))
+		return;
+
+	pud = pud_offset(pgd, address);
+	if (!pud_present(*pud))
+		return;
+
+	pmd = pmd_offset(pud, address);
+	if (!pmd_present(*pmd))
 		return;
 	/*
 	 * Caller holds the mmap_sem write mode, so a huge pmd cannot
mm/ksm.c +0 -1
index c78fff1e9eae..29cbd06c4884 100644
@@ -945,7 +945,6 @@ static int replace_page(struct vm_area_struct *vma, struct page *page,
 	pmd = mm_find_pmd(mm, addr);
 	if (!pmd)
 		goto out;
-	BUG_ON(pmd_trans_huge(*pmd));
 
 	mmun_start = addr;
 	mmun_end   = addr + PAGE_SIZE;
mm/migrate.c +0 -2
index d5c84b0a5243..fac5fa0813c4 100644
@@ -136,8 +136,6 @@ static int remove_migration_pte(struct page *new, struct vm_area_struct *vma,
 		pmd = mm_find_pmd(mm, addr);
 		if (!pmd)
 			goto out;
-		if (pmd_trans_huge(*pmd))
-			goto out;
 
 		ptep = pte_offset_map(pmd, addr);
 
mm/rmap.c +8 -4
index 5b8675ccc1ef..440c71c43b8d 100644
@@ -571,6 +571,7 @@ pmd_t *mm_find_pmd(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned long address)
 	pgd_t *pgd;
 	pud_t *pud;
 	pmd_t *pmd = NULL;
+	pmd_t pmde;
 
 	pgd = pgd_offset(mm, address);
 	if (!pgd_present(*pgd))
@@ -581,7 +582,13 @@ pmd_t *mm_find_pmd(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned long address)
 		goto out;
 
 	pmd = pmd_offset(pud, address);
-	if (!pmd_present(*pmd))
+	/*
+	 * Some THP functions use the sequence pmdp_clear_flush(), set_pmd_at()
+	 * without holding anon_vma lock for write.  So when looking for a
+	 * genuine pmde (in which to find pte), test present and !THP together.
+	 */
+	pmde = ACCESS_ONCE(*pmd);
+	if (!pmd_present(pmde) || pmd_trans_huge(pmde))
 		pmd = NULL;
 out:
 	return pmd;
@@ -617,9 +624,6 @@ pte_t *__page_check_address(struct page *page, struct mm_struct *mm,
 	if (!pmd)
 		return NULL;
 
-	if (pmd_trans_huge(*pmd))
-		return NULL;
-
 	pte = pte_offset_map(pmd, address);
 	/* Make a quick check before getting the lock */
 	if (!sync && !pte_present(*pte)) {
Signature · 1 line
2.2.1
#81 lore raw

Re: [PATCH 3.12 78/78] mm: let mm_find_pmd fix buggy race with THP fault

Quoted 182 lines · Jiri Slaby

From: Hugh Dickins <[email protected]>

3.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

===============

commit f72e7dcdd25229446b102e587ef2f826f76bff28 upstream.

Trinity has reported:

    BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000018
    IP: __lock_acquire (kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3070 (discriminator 1))
    CPU: 6 PID: 16173 Comm: trinity-c364 Tainted: G        W
                            3.15.0-rc1-next-20140415-sasha-00020-gaa90d09 #398
    lock_acquire (arch/x86/include/asm/current.h:14
                  kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3602)
    _raw_spin_lock (include/linux/spinlock_api_smp.h:143
                    kernel/locking/spinlock.c:151)
    remove_migration_pte (mm/migrate.c:137)
    rmap_walk (mm/rmap.c:1628 mm/rmap.c:1699)
    remove_migration_ptes (mm/migrate.c:224)
    migrate_pages (mm/migrate.c:922 mm/migrate.c:960 mm/migrate.c:1126)
    migrate_misplaced_page (mm/migrate.c:1733)
    __handle_mm_fault (mm/memory.c:3762 mm/memory.c:3812 mm/memory.c:3925)
    handle_mm_fault (mm/memory.c:3948)
    __get_user_pages (mm/memory.c:1851)
    __mlock_vma_pages_range (mm/mlock.c:255)
    __mm_populate (mm/mlock.c:711)
    SyS_mlockall (include/linux/mm.h:1799 mm/mlock.c:817 mm/mlock.c:791)

I believe this comes about because, whereas collapsing and splitting THP functions take anon_vma lock in write mode (which excludes concurrent rmap walks), faulting THP functions (write protection and misplaced NUMA) do not - and mostly they do not need to.

