f2fs: correct return value type of f2fs_fill_super

RFC PATCH Superseded Sheng Yong 2 participants 6 messages May 11, 2016 – May 12, 2016 F2FS file system

lore

Share & tools

lore

Sheng Yong

author

2016-05-11 09:11 UTC #0 lore raw

RFC PATCH 1/4 f2fs: correct return value type of f2fs_fill_super

Signed-off-by Sheng Yong <[email protected]>

---
 fs/f2fs/super.c | 6 +++---
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

fs/f2fs/super.c +3 -3

index 28c8992..0e54e84 100644
@@ -1417,7 +1417,7 @@ static int f2fs_fill_super(struct super_block *sb, void *data, int silent)
 	struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi;
 	struct f2fs_super_block *raw_super;
 	struct inode *root;
-	long err;
+	int err;
 	bool retry = true, need_fsck = false;
 	char *options = NULL;
 	int recovery, i, valid_super_block;

@@ -1643,7 +1643,7 @@ try_onemore:
 		if (err < 0) {
 			need_fsck = true;
 			f2fs_msg(sb, KERN_ERR,
-				"Cannot recover all fsync data errno=%ld", err);
+				"Cannot recover all fsync data errno=%d", err);
 			goto free_kobj;
 		}
 	} else {

@@ -1676,7 +1676,7 @@ try_onemore:
 	if (recovery) {
 		err = f2fs_commit_super(sbi, true);
 		f2fs_msg(sb, KERN_INFO,
-			"Try to recover %dth superblock, ret: %ld",
+			"Try to recover %dth superblock, ret: %d",
 			sbi->valid_super_block ? 1 : 2, err);
 	}

Signature · 9 lines

2.7.1


------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Mobile security can be enabling, not merely restricting. Employees who
bring their own devices (BYOD) to work are irked by the imposition of MDM
restrictions. Mobile Device Manager Plus allows you to control only the
apps on BYO-devices by containerizing them, leaving personal data untouched!
https://ad.doubleclick.net/ddm/clk/304595813;131938128;j

Sheng Yong

author

2016-05-11 09:11 UTC #1 lore raw

RFC PATCH 2/4 f2fs: introduce f2fs_fault_info for fault injection

This patch introduces a new struct f2fs_fault_info and a global f2fs_fault to save fault injection status.

Signed-off-by Sheng Yong <[email protected]>

---
 fs/f2fs/f2fs.h  | 12 ++++++++++++
 fs/f2fs/super.c |  1 +
 2 files changed, 13 insertions(+)

fs/f2fs/f2fs.h +12 -0

index 052f5a8..e18390b 100644
@@ -48,6 +48,18 @@ enum {
 	FAULT_MAX,
 };
 
+struct f2fs_fault_info {
+	unsigned int inject_rate;
+	atomic_t inject_ops;
+	unsigned int inject_kmalloc;
+	unsigned int inject_page_alloc;
+	unsigned int inject_nid_alloc;
+	unsigned int inject_orphan;
+	unsigned int inject_block;
+	unsigned int inject_dir_depth;
+};
+
+extern struct f2fs_fault_info f2fs_fault;
 extern u32 f2fs_fault_rate;
 extern atomic_t f2fs_ops;
 extern char *fault_name[FAULT_MAX];

fs/f2fs/super.c +1 -0

index 0e54e84..069dc44 100644
@@ -40,6 +40,7 @@ static struct kmem_cache *f2fs_inode_cachep;
 static struct kset *f2fs_kset;
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_F2FS_FAULT_INJECTION
+struct f2fs_fault_info f2fs_fault;
 u32 f2fs_fault_rate = 0;
 atomic_t f2fs_ops;

Signature · 9 lines

2.7.1


------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Mobile security can be enabling, not merely restricting. Employees who
bring their own devices (BYOD) to work are irked by the imposition of MDM
restrictions. Mobile Device Manager Plus allows you to control only the
apps on BYO-devices by containerizing them, leaving personal data untouched!
https://ad.doubleclick.net/ddm/clk/304595813;131938128;j

Sheng Yong

author

2016-05-11 09:11 UTC #2 lore raw

RFC PATCH 3/4 f2fs: add sysfs interfaces for fault injection

In reply to Sheng Yong

This patch adds a new entry called fault_injection in /sys/fs/f2fs, and all injection attributes are placed in this entry. During initializing f2fs module, these inject attributes are created.

