wpa-supplicant: Fix CVE-2015-4142
PATCH 1/1 wpa-supplicant: Fix CVE-2015-4142
Description on [1] and patch taken from [2]
[1]https://web.nvd.nist.gov/view/vuln/detail?vulnId=CVE-2015-4142 [2]http://w1.fi/security/2015-3/0001-AP-WMM-Fix-integer-underflow-in-WMM-Action-frame-par.patch
meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/0001-AP-WMM-Fix-integer-underflow-in-WMM-Action-frame-par.patch new file +41 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,41 @@ +From ef566a4d4f74022e1fdb0a2addfe81e6de9f4aae Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Jouni Malinen <[email protected]> +Date: Wed, 29 Apr 2015 02:21:53 +0300 +Subject: [PATCH] AP WMM: Fix integer underflow in WMM Action frame parser + +The length of the WMM Action frame was not properly validated and the +length of the information elements (int left) could end up being +negative. This would result in reading significantly past the stack +buffer while parsing the IEs in ieee802_11_parse_elems() and while doing +so, resulting in segmentation fault. + +This can result in an invalid frame being used for a denial of service +attack (hostapd process killed) against an AP with a driver that uses +hostapd for management frame processing (e.g., all mac80211-based +drivers). + +Thanks to Kostya Kortchinsky of Google security team for discovering and +reporting this issue. + +Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <[email protected]> +--- + src/ap/wmm.c | 3 +++ + 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+) + +diff --git a/src/ap/wmm.c b/src/ap/wmm.c +index 6d4177c..314e244 100644 +--- a/src/ap/wmm.c ++++ b/src/ap/wmm.c +@@ -274,6 +274,9 @@ void hostapd_wmm_action(struct hostapd_data *hapd, + return; + } + ++ if (left < 0) ++ return; /* not a valid WMM Action frame */ ++ + /* extract the tspec info element */ + if (ieee802_11_parse_elems(pos, left, &elems, 1) == ParseFailed) { + hostapd_logger(hapd, mgmt->sa, HOSTAPD_MODULE_IEEE80211, +-- +1.9.1 +
meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant_2.4.bb +1 -0
@@ -25,6 +25,7 @@ SRC_URI = "http://hostap.epitest.fi/releases/wpa_supplicant-${PV}.tar.gz \ file://wpa_supplicant.conf-sane \ file://99_wpa_supplicant \ file://0001-P2P-Validate-SSID-element-length-before-copying-it-C.patch \ + file://0001-AP-WMM-Fix-integer-underflow-in-WMM-Action-frame-par.patch \ " SRC_URI[md5sum] = "f0037dbe03897dcaf2ad2722e659095d" SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "058dc832c096139a059e6df814080f50251a8d313c21b13364c54a1e70109122"
Quoted 11 lines · fan.xin
meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/0001-AP-WMM-Fix-integer-underflow-in-WMM-Action-frame-par.patch new file +10
-0+From ef566a4d4f74022e1fdb0a2addfe81e6de9f4aae Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Jouni Malinen <[email protected]> +Date: Wed, 29 Apr 2015 02:21:53 +0300 +Subject: [PATCH] AP WMM: Fix integer underflow in WMM Action frame parser + +The length of the WMM Action frame was not properly validated and the +length of the information elements (int left) could end up being +negative. This would result in reading significantly past the stack +buffer while parsing the IEs in ieee802_11_parse_elems() and while doing +so, resulting in segmentation fault.
meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/0001-AP-WMM-Fix-integer-underflow-in-WMM-Action-frame-par.patch line 20
Quoted 10 lines
meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/0001-AP-WMM-Fix-integer-underflow-in-WMM-Action-frame-par.patch new file +10
-0+ +This can result in an invalid frame being used for a denial of service +attack (hostapd process killed) against an AP with a driver that uses +hostapd for management frame processing (e.g., all mac80211-based +drivers). + +Thanks to Kostya Kortchinsky of Google security team for discovering and +reporting this issue. + +Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <[email protected]>
This patch needs an Upstream-Status (backport?) and Signed-off-by in the patch header.
Ross
wpa-supplicant: Fix CVE-2015-4142
wpa-supplicant has a vulnerability aka CVE-2015-4142. This patch fixes CVE-2015-4142.
Description on [1] and patch taken from [2].