But they do use a pmdp_clear_flush(), set_pmd_at() sequence which, for an instant (indeed, for a long instant, given the inter-CPU TLB flush in there), leaves *pmd neither present not trans_huge.

Which can confuse a concurrent rmap walk, as when removing migration ptes, seen in the dumped trace. Although that rmap walk has a 4k page to insert, anon_vmas containing THPs are in no way segregated from 4k-page anon_vmas, so the 4k-intent mm_find_pmd() does need to cope with that instant when a trans_huge pmd is temporarily absent.

I don't think we need strengthen the locking at the THP end: it's easily handled with an ACCESS_ONCE() before testing both conditions.

And since mm_find_pmd() had only one caller who wanted a THP rather than a pmd, let's slightly repurpose it to fail when it hits a THP or non-present pmd, and open code split_huge_page_address() again.

---
 mm/huge_memory.c | 18 ++++++++++++------
 mm/ksm.c         |  1 -
 mm/migrate.c     |  2 --
 mm/rmap.c        | 12 ++++++++----
 4 files changed, 20 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)
mm/huge_memory.c +12 -6
index e497843f5f65..04d17ba00893 100644
@@ -2408,8 +2408,6 @@ static void collapse_huge_page(struct mm_struct *mm,
 	pmd = mm_find_pmd(mm, address);
 	if (!pmd)
 		goto out;
-	if (pmd_trans_huge(*pmd))
-		goto out;
 
 	anon_vma_lock_write(vma->anon_vma);
 
@@ -2508,8 +2506,6 @@ static int khugepaged_scan_pmd(struct mm_struct *mm,
 	pmd = mm_find_pmd(mm, address);
 	if (!pmd)
 		goto out;
-	if (pmd_trans_huge(*pmd))
-		goto out;
 
 	memset(khugepaged_node_load, 0, sizeof(khugepaged_node_load));
 	pte = pte_offset_map_lock(mm, pmd, address, &ptl);
@@ -2863,12 +2859,22 @@ void split_huge_page_pmd_mm(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned long address,
 static void split_huge_page_address(struct mm_struct *mm,
 				    unsigned long address)
 {
+	pgd_t *pgd;
+	pud_t *pud;
 	pmd_t *pmd;
 
 	VM_BUG_ON(!(address & ~HPAGE_PMD_MASK));
 
-	pmd = mm_find_pmd(mm, address);
-	if (!pmd)
+	pgd = pgd_offset(mm, address);
+	if (!pgd_present(*pgd))
+		return;
+
+	pud = pud_offset(pgd, address);
+	if (!pud_present(*pud))
+		return;
+
+	pmd = pmd_offset(pud, address);
+	if (!pmd_present(*pmd))
 		return;
 	/*
 	 * Caller holds the mmap_sem write mode, so a huge pmd cannot
mm/ksm.c +0 -1
index c78fff1e9eae..29cbd06c4884 100644
@@ -945,7 +945,6 @@ static int replace_page(struct vm_area_struct *vma, struct page *page,
 	pmd = mm_find_pmd(mm, addr);
 	if (!pmd)
 		goto out;
-	BUG_ON(pmd_trans_huge(*pmd));
 
 	mmun_start = addr;
 	mmun_end   = addr + PAGE_SIZE;
mm/migrate.c +0 -2
index d5c84b0a5243..fac5fa0813c4 100644
@@ -136,8 +136,6 @@ static int remove_migration_pte(struct page *new, struct vm_area_struct *vma,
 		pmd = mm_find_pmd(mm, addr);
 		if (!pmd)
 			goto out;
-		if (pmd_trans_huge(*pmd))
-			goto out;
 
 		ptep = pte_offset_map(pmd, addr);
 
mm/rmap.c +8 -4
index 5b8675ccc1ef..440c71c43b8d 100644
@@ -571,6 +571,7 @@ pmd_t *mm_find_pmd(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned long address)
 	pgd_t *pgd;
 	pud_t *pud;
 	pmd_t *pmd = NULL;
+	pmd_t pmde;
 