Signed-off-by Sheng Yong <[email protected]>

---
 fs/f2fs/super.c | 65 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 65 insertions(+)

fs/f2fs/super.c +65 -0

index 069dc44..a9066e4 100644
@@ -52,6 +52,12 @@ char *fault_name[FAULT_MAX] = {
 	[FAULT_BLOCK]		= "no more block",
 	[FAULT_DIR_DEPTH]	= "too big dir depth",
 };
+
+static int f2fs_build_fault_attr(void)
+{
+	memset(&f2fs_fault, 0, sizeof(struct f2fs_fault_info));
+	return 0;
+}
 #endif
 
 /* f2fs-wide shrinker description */

@@ -119,6 +125,10 @@ enum {
 	SM_INFO,	/* struct f2fs_sm_info */
 	NM_INFO,	/* struct f2fs_nm_info */
 	F2FS_SBI,	/* struct f2fs_sb_info */
+#ifdef CONFIG_F2FS_FAULT_INJECTION
+	FAULT_INFO_RATE,
+	FAULT_INFO,
+#endif
 };
 
 struct f2fs_attr {

@@ -140,6 +150,10 @@ static unsigned char *__struct_ptr(struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi, int struct_type)
 		return (unsigned char *)NM_I(sbi);
 	else if (struct_type == F2FS_SBI)
 		return (unsigned char *)sbi;
+#ifdef CONFIG_F2FS_FAULT_INJECTION
+	else if (struct_type == FAULT_INFO_RATE || struct_type == FAULT_INFO)
+		return (unsigned char *)&f2fs_fault;
+#endif
 	return NULL;
 }

@@ -189,6 +203,10 @@ static ssize_t f2fs_sbi_store(struct f2fs_attr *a,
 	ret = kstrtoul(skip_spaces(buf), 0, &t);
 	if (ret < 0)
 		return ret;
+#ifdef CONFIG_F2FS_FAULT_INJECTION
+	if (a->struct_type == FAULT_INFO && t > 1)
+		return -EINVAL;
+#endif
 	*ui = t;
 	return count;
 }

@@ -254,6 +272,15 @@ F2FS_RW_ATTR(F2FS_SBI, f2fs_sb_info, max_victim_search, max_victim_search);
 F2FS_RW_ATTR(F2FS_SBI, f2fs_sb_info, dir_level, dir_level);
 F2FS_RW_ATTR(F2FS_SBI, f2fs_sb_info, cp_interval, interval_time[CP_TIME]);
 F2FS_RW_ATTR(F2FS_SBI, f2fs_sb_info, idle_interval, interval_time[REQ_TIME]);
+#ifdef CONFIG_F2FS_FAULT_INJECTION
+F2FS_RW_ATTR(FAULT_INFO_RATE, f2fs_fault_info, inject_rate, inject_rate);
+F2FS_RW_ATTR(FAULT_INFO, f2fs_fault_info, inject_kmalloc, inject_kmalloc);
+F2FS_RW_ATTR(FAULT_INFO, f2fs_fault_info, inject_page_alloc, inject_page_alloc);
+F2FS_RW_ATTR(FAULT_INFO, f2fs_fault_info, inject_nid_alloc, inject_nid_alloc);
+F2FS_RW_ATTR(FAULT_INFO, f2fs_fault_info, inject_orphan, inject_orphan);
+F2FS_RW_ATTR(FAULT_INFO, f2fs_fault_info, inject_block, inject_block);
+F2FS_RW_ATTR(FAULT_INFO, f2fs_fault_info, inject_dir_depth, inject_dir_depth);
+#endif
 F2FS_GENERAL_RO_ATTR(lifetime_write_kbytes);
 