[1]https://web.nvd.nist.gov/view/vuln/detail?vulnId=CVE-2015-4142 [2]http://w1.fi/security/2015-3/0001-AP-WMM-Fix-integer-underflow-in-WMM-Action-frame-par.patch
Upstream-Status: Backport
--- ...integer-underflow-in-WMM-Action-frame-par.patch | 41 ++++++++++++++++++++++ .../wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant_2.4.bb | 1 + 2 files changed, 42 insertions(+) create mode 100644 meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/0001-AP-WMM-Fix-integer-underflow-in-WMM-Action-frame-par.patch
meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/0001-AP-WMM-Fix-integer-underflow-in-WMM-Action-frame-par.patch new file +41 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,41 @@ +From ef566a4d4f74022e1fdb0a2addfe81e6de9f4aae Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Jouni Malinen <[email protected]> +Date: Wed, 29 Apr 2015 02:21:53 +0300 +Subject: [PATCH] AP WMM: Fix integer underflow in WMM Action frame parser + +The length of the WMM Action frame was not properly validated and the +length of the information elements (int left) could end up being +negative. This would result in reading significantly past the stack +buffer while parsing the IEs in ieee802_11_parse_elems() and while doing +so, resulting in segmentation fault. + +This can result in an invalid frame being used for a denial of service +attack (hostapd process killed) against an AP with a driver that uses +hostapd for management frame processing (e.g., all mac80211-based +drivers). + +Thanks to Kostya Kortchinsky of Google security team for discovering and +reporting this issue. + +Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <[email protected]> +--- + src/ap/wmm.c | 3 +++ + 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+) + +diff --git a/src/ap/wmm.c b/src/ap/wmm.c +index 6d4177c..314e244 100644 +--- a/src/ap/wmm.c ++++ b/src/ap/wmm.c +@@ -274,6 +274,9 @@ void hostapd_wmm_action(struct hostapd_data *hapd, + return; + } + ++ if (left < 0) ++ return; /* not a valid WMM Action frame */ ++ + /* extract the tspec info element */ + if (ieee802_11_parse_elems(pos, left, &elems, 1) == ParseFailed) { + hostapd_logger(hapd, mgmt->sa, HOSTAPD_MODULE_IEEE80211, +-- +1.9.1 +
meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant_2.4.bb +1 -0
@@ -25,6 +25,7 @@ SRC_URI = "http://hostap.epitest.fi/releases/wpa_supplicant-${PV}.tar.gz \ file://wpa_supplicant.conf-sane \ file://99_wpa_supplicant \ file://0001-P2P-Validate-SSID-element-length-before-copying-it-C.patch \ + file://0001-AP-WMM-Fix-integer-underflow-in-WMM-Action-frame-par.patch \ " SRC_URI[md5sum] = "f0037dbe03897dcaf2ad2722e659095d" SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "058dc832c096139a059e6df814080f50251a8d313c21b13364c54a1e70109122"
Signature · 1 line
1.8.4.2
Quoted 28 lines · Ross
On 26 June 2015 at 09:05, fan.xin <[email protected] <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote:
+From
ef566a4d4f74022e1fdb0a2addfe81e6de9f4aaeMon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Jouni Malinen <[email protected] <mailto:[email protected]>>
+Date: Wed, 29 Apr 2015 02:21:53 +0300
+Subject: [PATCH] AP WMM: Fix integer underflow in WMM Action frame parser +
+The length of the WMM Action frame was not properly validated and the +length of the information elements (int left) could end up being +negative. This would result in reading significantly past the stack +buffer while parsing the IEs inieee802_11_parse_elems()and while doing +so, resulting in segmentation fault.
+
+This can result in an invalid frame being used for a denial of service +attack (hostapd process killed) against an AP with a driver that uses +hostapd for management frame processing (e.g., all mac80211-based +drivers).
+
+Thanks to Kostya Kortchinsky of Google security team for discovering and +reporting this issue.
+
+Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <[email protected] <mailto:[email protected]>>This patch needs an Upstream-Status (backport?) and Signed-off-by in the patch header.
Ross
Quoted 2 lines · fan.xin
Upstream-Status: Backport
This and signed-off-by In the patch header, not the commit message.
Ross
wpa-supplicant: backport patch to fix CVE-2015-4142
Backport patch to fix CVE-2015-4142. This patch is originally from:
http://w1.fi/security/2015-3/0001-AP-WMM-Fix-integer-underflow-in-WMM-Action-frame-par.patch
--- ...integer-underflow-in-WMM-Action-frame-par.patch | 45 ++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 45 insertions(+) create mode 100644 meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/0001-AP-WMM-Fix-integer-underflow-in-WMM-Action-frame-par.patch
meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/0001-AP-WMM-Fix-integer-underflow-in-WMM-Action-frame-par.patch new file +45 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,45 @@ +Upstream-Status: Backport + +Signed-off-by: Fan Xin <[email protected]> + +From ef566a4d4f74022e1fdb0a2addfe81e6de9f4aae Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Jouni Malinen <[email protected]> +Date: Wed, 29 Apr 2015 02:21:53 +0300 +Subject: [PATCH] AP WMM: Fix integer underflow in WMM Action frame parser + +The length of the WMM Action frame was not properly validated and the +length of the information elements (int left) could end up being +negative. This would result in reading significantly past the stack +buffer while parsing the IEs in ieee802_11_parse_elems() and while doing +so, resulting in segmentation fault. + +This can result in an invalid frame being used for a denial of service +attack (hostapd process killed) against an AP with a driver that uses +hostapd for management frame processing (e.g., all mac80211-based +drivers). + +Thanks to Kostya Kortchinsky of Google security team for discovering and +reporting this issue. + +Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <[email protected]> +--- + src/ap/wmm.c | 3 +++ + 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+) + +diff --git a/src/ap/wmm.c b/src/ap/wmm.c +index 6d4177c..314e244 100644 +--- a/src/ap/wmm.c ++++ b/src/ap/wmm.c +@@ -274,6 +274,9 @@ void hostapd_wmm_action(struct hostapd_data *hapd, + return; + } + ++ if (left < 0) ++ return; /* not a valid WMM Action frame */ ++ + /* extract the tspec info element */ + if (ieee802_11_parse_elems(pos, left, &elems, 1) == ParseFailed) { + hostapd_logger(hapd, mgmt->sa, HOSTAPD_MODULE_IEEE80211, +-- +1.9.1 +
Signature · 1 line
1.8.4.2
Quoted 9 lines · Ross
On 29 June 2015 at 09:11, fan.xin <[email protected] <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote:
Upstream-Status: Backport
This and signed-off-by In the patch header, not the commit message.
Ross