 	pgd = pgd_offset(mm, address);
 	if (!pgd_present(*pgd))
@@ -581,7 +582,13 @@ pmd_t *mm_find_pmd(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned long address)
 		goto out;
 
 	pmd = pmd_offset(pud, address);
-	if (!pmd_present(*pmd))
+	/*
+	 * Some THP functions use the sequence pmdp_clear_flush(), set_pmd_at()
+	 * without holding anon_vma lock for write.  So when looking for a
+	 * genuine pmde (in which to find pte), test present and !THP together.
+	 */
+	pmde = ACCESS_ONCE(*pmd);
+	if (!pmd_present(pmde) || pmd_trans_huge(pmde))
 		pmd = NULL;
 out:
 	return pmd;
@@ -617,9 +624,6 @@ pte_t *__page_check_address(struct page *page, struct mm_struct *mm,
 	if (!pmd)
 		return NULL;
 
-	if (pmd_trans_huge(*pmd))
-		return NULL;
-
 	pte = pte_offset_map(pmd, address);
 	/* Make a quick check before getting the lock */
 	if (!sync && !pte_present(*pte)) {
Signature · 1 line
2.2.1

Fine for this to go in, but there is one catch, which I discovered when backporting to v3.11: it needed one more hunk. I haven't checked your base tree, but if this applies then I believe you need it - most of the time no problem, but it can case page migration to fail to find a migration entry it inserted earlier, then BUG_ON(!PageLocked(p)) in migration_entry_to_page() soon after. Here's what I wrote back then:

Note on rebase to v3.11: added a hunk to replace the use of mm_find_pmd() in page_check_address_pmd(). This call had been similarly replaced by the time of my v3.16 commit, in Kirill Shutemov's v3.15 b5a8cad376ee ("thp: close race between split and zap huge pages"): which we do not need as such, since it's fixing v3.13 117b0791ac42 ("mm, thp: move ptl taking inside page_check_address_pmd()"), from a split page-table-lock series we are not backporting. But without this additional hunk, rmap sometimes broke when the new semantic for mm_find_pmd() was used here.

(Adding Kirill to Cc: shouldn't he have been Cc'ed already?)

Hugh

mm/huge_memory.c +9 -1
@@ -1584,12 +1584,20 @@ pmd_t *page_check_address_pmd(struct page *page,
 			      unsigned long address,
 			      enum page_check_address_pmd_flag flag)
 {
+	pgd_t *pgd;
+	pud_t *pud;
 	pmd_t *pmd, *ret = NULL;
 
 	if (address & ~HPAGE_PMD_MASK)
 		goto out;
 
-	pmd = mm_find_pmd(mm, address);
+	pgd = pgd_offset(mm, address);
+	if (!pgd_present(*pgd))
+		goto out;
+	pud = pud_offset(pgd, address);
+	if (!pud_present(*pud))
+		goto out;
+	pmd = pmd_offset(pud, address);
 	if (!pmd)
 		goto out;
 	if (pmd_none(*pmd))
author Tested-by Sasha Levin
#82 lore raw

Re: [PATCH 3.12 78/78] mm: let mm_find_pmd fix buggy race with THP fault

Quoted 9 lines · Hugh Dickins
Quoted 7 lines · Jiri Slaby

From: Hugh Dickins <[email protected]>

3.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

===============

commit f72e7dcdd25229446b102e587ef2f826f76bff28 upstream.

...

Quoted 16 lines

Fine for this to go in, but there is one catch, which I discovered when backporting to v3.11: it needed one more hunk. I haven't checked your base tree, but if this applies then I believe you need it - most of the time no problem, but it can case page migration to fail to find a migration entry it inserted earlier, then BUG_ON(!PageLocked(p)) in migration_entry_to_page() soon after. Here's what I wrote back then:

Note on rebase to v3.11: added a hunk to replace the use of mm_find_pmd() in page_check_address_pmd(). This call had been similarly replaced by the time of my v3.16 commit, in Kirill Shutemov's v3.15 b5a8cad376ee ("thp: close race between split and zap huge pages"): which we do not need as such, since it's fixing v3.13 117b0791ac42 ("mm, thp: move ptl taking inside page_check_address_pmd()"), from a split page-table-lock series we are not backporting. But without this additional hunk, rmap sometimes broke when the new semantic for mm_find_pmd() was used here.