 #define ATTR_LIST(name) (&f2fs_attr_##name.attr)

@@ -290,6 +317,27 @@ static struct kobj_type f2fs_ktype = {
 	.release	= f2fs_sb_release,
 };
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_F2FS_FAULT_INJECTION
+/* sysfs for f2fs fault injection */
+static struct kobject f2fs_fault_inject;
+
+static struct attribute *f2fs_fault_attrs[] = {
+	ATTR_LIST(inject_rate),
+	ATTR_LIST(inject_kmalloc),
+	ATTR_LIST(inject_page_alloc),
+	ATTR_LIST(inject_nid_alloc),
+	ATTR_LIST(inject_orphan),
+	ATTR_LIST(inject_block),
+	ATTR_LIST(inject_dir_depth),
+	NULL
+};
+
+static struct kobj_type f2fs_fault_ktype = {
+	.default_attrs	= f2fs_fault_attrs,
+	.sysfs_ops	= &f2fs_attr_ops,
+};
+#endif
+
 void f2fs_msg(struct super_block *sb, const char *level, const char *fmt, ...)
 {
 	struct va_format vaf;

@@ -1798,6 +1846,16 @@ static int __init init_f2fs_fs(void)
 		err = -ENOMEM;
 		goto free_extent_cache;
 	}
+#ifdef CONFIG_F2FS_FAULT_INJECTION
+	f2fs_fault_inject.kset = f2fs_kset;
+	f2fs_build_fault_attr();
+	err = kobject_init_and_add(&f2fs_fault_inject, &f2fs_fault_ktype,
+				NULL, "fault_injection");
+	if (err) {
+		f2fs_fault_inject.kset = NULL;
+		goto free_kset;
+	}
+#endif
 	err = register_shrinker(&f2fs_shrinker_info);
 	if (err)
 		goto free_kset;

@@ -1816,6 +1874,10 @@ free_filesystem:
 free_shrinker:
 	unregister_shrinker(&f2fs_shrinker_info);
 free_kset:
+#ifdef CONFIG_F2FS_FAULT_INJECTION
+	if (f2fs_fault_inject.kset)
+		kobject_put(&f2fs_fault_inject);
+#endif
 	kset_unregister(f2fs_kset);
 free_extent_cache:
 	destroy_extent_cache();

@@ -1842,6 +1904,9 @@ static void __exit exit_f2fs_fs(void)
 	destroy_segment_manager_caches();
 	destroy_node_manager_caches();
 	destroy_inodecache();
+#ifdef CONFIG_F2FS_FAULT_INJECTION
+	kobject_put(&f2fs_fault_inject);
+#endif
 	kset_unregister(f2fs_kset);
 	f2fs_destroy_trace_ios();
 }

Signature · 9 lines

2.7.1


------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Mobile security can be enabling, not merely restricting. Employees who
bring their own devices (BYOD) to work are irked by the imposition of MDM
restrictions. Mobile Device Manager Plus allows you to control only the
apps on BYO-devices by containerizing them, leaving personal data untouched!
https://ad.doubleclick.net/ddm/clk/304595813;131938128;j

Sheng Yong

author

2016-05-11 09:11 UTC #3 lore raw

RFC PATCH 4/4 f2fs: move fault injection to sysfs

In reply to Sheng Yong

Replace mount option "f2fs_injection" by injection attributes in sysfs.

