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powerpc/tm: Fix FP/VMX unavailable exceptions inside a transaction

PATCH In review Michael Neuling 4 participants 11 messages Sep 3, 2019 – Sep 25, 2019

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#0 lore raw

PATCH 1/3 powerpc/tm: Fix FP/VMX unavailable exceptions inside a transaction

From: Gustavo Romero <[email protected]>

When we take an FP unavailable exception in a transaction we have to account for the hardware FP TM checkpointed registers being incorrect. In this case for this process we know the current and checkpointed FP registers must be the same (since FP wasn't used inside the transaction) hence in the thread_struct we copy the current FP registers to the checkpointed ones.

This copy is done in tm_reclaim_thread(). We use thread->ckpt_regs.msr to determine if FP was on when in userspace. thread->ckpt_regs.msr represents the state of the MSR when exiting userspace. This is setup by check_if_tm_restore_required().

Unfortunatley there is an optimisation in giveup_all() which returns early if tsk->thread.regs->msr (via local variable usermsr) has FP=VEC=VSX=SPE=0. This optimisation means that check_if_tm_restore_required() is not called and hence thread->ckpt_regs.msr is not updated and will contain an old value.

This can happen if due to load_fp=255 we start a userspace process with MSR FP=1 and then we are context switched out. In this case thread->ckpt_regs.msr will contain FP=1. If that same process is then context switched in and load_fp overflows, MSR will have FP=0. If that process now enters a transaction and does an FP instruction, the FP unavailable will not update thread->ckpt_regs.msr (the bug) and MSR FP=1 will be retained in thread->ckpt_regs.msr. tm_reclaim_thread() will then not perform the required memcpy and the checkpointed FP regs in the thread struct will contain the wrong values.

The code path for this happening is:

       Userspace:                      Kernel
                   Start userspace
                    with MSR FP/VEC/VSX/SPE=0 TM=1
                      < -----
       ...
       tbegin
       bne
       fp instruction
                   FP unavailable
                       ---- >
                                        fp_unavailable_tm()
					  tm_reclaim_current()
					    tm_reclaim_thread()
					      giveup_all()
					        return early since FP/VMX/VSX=0
						/* ckpt MSR not updated (Incorrect) */
					      tm_reclaim()
					        /* thread_struct ckpt FP regs contain junk (OK) */
                                              /* Sees ckpt MSR FP=1 (Incorrect) */
					      no memcpy() performed
					        /* thread_struct ckpt FP regs not fixed (Incorrect) */
					  tm_recheckpoint()
					     /* Put junk in hardware checkpoint FP regs */
                                         ....
                      < -----
                   Return to userspace
                     with MSR TM=1 FP=1
                     with junk in the FP TM checkpoint
       TM rollback
       reads FP junk

This is a data integrity problem for the current process as the FP registers are corrupted. It's also a security problem as the FP registers from one process may be leaked to another.

This patch moves up check_if_tm_restore_required() in giveup_all() to ensure thread->ckpt_regs.msr is updated correctly.

A simple testcase to replicate this will be posted to tools/testing/selftests/powerpc/tm/tm-poison.c

Similarly for VMX.

This fixes CVE-2019-15030.

Fixes f48e91e87e67 ("powerpc/tm: Fix FP and VMX register corruption")
---
 arch/powerpc/kernel/process.c | 3 ++-
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
arch/powerpc/kernel/process.c +2 -1
index 8fc4de0d22..437b57068c 100644
@@ -497,13 +497,14 @@ void giveup_all(struct task_struct *tsk)
 	if (!tsk->thread.regs)
 		return;
 
+	check_if_tm_restore_required(tsk);
+
 	usermsr = tsk->thread.regs->msr;
 
 	if ((usermsr & msr_all_available) == 0)
 		return;
 
 	msr_check_and_set(msr_all_available);
-	check_if_tm_restore_required(tsk);
 
 	WARN_ON((usermsr & MSR_VSX) && !((usermsr & MSR_FP) && (usermsr & MSR_VEC)));
 
Signature · 1 line
2.21.0
#1 lore raw

PATCH 2/3 powerpc/tm: Fix restoring FP/VMX facility incorrectly on interrupts

From: Gustavo Romero <[email protected]>

When in userspace and MSR FP=0 the hardware FP state is unrelated to the current process. This is extended for transactions where if tbegin is run with FP=0, the hardware checkpoint FP state will also be unrelated to the current process. Due to this, we need to ensure this hardware checkpoint is updated with the correct state before we enable FP for this process.