Quoted 3 lines

(Adding Kirill to Cc: shouldn't he have been Cc'ed already?)

Hugh

Thanks, I see. So the diff between the hunk below and 117b0791ac42 are two things:

Quoted 13 lines
mm/huge_memory.c +2 -0
@@ -1584,12 +1584,20 @@ pmd_t *page_check_address_pmd(struct page *page,
 			      unsigned long address,
 			      enum page_check_address_pmd_flag flag)
 {
+	pgd_t *pgd;
+	pud_t *pud;
 	pmd_t *pmd, *ret = NULL;
 
 	if (address & ~HPAGE_PMD_MASK)
 		goto out;
 

mm/huge_memory.c pmd_t *page_check_address_pmd(struct page *page, · line 1602

Quoted 10 lines
mm/huge_memory.c +7 -1
-	pmd = mm_find_pmd(mm, address);
+	pgd = pgd_offset(mm, address);
+	if (!pgd_present(*pgd))
+		goto out;
+	pud = pud_offset(pgd, address);
+	if (!pud_present(*pud))
+		goto out;
+	pmd = pmd_offset(pud, address);
 	if (!pmd)
 		goto out;

This check is removed by 117b0791ac42. Can actually pmd returned from pmd_offset be NULL?

mm/huge_memory.c pmd_t *page_check_address_pmd(struct page *page, · line 1603

Quoted 1 line
mm/huge_memory.c +0 -0
 	if (pmd_none(*pmd))

pmd_none() is replaced by !pmd_present().

My question is: is it OK to take the backport of 117b0791ac42 attached (to stay with what upstream has)?

thanks,

Signature · 2 lines
js
suse labs

From f43340a2b0a461572ed53284148f9eb67d93733b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <[email protected]>
Date: Fri, 18 Apr 2014 15:07:25 -0700
Subject: [PATCH 1/1] thp: close race between split and zap huge pages

commit b5a8cad376eebbd8598642697e92a27983aee802 upstream.

Sasha Levin has reported two THP BUGs[1][2]. I believe both of them have the same root cause. Let's look to them one by one.

The first bug[1] is "kernel BUG at mm/huge_memory.c:1829!". It's BUG_ON(mapcount != page_mapcount(page)) in __split_huge_page(). From my testing I see that page_mapcount() is higher than mapcount here.

I think it happens due to race between zap_huge_pmd() and page_check_address_pmd(). page_check_address_pmd() misses PMD which is under zap:

	CPU0						CPU1
						zap_huge_pmd()
						  pmdp_get_and_clear()
__split_huge_page()
  anon_vma_interval_tree_foreach()
    __split_huge_page_splitting()
      page_check_address_pmd()
        mm_find_pmd()
	  /*
	   * We check if PMD present without taking ptl: no
	   * serialization against zap_huge_pmd(). We miss this PMD,
	   * it's not accounted to 'mapcount' in __split_huge_page().
	   */
	  pmd_present(pmd) == 0

BUG_ON(mapcount != page_mapcount(page)) // CRASH!!!

						  page_remove_rmap(page)
						    atomic_add_negative(-1, &page->_mapcount)

The second bug[2] is "kernel BUG at mm/huge_memory.c:1371!". It's VM_BUG_ON_PAGE(!PageHead(page), page) in zap_huge_pmd().

This happens in similar way:

	CPU0						CPU1
						zap_huge_pmd()
						  pmdp_get_and_clear()
						  page_remove_rmap(page)
						    atomic_add_negative(-1, &page->_mapcount)
__split_huge_page()
  anon_vma_interval_tree_foreach()
    __split_huge_page_splitting()
      page_check_address_pmd()
        mm_find_pmd()
	  pmd_present(pmd) == 0	/* The same comment as above */

/*
* No crash this time since we already decremented page->_mapcount in
* zap_huge_pmd().
*/
BUG_ON(mapcount != page_mapcount(page))

/*
* We split the compound page here into small pages without
* serialization against zap_huge_pmd()
*/
__split_huge_page_refcount()

						VM_BUG_ON_PAGE(!PageHead(page), page); // CRASH!!!