Signed-off-by Sheng Yong <[email protected]>

---
 fs/f2fs/f2fs.h  | 24 ++++++++++++++++++------
 fs/f2fs/super.c | 15 ---------------
 2 files changed, 18 insertions(+), 21 deletions(-)

fs/f2fs/f2fs.h +18 -6

index e18390b..81e3fad 100644
@@ -60,15 +60,28 @@ struct f2fs_fault_info {
 };
 
 extern struct f2fs_fault_info f2fs_fault;
-extern u32 f2fs_fault_rate;
-extern atomic_t f2fs_ops;
 extern char *fault_name[FAULT_MAX];
 
 static inline bool time_to_inject(int type)
 {
-	atomic_inc(&f2fs_ops);
-	if (f2fs_fault_rate && (atomic_read(&f2fs_ops) >= f2fs_fault_rate)) {
-		atomic_set(&f2fs_ops, 0);
+	if (!f2fs_fault.inject_rate)
+		return false;
+	if (type == FAULT_KMALLOC && !f2fs_fault.inject_kmalloc)
+		return false;
+	else if (type == FAULT_PAGE_ALLOC && !f2fs_fault.inject_page_alloc)
+		return false;
+	else if (type == FAULT_ALLOC_NID && !f2fs_fault.inject_nid_alloc)
+		return false;
+	else if (type == FAULT_ORPHAN && !f2fs_fault.inject_orphan)
+		return false;
+	else if (type == FAULT_BLOCK && !f2fs_fault.inject_block)
+		return false;
+	else if (type == FAULT_DIR_DEPTH && !f2fs_fault.inject_dir_depth)
+		return false;
+
+	atomic_inc(&f2fs_fault.inject_ops);
+	if (atomic_read(&f2fs_fault.inject_ops) >= f2fs_fault.inject_rate) {
+		atomic_set(&f2fs_fault.inject_ops, 0);
 		printk("%sF2FS-fs : inject %s in %pF\n",
 				KERN_INFO,
 				fault_name[type],

@@ -98,7 +111,6 @@ static inline bool time_to_inject(int type)
 #define F2FS_MOUNT_EXTENT_CACHE		0x00002000
 #define F2FS_MOUNT_FORCE_FG_GC		0x00004000
 #define F2FS_MOUNT_DATA_FLUSH		0x00008000
-#define F2FS_MOUNT_FAULT_INJECTION	0x00010000
 
 #define clear_opt(sbi, option)	(sbi->mount_opt.opt &= ~F2FS_MOUNT_##option)
 #define set_opt(sbi, option)	(sbi->mount_opt.opt |= F2FS_MOUNT_##option)

fs/f2fs/super.c +0 ~~-15~~

index a9066e4..1dfd854 100644
@@ -41,8 +41,6 @@ static struct kset *f2fs_kset;
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_F2FS_FAULT_INJECTION
 struct f2fs_fault_info f2fs_fault;
-u32 f2fs_fault_rate = 0;
-atomic_t f2fs_ops;
 
 char *fault_name[FAULT_MAX] = {
 	[FAULT_KMALLOC]		= "kmalloc",

@@ -89,7 +87,6 @@ enum {
 	Opt_noextent_cache,
 	Opt_noinline_data,
 	Opt_data_flush,
-	Opt_fault_injection,
 	Opt_err,
 };

@@ -115,7 +112,6 @@ static match_table_t f2fs_tokens = {
 	{Opt_noextent_cache, "noextent_cache"},
 	{Opt_noinline_data, "noinline_data"},
 	{Opt_data_flush, "data_flush"},
-	{Opt_fault_injection, "fault_injection=%u"},
 	{Opt_err, NULL},
 };

@@ -501,17 +497,6 @@ static int parse_options(struct super_block *sb, char *options)
 		case Opt_data_flush:
 			set_opt(sbi, DATA_FLUSH);
 			break;
-		case Opt_fault_injection:
-			if (args->from && match_int(args, &arg))
-				return -EINVAL;
-#ifdef CONFIG_F2FS_FAULT_INJECTION
-			f2fs_fault_rate = arg;
-			atomic_set(&f2fs_ops, 0);
-#else
-			f2fs_msg(sb, KERN_INFO,
-				"FAULT_INJECTION was not selected");
-#endif
-			break;
 		default:
 			f2fs_msg(sb, KERN_ERR,
 				"Unrecognized mount option \"%s\" or missing value",

