"ss -p" segfaults
Subsystems (2)
A message that is not in the archive (sent off-list or not yet received): [email protected]
Please find attached one simple patch for the code 4.1.0/4.1.1.
Essentially all that is needed to get rid of this issue is the addition of:
memset(u, 0, sizeof(*u));
after:
if (!(u = malloc(sizeof(*u))))
break;During the analysis of this issue I also found some other situations (strcpy and sprintf uses) that potentially produce the same results.
Corrections are also added, all with full comments.
Regards,
Jose Santos
misc/ss.c +43 -11
@@ -428,9 +428,12 @@while (cnt !=USER_ENT_HASH_SIZE ) { p = user_ent_hash[cnt];while (p) { -free (p->process); -free (p->process_ctx); -free (p->socket_ctx); +if (p->process) +free (p->process); +if (p->process_ctx) +free (p->process_ctx); +if (p->socket_ctx) +free (p->socket_ctx); p_next = p->next;free (p); p = p_next;
@@ -456,7 +459,21 @@ user_ent_hash_build_init =1 ; -strcpy (name, root); +/* strcpy is really dangerous! in this case if we're going to +copy an unknown input size from getenv("PROC_ROOT") to a +fixed size buffer name[1024] we're going to get troubles. +If the size of a manipulated "PROC_ROOT" > size of name we +will have a buffer overrun smashing the stack, overwriting +other local variables and/or return address, etc... */ + +memset (name,0 ,sizeof (name)); + +strncpy (name, root,512 ); +/* Chose this value ^^^ (maybe too large) just to avoid buffer +overflow if sizeof getenv("PROC_ROOT") > sizeof(name) and +to allow the name composition that follows below to fit in +the remaining space. */ +if (strlen (name) ==0 || name[strlen (name)-1 ] !='/' )strcat (name,"/" );
@@ -480,7 +497,7 @@if (getpidcon (pid, &pid_context) !=0 ) pid_context =strdup (no_ctx); -sprintf (name + nameoff,"%d/fd/" , pid); +snprintf (name + nameoff,sizeof (name) - nameoff,"%d/fd/" , pid); pos =strlen (name);if ((dir1 =opendir (name)) ==NULL )continue ;
@@ -499,7 +516,7 @@if (sscanf (d1->d_name,"%d%c" , &fd, &crap) !=1 )continue ; -sprintf (name+pos,"%d" , fd); +snprintf (name+pos,sizeof (name) - pos,"%d" , fd); link_len =readlink (name, lnk,sizeof (lnk)-1 );if (link_len ==-1 )
@@ -529,9 +546,16 @@ }user_ent_add (ino, p, pid, fd, pid_context, sock_context); -free (sock_context); - } -free (pid_context); +/* memory was allocated conditionally so +freeing it should go the same way (even +though the actual code implies that in +this case it will always be allocated). */ +if (sock_context) +free (sock_context); + } +/* same as above */ +if (pid_context) +free (pid_context);closedir (dir1); }closedir (dir);
@@ -2722,6 +2746,13 @@if (!(u =malloc (sizeof (*u))))break ; +/* The following memset of 'u' struct is crucial to avoid a segfault +when freeing memory 'free(name)' at 'unix_list_free()'. In fact, +without this 'initialization', testing 'if (name)' at line 2513 +will most likely return true even if 'name' isn't allocated. */ + +memset (u,0 ,sizeof (*u)); +if (sscanf (buf,"%x: %x %x %x %x %x %d %s" , &u->rport, &u->rq, &u->wq, &flags, &u->type, &u->state, &u->ino, name) <8 )
@@ -3064,11 +3095,12 @@strncpy (procname,"kernel" ,6 ); }else if (pid >0 ) {FILE *fp; -sprintf (procname,"%s/%d/stat" , +snprintf (procname,sizeof (procname),"%s/%d/stat" ,getenv ("PROC_ROOT" ) ? :"/proc" , pid);if ((fp =fopen (procname,"r" )) !=NULL ) {if (fscanf (fp,"%*d (%[^)])" , procname) ==1 ) { -sprintf (procname+strlen (procname),"/%d" , pid); +snprintf (procname+strlen (procname), +sizeof (procname)-strlen (procname),"/%d" , pid); done =1 ; }fclose (fp);
misc/ss.c line 436
Quoted 9 lines · "[email protected]" <[email protected]> writes:
misc/ss.c +6
-3-free (p->process); -free (p->process_ctx); -free (p->socket_ctx); +if (p->process) +free (p->process); +if (p->process_ctx) +free (p->process_ctx); +if (p->socket_ctx) +free (p->socket_ctx);
free(NULL) is a no-op.
Andreas.
Signature · 3 lines
Andreas Schwab, [email protected] GPG Key fingerprint = 58CA 54C7 6D53 942B 1756 01D3 44D5 214B 8276 4ED5 "And now for something completely different."