So my understanding the problem is pmd_present() check in mm_find_pmd() without taking page table lock.

The bug was introduced by me commit with commit 117b0791ac42. Sorry for that. :(

Let's open code mm_find_pmd() in page_check_address_pmd() and do the check under page table lock.

Note that __page_check_address() does the same for PTE entires if sync != 0.

I've stress tested split and zap code paths for 36+ hours by now and don't see crashes with the patch applied. Before it took <20 min to trigger the first bug and few hours for second one (if we ignore first).

[1] https://lkml.kernel.org/g/<[email protected]>
[2] https://lkml.kernel.org/g/<[email protected]>

Cc Bob Liu <[email protected]>
Cc Andrea Arcangeli <[email protected]>
Cc Rik van Riel <[email protected]>
Cc Mel Gorman <[email protected]>
Cc Michel Lespinasse <[email protected]>
Cc Dave Jones <[email protected]>
Cc Vlastimil Babka <[email protected]>
Cc <[email protected]> [3.13+]
---
 mm/huge_memory.c | 13 ++++++++++---
 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
mm/huge_memory.c +10 -3
index 04d17ba00893..04535b64119c 100644
@@ -1541,15 +1541,22 @@ pmd_t *page_check_address_pmd(struct page *page,
 			      unsigned long address,
 			      enum page_check_address_pmd_flag flag)
 {
+	pgd_t *pgd;
+	pud_t *pud;
 	pmd_t *pmd, *ret = NULL;
 
 	if (address & ~HPAGE_PMD_MASK)
 		goto out;
 
-	pmd = mm_find_pmd(mm, address);
-	if (!pmd)
+	pgd = pgd_offset(mm, address);
+	if (!pgd_present(*pgd))
 		goto out;
-	if (pmd_none(*pmd))
+	pud = pud_offset(pgd, address);
+	if (!pud_present(*pud))
+		goto out;
+	pmd = pmd_offset(pud, address);
+
+	if (!pmd_present(*pmd))
 		goto out;
 	if (pmd_page(*pmd) != page)
 		goto out;
Signature · 1 line
2.2.1
#83 lore raw

Re: [PATCH 3.12 78/78] mm: let mm_find_pmd fix buggy race with THP fault

Quoted 47 lines · Jiri Slaby
Quoted 9 lines · Hugh Dickins
Quoted 7 lines · Jiri Slaby

From: Hugh Dickins <[email protected]>

3.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

===============

commit f72e7dcdd25229446b102e587ef2f826f76bff28 upstream.

...

Quoted 16 lines

Fine for this to go in, but there is one catch, which I discovered when backporting to v3.11: it needed one more hunk. I haven't checked your base tree, but if this applies then I believe you need it - most of the time no problem, but it can case page migration to fail to find a migration entry it inserted earlier, then BUG_ON(!PageLocked(p)) in migration_entry_to_page() soon after. Here's what I wrote back then:

Note on rebase to v3.11: added a hunk to replace the use of mm_find_pmd() in page_check_address_pmd(). This call had been similarly replaced by the time of my v3.16 commit, in Kirill Shutemov's v3.15 b5a8cad376ee ("thp: close race between split and zap huge pages"): which we do not need as such, since it's fixing v3.13 117b0791ac42 ("mm, thp: move ptl taking inside page_check_address_pmd()"), from a split page-table-lock series we are not backporting. But without this additional hunk, rmap sometimes broke when the new semantic for mm_find_pmd() was used here.

Quoted 3 lines

(Adding Kirill to Cc: shouldn't he have been Cc'ed already?)

Hugh

Thanks, I see. So the diff between the hunk below and 117b0791ac42 are two things:

Quoted 13 lines
mm/huge_memory.c +2 -0
@@ -1584,12 +1584,20 @@ pmd_t *page_check_address_pmd(struct page *page,
 			      unsigned long address,
 			      enum page_check_address_pmd_flag flag)
 {
+	pgd_t *pgd;
+	pud_t *pud;
 	pmd_t *pmd, *ret = NULL;
 
 	if (address & ~HPAGE_PMD_MASK)
 		goto out;
 
Quoted 13 lines

mm/huge_memory.c pmd_t *page_check_address_pmd(struct page *page, · line 1560

Quoted 10 lines
mm/huge_memory.c +7 -1
-	pmd = mm_find_pmd(mm, address);
+	pgd = pgd_offset(mm, address);
+	if (!pgd_present(*pgd))
+		goto out;
+	pud = pud_offset(pgd, address);
+	if (!pud_present(*pud))
+		goto out;
+	pmd = pmd_offset(pud, address);
 	if (!pmd)
 		goto out;

This check is removed by 117b0791ac42. Can actually pmd returned from pmd_offset be NULL?