Signature · 9 lines

2.7.1


------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Mobile security can be enabling, not merely restricting. Employees who
bring their own devices (BYOD) to work are irked by the imposition of MDM
restrictions. Mobile Device Manager Plus allows you to control only the
apps on BYO-devices by containerizing them, leaving personal data untouched!
https://ad.doubleclick.net/ddm/clk/304595813;131938128;j

Sheng Yong

author

2016-05-12 03:46 UTC #4 lore raw

RFC PATCH v2 4/4 f2fs: move fault injection to sysfs

Replace mount option "f2fs_injection" by injection attributes in sysfs.

Signed-off-by Sheng Yong <[email protected]>

---
 fs/f2fs/f2fs.h  | 24 ++++++++++++++++++------
 fs/f2fs/super.c | 18 ------------------
 2 files changed, 18 insertions(+), 24 deletions(-)

fs/f2fs/f2fs.h +18 -6

index e18390b..81e3fad 100644
@@ -60,15 +60,28 @@ struct f2fs_fault_info {
 };
 
 extern struct f2fs_fault_info f2fs_fault;
-extern u32 f2fs_fault_rate;
-extern atomic_t f2fs_ops;
 extern char *fault_name[FAULT_MAX];
 
 static inline bool time_to_inject(int type)
 {
-	atomic_inc(&f2fs_ops);
-	if (f2fs_fault_rate && (atomic_read(&f2fs_ops) >= f2fs_fault_rate)) {
-		atomic_set(&f2fs_ops, 0);
+	if (!f2fs_fault.inject_rate)
+		return false;
+	if (type == FAULT_KMALLOC && !f2fs_fault.inject_kmalloc)
+		return false;
+	else if (type == FAULT_PAGE_ALLOC && !f2fs_fault.inject_page_alloc)
+		return false;
+	else if (type == FAULT_ALLOC_NID && !f2fs_fault.inject_nid_alloc)
+		return false;
+	else if (type == FAULT_ORPHAN && !f2fs_fault.inject_orphan)
+		return false;
+	else if (type == FAULT_BLOCK && !f2fs_fault.inject_block)
+		return false;
+	else if (type == FAULT_DIR_DEPTH && !f2fs_fault.inject_dir_depth)
+		return false;
+
+	atomic_inc(&f2fs_fault.inject_ops);
+	if (atomic_read(&f2fs_fault.inject_ops) >= f2fs_fault.inject_rate) {
+		atomic_set(&f2fs_fault.inject_ops, 0);
 		printk("%sF2FS-fs : inject %s in %pF\n",
 				KERN_INFO,
 				fault_name[type],

@@ -98,7 +111,6 @@ static inline bool time_to_inject(int type)
 #define F2FS_MOUNT_EXTENT_CACHE		0x00002000
 #define F2FS_MOUNT_FORCE_FG_GC		0x00004000
 #define F2FS_MOUNT_DATA_FLUSH		0x00008000
-#define F2FS_MOUNT_FAULT_INJECTION	0x00010000
 
 #define clear_opt(sbi, option)	(sbi->mount_opt.opt &= ~F2FS_MOUNT_##option)
 #define set_opt(sbi, option)	(sbi->mount_opt.opt |= F2FS_MOUNT_##option)

fs/f2fs/super.c +0 ~~-18~~

index a9066e4..df36152 100644
@@ -41,8 +41,6 @@ static struct kset *f2fs_kset;
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_F2FS_FAULT_INJECTION
 struct f2fs_fault_info f2fs_fault;
-u32 f2fs_fault_rate = 0;
-atomic_t f2fs_ops;
 
 char *fault_name[FAULT_MAX] = {
 	[FAULT_KMALLOC]		= "kmalloc",

@@ -89,7 +87,6 @@ enum {
 	Opt_noextent_cache,
 	Opt_noinline_data,
 	Opt_data_flush,
-	Opt_fault_injection,
 	Opt_err,
 };