Unfortunately we get this wrong when returning to a process from a hardware interrupt. A process that starts a transaction with FP=0 can take an interrupt. When the kernel returns back to that process, we change to FP=1 but with hardware checkpoint FP state not updated. If this transaction is then rolled back, the FP registers now contain the wrong state.

The process looks like this:
Userspace: Kernel

Start userspace
with MSR FP=0 TM=1
< -----
...
tbegin
bne

               Hardware interrupt
                   ---- >
                                    <do_IRQ...>
                                    ....
                                    ret_from_except
                                      restore_math()
				        /* sees FP=0 */
                                        restore_fp()
                                          tm_active_with_fp()
					    /* sees FP=1 (Incorrect) */
                                          load_fp_state()
                                        FP = 0 -> 1
                  < -----
               Return to userspace
                 with MSR TM=1 FP=1
                 with junk in the FP TM checkpoint

TM rollback
reads FP junk

When returning from the hardware exception, tm_active_with_fp() is incorrectly making restore_fp() call load_fp_state() which is setting FP=1.

The fix is to remove tm_active_with_fp().

tm_active_with_fp() is attempting to handle the case where FP state has been changed inside a transaction. In this case the checkpointed and transactional FP state is different and hence we must restore the FP state (ie. we can't do lazy FP restore inside a transaction that's used FP). It's safe to remove tm_active_with_fp() as this case is handled by restore_tm_state(). restore_tm_state() detects if FP has been using inside a transaction and will set load_fp and call restore_math() to ensure the FP state (checkpoint and transaction) is restored.

This is a data integrity problem for the current process as the FP registers are corrupted. It's also a security problem as the FP registers from one process may be leaked to another.

Similarly for VMX.

A simple testcase to replicate this will be posted to tools/testing/selftests/powerpc/tm/tm-poison.c

This fixes CVE-2019-15031.

Fixes a7771176b439 ("powerpc: Don't enable FP/Altivec if not checkpointed")
---
 arch/powerpc/kernel/process.c | 18 ++----------------
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-)
arch/powerpc/kernel/process.c +2 -16
index 437b57068c..7a84c9f177 100644
@@ -101,21 +101,8 @@ static void check_if_tm_restore_required(struct task_struct *tsk)
 	}
 }
 
-static bool tm_active_with_fp(struct task_struct *tsk)
-{
-	return MSR_TM_ACTIVE(tsk->thread.regs->msr) &&
-		(tsk->thread.ckpt_regs.msr & MSR_FP);
-}
-
-static bool tm_active_with_altivec(struct task_struct *tsk)
-{
-	return MSR_TM_ACTIVE(tsk->thread.regs->msr) &&
-		(tsk->thread.ckpt_regs.msr & MSR_VEC);
-}
 #else
 static inline void check_if_tm_restore_required(struct task_struct *tsk) { }
-static inline bool tm_active_with_fp(struct task_struct *tsk) { return false; }
-static inline bool tm_active_with_altivec(struct task_struct *tsk) { return false; }
 #endif /* CONFIG_PPC_TRANSACTIONAL_MEM */
 
 bool strict_msr_control;
@@ -252,7 +239,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(enable_kernel_fp);
 
 static int restore_fp(struct task_struct *tsk)
 {
-	if (tsk->thread.load_fp || tm_active_with_fp(tsk)) {
+	if (tsk->thread.load_fp) {
 		load_fp_state(&current->thread.fp_state);
 		current->thread.load_fp++;
 		return 1;
@@ -334,8 +321,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(flush_altivec_to_thread);
 
 static int restore_altivec(struct task_struct *tsk)
 {
-	if (cpu_has_feature(CPU_FTR_ALTIVEC) &&
-		(tsk->thread.load_vec || tm_active_with_altivec(tsk))) {
+	if (cpu_has_feature(CPU_FTR_ALTIVEC) && (tsk->thread.load_vec)) {
 		load_vr_state(&tsk->thread.vr_state);
 		tsk->thread.used_vr = 1;
 		tsk->thread.load_vec++;
Signature · 1 line
2.21.0
#2 lore raw

PATCH 3/3 powerpc/tm: Add tm-poison test

In reply to Michael Neuling

From: Gustavo Romero <[email protected]>

Add TM selftest to check if FP or VEC register values from one process can leak into another process when both run on the same CPU.