[ I believe, you mean by b5a8cad376ee, right? ]

No, pmd cannot be NULL here, if pud is present and valid (pud_page_vaddr() is not NULL).

Quoted 4 lines

mm/huge_memory.c pmd_t *page_check_address_pmd(struct page *page, · line 1603

Quoted 2 lines
mm/huge_memory.c +0 -0
 	if (pmd_none(*pmd))

pmd_none() is replaced by !pmd_present().

Both pmd_none() and !pmd_present() would work. pmd_none() can be slightly faster.

Quoted 2 lines

My question is: is it OK to take the backport of 117b0791ac42 attached (to stay with what upstream has)?

The commit message would be totally misleading, since the fixed bug is not present in v3.12. It's better to fold the patch into "mm: let mm_find_pmd fix buggy race with THP".

Signature · 1 line
 Kirill A. Shutemov
#84 lore raw

Re: [PATCH 3.12 78/78] mm: let mm_find_pmd fix buggy race with THP fault

Quoted 62 lines · Kirill A. Shutemov
Quoted 47 lines · Jiri Slaby
Quoted 9 lines · Hugh Dickins
Quoted 7 lines · Jiri Slaby

From: Hugh Dickins <[email protected]>

3.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

===============

commit f72e7dcdd25229446b102e587ef2f826f76bff28 upstream.

...

Quoted 16 lines

Fine for this to go in, but there is one catch, which I discovered when backporting to v3.11: it needed one more hunk. I haven't checked your base tree, but if this applies then I believe you need it - most of the time no problem, but it can case page migration to fail to find a migration entry it inserted earlier, then BUG_ON(!PageLocked(p)) in migration_entry_to_page() soon after. Here's what I wrote back then:

Note on rebase to v3.11: added a hunk to replace the use of mm_find_pmd() in page_check_address_pmd(). This call had been similarly replaced by the time of my v3.16 commit, in Kirill Shutemov's v3.15 b5a8cad376ee ("thp: close race between split and zap huge pages"): which we do not need as such, since it's fixing v3.13 117b0791ac42 ("mm, thp: move ptl taking inside page_check_address_pmd()"), from a split page-table-lock series we are not backporting. But without this additional hunk, rmap sometimes broke when the new semantic for mm_find_pmd() was used here.

Quoted 3 lines

(Adding Kirill to Cc: shouldn't he have been Cc'ed already?)

Hugh

Thanks, I see. So the diff between the hunk below and 117b0791ac42 are two things:

Quoted 13 lines
mm/huge_memory.c +2 -0
@@ -1584,12 +1584,20 @@ pmd_t *page_check_address_pmd(struct page *page,
 			      unsigned long address,
 			      enum page_check_address_pmd_flag flag)
 {
+	pgd_t *pgd;
+	pud_t *pud;
 	pmd_t *pmd, *ret = NULL;
 
 	if (address & ~HPAGE_PMD_MASK)
 		goto out;
 
Quoted 13 lines

mm/huge_memory.c pmd_t *page_check_address_pmd(struct page *page, · line 1560

Quoted 10 lines
mm/huge_memory.c +7 -1
-	pmd = mm_find_pmd(mm, address);
+	pgd = pgd_offset(mm, address);
+	if (!pgd_present(*pgd))
+		goto out;
+	pud = pud_offset(pgd, address);
+	if (!pud_present(*pud))
+		goto out;
+	pmd = pmd_offset(pud, address);
 	if (!pmd)
 		goto out;

This check is removed by 117b0791ac42. Can actually pmd returned from pmd_offset be NULL?

Quoted 4 lines

[ I believe, you mean by b5a8cad376ee, right? ]

No, pmd cannot be NULL here, if pud is present and valid (pud_page_vaddr() is not NULL).