@@ -115,7 +112,6 @@ static match_table_t f2fs_tokens = {
 	{Opt_noextent_cache, "noextent_cache"},
 	{Opt_noinline_data, "noinline_data"},
 	{Opt_data_flush, "data_flush"},
-	{Opt_fault_injection, "fault_injection=%u"},
 	{Opt_err, NULL},
 };

@@ -365,9 +361,6 @@ static int parse_options(struct super_block *sb, char *options)
 	char *p, *name;
 	int arg = 0;
 
-#ifdef CONFIG_F2FS_FAULT_INJECTION
-	f2fs_fault_rate = 0;
-#endif
 	if (!options)
 		return 0;

@@ -501,17 +494,6 @@ static int parse_options(struct super_block *sb, char *options)
 		case Opt_data_flush:
 			set_opt(sbi, DATA_FLUSH);
 			break;
-		case Opt_fault_injection:
-			if (args->from && match_int(args, &arg))
-				return -EINVAL;
-#ifdef CONFIG_F2FS_FAULT_INJECTION
-			f2fs_fault_rate = arg;
-			atomic_set(&f2fs_ops, 0);
-#else
-			f2fs_msg(sb, KERN_INFO,
-				"FAULT_INJECTION was not selected");
-#endif
-			break;
 		default:
 			f2fs_msg(sb, KERN_ERR,
 				"Unrecognized mount option \"%s\" or missing value",

Signature · 9 lines

2.7.1


------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Mobile security can be enabling, not merely restricting. Employees who
bring their own devices (BYOD) to work are irked by the imposition of MDM
restrictions. Mobile Device Manager Plus allows you to control only the
apps on BYO-devices by containerizing them, leaving personal data untouched!
https://ad.doubleclick.net/ddm/clk/304595813;131938128;j

Jaegeuk Kim

maintainer

2016-05-12 20:13 UTC #5 lore raw

Re: [RFC PATCH v2 4/4] f2fs: move fault injection to sysfs

Hello,

Could you send one patch which has 2, 3, and 4 together?
And also, we don't need drop the mount option.
Instead, we can turn on all the fault types with default values, once we get the option. Then, we can turn off any specific types dynamically.

Thanks,

Quoted 113 lines · Sheng Yong

Replace mount option "f2fs_injection" by injection attributes in sysfs.

Signed-off-by Sheng Yong <[email protected]>

---
 fs/f2fs/f2fs.h  | 24 ++++++++++++++++++------
 fs/f2fs/super.c | 18 ------------------
 2 files changed, 18 insertions(+), 24 deletions(-)

fs/f2fs/f2fs.h +18 -6

index e18390b..81e3fad 100644
@@ -60,15 +60,28 @@ struct f2fs_fault_info {
 };
 
 extern struct f2fs_fault_info f2fs_fault;
-extern u32 f2fs_fault_rate;
-extern atomic_t f2fs_ops;
 extern char *fault_name[FAULT_MAX];
 