This tests for CVE-2019-15030 and CVE-2019-15031.

---
 tools/testing/selftests/powerpc/tm/.gitignore |   1 +
 tools/testing/selftests/powerpc/tm/Makefile   |   2 +-
 .../testing/selftests/powerpc/tm/tm-poison.c  | 180 ++++++++++++++++++
 3 files changed, 182 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
 create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/powerpc/tm/tm-poison.c
tools/testing/selftests/powerpc/tm/.gitignore +1 -0
index 951fe855f7..98f2708d86 100644
@@ -17,3 +17,4 @@ tm-vmx-unavail
 tm-unavailable
 tm-trap
 tm-sigreturn
+tm-poison
tools/testing/selftests/powerpc/tm/Makefile +1 -1
index c0734ed0ef..b15a1a325b 100644
@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@ SIGNAL_CONTEXT_CHK_TESTS := tm-signal-context-chk-gpr tm-signal-context-chk-fpu
 TEST_GEN_PROGS := tm-resched-dscr tm-syscall tm-signal-msr-resv tm-signal-stack \
 	tm-vmxcopy tm-fork tm-tar tm-tmspr tm-vmx-unavail tm-unavailable tm-trap \
 	$(SIGNAL_CONTEXT_CHK_TESTS) tm-sigreturn tm-signal-sigreturn-nt \
-	tm-signal-context-force-tm
+	tm-signal-context-force-tm tm-poison
 
 top_srcdir = ../../../../..
 include ../../lib.mk
tools/testing/selftests/powerpc/tm/tm-poison.c new file +180 -0

180 lines not on this page · raw message

Signature · 1 line
2.21.0
#3 lore raw

Re: [PATCH 3/3] powerpc/tm: Add tm-poison test

Quoted 7 lines · Michael Neuling

From: Gustavo Romero <[email protected]>

Add TM selftest to check if FP or VEC register values from one process can leak into another process when both run on the same CPU.

This tests for CVE-2019-15030 and CVE-2019-15031.

Quoted 8 lines
---
 tools/testing/selftests/powerpc/tm/.gitignore |   1 +
 tools/testing/selftests/powerpc/tm/Makefile   |   2 +-
 .../testing/selftests/powerpc/tm/tm-poison.c  | 180 ++++++++++++++++++
 3 files changed, 182 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
 create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/powerpc/tm/tm-poison.c

This doesn't build on 64-bit big endian:

tm-poison.c: In function 'tm_poison_test':
tm-poison.c:118:10: error: format '%lx' expects argument of type 'long unsigned int', but argument 2 has type 'uint64_t {aka long long unsigned int}' [-Werror=format=]

   printf("Unknown value %#lx leaked into f31!\n", unknown);
          ^
tm-poison.c:166:10: error: format '%lx' expects argument of type 'long unsigned int', but argument 2 has type 'uint64_t {aka long long unsigned int}' [-Werror=format=]
   printf("Unknown value %#lx leaked into vr31!\n", unknown);
          ^

cheers

#4 lore raw

Re: [PATCH 3/3] powerpc/tm: Add tm-poison test

Hi Michael,

Quoted 19 lines · Michael Ellerman
Quoted 7 lines · Michael Neuling

From: Gustavo Romero <[email protected]>

Add TM selftest to check if FP or VEC register values from one process can leak into another process when both run on the same CPU.

This tests for CVE-2019-15030 and CVE-2019-15031.

Quoted 8 lines
---
  tools/testing/selftests/powerpc/tm/.gitignore |   1 +
  tools/testing/selftests/powerpc/tm/Makefile   |   2 +-
  .../testing/selftests/powerpc/tm/tm-poison.c  | 180 ++++++++++++++++++
  3 files changed, 182 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/powerpc/tm/tm-poison.c

This doesn't build on 64-bit big endian:

Quoted 7 lines

tm-poison.c: In function 'tm_poison_test':
tm-poison.c:118:10: error: format '%lx' expects argument of type 'long unsigned int', but argument 2 has type 'uint64_t {aka long long unsigned int}' [-Werror=format=]

    printf("Unknown value %#lx leaked into f31!\n", unknown);
           ^
tm-poison.c:166:10: error: format '%lx' expects argument of type 'long unsigned int', but argument 2 has type 'uint64_t {aka long long unsigned int}' [-Werror=format=]
    printf("Unknown value %#lx leaked into vr31!\n", unknown);
           ^

Sorry. I sent a v2 addressing it. Now I tested the fix against Travis CI.