Right, the !pmd test after pmd_offset is just stupid: I thought I was copying a standard version of that sequence from somewhere, and blindly duplicating the stupid test; but looking back now, suspect I was the one introducing that stupidity. It doesn't do anything wrong, but it's misleadingly stupid and better removed.

Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 5 lines

mm/huge_memory.c pmd_t *page_check_address_pmd(struct page *page, · line 1603

Quoted 3 lines
mm/huge_memory.c +0 -0
 	if (pmd_none(*pmd))

pmd_none() is replaced by !pmd_present().

Both pmd_none() and !pmd_present() would work. pmd_none() can be slightly faster.

Right, you can use whichever you feel like.

Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 3 lines

My question is: is it OK to take the backport of 117b0791ac42 attached (to stay with what upstream has)?

The commit message would be totally misleading, since the fixed bug is not present in v3.12. It's better to fold the patch into "mm: let mm_find_pmd fix buggy race with THP".

Agreed, it would be inappropriate to incorporate Kirill's changelog:
better just to append the text I supplied pointing to his commits.

Hugh

#85 lore raw
In reply to Jiri Slaby
Quoted 8 lines · Jiri Slaby

This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 3.12.36 release. There are 78 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please let me know.

Responses should be made by Tue Jan 13 11:29:45 CET 2015. Anything received after that time might be too late.

Build results:

	total: 135 pass: 135 fail: 0
Qemu tests:
	total: 27 pass: 27 fail: 0

Details are available at http://server.roeck-us.net:8010/builders.

Guenter

#86 lore raw

At Fri, 9 Jan 2015 09:59:10 -0800,

Quoted 10 lines · Guenter Roeck
Quoted 8 lines · Jiri Slaby

This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 3.12.36 release. There are 78 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please let me know.

Responses should be made by Tue Jan 13 11:29:45 CET 2015. Anything received after that time might be too late.

Quoted 8 lines

Build results:

	total: 135 pass: 135 fail: 0
Qemu tests:
	total: 27 pass: 27 fail: 0

Details are available at http://server.roeck-us.net:8010/builders.

Guenter

Plus, this kernel passed my test.

- Test Cases:
- Build this kernel.
- Boot this kernel.
- Build the latest mainline kernel with this kernel.

- Test Tool:
https://github.com/satoru-takeuchi/test-linux-stable

- Test Result (kernel .config, ktest config and test log):
http://satoru-takeuchi.org/test-linux-stable/results/<version>-<test datetime>.tar.xz

- Build Environment:
- OS: Debian Jessy x86_64
- CPU: Intel(R) Core(TM) i5-2400 CPU @ 3.10GHz x 4
- memory: 8GB

- Test Target Environment:
- Debian Jessy x86_64 (KVM guest on the Build Environment)
- # of vCPU: 2
- memory: 2GB

Thanks,
Satoru

author
#87 lore raw
Quoted 12 lines · Satoru Takeuchi

At Fri, 9 Jan 2015 09:59:10 -0800,

Quoted 10 lines · Guenter Roeck
Quoted 8 lines · Jiri Slaby

This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 3.12.36 release. There are 78 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please let me know.

Responses should be made by Tue Jan 13 11:29:45 CET 2015. Anything received after that time might be too late.

Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 6 lines

Build results:

	total: 135 pass: 135 fail: 0
Qemu tests:
	total: 27 pass: 27 fail: 0

Details are available at http://server.roeck-us.net:8010/builders.

Plus, this kernel passed my test.

Thank you both!

Signature · 2 lines
js
suse labs
#88 lore raw
In reply to Jiri Slaby
Quoted 8 lines · Jiri Slaby

This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 3.12.36 release. There are 78 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please let me know.

Responses should be made by Tue Jan 13 11:29:45 CET 2015. Anything received after that time might be too late.

Quoted 7 lines

The whole patch series can be found in one patch at:

	http://kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/people/jirislaby/stable-review/patch-3.12.36-rc1.xz

and the diffstat can be found below.

thanks,
js

Compiled and booted on my test system. No dmesg regressions.

-- Shuah

Signature · 5 lines
Shuah Khan
Sr. Linux Kernel Developer
Open Source Innovation Group
Samsung Research America (Silicon Valley)
[email protected] | (970) 217-8978