bpf, skmsg: fix NULL pointer dereference in sk_psock_skb_ingress_enqueue
Subsystems (4)
PATCH v2 1/1 bpf, skmsg: fix NULL pointer dereference in sk_psock_skb_ingress_enqueue
From: Jason Xing <[email protected]>
Fix NULL pointer data-races in sk_psock_skb_ingress_enqueue() which syzbot reported [1].
[1]
BUG: KCSAN: data-race in sk_psock_drop / sk_psock_skb_ingress_enqueue
write to 0xffff88814b3278b8 of 8 bytes by task 10724 on cpu 1:
sk_psock_stop_verdict net/core/skmsg.c:1257 [inline] sk_psock_drop+0x13e/0x1f0 net/core/skmsg.c:843 sk_psock_put include/linux/skmsg.h:459 [inline] sock_map_close+0x1a7/0x260 net/core/sock_map.c:1648 unix_release+0x4b/0x80 net/unix/af_unix.c:1048 __sock_release net/socket.c:659 [inline] sock_close+0x68/0x150 net/socket.c:1421 __fput+0x2c1/0x660 fs/file_table.c:422 __fput_sync+0x44/0x60 fs/file_table.c:507 __do_sys_close fs/open.c:1556 [inline] __se_sys_close+0x101/0x1b0 fs/open.c:1541 __x64_sys_close+0x1f/0x30 fs/open.c:1541 do_syscall_64+0xd3/0x1d0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6d/0x75
read to 0xffff88814b3278b8 of 8 bytes by task 10713 on cpu 0:
sk_psock_data_ready include/linux/skmsg.h:464 [inline] sk_psock_skb_ingress_enqueue+0x32d/0x390 net/core/skmsg.c:555 sk_psock_skb_ingress_self+0x185/0x1e0 net/core/skmsg.c:606 sk_psock_verdict_apply net/core/skmsg.c:1008 [inline] sk_psock_verdict_recv+0x3e4/0x4a0 net/core/skmsg.c:1202 unix_read_skb net/unix/af_unix.c:2546 [inline] unix_stream_read_skb+0x9e/0xf0 net/unix/af_unix.c:2682 sk_psock_verdict_data_ready+0x77/0x220 net/core/skmsg.c:1223 unix_stream_sendmsg+0x527/0x860 net/unix/af_unix.c:2339 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:730 [inline] __sock_sendmsg+0x140/0x180 net/socket.c:745 ____sys_sendmsg+0x312/0x410 net/socket.c:2584 ___sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2638 [inline] __sys_sendmsg+0x1e9/0x280 net/socket.c:2667 __do_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2676 [inline] __se_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2674 [inline] __x64_sys_sendmsg+0x46/0x50 net/socket.c:2674 do_syscall_64+0xd3/0x1d0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6d/0x75
value changed: 0xffffffff83d7feb0 -> 0x0000000000000000
Reported by Kernel Concurrency Sanitizer on:
CPU: 0 PID: 10713 Comm: syz-executor.4 Tainted: G W 6.8.0-syzkaller-08951-gfe46a7dd189e #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 02/29/2024
Prior to this, commit 4cd12c6065df ("bpf, sockmap: Fix NULL pointer dereference in sk_psock_verdict_data_ready()") fixed one NULL pointer similarly due to no protection of saved_data_ready. Here is another different caller causing the same issue because of the same reason. So we should protect it with sk_callback_lock read lock because the writer side in the sk_psock_drop() uses "write_lock_bh(&sk->sk_callback_lock);".
To avoid errors that could happen in future, I move those two pairs of lock into the sk_psock_data_ready(), which is suggested by John Fastabend.