 static inline bool time_to_inject(int type)
 {
-	atomic_inc(&f2fs_ops);
-	if (f2fs_fault_rate && (atomic_read(&f2fs_ops) >= f2fs_fault_rate)) {
-		atomic_set(&f2fs_ops, 0);
+	if (!f2fs_fault.inject_rate)
+		return false;
+	if (type == FAULT_KMALLOC && !f2fs_fault.inject_kmalloc)
+		return false;
+	else if (type == FAULT_PAGE_ALLOC && !f2fs_fault.inject_page_alloc)
+		return false;
+	else if (type == FAULT_ALLOC_NID && !f2fs_fault.inject_nid_alloc)
+		return false;
+	else if (type == FAULT_ORPHAN && !f2fs_fault.inject_orphan)
+		return false;
+	else if (type == FAULT_BLOCK && !f2fs_fault.inject_block)
+		return false;
+	else if (type == FAULT_DIR_DEPTH && !f2fs_fault.inject_dir_depth)
+		return false;
+
+	atomic_inc(&f2fs_fault.inject_ops);
+	if (atomic_read(&f2fs_fault.inject_ops) >= f2fs_fault.inject_rate) {
+		atomic_set(&f2fs_fault.inject_ops, 0);
 		printk("%sF2FS-fs : inject %s in %pF\n",
 				KERN_INFO,
 				fault_name[type],

@@ -98,7 +111,6 @@ static inline bool time_to_inject(int type)
 #define F2FS_MOUNT_EXTENT_CACHE		0x00002000
 #define F2FS_MOUNT_FORCE_FG_GC		0x00004000
 #define F2FS_MOUNT_DATA_FLUSH		0x00008000
-#define F2FS_MOUNT_FAULT_INJECTION	0x00010000
 
 #define clear_opt(sbi, option)	(sbi->mount_opt.opt &= ~F2FS_MOUNT_##option)
 #define set_opt(sbi, option)	(sbi->mount_opt.opt |= F2FS_MOUNT_##option)

fs/f2fs/super.c +0 ~~-18~~

index a9066e4..df36152 100644
@@ -41,8 +41,6 @@ static struct kset *f2fs_kset;
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_F2FS_FAULT_INJECTION
 struct f2fs_fault_info f2fs_fault;
-u32 f2fs_fault_rate = 0;
-atomic_t f2fs_ops;
 
 char *fault_name[FAULT_MAX] = {
 	[FAULT_KMALLOC]		= "kmalloc",

@@ -89,7 +87,6 @@ enum {
 	Opt_noextent_cache,
 	Opt_noinline_data,
 	Opt_data_flush,
-	Opt_fault_injection,
 	Opt_err,
 };

@@ -115,7 +112,6 @@ static match_table_t f2fs_tokens = {
 	{Opt_noextent_cache, "noextent_cache"},
 	{Opt_noinline_data, "noinline_data"},
 	{Opt_data_flush, "data_flush"},
-	{Opt_fault_injection, "fault_injection=%u"},
 	{Opt_err, NULL},
 };

@@ -365,9 +361,6 @@ static int parse_options(struct super_block *sb, char *options)
 	char *p, *name;
 	int arg = 0;
 
-#ifdef CONFIG_F2FS_FAULT_INJECTION
-	f2fs_fault_rate = 0;
-#endif
 	if (!options)
 		return 0;

@@ -501,17 +494,6 @@ static int parse_options(struct super_block *sb, char *options)
 		case Opt_data_flush:
 			set_opt(sbi, DATA_FLUSH);
 			break;
-		case Opt_fault_injection:
-			if (args->from && match_int(args, &arg))
-				return -EINVAL;
-#ifdef CONFIG_F2FS_FAULT_INJECTION
-			f2fs_fault_rate = arg;
-			atomic_set(&f2fs_ops, 0);
-#else
-			f2fs_msg(sb, KERN_INFO,
-				"FAULT_INJECTION was not selected");
-#endif
-			break;
 		default:
 			f2fs_msg(sb, KERN_ERR,
 				"Unrecognized mount option \"%s\" or missing value",

Signature · 1 line

2.7.1

------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Mobile security can be enabling, not merely restricting. Employees who bring their own devices (BYOD) to work are irked by the imposition of MDM restrictions. Mobile Device Manager Plus allows you to control only the apps on BYO-devices by containerizing them, leaving personal data untouched!
https://ad.doubleclick.net/ddm/clk/304595813;131938128;j