Avoid buffer overflows in get_user_pages()
Subsystems (2)
PATCH 1/1 Avoid buffer overflows in get_user_pages()
Avoid buffer overflows in get_user_pages()
So I spent a while pounding my head against my monitor trying to figure out the vmsplice() vulnerability - how could a failure to check for *read* access turn into a root exploit? It turns out that it's a buffer overflow problem which is made easy by the way get_user_pages() is coded.
In particular, "len" is a signed int, and it is only checked at the *end* of a do {} while() loop. So, if it is passed in as zero, the loop will execute once and decrement len to -1. At that point, the loop will proceed until the next invalid address is found; in the process, it will likely overflow the pages array passed in to get_user_pages().
I think that, if get_user_pages() has been asked to grab zero pages, that's what it should do. Thus this patch; it is, among other things, enough to block the (already fixed) root exploit and any others which might be lurking in similar code. I also think that the number of pages should be unsigned, but changing the prototype of this function probably requires some more careful review.
mm/memory.c +2 -0
@@ -989,6 +989,8 @@ int get_user_pages(struct task_struct *tsk, struct mm_struct *mm,int i;unsigned int vm_flags; +if (len <=0 ) +return 0 ;/* * Require read or write permissions. * If 'force' is set, we only require the "MAY" flags.
Quoted 28 lines · Jonathan Corbet
Avoid buffer overflows in
get_user_pages()So I spent a while pounding my head against my monitor trying to figure out the
vmsplice()vulnerability - how could a failure to check for *read* access turn into a root exploit? It turns out that it's a buffer overflow problem which is made easy by the wayget_user_pages()is coded.In particular, "len" is a signed int, and it is only checked at the *end* of a do {}
while()loop. So, if it is passed in as zero, the loop will execute once and decrement len to -1. At that point, the loop will proceed until the next invalid address is found; in the process, it will likely overflow the pages array passed in toget_user_pages().I think that, if
get_user_pages()has been asked to grab zero pages, that's what it should do. Thus this patch; it is, among other things, enough to block the (already fixed) root exploit and any others which might be lurking in similar code. I also think that the number of pages should be unsigned, but changing the prototype of this function probably requires some more careful review.Signed-off-by Jonathan Corbet <[email protected]>mm/memory.c +0
-0
mm/memory.c int get_user_pages(struct task_struct *tsk, struct · line 993
Quoted 5 lines
mm/memory.c +2
-0@@ -989,6 +989,8 @@ int get_user_pages(struct task_struct *tsk, struct mm_struct *mm, int i;unsigned int vm_flags; +if (len <=0 ) +return 0 ;
BUG_ON()?
Andrew Morton
maintainerQuoted 8 lines · On Mon, 11 Feb 2008 16:17:33 -0700 Jonathan Corbet <[email protected]> wrote:
Avoid buffer overflows in
get_user_pages()So I spent a while pounding my head against my monitor trying to figure out the
vmsplice()vulnerability - how could a failure to check for *read* access turn into a root exploit? It turns out that it's a buffer overflow problem which is made easy by the wayget_user_pages()is coded.
Quoted 5 lines
In particular, "len" is a signed int, and it is only checked at the *end* of a do {}
while()loop. So, if it is passed in as zero, the loop will execute once and decrement len to -1. At that point, the loop will proceed until the next invalid address is found; in the process, it will likely overflow the pages array passed in toget_user_pages().
Sounds convincing.
Quoted 14 lines
I think that, if
get_user_pages()has been asked to grab zero pages, that's what it should do. Thus this patch; it is, among other things, enough to block the (already fixed) root exploit and any others which might be lurking in similar code. I also think that the number of pages should be unsigned, but changing the prototype of this function probably requires some more careful review.Signed-off-by Jonathan Corbet <[email protected]>mm/memory.c +0
-0
mm/memory.c int get_user_pages(struct task_struct *tsk, struct mm_struct *mm, · line 996
Quoted 8 lines
mm/memory.c +2
-0@@ -989,6 +989,8 @@ int get_user_pages(struct task_struct *tsk, struct mm_struct *mm,int i;unsigned int vm_flags; +if (len <=0 ) +return 0 ;/* * Require read or write permissions. * If 'force' is set, we only require the "MAY" flags.
Can we just convert
do {
...
} while (len);into
while (len) {
...
}?
Quoted 6 lines · Andrew Morton
mm/memory.c int get_user_pages(struct task_struct *tsk, struct mm_struct *mm, · line 996
Quoted 5 lines
mm/memory.c +2
-0+if (len <=0 ) +return 0 ;/* * Require read or write permissions. * If 'force' is set, we only require the "MAY" flags. Can we just convert
Quoted 7 lines
do {
...
} while (len);
into
while (len) {
...
}How would that help?
Rather
while (len > 0) {
...
}would do the trick.
Signature · 1 line
Jiri Kosina
for stable (.22 .23 .24) ?
git id in mainline: 900cf086fd2fbad07f72f4575449e0d0958f860f
--
tested in: http://repo.or.cz/w/linux-2.6.22.y-op.git testing
Quoted 36 lines · Jonathan Corbet
Avoid buffer overflows in
get_user_pages()So I spent a while pounding my head against my monitor trying to figure out the
vmsplice()vulnerability - how could a failure to check for *read* access turn into a root exploit? It turns out that it's a buffer overflow problem which is made easy by the wayget_user_pages()is coded.In particular, "len" is a signed int, and it is only checked at the *end* of a do {}
while()loop. So, if it is passed in as zero, the loop will execute once and decrement len to -1. At that point, the loop will proceed until the next invalid address is found; in the process, it will likely overflow the pages array passed in toget_user_pages().I think that, if
get_user_pages()has been asked to grab zero pages, that's what it should do. Thus this patch; it is, among other things, enough to block the (already fixed) root exploit and any others which might be lurking in similar code. I also think that the number of pages should be unsigned, but changing the prototype of this function probably requires some more careful review.Signed-off-by Jonathan Corbet <[email protected]>mm/memory.c +2
-0@@ -989,6 +989,8 @@ int get_user_pages(struct task_struct *tsk, structmm_struct *mm, int i;unsigned int vm_flags; +if (len <=0 ) +return 0 ;/* * Require read or write permissions.
Quoted 7 lines
* If 'force' is set, we only require the "MAY" flags.
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Thanks,
Oliver
Quoted 3 lines · Oliver Pinter
for stable (.22 .23 .24) ?
git id in mainline:
900cf086fd2fbad07f72f4575449e0d0958f860f
I sent it to the stable folks a couple days ago.
Thanks,
jon
Jonathan Corbet / LWN.net / [email protected]