Thank you.

Cheers,
Gustavo

#5 lore raw

PATCH v2 1/3 powerpc/tm: Fix FP/VMX unavailable exceptions inside a transaction

In reply to Michael Neuling

From: Gustavo Romero <[email protected]>

When we take an FP unavailable exception in a transaction we have to account for the hardware FP TM checkpointed registers being incorrect. In this case for this process we know the current and checkpointed FP registers must be the same (since FP wasn't used inside the transaction) hence in the thread_struct we copy the current FP registers to the checkpointed ones.

This copy is done in tm_reclaim_thread(). We use thread->ckpt_regs.msr to determine if FP was on when in userspace. thread->ckpt_regs.msr represents the state of the MSR when exiting userspace. This is setup by check_if_tm_restore_required().

Unfortunatley there is an optimisation in giveup_all() which returns early if tsk->thread.regs->msr (via local variable usermsr) has FP=VEC=VSX=SPE=0. This optimisation means that check_if_tm_restore_required() is not called and hence thread->ckpt_regs.msr is not updated and will contain an old value.

This can happen if due to load_fp=255 we start a userspace process with MSR FP=1 and then we are context switched out. In this case thread->ckpt_regs.msr will contain FP=1. If that same process is then context switched in and load_fp overflows, MSR will have FP=0. If that process now enters a transaction and does an FP instruction, the FP unavailable will not update thread->ckpt_regs.msr (the bug) and MSR FP=1 will be retained in thread->ckpt_regs.msr. tm_reclaim_thread() will then not perform the required memcpy and the checkpointed FP regs in the thread struct will contain the wrong values.

The code path for this happening is:

       Userspace:                      Kernel
                   Start userspace
                    with MSR FP/VEC/VSX/SPE=0 TM=1
                      < -----
       ...
       tbegin
       bne
       fp instruction
                   FP unavailable
                       ---- >
                                        fp_unavailable_tm()
					  tm_reclaim_current()
					    tm_reclaim_thread()
					      giveup_all()
					        return early since FP/VMX/VSX=0
						/* ckpt MSR not updated (Incorrect) */
					      tm_reclaim()
					        /* thread_struct ckpt FP regs contain junk (OK) */
                                              /* Sees ckpt MSR FP=1 (Incorrect) */
					      no memcpy() performed
					        /* thread_struct ckpt FP regs not fixed (Incorrect) */
					  tm_recheckpoint()
					     /* Put junk in hardware checkpoint FP regs */
                                         ....
                      < -----
                   Return to userspace
                     with MSR TM=1 FP=1
                     with junk in the FP TM checkpoint
       TM rollback
       reads FP junk

This is a data integrity problem for the current process as the FP registers are corrupted. It's also a security problem as the FP registers from one process may be leaked to another.

This patch moves up check_if_tm_restore_required() in giveup_all() to ensure thread->ckpt_regs.msr is updated correctly.

A simple testcase to replicate this will be posted to tools/testing/selftests/powerpc/tm/tm-poison.c

Similarly for VMX.

This fixes CVE-2019-15030.

Fixes f48e91e87e67 ("powerpc/tm: Fix FP and VMX register corruption")
---
 arch/powerpc/kernel/process.c | 3 ++-
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
arch/powerpc/kernel/process.c +2 -1
index 8fc4de0d22b4..437b57068cf8 100644
@@ -497,13 +497,14 @@ void giveup_all(struct task_struct *tsk)
 	if (!tsk->thread.regs)
 		return;
 
+	check_if_tm_restore_required(tsk);
+
 	usermsr = tsk->thread.regs->msr;
 
 	if ((usermsr & msr_all_available) == 0)
 		return;
 
 	msr_check_and_set(msr_all_available);
-	check_if_tm_restore_required(tsk);
 