---
v2
1. move the read_lock_bh()/unlock_bh() into the sk_psock_data_ready() call (John)
--- include/linux/skmsg.h | 2 ++ net/core/skmsg.c | 5 +---- 2 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
include/linux/skmsg.h +2 -0
@@ -461,10 +461,12 @@ static inline void sk_psock_put(struct sock *sk, struct sk_psock *psock)static inline void sk_psock_data_ready (struct sock *sk,struct sk_psock *psock) { +read_lock_bh (&sk->sk_callback_lock);if (psock->saved_data_ready) psock->saved_data_ready (sk);else sk->sk_data_ready (sk); +read_unlock_bh (&sk->sk_callback_lock); } static inline void psock_set_prog(struct bpf_prog **pprog,
net/core/skmsg.c +1 -4
@@ -1226,11 +1226,8 @@ static void sk_psock_verdict_data_ready(struct sock *sk)rcu_read_lock (); psock =sk_psock (sk); -if (psock) { -read_lock_bh (&sk->sk_callback_lock); +if (psock)sk_psock_data_ready (sk, psock); -read_unlock_bh (&sk->sk_callback_lock); - }rcu_read_unlock (); } }
Signature · 1 line
2.37.3
Quoted 65 lines · Jason Xing
From: Jason Xing <[email protected]>
Fix NULL pointer data-races in
sk_psock_skb_ingress_enqueue()which syzbot reported [1].[1]
BUG: KCSAN: data-race in sk_psock_drop / sk_psock_skb_ingress_enqueuewrite to
0xffff88814b3278b8of 8 bytes by task 10724 on cpu 1:sk_psock_stop_verdict net/core/skmsg.c:1257 [inline] sk_psock_drop+0x13e/0x1f0 net/core/skmsg.c:843 sk_psock_put include/linux/skmsg.h:459 [inline] sock_map_close+0x1a7/0x260 net/core/sock_map.c:1648 unix_release+0x4b/0x80 net/unix/af_unix.c:1048 __sock_release net/socket.c:659 [inline] sock_close+0x68/0x150 net/socket.c:1421 __fput+0x2c1/0x660 fs/file_table.c:422 __fput_sync+0x44/0x60 fs/file_table.c:507 __do_sys_close fs/open.c:1556 [inline] __se_sys_close+0x101/0x1b0 fs/open.c:1541 __x64_sys_close+0x1f/0x30 fs/open.c:1541 do_syscall_64+0xd3/0x1d0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6d/0x75read to
0xffff88814b3278b8of 8 bytes by task 10713 on cpu 0:sk_psock_data_ready include/linux/skmsg.h:464 [inline] sk_psock_skb_ingress_enqueue+0x32d/0x390 net/core/skmsg.c:555 sk_psock_skb_ingress_self+0x185/0x1e0 net/core/skmsg.c:606 sk_psock_verdict_apply net/core/skmsg.c:1008 [inline] sk_psock_verdict_recv+0x3e4/0x4a0 net/core/skmsg.c:1202 unix_read_skb net/unix/af_unix.c:2546 [inline] unix_stream_read_skb+0x9e/0xf0 net/unix/af_unix.c:2682 sk_psock_verdict_data_ready+0x77/0x220 net/core/skmsg.c:1223 unix_stream_sendmsg+0x527/0x860 net/unix/af_unix.c:2339 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:730 [inline] __sock_sendmsg+0x140/0x180 net/socket.c:745 ____sys_sendmsg+0x312/0x410 net/socket.c:2584 ___sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2638 [inline] __sys_sendmsg+0x1e9/0x280 net/socket.c:2667 __do_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2676 [inline] __se_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2674 [inline] __x64_sys_sendmsg+0x46/0x50 net/socket.c:2674 do_syscall_64+0xd3/0x1d0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6d/0x75value changed:
0xffffffff83d7feb0->0x0000000000000000Reported by Kernel Concurrency Sanitizer on:
CPU: 0 PID: 10713 Comm: syz-executor.4 Tainted: G W 6.8.0-syzkaller-08951-gfe46a7dd189e #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 02/29/2024Prior to this, commit
4cd12c6065df("bpf, sockmap: Fix NULL pointer dereference insk_psock_verdict_data_ready()") fixed one NULL pointer similarly due to no protection ofsaved_data_ready. Here is another different caller causing the same issue because of the same reason. So we should protect it withsk_callback_lockread lock because the writer side in thesk_psock_drop()uses "write_lock_bh(&sk->sk_callback_lock);".To avoid errors that could happen in future, I move those two pairs of lock into the
sk_psock_data_ready(), which is suggested by John Fastabend.Fixes 604326b41a6f ("bpf, sockmap: convert to generic sk_msg interface")Reported-by [email protected]Signed-off-by Jason Xing <[email protected]>
Quoted 6 lines
---
v21. move the read_lock_bh()/unlock_bh() into the
sk_psock_data_ready()call (John)Signed-off-by Jason Xing <[email protected]>---
This patch was applied to bpf/bpf.git (master) by Daniel Borkmann <[email protected]>:
Hello:
This patch was applied to bpf/bpf.git (master)
by Daniel Borkmann <[email protected]>:
Quoted 9 lines · On Thu, 4 Apr 2024 10:10:01 +0800 you wrote:
From: Jason Xing <[email protected]>
Fix NULL pointer data-races in
sk_psock_skb_ingress_enqueue()which syzbot reported [1].[1]
BUG: KCSAN: data-race in sk_psock_drop / sk_psock_skb_ingress_enqueue[...]
Here is the summary with links:
- [net,v2] bpf, skmsg: fix NULL pointer dereference in sk_psock_skb_ingress_enqueue
https://git.kernel.org/bpf/bpf/c/6648e613226e
You are awesome, thank you!
Signature · 2 lines
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