 	WARN_ON((usermsr & MSR_VSX) && !((usermsr & MSR_FP) && (usermsr & MSR_VEC)));
 
Signature · 1 line
2.17.2
#6 lore raw

PATCH v2 2/3 powerpc/tm: Fix restoring FP/VMX facility incorrectly on interrupts

From: Gustavo Romero <[email protected]>

When in userspace and MSR FP=0 the hardware FP state is unrelated to the current process. This is extended for transactions where if tbegin is run with FP=0, the hardware checkpoint FP state will also be unrelated to the current process. Due to this, we need to ensure this hardware checkpoint is updated with the correct state before we enable FP for this process.

Unfortunately we get this wrong when returning to a process from a hardware interrupt. A process that starts a transaction with FP=0 can take an interrupt. When the kernel returns back to that process, we change to FP=1 but with hardware checkpoint FP state not updated. If this transaction is then rolled back, the FP registers now contain the wrong state.

The process looks like this:
Userspace: Kernel

Start userspace
with MSR FP=0 TM=1
< -----
...
tbegin
bne

               Hardware interrupt
                   ---- >
                                    <do_IRQ...>
                                    ....
                                    ret_from_except
                                      restore_math()
				        /* sees FP=0 */
                                        restore_fp()
                                          tm_active_with_fp()
					    /* sees FP=1 (Incorrect) */
                                          load_fp_state()
                                        FP = 0 -> 1
                  < -----
               Return to userspace
                 with MSR TM=1 FP=1
                 with junk in the FP TM checkpoint

TM rollback
reads FP junk

When returning from the hardware exception, tm_active_with_fp() is incorrectly making restore_fp() call load_fp_state() which is setting FP=1.

The fix is to remove tm_active_with_fp().

tm_active_with_fp() is attempting to handle the case where FP state has been changed inside a transaction. In this case the checkpointed and transactional FP state is different and hence we must restore the FP state (ie. we can't do lazy FP restore inside a transaction that's used FP). It's safe to remove tm_active_with_fp() as this case is handled by restore_tm_state(). restore_tm_state() detects if FP has been using inside a transaction and will set load_fp and call restore_math() to ensure the FP state (checkpoint and transaction) is restored.

This is a data integrity problem for the current process as the FP registers are corrupted. It's also a security problem as the FP registers from one process may be leaked to another.

Similarly for VMX.

A simple testcase to replicate this will be posted to tools/testing/selftests/powerpc/tm/tm-poison.c

This fixes CVE-2019-15031.

Fixes a7771176b439 ("powerpc: Don't enable FP/Altivec if not checkpointed")
---
 arch/powerpc/kernel/process.c | 18 ++----------------
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-)
arch/powerpc/kernel/process.c +2 -16
index 437b57068cf8..7a84c9f1778e 100644
@@ -101,21 +101,8 @@ static void check_if_tm_restore_required(struct task_struct *tsk)
 	}
 }
 
-static bool tm_active_with_fp(struct task_struct *tsk)
-{
-	return MSR_TM_ACTIVE(tsk->thread.regs->msr) &&
-		(tsk->thread.ckpt_regs.msr & MSR_FP);
-}
-
-static bool tm_active_with_altivec(struct task_struct *tsk)
-{
-	return MSR_TM_ACTIVE(tsk->thread.regs->msr) &&
-		(tsk->thread.ckpt_regs.msr & MSR_VEC);
-}
 #else
 static inline void check_if_tm_restore_required(struct task_struct *tsk) { }
-static inline bool tm_active_with_fp(struct task_struct *tsk) { return false; }
-static inline bool tm_active_with_altivec(struct task_struct *tsk) { return false; }
 #endif /* CONFIG_PPC_TRANSACTIONAL_MEM */
 
 bool strict_msr_control;
@@ -252,7 +239,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(enable_kernel_fp);
 
 static int restore_fp(struct task_struct *tsk)
 {
-	if (tsk->thread.load_fp || tm_active_with_fp(tsk)) {
+	if (tsk->thread.load_fp) {
 		load_fp_state(&current->thread.fp_state);
 		current->thread.load_fp++;
 		return 1;
@@ -334,8 +321,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(flush_altivec_to_thread);
 
 static int restore_altivec(struct task_struct *tsk)
 {
-	if (cpu_has_feature(CPU_FTR_ALTIVEC) &&
-		(tsk->thread.load_vec || tm_active_with_altivec(tsk))) {
+	if (cpu_has_feature(CPU_FTR_ALTIVEC) && (tsk->thread.load_vec)) {
 		load_vr_state(&tsk->thread.vr_state);
 		tsk->thread.used_vr = 1;
 		tsk->thread.load_vec++;
Signature · 1 line
2.17.2
#7 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v2 2/3] powerpc/tm: Fix restoring FP/VMX facility incorrectly on interrupts

Quoted 8 lines · gromero

From: Gustavo Romero <[email protected]>

When in userspace and MSR FP=0 the hardware FP state is unrelated to the current process. This is extended for transactions where if tbegin is run with FP=0, the hardware checkpoint FP state will also be unrelated to the current process. Due to this, we need to ensure this hardware checkpoint is updated with the correct state before we enable FP for this process.

...

Quoted 7 lines

This fixes CVE-2019-15031.

Fixes a7771176b439 ("powerpc: Don't enable FP/Altivec if not checkpointed")

Applied to powerpc fixes, thanks.

https://git.kernel.org/powerpc/c/a8318c13e79badb92bc6640704a64cc022a6eb97

cheers

#8 lore raw

PATCH v2 3/3 powerpc/tm: Add tm-poison test

In reply to gromero

From: Gustavo Romero <[email protected]>

Add TM selftest to check if FP or VEC register values from one process can leak into another process when both run on the same CPU.

---
 tools/testing/selftests/powerpc/tm/.gitignore |   1 +
 tools/testing/selftests/powerpc/tm/Makefile   |   2 +-
 .../testing/selftests/powerpc/tm/tm-poison.c  | 179 ++++++++++++++++++
 3 files changed, 181 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
 create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/powerpc/tm/tm-poison.c
tools/testing/selftests/powerpc/tm/.gitignore +1 -0
index 951fe855f7cd..98f2708d86cc 100644
@@ -17,3 +17,4 @@ tm-vmx-unavail
 tm-unavailable
 tm-trap
 tm-sigreturn
+tm-poison
tools/testing/selftests/powerpc/tm/Makefile +1 -1
index c0734ed0ef56..b15a1a325bd0 100644
@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@ SIGNAL_CONTEXT_CHK_TESTS := tm-signal-context-chk-gpr tm-signal-context-chk-fpu
 TEST_GEN_PROGS := tm-resched-dscr tm-syscall tm-signal-msr-resv tm-signal-stack \
 	tm-vmxcopy tm-fork tm-tar tm-tmspr tm-vmx-unavail tm-unavailable tm-trap \
 	$(SIGNAL_CONTEXT_CHK_TESTS) tm-sigreturn tm-signal-sigreturn-nt \
-	tm-signal-context-force-tm
+	tm-signal-context-force-tm tm-poison
 
 top_srcdir = ../../../../..
 include ../../lib.mk
tools/testing/selftests/powerpc/tm/tm-poison.c new file +179 -0

179 lines not on this page · raw message

Signature · 1 line
2.17.2
#9 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v2 3/3] powerpc/tm: Add tm-poison test

Quoted 7 lines · gromero

From: Gustavo Romero <[email protected]>

Add TM selftest to check if FP or VEC register values from one process can leak into another process when both run on the same CPU.

Applied to powerpc fixes, thanks.

https://git.kernel.org/powerpc/c/a003365cab64b0f7988ac3ccb1da895ce0bece5e

cheers

#10 lore raw
In reply to gromero
Quoted 8 lines · gromero

From: Gustavo Romero <[email protected]>

When we take an FP unavailable exception in a transaction we have to account for the hardware FP TM checkpointed registers being incorrect. In this case for this process we know the current and checkpointed FP registers must be the same (since FP wasn't used inside the transaction) hence in the thread_struct we copy the current FP registers to the checkpointed ones.

...

Quoted 7 lines

This fixes CVE-2019-15030.

Fixes f48e91e87e67 ("powerpc/tm: Fix FP and VMX register corruption")

Applied to powerpc fixes, thanks.

https://git.kernel.org/powerpc/c/8205d5d98ef7f155de211f5e2eb6ca03d95a5a60

cheers